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Rustle: the first static analyzer for smart contracts in Rust

Matthew Jiang

Director of Security Team @ BlockSec



Outline

1

Motivation

2

Background

3

Design

4

Capability

5

Usability

6

Conclusion

Motivation

Why do we develop Rustle?



Motivation

Emerging chains with Rust as smart contracts language




CosmWasm

Limitations of manual audit

- Time-consuming
- Expensive
- Skilled auditors
- Error-prone

Motivation

Current tools:
Don't support
contracts in Rust




Background



Design


LLVM IR




LLVM Pass: rich APIs to analysis the LLVM IR

Blockchains with smart contracts in Rust

Near



Solana



Though they are compiled into bytecode in different formats, we can analyze the logic on the LLVM IR

Background

Rich experience in auditing smart contracts in Rust

Name	Category
1 Ref Finance 1 chain	Dexes
2 LiNEAR Protocol 1 chain	Liquid Staking
3 Meta Pool 2 chains	Liquid Staking
4 Burrow 1 chain	Lending
5 Orderly Network 1 chain	Dexes
6 Stader 6 chains	Liquid Staking
7 Phoenix Bonds 1 chain	Yield Aggregator
8 PembRock Finance 1 chain	Yield

Design



Design

Workflow



Design

Example

Reentrancy Attack

```
pub fn withdraw(&mut self, amount: U128) -> Promise {  
    assert!(self.balance >= amount.into(), "insufficient balance");  
    self.balance hasn't been modified upon second entrance  
    ext_ft_core::ext(self.token_id.clone())  
        .with_attached_deposit(1)  
        .with_static_gas(GAS_FOR_FT_TRANSFER_CALL)  
        .ft_transfer_call(self.depositor.clone(), amount, None, "".to_string())  
    .then(  
        Reentrancy point, hand over control flow to external contract  
        ext_self::ext(env::current_account_id())  
            .with_static_gas(GAS_FOR_FT_RESOLVE_TRANSFER)  
            .with_attached_deposit(0)  
            .callback_withdraw(amount),  
    )  
}
```

ft_transfer_call()

```
#[private]  
pub fn callback_withdraw(&mut self, amount: U128) {  
    match env::promise_result(0) {  
        PromiseResult::NotReady => unreachable!(),  
        PromiseResult::Successful(_) => {  
            self.balance -= amount.0;  
        }  
        State change  
        PromiseResult::Failed => {}  
    };  
}
```

Design

```
pub fn callback_withdraw(&mut self, amount: U128) {
    match env::promise_result(0) {
        PromiseResult::NotReady => unreachable!(),
        PromiseResult::Successful(_) => {
            self.balance -= amount.0;
        }
        PromiseResult::Failed => {}
    };
}
```

```
call void
@_ZN8near_sdk11environment3env14promise_result17hdbc39eb9958e6bdc
E(ptr sret(%"near_sdk::types::vm_types::PromiseResult") %_21, i64 0)
#9, !dbg !4685
%_22 = load i32, ptr %_21, align 4, !dbg !4685, !range !2246, !noundef !35
switch i32 %_22, label %bb9 [
    i32 0, label %bb10
    i32 1, label %bb11
    i32 2, label %bb13
], !dbg !4686
```



```
bb10:
; call core::panicking::panic
call void
@_ZN4core9panicking5panic17h364c37174a08a6a4E(ptr align 1 @alloc438, i32 40, ptr align 4 @alloc440) #10, !dbg !4687
unreachable, !dbg !4687
```

```
bb11:
%_6 = load i128, ptr %self, align 8, !dbg !4688
%_25_0 = sub i128 %_6, %amount, !dbg !4688
%_25_1 = icmp ult i128 %_6, %amount, !dbg !4688
%7 = call i1 @llvm.expect.i1(i1 %_25_1, i1
false), !dbg !4688
br i1 %7, label %panic, label %bb12, !dbg !4688
```

```
bb13:
; call core::ptr::drop_in_place<near_sdk::types::vm_types::PromiseResult>
call void
@_ZN4core3ptr61drop_in_place$LT$near_sdk..types..vm_types..PromiseResult$GT$17hc8d1a50a856c2b05E(ptr %_21) #9, !dbg !4689
ret void, !dbg !4690
```

```
bb12:
store i128 %_25_0, ptr %self, align 8, !dbg !4688
br label %bb13, !dbg !4691
```

[!] Changing state upon `PromiseResult::Successful` at [src/lib.rs:71:17](#) may lead to reentrancy.

Design

Advantages

- Support different chains with smart contracts in Rust
- Support to add new detectors for extension
- Support different platforms/OSSs

Capability

- Being able to locate 30 different types of vulnerabilities
- Being able to find real world vulnerabilities



Capability

Rich Detectors

- Each detector can locate one specific type of security issues
- Rustle currently supports 30 different detectors
- For the complete list, refer to <https://github.com/blocksecteam/rustle#detectors>

Detectors

All vulnerabilities Rustle can find.

Detector ID	Description	Severity
unhandled-promise	find <code>Promises</code> that are not handled	High
non-private-callback	missing macro <code>#[private]</code> for callback functions	High
reentrancy	find functions that are vulnerable to reentrancy attack	High
unsafe-math	lack of overflow check for arithmetic operation	High
self-transfer	missing check of <code>sender != receiver</code>	High
incorrect-json-type	incorrect type used in parameters or return values	High
unsaved-changes	changes to collections are not saved	High
nft-approval-check	find <code>nft_transfer</code> without check of <code>approval id</code>	High
nft-owner-check	find approve or revoke functions without owner check	High

Capability

Assume `collateral_amount` is 3, `self.0` is 2,
then `liquidity_amout` will be `round(3 / 2) = 2`
the returned `collateral_amount` will be `round(2 * 2) = 4 > 3`,
you can get more than you collateralized

Real case

SPL-Lending
Incorrect rounding

```
555     pub fn collateral_to_liquidity(&self, collateral_amount: u64) -> Result<u64, ProgramError> {
556         Decimal::from(collateral_amount)
557             .try_div(self.0)?
558             .try_round_u64()
559     }                                rounding can be manipulated
```

```
570     pub fn liquidity_to_collateral(&self, liquidity_amount: u64) -> Result<u64, ProgramError> {
571         self.0.try_mul(liquidity_amount)? .try_round_u64()
572     }
```

Rustle's Result:

```
[!] Find round at token-lending/program/src/state/reserve.rs:556:9
[!] Find round at token-lending/program/src/state/reserve.rs:571:9
[!] Find round at token-lending/program/src/state/reserve.rs:681:30
[!] Find round at token-lending/program/src/state/reserve.rs:688:17
```

Capability

Real case

NearX - \$830K
Self-transfer

Rustle's Result:

```
[*] Find ft_transfer _ZN6near_x14fungible_token11ne
[!] Lack self-transfer check for ft_transfer
[*] Find ft_transfer_call _ZN6near_x14fungible_toke
[!] Lack self-transfer check for ft_transfer_call
```

(both ft_transfer and ft_transfer_call invoke internal_neax_transfer)

```
impl NearxPool {
    pub fn internal_nearx_transfer(
        &mut self,
        sender_id: &AccountId,
        receiver_id: &AccountId,
        amount: u128,
    ) {
        assert!(amount > 0, "The amount should be a positive number");
        let mut sender_acc = self.internal_get_account(sender_id);
        let mut receiver_acc = self.internal_get_account(receiver_id);
        assert!(
            amount <= sender_acc.stake_shares,
            "{} does not have enough NearX balance {}",
            sender_id,
            sender_acc.stake_shares
        );
        sender_acc and receiver_acc can be the same
        sender_acc.stake_shares -= amount;
        receiver_acc.stake_shares += amount;

        self.internal_update_account(sender_id, &sender_acc);
        self.internal_update_account(receiver_id, &receiver_acc);
    }
}
```

Capability

Real case

Wormhole - \$321M
Lack of owner-check

```
92     let current_instruction = solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_current_index(
93         &accs.instruction_acc.try_borrow_mut_data()?,
94     );
95     if current_instruction == 0 {
96         return Err(InstructionAtWrongIndex.into());
97     }
98
99     // The previous ix must be a secp verification instruction
100    let secp_ix_index = (current_instruction - 1) as u8;
101    let secp_ix = solana_program::sysvar::instructions::load_instruction_at(
102        secp_ix_index as usize,
103        &accs.instruction_acc.try_borrow_mut_data()?,
104    )
105        .map_err(|_| ProgramError::InvalidAccountData)?;
```

secp_ix can be controlled with a fake accs.instruction_acc

Rustle's Result:

```
[!] Require owner check at program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:92:31
[!] Require owner check at program/src/api/verify_signature.rs:101:19
```

Usability

With complex technology stack, Rustle is easy to use



Easy to use

Launch Rustle with a single command in multiple platforms

- Easy to set up: run a few commands to install
- Easy to launch: **./Rustle -h**
- Easy to deploy: Linux, macOS, Docker

Usability

Results in different formats

CLI, CSV, Notion, and etc.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	file	name	high	medium	low	info			
2	src/common.ma	get_sqrt_price	unsafe math at <L63>:						
3	src/common.ma	get_log_sqrt_price	unsafe math at <L136 L138>:						
4	src/management	pause_pool							
5	src/management	resume_pool							
6	src/management	extend_frozenlist_tokens							
7	src/management	remove_frozenlist_tokens							
8	src/management	modify_protocol_fee_rate							
9	src/management	claim_charged_fee	unsafe math at <L91 L90 L92 L83>	public interface:					
10	src/tokens	receive_ft_on_transfer	unsafe math at <L10>:call to <internal_add_order_with_swap(L120> internal_add_order>						
11	src/nft.rs	internal_change_owner_without_check							
12	src/nft.rs	internal_transfer							
13	src/nft.rs	nft_transfer							
14	src/nft.rs	nft_transfer_call							
15	src/mmd.rs	get_liquidity_range							
16	src/mmd.rs	get_pointorder_range							
17	src/mmd.rs	get_markedepth	unsafe math at <L172 L174 L165> loop with complex logic at <L72>; public interface:						
18	src/mmd.rs	range_info_to_the_left	unsafe math at <L172 L174 L165> loop with complex logic at <L72>; public interface:						
19	src/mmd.rs	range_info_to_the_right	unsafe math at <L172 L174 L165> loop with complex logic at <L72>; public interface:						
20	src/pointorder.rs	update_endpoint	unsafe math at <L20>:require gas check for storage expansion:						
21	src/swap.rs	quote							
22	src/swap.rs	internal_swap	unsafe math at <L195> call to <internal_swap> with unused return value:						
23	src/swap.rs	internal_swap_by_ou	unsafe math at <L195> call to <internal_swap_by_ou> with unused return value:						
24	src/swap.rs	internal_swap_by_stc	unsafe math at <L195> call to <internal_swap_by_stc> with unused return value:						
25	src/user_asset.rs	add_asset_uncheck							
26	src/user_asset.rs	sub_asset							
27	src/user_asset.rs	get_user_asset							
28	src/user_asset.rs	list_user_assets	u64 with too large integer type if public interface:						
29	src/user_asset.rs	withdraw_asset	transfer at <L89>; public interface:						

summary		Notion	
All file	info	Issue	Summary
src/swap_math.rs	used of E208_INTERNAL_ERR1		x_swap_x_range_complete
src/swap_math.rs	used of E210_INTERNAL_ERR3		y_swap_y_range_complete
src/tokens_receivers	call to <internal_add_order_with_swap(L111> internal_add_order(L103> > with unused return value;		it_on_transfer
src/lib.rs	require assert_one_yocto check for privilege function;		is_owner_or_operators
src/mmd.rs	loop with complex logic at 160; unsafe math at 174;		get_markedepth
src/mmd.rs	loop with complex logic at 212; unsafe math at 243;		range_info_to_the_left_of_cp
src/mmd.rs	loop with complex logic at 208; unsafe math at 334;		range_info_to_the_right_of_cp
src/user_orders.rs	call to <internal_update_order(L58> > with unused return value;		get_order
src/user_orders.rs	call to <internal_update_order(L50> > with unused return value;		find_order
src/user_orders.rs	call to <internal_update_order(L12> > with unused return value;		list_active_orders
src/user_orders.rs	transfer at 263; timestamp use unhandled promise at 271; require assert_one_yocto check for privilege function; call to <process_ft_transfer(L> cancel_order		
src/user_orders.rs	transfer at 453; unhandled promise at 453;		internal_add_order_with_swap
src/user_orders.rs	timestamp use at 559; call to <process_ft_transfer(L453> process_near_transfer(L453> > with unused return value;		internal_add_order
src/ubdk.rs	used of E400_INVALID_POOL_ID		gen_from
src/ubdk.rs	used of E400_INVALID_POOL_ID		is_err_y
src/ubdk.rs	used of E400_INVALID_POOL_ID		parse
src/poolrs	unsafe math at 89;		pass_endpoint
src/poolrs	loop with complex logic at 221;		internal_swap_y
src/poolrs	loop with complex logic at 407;		internal_swap_x
src/poolrs	loop with complex logic at 549;		internal_x_swap_y_desire_y
src/poolrs	loop with complex logic at 700;		internal_y_swap_x_desire_x
src/poolrs	unsafe math at 839;		internal_remove_liquidity
src/poolrs	transfer at 1079;		create_pool

Extend Rustle to support locating new vulnerabilities

Welcome to Contribute

- Write an LLVM pass as detector plugin
- Add compiling option in **Makefile**
- Specify severity in **Rustle**
- Complete documentation and samples is preferred



Conclusion

- Rustle is the first static analyzer for smart contracts in Rust and has been integrated into our workflow
- Rustle supports checking various types of security vulnerabilities and can identify them in the wild
- Rustle is highly scalable and can be easily extended to support new features
- Rustle is open source (<https://github.com/blocksecteam/rustle>) and powered by BlockSec
(<https://blocksec.com/>)



Thank you !



Q & A



- Email: contact@blocksec.com
- Website: <https://www.blocksec.com>
- Medium: <https://blocksecteam.medium.com>

