Information design (or Bayesian persuasion) models scenarios where a principal strategically re veals her private information to incentivize an agent to play preferred actions. For instance, a seller may want to reveal only partial details about her products to incentivize an agent to buy a particular one, or a school may want to issue only coarse grades to improve its students' job outcomes [Boleslavsky and Cotton, 2015; Kamenica, 2019; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2010]. The characterization also result in an efficient algorithm to compute optimal mechanisms, thereby highlighting both the computational and utility benefits they offer. Additionally, we provide matching hardness results that emerge when these additional design choices are not employed, thereby highlighting their computational benefits.The standard information design model assumes that the principal knows the utility func tion of the agent [Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011], which may not hold in practice. Numerous works subsequently study a model where the principal does not know the agent's type but has a prior over it [Alonso and Cˆ amara, 2018; Bernasconi et al., 2023; Castiglioni et al., 2020, 2022, 2023; Gill and Sgroi, 2008; Kolotilin et al., 2017; Perez-Richet, 2014]. The principal may try to design the signaling scheme (i.e., strategically reveal her private information) to maximize her expected utility given only this prior. Another, possibly better, alternative for the principal, if feasible, is to ask the agent to reveal his type before the principal sends her signal, through an elicitation process. In this case, the agent may be credible, i.e., take actions consistent with his reported type, or be non-credible, i.e., report any type and then play any, possibly inconsistent, action afterward 1 (essentially, cheap talk). In this paper, we study such scenarios, with a particular focus on credible agents. It necessitates additional design choices that would be unnecessary when the agent is non-credible. We introduce novel stages in the mechanism design and provide non-trivial examples to demonstrate strict payoff improvements they achieve. Moreover, we characterize optimal mechanisms under these additional design choices and prove the general optimaility they lead to.