

Software quality and formal methods: Hoare/Dijkstra approach

Dr. Ivan S. Zapreev

Neat Software Designs

2020-01-20

Global Outline:

- Software Quality
- Programming Languages
- Formal Methods
- Frama - C
- Verification in practice
- Concluding remarks

Software
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Hoare/Dijkstra
approach

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Software Quality

Software Quality: Outline

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- Our Motivation
- Software Development
- Software Verification

Our Motivation: Therac-25

- Years 1985–1987:
 - Radiation therapy overdose
 - Control software flaw:
 - Race conditions
 - Death of 6 (six) cancer patients



Figure 1: Radiation therapy

Our Motivation: Ariane-5

- Year 1996:
 - Missile crash
 - Control software flaw:
 - 64-bit float to 16-bit int
 - \$7 billion development program
 - \$500 million cargo



Our Motivation: Toyota Camry

- Year 2005
 - Sudden unintended acceleration:
 - Control software flaw:
 - Recursion causing stack overflow
 - 89 deaths and 57 injuries
 - \$1.2 billion compensations



Figure 3: Automobiles

Our Motivation: Plenty More

The 12 Software Bugs That Caused Epic Failures: [<link>](#)

BUGS



BUGS EVERYWHERE

Software Development: V-model




Figure 4: Software development process

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Software Development: V & V

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Is formally defined in, e.g.: ISO-9000:2015:

- **Verification** – *“Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that specified requirements have been fulfilled.”*
- **Validation** – *“Confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the requirements for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled.”*

Software Development: Testing

- **Verification:**
 - Are we building the product right?
 - Does the system comply with its specification?
- **Validation:**
 - Are we building the right product?
 - Does the system meet the needs of the customer?




Figure 5: Devision of testing types

Formal Verification

Facts:

- No globally recognized definition of Formal Methods¹.
- Local attempts to have one², e.g.:

“Formal methods are techniques used to model complex systems as mathematical entities.”

“By building a rigorous model of a complex system, it is possible to verify the system’s properties in a more thorough fashion than empirical testing.”

Conclusion:

Formal methods are techniques suitable for Verification.

¹“Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems”, S. Gnesi, T. Margaria

²“Formal Methods”, Michael Collins, CMU

Software Verification

Goal:

A program shall satisfy a formal specification of its behavior.




Figure 6: Verification methods

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Programming Languages

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- Language generations
- Declarative vs. Imperative
- What is ANSI-C?

Language generations




Figure 7: Generations of Programming languages

Declarative vs. Imperative: Main

- *Declarative* – Expresses what to accomplish without specifying concrete steps.

```
//Declarative `JavaScript`  
var arr_dbl = arr.map((x) => x * 2)
```

- *Imperative* – Describes computation in terms of statements that change a program state.

```
//Imperative `JavaScript`  
var arr_dbl = []  
for (let i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {  
    arr_dbl.push(arr[i] * 2)  
}
```

Declarative vs. Imperative: Test

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


Figure 8: If you laugh, it means you've passed

What is ANSI-C: Old C

Procedural language:

Is an imperative language in which the program is built from one or more subroutines commonly known as `functions`.

C language:

C is an *imperative procedural* language.

Defining ANSI-C:

ANSI-C is a common name for two equivalent language specs:

- C89 by American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
- C90 by International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

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Formal Methods

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- Formal Verification
- Hoare Approach
- Dijkstra Extension

Formal verification

Question: Does formal *validation* exist?




Figure 9: Formal correctness proving

Prove conformance to specifications for *imperative programs*.

Hoare Approach³

Hoare triples: $\{P\} C \{Q\}$

C - code; P - pre-condition; Q - post-condition;

Axioms, e.g. *Skip* and *Assign*:

$$\overline{\{P\} \text{skip} \{P\}} \text{ and } \overline{\{P[E/V]\} V := E \{P\}}$$

Where E is any expression and V is any variable.

Inference rules, e.g. *Composition* and *Conditional*:

$$\frac{\{P\} S_1 \{R\}, \{R\} S_2 \{Q\}}{\{P\} S_1; S_2 \{Q\}} \text{ and } \frac{\{B \wedge P\} S \{Q\}, \{\neg B \wedge P\} T \{Q\}}{\{P\} \text{ if } B \text{ then } S \text{ else } T \text{ elseif } \{Q\}}$$

Partial correctness: If P holds before executing C then Q holds afterwards, ONLY if C terminates.

³"An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming", Tony Hoare, 1969.

Dijkstra Extension⁴

The *weakest precondition calculus* for

- A predicate transform semantics to mechanize the proofs.
- Explains how C transforms P into Q .

Backward reasoning:

- Based on Q and C calculate the *weakest pre-condition* \hat{P}
- If $P \implies \hat{P}$, then the proof is complete

Forward reasoning:

- Based on P and C calculate the *strongest post-condition* \hat{Q}
- If $\hat{Q} \implies Q$, then the proof is complete

⁴“Guarded commands, non-determinacy and formal derivation of programs”, Edsger Dijkstra, 1975

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Frama - C

Frama - C: Outline

- Platform description
- Plugins overview
- What is ACSL?

Platform description

A plug-in-based open-source cross-platform framework for ANSI-C source-code analysis:

- Browsing unfamiliar code
- Static code analysis
- Dynamic code analysis
- Code transformations
- Certification of critical software

You can easily build upon the existing plug-ins to implement your own analysis.

Plugins overview: Main




Figure 10: Frama-C plugins

Plugins overview: WP

WP – *weakest precondition* for ACSL specs of ANSI-C programs.




Figure 11: Frama-C WP plugin

What is ACSL: General

In short:

- ACSL – ANSI/ISO C Specification Language
- Allows to formally specify properties of a C program

It is all about function contracts:

```
/*@ ensures \result >= x && \result >= y;  
    ensures \result == x || \result == y;  
*/  
int max (int x, int y) {  
    return(x > y) ? x : y;  
}
```

A function contract is a combination of:

- post-conditions - ensures
- pre-conditions - requires

What is ACSL: Pointers

ACSL allows to reason about, e.g.:

- Pointers
- Arrays
- Termination

Consider pointers:

```
/*@ requires \valid(p) && \valid(q);  
    ensures *p <= *q;  
    */  
void max_ptr (int *x, int *y) {  
    if(*x > *y) {  
        int tmp = *x;  
        *x = *y;  
        *y = tmp;  
    }  
}
```

What is ACSL: Completeness

Is the following `max_ptr` implementation correct?

```
/*@ requires \valid(p) && \valid(q);
    ensures *p <= *q;
*/
void max_ptr (int *x, int *y) {
    *p = *q = 0;
}
```

Is the following specification *complete*?

```
/*@ requires \valid(p) && \valid(q);
    ensures *p <= *q;
    ensures (*p == \old(*p) && *q == \old(*q)) ||
           (*p == \old(*q) && *q == \old(*p));
*/
void max_ptr(int*p, int*q);
```


What is ACSL: The whole spec.

The complete specification v1.4 has 93 pages:

https://frama-c.com/download/acsl_1.4.pdf



Figure 12: Feel free to explore

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- Verification Examples
- Verification Outcomes
- The morale

Verification Examples: abs(.)

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Consider a primitive integer absolute value computation:

```
/*@  
    ensures \result >= 0;  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val < 0) return -val;  
    return val;  
}
```

The verification shall return **OK**, right?

Verification Examples: Issue #1

NOP - the verification results are inconclusive:

The screenshot displays the Frama-C WP (Wp) interface. The top pane shows a C code snippet for a function `abs`. The code includes an `/*@ ensures` block with three post-conditions: `(\old(val) == 0 => \result == 0) ^`, `(\old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val)) ^`, and `(\old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val));`. The function body calculates `__retres` based on whether `val` is negative, and then returns it. A specific line of code, `/*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: -2147483647 <= val; */`, is highlighted in yellow. The bottom pane shows the verification results in a table format.

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0
abs	Post-condition	Typed		—	
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	—	—	

Figure 13: WP detects a possible overflow

Verification Examples: Issue #2

Extend the specification with a pre-condition:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures \result >= 0;  
    */  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val < 0) return -val;  
    return val;  
}
```

The verification is **OK**, but are we complete (?), consider:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures \result >= 0;  
    */  
int abs(int val) {  
    return 1;  
}
```

Verification Examples: Final?

An explicit `\result` value specification makes it complete:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0) &&  
           (val > 0 ==> \result == val) &&  
           (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val < 0) return -val;  
    return val;  
}
```

What if the implementation was wrong?

Would we be able to identify the root-cause?

Verification Examples: Faulty

Consider a lengthy and potentially buggy implementation:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0) &&  
           (val > 0 ==> \result == val) &&  
           (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val == 0) {  
        return 0;  
    } else {  
        if(val < 0) {  
            return val;  
        } else {  
            return -val;  
        }  
    }  
}
```


Verification Examples: Issue #3

The verification is inconclusive, the entire post condition failed!

The screenshot shows the Frama-C IDE with a C program and its verification results. The program is as follows:

```

/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
   ensures
      (\old(val) == 0 => \result == 0) ^
      (\old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val)) ^
      (\old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val));
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        __retres = 0;
        goto return_label;
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {

```

Below the code, the IDE's interface shows several tabs: Information, Messages (2), Console, Properties, Values, Red Alarms, and WP Goals. The 'Messages (2)' tab is active, displaying a table of verification results.

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	C
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—	✂	
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	●	—		

Figure 14: What is the actual reason?

Verification Examples: Split

What if we split the post-condition from:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0) &&  
           (val > 0 ==> \result == val) &&  
           (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/
```

into separate statements:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);  
    ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);  
    ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/
```

and then run verification again!

Verification Examples: Insights

This is enough hint to know where to look:

```
/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
    ensures \old(val) == 0 => \result == 0;
    ensures \old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val);
    ensures \old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val);
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        __retres = 0;
        goto return_label;
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
```

Information | Messages (2) | Console | Properties | Values | Red Alarms | WP Goals

⏪

👍

⏩

Property ▾

All Results ▾

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	C
abs	Post-condition	Typed	<div></div>	—		
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—	<div></div>	
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—	<div></div>	

Figure 15: Finding the root-causes

Verification Examples: Bugs

Now we can identify the actual bugs:

```
/*@ requires INT_MIN < val;  
    ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);  
    ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);  
    ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);  
*/  
int abs(int val) {  
    if(val == 0) {  
        return 0;           //OK  
    } else {  
        if(val < 0) {  
            return val;     //BUG #1, should return -val  
        } else {  
            return -val;    //BUG #2, should return val  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Verification Examples: Issue #4

Fixing BUG #1 turns the corresponding post-conditions green!

```

/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
    ensures \old(val) == 0 => \result == 0;
    ensures \old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val);
    ensures \old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val);
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int _retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        _retres = 0;
        goto return_label;
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
            /* assert that signed overflow: -2147483647 - 1 < val;
            */

```

```

main.c
31 /*@
32 requires INT_MIN < val;
33 ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);
34 ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);
35 ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);
36 */
37 int abs(int val) {
38     if(val == 0) {
39         return 0; //OK
40     } else {
41         if(val < 0) {
42             return -val; //OK
43         } else {
44             return -val; //BUG #2, should return val
45         }
46     }
47 }
48

```

Information		Messages (2)	Console	Properties	Values	Red Alarms	WP Goals	
				Property ▼	All Results ▼			
Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	CVC4 1.7	CVC4 1.7 (counterexamples)	Coq 8.9.1
abs	Post-condition	Typed		—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed	—	—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed		—				
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed		—				

Figure 16: Sequential issue resolution

Verification Examples: Issue #5

Fixing BUG #2 yields an **OK** verification result!

```
/*@ requires -2147483647 - 1 < val;
ensures \old(val) == 0 => \result == 0;
ensures \old(val) > 0 => \result == \old(val);
ensures \old(val) < 0 => \result == -\old(val);
*/
int abs(int val)
{
    int __retres;
    if (val == 0) {
        {
            __retres = 0;
            goto return_label;
        }
    }
    else {
        if (val < 0) {
            {

```

```
main.c
31 /*@
32 requires INT_MIN < val;
33 ensures (val == 0 ==> \result == 0);
34 ensures (val > 0 ==> \result == val);
35 ensures (val < 0 ==> \result == -val);
36 */
37 int abs(int val) {
38     if (val == 0) {
39         return 0; //OK
40     } else {
41         if (val < 0) {
42             return -val; //OK
43         } else {
44             return val; //OK
45         }
46     }
47 }
```

Information | Messages (2) | Console | Properties | Values | Red Alarms | WP Goals

Property

All Results

Module	Goal	Model	Qed	Script	Alt-Ergo 2.3.0	CVC4 1.7	CVC4 1.7 (counterexamples)	Coc
abs	Post-condition	Typed	OK	—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed	OK	—				
abs	Post-condition	Typed	OK	—				
abs	Assertion 'rte,signed_overflow'	Typed	OK	—				

Figure 17: Now we are all fine

Verification Outcomes

If the proof is **OK**:

- The program satisfies the specification
- *Is the specification correct/complete?*

If the proof is **NOK**:

- An *incorrect implementation*
 - Find counter-example via test generation;
- A *wrong specification*
 - Complete spec. and proof analysis;
 - Change/extend the specification;
- A *prover's failure*
 - Alternative provers;
 - Interactive proof assistants;




Figure 18: It is not so easy but ...

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Concluding remarks

We have looked into:

- Software quality and software engineering
- Programming language classification
- Formalization of software verification
- Hoare/Dijkstra approach to formal proving
- Frama-C a platform for ANSI-C code analysis
- Experienced practical program verification

We can conclude that:

- Formal software verification is useful
- It is not yet fully automated
- There is a lot more to learn about it!

Thank you and are there any questions?

I appreciate your time!




Figure 19: It was great to give you a talk!