



Synthesizing Quantum Circuits of AES with Lower T -depth and Less Qubits

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Abstract. The significant progress in the development of quantum computers has made the study of cryptanalysis based on quantum computing an active topic. To accurately estimate the resources required to carry out quantum attacks, the involved quantum algorithms have to be synthesized into quantum circuits with basic quantum gates. In this work, we present several generic synthesis and optimization techniques for circuits implementing the quantum oracles of iterative symmetric-key ciphers that are commonly employed in quantum attacks based on Grover and Simon's algorithms. Firstly, a general structure for implementing the round functions of block ciphers in-place is proposed. Then, we present some novel techniques for synthesizing efficient quantum circuits of linear and non-linear cryptographic building blocks. We apply these techniques to AES and systematically investigate the strategies for depth-width trade-offs. Along the way, we derive a quantum circuit for the AES S-box with *provably* minimal T -depth based on some new observations on its classical circuit. As a result, the T -depth and width (number of qubits) required for implementing the quantum circuits of AES are significantly reduced. Compared with the circuit proposed in EURO-CRYPT 2020, the T -depth is reduced from 60 to 40 without increasing the width or 30 with a slight increase in width. These circuits are fully implemented in Microsoft Q# and the source code is publicly available. Compared with the circuit proposed in ASIACRYPT 2020, the width of one of our circuits is reduced from 512 to 371, and the Toffoli-depth is reduced from 2016 to 1558 at the same time. Actually, we can reduce the width to 270 at the cost of increased depth. Moreover, a full spectrum of depth-width trade-offs is provided, setting new records for the synthesis and optimization of quantum circuits of AES.

Keywords: Quantum circuit · T -depth · Grover's algorithm · AES

1 Introduction

The rapid and fruitful development of the theory and practice on building computing machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena has made the research on algorithms running on quantum computers a topic with potential practical consequences. This especially attracts substantial attention from the cryptographic community, where the security of many primitives relies on the computational hardness of solving certain number theoretical or combinatorial problems. Shor's algorithm [Sho99] is probably the most influential research in this aspect. It will compromise the security of many widely deployed public-key cryptosystems (including RSA, DSA, and ECC) if large-scale quantum computers are ever built.

For symmetric-key ciphers, a trivial application of Grover's algorithm [Gro96] results in a quadratic speedup of the exhaustive search attack. If the attackers have access to the keyed quantum oracle, it is shown that many symmetric-key schemes can be broken with Simon's period-finding algorithm [KLLN16a, BLNS21]. Since the practical relevance of querying online keyed quantum oracles is questionable, some subsequent work investigates techniques limited to classical queries and offline quantum computations [HS18a, BHN+19, CNS17]. Also, quantum attacks derived from dedicated cryptanalytic techniques are extensively studied [BNS19b, BNS19a, HS18b, KLLN16b, NS, HsSa]. To concretely estimate the complexities in the standard quantum circuit model [NC16], the quantum circuits for these attacks have to be constructed based on some basic quantum gates. Our community is especially interested in constructing efficient quantum circuits for cryptographic primitives fulfilling specific input-output behaviors since such circuits typically work as sub-circuits of the quantum attacks. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) used the complexity of the quantum circuit for AES with a bound of depth called **MAXDEPTH** as a baseline to categorize the post-quantum public-key schemes into different security levels in the call for proposals to the standardization of post-quantum cryptography [NIS16]. Note that when the quantum circuits are applied in exhaustive key search, we can use parallelization by dividing the search space, which naturally decreases the depth but increases the number of quantum gates and qubits, and in fact, to perform exhaustive key search attacks on AES on a quantum computer with Grover's algorithm under NIST's **MAXDEPTH** bound, parallelization is required for the majority of values of **MAXDEPTH**. For parallelization, we have the following observation.

Observation 1. *Let \mathfrak{C} be the quantum circuit implementing the Grover oracle and \mathbb{V} be the search space. If we divide \mathbb{V} into k^2 equal parts and execute k^2 parallel Grover searches, the number of iterations of \mathfrak{C} required in each search will decrease by a factor of k . The number of qubits required in each search will not change, while the number of gates used in each search will decrease by a factor of k . Therefore, the number of qubits required in all searches will increase by a factor of k^2 , and the number of gates used in all searches will increase by a factor of k .*

Let \mathcal{C}' be a new quantum circuit whose depth is reduced to $\text{depth}(\mathcal{C})/k$, and the numbers of qubits and gates are respectively increased by a factor less than k^2 and a factor less than k . Then, Observation 1 implies that using \mathcal{C}' in a parallel approach is better than applying \mathcal{C} . This is the very reason that [JNRV20] claims: Grover’s algorithm does not parallelize well, meaning that minimizing depth rather than width is crucial to make the most out of the available depth. Finally, NIST states that the MAXDEPTH restriction is motivated by the difficulty of running extremely long serial computations. Plausible values for MAXDEPTH range from 2^{40} logical gates through 2^{64} logical gates, to no more than 2^{96} logical gates.

Related Work. To perform quantum attacks based on Grover’s and Simon’s algorithm, one has to implement the actual device that executes the attack, whose cost is evaluated in the quantum circuit model. Especially, in [HB20], an economic model which can be used to determine whether a quantum key-recovery attack is profitable was developed. A critical parameter of this model is the cost of a concrete quantum encryption circuit. From an attacker’s perspective, it is important to reduce the cost. From a designer’s perspective, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the cost to evaluate the security margin and to guide future designs. In particular, the classical and quantum implementations of AES receive most attention from our community.

The first quantum circuit of AES [GLRS16] was proposed by Grassl et al., where the so-called zig-zag structure was introduced to reduce the width (the number of qubits required) of the resulting quantum circuits. The width was further reduced in a follow-up work [ASAM18]. In [LPS19], Langenberg et al. presented improved quantum circuits for the S-box and key expansion of AES, leading to significantly improved AES circuits. At ASIACRYPT 2020, by tweaking the zig-zag structure, together with new quantum circuits for the AES S-box and its inverse constructed based on improved classical circuits Zou et al. significantly improved the width of the quantum circuit of AES [ZWS+20].

While the primary goal of the above works is to reduce the width, the cryptographic community is more concerned with the depth, since in NIST’s ongoing post-quantum standardization effort, different security categories are defined according to the quantum resources needed to attack AES with a depth bound. At EUROCRYPT 2020, Jaques et al. proposed several techniques to improve the depth, and presented the currently known shallowest quantum circuit for AES [JNRV20]. Besides, we also see works considering the implementation of quantum circuits for other primitives (e.g., SHA-2 and SHA3 [AMG+16], LowMC [JNRV20], and ECC [BBvHL21]).

Note that this line of research is not only interested by the cryptographic community, but also contributes to a much broader subject known as synthesis and optimization of quantum circuits. As realistic quantum computers will likely require some fault tolerance schemes where the amount of error correction is proportional to the resources used, the effect of quantum circuit optimizations becomes even more profound than its classical counterpart. In fact, the industrial

community has already invested huge resources to develop the tool chain for synthesis and optimization of quantum circuits [Mic, IBM].

Our Contributions. We propose an *in-place* quantum circuit for the (invertible) round-function of a block cipher or other iterative designs. With this type of in-place structure, the circuits implementing the round functions can be connected together to form the whole design without using additional ancilla qubits. In addition, we present a generic method for constructing such *in-place* circuits with *out-of-place* sub-circuits. Then, a systematic comparison of this structure with previous designs (the pipeline structure and the zig-zag structure) is made with respect to the depth and width (the number of qubits) requirements.

We then consider how to implement the building blocks of a symmetric-key cipher efficiently. Specifically, a SAT-based technique for synthesizing small linear components is presented, which can output the CNOT network with the minimal gate count. For nonlinear components, a systematic method for constructing a circuit mapping $|x\rangle|a\rangle$ to $|x\rangle|a \oplus f(x)\rangle$ based on a circuit mapping $|x\rangle|0\rangle$ to $|x\rangle|f(x)\rangle$ meeting certain clearly defined conditions with only additional CNOT gates is given. Based on this method, we present circuits for AES S-box and its inverse with both T -depth and width improved compared to the one given in [ZWS+20].

To further reduce the T -depth, we formulate a technique for converting an AND-depth- t classical circuit into a T -depth- t quantum circuit. We note that this is not a trivial conversion due to the peculiarities of a quantum circuit, and the natural order of the classical circuit has to be rearranged to achieve this goal. Based on this method with a new observation on the classical circuit for the AES S-box, we obtain two circuits for the AES S-box with T -depth-4 and T -depth-3, respectively, both of which have lower T -depth than the one presented at EUROCRYPT 2020 [JNRV20]. Since the degree of the algebraic normal form of the AES S-box is 7, with less than 3 stages of multiplications, one cannot generate polynomials with degree 7, which implies that our implementation reaches the theoretical lower bound.

By applying the method presented in this paper, we significantly improve the efficiency of the quantum circuits for AES. Compared with the circuit proposed in EUROCRYPT 2020, the T -depth is reduced from 60 to 40 without increasing the width and the T -gate count, or 30 with a slight increase in width and T -gate count. These circuits are fully implemented in Microsoft Q# and the source code is publicly available. Compared with the circuit proposed in ASIACRYPT 2020, the width of one of our circuits is reduced from 512 to 371, the number of Toffoli gates is reduced from 19788 to 17888, and the Toffoli-depth is reduced from 2016 to 1558 at the same time. Actually, we can reduce the width to 270 at the cost of increased depth. Moreover, by varying the local and global circuit structures, a full spectrum of depth-width trade-offs are provided and illustrated in Fig. 19 (Sect. 8), setting new records for the synthesis and optimization of quantum circuits of AES.

2 Preliminaries on Synthesizing Quantum Circuits

The states of an n -qubit quantum system can be described by the unit vectors in \mathbb{C}^{2^n} . A quantum state is typically written as $|u\rangle$, and in this paper we denote it by $|u\rangle_n$ to emphasize that this state has n qubits. When n is clear from the context, we abbreviate $|0 \cdots 0\rangle_n$ as $|0\rangle$.

A quantum algorithm manipulates the state of an n -qubit system through a series of unitary transformations and measurements, where a unitary transformation is a linear map U over \mathbb{C}^{2^n} with $UU^\dagger = U^\dagger U = I$. Any unitary transformation can be constructed with a finite set of single-qubit and two-qubit unitary transformations through composition and tensor product. In the standard quantum circuit model [NC16], we call these simple single-qubit and two-qubit unitary transformations quantum gates. In particular, we consider how to synthesize a quantum circuit with the commonly used universal fault-tolerant gate set Clifford + T , which contains the Clifford gates:

$$H = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad S = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & i \end{pmatrix}, \quad \text{CNOT} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

and the non-Clifford gate $T = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\pi/4} \end{pmatrix}$.

We also frequently employ the Pauli- X gate $X = HS^2H = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ and the Toffoli gate

$$\text{ToF} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

In this work, we are mainly concerned with the quantum circuits that can compute a classical vectorial Boolean function when the input is in the computational basis. Since the Toffoli gate can be used to simulate a universal gate set for classical computation, all these circuits can be constructed by using only Toffoli gates with additional qubits (potentially set to appropriate values). For example, the multiplication operation $a \cdot b$ can be directly implemented by the Toffoli gate $|a\rangle|b\rangle|c\rangle \rightarrow |a\rangle|b\rangle|c \oplus a \cdot b\rangle$. There is another quantum circuit for implementing the functionality of a classical AND gate, and we call it a quantum AND gate. This gate together with its adjoint is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Optimization Goals. The complexity of a quantum circuit can be measured in terms of its width (number of qubits), gate count, and depth. The cryptographic




Fig. 1. The quantum AND gate together with its adjoint

community is mainly concerned with the depth metric, and in particular the T -depth is the most interested parameter of a quantum circuit. The reason can be summarized as follows.

Firstly, as indicated in [JNRV20] and our introduction, favoring lower depth at the cost of a slightly larger width in the circuit leads to costs that are smaller in several metrics than for the circuits presented in [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS19]. Secondly, the time for fault tolerant quantum computation is proportional to one round of measurement per layer of T -gates, and so the runtime is dominated by T -depth, rather than gate count, circuit depth, or even measurement depth [Fow12]. This is why in the adjoint of the quantum AND gate (see Fig. 1) we avoid using T -gates at the cost of quantum measurement.

The T -depth is defined as the minimum number of stages of parallel applications of T -gates in a circuit, where parallel T -gates are allowed when they are acting on different qubits. Note that we can implement the Toffoli gate with several different circuits based on the Clifford + T gates with different T -depth, and these circuits with T -depth 1, 2, and 3 can be found in [Sel12, AMMR13].

3 The Round-in-Place Structure for Iterative Primitives

We start by reviewing the two main structures used in previous work on the quantum circuits for AES, including the pipeline structure [JNRV20] and the zig-zag structure [GLRS16] illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively. In the Figures we can see that each pair of neighbouring sub-circuits (represented as small rectangles) are not perfectly aligned horizontally, but forming a stepladder pattern. This interconnection pattern is due to the *out-of-place* nature of the circuit \mathcal{R}_i , which implements the i -th round function of AES, mapping $|k_i\rangle|x\rangle|0\rangle$ to $|k_i\rangle|x\rangle|O(\mathcal{R}_i)\rangle$, where $|k_i\rangle$ is the round key, $|x\rangle$ is the input state, and $|O(\mathcal{R}_i)\rangle$ is the output state of the round function. Here by *out-of-place* we mean that the output $|O(\mathcal{R}_i)\rangle$ of the round function is not carried in the qubits that encode the input $|x\rangle$.

It is easy to see that, since the round transformation is implemented by the out-of-place circuit \mathcal{R}_s , the pipeline structure needs lots of qubits to preserve the input states of all rounds, and the zig-zag structure is designed to reduce




Fig. 2. The pipeline structure, where k_0 is the initial key, m is the plaintext, c is the ciphertext. For the sake of simplicity, the ancilla qubits and the key expansion process are omitted, and $|k_0\rangle$ is used as the round key in each round.




Fig. 3. The zig-zag structure, where \mathcal{R}_s^\dagger is used to erase the redundant input states of \mathcal{R}_{s+1} .

the cost of qubits by using the reverse circuit for the last round to erase these inputs. In [JNRV20], the pipeline structure was used for designing low-depth circuits of AES, and in [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS19], the zig-zag structure was used for designing low-width circuits of AES.

3.1 The Round-in-Place Structure

For iterative designs with invertible round functions, an *in-place* implementation (with some ancillae) of the round function maps $|k_s\rangle|x\rangle|0\rangle$ to $|k_s\rangle|O(\mathcal{R}_s)\rangle|0\rangle$. Such in-place implementations of the round functions can be connected naturally to form the compositions of the round functions without the need of additional qubits. However, directly designing an in-place circuit with low T -depth for the round transformation involved in typical ciphers is difficult. In contrast, a compact out-of-place circuit for a round transformation can be efficiently derived from a compact classical circuit by implementing additions by CNOT gates and multiplications by Toffoli gates.

A natural idea is to construct an in-place circuit based on out-of-place sub-circuits, and this construction is depicted in Fig. 4. This structure is a general form of the circuits used in [AMG+16], and later we will show that previous work neglect important things in implementing U_{R-1} .

We write the classical round transformation of a symmetric cipher into the following form $\text{Round} : (x, k) \rightarrow (T(x, k), k)$. Let $\text{Round}^{-1} : (z, k) \rightarrow (T'(z, k), k)$ be the inverse of the round transformation, where $T'(T(x, k), k) = x$. Suppose we have an out-of-place circuit U_R for Round and an out-of-place circuit $U_{R^{-1}}$ for Round^{-1} . Actually, by implementing the classical Boolean operations with Toffoli gates we can always construct such out-of-place circuits. Then the circuit in Fig. 4 in-place implements Round with some ancilla qubits.




Fig. 4. In-place implementation of an invertible round transformation based on out-of-place sub-circuits

Figure 4 provides an efficient way to implement an invertible round transformation in-place. We call this kind of circuit an *out-of-place based* (abbreviated as OP-based) in-place circuit. Based on this circuit, we can implement an iterative cipher with the structure shown in Fig. 5. We call this structure the OP-based round-in-place structure, abbreviated as the *round-in-place* structure.




Fig. 5. The OP-based round-in-place structure

Remark 1. In Fig. 4, the functionality of $U_{R^{-1}}$ is to compute T' , and then XOR T' into the third register. Moreover, this functionality should work when the state on the third register is $|x\rangle$, which is related with the state in the second register. Therefore,

- If we use a $U_{R^{-1}}$ which only works for $|0\rangle$, the output will be wrong.
- If we use a $U_{R^{-1}}$ which works for any $|y\rangle$, the output will be correct. However, since the relationship between $|x\rangle$ and $|T(x, k)\rangle$ is not sufficiently used, such $U_{R^{-1}}$ will cost more quantum resources.

In [AMG+16], an in-place circuit of the χ function of SHA3 was presented with a structure which is similar with our OP-based in-place circuit. However, their implementation of χ^{-1} is a straightforward implementation of the classical circuit

from KECCAK tools, which is equivalent to a $U_{R^{-1}}$ that only works for $|0\rangle$, leading to incorrect output. In [ZWS+20], the implementation is equivalent to a $U_{R^{-1}}$ that works for any $|y\rangle$, which needs more quantum resources.

Remark 2. Note that $U_{R^{-1}}$ and U_R^\dagger are different. U_R^\dagger is the circuit for the adjoint of the unitary transformation U_R . It can be obtained by placing the adjoints of the gates in U_R in the reverse order, and thus U_R^\dagger and U_R cost the same quantum resources in most times. In comparison, $U_{R^{-1}}$ is the circuit for the reverse transformation R^{-1} . Hence, the costs of U_R and $U_{R^{-1}}$ are different in general. However, in our context, R is for encryption, while R^{-1} is for decryption. For most symmetric ciphers, the complexities of the encryption and decryption are similar. Hence the quantum resources for implementing U_R and $U_{R^{-1}}$ are almost the same.

3.2 A Depth-Width Comparison of Different Structures

Given an iterative block cipher whose block size is n -bit, a rough estimation of the width of the circuits with the pipeline, zig-zag, and round-in-place structures, when they use the same out-of-place circuit U_R as their main component, can be easily obtained from Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5. We suppose U_R requires n qubits for the input data block, n qubits for the output data block, and αn for the round key and ancillae. Note that in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we omit the possible ancilla qubits used in \mathcal{R}_s . Then, the widths of the three structures for implementing all r -round operations are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The widths of different structures, where t is the minimal number such that $\sum_{i=1}^t i > r$.

Pipeline	Zig-zag	Round-in-place
$(r + \alpha + 1)n$	$(t + 1 + \alpha)n \approx (\sqrt{2r} + \alpha)n$	$(2 + \alpha)n$

To estimate the depths of these structures, we need to consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we build circuits for the Grover oracles used in exhaustive key search attacks. In the second scenario, we construct circuits for the encryption oracles used in [KLLN16a].

Circuits for Grover Oracles. First, we consider the Grover oracle: $|y\rangle|q\rangle \rightarrow |y\rangle|q \oplus f(y)\rangle$, where $f(y)$ is a Boolean function that outputs one bit 1 or 0. When given some pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, by constructing a Grover oracle with the key $|k\rangle$ as the input, one can use Grover's algorithm to search the correct key. For simplicity, we consider the case of using one pair of plaintext and ciphertext (m, c_0) . In this case, the circuits of the Grover oracle based on different structures are shown in Fig. 6. In this figure, the out-of-place sub-circuit

E_{OP} denotes the encryption circuit generated by the pipeline or zig-zag structure, while the in-place sub-circuit E_{IP} denotes the encryption circuit generated by the round-in-place structure. Besides the ciphertext $|c\rangle$, E_{OP} outputs the redundant state $|r\rangle$ corresponding to those $O(R_s)$ in Fig. 2. Since the plaintext m is fixed, $|m\rangle$ is a computational basis state, which can be viewed as ancilla qubits in this circuit. The sub-circuit “COM” compares $|c\rangle$ with the provided ciphertext c_0 , if they are equal, then flips the target qubit $|q\rangle$. Apparently, in these two circuits, the depth of the oracle is roughly two times of the depth of the encryption circuit (E_{OP} or E_{IP}).





Fig. 6. The Grover oracle based on different structure

Circuits for Encryption Oracles. Now we consider the encryption oracle defined in [KLLN16a]: $|m\rangle|0\rangle \rightarrow |m\rangle|E(m)\rangle$, where m is the plaintext, and $E(m)$ is the corresponding ciphertext. For this oracle, if its input is a superposition $\sum_m |m\rangle|0\rangle$, then its output will be a superposition $\sum_m |m\rangle|E(m)\rangle$. Figure 7 shows how to construct quantum cryptographic oracles based on different structures. Here $|c\rangle = |E(m)\rangle$ is the ciphertext. Note that, in this oracle, we do not need to store $|k\rangle$ by qubits, since we can pre-compute all the round keys via classical computation, and add them on the input of each round by Pauli-X gates. For the pipeline and the zig-zag structures, since we need uncomputation to erase the redundant state $|r\rangle$, the depth of the oracle is twice of that of the encryption process. However, for the round-in-place structure, since we do not generate $|r\rangle$, we do not need the uncomputation process.

By summarizing the above discussion, we have the following results. Given a symmetric cipher with r rounds, suppose the depths (or T -depths) of U_R and U_{R-1} in Fig. 4 are both d . This is reasonable according to Remark 2. If we ignore the cost of the compare process in the Grover oracle and the copy process in the quantum cryptographic oracle, then the depths (or T -depths) and the DW-costs (the product of depth and width) of the oracles based on these three structures are as shown in Table 2.

From the results in Table 1 and Table 2, we have the following observations.

Observation 2. *The round-in-place structure has the smallest width in any cases. For the Grover oracle, the pipeline structure has the lowest depth. When $r \leq 3 + \alpha$, the DW-cost of the pipeline structure is lowest, and when $r > 3 + \alpha$,*

**Fig. 7.** The encryption oracle based on different structure**Table 2.** The depths and DW-costs of the oracles based on different structures

Metric	Type	Pipeline	Zig-zag	Round-in-place
Depth	Grover	$2r \cdot d$	$2 \cdot \sum_{i=1}^t (2(t-i) + 1) \approx 4r \cdot d$	$4r \cdot d$
	Encrypt	$2r \cdot d$	$\approx 4r \cdot d$	$2r \cdot d$
DW-cost	Grover	$2r(r+1+\alpha)nd$	$2r(\sqrt{2r}+\alpha)nd$	$4r(2+\alpha)nd$
	Encrypt	$2r(r+1+\alpha)nd$	$2r(\sqrt{2r}+\alpha)nd$	$2r(2+\alpha)nd$

the DW-cost of the round-in-place structure is lowest. For the quantum cryptographic oracle, the pipeline structure and the round-in-place structure have the same depth, and the DW-cost of the round-in-place structure is always the lowest.

4 Synthesizing Optimal CNOT Circuits with SAT

It is well known that an invertible linear transformation over \mathbb{F}_2^n can be implemented in-place with n qubits by the CNOT gates [PMH08]. Given an invertible transformation represented as a binary matrix, the PLU decomposition technique [GLRS16, JNRV20, ZWS+20] and the heuristic algorithm proposed at FSE 2020 [XZL+20] are typically employed to produce a compact CNOT circuit implementing the linear transformation. However, these methods are far from being optimal. In the following, we present a SAT-based method to generate the most compact CNOT circuit for invertible linear transformations over \mathbb{F}_2^n . Due to the difficulty of solving large scale SAT models in practice, the SAT-based technique only works when n is small.

The idea of our algorithm is to convert the problem of finding a circuit with k CNOT gates into the problem of solving a system of Boolean equations. Similar ideas were used in [FS10, Sto16, MSM18], where different classical and quantum circuit synthesis problems were considered. A brief introduction of our method is given in the following, and a detailed description can be found in the full version of this paper [HSb].

Given a positive integer k and a linear transformation which can be expressed as n linear forms $L_i(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ in x_i , we generate a model with the following sets of variables: $B = (b_{ij})_{k \times n}$, $C = (c_{ij})_{k \times n}$, $F = (f_{ij})_{n \times n}$, and $\Psi = \{\psi_{i,j,s}\}_{k \times n \times n}$. These variables are of different semantics. For B and C ,

$b_{ij_1} = c_{i,j_2} = 1$ means the i -th gate is a CNOT gate with control wire j_1 and target wire j_2 . For F , $f_{ij} = 1$ implies that the final output of the j -th wire is L_i . For Ψ , $\psi_{i,j,k} = 1$ indicates that after the i -th gate, the coefficient of x_k in the Boolean expression for the j -th wire is 1. We generate the equations of these variables to encode the gates and their outputs. It can be shown that the obtained system of equations has a solution (which can be tested with SAT solvers) if and only if there is a CNOT-circuit with k CNOT gates. By incrementally increasing k , we can identify the minimal k such that the corresponding equations can be satisfied simultaneously. According to our experiments, linear transformations with less than 9 variables can be solved in a reasonable time. Hence, we employ this method to identify the optimal CNOT sub-circuits in our implementations of the AES S-box presented in Sect. 5.

5 In-Place Circuits for Nonlinear Components

It is well known that for any $\mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ permutation, there is an in-place quantum circuit implementing it using only Pauli- X , CNOT, and Toffoli gates with at most one ancilla qubit [SPMH03]. To obtain this in-place implementation with minimal width, one needs to solve a corresponding permutation factorization problem, which is computationally difficult for large permutations like the AES S-box. Moreover, the complexity in terms of the gate count and depth of the circuits produced by this method is typically far from being satisfactory. For example, in [GLRS16], the authors estimated that the in-place circuit of the AES S-box with 9 qubits would cost about 9695 T gates. In contrast, with the method provided in this section, we can construct an in-place circuit that requires only 22 qubits and 728 T gates.

In what follows, we consider special quantum circuits (named as \mathfrak{C}^0 - and \mathfrak{C}^* -circuits) implementing a vectorial Boolean function, based on which in-place quantum circuits for nonlinear transformations with different shapes can be constructed.

5.1 \mathfrak{C}^0 - And \mathfrak{C}^* -Circuits for a Vectorial Boolean Function

Given a vectorial Boolean function $f: \mathbb{F}_2^a \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^b$, a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit for f is a quantum circuit mapping $|x\rangle_a |0\rangle_b |0\rangle_c$ to $|x\rangle_a |f(x)\rangle_b |0\rangle_c$ for any $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^a$, and a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit for f is a quantum circuit mapping $|x\rangle_a |y\rangle_b |0\rangle_c$ to $|x\rangle_a |y \oplus f(x)\rangle_b |0\rangle_c$ for any $(x, y) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{a+b}$. Obviously, a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit for f is always a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit for f . Moreover, building a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit is much easier than building a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit since a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit has more restrictions on its input-output behavior. For example, the circuits for the AES S-box proposed in [GLRS16, ASAM18, LPS19] are \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits, but not \mathfrak{C}^* -circuits.

Next, we present a generic method that can convert a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit for f with some clearly defined properties (called *simplex* \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits) into a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit for f efficiently. In particular, the obtained \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit do not increase the T -depth of the corresponding \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit.

Simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -Circuits. A \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit for f is *simplex* if it maps $|x\rangle_a|y\rangle_b|0\rangle_c$ to

$$|x\rangle_a|A(y) \oplus f(x)\rangle_b|0\rangle_c,$$

where $A : \mathbb{F}_2^b \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^b$ is an invertible linear function. We now consider the gate-level structures of (simplex) \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits, which gives some intuitive ideas on how to construct efficient simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits and the sufficient condition for a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit to be simplex.

Suppose we have a quantum circuit built with Pauli- X , CNOT and Toffoli gates. Let $|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_a\rangle|y_1, y_2, \dots, y_b\rangle|0\rangle_c$ and $|t_1, \dots, t_a\rangle|z_1, \dots, z_b\rangle|0\rangle_c$ be the input and output of the circuit with x_i, y_i and z_i in \mathbb{F}_2 . For $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, b\}$, we have

$$z_j(x, y) = \sum_{u,v} a_{u,v}^j x^u y^v + \sum_u b_u^j x^u + \sum_u d_u^j y^u + T^j(x) + L^j(y) + c^j,$$

where $a_{u,v}^j, b_u^j, d_u^j$, and $c^j \in \mathbb{F}_2$, $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^a$, $v \in \mathbb{F}_2^b$, T^j and L^j are linear functions, and x^u is the monomial $\prod_{u_i=1} x_i$. If this circuit is a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of the vectorial function $f(x) = (f_1(x), \dots, f_b(x))$, then

$$z_j(x, 0) = \sum_u b_u^j x^u + T^j(x) + c^j = f_j(x),$$

which implies that $z_j(x, y) = f_j(x) + \sum_{u,v} a_{u,v}^j x^u y^v + \sum_u d_u^j y^u + L^j(y)$. Thus, if the quantum gates applied to the input qubits $|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_a\rangle|y_1, y_2, \dots, y_b\rangle|0\rangle_c$ do not produce any nontrivial $x^u y^v$ and y^u terms whose degree are greater or equal to 2, the \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit must be simplex.

Now we analyze which operations may generate these $x^u y^v$ and y^u terms. We denote the set of the b output wires in this circuit as \mathcal{W} , and the set of other $a + c$ wires as \mathcal{V} . Then, the algebraic expressions of the initial states on the wires in \mathcal{W} are y . All operations that operate on at least one wire in \mathcal{W} can be classified into the following 7 types of operations illustrated in Fig. 8.




Fig. 8. Operations that operate on at least one wire in \mathcal{W}

Denote $\sum_i a_{u,v}^j x^u y^v + \sum_s d_s^j y^s + L^j(y)$ by $h_j(x, y)$, then $z_j(x, y) = h_j(x, y) + f_j(x)$. From the above analysis, to design a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit, since there is no constraint on $h_j(x, y)$, we do not need to care about the generation of $x^u y^v$ and y^u . This means the above 7 types of operations are all permitted. The designer only needs

to focus on efficiently constructing $f(x)$. From the view of algebraic expression, the qubits on the wires in \mathcal{W} can be seen as newly defined variables. Additions and multiplications about these variables can be used to generate $f(x)$.

To design a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit, we should guarantee that $h_j(x, y) = L^j(y)$, which means that $x^u y^v$ and y^u should not appear. We have the following observation:

Observation 3. *If some $x^u y^v$ was generated, it is hard to eliminate this $x^u y^v$ in the following steps, unless we repeat the same Toffoli gate which generates it.*

This means generating $x^u y^v$ will likely increase the cost of the circuits. Hence a natural criterion for designing a compact \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit is to avoid generating $x^u y^v$.

Under this criterion, operations (a) and (b) should obviously be avoided. For operation (d), it can only be applied when we use the qubit on the target wire as a dirty qubit for some CNOT gates. Note that operation (e), (f), and (d) under this constrain can be described together as the following operation.

(h): Apply s CNOT gates, $s \geq 1$, which map $|u\rangle_a |w\rangle_b |v\rangle_c$ to $|u\rangle_a |L(u, v, w)\rangle_b |v\rangle_c$ for any u, v, w , where L is a linear function w.r.t. u, v, w .

Thus, our criterion for designing a compact \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit is: *only operations (c), (h), (g) can be applied on the output wires*. Note that without applying operation (a), y^{γ^s} will not be generated either. Therefore, under this criterion, if we construct U_f , which is a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of f , then the output of U_f is

$$|x\rangle |h_1(x, y) + f_1(x), \dots, h_b(x, y) + f_b(x)\rangle |0\rangle,$$

where $h_k(x, y) = L_k(y)$ is a linear function with respect to y . Let $A(y) = (L_1(y), L_2(y), \dots, L_b(y))$, then the output can be denoted by $|x\rangle |A(y) \oplus f(x)\rangle |0\rangle$, which implies this is a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit.

Converting Simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits into \mathfrak{C}^* -Circuits. Let U_f be a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of $f(x)$. We can construct a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of $f(x)$ as shown in Fig. 9. Here $U_{A^{-1}}$ is an in-place sub-circuit, which implements $A^{-1}(y)$. $|y\rangle$ will be converted to $|A^{-1}(y)\rangle$ after passing $U_{A^{-1}}$, and the output of this modified circuit will be $|x\rangle |A(A^{-1}(y)) \oplus f(x)\rangle |0\rangle = |x\rangle |y \oplus f(x)\rangle |0\rangle$, which means this is a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of $f(x)$.

It is easy to see that the \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit constructed by the above method has the same width as the \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit U_f . Moreover, the numbers and the depths of Toffoli gates (or T gates) are the same for these two circuits. From this construction, we can see that the \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit and the simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit are almost the same. Hence, to efficiently construct a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit, we should also follow the above criterion of designing a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit, and by this way we will always obtain a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit. Then, the process of designing a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of $f(x)$ can be summarized as following steps:




Fig. 9. A \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit based on a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit

- 1) We design U_f , a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of $f(x)$, in which only operations (c), (g), and (h) can be applied on the wires in \mathcal{W} . Then U_f will be a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit.
- 2) We determine A . Note that, in a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit, operations (c), (g) will not generate any term containing y , which means A is determined by (h) operations. Hence, we can obtain A by computing the composition of the linear transformations corresponding to all (h) operations.
- 3) If A is identity, this is already a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit. Otherwise, we implement A^{-1} by an in-place CNOT circuit $U_{A^{-1}}$, then construct a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit as Fig. 9.

For most S-box implementation problems, the number of the output wires is not bigger than 8, which means, by our SAT-based algorithm, we can make sure $U_{A^{-1}}$ uses the minimal number of CNOT gates.

5.2 In-Place Implementations of Nonlinear Transformations of Different Shapes with \mathfrak{C}^0 - And \mathfrak{C}^* -Circuits

We show how to implement nonlinear transformations with typical shapes encountered in practice with \mathfrak{C}^0 - and \mathfrak{C}^* -Circuits. In most symmetric ciphers, a nonlinear component can correspond to one of the classical invertible nonlinear transformations presented in Fig. 10.




Fig. 10. Two kinds of classical invertible nonlinear transformations

Feistel-Like Transformations. First, we consider Feistel-like classical invertible nonlinear transformations of the form

$$\Psi : (x, y) \mapsto (x, y \oplus F(x)).$$

The quantum circuit of this type of nonlinear transformation can be realized by a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of F , which in turn can be derived from a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of F . We note that a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of F , mapping $|x\rangle|y\rangle|0\rangle$ to

$$|x\rangle|y \oplus F(x)\rangle|0\rangle = |\Psi(x, y)\rangle|0\rangle,$$

is an *out-of-place* implementation of F but an *in-place* implementation of Ψ . Feistel-like structures are frequently seen in Feistel ciphers, NFSR-based designs, and key-schedule algorithms of block ciphers.

For example, **SubByte** and the following XOR operation in the AES key schedule can be seen as a Feistel-like transformation. Therefore to in-place implement this transformation, we can construct a simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of the AES S-box, then extend it to a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit. In the previous works about AES, a lot of proposed quantum circuits of the AES S-box are simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits [ASAM18, LPS19, ZWS+20], since in these circuits only operations (c),(h),(g) are applied. Hence, by the method proposed in Sect. 5.1, we can easily extend them to the \mathfrak{C}^* -circuits. For example, based on the simplex \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of the AES S-box proposed in [ZWS+20], we construct a compact \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit¹. In this \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit, the in-place circuit implementing A^{-1} with minimum number of CNOT gates is achieved by our SAT-based algorithm. This circuit costs 10 CNOT gates, and in the full version of this paper [HSb], we present the matrix corresponding to A^{-1} and the specific form of this circuit.

In Table 3, we compare the quantum resources used in our \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit and those used in the \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit proposed in [ZWS+20].

Table 3. Quantum resources for implementing the S-box of AES

	#ancilla	Toffoli-depth	#Toffoli	#CNOT	#Pauli-X	Source
\mathfrak{C}^0 -S-box	6	41	52	326	4	[ZWS+20]
\mathfrak{C}^* -S-box	7	60	68	352	4	[ZWS+20]
	6	41	52	336	4	This paper

Substitution-Like Transformations. Next, we consider classical invertible substitution-like transformations of the form

$$\Phi : (x, y) \rightarrow (S(x, y), y).$$

It is easy to see that the description of such nonlinear transformation is the same as that of the round transformation discussed in Sect. 3, and thus we can implement such nonlinear transformation by the OP-based in-place circuit in Fig. 11.

¹ The C code for checking the correctness of this \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit is available at <https://github.com/hzy-cas/AES-quantum-circuit>.




Fig. 11. An OP-based in-place circuit for a substitution-like nonlinear transformation, where S' is a function satisfying $S'(S(x, y), y) = x$ for any y .

We now consider how to implement the building blocks of the circuit depicted in Fig. 11. For U_T , it can be implemented as a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of S . For $U_{T^{-1}}$, a circuit which mapping $|S(x)\rangle|y\rangle|x\rangle|0\rangle$ to $|S(x)\rangle|y\rangle|x \oplus S'(S(x), y)\rangle|0\rangle$, one may attempt to implement this part as a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of S' . We now show that this is an overshoot.

For $U_{T^{-1}}$, if we set $z = S(x)$, then $S'(z, y) = x$, and $U_{T^{-1}}$ maps $|z\rangle|y\rangle|S'(z, y)\rangle|0\rangle$ to $|z\rangle|y\rangle|0\rangle|0\rangle$. Suppose U_{T_0} is a circuit that maps $|z\rangle|y\rangle|0\rangle|0\rangle$ to $|z\rangle|y\rangle|S'(z, y)\rangle|0\rangle$, then obviously, $U_{T_0}^\dagger$, the reverse circuit of U_{T_0} , is equivalent to $U_{T^{-1}}$. Therefore, to implement a substitution-like transformation, we only need to design a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of S , and a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of S' , whose reverse circuit is used.

6 A Method for Constructing Low T -Depth Circuits

As discussed in Sect. 2, the T -depth is the most concerned parameter. In our context, T gates only appear in the Toffoli gates, the quantum AND gates and their adjoints, which are employed to implement the quantum correspondences of the multiplications in the classical computation. In the following, we first show that there always exists a quantum circuit with T -depth equal to the AND-depth of the corresponding classical circuit. Therefore, we can first construct a classical circuit with low AND-depth, and then convert it into a low T -depth quantum circuit.

6.1 Classical AND-depths v.s. Quantum T -depths

The AND-depth of a classical circuit (a.k.a. the multiplicative depth) constructed with AND, XOR, and NOT gates is the largest number of AND gates on any path from a primary input to a primary output. For example, the AND-depth of the classical circuit shown in Fig. 12 is 1.

The readers may think that it is trivial to build a quantum version of a given classical circuit such that the T -depth of the quantum circuit is equal to the AND-depth of the classical circuit by just properly replacing the classical AND gates with Toffoli gates or quantum AND gates, all of which have T -depth 1 implementations. However, for quantum circuits, a direct copy as the “ b ” signal in Fig. 12 is not allowed and a qubit cannot be used in different quantum gates

simultaneously. Therefore, a quantum circuit obtained from a classical one by the simple replacement strategy mentioned above maintaining the natural order of operations may result in increased T -depth. For example, the quantum circuits with different Toffoli-depth depicted in (2) and (3) of Fig. 12 both implement the functionality of the classical circuit given in (1) of Fig. 12. Next, we show that the AND-depth of a classical circuit set a lower bound for the T -depth of its quantum counterpart, and this lower bound is achievable.




Fig. 12. Quantum implementations of a classical circuit with multiplicative depth 1

Theorem 1. *Given a classical circuit with AND-depth s , the T -depth of the quantum circuit implementing all the nodes of the classical circuit is not smaller than s . Moreover, with sufficiently many ancillae, we can construct a quantum circuit implementing all the nodes of the classical circuit with T -depth s .*

Theorem 1 can be proved by a constructive method with some notations and terminologies introduced below. Here we illustrate this method with the classical circuit given by Example 1. A full proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the full version [HSb], which also provides a generic method to convert an AND-depth t classical circuit into a T -depth t quantum circuit.

Example 1. $M_4 = M_1 \cdot M_2$, $M_5 = M_2 \cdot M_3$, $M_6 = M_4 \oplus M_3$, $M_7 = M_5 \oplus M_1$, $M_8 = M_7 \cdot M_2$, $M_9 = M_7 \cdot M_3$, $M_{10} = M_8 \oplus M_6$, $M_{11} = M_{10} \oplus M_9$, $M_{12} = M_7 \cdot M_6$, $M_{13} = M_{11} \cdot M_3$

The AND-depth of the circuit given by Example 1 is 3. Before we present the method for building the corresponding T -depth-3 quantum circuit, we define the AND-depth for each intermediate node (or signal) appearing in the circuit. We call a variable an AND-variable if it represents the output of an AND gate. In Example 1, M_4 , M_5 , M_8 , M_9 , M_{12} , and M_{13} are AND-variables.

Let M_i and M_j be two AND-variables. M_j is said to be an AND-successor of M_i if $M_j = M_i \cdot M_k$ for some k , or $M_j = M_u \cdot M_v$ for some u and v such that M_u is generated from M_i by some XOR operations, which is denoted by $M_i \rightarrow M_j$. Also, we call M_i is an AND-predecessor of M_j . In our Example 1, we have $M_5 \rightarrow M_8$ and $M_8 \rightarrow M_{13}$, forming a directed path $M_5 \rightarrow M_8 \rightarrow M_{13}$. By

generating all such paths, a directed acyclic graph is obtained with the nodes representing the AND-variables. Then, the AND-depth of an AND-variable M , denoted as $d_{\wedge}(M)$ is defined as k , if M is the k -th node in the longest path containing M . Apparently, the AND-depth of a classical circuit is equal to the maximum AND-depth of its AND-variables. It is easy to see that, for an AND-variable M , if M has no AND-predecessor, then $d_{\wedge}(M) = 1$, otherwise $d_{\wedge}(M) = 1 + \max_{v \in \text{Pre}(M)} d_{\wedge}(v)$, where $\text{Pre}(M)$ denotes the set of all predecessors of M . In Example 1, $d_{\wedge}(M_4) = d_{\wedge}(M_5) = 1$, $d_{\wedge}(M_8) = d_{\wedge}(M_9) = d_{\wedge}(M_{12}) = 2$, and $d_{\wedge}(M_{13}) = 3$.

Now, we are ready to describe our method for building the quantum circuit. Note that since we aim at reducing the T -depth, in our constructions, we always use the quantum AND gate with T -depth 1 and its adjoint with T -depth 0 depicted in Fig. 1 whenever possible, while in the figures illustrating the quantum circuits, we use Toffoli gates due to the compactness of its visualization. The circuit generated by our method has the following features. Firstly, for AND-variables with the same AND-depth, a layer of quantum AND gates which generate these AND-variables are applied in parallel. Secondly, before the quantum AND layer, all necessary input are generated with a CNOT network. In particular, when a variable is used as inputs of different AND gates of the subsequent AND layer, we can copy it into an ancilla qubit with the application of a CNOT gate, and clean the effect of the CNOT gate after the quantum AND layer.




Fig. 13. An AND-depth-3 implementation for the classical circuit in Example 1

Figure 13 present a quantum circuit corresponding to Example 1. In this circuit, we have three layers of quantum AND gates, within each layer the gates are applied in parallel. In Layer 1, we generate M_4 and M_5 . In Layer 2, we generate M_8 , M_9 , and M_{12} . In Layer 3, we generate M_{13} . The variables required by Layer 1 are M_1 , M_2 , and M_3 . Since $M_4 = M_1 \cdot M_2$, and $M_5 = M_2 \cdot M_3$, M_2 is needed in two different AND gates. Therefore, before Layer 1, we copy $|M_2\rangle$ to another qubit by a CNOT gate. This is an idle qubit, which will be used to store $|M_6\rangle$. We clean this qubit after Layer 1. The variables required by Layer 2 are M_2 , M_3 ,

M_6 , and M_7 . Hence, we have to generate M_6 and M_7 . We do this by applying 4 CNOT gates before Layer 2. Similarly, M_7 is required for computing M_8 , M_9 , and M_{12} . We copy it into two idle qubits by 2 CNOT gates before Layer 2, which are cleaned after Layer 2. The variables required by Layer 3 are M_2 , and M_{11} . Thus, before Layer 3, we apply 4 CNOT gates to generate M_{11} . This leads to a quantum circuit computing all the nodes in Example 1 with T -depth 3.

6.2 A Trick for Reducing the AND-depth of Classical Circuits

According to the discussion of the previous section, low AND-depth classical circuits imply low T -depth quantum circuits. In this section, we show how to reduce the AND-depth of a classical circuit without changing the functionalities of its primary outputs based on a simple observation. Let $M_4 = M_1 \cdot M_2$ and $M = M_4 \cdot M_3$ with $d_\wedge(M_1) = 2$, $d_\wedge(M_2) = 1$, and $d_\wedge(M_3) = 1$. Then $d_\wedge(M_4) = 3$, and $d_\wedge(M) = 4$. In addition, We can deduce that $M = (M_1 \cdot M_2) \cdot M_3$. Obviously, we also have $M = M_1 \cdot (M_2 \cdot M_3)$. Therefore, if we first compute $M_4 = M_2 \cdot M_3$, and then $M = M_1 \cdot M_4$. The AND-depth of M is reduced from 4 to 3.

We now show how this idea works for a more complicated case based on Example 1, where M_1, M_2, M_3 are primary inputs and M_{12}, M_{13} are primary outputs. For M_{13} , we have

$$M_{13} = (M_{10} \oplus M_9)M_3 = (M_8 \oplus M_6 \oplus M_9)M_3 = M_7(M_2M_3) \oplus M_6M_3 \oplus M_7M_3.$$

We modify the circuit by using the following steps to generate M_{13} : $N_1 = M_2 \cdot M_3$, $N_2 = M_6 \cdot M_3$, $N_3 = M_7 \cdot M_3$, $N_4 = M_7 \cdot N_1$, $N_5 = N_4 \oplus N_2$, $M_{13} = N_5 \oplus N_3$. M_{13} is not an AND-variable anymore. It is easy to check that $d_\wedge(N_1) = 1$, $d_\wedge(N_2) = 2$, $d_\wedge(N_3) = 2$, and $d_\wedge(N_4) = 2$. Therefore, the AND-depth of this new circuit is 2. The modified circuit is given by Example 2, where M_{12} and M_{13} are the primary outputs.

Example 2. $M_4 = M_1 \cdot M_2$, $M_5 = M_2 \cdot M_3$, $M_6 = M_4 \oplus M_3$, $M_7 = M_5 \oplus M_1$, $M'_8 = M_6 \cdot M_3$, $M'_9 = M_7 \cdot M_3$, $M'_{10} = M_7 \cdot M_5$, $M'_{11} = M'_{10} \oplus M'_8$, $M_{12} = M_7 \cdot M_6$, $M_{13} = M'_{11} \oplus M'_9$.

More generally, given a classical circuit, we can try to reduce its AND-depth as follows. Firstly, for a M' which is not an AND-variable, we extend the definition of $d_\wedge(M')$, by setting $d_\wedge(M')$ to be $\max_i \{d_\wedge(M_i)\}$, where M_i is an AND-variables and there is a path from M_i to M' in the classical circuit.

For an AND-variable M with $d_\wedge(M) = d \geq 3$, we have $M = M_1 M_2$ for some M_1 with $d_\wedge(M_1) = d - 1$. If $d_\wedge(M_2) \leq d - 3$, we further decompose M_1 to variables with lower AND-depth. That is we write M_1 as $\sum_{i,j} M'_i M'_j + \sum_k M'_k$, where $d_\wedge(M'_i) \leq d - 2$, $d_\wedge(M'_j) \leq d - 2$, $d_\wedge(M'_k) \leq d - 2$, for any i, j, k . Then, we have

$$M = \sum_{i,j} M'_i (M'_j M_2) + \sum_k M'_k M_2.$$

For any M'_i with $d_\wedge(M_i^1) = d - 2$, if the corresponding M'_j always satisfies $d_\wedge(M_j^1) \leq d - 3$, then by constructing some new operations which generate those $M'_j M_2$ first, we can reduce the AND-depth of M from d to $d - 1$.

6.3 T -depth-4 and T -depth-3 Quantum Circuits for the AES S-box

Firstly, based on the classical circuit proposed in [BP12] with AND-depth 4 (see the full version [HSb]), we can build a quantum circuit for the AES S-box with T -depth 4 by employing the method given in Sect. 6.1. In comparison, the T -depth of the quantum circuit presented by Jaques et al. [JNRV20] based on the same classical circuit is 6, and its width is the same as ours.

Furthermore, based on the trick given in Sect. 6.2, we transform the classical circuit proposed in [BP12] into a circuit with AND-depth 3 (shown in the full version [HSb]), based on which a T -depth-3 quantum circuit for the AES S-box can be constructed. Note that, the algebraic degree of the AES S-box is 7. With two layers of multiplications, we can only obtain polynomials with degree 4. This means that we need at least three layers of multiplications to generate the output of the AES S-box. Therefore, if we implement the AES S-box by firstly designing a classical reversible circuit, and then decomposing each gate into the Clifford+ T gates, the minimum T -depth is 3, which is achieved by our circuit. A comparison of our circuits and the one presented in [JNRV20] is presented in Table 4. In this table, the gate counts and depths are obtained by summing the corresponding values for the forward circuit which computes the S-box output and the uncomputation circuit. The Q# code for our T -depth-4 and T -depth-3 quantum circuits are available at <https://github.com/hzy-cas/AES-quantum-circuit>.

Table 4. Quantum resources for different AES S-box circuits

#CNOT	#1qClifford	# T	# Measure	T -depth	Full depth	Width	Source
664	205	136	34	6	117	136	[JNRV20]
718	208	136	34	4	109	136	T -depth-4
1395	467	312	78	3	113	218	T -depth-3

Remark 3. The widths presented in Table 4 are not obtained by the Q# resource estimator. As mentioned in the latest ePrint version of [JNRV20] and <https://github.com/microsoft/qsharp-runtime/issues/192>. There was a bug in Q# that produces conflict width and depth estimations, and this issue was solved in the latest version of Q#. However, when Q# tries to optimize the T -depth, the width obtained is not optimal (<https://github.com/microsoft/qsharp-runtime/pull/446>). Therefore, we manually estimate the widths to obtain more accurate figures. The specific estimation process can be found in the full version of this paper [HSb].

7 Efficient Quantum Circuits for AES

To implement an iterative block cipher, we proceed as follows. Firstly, we choose the pipeline structure or the round-in-place structure according to our optimization objective (low depth or low width). Then, implement the linear layers

with Xiang et al.’s method, the PLU decomposition method, or the SAT-based technique presented in this paper. For the nonlinear components, construct \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits and then convert them to \mathfrak{C}^* circuits. Finally, plug these sub-circuits into the round-level structure. We will show case this procedure with AES-128, and all the techniques can be easily extended to AES-192, AES-256, and other iterative block ciphers.

7.1 Low-Width Quantum Circuits for AES

First of all, we choose the round-in-place structure according to observation 2 of Sect. 3. Then, we show how to implement the building blocks of AES in-place. The `ShiftRow` and `RotByte` operations can be easily implemented by rewiring. For the `MixColumns` operation, regarded as a 32×32 binary matrix, we employ the in-place circuit from [XZL+20], which requires 92 CNOT gates. In the following, we consider the implementations of the S-boxes, for which different circuits are used in different situations.

S-boxes in the Key Schedule Data Path. Since the S-box is immediately followed by an XOR operation in the key schedule (a Feistel-like transformation), we only need a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit of the S-box. In our implementation, we used the \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit introduced in Sect. 5.2.

For the sake of simplicity, we call a \mathfrak{C}^* -circuit (or \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit) of the AES S-box a \mathfrak{C}^* (or \mathfrak{C}^0) S-box. Figure 14 illustrates the structure of the in-place circuit for the AES key schedule. In this figure, `SubByte` represents the sub-circuit for the parallel application of four \mathfrak{C}^* S-boxes. Note that while the implementations of the S-boxes are improved in this paper, the high-level structure is attributed to [JNRV20].




Fig. 14. An in-place circuit for generating the first round key

S-boxes in the Encryption Data Path. In the encryption process of AES, `ByteSub` can be regarded as a substitution-like transformation defined in Sect. 4, and thus we can implement it with the OP-based in-place circuit. This means we need to construct a \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box and a \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box⁻¹. Here, we use the \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box proposed in [ZWS+20], based on which a \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box⁻¹ can be constructed as follows.

Suppose $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^8$ is the input of the S-Box, then y , the output of the S-box, is equal to $LS_0(x) + c$, where L is a linear function and $S_0(x)$ is the inverse of x in \mathbb{F}_2^8 . Hence, we have $x = S_0^{-1}L^{-1}(y + c) = S_0L^{-1}(y + c) = L^{-1}(LS_0)L^{-1}(y + c)$.

Suppose U_0 is the circuit that implements $|x\rangle|0\rangle|0\rangle \rightarrow |x\rangle|LS_0(x)\rangle|0\rangle$. Obviously, it can be generated from a \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box by deleting the last 4 Pauli-X gates. Then, it is easy to check that the circuit in Fig. 15 is a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of $S\text{-box}^{-1}$.




Fig. 15. The circuit for implementing the $S\text{-box}^{-1}$ of AES

In Fig. 15, U_C is the circuit consisting of 4 Pauli-X gates, and it implements constant addition of c . U_L and $U_{L^{-1}}$ are the circuits consisting of CNOT gates, and they implement the linear transformation L and L^{-1} respectively. According to our SAT-based method, L can be implemented by 14 CNOT gates. Consequently, we can implement a \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuit of $S\text{-Box}^{-1}$ with 6 ancilla qubits, 52 Toffoli gates, 41 Toffoli depth, 368 CNOT gates, and 8 NOT gates². In the full version [HSb], we present the specific form of the matrix corresponding to L , and the quantum circuit that implements L with minimal number of CNOT gates.

Based on the above circuits, we can in-place implement **ByteSub** in each round by 16 OP-based in-place circuits of the S-box. We suppose these 16 in-place circuits are implemented in parallel, then our implementation of **ByteSub** has the following two phases:

Phase 1: Implement 16 \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box, denoted by ByteSub_1 ;

Phase 2: Implement 16 reverse circuits of \mathfrak{C}^0 $S\text{-box}^{-1}$, denoted by ByteSub^{-1} .

Note that in the key schedule process of each round, we need to apply 4 \mathfrak{C}^* S-boxes. Obviously, by applying 2 of them in **Phase 1**, and another 2 of them in **Phase 2**, we can reduce the DW-cost of the whole circuit. Under this strategy, our implementation of the i -th round of AES can be illustrated by Fig. 16.

In this figure, k_{i-1} denotes the round key in the $(i - 1)$ -th round, and c_{i-1} denotes the output state of the $(i - 1)$ -th round. The last step of each round is **AddRoundKey**, which can be implemented by applying 128 CNOT gates in parallel, and denoted by a CNOT gate in Fig. 16. For the final round, we do not need the sub-circuit **Mixcol**. Round 0, which performs a bitwise XOR of k_0 to the plaintext, can be implemented by applying 128 CNOT gates in parallel.

² The C code for checking the correctness of this \mathfrak{C}^0 -circuits of $S\text{-box}^{-1}$ is available at <https://github.com/hzy-cas/AES-quantum-circuit>.




Fig. 16. The in-place implementation of the i -th round of AES-128

Note that the ancilla qubits used in these S-box circuits are ignored in this figure. From Table 3, we know that the number of ancilla qubits used in our out-of-place (\mathfrak{C}^0 or \mathfrak{C}^*) S-box circuit is 6, and the Toffoli-depth of this circuit is 41. We implement 18 out-of-place S-box circuits simultaneously in a phase, and the third register uses $8 \times 16 = 128$ qubits to store the outputs of the 16 out-of-place S-box circuits in ByteSub_1 , hence the width of this one round circuit is $18 \times 6 + 3 \times 128 = 492$, and the Toffoli-depth is $41 \times 2 = 82$.

Apparently, for this one round circuit, we can make a tradeoff between width and depth by reducing the number of S-box circuits applied in parallel. In Fig. 16, the Toffoli-depth for sequentially implementing one \mathfrak{C}^* S-box in KeyExpan_1 and one \mathfrak{C}^* S-box in KeyExpan_2 is the same as the Toffoli-depth of an OP-based in-place S-box circuit. Hence, we see two sequential \mathfrak{C}^* S-box as a whole circuit, and in the following call such circuit and the OP-based in-place S-box circuit, *double-depth S-box circuits*. In this case, the process of **Phase 1** and **Phase 2** in Fig. 16 implements 18 double-depth S-box circuits in parallel. Now suppose we implement p double-depth S-box circuits in parallel, where $p|18$.

- If $p = 9$, the Toffoli-depth is $82 \times 2 = 164$. In the 9 double-depth S-box circuits applied in the same layer, one of them is in KeyExpan and eight of them are in ByteSub , hence the width is $128 \times 2 + 6 + (8 + 6) \times 8 = 374$.
- If $18/p \geq 3$, the Toffoli-depth is $82 \times 18/p = 1476/p$. the widest part of such one round circuit is a phase in which all p double-depth S-box circuits are in ByteSub , and the width is $2 \times 128 + (8 + 6)p = 256 + 14p$.

Table 5 present the numbers of different quantum gates used in each component and one round. Obviously, these numbers are irrelevant to p .

Table 5. Quantum resources for implementing different components of AES

	KeyExpan	MixCol	AddRoundKey	ByteSub ₁	ByteSub ⁻¹	One round
#Toffoli	208	0	0	832	832	1872
#CNOT	1440	368	128	5216	6096	13248
# Pauli-X	48	0	0	64	128	240

Implement the Grover Oracle. If we want to construct a Grover oracle to search k_0 , since the plaintext m is fixed and Round 0 is adding k_0 on m , we can apply Pauli- X gates on some specific ones of the wires carrying $|k_0\rangle$ to obtain $|k_0 \oplus m\rangle$, then when $|k_0\rangle$ is needed later, apply Pauli- X gates on these wires again to convert $|k_0 \oplus m\rangle$ back to $|k_0\rangle$. Therefore, we can use the circuit in Fig. 17 to implement Round 0 and Round 1 together.

Compare to Fig. 16, in this circuit, we do not need to implement ByteSub^{-1} , hence we can save $16 \times 52 = 832$ Toffoli gates. Note that, the a qubits in the third register, which will be used in the following rounds, is idle in these two rounds. Hence if $p \geq 9$, we have $a > 96$, then the 16 S-box circuits in ByteSub_1 can be implemented in parallel (need 96 ancilla qubits), Similarly, KeyExpan , which contains 4 S-box circuits, can be implemented in parallel. However, ByteSub_1 and KeyExpan can not be implemented simultaneously. Therefore, if $p \geq 9$, the width and Toffoli-depth of these two rounds are 384 and 82 respectively. Moreover, these two rounds use $256 + 64 + 48 = 368$ Pauli- X gates, $5126 + 1440 + 368 + 128 = 7152$ CNOT gates and $208 + 832 = 1040$ Toffoli gates.




Fig. 17. The implementation of the round 0 and round 1 of AES

Then, by combining the circuits in Fig. 17 and Fig. 16, we can implement encryption circuit of the AES Grover oracle. In Table 6, we present the quantum resources needed for this circuit with $p = 18$ and $p = 9$, and compare our results with the results presented in [ZWS+20].

Table 6. Quantum resources for implementing AES-128

Width	Toffoli-Depth	#Toffoli	#CNOT	#Pauli-X	source
512	2016	19788	128517	4528	[ZWS+20]
492	820	17888	126016	2528	$p = 18$
374	1558	17888	126016	2528	$p = 9$

7.2 Low-Depth Quantum Circuits for AES

To reduce the depth, we should use the pipeline structure. First, we consider the nonlinear components. Since the round transformation is implemented out-of-place in the pipeline structure, for implementing ByteSub , we only need a low

T -depth \mathfrak{C}^0 S-box. For the AES key schedule, since it is the Feistel-like non-linear transformation, as shown in Sect. 7.1, it can be implemented in-place with the circuit in Fig. 14. It is easy to see that compared to other out-of-place implementations of the AES key schedule, the depth of such in-place implementation is also lower, since no extra operations are needed. As a consequence, we also in-place implement the AES key schedule in our shallower circuit of AES based on a \mathfrak{C}^* S-box.

In Sect. 6.3, we presented two circuits of the AES S-box, which have T -depth 4 and T -depth 3 respectively. In these two circuits, the output wires are only be used as target wires. Therefore, these circuits are both \mathfrak{C}^* -circuits, and can be used in ByteSub and the key schedule.

For MixColumns, we use the in-place circuit in Sect. 7.1, which has the optimal width, and the lowest CNOT-count until now. The Q# resource estimator shows that the depth of this in-place circuit is 30. In our resource estimation model, the CNOT-depth metric is less important than other metrics. For these reasons, we use this in-place circuit to implement MixColumns.




Fig. 18. The out-of-place implementation of the i -th round of AES-128

Figure 18 presents our implementation of the i -th round. In KeyExpan and ByteSub₁, 20 S-box circuits are applied in parallel. The round 0 is implemented by applying 128 CNOT gates in parallel, which maps $|k_0\rangle|m\rangle$ to $|k_0\rangle|c_0\rangle$. Note that, we don't use the circuit in Fig. 17 to implement the round 0 and round 1 together. The reason is in Fig. 17, KeyExpan and ByteSub₁ cannot be applied in parallel, hence the T -depth and full depth will be higher.

We implemented our AES circuits by Q# based on the code proposed in [JNRV20], and our code of Mixcolumn and the S-box (<https://github.com/hzy-cas/AES-quantum-circuit>). Table 7 shows the quantum resources of our circuits based on different S-box implementations. Same as in [JNRV20], the results presented here are the quantum resources required for implementing the forward circuit, which outputs the ciphertext, and the reverse circuit, which is used for uncomputation. As in Table 4, except the width³, other values are obtain from Q# resource estimator. We can see that, similarly as the results of the S-box circuits, the T -depths and the full depths of our circuits are all lower than those in [JNRV20].

³ In the full version [HSb], we show how to obtain these values of widths.

Table 7. Quantum resources for implementing AES and AES[†]

#CNOT	#1qClifford	# T	#M	T -depth	Full depth	width	source
291150	83116	54400	13600	120	2827	3936	[JNRV20]
298720	83295	54400	13600	80	2198	3936	with T -depth-4 S-box
570785	189026	124800	31200	60	2312	5576	with T -depth-3 S-box

8 General Width and T -depth Trade-offs

By combining different S-box circuits with different structures, and adjusting the number of S-box circuits applied in parallel, we can have a spectrum of trade-offs between width and T -depth.

Since we consider the T -depth, the Toffoli gates in the out-of-place S-box circuits used in Sect. 7.1 should be decomposed into Clifford+ T gates. Note that, we cannot replace these Toffoli gates with quantum AND gates, since the output wires of the multiplication operations are not initialized to $|0\rangle$. Here, we use the T -depth-1 Toffoli gate proposed in [Sel12], where 4 ancilla qubits are required. In these S-box circuits, we apply at most two Toffoli gates in parallel, hence we need 8 extra ancilla qubits. In all, we have a Clifford+ T implementation of the S-box (or the S-box⁻¹) with $8 + 6 = 14$ ancilla qubits and T -depth 41. We name these S-box circuits as Circuit 0. Moreover, to use the T -depth-4 (or the T -depth-3) S-box circuit in the round-in-place structure, we need to construct a \mathbb{C}^0 -circuit of the S-box⁻¹. Obviously, we can construct such circuit with T -depth-4 (or T -depth-3), since the nonlinear parts in the classical circuits of the S-box and S-box⁻¹ are the same. We name these T -depth-4 circuits as Circuit 1, and these T -depth-3 circuits as Circuit 2.

We obtain the trade-off curve shown in Fig. 19 by applying Circuit 0, Circuit 1, and Circuit 2 in different structures. In this figure, Strategy 1, 2, 3, respectively correspond to the use of Circuit 0, Circuit 1, Circuit 3 in the round-in-place structure. Strategy 4, 5, 6 respectively correspond to the use of Circuit 0, Circuit 1, Circuit 3 in the pipeline structure. Different points on a curve are obtained by applying different number of S-box circuits in parallel. We also list the results of previous works [ZWS+20, JNRV20, GLRS16, LPS19] in this figure. For [ZWS+20], since the T -depth is not presented, here we decompose the Toffoli gate by the same Clifford+ T gates as in Circuit 0, hence slightly increase the width. For the point corresponding to [JNRV20], the width is fixed as we mentioned. The detailed process for estimating these T -depths and widths is presented in the full version of this paper [HSb].




Fig. 19. The width and T -depth for implementing the Grover oracle of AES-128

9 Conclusion and Discussion

We propose the round-in-place structure for the quantum circuits of iterative ciphers, and manage to find a generic way to efficiently realize this structure in practice. We give guidelines in how to synthesize quantum circuits with specific optimization objectives based on a detailed analysis of the pipeline, zig-zag, and round-in-place structures. Moreover, new techniques for implementing the quantum circuits for linear and non-linear building blocks are presented. In particular, based on a new observation on the classical circuit of the AES S-box, we obtain a quantum circuit for the AES S-box with T -depth 3, reaching its theoretical minimum. Based on these techniques and results, we produce significantly improved quantum circuits for AES with respect to both depth and width. Finally, we conjecture that without optimizing across the natural hierarchical boundaries formed by the round functions of AES, the T -depth of the quantum circuit cannot be further improved.

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