

# Workshop:

# The Safe source for Open Source

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# Spare time

- Just joined Home Guard
- Sailing
- Fiddling with SW and HW
- Favorite project now:  
Signal-K, connect different protocols  
in a boat



# Agenda

- Intro to CVEs
- Intro to free Chainguard Images
- Show our example image
- Migrate to free Chainguard equivalent
- Using Multistage Builds
- Troubleshoot distroless containers
- Signing an image
- Scanners and more
- Q&A

# Prerequisites

- Docker installed
  - Podman should also work
- Git installed
- Bash >4
- Trivy
- Gype
- Syft
- Cosign
- Jq
- Docker hub account



# Open Source Software Has Transformed Software Development

2%  
Source Code

98%  
Open Source



 python  Java

 GO  C  node

 cilium  MariaDB

 Grafana  kubernetes

# Heartbleed Bug

The Heartbleed Bug is a serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL software library. This weakness allows stealing the information protected, under normal conditions, by the SSL/TLS encryption used to secure the Internet. SSL/TLS provides communication privacy over the Internet for applications such as web, email, instant messaging (IM) and some virtual private networks (VPNs).


The Heartbleed bug allows anyone on the Internet to read the memory of vulnerable versions of the OpenSSL. This compromises the secret keys used to identify the service and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the actual content. This allows attackers to eavesdrop on communications, steal data directly from the services and users and to impersonate services and users.



SCAN			
	Vulnerability	Severity	Package
>	CVE-2018-5709	Negligible	krb5
>	CVE-2018-7738	Negligible	util-linux
	CVE-2016-10228	Negligible	glibc
	CVE-2019-7309	Negligible	glibc
	CVE-2017-7245	Negligible	pcrc3
	CVE-2017-7246	Negligible	pcrc3
	CVE-2019-0654	Negligible	libtasn1-6
		Medium	krb5
		Medium	glibc
>	CVE-2019-11461	Medium	libonig
>	CVE-2019-11462	Medium	gnupg2
	CVE-2019-0510	Medium	krb5

# The Status Quo for CVE Management is Deeply Broken...























## Today's State: The CVE Doom Cycle





# Chainguard Images

- ✓ Dedicated OS-Level STIG
- ✓ Kernel Independent FIPS
- ✓ HTML OSCAP Scan Reports
- ✓ SLAs for CVE Remediation
- ✓ Zero CVEs
- ✓ Minimal Attack Surface
- ✓ All Maintained Versions
- ✓ SBOMs and Attestation

Latest version: 8.3.13-r0-fpm	 <b>envoy</b> Last changed 2 hours ago Latest version: 1.32.0	Latest version: 0.15.1
 <b>prometheus-pushgateway</b> Last changed 15 hours ago Latest version: 1.10.0	 <b>jenkins</b> Last changed 14 hours ago Latest version: 2.480	 <b>pytorch</b> Last changed 12 hours ago Latest version: 2.3.1-r5-py3.11-cuda12.3-cudnn
 <b>envoy</b> Last changed 2 hours ago Latest version: 1.32.0	 <b>node</b> Last changed 6 hours ago Latest version: 23.1.0	 <b>aspnet-runtime</b> Last changed 15 hours ago Latest version: 8.0.10
 <b>jenkins</b> Last changed 14 hours ago Latest version: 2.480	 <b>prometheus</b> Last changed 12 hours ago Latest version: 2.55.0	 <b>jdk</b> Last changed 12 hours ago Latest version: openjdk-24-r1-ea
 <b>node</b> Last changed 6 hours ago Latest version: 23.1.0	 <b>python</b> Last changed 2 hours ago Latest version: 3.13.0	 <b>nginx</b> Last changed 15 hours ago Latest version: 1.27.2
 <b>prometheus</b> Last changed 12 hours ago Latest version: 2.55.0	 <b>go</b> Last changed 16 hours ago Latest version: 1.23.2	 <b>php-fips</b> Last changed 15 hours ago Latest version: 8.3.13-r0-fpm
 <b>python</b> Last changed 2 hours ago Latest version: 3.13.0	 <b>jre</b> Last changed 14 hours ago Latest version: openjdk-24-r1-ea	 <b>prometheus-pushgateway</b> Last changed 15 hours ago Latest version: 1.10.0
 <b>go</b> Last changed 16 hours ago Latest version: 1.23.2	 <b>php</b>	 <b>envoy</b> Last changed 2 hours ago Latest version: 1.32.0

## Chainguard

cgr.dev/chainguard-private/python:latest

Latest CVE count

0

Daily average

0

Compressed size

22.39 MB

## Alternative

python:latest

Latest CVE count

176

Daily average


210

Compressed size


392.85 MB

## CVEs by Severity

### Chainguard



### Alternative



# ~~Shift Left.~~ Start Left.

## Delivered & Verified

Images with SBOMs attestations all signed with Sigstore and delivered to your registry of choice.



## Rebuilt Daily

From upstream open source projects and minimized.




## Scan & Patch CVEs

To fix any known or new vulnerabilities.



## Check Behavior

Changes in behavior between package versions are checked.



# Practical

- Switching to a free Chainguard Image
- Grab the code from:
  - <https://github.com/chainguard-dev/learning-labs-static/>


# Results

Build Based On	Size (MB)	CVEs (Grype)	CVEs (Scout)
golang	1330	329	72
cgr.dev/chainguard/go	1220	0	0
<a href="https://cgr.dev/chainguard/static">cgr.dev/chainguard/static</a>	18	0	0




# ... With Chainguard, ~~Shift Left~~ Start Left to Build Right

## Today's State: The CVE Doom Cycle



## Future State: Empower Developers to Innovate with Joy



# So what is this "static" thing?

- Dynamic binaries
  - Link against other libraries
  - Often system libraries
- Static binaries are fully self contained
- Rust and Go code itself is statically linked
  - **Except** against system libraries

# glibc and musl

- glibc is the "standard" Linux C library
  - But isn't good for static linking
  - Variant images available
- musl is an alternative C library
  - Can be statically linked
  - Sometimes compatibility concerns

# Static Variants

- Sometimes need a few common libraries
- Almost static?!
- [cgr.dev/chainguard/cc-dynamic](https://cgr.dev/chainguard/cc-dynamic)
  - `glibc`, `libgcc`
- [cgr.dev/chainguard/glibc-dynamic](https://cgr.dev/chainguard/glibc-dynamic)
  - `glibc`, `libgcc`, `libstdc++`

# A word on FIPS

- FIPS is not covered by this lab
- You are responsible for creating binaries and images which solely use FIPS cryptography
- [go-fips](#) image
  - Overview and advice
- [glibc-openssl-fips](#) image
  - Possibly useful as a base in multistage



# Static Binaries and Rust

- `cgr.dev/chainguard/glibc-dynamic` image should work
- Otherwise use musl target
  - E.g. `cargo build \`  
`--target=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl`

# What's "distroless"?

- Chainguard Images are often described as distroless
  - Contain minimum number of dependencies
  - No shell or package manager by default
  - But latest-dev variants available

# Different Image Flavours

- PROD and DEV Images
  - DEV Image comes with a:
    - Root-Access
    - Package-Manager
    - Shell
  - PROD Images comes without:
    - Root-User ( Non-root User only)
    - Package Manager
    - Shell
- Different Tags (Versions)
  - Standard
  - EOL Image Support
  - Immutable Digests vs. Mutable Tags
  - Epoch Tags



# Practical 2

- Debugging Distroless Containers

# Debugging Distroless

- Note latest-dev variants
- Docker Debug
- Ephemeral containers
- cdebug




# How we keep out CVEs

- Cut down dependencies
- Keep things up-to-date
- Apply patches when necessary
- Issue Security Advisories

# Wrap Up

- Simple to change to ~~Chainguard~~ Distroless Images
- Major advantages in size and security
- Large number of images available
  - Include -dev variants

# You want to build a ~~Chocolate~~ Container Factory?



# Introducing – Sigstore!

## Digital Signatures for Containers

- Open Source Project (Chainguard founders involved)

### Components:

- Cosign: sign/verify
- Fulcio: ephemeral certs
- Rekor: transparency log

Goal: make trust cryptographically verifiable



sigstore  
cosign

# Howto Sign an SBOM with Cosign

- <https://edu.chainguard.dev/open-source/sigstore/cosign/how-to-sign-an-sbom-with-cosign/>

- (And for mature organisations, use admission controller to only allow untampered signed images

<https://edu.chainguard.dev/open-source/sigstore/policy-controller/how-to-install-policy-controller/>)



# Further Resources

- [Chainguard Images Directory](#)
- [Chainguard Academy](#)
- [Docker Debug](#)
- [cdebug](#)
- [Statically Linking Go](#)