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IDENTIFICATION FORM**

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## TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  
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COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
SUBJECT: WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962  
DATE OF INFO: 1 AUGUST 1962  
PLACE & DATE ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)  
APPRAISAL: SEE BELOW  
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/650,938  
DATE DISTR: 1 AUGUST 1962  
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY  
REFERENCES: IN  
FIELD REPORT NO.  
SMITH DUNDY  
DUNGAN  
KAYSEN  
KILDUFF  
PETERSEN  
SCHLESINGER  
TAYLOR  
BELK

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS

SOURCE: PARAS 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARVN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)  
PARAS 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM MAJOR LONG, AT AN UNIDENTIFIED SOURCE, STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)  
PARA 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)  
ON 1 AUGUST 1962, CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.

COMMUNICATED OFFICER OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE COMMAND HAD IMMEDIATELY  
1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE INTO A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN PARAS 10 THROUGH 14.  
2. CHAU COMMENTED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURRING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE

IN

S-E-C-R-E-T

ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

TDCS DB-3/650,938

PAGE TWO

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WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.)

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE

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# END OF MESSAGE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

FIELD COMMENT: CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INsofar AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED.

GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

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CLASSIFICATION -- DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		INX	
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IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

FIELD COMMENT.

12. AT 102000 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA 1105. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPE'S CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

FIELD DISSEM. STATE OF CINCPAC ARPAC TO PACAF PAFT.

END OF MESSAGE

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