


# Classical cryptography Quantum computations

Ivan Murashko

# Introduction

- Quantum mechanics
- Quantum computations
- Symmetric cryptography. Grover search algorithm (GSA)
- Public-key cryptography (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic curve) and Shor's algorithm.


## Two-level atom



$$|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |a\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |b\rangle$$

**Figure:** Energy measurement for two-level atom. The atom is in pure state:  $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |a\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |b\rangle$ . Device can get either  $E_a$  or  $E_b$ .


## Two-level atom. $E_a$ measurement



$$|\psi\rangle \rightarrow |a\rangle$$

**Figure:** Energy measurement for two-level atom. The atom is in pure state:  $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|a\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}|b\rangle$ . Device got  $E_a$ . The following wave function collapse occurs as a result of the measurement  $|\psi\rangle \rightarrow |a\rangle$

## Two-level atom. $E_b$ measurement



**Figure:** Energy measurement for two-level atom. The atom is in pure state:  $|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |a\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} |b\rangle$ . Device got  $E_b$ . The following wave function collapse occurs as a result of the measurement  $|\psi\rangle \rightarrow |b\rangle$

# Schrödinger's cat



## Bell experiment. Classical case

$$f = \frac{1}{2} (ab + a'b + ab' - a'b'), a, a', b, b' \in \{-1, +1\}.$$

therefore  $f \in \{-1, +1\}$  and  $|\langle f \rangle| \leq 1$

# Bell experiment. Quantum case

$$|\langle f \rangle| = \sqrt{2} > 1$$



# Negative probabilities

$$\langle f \rangle = \sum_{a, a', b, b'} p(a, a', b, b') f(a, a', b, b').$$

therefore for  $|\langle f \rangle| > 1$  necessary to have

$$\exists a, a', b, b' : p(a, a', b, b') < 0$$

# Quantum logic

Distributive law is failed for quantum logic:

- $p \wedge (q_1 \vee q_2)$  can be true
- but both  $p \wedge q_1$  as well as  $p \wedge q_2$  are false

in other words

$$p \wedge (q_1 \vee q_2) \neq (p \wedge q_1) \vee (p \wedge q_2)$$


where  $\wedge$  is “logical and”,  $\vee$  is “logical or”

# Classical bit vs quantum q-bit

Classical bit is either 0 or 1.


Quantum q-bit is another case. It's a state  $|q\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$ . I.e. as Schrödinger's cat it can be 1 (die) and 0 (alive) simultaneously

# Classical computation



**Figure:** Classical computation. Input has a number  $x$  that consists of  $n$  bits. Output  $y = f(x)$  is the result that consists of  $m$  bits

# Quantum computations



**Figure:** Quantum computations should be reversible. We have a number  $x$  as input. The number consists of  $n$  q-bits. We also require to have a seed of 0 states ( $m$  q-bits). Output also have two parts: the result  $|y\rangle = |f(x)\rangle$  is described by  $m$  q-bits and initial state  $|x\rangle$  ( $n$  q-bits)

# Quantum computations


Classical case

$$x \rightarrow f(x)$$

Quantum case

$$\begin{aligned} &|0\rangle |0\rangle + |1\rangle |0\rangle + |2\rangle |0\rangle + \dots + |x\rangle |0\rangle + \dots \rightarrow \\ &\rightarrow |0\rangle |f(0)\rangle + |1\rangle |f(1)\rangle + |2\rangle |f(2)\rangle + \dots + |x\rangle |f(x)\rangle + \dots \end{aligned}$$

# Needle in a haystack task



**Figure:** Search in unstructured data array (search "a needle in a haystack").  
Classical complexity is  $O(N)$

# Grover search algorithm. Scheme




Figure: Grover search algorithm. Complexity is  $O(\sqrt{N})$



# Grover search algorithm. Repeating element scheme




Figure: Grover search algorithm. Grover iteration

# Grover search algorithm. Main principle




Figure: Grover search algorithm. Phase inversion aka conditional inversion

# Grover search algorithm. Main principle




Figure: Grover search algorithm. Grover diffusion operator

# Impact on classical cryptography

$O(N) \rightarrow O(\sqrt{N})$  leads to the following recommendation  
 $AES_{128} \rightarrow AES_{256}$

# Public key cryptography

- RSA and factorisation problem
- Diffie-Hellman and discrete logarithm
- Elliptic curve and discrete logarithm

# RSA and period-finding problem

$$N = p \cdot q$$

$$f(x, a) = a^x \mod N.$$

The period of the function is  $T = 2r$ , i.e.

$$a^{x+2r} \mod N = a^x \mod N,$$

$$a^{2r} \equiv 1 \mod N,$$

$$(a^r + 1)(a^r - 1) \equiv 0 \mod N$$

# Shor's algorithm





Figure: Period finding problem and quantum Fourier's transform


# Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$



**Figure:** Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for  $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$ ,  $a = 2$ ,  $N = 21$ .




# Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$



**Figure:** Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for  $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$ ,  $a = 2$ , Value 1 is repeated with period of  $T = 6$ .

# Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$



**Figure:** Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for  $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$ ,  $a = 2$ . Local maxima of Fourier transform are repeated with period  $\frac{M}{r} \approx 10.67$  ( $M = 64$  is the number of samples for Fourier transform). This gives us  $T \approx 6$

# Shor's algorithm. Period finding problem for $f(x, a) = a^x \bmod N$

Local maxima of Fourier transform are repeated with period  $\frac{M}{r} \approx 10.67$  ( $M = 64$  is the number of samples for Fourier transform). This gives us  $T \approx 6$  and as therefore  $r = \frac{T}{2} = 3$ .  
As result (in our case)  $(a^r - 1) = 7$  and  $(a^r + 1) = 9$  have common divisors with  $N = 21$ : 7 and 3.

# Public key cryptography. Recommendations for key length

All key sizes are provided in bits. These are the minimal sizes for security.

**Click on a value to compare it with other methods.**

Year	Symmetric	Factoring (modulus)		Discrete Logarithm		Elliptic Curve	Hash
		Optimistic	Conservative	Key	Group		
2015	78	1245	1350	156	1245	156	156
2016	79	1273	1392	158	1273	158	158
<b>2017</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>1300</b>	<b>1435</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>1300</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>159</b>
2018	80	1329	1478	160	1329	160	160
2019	81	1358	1523	162	1358	162	162



To resist until year 2017, you may consider using a minimum of 80-bit key for symmetric systems (e.g. AES-128) and a minimum of 1440-bit key for asymmetric systems (e.g. RSA).

# Impact on public-key cryptography

- RSA: 4096
- DH: 2048/256
- Elliptic curve: 512/256 (bitcoin)

NSA doesn't recommend elliptic curve cryptography for internal usage.

# Additional info

<https://github.com/ivanmurashko/lectures/tree/master/pdfs>

Branch: master ▾ lectures / pdfs /

Create new fileUpload filesFind fileHistory

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# Questions

SHRODINGER VS. HEISENBERG



CAT-DEAD OR ALIVE?  
WHAT DO YOU THINK?

[cloudcomics.blogspot.com](http://cloudcomics.blogspot.com)

I DON'T KNOW

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