



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



Office Of The Secretary

6 June 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM: SAF/MG
1720 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1720

SUBJECT: Independent Analysis of Physical Security Risk Assessment Tools

We were asked to complete an environmental scan of systems to address physical security risk assessments (Attachment 2) during the 5 April 2016 Air Force (AF) Security Enterprise Executive Board. We evaluated three systems: Enterprise Protection Risk Management (EPRM), ForcePro, and Joint Risk Decision Support Tool (JRDST). The attached point paper provides details of the analysis, the facts, and observations that were considered (Attachment 1).

Based on the analysis, we recommend EPRM be designated the system to support Security Forces vulnerability assessments. To ensure EPRM is fully integrated to support Security Forces vulnerability assessments we further recommend:

- a. HAF/A4S and AF Security Forces Center work with SAF/AAZ to develop the functional requirements document by conducting a gap analysis.
- b. SAF/AAZ work with the current contractor to build the Security Forces requirements into EPRM.
- c. Clearly document decisions to facilitate change management.

My Point of contact for this matter is Mr. Richard Gustafson, (703) 697-6250,
richard.p.gustafson.civ@mail.mil.

RICHARD W. LOMBARDI, SES
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force,
Management and Deputy Chief management Officer

Attachments:

1. Point Paper on ForcePro/JRDST vs EPRM
2. AFSEEB Meeting Minutes, 5 Apr 2016

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ATTACHMENT 1



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, DC

Office Of The Secretary

FROM: SAF/AA

TO: Air Force Security Enterprise Executive Board (AFSEEB) Members

SUBJECT: 5 Apr 16 AFSEEB Meeting Minutes (1300-1500), Room MC800

Purpose: The AFSEEB is the senior-level governance authority for the strategic oversight of the Air Force Security Enterprise. This AFSEEB meeting covered the progress of the Post Chattanooga Air Force Action Plan and Small Unmanned Aircraft System Action Item Review. In-depth updates to the Air Force Insider Threat Program were extended for awareness to the field. The Enterprise Protection Risk Management (EPRM) Program briefing provided updates to its development and deployment schedule. Lastly, the Personnel Security Investigation brief was the final presentation which discussed backlog recommendations and next steps.

Discussion Agenda

Opening Remarks

AF Chattanooga Shooting Update**

Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS) Action Item Review**

Enterprise Protection Risk Management (EPRM)**

Insider Threat Program Update **

Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) Backlog**

** Denotes information brief

1. Meeting Summary

The AFSEEB Chair, Ms. Patricia Zarodkiewicz, SAF/AA, welcomed the AFSEEB members. She opened the meeting with an overview of topics to be discussed and then transitioned into the first briefing presented by AF/A4S, Post Chattanooga Update.

2. Post Chattanooga Update **

Col Michael Florio, AF/A4SP, provided an update to the Chattanooga Air Force Action Plan which included Arming, Mass Notification and Warning System (MNWS) and Physical Security Line of Efforts (LOE)s. This encompasses the current status of tasking and timelines associated with the SecDef memo dated, 27 Aug 15 that implements the lines of effort aimed to bolster safety and security for personnel assigned to off-base facilities.

Arming LOE: Three arming programs (Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act, Security Forces Staff Arming and Unit Marshal Program) have been enacted and guidance has been updated to include DoD policy regarding privately owned firearms on installations.

Mass Notification and Warning System (MNWS) LOE: The Fort Hood requirement has been expanded upon by DoD and the Services by implementing the ability to notify personnel of incidents within 10 minutes. AF/A3 is working to optimize current AtHoc capabilities. AtHoc is currently the Air Force Enterprise interim solution and is operational across the National Capitol Region. All bases, with the exception of ANG, are now activated through a mass warning and notification system. The MNWS CONOP is being developed to codify processes.

Physical Security LOE: Joint Recruiting Facilities Command identified physical security enhancements for recruiting facilities to include \$17.7M (Air Force Share) for FY16 and \$22M (\$11M each year) to the Army Corps of Engineers for FY17/FY18. Chattanooga LOEs have \$30M funds set aside by SAF/FMBO secured for FY16. The plan forward is to set aside funds needed for FY17/FY18. The AFSEEB approved the use of the SAF/FM \$30M withhold for use across all lines of effort including non-recruiting requirements.

3. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) AFSEEB Action Item Review **

Lt Col Seth Volk provided an authorities and awareness update to changes that have provided more latitude for Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) efforts. Support from the Joint Staff efforts, USNORTHCOM actions, HAF initiatives, and the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Force Subcommittee has resulted in a request for legislation related to sUAS. Major milestone efforts are being executed to mitigate unauthorized sUAS on DoD installations. Joint Staff proposed C-sUAS legislation can be viewed in SIPR TMT Tasker #HAFS1607014098. AFSEEB expressed the need to send interim C-sUAS guidance to the field as soon as possible; draft memo is currently in review at AF/A35.

4. Enterprise Protection Risk Management (EPRM)**

Ms. Angela Ivey, SAF/AAZ, provided an update on the EPRM program which incorporated the history of the program, SAF/AAZ program management, and the current capabilities and development status of various modules. EPRM has been in development for some years under SAF/AAZ. The development consists of vetting from the field [referred to as user evaluation training (Dec 14 – Sep 15)] and incorporating the content received from stakeholders pertaining to guidance. All nine existing modules have been developed; however, all modules require content. The OPSEC and DoD Insider Threat modules have been fully developed and deployed. INFOSEC, PERSEC, and INDUSEC modules will be deployed in phases to the MAJCOMs starting in May 16. The remaining modules Facility Security, Acquisition Security, Cyber Security, and Mission Security will be continuously worked for content requirements. The next step for EPRM is to transition to a field program management office. The AFSEEB recommendation is to take the EPRM program and Security Forces requirements to SAF/MG for a complete Air Force environmental scan on field requirements from all systems.

5. Insider Threat Program Update**

Ms. Angela Ivey, SAF/AAZ provided a status update on the Air Force Insider Threat (InT) Program. The brief included the development of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs), User Activity Monitoring (UAM), the EPRM InT module and concluded with next steps. Currently the Air Force has implemented UAM across the JWICS network and operations are being evaluated to further streamline criteria for input indicators for more specific output. 68K events have been identified as potential insider threat related indicators. Analysis of those events

resulted in 20 referrals to OSI, Cognizant Security Authority, and Air Force IC security. The Air Force is planning to expand to SIPR and NIPR networks in the future. UAM standards and processes are incorporated into the Air Force InT CONOPs and are still being evaluated. The InT CONOPs is a living document currently being reviewed by the InT working group and the field for AO coordination. The CONOPs currently focuses on Hub Operations in four spirals. The summary of planned development consists of Spiral I: Implement reporting procedures for UAM events on Air Force JWICS, Spiral II: Stand Up IOC Hub, Spiral III: Achieve FOC Hub, Spiral IV: Integration with DITMAC.

As the program rapidly progresses, training will be required on various levels based on roles and responsibilities. Recommended training that was selected by the InT working group was presented to the AFSEEB and MAJCOMs. A timeline for completion has yet to be determined. InT currently is utilizing existing resources to meet expectations. Meanwhile, a rough cost estimate has been submitted for the FY18-22 POM as a place holder to assist and continue with program buildout. It's imperative to keep the field informed and involved in the program process.

The InT module nested within the EPRM program tool has been adopted by OUSD as the DoD standard. The DoD InT Working Group is utilizing EPRM to transition the existing manual reporting process to a more timely and automated process. All 43 components will use the same standard mechanism to meet the quarterly requirement. This module incorporates the White House/National InT Task Force (NITTF) minimum standards. EPRM InT module has automated DoD-Wide National Insider Threat compliance while also enhancing timeliness.

6. Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) Backlog**

Ms. Stacey Jefferson, SAF/AAZ, presented the Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) Backlog update. This brief provided an overview of status of assessments, Air Force actions, DoD recommendations, and what actions the field can take at this time to eliminate issues. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) backlog impacts the entire Federal government. OPM's total backlog is 439K investigations for the Federal government to include approximately 47K pending investigations with the Air Force. This backlog has limited the AF's ability to maintain cleared personnel for mission critical intelligence, nuclear, space, and special access programs. Recommendations to the field were discussed:

- Ensure AFI's are not more restrictive than DoD Guidance. (e.g. Does DoD allow interim security clearance, but Air Force guidance require final TS eligibility?)
- When appropriate, utilize continued access, one-time access and interim security clearances IAW 31-501, "Personnel Security Program Management."
- Scrub UMDs to ensure only necessary billets have TS investigative requirements. Functional Managers remove mandatory TS requirements from AFSCs that are no longer necessary (AFI 31-501 annual revalidation requirement, 2015 Audit Report findings, RMD targets).
- Make assignment selections utilizing pools of personnel who already have current TS security clearances.
- Ensure processes are in place to identify the appropriate background investigation required for positions. Proper position designation is the foundation of an effective and consistent personnel security program.

- Encourage leadership to engage with OSD counterparts to express the operational impact to your program(s) and request interim guidance which can be implemented by the Air Force community.

Efforts to mitigate security clearance investigation backlogs are ongoing and strategies will be implemented as they become available. Updates will be provided to field as needed.

7. Action Items:

The following table lists all AFSEEB Action Items, including new actions arising from the meeting; these will be tracked immediately following the formal dissemination of the Meeting Summary.

#	STATUS	ACTION DESCRIPTION	PROGRESS / STATUS	OWNER
1.	NEW	SAF/AAZ- Present OPM Personnel Background Investigation (PSI) to the A3 Chief's of Staff Forum "the Tank"	In progress	SAF/AAZ
2.	NEW	SAF/AA- EPRM should be opened up to the AFSEEB corporate structure and SAF/MG to ensure "Environmental Analysis" is properly completed	In progress	SAF/AAZ
3.	NEW	Send Air Force Insider Threat CONOP to MAJCOMs for comments	Completed	SAF/AAZ
4.	NEW	25 th Air Force User Activity Monitoring Briefing (UAM) to be presented at next AFSEEB	In progress	25 th AF
5.	NEW	AFSEEB tasker to all MAJCOMs to conduct the semi-annual Active Shooter exercise	In progress	AF/A4
6.	NEW	MAJCOMs must ensure legal and regulatory requirements are met before removing Air Force or Military signage from military facilities or property	In progress	AF/A4
7.	NEW	AFGSC brief at next AFSEEB on C-sUAS capabilities and issues such as frequency management and consequence management	In progress	AFGSC

8. Closing Remarks [Chair, Patricia Zarodkiewicz (SAF/AA)]:

The Chair expressed the level of importance of awareness and being prepared for the topics presented. The information provided expressed the top issues of the Air Force Security Enterprise. These issues require continuous attention and discussion from all stakeholders as we move forward. Strategies to mitigate these issues will be diligent in approach but attacked aggressively. The decisions the Air Force makes today will significantly impact our future for years to come. She thanked AFSEEB members for their participation in a very meaningful

discussion on security issues that cross all functional communities then opened the floor for questions and comments. The meeting was adjourned.

9. **Next AFSEEB Meeting:** Tentatively scheduled 28 Jun 16, room MC800 (1300-1500).

Approved:

X

Patricia Zarodkiewicz
Chair, AFSEEB

Attachment:
AFSEEB List of Attendees

PRINCIPALS/ Technical Advisors	
SAF/AA	Ms. Patricia Zarodkiewicz, SES
SAF/AAZ	Ms. Wendy Kay, SES Mr. David Lowy, SES
SAF/AQ	Maj Gen David O'brien
SAF/CIO A6	Mr. Peter Kim, SES
SAF/IG	n/a
SAF/US(M)	Mr. William Booth, SES
AF/A1	Mr. Robert Corsi, SES
AF/A2	Mr. Dean Yount, SES
AF/A3	Mr. William McClure, GS-15
AF/A4	Mr. Timothy Bridges, SES Brig Gen Allen Jamerson
AF/A10	Mr. Michael Shoults, SES

SAF/AG	Mr. James Blackston, GS-13
SAF/FM	n/a
SAF/GC	Mr. Craig Smith, SES
SAF/IA	Mr. Gordon Ettenson, SES
SAF/IE	Mr. Richard Hartley, SES
SAF/MR	Mr. Michael LoGrande, SES
SAF/PA	Col Robert Ricker
AF/A5/8	Mr. Anthony Reardon, SES
AF/A9	Mr. John Sullivan, SES
AF/SG	Mr. Dean Borsos, Col
AF/JA	Mr. Conrad M. Von Wald, SES
AF/RE	Mr. Michael Ricci, GS-15
AF/TE	Mr. Devin Cate, SES
NGB	Mr. Tommy Bertrand
MAJCOM CVs (VTC)	
ACC (Langley AFB)	Maj Gen Jerry Harris Jr.
AETC (Randolph AFB)	Maj Gen Leonard Patrick
AFDW (JB Andrews)	Col Chris Patterson Ms. Monica Dempsey
AFGSC (Barksdale AFB)	Mr. Steven Brunts, GS-15
AFMC (Wright Patterson AFB)	Maj Gen Warren Berry
AFIMSC (San Antonio)	Col Gregory Reese
AFRC (Robins AFB)	Mr. Danny Hundley, GS-14
AFSOC (Hurlburt Field)	Maj Gen Eugene Haase
AFSPC (Peterson AFB)	Maj Gen David Thompson
AMC (Scott AFB)	Maj Gen Rowayne Schatz
PACAF (Hickam AFB)	Brig Gen Kevin Schneider
USAFA (Colorado)	Col Kevin Lamberth
USAFE (Ramstein AB)	Maj Gen Roy Agustin

ATTACHMENT 2

Point Paper

On

ForcePro/Joint Risk Decision Support Tool (JRDST) vs Enterprise Protection Risk Management (EPRM)

Background: SAF/MG was asked to review these two programs and their ability to provide Air Force installations and commanders capability to perform Physical Security vulnerability assessments.

Facts ForcePro/JRDST:

- ForcePro is a standalone product developed by a contractor and managed by Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC)
- AFSFC plans to decommission ForcePro and replace it with the Joint Risk Decision Support Tool (JRDST) which is being developed by the same contractor as ForcePro
- The contractor is K2, a service disabled veteran owned small business that has been in the Physical Security/Risk Management space since at least 2009
- The Joint in JRDST is an assigned title and I could not find a sponsor other than the HAF/A4S staff and the AFSFC
- JRDST will not be stand alone and plans to obtain a Authority to Operate (ATO) as part of their Phase 1 plan
- Phase 1 of JRDST has been developed but has not been tested or gone through Certification and Accreditation
- Phase 1 is was funded by the Physical Security Enterprise and Analysis Group (PSEAG) to seed the initiative
- Sustainment funds are required to operate Phase 1 at an estimated cost of \$800K a year
- It does not appear that JRDST is an approved system of record, it does not exist in the official systems inventory, it does not have an approved budget line and is not in the POM in the outyears
- Traditional systems documentation such as Functional Requirement Document, Test Plan, Deployment/Change Management Plan do not exist

Facts Enterprise Protection Risk Management (EPRM):

- EPRM is a deployed risk management tool that has five modules operational. A Physical Security Module has been partially developed but is not operational
- EPRM is an approved system with a current ATO, funding line, Program Manager and most of the traditional systems development documentation
- EPRM is a COTS based application. The underlying COTS is owned by Alion, who is also under contract to configure and assist in deploying EPRM
- A well thought out plan exists to incorporate customer specific functionality into the COTS product without risky customizations. This makes future upgrades easier
- Alion is a small business with about \$750M a year in revenues.
- EPRM is championed and funded through SAF/AA channels who has responsibility for the "securities" other than physical

Other Facts:

- A meeting will be scheduled in late May to perform the gap analysis of current EPRM functionality and HAF/A4S functional requirements.

Observations:

- Lines of authority are blurred as responsibility for "security" is split between HAF/A4S for Physical Security and SAF/AA for the other securities
- The ForcePro/JRDST concept seems to be focused on the risk management needs of the Installation while EPRM seems more focused on the Enterprise wide needs
 - o There are pluses and minuses to each
 - o Installation flexibility support the Installation Commander but inhibits enterprise roll-up to higher echelons
- It is not clear to me how either program obtained the authority to spend government funds on requirements that were not "ordered" by a customer. JRDST doesn't seem to have gone through any Air Force governance process and EPRM seems to have developed Physical Security capability without endorsement/support from A4S
- Documentation of previous decisions about these two programs is lacking
- Neither system has an acquisition qualified Program Manager but are small enough that they probably do not need the full range of Program Management capabilities. The selected system does need a degree of discipline
- Size and capabilities of the supporting contractor should be taken into account
- EPRM seems very user friendly and provides an integrated Mission Assurance view for decision makers
- EPRM seems to have a good working relationship with J33 staff

Not Observed:

- Analysis of functionality. I felt this was best left to Security Forces qualified personnel so my assumption is EPRM does not meet functional requirements

Recommendation:

- EPRM should be designated the system to support Security Forces vulnerability assessments
- A4S and AFSFC should work with SAF/AAZ to develop the functional requirements document
 - o The meeting scheduled for May could be used as a Gap Analysis session to begin that process
- SAF/AAZ should work with the current contractor to build the Security Forces requirements into EPRM
- Whatever decision is made should be clearly documented to end this impasse for good

Basis for Recommendation:

- EPRM is a current system of record under effective program management
- EPRM has funding in the current FY and outyears to modify the Physical Security module and sustain it in the future
- EPRM has a current ATO
- EPRM has an relationship with J33
- EPRM has senior leadership oversight at the highest levels of the Air Force