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Page:1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA  
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-398

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DATE : 06/25/75  
PAGES : ~~96~~ 104

SUBJECTS :  
OPERATION MONGOOSE  
ROSELLI, JOHNNY  
CASTRO  
ASSASSINATION  
POISON PILLS  
CUBA  
MCCONE, JOHN  
CIA  
BISSELL, RICHARD  
WHITE HOUSE  
MAFIA  
ROWAN, DAN  
GIANCANA, SAM

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COMMENTS :

Box 245  
Folder 14

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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HARVEY EX 1 R371

6/25/75

gyp

1

21 JUN 74

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~per~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~not~~ ~~not~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement and maintenance of foreign and domestic assets in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine service, as outlined by the National Security Agency~~. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~of the operational requirements of foreign and domestic~~ ~~installations~~, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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10002-1010

2

#### 4. Operational assets:

(1) Personal: Q JWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. Q Jwin was first contacted in 1958 through [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted & sporadically [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by Q Jwin. On <sup>October</sup> ~~September~~ 1960,

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3

Q Jwin annual salary : 7,200  
Travel + ops expenses for  
Q Jwin + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000  
Fees for services by and  
standby of agents and  
agent candidates : 2,000  
Travel of staff employees  
engaged in Zorifle activity : 2,500  
Hire of safehouses, automobiles  
and other operational expenses : 1,000  
\$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (~~English~~) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (~~Concept, Russian style, KGB style~~) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + adjust to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, <sup>with high regard for operational security</sup> assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kuba only (e.g., what does ~~the agency~~ know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kuba, one focal point for control, search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially denied?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with owner (non-station) commo. Word of mouth + no backchannel re trips

d. No PA's <sup>(except for search)</sup> or intermediaries; rigid case-officing, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govt.

f. No use of <sup>JUN 24 1975</sup> any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would need.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

~~Marshall~~ in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubaers who can



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5

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretext: ~~Not to be~~ secret; this established by ~~known~~  
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.  
4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visas.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning house or checks in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have plan to backstop this, all documents, etc. to be kept in backstop. Should be able to

document when needed. Should be able to

act if file

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~to be done~~.

Keeping of files.

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freed to travel

6

Legal; operational + ethical → morale problems.

~~Not to be used~~ case.

- Legal not secure enough.
- 1) Maximum security + within KGB only (e.g., how much does ~~the~~ know?). Limitation on number ~~code~~.
  - 2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandate. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-station) comm.
  - 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

- 4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., Officer) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow. i.e. 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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7

10) ~~Confidential~~ recommended. ~~Nothing will be done~~

~~Mafia~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) <sup>all</sup> ~~any~~ Cuban personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~Stability~~ + stable ~~in~~ ~~person~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~select~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

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ed 21 - 25/1 - 4 sec (action)  
 "The Magic Button" 8

Narcotics Büro ~~✗~~

"for a living" -

RIS 201. Cover

Button - Bankruptcy - No Star

eyes - Jim A.

not a TSD problem

Contradict from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &  
 a confession of weakness. -

- El Benefactor - assumptions -

Example 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job.

Memo. (C)

[redacted] Year

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Anesthesia -

26/1 -

[redacted] Forensic DCI - Matter -

No file Review -

1. Select proper open to run -

2. [redacted]

Max. of 2

3. Security Rules

B-WITH-AS-3

4. [redacted] lives

[redacted] - Review.

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6. No [REDACTED]
7. No projects or papers  
except per cones. 9
8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] -  
[REDACTED] Program Chief LCH -  
Ticket 1500 - from MB -  
mark spot again. Chief of  
project - [REDACTED] Dicko
9. Disposed -
10. Targets who & where -  
Must know before  
we can spot -
11. Case officering
12. [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]
- Fd I list - Remember

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