







- Centralized
- No intra-nodes communication
- Cloud-dependent
- Very popular:    



Ideal smart (ECA) devices setting

- Fully distributed
- Communication between nodes
- Cloud-agnostic





Excerpt from Modello A:

*[...] We will develop a **new programming model, integrating ECA, Attribute-based Programming**, and Aggregate Programming. This will require the definition of a **suitable formal model (e.g. a process algebra) for "ECA Attribute-based Programming"**, merging concepts from **AbC** and the field calculus [...] On the basis of this programming model, we will provide techniques and tools for the static and dynamic verification of attribute-based programs [...] At the implementation level, we will embed our model within languages such as Java, Haskell, or Erlang.*

Nodes behavior: **ECA rules**

Nodes state: **local memory**

Communication: **remote updates**



Attribute-based interaction: send (the value of) **e** to all nodes satisfying Π

	AbC	AbU
<i>Communication</i>	message-passing	memory updates
<i>Output</i>	$e @ \Pi$	$@ \Pi$
<i>Input</i>	$x \mid \Pi$	nodes invariant

In AbU there are no explicit input primitives, to filter incoming updates.
But we can specify *admissible* states by means of state invariants.

- An **AbU system** S is a **AbU node** $R, \iota \langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle$ or the parallel of systems $S_1 \parallel S_2$
- Each node is equipped with a list R of **AbU rules**

Syntax

rule $::= \text{evt} \triangleright \text{act, task}$

evt $::= x \mid \text{evt evt}$

act $::= \epsilon \mid x \leftarrow \epsilon \text{ act} \mid \bar{x} \leftarrow \epsilon \text{ act}$



task $::= \text{cnd} : \text{act}$

cnd $::= \varphi \mid @ \varphi$

$\varphi, \iota ::= F \mid T \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \varphi \vee \varphi \mid \epsilon \bowtie \epsilon$

$\epsilon ::= v \mid x \mid \bar{x} \mid \epsilon \otimes \epsilon$

$x \in \mathbb{X} \quad v \in \mathbb{V}$



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
$x \in \mathbb{X} \quad v \in \mathbb{V}$

for all: $@(x < \bar{x}) \bar{x} \leftarrow x$

“send to all nodes with (remote) x greater than the sender (local) x ”

“assign the receiver (remote) x with the sender (local) x ”

The AbU calculus (Cont'd)



Invariants are predicates over states which must not be violated, i.e., updates which would violated ι will be not executed.

Given a set X of resources that have been changed

- Active rules: rules $\text{evt} \triangleright \text{act}, \text{task}$ in R such that $\text{evt} \cap X \neq \emptyset$
- External tasks: tasks $@\varphi : \text{act}$ of active rules
 - Pre-evaluation: $\{\@ (x < \bar{x}) : \bar{y} \leftarrow x + \bar{y}\} [x \mapsto 1 \ y \mapsto 0] = (1 \leq x) : y \leftarrow 1 + y$

Semantics

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{upd} \in \Theta \quad \text{upd} = (x_1, v_1) \dots (x_k, v_k) \quad \Sigma' = \Sigma[v_1/x_1 \dots v_k/x_k] \\
 \Theta'' = \Theta \setminus \{\text{upd}\} \quad X = \{x_i \mid i \in [1..k] \wedge \Sigma(x_i) \neq \Sigma'(x_i)\} \quad \Sigma' \models \iota \\
 \Theta' = \Theta'' \cup \text{DefUpds}(R, X, \Sigma) \cup \text{LocalUpds}(R, X, \Sigma) \quad T = \text{ExtTasks}(R, X, \Sigma) \\
 \text{(EXEC)} \frac{}{R, \iota\langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{upd} \triangleright T} R, \iota\langle \Sigma', \Theta' \rangle} \\
 \\
 \Theta'' = \{\llbracket \text{act} \rrbracket \Sigma \mid \exists i \in [1..n]. \text{task}_i = @\varphi : \text{act} \wedge \Sigma \models \varphi\} \quad \Theta' = \Theta \cup \Theta'' \\
 \text{(DISC)} \frac{}{R, \iota\langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{task}_1 \dots \text{task}_n} R, \iota\langle \Sigma, \Theta' \rangle}
 \end{array}$$

- Similar (INPUT) rule for sensors change, with labels of the form: $\text{upd} \blacktriangleright T$
- The **discovery phase** is used for synchronization:


$$\text{(STEP)} \frac{S_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} S'_1 \quad S_2 \xrightarrow{T} S'_2}{S_1 \parallel S_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha} S'_1 \parallel S'_2} \quad \alpha \in \{\text{upd} \triangleright T, \text{upd} \blacktriangleright T\}$$

Semantics


$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{upd} \in \Theta \quad \text{upd} = (x_1, v_1) \dots (x_k, v_k) \quad \Sigma' = \Sigma[v_1/x_1 \dots v_k/x_k] \\
 \Sigma' \not\models \iota \quad \Theta' = \Theta \setminus \{\text{upd}\} \\
 \text{(EXEC-FAIL)} \frac{}{R, \iota\langle \Sigma, \Theta \rangle \xrightarrow{\text{upd} \triangleright T} R, \iota\langle \Sigma', \Theta' \rangle} \\
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Encoding AbC into AbU



- Reconstruct the sequential execution flow of AbC components, by means of **token-passing** mechanism to activate rules (program counter)
- Encode attribute-based communication with **attribute-based memory updates**

Theorem (AbC to AbU correctness)


Consider an AbC component C and its corresponding AbU encoding $S = \mathcal{T}(C)$. Then, for all C' such that $C \rightarrow^* C'$ there exists S' such that $S \rightarrow^* S'$ and $S' \succeq C'$.

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The wave semantics may exhibit **internal divergence**, namely $S \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} S^0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \dots$

ECA
dependency graph



rule A $r_4(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$

rule B $r_3 r_2(\square) : r_4 \leftarrow \square$

rule C $r_5(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square$


rule D $r_1(\square) : r_2 \leftarrow \square$

Theorem (AbU stabilization)

If the ECA dependency graph of an AbU system S is acyclic, then S is stabilizing.

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ECA
dependency graph



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
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
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Theorem (AbU stabilization)

If the ECA dependency graph of an AbU system S is acyclic, then S is stabilizing.

The AbU **scheduler** should not influence the AbU semantics: for all S_1 and S_2 such that $S \rightarrow^* S_1$ and $S \rightarrow^* S_2$, there exists S' such that $S_1 \rightarrow^* S'$ and $S_2 \rightarrow^* S'$

labeled ECA
dependency graph



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
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Theorem (AbU confluence)

If for each pair (x, y) of nodes in the labeled ECA dependency graph of an AbU system S we have that $|\text{walks}(x, y)| \leq 1$, then S is confluent.

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labeled ECA
dependency graph



rule A $r_4(\square) : r_6 \leftarrow \square \quad r_3 \leftarrow \square$

rule B $r_3 \ r_2(\square) : r_4 \leftarrow \square$


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
Security



Safety




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
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


Safety



Security: protection of confidential data (noninterference)


- Security policy: L (**public**) and H (**confidential**) resources
- No flows from H to L allowed
- Bisimulation \approx_{h_L} that hides L-level updates



for all **L-equivalent states** $\Sigma_1 \equiv_L \Sigma'_1 \dots \Sigma_n \equiv_L \Sigma'_n$

Safety: prevention of **unintended** interactions


- The systems S and R are known to be safe
- Is the ensemble of all nodes in S and R still safe?
- Bisimulation \approx_{h_S} that hides the updates of S



S does not interact with, or is **transparent** for, R

Hiding bisimulation

- Weak bisimulation **hiding** labels not related to the requirements
- Parametric on a **function** h making non-observable labels α such that $h(\alpha) = \diamond$



Security h_L hides:

- discovery labels
- execution labels with H resources


Safety h_S hides:

- discovery labels
- execution labels produced by S

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A (modular) distributed implementation



- ECA rules engine module: AbU semantics
- Device drivers module: abstraction of physical resources
- Distribution module: abstraction of send/receive and cluster nodes join/leave

AbU-lang: a Domain Specific Language for the IoT


```

1  # AbU devices definition.
2
3  hvac : "An HVAC control system" {
4      physical output boolean heating = false
5      physical output boolean condit = false
6      logical integer temp = 0
7      logical integer humidity = 0
8      physical input boolean airButton
9      logical string node = "hvac"
10     where not (condit and heating == true)
11 } has cool warm dry stopAir
12
13 tempSens : "A temperature sensor" {
14     physical input integer temp
15     logical string node = "tempSens"
16 } has notifyTemp
17
18 humSens : "A humidity sensor" {
19     physical input integer humidity
20     logical string node = "humSens"
21 } has notifyHum
    
```

```


22  \%
23     AbU (ECA) rules definition.
24     Rules can be referenced by multiple devices.
25  \%
26
27  rule cool on temp
28     for (this.temp < 18) do this.heating = true
29
30  rule warm on temp
31     for (this.temp > 27) do this.heating = false
32
33  rule dry on humidity; temp
34     for (this.temp * 0.14 < this.humidity)
35         do this.condit = true
36
37  rule stopAir on airButton
38     for (this.airButton) do this.condit = false
39
40  rule notifyTemp on temp
41     for all (ext.node == "hvac")
42         do ext.temp = this.temp
    
```

AbU-lang Programs Compilation Cycle




Prototype compiler from AbU-lang to **Golang** (available at <https://github.com/abu-lang>)

- Hashicorp Memberlist for cluster membership (gossip-based protocol)
- Transactional communication (three-phase commit protocol)
- GOBOT library for physical IoT input/output



Docker-based simulator for AbU nodes

- Quick multiple nodes definition via node **prototypes**
- Automatic deployment and interaction of nodes (one Docker image per node)
- Web-based inputs management and resources visualization



AbU

- Simple to use (**ECA paradigm**)
- Particularly suitable for the IoT domain
- Strongly distributed
- Local nodes coordination (**Attribute-based memory updates**)
- Supports several verification techniques

- Efficient distributed implementation of AbU
 - ▶ Distributed RETE algorithm (RPCs or message-passing)
 - ▶ More implementations (e.g., for Android, in Java)
- Porting (ECA) verification techniques from ECA-languages (e.g., [IE17]) to AbU
- Distributed runtime monitor for AbU
 - ▶ Runtime enforcing of correctness properties (e.g., [RV17])

[IE17] Vannucchi C. et al. (2017) vIRONy: A tool for analysis and verification of ECA rules in intelligent environments

[RV17] Francalanza A. et al. (2017) A Foundation for Runtime Monitoring

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Almost there!
Thanks for the attention!