Proximity Tracing

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The Problem

Contact Tracing

- Ways to constrain a pandemic:
  - Lockdown → ☹
  - Contact Tracing → ☺
- Manual contact tracing is…
  - …labour intensive
  - …slow
- Automate it!



The Solution

Bluetooth Beacons

- Widely available
- More accurate than cell tower location
- Less invasive than ultrasonic
- More privacy-preserving than GPS



Alice and Bob don't know each other, but have a lengthy conversation sitting a few feet apart



Their phones exchange beacons with random Bluetooth identifiers (which change frequently)



A few days later…

Bob is positively diagnosed for COVID-19 and enters the test result in an app from his public health authority

With Bob's consent, his phone uploads the last 14 days of keys for his Bluetooth beacons to the server

Apps can only get more information via user consent

Google

Alice continues her day unaware she had been near a potentially contagious person

Alice sees a notification on her phone

Sometime later...

Alice's phone periodically downloads the Bluetooth beacon keys of everyone who has tested positive for COVID-19 in her region. A match is found with Bob's random Bluetooth identifiers.



Alice's phone receives a notification with information about what to do next.



Google

The European academic effort

PEPP-PT & DP-3T

- PEPP-PT: Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
  - Centralized protocol
  - Initially supported by Germany
  - Still favored by France
- DP-3T: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
  - Decentralized version of PEPP-PT
  - Originally developed by EPFL and ETHZ

~~Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing~~

Exposure Notification API

- The current de-facto standard
- Similar to DP-3T
- Very low privacy footprint
- Until an exposure actually occurs, no PII leaves the device



Situation in Germany

Corona-Warn-App



Corona-Warn-App

- Jointly developed by SAP (App) and Telekom (Infrastructure)
- Available since the 15th of June 2020
- Pretty simple interface
- Not much to see for the user


Exposure logging active
Risk Unknown
Since you have not had exposure logging turned on for long enough, we could not calculate your risk of infection.


Enable COVID-19 Exposure Logging and Notifications
Your iPhone can securely collect and share random IDs with nearby devices. The app can use these IDs to notify you if you may have been exposed to COVID-19. The date, duration and signal strength of an exposure will be shared with “Corona-Warn”.
Don’t Enable
Enable


“Corona-Warn” Would Like to Send You Notifications
Notifications may include alerts, sounds and icon badges. These can be configured in Settings.
Don’t Allow
Allow
Identify Risks


SAP

Transparency:
Surprisingly Good

- Almost everything is open-source
- There is documentation
- It’s written in markdown
- Most issues are public
- Pull-requests are accepted




Lab Test Result
Verification Process
Doctor or
Test Center
Broadcasting
Scanning
App User
Health Authority
Employee
Corona-Warn-App (CWA)
Apple iOS and Android
Health Authority
Laboratory
Open Telekom Cloud
Corona-Warn-App
Server
Verification
Server
Portal
Server



Figure 7: Interaction of the mobile application(s) with the backend servers and CDN



	Device 1	Device 2	Device 3	Device 4	Device 5
Reality	**Met on the street 3 minutes, distance**	**Met occasionally 7 minutes, distance, but hugged in between**	**Stood on train platform 2 minutes, distance**	**Met occasionally 3 minutes, distance, hugged for prolonged time**	**Brushed each other at supermarket 2 seconds**
Detected by phone	seen once **<5 min** **>50dB (far)**	seen twice **5 min** **>50dB (far)**	never seen	never seen	seen once **<5 min** **<50dB (close)**

Figure 14: Limitations of the Bluetooth Low Energy approach

In summary

It’s pretty good – you should install it

- ✓ No Central Entity to Trust
- ✓ Data Minimization
- ✓ Anonymity (Pseudonymity)
- ✓ No Central Movement Profiles
- ✓ Unlinkability
- ✓ Unobservability of Communication



More infos and sources

- https://ukw.fm/ukw030-die-corona-warn-app/
- https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-documentation
- https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing
- https://www.google.com/covid19/exposurenotifications/