

# Software quality and formal methods: Hoare/Dijkstra approach

Dr. Ivan S. Zapreev

Neat Software Designs

2020-01-24

## Global Outline:

- Software Quality
- Programming Languages
- Formal Verification
- Frama-C Framework
- Verification Practice
- Concluding Remarks

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

# Software Quality

# Software Quality: Outline

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

- Motivating examples
- Software Development
- Software Verification

# Motivating examples: Therac-25

Years 1985–1987: Radiation overdose

- Control software flaw:
  - Race conditions
- Death of 6 (six) cancer patients




Figure 1: Radiation therapy

# Motivating examples: Ariane-5

Year 1996: Missile crash

- Control software flaw:
  - 64-bit float to 16-bit integer conversion
- \$137 million Rocket + \$500 million cargo



Figure 2: Space flights

# Motivating examples: Toyota

Year 2005: Sudden unintended acceleration

- Control software flaw:
  - Recursion causing stack overflow
- 89 deaths and 57 injuries
- \$1.2 billion compensations



Figure 3: Toyota Camry

Motivating examples: Plenty More

# BUGS



## BUGS EVERYWHERE

The 12 Software Bugs That Caused Epic Failures: [<link>](#)

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks



# Software Development: V-model




Figure 4: Software development process

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

# Software Development: V & V

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

## Software **Validation** and **Verification**.

Formally defined by the International Organization for Standardization, see ISO-9000:2015:

- **Verification** – *“Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled.”*
- **Validation** – *“Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the requirements for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled.”*

Software  
Quality  
  
Programming  
Languages  
  
Formal  
Verification  
  
Frama-C  
Framework  
  
Verification  
Practice  
  
Concluding  
Remarks

# Software Development: Testing

- **Verification:**
  - Are we building the product right?
  - Does the system comply with its specification?
- **Validation:**
  - Are we building the right product?
  - Does the system meet the needs of the customer?




Figure 5: Types of testing

# Software Verification: Formal

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

## Formal verification<sup>1</sup>:

*"Is the act of proving or disproving the correctness of intended algorithms underlying a system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics."*

## Formal methods<sup>2</sup>:

*"Formal methods are techniques used to model complex systems as mathematical entities."*

*"By building a rigorous model of a complex system, it is possible to verify the system's properties in a more thorough fashion than empirical testing."*

---

<sup>1</sup>"Formal Verification" on Wikipedia

<sup>2</sup>"Formal Methods", Michael Collins, CMU

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

# Programming Languages

# Programming Languages: Outline

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

- Language Generations
- Declarative vs. Imperative
- What is ANSI-C?

# Language Generations




Figure 6: Generations of Programming languages

# Declarative vs. Imperative: Main

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

Consider a problem of multiplying all array elements by 2:

- **Declarative** – Specifies **what** to achieve:

```
//Declarative `JavaScript`  
var arr_dbl = arr.map((x) => x * 2)
```

- **Imperative** – Defines the **how** steps:

```
//Imperative `JavaScript`  
var arr_dbl = []  
for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {  
    arr_dbl.push(arr[i] * 2)  
}
```



# Declarative vs. Imperative: Test

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality  
Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks




Figure 7: If you laugh, it means you've passed

# What is ANSI-C: An old C

## C language:

C is an *imperative procedural* language.

## Procedural language:

Is an imperative language in which the program is built from one or more subroutines commonly known as *functions*.

## Defining ANSI-C:

ANSI-C is a common name for two equivalent standards:

- C89 – American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
- C90 – International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

# Formal Verification

# Formal Verification: Outline

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality  
  
Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

- Verification Goal
- Hoare Approach
- Dijkstra Extension

# Verification Goal: Global

A *program* shall satisfy a formal specification of its *behavior*.




Figure 8: Verification methods

# Verification Goal: Proving

Mathematically prove conformance to formal specifications.




Figure 9: Formal correctness proving

## Consider:

The Hoare/Dijkstra approach for proving correctness of *imperative programs*.

## Hoare Approach<sup>3</sup>

**Hoare triples:**  $\{P\} C \{Q\}$

$C$  - code;  $P$  - pre-condition;  $Q$  - post-condition;

**Axioms**, e.g. *Skip* and *Assign*:

$$\overline{\{P\} \text{skip} \{P\}} \text{ and } \overline{\{P[E/V]\} V := E \{P\}}$$

Where  $E$  is any expression and  $V$  is any variable.

**Inference rules**, e.g. *Composition* and *Conditional*:

$$\frac{\{P\} S_1 \{R\}, \{R\} S_2 \{Q\}}{\{P\} S_1; S_2 \{Q\}} \text{ and } \frac{\{B \wedge P\} S \{Q\}, \{\neg B \wedge P\} T \{Q\}}{\{P\} \text{ if } B \text{ then } S \text{ else } T \text{ elseif } \{Q\}}$$

**Partial correctness:** If  $P$  holds before executing  $C$  then  $Q$  holds afterwards, **ONLY** if  $C$  terminates.

---

<sup>3</sup>"An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming", Tony Hoare, 1969.

## Dijkstra Extension<sup>4</sup>

The *weakest pre-condition calculus* for  $\{P\} C \{Q\}$

- Explains how  $C$  transforms  $P$  into  $Q$ ;
- Gives a predicate transform semantics for proofs;

**Backward reasoning:** ( $W.P.$ )

- Based on  $Q$  and  $C$  calculate the *weakest pre-condition*  $\hat{P}$
- If  $P \implies \hat{P}$ , then  $\{P\} C \{Q\}$  holds

**Forward reasoning:** ( $S.P.$ )

- Based on  $P$  and  $C$  calculate the *strongest post-condition*  $\hat{Q}$
- If  $\hat{Q} \implies Q$ , then  $\{P\} C \{Q\}$  holds

---

<sup>4</sup>“Guarded commands, non-determinacy and formal derivation of programs”, Edsger Dijkstra, 1975



Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

**Frama-C  
Framework**

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

# Frama-C Framework

# Frama-C Framework: Outline

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality  
  
Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

- Framework Description
- Plugins Overview
- What is ACSL?

# Framework Description

Frama-C is a:

- Plug-in-based
- Open-source
- Cross-platform

framework for ANSI-C source-code analysis:

- Browse unfamiliar code
- Static code analysis
- Dynamic code analysis
- Code transformations
- Certification of critical software

You can easily build upon the existing plug-ins to implement your own analysis.

# Plugins Overview: Main




Figure 10: Frama-C plugins

# Plugins Overview: WP

WP – *weakest precondition* for ACSL specs of ANSI-C programs.




Figure 11: Frama-C WP plugin

# What is ACSL: General

In short:

- ACSL – ANSI/ISO C Specification Language
- Allows to formally specify properties of C programs

It is all about function contracts:

```
/*@ ensures \result >= x && \result >= y;  
    ensures \result == x || \result == y;  
*/  
  
int max (int x, int y) {  
    return(x > y) ? x : y;  
}
```

A function contract is a combination of:

- post-conditions - ensures
- pre-conditions - requires

# What is ACSL: Pointers

ACSL allows to reason about, e.g.:

- Pointers
- Arrays
- Termination

Consider pointers:

```
/*@ requires \valid(x) && \valid(y);  
    ensures *x <= *y;  
    */  
void max_ptr (int *x, int *y) {  
    if(*x > *y) {  
        int tmp = *x;  
        *x = *y;  
        *y = tmp;  
    }  
}
```

# What is ACSL: Completeness

Is the following max\_ptr implementation correct?

```
/*@ requires \valid(x) ∧ \valid(y);
    ensures *x <= *y;
*/
void max_ptr (int *x, int *y) {
    *x = *y = 0;
}
```

We need to make our specification **complete**:

```
/*@ requires \valid(x) ∧ \valid(y);
    ensures *x <= *y;
    ensures (*x == \old(*x) ∧ *y == \old(*y)) ||
           (*x == \old(*y) ∧ *y == \old(*x));
*/
void max_ptr(int *x, int *y);
```



# What is ACSL: The whole spec.

The complete ACSL specification v1.4 has 93 pages:

[https://frama-c.com/download/acsl\\_1.4.pdf](https://frama-c.com/download/acsl_1.4.pdf)



Figure 12: Feel free to explore

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality  
Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

**Verification  
Practice**

Concluding  
Remarks

# Verification Practice

# Verification Practice: Outline

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality  
  
Programming  
Languages  
  
Formal  
Verification  
  
Frama-C  
Framework  
  
Verification  
Practice  
  
Concluding  
Remarks

- Verification Examples
- Verification Outcomes
- Experience Summary

# Verification Examples: abs(.)

Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality  
Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

Consider a primitive integer absolute value computation:

```
/*@  
    ensures \result >= 0;  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val < 0) return -val;  
    return val;  
}
```

The verification shall return **OK**, right?

# Verification Examples: Issue #1

## NOP - the verification results are inconclusive:

```
/*@ ensures
    (\old(val) == 0 => \result == 0) ^
    (\old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val)) ^
    (\old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val));
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val < 0) {
        /*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: -2147483647 <= val; */
        __retres = - val;
        goto return_label;
    }
    __retres = val;
    return_label: return __retres;
}
```

Information	Messages (2)	Console	Properties	Values	Red Alarms	WP Goals
<div>← → ↻ Property ▾ All Results ▾</div>						
Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	
abs	Post-condition	Typed	●	—		
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	—	—	✖	

Figure 13: WP detects a possible overflow

## Verification Examples: Issue #2

Extend the specification with a pre-condition:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures \result >= 0;  
    */  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val < 0) return -val;  
    return val;  
}
```

The verification is **OK**, but the spec is NOT complete:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures \result >= 0;  
    */  
int abs(int val) {  
    return 1;  
}
```

# Verification Examples: Final?

An explicit `\result` value specification makes it complete:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0) &&  
           (val > 0 ==> \result == val) &&  
           (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val < 0) return -val;  
    return val;  
}
```

What if the implementation was wrong?

Would we be able to identify the root-cause?

## Verification Examples: Faulty

Consider a lengthy and potentially buggy implementation:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0) &&  
           (val > 0 ==> \result == val) &&  
           (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val == 0) {  
        return 0;  
    } else {  
        if(val < 0) {  
            return val;  
        } else {  
            return -val;  
        }  
    }  
}
```



# Verification Examples: Issue #3

The verification is inconclusive, the prover has failed!

The screenshot displays the Frama-C IDE interface. The top pane shows a C code snippet with annotations. The bottom pane shows a table of verification goals.

```
/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
   ensures
      (\old(val) == 0 => \result == 0) ^
      (\old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val)) ^
      (\old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val));
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        __retres = 0;
        goto return_label;
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
```

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	C
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—	✂	
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	●	—		

Figure 14: What is the actual reason?

## Verification Examples: Split

What if we split the post-condition from:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0) &&  
           (val > 0 ==> \result == val) &&  
           (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/
```

into separate statements:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);  
    ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);  
    ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/
```

and then run verification again.

# Verification Examples: Insights

This gives us insights into what could be wrong:

```
/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
    ensures \old(val) == 0 => \result == 0;
    ensures \old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val);
    ensures \old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val);
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        __retres = 0;
        goto return_label;
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
```

\*\*\*\*\*

Information	Messages (2)	Console	Properties	Values	Red Alarms	WP Goals
			Property ▾	All Results ▾		
Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	C
abs	Post-condition	Typed		—		
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—		
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—		

Figure 15: Finding the root-causes

## Verification Examples: Bugs

Now we can now look into the code and identify bugs:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);
    ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);
    ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);
*/
int abs(int val) {
    if(val == 0) {
        return 0;           //OK
    } else {
        if(val < 0) {
            return val;     //BUG #1, should return -val
        } else {
            return -val;    //BUG #2, should return val
        }
    }
}
```

# Verification Examples: Issue #4

Fixing BUG #1 turns the corresponding post-conditions green!

```

/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
    ensures \old(val) == 0 => \result == 0;
    ensures \old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val);
    ensures \old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val);
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        __retres = 0;
        goto return_label;
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
            /*@ assert __retres signed overflow: 2147483647

```

```

main.c
31 /*@
32 requires INT_MIN < val;
33 ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);
34 ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);
35 ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);
36 */
37 int abs(int val) {
38     if(val == 0) {
39         return 0; //OK
40     } else {
41         if(val < 0) {
42             return -val; //OK
43         } else {
44             return -val; //BUG #2, should return val
45         }
46     }
47 }
48

```

Information Messages (2) Console Properties Values Red Alarms WP Goals

Property All Results

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	CVC4 1.7	CVC4 1.7 (counterexamples)	Cc
abs	Post-condition	Typed	●	—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—	✂			
abs	Post-condition	Typed	●	—				
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	●	—				

Figure 16: Sequential issue resolution

# Verification Examples: Issue #5

Fixing BUG #2 yields an **OK** verification result!

```
/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
   ensures \old(val) == 0 => \result == 0;
   ensures \old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val);
   ensures \old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val);
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        {
            __retres = 0;
            goto return_label;
        }
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
            {

```

```
main.c
31 /*@
32 requires INT_MIN < val;
33 ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);
34 ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);
35 ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);
36 */
37 int abs(int val) {
38     if(val == 0) {
39         return 0; //OK
40     } else {
41         if(val < 0) {
42             return -val; //OK
43         } else {
44             return val; //OK
45         }
46     }
47 }
```

Information | Messages (2) | Console | Properties | Values | Red Alarms | WP Goals

Property

All Results

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	CVC4 1.7	CVC4 1.7 (counterexamples)	Coc
abs	Post-condition	Typed	OK	—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed	OK	—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed	OK	—				
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	OK	—				

Figure 17: Now we are all fine

# Verification Outcomes

If the verification result is **OK**:

- The program satisfies the specification, BUT
- Is the specification correct/complete?

If the verification result is **NOK**<sup>5</sup>:

- An *incorrect implementation*:
  - Find counter-example via test generation;
- A *wrong specification*:
  - Complete spec. and proof analysis;
  - Change/extend the specification;
- A *prover's failure*:
  - Alternative provers;
  - Interactive proof assistants;

---

<sup>5</sup>This includes a failed verification attempt, e.g. a time out

## Experience Summary




Figure 18: It is not so easy but it helps!



Software  
quality and  
formal  
methods:  
Hoare/Dijkstra  
approach

Dr. Ivan S.  
Zapreev

Software  
Quality

Programming  
Languages

Formal  
Verification

Frama-C  
Framework

Verification  
Practice

Concluding  
Remarks

## Concluding Remarks

## Concluding Remarks

We have looked into:

- Software quality and software engineering
- Programming language classification
- Formalization of software verification
- Hoare/Dijkstra approach to formal proving
- Frama-C a platform for ANSI-C code analysis
- Experienced practical program verification

We can conclude that:

- Formal software verification is useful
- It is not yet fully automated
- There is a lot more to learn about it!

Thank you and are there any questions?

I appreciate your time!




Figure 19: It was great to give you a talk!

## More useful links:

- **ACSL Mini-Tutorial:**  
<https://frama-c.com/download/acsl-tutorial.pdf>
- **ACSL-tutorial:**  
<https://frama-c.com/download/acsl-tutorial.pdf>
- **ACSL-by-Example:**  
<https://www.cs.umd.edu/class/spring2016/cmsc838G/frama-c/ACSL-by-Example-12.1.0.pdf>
- **Frama-C website:** <https://frama-c.com/>
- **Frama-C v20.0 manual:** <https://frama-c.com/download/user-manual-20.0-Calcium.pdf>
- **Frama-C WP tutorial:** <https://allan-blanchard.fr/publis/frama-c-wp-tutorial-en.pdf>