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## RESUME

REPORT NO.

00-A-3, 203, 015

Oliver E. Simpson, Soviet Embassy Staff, Unregistered Return to the Villavie  
Possibly from ability to communicate/  
Resident with Authentication, August 15  
1964

DATE DISTR.

4 December 1961

NO. PAGES

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## REFERENCES

Figure 2. 5. 10. 2004

(NY-52511)

20 Nov 61 and 20-11-61

c/c Magnan 5

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Source: Prof. Chhabra

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**SOURCE:**

US citizens, head of the clandestine department of a large US technical

During the period 27 Sep to 23 Oct 61, they 5 Flanagan, Special Activities  
Student under their Foreign-Exchange Agreement, and under the supervision of  
himself and members of his staff.

1. When Aleksandr Fingar came to do post-doctorate research work in the Department of Chemistry under the supervision of myself and my associates on 27 Sep 61. He came pursuant to the Soviet-American exchange agreement and it was intended that he would work here for a period of three or four months. He had been here less than a month when his sudden and unexpected departure occurred on 23 Oct 61. Prior to coming here, he had been a Scientific Associate of the Institute of Chemical Physics, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
2. He was very much disturbed by Fingar's sudden departure because we feared that the whole exchange program might have been jeopardized. So, on 27 Oct 61, we sent a cable to Professor Nikolay Aleksandrovich Fingar, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who is the head of the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow, where Fingar had worked. Answer replied to this cable with a cable which we received 11 Oct 61. It was very conciliatory. It stated that Fingar came back for family reasons. "We are extremely sorry," it said, "and will write a letter with details later." However, no such letter has arrived to date, 20 Nov 61.
3. Another cable was sent by the National Academy of Sciences, 6 Nov 61 to Dr. Evgeniy Evgenievich Saltykov, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and this or that, but no reply has been received, as far as I know.
4. As far as I am concerned, I am sure that thinking that Fingar's wife and family made him return to the USSR is not the reason for his departure.
5. I think his departure forced, here is a guy that is being coerced. Or it may have been a combination of two or three things which brought about his recall.
6. Fingar fitted in very well here. He is a very personable fellow. He gave him the title of Senior Scientist. He seemed to work with satisfaction.

[Prof. Herman Mark & Murray Goodman]

12/4 Copy to  
FISIC and SR/6

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students about four or five years after receiving their Ph.D. When he arrived, he spoke very little English but was interesting first. He had a room in a dormitory over at the Long Island College, there we continued our class. He made many friends. He is married and has a wife and two children who remained in Moscow. One of his parents came from the Ukraine, I believe. The U.S.S.R. has all the details. They are getting the freight."

7. He was obviously impressed with Pirogov's ability and regarded him as a capable research worker. He is well informed in the kind of work in which he has been working. He mixed well with the other students. He was not pretentious. He did not seem to hide anything. On the subject of housing, for example, he did not pretend that the USSR's is up to date in the U.S. He was not prejudicing for the Soviet system. It seemed to me that he was the sort of man who might have been converted to the U.S. way of doing things, if he was not careful. It may be that the people to whom he reported in the Council of the Soviet Delegation to the UN at Park Avenue and 68th Street, New York City, may have reached the same conclusion. Or his department may have been brought about for other reasons, for example, by his work with Soviet American flight, construction and president of the International Astronomical Society and Chairman of the Soviet Interplanetary Commission.
8. Dr. Sidorov was visiting our institution and one of us thought it would be a good idea for Pirogov to meet Sidorov. This was brought about at a reception where he was introduced as "Pirogov of Moscow." They shook hands and Pirogov said something in English like, "pleased to meet you." Sidorov said something to him in a very sharp tone in Russian and later, in the elevator, saw his smile and laughed him in a very stern voice. I was present and observed that Pirogov grew pale. Later, he became very nervous and went to the UN Delegation Headquarters on Park Avenue and 68th Street. I understood that they laughed at his apprehensions and told him not to worry. However, from then on he became more nervous. Somehow, he said, had indicated that he was talking too much. He was afraid he had given away some important information.
9. This was a lot of bother because we already knew what they are doing. He certainly had no reason to feel he was disclosing more than he should. He only disclosed what was necessary to do the work planned for him in the program assigned under the exchange agreement. It would have been impossible for him to carry out his assignment without making the disclosures that he made. We just cannot work on such a project without being confidential. Just the same Pirogov became very apprehensive and could be recalled. They still reported no danger. They think I have called too much about what we are doing in the Institute of Chemical Physics. Pirogov had taken the position that it was not wrong for him to talk about his work at this Institute in the USSR, which is the one headed by himself, incidentally. Pirogov maintained that an exchange project cannot be all take and no give. There is supposed to be an exchange of information.
10. Another thing that contributed to Pirogov's apprehensions was the fact that he had not heard from his wife or family for several weeks. He was greatly concerned about this. However, I believe he did have a letter from his wife just before he left.
11. By one feeling is that his popularity worked against him. The suspicious people in the UN Delegation office did not like the idea of his becoming a part of the community here. The students liked him and he went to classes with them. When some of my students were celebrating receiving their degrees, Pirogov joined the party and after dinner he came along with the rest of them to have a drink at my home. He obviously acted like a human being.
12. In my opinion, Pirogov's signature into a certain article is not appreciating what a good propaganda agent he was for their system, even though he was not afraid to admit that the Soviet system is not perfect and that there

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is a heavy shouter, for example. They thought he talked too much and was too friendly. He did not keep his mouth shut and he did not act like a Jew. I am sure they concluded that he was susceptible to coercion. I thought of myself.

13. As I suspect that Pirogov dug his own hole. He had to report to the Council of the US Delegation every week and, in the process, his general attitude got across to them. He talked too much. His conversation with Becker was an example.
14. Again, what he was working on here was very close to what he had been working on under Gurney and the Council may have jumped to the conclusion that he was telling us all that he knew.
15. The problem on which he worked here was the cryptanalytic solution of cipher and alpha-ciphers using a transmission aerial cryptosystem. For example, one of the cryptosystems on which he worked involved the cipher, beta-cipher, and the alpha cipher, program.
16. He was known to many of the staff and was intimate with ten or fifteen students here but was probably most intimate with the man with whom he shared a laboratory. This was an Italian, named Dr. Emilio Rignani. They appeared to be good friends.
17. I do not think that Pirogov was the victim of an informer. I have wondered about this a lot but I do not think this is what happened. I think, as I said before, that he dug his own hole. Instinctively, we were most anxious to keep this incident out of the papers and there was no leak. Had there been an informer, this might not have been the case.

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