

# Key Exchange and Protocols

MAT364 - Cryptography Course

**Instructor:** Adil Akhmetov

**University:** SDU

**Week 8**

Press Space for next page →

# The Key Exchange Problem

## The Challenge

- **Alice and Bob** want to communicate securely
- **No pre-shared secret** exists
- **Eve eavesdrops** on all communication
- **How to establish** shared secret key?

## Before Public Key Crypto

- **Courier delivery** - Slow and expensive
- **Pre-shared keys** - Doesn't scale
- **Trusted third party** - Single point of failure
- **Physical meeting** - Not always possible

## The Breakthrough

### Diffie-Hellman (1976):

- First practical key exchange protocol
- Based on discrete logarithm problem
- Allows secure key establishment over insecure channel
- Foundation for modern cryptography

## Real-World Importance

- **TLS/SSL** - Secure web browsing
- **VPN** - Secure remote access
- **SSH** - Secure shell connections
- **Signal/WhatsApp** - Secure messaging

**Key insight:** Key exchange enables secure communication without pre-shared secrets!

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

# Diffie-Hellman Protocol

## How It Works

1. **Public parameters:** prime  $p$  and generator  $g$
2. **Alice's secret:** random  $a$ , sends  $A = g^a \text{ mod } p$
3. **Bob's secret:** random  $b$ , sends  $B = g^b \text{ mod } p$
4. **Shared secret:** Both compute  $s = g^{(ab)} \text{ mod } p$

## Mathematical Foundation

- **Discrete log problem:** Given  $g$ ,  $p$ , and  $g^a$ , hard to find  $a$
- **Diffie-Hellman problem:** Given  $g^a$  and  $g^b$ , hard to find  $g^{(ab)}$
- **Security:** Relies on hardness of these problems

## Example

```
# Public parameters
p = 23 # Prime modulus
g = 5 # Generator

# Alice's side
a = 6 # Alice's secret
A = pow(g, a, p) # A = 5^6 mod 23 = 8

# Bob's side
b = 15 # Bob's secret
B = pow(g, b, p) # B = 5^15 mod 23 = 19

# Shared secret computation
# Alice computes: s = B^a mod p = 19^6 mod 23 = 2
s_alice = pow(B, a, p)
```

# DH Implementation

## Complete Implementation

```
import secrets
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import DH

class DiffieHellmanKeyExchange:
    def __init__(self, key_size=2048):
        # Generate parameters (usually pre-shared)
        self.parameters = dh.generate_parameters(
            generator=2,
            key_size=key_size
        )

        # Generate private key
        self.private_key = self.parameters.generate_private_key(key_size)

    def get_public_bytes(self):
        return self.private_key.public_key().public_bytes(
            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
            format=serialization.PUBLIC_KEY_FORMAT.Raw
        )

    def compute_shared_secret(self, public_key):
        return self.private_key.exchange(public_key)
```

## Usage Example

```
# Alice's side
alice = DiffieHellmanKeyExchange()
alice_public = alice.get_public_bytes()

# Bob's side
bob = DiffieHellmanKeyExchange()
bob_public = bob.get_public_bytes()

# Exchange public keys (over insecure channel)
# ...

# Compute shared secrets
alice_shared = alice.compute_shared_secret(bob_public)
bob_shared = bob.compute_shared_secret(alice_public)
```

# Man-in-the-Middle Attack

## The Attack


### Eve intercepts and modifies:

1. Alice sends A → Eve intercepts, sends E<sub>1</sub>
2. Bob sends B → Eve intercepts, sends E<sub>2</sub>
3. Alice thinks she's talking to Bob (key K<sub>1</sub>)
4. Bob thinks he's talking to Alice (key K<sub>2</sub>)
5. Eve can decrypt, read, re-encrypt all messages

## Why It Works

- **No authentication** in basic DH
- **Eve controls** the channel
- **Alice and Bob** can't detect the attack
- **Need authentication** to prevent this

## Attack Diagram



## Solution: Authenticated DH

- **Sign** public keys with private key
- **Verify signatures** before computing shared secret
- **Use certificates** to bind identity to public key
- **Station-to-Station** protocol
- **TLS handshake** includes authentication



# Student Task: DH Key Exchange

## Task: Manual DH Calculation

Given public parameters:

- $p = 71$  (prime)
- $g = 7$  (generator)
- Alice's secret:  $a = 5$
- Bob's secret:  $b = 12$

**Your tasks:**

1. Calculate Alice's public value  $A = g^a \text{ mod } p$
2. Calculate Bob's public value  $B = g^b \text{ mod } p$
3. Calculate shared secret from Alice's perspective:  $s = B^a \text{ mod } p$
4. Calculate shared secret from Bob's perspective:  $s = A^b \text{ mod } p$
5. Verify they match

**Bonus:** Explain why Eve can't compute the shared secret even though she sees A and B.

# ✓ Solution: DH Calculation

## Step-by-Step Solution

**Given:**  $p = 71$ ,  $g = 7$ ,  $a = 5$ ,  $b = 12$

**Step 1:** Alice's public value

$$A = g^a \bmod p = 7^5 \bmod 71 = 16807 \bmod 71 = 51$$

**Step 2:** Bob's public value

$$B = g^b \bmod p = 7^{12} \bmod 71 = 13841287201 \bmod 71 = 4$$

**Step 3:** Alice computes shared secret

$$s = B^a \bmod p = 4^5 \bmod 71 = 1024 \bmod 71 = 30$$

**Step 4:** Bob computes shared secret

$$s = A^b \bmod p = 51^{12} \bmod 71 = 30$$

# Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

# ECDH Overview

## Why ECDH?

- **Smaller keys** - 256-bit ECC  $\approx$  3072-bit RSA
- **Faster** - More efficient operations
- **Lower bandwidth** - Smaller key transmission
- **Mobile-friendly** - Less computation/storage

## How It Works

1. **Agree on curve** and base point G
2. **Alice:** secret a, public A = aG
3. **Bob:** secret b, public B = bG
4. **Shared secret:** S = aB = bA = abG

## Implementation

```
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import *
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import PublicFormat, SubjectIdentifier

class ECDHKeyExchange:
    def __init__(self):
        # Generate private key on secp256r1 curve
        self.private_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1)
        self.public_key = self.private_key.public_key()

    def get_public_bytes(self):
        """Get public key for transmission"""
        return self.public_key.public_bytes(
            encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
            format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
```

# TLS Handshake Protocol

# TLS 1.3 Handshake

## Handshake Flow

### ClientHello:

- Supported cipher suites
- Key share (ECDHE public key)
- Supported groups (curves)

### ServerHello:

- Selected cipher suite
- Key share (server's public key)
- Server certificate

### Key Derivation:

- Both compute shared secret
- Derive encryption keys
- Start encrypted communication

## Simplified Implementation

```
class TLSHandshake:  
    def __init__(self, is_server=False):  
        self.is_server = is_server  
        self.ecdh = ECDHKeyExchange()  
        self.cipher_suites = [  
            'TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384',  
            'TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256'  
        ]  
  
    def create_client_hello(self):  
        """Create ClientHello message"""\n        return {  
            'version': 'TLS 1.3',  
            'cipher_suites': self.cipher_suites,  
            'key_share': self.ecdh.get_public_bytes()}
```

# Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)

## What is PFS?

- **Ephemeral keys** for each session
- **Past sessions** remain secure even if long-term key compromised
- **No single key** can decrypt all past traffic
- **Essential** for long-term security

## With PFS (DHE/ECDHE)

- **New ephemeral key** for each session
- **Session keys** discarded after use
- **Past sessions** remain secure
- **TLS 1.3 mandates PFS**

## Without PFS

- RSA key exchange: same key encrypts many sessions
- If private key leaked → all past traffic decryptable
- "Decrypt all historical traffic" attack

## Implementation

```
class PFSsession:  
    def __init__(self):  
        # Generate ephemeral key pair  
        self.ephemeral_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.  
  
    def start_session(self, peer_public):  
        """Start new session with PFS"""  
        # Compute session key  
        session_key = self.ephemeral_key.exchange(  
            ec.ECDH(), peer_public  
        )
```

# Authenticated Key Exchange

# Station-to-Station (STS) Protocol

## Protocol Flow

1. **Alice → Bob:**  $g^a$
2. **Bob → Alice:**  $g^b, \text{Sig}_B(g^a, g^b)$
3. **Alice → Bob:**  $\text{Sig}_A(g^a, g^b)$
4. **Both verify** signatures with certificates
5. **Compute** shared secret

## Security Properties

- **Authentication** - Both parties verified
- **Key confirmation** - Both know they have same key
- **Perfect forward secrecy** - Ephemeral keys
- **Prevents MITM** - Signatures bind identity

## Implementation Sketch

```
class STSProtocol:  
    def __init__(self, private_key, certificate):  
        self.private_key = private_key # Long-term sig  
        self.certificate = certificate  
        self.dh = DiffieHellmanKeyExchange()  
  
    def initiate(self):  
        """Initiator sends DH public value"""  
        return self.dh.get_public_bytes()  
  
    def respond(self, initiator_public):  
        """Responder sends DH public + signature"""  
        my_public = self.dh.get_public_bytes()  
  
        # Sign both public values
```

# Signal Protocol (Double Ratchet)

## Key Features

- **End-to-end encryption** for messaging
- **Perfect forward secrecy** for every message
- **Future secrecy** - Compromise doesn't affect future
- **Used by** Signal, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger

## Ratchets

### DH Ratchet:

- New ECDH key pair for each message exchange
- Provides forward secrecy

### Symmetric Ratchet:

- Derives new keys from previous keys
- KDF chain for message keys

## Simplified Concept

```
class DoubleRatchet:  
    def __init__(self):  
        self.dh_key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256K1())  
        self.root_key = None  
        self.chain_key = None  
        self.message_number = 0  
  
    def dh_ratchet(self, peer_public):  
        """Perform DH ratchet step"""  
        # Compute new shared secret  
        dh_output = self.dh_key.exchange(ec.ECDH(), peer_public)  
  
        # Derive new root and chain keys  
        self.root_key, self.chain_key = self.kdf_rk(  
            self.root_key, dh_output)
```

# Key Derivation Functions (KDFs)

## Purpose

- **Transform** shared secret into usable keys
- **Expand** short secret into multiple keys
- **Extract** entropy from non-uniform sources
- **Domain separation** - Different keys for different purposes

## Implementation

```
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes

def derive_keys(shared_secret, salt=None):
    """Derive multiple keys from shared secret"""

    # Extract phase
    kdf_extract = HKDF(
        algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
        length=32,
        salt=salt,
        info=b'master'
    )
    master_key = kdf_extract.derive(shared_secret)
```

## HKDF (HMAC-based KDF)

- **Extract:** Extract fixed-length key from source
- **Expand:** Expand key to desired length
- **Standard:** RFC 5869



# Student Task: Protocol Analysis

## Task: Design Secure Protocol

**Scenario:** Alice and Bob want to establish a secure channel for exchanging messages.

**Requirements:**

1. Mutual authentication (both verify each other's identity)
2. Perfect forward secrecy
3. Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks
4. Efficient for mobile devices

**Your task:**

1. Choose key exchange method (DH or ECDH)
2. Design authentication mechanism
3. Specify key derivation process
4. Describe message encryption scheme
5. Identify potential vulnerabilities

**Deliverable:** Protocol description with security analysis

# ✓ Solution: Protocol Design

## Recommended Solution

### Protocol: Authenticated ECDHE with Certificates

1. **Key Exchange:** ECDHE (secp256r1 or X25519)
2. **Authentication:** Digital signatures (ECDSA)
3. **Key Derivation:** HKDF-SHA256
4. **Encryption:** AES-256-GCM

### Flow:

```
Alice → Bob: A = aG, Cert_A  
Bob → Alice: B = bG, Cert_B, Sig_B(A || B)  
Alice → Bob: Sig_A(A || B)  
Both: Verify certs and signatures, compute K = abG  
Both: Derive keys = HKDF(K, "encryption" || "mac")
```

### Security:

- ECDHE provides PFS
- Certificates prevent MITM

# Real-World Protocols

## TLS 1.3

- **Mandatory PFS** (DHE/ECDHE only)
- **1-RTT** handshake
- **0-RTT** resumption (with replay risk)
- **Simplified** cipher suites

## SSH (Secure Shell)

- **Key exchange:** DH group exchange
- **Authentication:** Public key, password, certificates
- **Channel security:** Separate keys for each direction
- **Applications:** Remote login, file transfer

## WireGuard VPN

- **Modern** cryptographic primitives
- **Simple** protocol design
- **Fast** performance
- **Noise Protocol** framework

## IPsec

- **IKEv2** key exchange
- **ESP/AH** protocols
- **SA (Security Association)** establishment
- **VPN** and network-level security

# Best Practices

## Protocol Design

- **Use established protocols** (TLS, Signal)
- **Avoid custom protocols** unless expert
- **Get security review** before deployment
- **Follow standards** (NIST, IETF RFCs)

## Implementation

- **Use vetted libraries** (OpenSSL, cryptography)
- **Validate all inputs** and certificates
- **Implement timeouts** and limits
- **Test edge cases** thoroughly

## Security Considerations

- **Always authenticate** key exchange
- **Use perfect forward secrecy**
- **Derive keys properly** (HKDF)
- **Check certificate validity**
- **Implement revocation checking**

## Common Mistakes

- **✗ Unauthenticated DH**
- **✗ Reusing ephemeral keys**
- **✗ Weak random number generation**
- **✗ Missing certificate validation**
- **✗ Poor error handling**

# Questions?

Let's discuss key exchange protocols! 

**Next Week:** We'll explore digital signatures and their applications in detail.

**Assignment:** Implement ECDH key exchange with proper key derivation.