

SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.

12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

SECRET

- If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.
- This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.
- In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article.
 - The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;
 - they know or suspect what he told the US;
 - they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;
 - they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.
 - And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.
- In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key.
 - The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.
 - But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

SECRET

SECRET

- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.
 - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.
 - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- THIRD, is an equitable issue.
 - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;
 - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
 - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.
 - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.
 - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.