

National Research University

Higher School of Economics

As a manuscript

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**DETERMINANTS OF SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE
PERSISTENCE IN VARIOUS TYPES OF POLITICAL REGIMES**

SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

for the purpose of obtaining academic degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science HSE

Academic Supervisor:

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PhD in Political Science

Moscow, 2018

Research design

Statement of research problem. The existing academic literature on the factors of dominant party regimes persistence mostly focuses on regimes with any duration. There is a problem of insufficient attention to specific factors influencing the durability of single-party dominance within the set of "absolute" dominant party regimes that overcome a critical duration threshold.

Thus, the following question needs to be clarified: "why are dominant party regimes that overcome a critical duration threshold have different longevity?" Main focus of existing literature is oriented to revealing determinants of the emergence of single-party dominance. My research aims to fill the gap and concentrates on single-party dominance persistence among regimes that overcome a critical longevity threshold.

Literature review. Dominant party regime's¹ extraordinary longevity is a part of the mainstream research in political science, but most of academic literature relates to case-study research on country-specific regimes characteristics.

Most significant contribution to developing the comprehensive understanding of the dominant party regimes and the nature of the emergence and persistence of single-party dominance is provided by K.Greene², S.Huntington and C.Moore³, A.Arian and S.H.Barnes⁴, S.Levitsky and L.Way⁵, T.Pempel⁶, H.Giliomee and

¹ The terms 'single-party dominance' and 'dominant party regime' are used as a synonyms in the research.

² Greene K.F. *Why Dominant Parties Lose?: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007; Greene K.F. (2008) *Dominant Party Strategy and Democratization* // *American Journal of Political Science*, 52; Greene K.F. (2002) *Opposition Party Strategy and Spatial Competition in Dominant Party Regimes: A Theory and the Case of Mexico* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 35; Greene K.F. (2010) *The Political Economy of Single-Party Dominance* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 43; Greene K.F. *A Resource Theory of Single Party Dominance: The PRI in Mexico* // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons*. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

³ Huntington S.P., Moore C. *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-party Systems*. – New York: Basic Books, 1970; Huntington S.P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. – New Haven: Yale University, 1968.

⁴ Arian A., Barnes S.H. (1974) *The Dominant Party System: a Neglected Model of Democratic Stability* // *The Journal of Democracy*, 36.

⁵ Levitsky S., Way L. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

⁶ Pempel T.J. *Introduction: Uncommon Democracies: the One-party Dominant Regimes* // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990; Pempel T.J. *Conclusion: One-Party Dominance and the Creation of Regimes* // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

C.Simkins⁷, B.Magaloni⁸, A.McGann⁹, F.Boucek¹⁰, K.A.Templeman¹¹, A.Schedler¹², O.J.Reuter and T.Remington¹³, B.Geddes¹⁴, J.Brownlee¹⁵, J.Gandhi and A.Przeworski¹⁶, M.Svolik¹⁷, D.Slater and N.Smith¹⁸.

Studies by G.Sartori¹⁹, M.Duverger²⁰, A.Arian and S.H.Barnes²¹, K.Matlosa and S.Karume²², D.Anckar²³, M.Bogaards²⁴, A.Lijphart²⁵, J.Coleman²⁶,

⁷ Giliomee H., Simkins C. Conclusion // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999; Simkins C. *Stability and Competitiveness in the Political Configurations of Semi-Developed Countries* // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

⁸ Magaloni B. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Magaloni B., Kricheli R. (2010) *Political Order and One-Party Rule* // *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13; Diaz-Cayeros A., Magaloni B. (2001) *Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico's Transition to Democracy* // *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 13(3); Magaloni B. (2008) *Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5).

⁹ McGann A. *The Modal Voter Result: Preference Distributions, Intra-Party Competition, and Political Dominance*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Duke University, 1999.

¹⁰ Boucek F. *Electoral and Parliamentary Aspects of Dominant Party Systems* // Pennings P., Lane J.E. (eds.), *Comparing Party System Change*. – London: Routledge, 1998.

¹¹ Templeman K.A. *The Origins and Decline of Dominant Party Systems: Taiwan's Transition in Comparative Perspective*. – Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 2012.

¹² Schedler A. *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism*. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2013; Schedler A. *The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism* // Schedler A. (ed.) *Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. – Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006; Schedler A. *Sources of Competition under Electoral Authoritarianism* // Lindberg S.I. (ed.) *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. – Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009; Schedler A. *The Contingent Power of Authoritarian Elections* // Lindberg S.I. (ed.) *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition*. – Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

¹³ Reuter O.J., Remington T.F. (2009) *Dominant Party Regimes and The Commitment Problem. The Case of United Russia* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(4); Reuter O.J. *The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia*. – Cambridge University Press, 2017.

¹⁴ Geddes B. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. – Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994; Geddes B., Zaller J. (1989) *Sources of Support for Authoritarian Regimes* // *American Journal of Political Science*, 33; Geddes B. *Minimum-Winning Coalitions and Personalization in Authoritarian Regimes* // *Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association*, Chicago, 2004; Geddes B. *Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes? Revised Version of a Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*. – Washington, D.C., 2005.

¹⁵ Brownlee J. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. – Cambridge University Press, 2007.

¹⁶ Gandhi J. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Gandhi J., Przeworski A. (2007) *Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Dictators* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(11).

¹⁷ Svolik M. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

¹⁸ Slater D., Smith N.R. *The Power of Counterrevolution: Contentious Origins of Dominant Party Durability in Asia and Africa*. Paper presented at the APSA Annual Conference, Washington, D.C., 2010.

¹⁹ Sartori G. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

²⁰ Duverger M. *Politicheskie partii* (in Russian, 'Political parties'). – Moscow: Academic project, 2002.

²¹ Arian A., Barnes S.H. (1974) *The Dominant Party System: a Neglected Model of Democratic Stability* // *The Journal of Democracy*, 36.

²² Matlosa K., Karume S. (2004) *Ten Years of Democracy and the Dominant Party System in South Africa* // *Election Update 2004: South Africa*, 5(10).

²³ Anckar D. (1997) *Dominating Smallness: Big Parties in Lilliput Systems* // *Party Politics*, 3(2).

²⁴ Bogaards M. (2004) *Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party System in Africa* // *European Journal of Political Research*, 43.

²⁵ Lijphart A. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. – New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

²⁶ Coleman J. *The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa* // Almond G., Coleman J. (eds.) *Politics of the Developing Areas*. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

S.Mainwaring and T.Scully²⁷, G.Cox²⁸, B.O’Leary²⁹, M.Kuenzi and G.Lambright³⁰, N.Van de Walle³¹, A.Ware³², P.Dunleavy³³, J.Blondel³⁴, O.Reuter³⁵, R.McDonald³⁶, J.-F.Caulier and P.Dumont³⁷ are important due to conceptualization and operationalization of single-party dominance.

G.Sartori³⁸, H.Templeman³⁹, A.Lijphart⁴⁰, J.Linz⁴¹, S.Mainwaring⁴², M.Shugart and J.Carey⁴³, M.Laver⁴⁴, A.Hicken and H.Stoll⁴⁵, J.Hsieh⁴⁶, O.Kharitonova⁴⁷ consider effects of institutional design on the emergence and persistence of dominant-party regimes. Particularly, H.Templeman argues that parliamentary regimes are more durable. However, this argument requires re-

²⁷ Mainwaring S., Scully T. (eds.) *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. - Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

²⁸ Cox G. *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

²⁹ O’Leary B. *Britain’s Japanese Question: Is There a Dominant Party?* // Margetts H., Smyth G. (eds.) *Turning Japanese: Britain with a Permanent Party of Government*. – London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994

³⁰ Kuenzi M., Lambright G. (2005) *Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa’s Electoral Regimes* // *Party Politics*, 11(4).

³¹ Van de Walle N. (2002) *Africa’s Range of Regimes* // *Journal of Democracy*, 13; Van de Walle N., Butler K. (1999) *Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa’s Illiberal Democracies* // *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 13(1).

³² Ware A. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

³³ Dunleavy P. *Rethinking Dominant Party Systems* // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons*. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

³⁴ Blondel J. *Comparing Political Systems*. – New York: Praeger, 1972.

³⁵ Reuter O.J. *The Origins of Dominant Parties*. – Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Emory University, 2010.

³⁶ McDonald R. *Party Systems and Elections in Latin America*. – Chicago: Markham, 1971.

³⁷ Caulier J.-F., Dumont P. *Measuring One-Party Dominance with Voting Power Indices* // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons*. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

³⁸ Sartori G. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. – New York: New York University Press, 1994.

³⁹ Templeman K.A. *The Origins and Decline of Dominant Party Systems: Taiwan’s Transition in Comparative Perspective*. – Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 2012.

⁴⁰ Lijphart A. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. – New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

⁴¹ Linz J. (1990) *Perils of Presidentialism* // *Journal of Democracy*, 1(1): 51-69; Linz J. (1990) *The Virtues of Parliamentarism* // *Journal of Democracy*, 1(1).

⁴² Mainwaring S., Shugart M.S. (1997) *Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal* // *Comparative Politics*, 29(4).

⁴³ Shugart M.S. *Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations* // Rhodes R.A.W., Binder S.A., Rockman B.A. (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; Shugart M.S., Carey J.M. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Carey J., Shugart M.S. *Executive Decree Authority*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

⁴⁴ Laver M. (1998) *Models of Government Formation* // *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1.

⁴⁵ Hicken A., Stoll H. (2011) *Presidents and Parties: How Presidential Elections Shape Coordination in Legislative Elections*. – *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(7).

⁴⁶ Hsieh J. *The SNTV System and Its Political Implications* // Tien H. (ed.) *Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*. - Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

⁴⁷ Kharitonova O.G. *Prezidentstvo i demokratiya: sostoyanie diskussii* (in Russian, ‘Presidentialism and democracy: state of discussion’) // *Politicheskaya nauka*. – 2012. – Vol. 3.

examination because it resulted from the research sample that included political regimes that both ceased and continued to exist.

The connection between electoral systems and dominant-party regimes is a topic of studies by A.Lijphart⁴⁸, M.Duverger⁴⁹, G.Sartori⁵⁰, R.Taagepera and M.Shugart⁵¹, A.Blais⁵², D.Rae⁵³, W.Riker⁵⁴, K.McElwain⁵⁵, P.Norris⁵⁶, D.Farell⁵⁷, S.Bowler⁵⁸.

Three main areas of exploring the mechanisms of single-party dominance left beyond the dissertation - elitist studies, economic studies and electoral fraud studies. Elitist approaches have been developed by B.Magaloni⁵⁹, W.Riker⁶⁰, B.Geddes⁶¹, O.Reuter and T.Remington⁶². The common view of economic theories states that high support for dominant parties is a response to good economic performance of

⁴⁸ Lijphart A. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Grofman B., Lijphart A. (eds.) *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. – New York: Agathon Press, 1986.

⁴⁹ Duverger M. *Politicheskie partii* (in Russian, 'Political parties'). – Moscow: Academic project, 2002.

⁵⁰ Sartori G. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. – New York: New York University Press, 1994.

⁵¹ Taagepera R., Shugart M. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

⁵² Blais A. (ed.) *To Keep or Change First Past the Post?: The Politics of Electoral Reform*. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Blais A., Carty K. (1987) *The Impact of Electoral Formulae on the Creation of Majority Governments* // *Electoral Studies*, 5 (2).

⁵³ Rae D. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. – New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

⁵⁴ Riker W. (1976) *The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law* // *Comparative Politics*, 9(1): 93-106.

⁵⁵ McElwain K. (2008) *Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance* // *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1): 32-47.

⁵⁶ Norris P. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Norris P. (1997) *Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems* // *International Political Science Review*, 18(3).

⁵⁷ Farrell D. *Comparing Electoral Systems*. – London: Prentice Hall, 1997.

⁵⁸ Bowler S. *Electoral Systems* // Rhodes R.A.W., Binder S.A., Rockman B.A. (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

⁵⁹ Magaloni B. (2008) *Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5).

⁶⁰ Riker W. (1976) *The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law* // *Comparative Politics*, 9(1).

⁶¹ Geddes B. (1999) *What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?* // *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

⁶² Reuter O.J., Remington T.F. (2009) *Dominant Party Regimes and The Commitment Problem. The Case of United Russia* // *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(4).

the government⁶³. B.Magaloni⁶⁴, S.Lindberg⁶⁵, S.Huntington⁶⁶ argue importance of electoral fraud for maintaining power by the ruling parties.

There are a lot of studies that analyze the characteristics of country-specific dominant-party regimes, in form of case-study research and comparative research. Among such studies, for example, are the following: Y.Chu on Taiwan⁶⁷, B.Magaloni on Mexico⁶⁸, A.Zolberg on African regimes⁶⁹, G.Esping-Andersen on Sweden⁷⁰, D.Mabry on Mexico⁷¹, D.Slater on Great Britain⁷², J.Pontusson on Sweden and Great Britain⁷³, F.Boucek on Great Britain, Italy and Japan⁷⁴, M.Shalev on Israel⁷⁵, S.Johnson on Japan⁷⁶, U.Cornelius and A.Craig on Mexico⁷⁷, C.-L.Lin on Taiwan⁷⁸, H.Otake on Japan and Germany⁷⁹, H.Binen on African regimes⁸⁰,

⁶³ Hansen T. (1994) Local Elections and Local Government Performance // *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 17(1).

⁶⁴ Magaloni B. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

⁶⁵ Lindberg S.I. *Democracy and Elections in Africa*. – Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

⁶⁶ Huntington S.P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. – New Haven: Yale University, 1968.

⁶⁷ Chu Y. *The Legacy of One-Party Hegemony in Taiwan* // Diamond L., Gunther R. (eds.) *Political Parties and Democracy*. – Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002; Chu Y. *A Born-Again Dominant Party? The Transformation of the Kuomintang and Taiwan's Regime Transition* // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

⁶⁸ Magaloni B. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. – Cambridge University Press, 2006; Diaz-Cayeros A., Magaloni B. (2001) *Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico's Transition to Democracy* // *Journal of theoretical Politics*, 13(3).

⁶⁹ Zolberg A.R. *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa*. – Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

⁷⁰ Esping-Andersen G. *Single-Party Dominance in Sweden: the Saga of Social Democracy* // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁷¹ Mabry D.J. *Mexico's Accion Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution*. – Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973.

⁷² Slater D. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

⁷³ Pontusson J. *Conditions of Labor-Party Dominance: Sweden and Britain Compared* // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁷⁴ Boucek F. *The Factional Politics of Dominant Parties: Evidence from Britain, Italy and Japan* // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons*. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

⁷⁵ Shalev M. *The Political Economy of Labor-Party Dominance and Decline in Israel* // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁷⁶ Johnson S. *Opposition Politics in Japan: Strategies under a One-Party Dominant Regime*. – London and New York: Nissan Institute/Routledge, 2000.

⁷⁷ Cornelius W., Craig A. *The Mexican Political System in Transition*. – Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1991.

⁷⁸ Lin C.-L. *Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. – Yale University, 1998.

⁷⁹ Otake H. *Defense Controversies and One-party Dominance: the Opposition in Japan and West Germany* // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁸⁰ Bienen H. *Armies and Parties in Africa*. – New York: Africana, 1978.

J.Myburgh and H.Giliomee on South Africa⁸¹, T.Inoguchi on Japan⁸², M.Bogaards on African regimes⁸³, E.Krauss and J.Pierre on Sweden and Japan⁸⁴, M.Kreuzer on Germany⁸⁵, A.Levite and S.Tarrow on Israel and Italy⁸⁶, M.Aronoff on Israel⁸⁷, K.Matlosa and S.Karume on South Africa⁸⁸, M.Muramatsu and E.S.Krauss on Japan⁸⁹, A.Abedi and S.Schneider on Canada, Australia, Germany and Austria⁹⁰, B.Ames on Mexico⁹¹, S.Tarrow on Italy⁹², T.Eisenstadt on Mexico⁹³, S.Lindberg and J.Jones on African regimes⁹⁴, S.Friedman on South Africa⁹⁵, R.Kaufman on Mexico⁹⁶, P.Toit on Zambia and Malawi⁹⁷, H.Giliomee and C.Simkins on South

⁸¹ Myburgh J., Giliomee H. One-Party Dominance in South-Africa // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons*. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

⁸² Inoguchi T. The Political Economy of Conservative Resurgence under Recession: Public Policies and Political Support in Japan, 1977-1983 // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁸³ Bogaards M. (2004) Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party System in Africa // *European Journal of Political Research*, 43.

⁸⁴ Krauss E.S., Pierre J. The Decline of Dominant Parties: Parliamentary Politics in Sweden and Japan in the 1970s // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁸⁵ Kreuzer M. (2009) How Party Systems Form: Path Dependency and the Institutionalization of the Postwar German Party System // *British Journal of Political Science*, 39.

⁸⁶ Levite A. Tarrow S. (1983) The Legitimation of Excluded Parties in Dominant Party Systems: A Comparison of Israel and Italy // *Comparative Politics*, 15(3).

⁸⁷ Aronoff M. Israel under Labor and the Likud: the Role of Dominance Considered // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁸⁸ Matlosa K., Karume S. (2004) Ten Years of Democracy and the Dominant Party System in South Africa // *Election Update 2004: South Africa*, 5(10).

⁸⁹ Muramatsu M., Krauss E.S. The Dominant Party and Social Coalitions in Japan // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁹⁰ Abedi A., Schneider S.G. Federalism, Parliamentary Government, and Single-Party Dominance: An Examination of Dominant Party Regimes in Canada, Australia, Germany, and Austria. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2006.

⁹¹ Ames B. (1970) Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party // *American Political Science Review*, 64.

⁹² Tarrow S. Maintaining Hegemony in Italy: "The Softer they Rise, the Slower they Fall!" // Pempel T.J. (ed.) *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

⁹³ Eisenstadt T. *Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

⁹⁴ Lindberg S.I., Jones J. Laying a Foundation for Democracy or Undermining It? Dominant Parties in Africa's Burgeoning Democracies // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons*. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

⁹⁵ Friedman S. No Easy Stroll to Dominance: Party Dominance, Opposition and Civil Society in South Africa // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

⁹⁶ Kaufman R.R. Dominant Party and Opposition Parties in Mexico: From Crisis to Reform to Crisis // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

⁹⁷ Toit P. Bridge or Bridgehead? Comparing the Party Systems of Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

Africa and Mexico⁹⁸, R.B.Collier on Mexico⁹⁹, P.Köllner on Japan¹⁰⁰, M.Cook on Mexico¹⁰¹, T.Cheng on Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey¹⁰², R.K.Carty on Canada¹⁰³, H.Adam on South Africa¹⁰⁴, L.Schlemmer on South Africa¹⁰⁵, A.Diaw and M.Diouf on Senegal¹⁰⁶, S.Rigger on Taiwan and Mexico¹⁰⁷.

Russian scholars that focus on topics concerning dominant party regimes are E.Meleshkina¹⁰⁸, Y.Korgunyuk¹⁰⁹, B.Makarenko¹¹⁰, G.Golosov¹¹¹,

⁹⁸ Giliomee H., Simkins C. The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

⁹⁹ Collier R.B. The Contradictory Alliance: State-labor Relations and Regime Change in Mexico, University of California (Berkeley), 1992; Collier R.B. The Transformation of Labor-Based One-Partyism at the End of the 20th Century: The Case of Mexico // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

¹⁰⁰ Köllner P. (2006) The Liberal Democratic Party at 50: Sources of Dominance and Change in the Koizumi Era // Social Science Japan Journal, 9(2).

¹⁰¹ Cook M.L. The Mexican Paradox: Neo-Liberalism and Labor Entrenchment in Mexico's Ruling Party // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

¹⁰² Cheng T. (2001) One-Party Hegemony and Democratic Transition: Comparing Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey // Conference on The Rise of the DPP and PAN in Taiwan and Mexico, Duke University.

¹⁰³ Carty R.K. Dominance without Factions: The Liberal Party of Canada // Bogaards M., Boucek F. (eds.) Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases, and Comparisons. – New York: Routledge, 2010.

¹⁰⁴ Adam H. Corporatism as Minority Veto under ANC Hegemony in South Africa // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Schlemmer L. Democracy or Democratic Hegemony? The Future of Political Pluralism in South Africa // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999.

¹⁰⁶ Diaw A., Diouf M. The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power // Olukoshi A.O. (ed.) The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. – Nordic Africa Institute, 1998.

¹⁰⁷ Rigger S. Grassroots Electoral Organization and Political Reform in the ROC on Taiwan and Mexico // Giliomee H., Simkins C. (eds.) The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999; Rigger S. From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party. – Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; Rigger S. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. – New York: Routledge, 1999.

¹⁰⁸ Meleshkina E.Y. Dominirovaniye po-russki ili mirovoy fenomen? (in Russian, 'Domination Russian-style or world phenomenon?') // Politicheskaya nauka. – 2006. – Vol. 1; Golosov G.V., Meleshkina E.Y. Politicheskies partii i vybory (in Russian, 'Political parties and elections'). – SPb.: Borey-art, 2001.

¹⁰⁹ Korgunyuk Y.G. Stanovleniye partiynoy sistemy v sovremennoy Rossii (in Russian, 'Emergence of party system in modern Russia'). – M.: Fond Indem, Moskovskiy gorodskoy pedagogicheskii universitet, 2007.

¹¹⁰ Makarenko B.I. Partii bez demokratii (in Russian, 'Parties without democracy') // Korgunyuk Y.G., Meleshkina E.Y., Podvintsev O., Shashkova Ya. Partiynaya organizatsiya i partiynaya konkurentsia v "nedemokraticeskikh" rezhimakh. – M.: ROSSPEN, 2012; Makarenko B.I., Lokshin I.M., Meleshkina E.Y., Mironyuk M.G., Petrov N.V. Partii i partiynye sistemy: sovremennye tendentsii razvitiya (in Russian, Parties and party systems: modern trends of development'). – M.: ROSSPEN, 2015; Makarenko B.I., Lokshin I.M. Sovremennye partiynye sistemy: stsennarii evolyutsii i tendentsii razvitiya (in Russian, Modern party systems: scenarios of evolution and trends of development) // Polis. Politicheskies issledovaniya. – 2015. – Vol. 3; Makarenko B.I. Sovremennye tendentsii razvitiya partii i partiynykh sistem (in Russian, 'Modern trends of development of parties and party systems'). PhD Dissertation. 2016. <https://www.hse.ru/sci/diss/182234596>

¹¹¹ Golosov G. (2013) Authoritarian Party Systems: Patterns of Emergence, Sustainability and Survival // Comparative Sociology, 12(5); Golosov G. Electoral Integrity and Voter Turnout in Contemporary Autocracies // Garnett H.A., Zavadskaya M. (eds.) Electoral Integrity and Political Regimes: Actors, Strategies and Consequences. – New York: Routledge, 2018; Golosov G.V. Partiynye sistemy stran mira: regionalnoe i khronologicheskoe raspredeleniye, modeli ustoychivosti (in Russian, 'Party systems of the world: regional and chronological distribution, patterns of sustainability'). – Politicheskaya nauka. 2012. – Vol. 3; Golosov G.V., Meleshkina E.Y. Politicheskies partii i vybory (in Russian, 'Political parties and elections'). – SPb.: Borey-art, 2001.

O.Kharitonova¹¹², M.Zavadskaya¹¹³, S.Shkel¹¹⁴, A.Melville¹¹⁵, D.Streltsov¹¹⁶. Also Russian scholars are active in debates on prospects for developing a dominant party system in Russia. Particularly, studies by E.Meleshkina¹¹⁷, V.Gel'man¹¹⁸,

¹¹² Kharitonova O.G. Nedemokraticheskie politicheskie rezhimy (in Russian, 'Undemocratic political regimes') // Politicheskaya nauka. – 2012. – Vol. 3.

¹¹³ Zavadskaya M. When Do Elections Subvert Authoritarianism? Electoral Malpractice and Variety of Post-Electoral Scenarios // Garnett H.A., Zavadskaya M. (eds.) Electoral Integrity and Political Regimes: Actors, Strategies and Consequences. – New York: Routledge, 2018; Zavadskaya M., Welzel C. (2015) Subverting Autocracy: Emancipative Mass Values in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes // Democratization, 22(6); Zavadskaya M.A. Vremya vybirat': manipulirovanie elektoral'nyimi tsiklami v sovremennykh avtoritarnykh rezhimakh (in Russian, 'Playing with the time: electoral schedule in authoritarian regimes') // Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Seriya «Politologiya». – 2015. – Vol. 4; Zavadskaya M.A. Elektoral'nye tsikly v sorevnovatel'nykh avtoritarnykh rezhimakh (in Russian, 'Electoral cycles into competitive authoritarian regimes') // Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Seriya «Politologiya». – 2014. – Vol. 3; Zavadskaya M.A. Elektoralny avtoritarizm v Evrope: rasshirenie Evropeyskogo Soyuza i strategii inkumbentov na vyborakh (in Russian, 'Electoral authoritarianism in Europe: enlargement of the European Union and incumbents' electoral strategies') // Belokurova E.V., Nozhenko M.V. (eds.) Sdelano v Evrope: vzglyad rossiyskikh issledovateley. Vol. 1. – SPb.: NORMA, 2014; Zavadskaya M., Welzel C. (2013) Repression, and Subversion: Incumbent Defeat in Competitive Autocracies // World Values Survey Association. Series «World Values Research», 2; Zavadskaya M.A. Kogda vybory vykhodyat iz-pod kontrolya? Neprednamerennyye elektoralnye posledstviya v sorevnovatel'nykh avtoritarnykh rezhimakh? (in Russian, 'When elections get out of hand? Unintended electoral outcomes in the competitive authoritarian regimes?') // Politicheskaya nauka. – 2012. – Vol. 3.

¹¹⁴ Shkel' S.N. Postsovetskiy avtoritarizm v sravnitel'noy perspektive (in Russian, 'Post-soviet authoritarianism in comparative perspective'). – Ufa: Gilem, 2014; Shkel' S.N. Neopatrimonial'nye praktiki i ustoychivost avtoritarnykh rezhimov v Evrazii (in Russian, 'Neopatrimonial practices and persistence of authoritarian regimes in Eurasia') // Politiya. – 2016. – Vol. 4.

¹¹⁵ Melville A.Y., Stukal D.K., Mironyuk M.G. «Tsar gory», ili pochemu v postkommunisticheskikh avtokratiyakh plokhie instituty (in Russian, '«King of the Mountain», or why postcommunist autocracies have bad institutions') // Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. – 2013. – Vol. 2; Melville A.Y. Zachem «Tsaryu gory» khoroshie instituty? (in Russian, 'Why «King of the Mountain» needs good institutions?') // Politicheskaya nauka. – 2013. – Vol. 3.

¹¹⁶ Streltsov D. Political Parties in Disarray // Inoguchi T. (ed.) Japanese and Russian Politics. – New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Streltsov D.V. Sovremennyy yaponskiy parlament (in Russian, 'Modern parliament of Japan') . – M.: Nauka, 1994.

¹¹⁷ Meleshkina E.Y. Dominirovanie po-russki ili mirovoy fenomen? (in Russian, 'Domination Russian-style or world phenomenon?') // Politicheskaya nauka. – 2006. – Vol. 1.

¹¹⁸ Gel'man V.Y. Pespektivy dominiruyushchey partii v Rossii (in Russian, 'Perspectives for dominant party in Russia') // Pro et Contra. – 2006. – Vol. 4; Gel'man V.Y. Ot «besformennogo plyuralizma» k «dominiruyushchey vlasti»? Transformatsiya rossiyskoy partiynoy sistemy (in Russian, 'From «feckless Pluralism» to «dominant power politics»? The transformation of Russia's party system') // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost', 2006. – Vol. 1; Gel'man V.Y. Politicheskie partii v Rossii: ot konkurentsii – k ierarkhii (in Russian, 'Political parties in Russia: from competition to hierarchy') // Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. – 2008. – Vol. 5; Gel'man V.Y. Rastsvet i upadok elektoral'nogo avtoritarizma v Rossii (in Russian, 'The rise and decline of electoral authoritarianism in Russia') // – Politiya. – 2012. – Vol. 4; Gel'man V.Y. Treshchiny v stene (in Russian, 'Cracks in the Wall') // Pro et Contra. – 2012. – Vol. 1-2.

Y.Korgunyuk¹¹⁹, B.Makarenko¹²⁰, R.Turovsky¹²¹, A.Makarkin¹²², A.Kynev¹²³, G.Mikhaleva¹²⁴, G.Golosov¹²⁵, M.Zavadskaya¹²⁶ and P.Panov¹²⁷ discuss the transformation of the party system and political regime in Russia towards single-party dominance.

There is an insufficiency of academic studies that analyze, first, the determinants of single-party dominance survival within regimes that overcome the critical longevity threshold, and second, explore the dominant party regime from the perspective of the conditions for their persistence.

Research question. The main research question is formulated as follows: what institutional and political factors determine the persistence of single-party dominance?

¹¹⁹ Korgunyuk Y.G. Stanovlenie partiynoy sistemy v sovremennoy Rossii (in Russian, 'Emergence of party system in modern Russia'). – M.: Fond Indem, Moskovskiy gorodskoy pedagogicheskiy universitet, 2007.

¹²⁰ Makarenko B.I. Postsovetskaya partiya vlasti: «Edinaya Rossiya» v sravnitel'nom kontexte (in Russian, 'Post-soviet party of power: «United Russia» in comparative context') // Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. – 2011. – Vol. 1; Makarenko B.I. Stsenarii evolyutsii partiynoy sistemy (in Russian, 'Scenarios of evolution of party system') // Lipman M., Petrov N. (eds.) ROSSIYA-2020: Stsenarii razvitiya. – M.: ROSSPEN, 2012; Makarenko B.I. Stsenarii evolyutsii partiynoy sistemy (in Russian, 'Scenarios of evolution of party system') // Pro et Contra. – 2010. – Vol. 4-5.

¹²¹ Reuter O.J., Turovsky R.F. (2014) Dominant Party Rule and Legislative Leadership in Authoritarian Regimes // Party Politics, 20.

¹²² Makarkin A. «Edinaya Rossiya»: partiya-instrument (in Russian, '«United Russia»: party-instrument') // Neprikosnovenny zapas. – 2013. – Vol. 1.

¹²³ Kynev A.V., Lyubarev A.E. Partii i vybory v sovremennoy Rossii: evolyutsia i devolyutsia (in Russian, 'Parties and elections in modern Russia: evolution and devolution'). – M.: Fond «Liberal'naya missiya», Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2011; Kynev A. «Partiya vlasti» kak partiya (in Russian, '«Party of power» as a party') // Neprikosnovenny zapas. – 2013. – Vol. 1.

¹²⁴ Mikhaleva G.M. Rossiyskie partii v kontexte transformatsii (in Russian, 'Political parties in Russia in context of transformation'). – M.: Knizhny dom «Liberkom», 2009.

¹²⁵ Golosov G.V. Rossiyskaya partiynaya sistema i regional'naya politika, 1993-2003 (in Russian, 'Party system in Russia and regional policy, 1993-2003'). – SPb: Izdatel'stvo Evropeyskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge, 2006; Golosov G.V., Likhtenshtein A.V. «Partiya vlasti» i rossiyskiy institutsional'ny dizayn: teoreticheskiy analiz (in Russian, '«Party of power» and institutional design in Russia: theoretical analysis') // Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya. – 2001. – Vol. 1.

¹²⁶ Zavadskaya M., Groemping M., Martinez-i-Coma F. (2017) Electoral Sources of Authoritarian Resilience in Russia: Varieties of Electoral Malpractice 2007-2016 // Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 25(4): 455-480; Zavadskaya M.A. Dumskie inkumbenty i «partiya vlasti» (Krosstemporalny analiz) (in Russian, 'The State Duma incumbents and «party of power» (Crosstemporal analysis) // Politiya. – 2012. – Vol. 3.

¹²⁷ Panov P.V. «Edinaya Rossiya» kak instrument konsolidatsii elit na mestnykh vyborakh (in Russian, '«United Russia» as an instrument for elite consolidation in local elections') // Korgunyuk Y.G., Meleshkina E.Y., Mikhaleva G.M. (eds.) Politicheskie partii i politicheskaya konkurentsia v demokraticeskikh i nedemokraticeskikh rezhimakh. – M.: KMK, 2010.

Aim and objectives. The aim of the study is to reveal the determinants of the persistence of single-party dominance. To achieve this aim, the following objectives are set:

- 1) To study theoretical approaches to understanding the dominant party regimes as a specific type of political regime;
- 2) To develop conceptualization and operationalization of single-party dominance;
- 3) To carry out a theoretical analysis of institutional and political factors' impact on the persistence of single-party dominance;
- 4) To develop theoretical hypotheses on the relationship between the institutional and political factors and the persistence of single-party dominance;
- 5) To carry out correlation analysis, regression analysis and survival analysis in relation to the linkage between institutional and political factors (independent variables) and the single-party dominance persistence (dependent variable);
- 6) To determine the degree of institutional and political factors influence on the persistence of single-party dominance.

Hypotheses. The following hypotheses are formulated and tested for the aims of the research:

- 1) H1: Single-party dominance in parliamentary regimes has a longer duration than in presidential ones;
- 2) H2: Regimes with a higher electoral system's disproportionality have a longer duration of single-party dominance;
- 3) H3: Regimes with a higher electoral support for the ruling party's competitors have a shorter duration of single-party dominance;
- 4) H4: Regimes with prior experience with electoral democracy have a longer duration of single-party dominance than regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy;

- 5) H5: Regimes with more frequent chief executive turnover have a longer duration of single-party dominance.

Scope and limitations of research. The study does not explore the whole set of factors that determine the survival of dominant party regimes. The research concentrates on the role of institutional and political factors in determining persistence of single-party dominance. The limited scope is justified by the insufficient attention to this research focus in existing literature. The choice of a relatively «narrow» set of determinants allows to conduct a deeper analysis of the relevant topics, looking more closely at the nature of the causal dependencies from the theoretical perspective.

The research attempts to reveal the institutional and political factors determining the longevity of single-party dominance, regardless of whether it occurred in a democratic or an undemocratic regime. This decision, first of all, is made because of the focus on single-party dominance as an independent descriptive characteristic of political regimes. It is definite that there are different mechanisms maintaining single-party dominance under democratic and authoritarian regimes. However, it is also true that the existence of single-party dominance as such is a significant characteristic of the political regime, regardless of whether it occurred under democracy or authoritarianism. Single-party dominance has a significant influence on the functioning of political institutions, electoral competition between the incumbent and the opposition, the resource distribution among various actors. This choice is also explained by the relatively small size of the sample and the unfeasibility of its further reduction in the context of the need for a valid empirical assessment of hypotheses.

The single-party dominance is described as the long control over chief executive by a single party. Therefore the research sample includes quite different regimes by the nature of a dominant party, i.e. cases of stable independent governments that entirely consisting of dominant party's members, as well as cases of coalition governments with the participation of minor parties. The criterion of

maintaining party control over chief executive with regime duration for 18 years or more well reflects the reality of single-party dominance. Even under the coalition government, party that holds chief executive post clearly has a distinctly dominant status within the party system, which essentially surpasses that of all other parties. The question whether the dominant party control over the agenda is monopolistic or the dominant party is forced to share it with its minor coalition partners is not considered and left beyond the scope of the present research. Thus, it seems fair to choose the control over chief executive as a criterion to describe dominant party regimes.

The causality of the single-party dominance persistence by the influence of institutional and political factors is explored within the ceased regimes. This decision is due to, first, the original research design, and second, the need for an empirical assessment of the effects of the institutional and political determinants on the single-party dominance persistence.

Independent variables have a static measurement. In particular, mean values for the entire period of single-party dominance are used for two independent variables and for one control variable. The basis for this approach originates from the focus of the research on the comparison within regimes, rather than on exploring the evolution of any regime during the period of its existence. The usage of mean values limits the consideration of factors' internal dynamics due to the fluctuations of corresponding variables during the period of single-party dominance. However, it is not critically important for the objectives of the present comparative analysis. Fluctuations are moderate, and mean values expressed differences among regimes correctly.

Methodology. The research is carried out within the framework of the rational choice institutionalism, the principles of which are used to analyze the institutional and political determinants of dominant party regimes persistence. The core of rational choice institutionalism is the idea of the actors' rational behavior and institutions as a patterns of actors' interaction.

The understanding of institutions relies on the approach of J. March and J. Olsen. In their view an institution is defined as «a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances»¹²⁸.

Methods. The methods of multivariate statistical analysis (correlation analysis, regression analysis, survival analysis) are used for an empirical assessment of the impact of institutional and political factors on the single-party dominance persistence.

Selection of empirical data. Single-party dominance is defined as the long continuous control over chief executive by a dominant party for 18 years or more in a system with regular competitive elections. 18-year threshold was chosen because this period is minimal, under which a regime exists at least for three electoral cycles.

The research sample includes dominant party regimes that occurred from 1950 to 2015 and collapsed no later than December 31, 2015. The choice of time interval is explained by the need to make sample entirely consisting of so-called present regimes. The sample includes 30 cases of single-party dominance that occurred in 27 countries¹²⁹.

The identification of determinants of the single-party dominance persistence (dependent variable) is carried out through the analysis of the impact of the following institutional and political factors (independent variables):

- 1) The type of institutional design (parliamentary or presidential);
- 2) The level of electoral system's disproportionality in parliamentary elections (calculation of the Gallagher Index);

¹²⁸ March J.G., Olsen J.P. Elaborating the "New Institutionalism" // Rhodes R.A.W., Binder S.A., Rockman B.A. (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. – N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2006. - P. 3.

¹²⁹ Austria, Guyana and Luxembourg have two periods of single-party dominance, that counted as a separate cases.

- 3) The level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors (calculation as 1 minus the share of the votes for the ruling party - the party that controls chief executive post);
- 4) The prior experience with electoral democracy (presence or absence);
- 5) The frequency of a chief executive turnover (the ratio of the number of individuals who controls chief executive post for one year or more, to the regime's duration in months).

The following control variables are analyzed in the research:

- 1) The term length of high elected office;
- 2) Type of political regime;
- 3) The degree of dominant party's control in the governing coalition.

Variable «The level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors» does not differentiate opposition parties in terms of their closeness to the dominant party. Such operationalization is caused by the intention to forward this predictor to the electoral choice between the ruling party, that seeks to have a maximum autonomous dominance, and all other parties, support for them under persistent control over government by dominant party is indicates an alternative trend. There are several cases of close, stable and long-term cooperation between independent parties (Belgium, Germany, Australia). Such combined structures are considered as dominant parties.

Perhaps, the selected control variables could be also classified as independent variables due to they originally belong to political or institutional factors by their nature. Nevertheless, these variables are specified as control ones, because there are no theoretical hypotheses on their connection with longevity of single-party dominance.

These control variables are selected to examine their possible influence on the dependent variable. In the case of the term length of high elected office it is the possible connection of the duration of single-party dominance with term limits and

the frequency of regular elections. In the case of the political regime type it is the possible influence of the democratic or authoritarian context on single-party dominance persistence. In the case of a degree of a dominant party's control in the governing coalition it is the probable significance of the effect of one-party or multi-party government.

An empirical examination of the determinants of the single-party dominance persistence is carried out through the means of correlation analysis, regression analysis and survival analysis.

Contribution to the discussion of the problem in existing literature. The contribution to the research field is follows:

- 1) The causality of single-party dominance persistence is explained by the influence of institutional and political factors and analyzed within regimes that have already overcome the critical duration threshold;
- 2) Author's original conceptualization of the single-party dominance persistence as the duration of its functioning with the time threshold for the qualification of confirmed single-party dominance has been developed. This conceptualization makes it possible to obtain the most accurate and reliable empirical estimates of the impact of political and institutional factors on the single-party dominance persistence;
- 3) An integrated system of theoretical assumptions has been developed and theoretical hypotheses have been formulated and tested on causality of the single-party dominance persistence by impact of institutional and political factors (the type of institutional design, the level of electoral system's disproportionality in parliamentary elections, the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors, prior experience with electoral democracy, the frequency of chief executive turnover) were formulated;
- 4) The effects of institutional and political factors (the type of institutional design, the level of electoral system's disproportionality in parliamentary elections, the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors, prior

experience with electoral democracy, the frequency of chief executive turnover) on single-party dominance persistence were empirically assessed.

The theoretical significance of the research is summarized in the following points:

- 1) The single-party dominance persistence was conceptualized as the duration of continuous control over chief executive by the dominant party for 18 years or more;
- 2) The theoretical model of the relationship between institutional / political factors and single-party dominance persistence was developed;
- 3) The methodological approach for determining the degree of impact of the institutional and political determinants of dominant party regimes persistence was developed, implemented and evaluated;
- 4) The statistically significant effects were revealed for single-party dominance longer duration in the conditions of lower level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and under the presence of prior experience with electoral democracy.

The practical significance of the thesis is determined by the fact that it is aimed at assessing the effects of institutional and political factors on the dominant party regimes persistence that occur widely in modern world.

Statements to be defended.

- 1) The empirical analysis of the causal institutional and political factors of single-party dominance requires that the single-party dominance persistence to be conceptualized and operationalized. In this way the single-party dominance persistence is interpreted as the duration of continuous control over chief executive by the dominant party with the establishment of a critical duration threshold of 18 years in order to qualify as a confirmed single-party dominance under regular competitive elections;

- 2) The single-party dominance as such largely determines the logic of political competition between the incumbent and the opposition. That validates regimes' empirical analysis based on this conceptualization;
- 3) The single-party dominance persistence can be considered as a variable, the variation of which is explained by five key institutional and political factors. The corresponding theoretical hypotheses for these factors have been formulated. In accordance to them the single-party dominance duration is longer under the parliamentary type of institutional design, higher electoral system' disproportionality, a lower level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors, presence of prior experience with electoral democracy, higher frequency of chief executive turnover;
- 4) A statistically significant effects both of the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and the prior experience with electoral democracy on single-party dominance persistence have been revealed. The results of statistical analysis demonstrate the absence of a statistically significant linkage of the single-party dominance persistence with the type of institutional design, the level of electoral system' disproportionality and the frequency of chief executive turnover.

Analysis of data and findings

In *the Introduction*, the research design is presented. The Introduction includes statement of research problem, literature review, research question, aim, objectives and hypotheses of research, scope and limitations of research, methodology and methods of research, criteria of selection of empirical data, contribution of research to the discussion of the problem in existing literature, statements to be defended, publications and results of approbation of research.

The *first chapter* sets out the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the study.

Section 1.1. The ways to analyze single-party dominance considers theoretical approaches to defining single-party dominance, as well as author's conceptualization of the single-party dominance phenomenon. Main theoretical ways of understanding single-party dominance rely on such factors as control over certain share of votes and seats in parliament, long-term control over chief-executive, systematic control over the political agenda, the role in forming the ruling coalition, strong identification of the dominant party with the state.

In terms of the required proportion of seats in the parliament, scholars propose criteria varying from the relative majority¹³⁰ to exceeding absolute majority, i.e. 70% of seats¹³¹. In order to operationalize the moment of the regime's transition to dominant party regime, researchers suggest to use the number of electoral cycles (generally 3 or 4¹³²) or the number of years of continuous rule (generally 15-20 years¹³³). Within the framework of understanding single-party dominance through the control over the political agenda, dominant party regimes are characterized by a strong systematic influence of the ruling party on the political decision-making process¹³⁴. The understanding of single-party dominance as a strong dominant party's identification with the state is primarily used in relation to authoritarian regimes since much importance is given to the dominant party's role as a mechanism for elite coordination.

In *Section 1.2. Conceptualization of single-party dominance* the author develops conceptualization of a single-party dominance.

The conceptualization of a single-party dominance combines two key criteria:

¹³⁰ Duverger M. Politicheskie partii (in Russian, 'Political parties'). – Moscow: Academic project, 2002. – P. 377; Pempel T.J. (ed.) Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes. – Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. – P. 3.

¹³¹ Coleman J.S. The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa // Almond G., Coleman J. (eds.) Politics of the Developing Areas. – Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. – P. 295.

¹³² Sartori G. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. – P. 260.

¹³³ Greene K.F. Why Dominant Parties Lose?: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. – P. 12.

¹³⁴ O'Leary B. Britain's Japanese Question: "Is There a Dominant Party?" // Margetts H., Smyth G. (eds.) Turning Japanese: Britain with a Permanent Party of Government. – London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994. – P. 4.

- 1) regular competitive elections with the participation of more than one party or candidate;
- 2) continuous control over chief executive by a party for 18 years or more.

Section 1.3. The characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism within the dominant party regimes covers differences of a single-party dominance under democratic and undemocratic regimes. The analysis suggests that the democratic / authoritarian context of single-party dominance determines different mechanisms of its endurance. However, the existence of single-party dominance as such is an important characteristic of a political regime, which largely determines the allocation of resources, the logic of political competition between incumbent and opposition, and therefore it becomes a regime-distinguishing notion. Regardless of the degree of democracy within a particular dominant party regime, there is some merging of government institutions with the dominant party structure, as well as the weakening of electoral competitiveness and, consequently, a declining probability of any turnover in power as a result of elections.

Section 1.4. The origins of the rise of single-party dominance studies main theoretical approaches to explaining the nature of dominant party regimes and key conditions for its emergence. These include the absence of significant social cleavages in the society, the need to overcome the fragmentation of social structure and the social demand for power consolidation.

Section 1.5. Ensuring elite integration is devoted to the dominant parties as mechanisms for coordinating elites. Due to the fact that the ruling party dominance is sustained through continuous electoral superiority over the opposition, the dominant party becomes a leading unchallenged political actor with a crucial influence on the political decision-making process¹³⁵. Thus, the dominant parties co-opt a lot of politicians seeking seats, offices and a successful political career¹³⁶. The

¹³⁵ Giliomee H., Simkins C. *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. – Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999. – P. 12.

¹³⁶ Greene K.F. *Why Dominant Parties Lose?: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. – New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. – P. 5-6.

attraction of large political and corporate groups by the dominant party, in turn, leads to the elite integration around the dominant party structure. Therefore the dominant party gains resource advantage over opposition. So ruling party's competitors have low electoral support to win elections and gain control over chief executive office.

Section 1.6. Incumbent and opposition within the electoral space studies the nature of political competition under single-party dominance. The consolidation of single-party dominance creates stable expectations at the levels of political elites and voters. Generally, these expectations can be summarized as a lack of any alternative at the political arena and a lack of party choice for pragmatically minded political actors. Under such conditions, the incumbent gets a steady superiority over the challengers for a long time.

The second chapter develops theoretical implications for the effects of institutional and political factors on the single-party dominance persistence. These effects are introduced in the theoretical hypotheses describing the nature of the relationship between institutional and political factors and the single-party dominance persistence.

Section 2.1. The type of institutional design considers the influence of institutional design on the single-party dominance persistence. The effect of institutional design on the single-party dominance persistence is explained through three key implications: influence of the dominant party on the election results, ideological identification of incumbent and challengers, problems of election campaign's organization.

Under presidentialism, the opposition is able to more successfully overcome the ruling party advantage in electoral support¹³⁷. The candidates' personal characteristics, individual profiles and political views are more important in

¹³⁷ Scheiner E. Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. – P. 216.

presidential elections, while the role of party affiliation is more important in parliamentary ones.

Parliamentarianism and presidentialism have different consequences for the candidates' agenda formation. The direct and fixed presidential mandate, which does not depend on the support of the parliamentary majority, stipulates candidates' autonomy from the ideological positions expressed in party platforms to create agenda in accordance with own political views. In particular, it leads to leaning towards the median voter and avoiding extreme views. The more blurred ideological identification of candidates in presidential regimes eliminates the advantage of the dominant party in greater ideological flexibility.

In parliamentary regimes, single-party dominance becomes more durable due to greater importance of incumbent's advantages over opposition in electoral campaign organization. Parliamentarianism expose the opposition to difficult problem of ensuring the most efficient way of turning electoral support into seats in parliament and cabinet.

The following theoretical hypothesis about the relationship between the type of institutional design and the single-party dominance persistence is formulated:

H1: Single-party dominance in parliamentary regimes has a longer duration than in presidential ones.

Section 2.2. The level of electoral system's disproportionality in parliamentary elections analyzes the effects of the level of the electoral system's disproportionality in parliamentary elections on the single-party dominance persistence. This factor refers to the level of correspondence between the shares of votes and seats. It is measured by the Gallagher's Index.

The logic of the effects of the level of electoral system's disproportionality on the single-party dominance persistence is examined in the context of ideological identification of the incumbent and the opposition, as well as coordination problems between the challengers.

The resource and electoral advantage of incumbent over opposition has greater significance in plurality systems. The ideological attractiveness of the dominant party for the median voter matters more in plurality settings. Under proportional representation settings, this advantage does not play such an important role. Therefore, the opposition's chances of winning the elections are improved. Moreover, opposition gains advantage from leaning electoral behavior towards original structure of voters' preferences.

It was revealed that the peculiarities of plurality systems effects (in particular, the inducing two-party or two-bloc system), expose the opposition to difficult problem of providing internal coordination. Challengers should be cooperative to nominate consolidated candidates. In proportional representation systems, opposition parties can be successful by nominating several party lists and gaining the increasing aggregate share of seats in parliament.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated about the relationship between the level of electoral system's disproportionality and the single-party dominance persistence:

H2: Regimes with a higher electoral system's disproportionality have a longer duration of single-party dominance.

Section 2.3. The level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors clarifies the impact of the level of electoral support of the ruling party's competitors on the single-party dominance persistence. Due to the fact that single-party dominance is maintained in competitive elections, the threat of losing power by a dominant party as a result of defeat in elections increases under conditions of higher level of electoral support for its competitors. Thus, the likelihood of dominant party rule collapse as a result of higher share of votes for the challengers is increasing.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated on the relationship between the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and the single-party dominance persistence:

H3: Regimes with a higher electoral support for the ruling party's competitors have a shorter duration of single-party dominance.

Section 2.4. *The prior experience with electoral democracy* deals with the effects of the prior experience with electoral democracy on the single-party dominance persistence. The specification of the presence of prior experience with electoral democracy for dominant party regimes is realized by examining at least one observation of electoral turnover in power prior to the emergence of single-party dominance.

The presence or absence of prior experience with electoral democracy is recognized as an important factor influencing the functioning of political institutions within dominant party regimes. Single-party dominance, which emerges under conditions of prior experience with electoral democracy, is likely to stem from the political structure of society. In this way the dominant party represents the demand for a certain policy supported by a large social groups. So long-term stable incentives are created for the upholding of single-party dominance.

Single-party dominance in regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy, and with survival mechanisms based on the incentives and interests of the ruling party, rather than on the social demands, is more exposed to threat of breakdown due to low electoral support and vulnerability to social and economic challenges.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated on the relationship between the prior experience with electoral democracy and the single-party dominance persistence:

H4: Regimes with prior experience with electoral democracy have a longer duration of single-party dominance than regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy.

Section 2.5. *The frequency of the chief executive turnover* analyzes the impact of chief executive turnover frequency. The indicator is calculated as the ratio

of the number of persons holding the chief executive post (only persons with the term of office of 1 year and more are considered in order to exclude temporary individuals), to the period of single-party dominance (in months).

It is assumed that longer duration will characterize those dominant party regimes which passed the test of the chief executive turnover and did not collapse as a result. It is proposed to use the quantitative index of the frequency of chief executive turnover.

As a result, the following theoretical hypothesis is formulated on the relationship between the frequency of the chief executive turnover and the single-party dominance persistence:

H5: Regimes with more frequent chief executive turnover have a longer duration of single-party dominance.

The third chapter provides an empirical assessment of theoretical hypotheses through multivariate statistical analysis, including correlation analysis, regression analysis, survival analysis.

Based on the results of the multivariate statistical analysis, the theoretical model of the research was evaluated as quite efficient in explaining the persistence of single-party dominance. Two predictors have a statistically significant effects on the single-party dominance persistence - the level of electoral support for the ruling party's competitors and the prior experience with electoral democracy. All control variables were statistically insignificant.

Thus, the following theoretical hypotheses were confirmed:

- 1) H3: Regimes with a higher electoral support for the ruling party's competitors have a shorter duration of single-party dominance;
- 2) H4: Regimes with prior experience with electoral democracy have a longer duration of single-party dominance than regimes without prior experience with electoral democracy.

The Conclusion summarizes the results of the dissertation and outlines the prospects for further research.

Publications

The results of the study have been presented in the following publications:

Publications in peer-reviewed journals

1. Poroshin A.V. Vliyanie konstitutsionnogo dizayna na ustoychivost odnopartiynogo dominirovaniya (in Russian, 'Influence of the constitutional design on longevity of single-party dominance') // Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Seriya «Politologiya». 2017. Vol. 1. P. 87-97.
2. Poroshin A.V. Rol' dominantnoy partii v regulirovanii etnicheskikh konfliktov: Primer Malayzii (in Russian, 'Dominant party's role in ethnic conflict management: The case of Malaysia') // Politicheskaya nauka. 2016. Vol. 1. P. 176-185.
3. Poroshin A.V. Rezhim s dominantnoy partiyey kak perspektiva politicheskoy transformatsii postkommunisticheskikh gosudarstv (in Russian, 'Dominant party regime as perspective for political transformation of post-communist states') // Politicheskaya nauka. 2014. Vol. 3. P. 232-248.

Publications in other journals

1. Poroshin A.V. Avtoritarnye rezhimy s dominantnoy partiyey: osnovnye svoystva i faktory ustoychivosti (in Russian, 'Dominant party authoritarian regimes: key characteristics and reasons for stability') // Biznes. Obschestvo. Vlast. 2011. Vol. 7. P. 156-178.

Approbation of research

The contents and results of the study have been presented at the following conferences:

1. 24th World Congress of Political Science. Poznań, Poland. 27.07.2016. Topic of the paper: Impact of Constitutional Design on Durability of Single-Party Dominance.
2. 2016 ECPR Graduate Student Conference. Tartu, Estonia. 12.07.2016. Topic of the paper: Impact of Effective Number of Parties on Durability of Single-Party Dominance.
3. 7th International Academic Conference for Students and Graduate Students 'Statistical Methods for Analysis of the Economy and Society'. 18.05.2016. Topic of the paper: Impact of Electoral Competition on Single-Party Dominance Persistence.
4. 1st Inter-University Student Conference on Political Science. Moscow, Russia. 05.03.2011. Topic of the paper: Dominant Party Authoritarian Regimes: Key Characteristics and Reasons for Stability.
5. Academic Seminar 'Political Parties and Political Competition in Democratic and Undemocratic Regimes'. Moscow, Russia. 16.04.2010. Topic of the paper: 'United Russia': a Problem of Party Ideological Identification.
6. International Academic Conference 'The Crisis of European Social Democracy: Roots, Evidences, Solutions. Moscow, Russia. 19.02.2010. Topic of the paper: 'Just Russia': Significance of Social-Democratic Identity.