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To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is necessary to go back to World War II, according to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into the foreign intelligence field in World War II. Overnight the FBI had to generate the capability to move into Latin America against the German espionage operation which included business covers, radio networks, and influence in Latin American governments. The FBI had no precedent or guidance. Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegg conferred with FBI agents the British in London for assistance. went into Latin America first under business covers, then in the embassies, which was thin cover. legal attaches established official liaison wi local authorities. The FBI's role was prima counterintelligence but some positive interintelligence was gathered about the stability of ga Mo FBI agents learned on the job. headquarters was ridiculous until were reported back.

and Asia as well The OSS ran operations is ran undercover Donova operations in the United States. See the book by Donald Downs. OSS had a very close relationship with MI 5 and MI 6. The British also ran operations in the United States in 1939-41. No one knows how many. They saw the FBI as neophytes knowing little about the business. The British developed closer relations to OSS than to FBI.

At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in the United States for example, the OSS bugging of the Spenish Beneav Other complaints came from The friction between Hoover and Latin America. Donovan is important background for Hoover's view of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regardless of their background if he thought they had the capability to penetrate the access. The OSS use of Communists "shook the hell" out of Hoover, as did OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation with the NKVD. Hoover would never work with Hoover saw CIA roots in OSS. Papich stressed that OSS had some great people, extremely capable and dedicated, but OSS had an element that Hoover would never buy.

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had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence community could have dealt with the New Left later. The CIA would have had assets to assess the issues. Such questions involved New Left travels overseas and relationships with foreign agents.

The FBI and CIA did discuss developing a cover in the U. S. to get into the content of the cover in the U. S. to get into the cover in the U. S. to get into the cover in the proposal for a joint approach. When Papich was there, it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no support. However, if the CIA desired to use a company it would ask for a check of FBI files. Papich is not aware of any political organization created by the CIA, although it may have been determined by the CIA, although it may have been determined to the content of the coverence of the coverence of the coverence of the coverence organizations were implemented to the decision would have been at Hoover's level

FBI informant travel oversea was limited mainly to CPUSA members. The FBI would not tell CIA about informant trips to Moscow or Paris beforehand. The reason was that the CIA would have notified its field agencies that the informant's life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.

The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA. Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and the Office of Security. Papich and Creager backed each other up in their respective areas. There were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other liaison agents were not so deeply involved in intelligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison at NSA was Bill McDonnell, although Papich was also involved with

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When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for any information rather than specifying the data. This is because foreign services may be penetrated by the KGB.

Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft in France or the "17 wiretaps".

Regarding "leak" cases, over the years sack Eisenhower and Kennedy, the White House and go through the roof. Hoover wester a source would be a top official acnothing would be done. For example, under President Kennedy the FBI did identify a top source of leaks, gave the information to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The security committee was created to deal with leaks. Each agency would handle its own, although the President could still order the FBI to enter the case.

Papich did not recall anything about Anna Chennault, but he did recall that during the Korean War there was a request of a top American citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich says he talked them out of it.

Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens, Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on antiwar protests.

Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up. He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his unit but he did know of its existence after it was established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders. These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not know CIA project codewords). There was no CIA capability to cover antiwar contacts in the cia accordance was similar to the old assumptions about the CPUSA.

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
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
wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent who gave the information. The CIA officer refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things like this had happened in the past. FBI field agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go to Helms and get the identity of the FBI source. Helms called in the CIA man, who refused to identify him. Helms sent Hoover a letter than this and said he was "taking the necessary distribution". Hoover noted on the "distribution of the PBI source."

Papich then wrote a long to designation to Hoover instead of his prief resignation note. He strongly apported to Hoover to reconsider and keep communications open. He also raised serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions. Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been dozens of incidents like this before. He did not confer with anyone in the FBI about his letter. W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI it's OK with him for the Committee to get the letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover. The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)

Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich thinks it started with the Long Committee hearings on the Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy Administration, and especially under Attorney General Clark, there were cutbacks in place the Soverage. This deficitely attentes the interest in the coverage of flowlets. Clarente The Interest In the coverage of cutassiss. ICLA Toolsiss! Bervices Division only lossed equipment to Falls as coss recall a four-month foint apportments!

W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA problems with Sullivan. Papich stressed the need for micrograms coverage. This was a red [lag" to Scorer. The costesse was their batty operations [6] were assessed and foods be detected.





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Regarding postal intercept, CIA came up with the proposition, said they had entree, and desired it for positive intelligence. CIA did all the work. The focus was air mail to and from the focus on persons of interest and also where other information might be of interest to FBI. It provided some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls a brief mail intercept in the early 1950's on the West Coast regarding the focus of the

Papich recalls meetings with CIA and MSA on Approx Store covered but not much worthwhile resulted.

There was committee the Miami area MBERTAL and (S)
monitoring. The FBI would get leads for suspects.

Salada, Division D were the COMINT people. Papich (S)
recalls no other areas was partial in the U.S.(S)

Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would get positive intelligence reports, for example, on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI was interested in his training in Russia as a possible source regarding Soviet intelligence activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They got the information from faculty and students regarding future riots.

The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities were set by the intelligence community, for example, gather whatever they can about missiles. The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into operations, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good officers who would note potential for counterintelligence use. There was no increase in DCS traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.

The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who feared an internal security role. It was set up by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact between FBI and the DCS at the field level. The procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview

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Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls proposals for developing cover in the U.S. for going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the development of sources in the U.S. to cover overseas targets. Papich would write a memo on the situation and provide any relevant FBI information. He also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and reported back through CIA.

Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather information on policy guidance, funding, and training of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large volume of communication covering names like Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.

FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investigation regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not in a position to testify. Papich does not recall asking CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might have originated with electronic surveillance overseas.

If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief. Papich would insist on identification of the sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI did get access to sources, sometimes working through a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.

Papich recalls discussing creation of "notional" groups targeted at Gains and Bussie. The program was not implemented before he left in 1970. It could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence Division but they would have come to Papich if CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East Division in CIA.

Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the entire intelligence community, including the White 1 B (FBI)



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House, to acquire notes on the profile. The money was for real contents of the provide of the profile of the provide of the pr

Papich recalls discussion with Inchained Services (5)

instance where TSD provided documents to FBI and he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of CIA alias documentation or other document forging. If this had been done, it would have had to go through Papich.

Papich knew nothing about Vesco.

On Ober memos to FBI. Parish recalls a code designation consist FILE. The purpose was so that when information came back to CIA from FBI it could be sent directly to Ober. The counterintelligence staff had an office to log communications. The determination as to what FBI information would go to Ober was first based on Ober's request for specifics and second based on FBI criteria which considered whether there would be any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober regarding an individual and ask for any information generally about his overseas activity.

Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and entering operations in the 1960's.

Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-type" operation, doing research on penetration of the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might have been Communists or have had World War II Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant minds who might still have strong identification with their home countries in eastern and middle Europe.

Finally, Papich and Creager felt that "the guts of liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not on their internal security problems. With Office of Security there was a small number of investigations overlapping FBI.