

# File #:

62-116395

# Serial Scope:

477 THRU 1<sup>ST</sup> NR 497

3<sup>RD</sup> NR 497 THRU 499

Released under the John F. Kennedy  
Assassination Records Collection Act  
of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).  
Case#:NW 65360 Date: 11-17-2022

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. Wannall

FROM : R. L. Shackelford

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford  
DATE: 7/28/75  
1 - Mr. K. A. Mendenhall

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ass. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75, captioned as above. This memorandum advised CIA had prepared a document citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Portions of this CIA document were furnished this Bureau and referenced memorandum requested documents pertaining to a particular Bureau division and/or Intelligence Division section be reviewed to identify the subject matter and make an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved. Those portions of the CIA document pertaining to the IS-2 Section of the Intelligence Division are pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.

A review has been made of the material, supra, and the following comments apply:

Pages 29, 30, under the heading "Merrimac," refer to recruitment and handling of "several Agents" to covertly monitor dissident groups in the Washington area and states one was so successful the "Agent" was turned over to the FBI. We have no idea who the "Agent" was and in absence of identifying information no compromise exists to Bureau operations.

REC-102 62-11639-499  
Page 171 refers to CIA producing a document titled "Restless Youth" in two versions. The version dealing with radical students in America was sent only to the President and two other high officials. Page 171, itself, in no way compromises Bureau operations.

14 AUG 11 1975  
Pages 190, 191, also deal with the "Restless Youth" document, which disclose the document only went to ~~nine~~ readers, "a copy may be in the Johnson Library," and refers to updating of the document. These pages, themselves, in no way compromise Bureau operations.

62-116395

KAM:lm  
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

Pages 193, 194, refer to CIA participation in preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of U. S. organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. Reference is made to collecting information from their own sources "and through liaison with the FBI." A reference is also made to primary source of information being "sensitive intercepts produced by NSA." While these pages do not directly compromise Bureau operations, disclosure of NSA intercepts could well indirectly adversely affect Bureau operations by disclosure of sensitive techniques which produce extremely valuable information to the intelligence community, of which the FBI is a part.

Pages 197, 198, refer to the response to an inquiry as to involvement in domestic affairs by the Director, Central Reference Service, CIA, and in no way compromises Bureau operations.

Page 203 refers to a similar response by Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIA, and includes a reference to their monitoring foreign broadcasts of Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark and furnishing transcripts at the request of the FBI and Department of Justice for consideration for possible trial use. There is no compromise of Bureau operations involved as this was to be evidence in a public trial and would have required CIA personnel to publicly testify.

Page 330 again makes reference to "Restless Youth" and use of FBI reports. It also refers to a 1967 CIA study of "SDS and its foreign ties." The page, itself, does not compromise Bureau operations.

Page 482 refers to a "project MPLODESTAR," which involved manipulation of assets against targets in the "leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world." Comments include "each case is cleared with the FBI..." The page itself does not compromise Bureau operations.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

ACTION:

None. For information.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the  
information contained therein should be closely  
guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know  
basis.

Kerry

~~MBC~~  
~~WJG~~ EP/62

~~WJD~~

~~JBB~~  
~~PLM~~

KI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. Cochran

FROM : T. F. Kelleher

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 7/28/75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inquiries \_\_\_\_\_  
Info. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an assessment of the accuracy and possible damage that might be suffered by the Bureau by the release of information to the Senate Select Committee <sup>CIA</sup> as set forth in Cregar to Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75 captioned as above.

Attached are separate commentaries relating to items appearing on corresponding page numbers in the CIA document.

It is to be noted that no written record or personal recollection could be located concerning item 7, page 00118 relating to the purchase of cameras.

Attached are nine pages containing the results of the requested assessment. Copies of these assessments have also been made for each designated copy of this memorandum.

ACTION:

For information.  
*fr*  
Enclosures

13<sup>th</sup>

REC-102

62-11635-WPN-498  
*33*  
*Open*

ENCLOSURE

- 1 - Mr. Cochran  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. McNiff

~~SECRET~~

14 AUG 11 1975

TFK:eb  
(4)

Classified by 129 *TKJAM*  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

DOWNGRADED TO

~~SECRET~~

Per 60324 UCBAW/SES  
Date 8-1-75

~~TOP SECRET~~

RE: SENSTUDY

The following are comments prepared by the Radio Engineering Section of the FBI Laboratory and relate to copies of excerpted pages from a report written by the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments are keyed to page numbers which appear in the lower right-hand corner of each sheet.

1. Page 00112

Paragraph b. refers to FBI purchases of television equipment and is accurate as to equipment obtained. According to Bureau records, Purchase Order #21100 was issued to CIA on 4/11/73 and was amended 9/24/73. The items were 1 each WTC-20 @ \$18, 300 and 1 each WTC-23 @ \$18, 600. Purchase Order #21469 dated 5/1/73 was issued to CIA for 2 each lens systems totaling \$11, 200.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

2. Page 00118

Item 9 lists 50 "Actuators, Recorders." This entry is partially correct.

Bureau records show that Purchase Order #8989 was issued to CIA on 11/17/71 for 30 each QTC-11s at \$488.25, and 20 each QTC-12As at \$236.25.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

Item 11 lists 1 "Camera, Video." This entry could refer to that transaction detailed in Purchase Order #18301 issued to CIA on 11/27/72 for 1 each WTC-20 camera in the amount of \$18, 400. Tubes installed in these cameras were of the type mentioned under Item 12 and 13 below.

Item 12 lists 1 "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of WL 30691." This entry is accurate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Purchase Order #16555 was issued to CIA on 9/21/72 in the amount of \$4,639. The video tube was for use in a closed circuit television camera.

Item 13 lists 2 "Tube, Image, WL 30691" as having been furnished the FBI on 3/26/71 at a cost of \$4,607 each. This entry is probably a duplication of Item 4 on page 0019. Bureau records show that Purchase Order #5450 dated 5/21/71 was issued to CIA for this equipment for use in CCTV cameras. No purchase order to support two such acquisitions (March and May) could be located.

Item 14 lists 2 "Cameras, Television" at a unit cost of \$18,300. This entry probably refers to that equipment acquired under Purchase Order #21100 and is detailed in Paragraph b. page 00112, above.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

3. Page 00119

Item 2 lists 25 "Actuators, Recorders." The entry is accurate.

Purchase Order #17204 was issued to CIA on 10/18/72 for 25 each QTC-11s @ \$591.94. This equipment is identical to that obtained on Purchase Order #8989 mentioned above.

Item 3 lists "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance" etc., and is a duplication of Item 12 on page 00118. Note identical dates.

Item 4 lists "Tube, Image, WL 30691" and is believed to refer to the transaction carried as Item 13 on page 00118.

Items 5, 6, and 7 list "Transmitters, Module, Plug-In, and Power Supply - UWP-39A." These entries are essentially accurate.

Purchase Order #4203 was issued to CIA on 4/6/71 for 2 each transmitters SRT-67 @ \$1372.35; 1 each transmitter QRT-10A @ \$160.33; 1 each module QWT-18 @ \$1247.40; and, 1 each power supply UWP-39A @ \$538.65.

No damage would be suffered by release of this information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Page 00221

Item (A) is believed to be accurate and in the absence of additional detail no serious damage would be suffered by release of this information.

Item (B) is accurate and as long as target is not specifically identified no serious damage should be incurred. It should be recognized, however, that although the concept of intercepting cryptographic machine emanations would come as no surprise to those familiar with intelligence work, confirmation of a functioning system could encourage implementation of countermeasures which would deprive the U.S. of invaluable information.

Item (C) is accurate except that the equipment has not been operated for some time. Without specific identification no serious damage would result from disclosure of this information.

Item (D) is inaccurate to the extent that it states that "installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived." Aside from that, disclosure of information could lead the knowledgeable foreign government to be certain of Bureau's participation and take whatever diplomatic steps they felt necessary. Decision to withhold is an operational/political one rather than one which would affect technical capabilities and, therefore, the Laboratory is making no recommendations in this regard.

5. Page 00222

Item (E) is accurate and entirely too revealing. If there is any way this item can be deleted from material yet to be given to anyone outside the intelligence community, it should be done. As written, it suggests a concerted effort toward a penetration to be attempted in the future. Disclosure of this information could easily negate millions of dollars already spent and literally years of work already performed - the largest single project ever undertaken by this Bureau. In view of our responsibilities in the counter-intelligence field, the FBI, as well as the intelligence community, and perhaps the free world as well, would suffer incalculable harm from release of this information. It would also be appropriate for the Intelligence Division to comment on this item.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Item (F) is accurate and, although its disclosure is confirmatory no serious technical damage would result from its disclosure. To our knowledge, there has been no diplomatic protest, disclosure could precipitate such protest. Intelligence Division may wish to comment regarding this possibility.

Item (G) asserts that in one case it is known that CIA equipment was used against a "domestic target." This is insufficient information to identify this matter.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARABIC LINGUISTS

(Item 6, pgs. 182 & 202)

With regard to press allegations concerning the use of polygraph, it was noted that during July 1971 the President was alleged to be furious with unauthorized disclosure of classified information relative to the SALT Talks as disclosed in the New York Times. The President directed a sweeping investigation to determine the source of the disclosure and this was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and others of the White House Staff.

A subsequent article in the Washington Post dated September 3, 1971 stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT Talks in July. This statement is not accurate and the Director of the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) denied this allegation in a letter to the Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency.

As noted in the CIA notes in fact, it was CIA that conducted the polygraph examination in conjunction with the State Department and the FBI was not involved in any way in these polygraph examinations. It is recalled that FBI officials had been called to a White House meeting headed by Mr. Krogh in which it was indicated we might have to conduct some polygraph examinations and were so alerted. A subsequent call from the White House to the FBI instructed that the FBI polygraph examinations would not be required.

In view of above, it does not appear the FBI would incur any damage to its reputation or recognized use of the polygraph in carefully selected criminal and security matters in which we have jurisdiction.

## POLYGRAPH

(Item 7, pgs 65-67)

~~SECRET~~

In regard to the CIA notes concerning the subject of the lending of Arabic linguists to the FBI, the following is noted:

The FBI's linguistic capacity is limited to those foreign languages in which translators can be fully utilized on a full-time basis. When we need translations of foreign language material beyond our normal translation capacity, we turn to the governmental linguistic community for assistance. Such help has been obtained in the past from such agencies as the Library of Congress, Voice of America, Foreign Service Institute, Defense Language Institute, CIA, NSA, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Information Agency and Smithsonian Institution. On occasions, we have also turned to private citizens for help in very unique situations involving exotic or rare languages.

The massacre of the Israeli athletes in Munich at the 1972 Summer Olympics and other Arab terrorist acts fomented a situation involving the national security of the United States. The FBI needed immediate assistance in the Arabic language field. A program was immediately instituted to hire our own Arabic translators and, in the interim period, CIA lent to our Washington Field Office the necessary Arabic translators to fulfill our responsibilities.

The opening of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in Washington also created a need in the Washington Field Office for Chinese translators with special talents. Two such translators were borrowed from CIA and one of them became an FBI employee for a short time following his retirement from CIA.

All arrangements for the loan of Arabic and Chinese linguists from CIA were effected by the Intelligence Division and the Washington Field Office through their liaison with CIA, and the FBI Laboratory was not directly involved.

In summary, the CIA notes are accurate. It is not believed, however, that the FBI would incur any embarrassment or damages as a result of this interagency cooperation.

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X ~~SECRET~~

DISCUSSIONS ON IMAGERY ENHANCEMENT TECHNIQUES

Item 8 (Pg. 00234)

Current personnel are unable to verify or disclaim contact with CIA regarding this photographic technique.

In all likelihood, this contact was made in conjunction with our continuing technical liaison with other Federal agencies.

This consultation was entirely proper and made to augment the Bureau's capabilities in this area. No deleterious effect can be seen as a result of exposure of this information.

X ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PURCHASE OF CAMERAS

(Item 7, Pg. 00118)

Based on the information furnished, no written record or personal recollection of current employees can attest to or disclaim the whether "20 camera sets" at a unit cost of \$656 were purchased from CIA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PURCHASE OF CAMERAS

(Item 8, Pg. 00118)

The F.B.I., by purchase order #1793 dated 1/20/72, contracted for the purchase of 10 Tessina cameras on a transfer of funds basis arranged as a result of our liaison with the Technical Services Division of CIA. Cost of these cameras amounted to \$7,000.

The Tessina camera is a small, sophisticated camera which is employed in concealment devices needed for photographic surveillances.

Although the exact nature of the concealment devices we employ is not publicized, the disclosure of the fact that we purchased cameras suitable for this use is not considered inimical to our operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI

August 4, 1975

*Senstudy-75*  
REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

- Rec'd from Senate Select Committee*
- 8-15-75) - D.*
- I. Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:
    - A. The notebook or binder containing materials on FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office of the Special Counsel.
    - B. Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970 previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.
    - C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
  - E. The following materials maintained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files and designated "non-derogatory," previously examined by SSC staff:
    1. Agreement Between FBI and Secret Service;
    2. Attorney General - Submission of Memoranda by FBI;
    3. "Black Bag" Jobs;
    4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Coverage;
    5. Intelligence Coverage - Domestic and Foreign;
    6. Directives (60);
    7. Cook, Fred (52).
  - F. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 5 Inspection for the \_\_\_\_\_ individuals whose names are underscored on the attached list (slightly expanded from previous access request).
  - G. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently sanitized.
- 62-116 395*
- ~~NOT RECORDED~~
- 5* *Phillips*
- 9 AUG 6 1975

II. Newly requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 14, 1975:

- A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.
- B. Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14 F of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- C. Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
- D. The following materials referred to in memoranda previously delivered to SSC regarding FBI Legal Attaches:
  - 1. Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971;
  - 2. Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and May 28, 1971;
  - 3. Letter of Hoover to the President dated September 21, 1970;
  - 4. Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 22, 1970;
  - 5. Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21, 1970;
  - 6. Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
  - 7. Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in memorandum of Sullivan of June 7, 1971;
  - 8. Materials pertaining to conversations between the President and Hoover regarding foreign liaison operations in September 1970;
  - 9. Materials pertaining to conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
  - 10. Materials pertaining to communications between the FBI and the State Department regarding foreign liaison operations in 1970;
  - 11. Materials pertaining to a conference with the President regarding foreign liaison operations in June 1971;

12. Material pertaining to an inspection of all FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971 pursuant to instructions from Hoover to Assistant Director Ponder in charge of inspections.
- E. Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and termination of the Mass Media Program implemented by the former FBI Crime Records Division.
- F. Materials pertaining to the establishment and functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.
- G. "Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1, of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.
- H. "The Standard Sub List".
- I. The following materials pertaining to Project INLET:
  1. Materials reflecting approval of the Project on or about November 20, 1969.
  2. Inspection Report referred to in SAC Memorandum of December 26, 1972.
  3. ~~Any materials pertaining to recommendations that the Project be terminated.~~
  4. Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin in 1973 regarding the Project.
- J. Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-called "undercover" activity.

III. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by August 18, 1975:

- A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro Agnew:
1. All materials pertaining to the authorization or re-authorization by the President or the Attorney General of technical surveillance of the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C. in 1968.
  2. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault in November 1968.
  3. All materials pertaining to the initiation, authorization, conduct, and termination of technical or physical surveillance and "telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
  4. All materials summarizing the results of technical or physical surveillance, including incidental overhearings, and "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
  5. All materials pertaining to White House instructions to the FBI for the handling of the summary letters described in item 4 above.
  6. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary letters described in item 4 above.
  7. The current addresses of the following former Special Agents, who may have participated in the technical or physical surveillance or "telephone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or Spiro T. Agnew:
    - a. Phil Claridge
    - b. William Jackson

- B. The following materials pertaining to Yeoman Charles E. Radford:
1. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillances of Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December 1971 to June 1972.
  2. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford one retired from the Navy, the other a State Department employee, from January to April 1972.
  3. All materials, including memorializations of oral communications, pertaining to the authorization, initiation, conduct, and termination of technical surveillance of Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from February to April 1972.
  4. All materials summarizing the results of the technical surveillances described in items 1 through 3 above.
  5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by the White House as a result of information contained in the summary described in item 4 above.
- C. With respect to surreptitious entries carried out by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all materials pertaining to the following:
1. The date, place, target, and purpose of each entry;
  2. The request and authorization for each entry including the identities of the agencies and/or individuals who requested and/or authorized the entry;
  3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct of each entry;
  4. The results of each entry, including the information obtained and the identities of

the agencies and/or individuals to whom  
the information was disseminated.

- D. Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agreements, agreements of coordination, or other agreements between the FBI and any other federal, state or local agency with regard to the conduct of and dissemination of information from surreptitious entries.
- E. The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the following current or former FBI employees:
  - 1. George Berley
  - 2. Wilfred Bergeron
  - 3. William D. Campbell
  - 4. Richard Suter
  - 5. William Tucker
  - 6. Terry O'Connor
  - 7. Joseph English
- F. The current office assignment or last known address of the individuals listed in E. above.
- G. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967 through 1973, which involved the monitoring of international communications that were addressed to, or from, or included the names of persons on a changing "watch list":
  - 1. All materials pertaining to the proposing, approving, putting names on, executing, evaluating, or terminating the watch list activity;
  - 2. All materials (including correspondence) sent by the FBI to the National Security Agency or any other entity in the Department of Defense listing names for the watch list or otherwise commenting on the activity;

3. Any internal FBI materials produced as part of the activity;
4. Any NSA or Department of Defense materials (including correspondence and reports) regarding the watch list activity sent to the FBI.
- H. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FBI contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to, receipt of information from, and requests by the FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. (CIRCA 1969)
- I. "The Handbook of Technical Equipment".
- J. Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.
- K. Philadelphia FBI Field Office file number 100-51132 (Women's Liberation). (1970-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 26 1975

*Tele*  
~~TELETYPE~~

~~SECRET~~

NR014 PH CODE

940 PM NITEL JULY 30, 1975 DCC

Anne. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dfn.-A.D.-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

~~TO: DIRECTOR~~  
~~FROM: PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)~~

~~SENSTUDY~~

RE PHILADELPHIA NITEL TO DIRECTOR, JULY 29, 1975, BUREAU  
PHONE CALL TO PHILADELPHIA AND PHILADELPHIA PHONE CALL TO THE  
BUREAU, JULY 30, 1975.

ON JULY 30, 1975, ROBERT THWEAT, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER,  
RETIRED, ADVISED HE HAD NO PERSONAL OBJECTION TO HIS NAME BEING  
DIVULGED. HOWEVER, THWEAT ADVISED THAT HIS SOURCE IS A RELATIVE  
AND THAT ONCE THWEAT'S NAME IS DIVULGED IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY  
IDENTIFY HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

*George L. Miller*  
THWEAT ADVISED HIS SOURCE HAD RELATED TO HIM THAT ONE  
DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, WHO IS EMPLOYED WITH THE CHURCH COMMITTEE, HAD  
REMOVED FROM HIS WORK AREA BY HIDING UNDERNEATH HIS SHIRT A CIA  
MEMORANDUM CONTAINING DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON SENATOR HENRY  
JACKSON. O'FLAHERTY THEN XEROXED THE MEMORANDUM. THE DATE FOR  
THIS OCCURRENCE IS NOT KNOWN TO THWEAT. O'FLAHERTY THEN PROVIDED  
A COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM TO AN UNKNOWN PERSON FOR SUBSEQUENT  
TRANSMITTAL TO SENATOR MORRIS UDALL. THWEAT ADVISED HIS SOURCE

8/11/75 TAYLOR  
FBI/PA E 293030  
125 EAL 2  
CIVIL ACT. 4  
E.O. 11256  
DATE 12-19-75 INITIALS GM  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE  
NOTED  
S1 IS CIA (S) OTHERWISE

62-116395-  
NOT RECORDED  
170 AUG 12 1975

~~SECRET~~

84 AUG 13 1975

NW 69886 DocId:32989626 Page 22

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO, PH 62-0-23222

STATED THAT O'FLAHERTY HAD PERSONALLY RELATED THIS INFORMATION TO THE SOURCE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT O'FLAHERTY HAD RELATED TO THE SOURCE THAT HE, O'FLAHERTY, HAD ALSO TOLD A FORMER ASSOCIATE, MR. KATZ, CURRENTLY A PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VANDERBILT, NASHVILLE, TENN., OF HIS, O'FLAHERTY'S, ACTION. KATZ HAD VOICED A DISPLEASURE AS TO O'FLAHERTY'S ACTION AND DID NOT APPROVE OF HIS ACTION.

[THE CAPTIONED MEMORANDUM DEALT WITH CIA POSSIBLE USE OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THE DIRECTION SENATOR JACKSON WOULD TAKE IN FUTURE ACTIONS HE MIGHT ENCOUNTER WHICH WOULD INVOLVE CIA ACTIVITY.] THWEAT I DOES NOT KNOW IF HIS SOURCE HAS SEEN XEROXED MEMORANDUM. THWEAT HIMSELF HAS NOT SEEN THE MEMORANDUM.

THWEAT ADVISED HE WILL RECONTACT HIS SOURCE AND ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE SOURCE TO COME FORWARD AND REVEAL HIS IDENTITY AND BE COOPERATIVE IN ANY INVESTIGATION. THWEAT FEELS THIS WILL PROBABLY BE THE RESULT OF HIS RECONTACT IN AS MUCH AS SOURCE HAS EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF O'FLAHERTY'S ACTIONS.

PHILA DIV. WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THWEAT AND ADVISE BUREAU.

END

SJP FBIHQ CLR

~~SECRET~~

Date of Mail 6/14/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 num/amp

Removed By 79 AUG 14 1975

more-16

File Number 62-116395-497

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

F B I

Date: 7/24/75

WRCB  
RLLTransmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)  
 (ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (62-2854)

SENSTUDY 75

Enclosed are the original and seven copies of seven LHM's prepared at Atlanta and captioned "U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)," subcaptioned and dated as follows:

1. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) W. John Benton by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75; *KK*
2. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) O. Richard Hamilton by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75; *D*
3. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Robert W. Thomson by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75;
4. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Donald P. Burgess by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75;
5. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Alden F. Miller by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75; *REC-102*
6. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Charles T. Haynes by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75; *62-116395-496*
7. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Edward A. Shea by SSC Staff Members" - 7/24/75. *EE JUL 26 1975*

The FBI representative who was available in the Atlanta FBI Office for consultation during the interviews was Bureau Supervisor SEYMOR F. PHILLIPS.

(2-Bureau (Enc. 56))

1-Atlanta

CTH:rwl (3)

Approved:

Sent

AUG 28 1975 M

Per



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 22, 1975

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by  
SA W. John Benton concerning an interview of him by SSC  
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took  
place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.  
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA W. John Benton began at 9:45  
A. M. and terminated at 10:32 A. M., July 22, 1975. At the  
outset of the interview no mention was made of SA Benton's  
rights by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.

SA Benton was asked how long he had served with  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). SA Benton advised  
from December, 1956 to the present time.

SA Benton was asked what offices he had been assigned  
to. SA Benton advised the FBI Identification Division,  
Washington, D. C.; the Atlanta Field Division, Atlanta, Georgia;  
FBI Agents Training at Washington, D. C.; Oklahoma City Field  
Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Indianapolis Field  
Division, Indianapolis, Indiana; and the Knoxville Field  
Division, Knoxville, Tennessee, having current assignment  
in the Chattanooga Resident Agency, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

SA Benton was asked how long he had been assigned  
at Chattanooga, Tennessee. SA Benton advised from March 15,  
1974 to the present date.

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
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SA Benton was asked the period of time he was assigned to the Atlanta Field Division. SA Benton advised from 1959 until August 22, 1966.

SA Benton was asked during what period of time he was assigned to the King investigation. SA Benton advised from his best recollection during the year 1964. SA Benton was asked if he conducted any investigation regarding the King case prior to his assignment during 1964 and SA Benton answered in the negative.

SA Benton was asked what his job responsibilities were concerning the monitoring of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) headquarters and King telephones. SA Benton advised his job responsibilities dealt with the monitoring of incoming and outgoing telephone calls.

SA Benton was asked what did he do when receiving or intercepting incoming or outgoing calls. SA Benton advised a written log was maintained of incoming and outgoing calls and only the pertinent facts of the calls were written on the log. SA Benton further advised the incoming and outgoing calls were tape recorded. SA Benton was asked how many telephones were monitored at the SCLC headquarters and at the King residence. SA Benton advised he did not recall the exact number of telephone lines monitored; however, there were several lines.

SA Benton was asked the names of Agents assigned with him to monitor telephone calls. SA Benton advised his best recollection was that SA Hamilton, SA Burgess and SA Thomson were assigned at the location during the period SA Benton monitored the telephones.

SA Benton was asked the location of the plant, the floor and room number where the plant was located. SA Benton advised the plant was located in an apartment building directly across the street from the FBI Atlanta Field Division, and he does not recall the floor or room number of the plant.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

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SA Benton was asked who directed him to monitor the telephones. SA Benton advised the Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Joseph K. Ponder, directed him to his job assignment on the King investigation.

SA Benton was asked what did he do with the logs and tapes at the end of each day's work. SA Benton advised the logs and tapes were handled by other Special Agents of the FBI assigned to the case.

SA Benton was asked who the supervising or case Agent was in the King investigation. SA Benton advised SA Robert Nichols was the case Agent in charge of the King investigation.

SA Benton was asked how many squads were located in the Atlanta Division at the time the telephones were being monitored. SA Benton advised there were four squads in the Atlanta Division at that time. SA Benton was asked which squad handled the investigation of the King matter and SA Benton advised the Number 3 Squad handled the King investigation.

SA Benton was asked who furnished supplies such as tapes and logs to the plant where the monitoring took place. SA Benton advised the supplies were brought to the location by other Special Agents assigned to the case.

SA Benton was asked what happened to the tapes and logs at the end of the day or when a day's work was completed. SA Benton advised to his best knowledge the tapes and logs were turned over to the supervising Agent of the case.

SA Benton was asked whether he dictated any daily summaries or memoranda regarding the monitoring of the telephones. SA Benton advised that he did not dictate any summaries or memoranda at any time regarding the monitoring of the telephones.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

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W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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SA Benton was asked who handled the repairs of the equipment if there was a malfunction of the equipment. SA Benton advised the equipment and any repairs to the equipment was handled by SA Miller who was assigned to the Atlanta Field Division.

SA Benton was asked how many files were involved in the King investigation. SA Benton advised to his best recollection there was only one file involved. SA Benton was asked if there were other files where investigation was being conducted regarding SCLC and SCLC members other than the King file. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any other FBI investigations regarding SCLC or SCLC members.

SA Benton was asked who were some of the named individuals that he was told to listen for and the basis for listening for these particular individuals. SA Benton advised he was instructed to monitor incoming and outgoing calls and that to the best of his knowledge several individuals were of interest to the investigation. These individuals were Stan Levison, Harry Wachtel, Ralph Helstein and Hunter Pitts O'Dell. SA Benton was asked why these individuals or any other named individuals might be of interest to the FBI. SA Benton advised the FBI had developed information that certain individuals that had contact with Martin Luther King, Jr. and SCLC headquarters were either sympathizers to the Communist Party of the United States or possibly members of the Communist Party of the United States.

SA Benton was asked if he received any mail at the plant where the telephones were monitored and if there was a mail box in the apartment complex where mail could be received. SA Benton advised he did not receive any mail at the apartment complex and did not have any knowledge of any mail boxes.

SA Benton was asked if there was a telephone located at the plant and if this telephone was assigned an FBI telephone number. SA Benton advised there was one

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

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W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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telephone at the plant and he does not recall the telephone number or in what name this telephone number was assigned.

SA Benton was asked what name the apartment was rented in and who paid the apartment rent. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge as to the name the apartment was rented in and he did not know who paid the rent on the apartment.

SA Benton was asked who cleaned up the apartment since it was their understanding that this location was manned by Agents 24 hours a day. SA Benton advised the apartment complex was kept in a clean and orderly manner by Agents assigned to the monitoring operations. SA Benton was asked to give a description of the layout of the apartment. SA Benton advised the apartment contained a kitchen, a living room, a bedroom, and one bathroom.

SA Benton was asked which room the monitoring took place in and SA Benton advised the equipment was located in the bedroom of the apartment.

SA Benton was asked if he had knowledge of any telephone calls intercepted of high elected Government officials and the approximate date these calls might have been intercepted. SA Benton advised to the best of his recollection and while assigned to the monitoring operation there was one telephone call intercepted of a high elected Government official. SA Benton was asked the name of the Government official and the parties involved in the telephone conversation. SA Benton advised the intercepted telephone call was between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr. SA Benton was asked when this telephone conversation took place and SA Benton advised it took place sometime in 1964 to the best of his recollection. (At no time did SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo ask the contents of the telephone conversation between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr.)

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

---

SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any telephone calls intercepted between Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Attorney General of the United States during the period of time he monitored the telephone. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any calls intercepted between Martin Luther King and the Attorney General of the United States.

SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any telephone calls to the Democratic Convention in 1964 by Martin Luther King, Jr. that were intercepted during the monitoring operation. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any intercepted calls made by Martin Luther King to the Democratic Convention during 1964.

SA Benton was asked at the time he was assigned to the monitoring of the King telephones by the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Field Division did he question his assignment. SA Benton advised absolutely not.

SA Benton was asked that during the period he monitored the King telephones did he ask to be relieved of his assignment. SA Benton answered absolutely not.

SA Benton was asked at this time does he question his assignment to the monitoring of the King telephones and SA Benton answered absolutely not.

The interview was terminated at 10:32 A. M. this date, July 22, 1975.



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U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
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INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by  
SA O. Richard Hamilton concerning an interview of him by  
SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which  
took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator  
Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The above-mentioned interview commenced at  
10:38 a.m. and concluded at 11:54 a.m. SA Hamilton was  
not advised of his rights by the SSC Staff Members. The  
following information is not necessarily in chronological  
order.

Regarding the period of time of SA Hamilton's  
FBI employment and period of assignment in Atlanta,  
Georgia, SA Hamilton advised he became a Special Agent  
in September, 1951, and has been assigned to the Atlanta  
Office since February, 1961. SA Hamilton was questioned  
regarding the period of time he was assigned to the  
Security Squad in Atlanta. SA Hamilton advised that  
according to his best recollection, he was assigned to  
the Security Squad shortly after his arrival in Atlanta  
in 1961, and continued that assignment until approximately  
sometime in 1962. At that time he was assigned to a road

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U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
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INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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trip involving investigations of any FBI matter occurring within that road trip and such assignments were not necessarily connected with the Security Squad. SA Hamilton advised he was reassigned to the Security Squad in Atlanta during the Spring or early Summer of 1964 or 1965, and he believed that, according to his best recollection, this was in 1964.

The SSC Staff Members questioned SA Hamilton as to what, if any, assignment he had regarding the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA Hamilton advised that upon his reassignment to the Security Squad, he was assigned to monitor a wiretap, on SCLC and on the residence of King. The Staff Members inquired as to the number of lines monitored and as to the location of the technical installation. SA Hamilton recalled that lines on the SCLC switchboard and SCLC Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) as well as the residence telephone of King were monitored. The Staff Members inquired whether tapes of conversations were made from the technical installation and SA Hamilton replied that occasionally when it was necessary to record more than one telephone conversation occurring at the same time, that he occasionally would tape one conversation while preparing a handwritten log of another, that thereafter the conversation recorded on tape was reduced to a handwritten log when time permitted. The Staff Members asked what was done with the recorded tapes following the completion of the recording and Hamilton advised that when the conversation had been reduced to writing on a log and the tape was used up, that as best as he could recall, the tape was erased and then reused. The Staff Members asked whether such tapes were reviewed by other FBI personnel and SA Hamilton stated he could not recall any situation where this occurred. The Staff Members inquired as to whether such tapes were further maintained or placed

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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somewhere else and SA Hamilton replied he was not aware of any instance where this was done. The Staff Members asked to whom the case on King was assigned and who was the supervisor of the squad at the time that SA Hamilton was assigned to the monitoring of the installation. They were advised the agent assigned to the case was former SA Robert Nichols and the supervisor was Charles Harding. At that point the Staff Members inquired as to who was the supervisor of the Security Squad when SA Hamilton was first assigned to Atlanta and who were the succeeding supervisors on that squad. They were advised that Mr. Henry Rowse was the supervisor when Hamilton was first assigned to Atlanta and that upon Rowse's transfer to FBI Headquarters, Harding became the supervisor. Thereafter, in approximately 1968, Charles Haynes replaced Harding as supervisor of the Security Squad in Atlanta. The Staff Members inquired as to the reason for the replacement of Harding by Haynes. Hamilton advised that was an administrative decision made by FBI Headquarters and since that did not relate to the investigation pertaining to Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., he would respectfully decline to discuss that matter. The Staff Members subsequently asked if SA Nichols was subsequently assigned to the Valdosta, Georgia, Resident Agency of the Atlanta Office and, then transferred to another field office. SA Hamilton advised that was correct. The Staff Members inquired as to the reason for SA Nichols' transfer to another field office, to which SA Hamilton replied he felt that question did not relate to the investigation of King and involved an administrative decision by FBI Headquarters; and, therefore, declined to answer.

The Staff Members, after being advised by SA Hamilton that he was assigned to monitoring the technical installation for a period of approximately four months, inquired as to whether he was ever subsequently assigned to any investigation relating to King or SCLC. Hamilton advised the case concerning SCLC was assigned to him

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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upon the retirement of former SA Alan Sentinella in approximately 1970. The Staff Members inquired as to the period of time thereafter that SCLC remained under investigation and what basis if any there was for closing the case. SA Hamilton pointed out that since the re-assignment of the case to him occurred after the death of King, he felt that question did not directly relate to the investigation of King and that prior to furnishing an answer to that question, he felt he should confer with a FBI Headquarters representative who was then present in the Atlanta Office of the FBI. The Staff Members advised they did desire an answer to that question and approved of a consultation between SA Hamilton and the FBI Headquarters representative. SA Hamilton conferred with the FBI Headquarters representative then in the Atlanta Office of the FBI and it was agreed the question regarding the closing of SCLC and the assignment of that case to SA Hamilton was outside the parameter of the authority given to SA Hamilton by FBI Headquarters regarding discussion of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. However, in the spirit of cooperation, it was agreed that SA Hamilton would answer the question of the Staff Members in this regard. Thereafter, SA Hamilton advised the FBI investigation regarding SCLC was closed about 1972 or 1973 since a review of the case file failed to reflect any influence by individuals or organizations having affiliations with communist background. In view of that, it was felt the SCLC case should be closed.

The Staff Members inquired as to who made the decision regarding closing of SCLC and whether the matter was first discussed with FBI Headquarters or other individuals within the Atlanta Office of the FBI or if it was a decision made by SA Hamilton alone. Hamilton advised that as he recalled, he reviewed the SCLC case file from that time to a substantial period in the past and that he recommended to the supervisor of the Security

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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Squad that the case be closed since there had been no known communist influence upon the activities of the SCLC organization for a long period of time. In response to the mechanics of closing the case they were advised that SA Hamilton dictated a letter to FBI Headquarters from the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Office, advising that a review of the file reflected no communist influence upon the activities of SCLC and that unless advised to the contrary by FBI Headquarters, the case was being closed. The Staff Members asked if a form letter was used whereby blanks were filled in and they were advised this was not the case. The Staff Members inquired if FBI Headquarters agreed with the closing and SA Hamilton advised that to his knowledge, no communication was thereafter received from Headquarters which would disagree with the closing of that case. The Staff Members inquired as to whether SA Hamilton or anyone in Atlanta conferred with any persons in the New York Office of the FBI prior to closing the case and SA Hamilton advised that to his knowledge this did not occur. The Staff Members then inquired as to the basis for closing the case on SCLC as compared with the basis for opening the case originally. Hamilton advised he did not specifically recall the wording of any communications upon which the case was originally opened, however, a review of the case at the time it was closed did not indicate that SCLC might be involved in any activities which could constitute a violation of the Internal Security Statutes. The Staff Members inquired as to whether the investigation was based upon the Smith Act and SA Hamilton stated he did not recall specifically seeing the words "Smith Act", however, FBI investigations regarding communist influence was based upon the communist goal of forceable overthrow of the U.S. Government.

The Staff Members asked if, after the death of King, whether Stanley Levison was in contact with Reverend

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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Ralph Abernathy, President of SCLC. They were advised by Hamilton that that question was not related to the FBI's investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., and he would decline to discuss that matter without further consultation with FBI Headquarters representative in the Atlanta Office. The Staff Members did not ask that Hamilton then discuss that point with the Headquarters representative.

The Staff Members inquired as to the identities of other FBI personnel assigned to the monitoring of the technical installation and SA Hamilton advised he recalled that at that time SA Robert Thomson and SA John Benton were assigned to monitoring, however, SA Hamilton could not recall the identities of other agents assigned during the period of time he was assigned to the monitoring of the installation. Staff Members inquired as to the reason for SA Hamilton being removed from the assignment of monitoring the installation and Hamilton replied that he requested he be removed for the purpose of being reassigned to security investigative matters. Hamilton stated that shortly after discussing this desire with Supervisor Harding, he was taken off the assignment and was given other investigative assignments. They inquired as to whether Hamilton questioned the propriety of the technical installation regarding King and SCLC and Hamilton replied that he did not question such propriety. The Staff Members inquired as to the names Hamilton was instructed to listen for on the installation and Hamilton replied he recalls being instructed to listen for conversations of individuals by the names of Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel. They asked if he was instructed to listen for conversations of individuals by the names of Helstein and O'Dell. Hamilton advised the name Helstein was familiar although he could not recall specific instructions regarding him but recalled that he was instructed and did listen for conversations of Hunter Pitts O'Dell.

Staff Members asked whether the Atlanta FBI Office maintained subfiles regarding Doctor Martin Luther

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
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O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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King, Jr., or SCLC or whether the Atlanta Office or FBI Headquarters maintained a JUNE file regarding King. SA Hamilton advised he could not recall the maintaining of subfiles and could not recall a JUNE file relating to King. They asked if the FBI maintained a case regarding Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., and SA Hamilton advised he could not recall at this time whether such a file was maintained on Mrs. King.

During the interview the Staff Members asked who handled the arrangements for renting the apartment where the technical installation was located and where it was located. Hamilton advised the installation was located in an apartment at 300 West Peachtree Street, but he could not recall in which apartment it was located. They inquired as to the identities of the individuals who handled the rental and who made the rent payments and SA Hamilton advised he did not know that information. They asked whether or not FBI inspectors ever inspected the installation or if during the course of an inspection of the FBI Office in Atlanta whether they visited the installation. Hamilton advised he was not aware of any inspection of the installation or visit of it by inspectors.

The Staff Members asked if Hamilton could recall any contact with King by any political personalities, public officials, or officeholders, to which Hamilton replied he could not at that time recall any such contacts.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
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WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by  
SA Robert W. Thomson concerning an interview of him by  
SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which  
took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator  
Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

No mention was made at the outset of this interview by either Michael Epstein or Mary DeOreo as to any Constitutional rights of SA Thomson.

The interview commenced at approximately 3:15 P. M. and was terminated at approximately 3:32 P. M. Set forth as follows are the results of this interview which are not necessarily in chronological order:

SA Thomson was requested to furnish the approximate date of his assignment to Atlanta as well as his assignment to other divisions. SA Thomson advised that he entered on duty with the FBI in July, 1947, and was assigned to FBI Headquarters, New York City and Albany, New York as both a clerical employee and as a special employee. SA Thomson was appointed an Agent in 1962 and was assigned to the Little Rock Office until approximately the middle of May, 1964, when he was assigned to the Atlanta Office.

SA Thomson was asked if he worked security matters in Little Rock, which was answered no and he was then asked if his assignment upon reporting to Atlanta was in the security

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TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
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INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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field. SA Thomson advised that he was assigned to the security squad and upon questioning stated that the nature of this security assignment was to monitor the telephones of Martin Luther King, Jr., both at his residence and his office. SA Thomson advised that he continued in this assignment until approximately August, 1964, when he was transferred to the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency.

SA Thomson was asked the reason for his transfer from Little Rock to Atlanta and thereafter to the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency, at which time SA Thomson replied that both transfers were routine transfers, the transfer to Columbus due to the fact an opening had been created in the Resident Agency.

SA Thomson further advised that in 1969 he was transferred from the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency back to Atlanta, Georgia and that for a short period of time in 1971 was assigned to security work in the Atlanta Office.

SA Thomson was asked that upon his return to Atlanta and engaged in security work in 1971, if he was aware of any pending investigation concerning SCLC and SA Thomson advised he could not recall any investigation of SCLC but could state that he was not involved in any if there was such an investigation.

SA Thomson was asked if he had any knowledge as to when this telephone monitoring of Martin Luther King was instituted or when it was discontinued. SA Thomson replied that he had no such knowledge.

SA Thomson was further questioned as to what pertinent instructions were furnished him in regard to his monitoring of Martin Luther King's telephones and who gave these instructions. SA Thomson advised that the supervisor at that time was Special Agent Charles S. Harding and that SA Thomson was advised that the monitoring of these telephones was being done because of national security and information was to be obtained concerning King's contacts and associates, and the reason for such contacts.

SA Thomson was questioned if he ever questioned himself at any time as to the morality or justification for this monitoring. SA Thomson replied that after having only worked on such monitoring for two months he had no question in his mind as to the reason for this telephone monitoring.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
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ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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SA Thomson was asked how many telephone lines were monitored or if he knew the exact location of the telephones being monitored at which time SA Thomson stated he could not recall exactly how many telephones were being monitored but that they were at the residence of Martin Luther King and SCLC, and that he could not furnish the addresses of either of these locations. In addition, SA Thomson was asked if he typed logs or handwrote them. SA Thomson replied that he utilized both methods.

SA Thomson was asked if he was furnished any list of names of certain individuals to be on the lookout for in contacts by Martin Luther King. SA Thomson stated he could not recall any such list. In addition, when asked where the physical location of this telephone monitoring was accomplished, SA Thomson advised that it was at the Peachtree Towers Apartments but that he could not furnish the exact room or floor utilized.

SA Thomson was asked if he ever highlighted or placed additional emphasis on any of the telephone calls that he monitored. SA Thomson replied that no such emphasis was placed on any such call, and when asked if SA Thomson prepared any other forms or memoranda or communications regarding any of the telephone calls, he monitored, SA Thomson replied in the negative.

SA Thomson was asked if he could recall Martin Luther King or any of the other persons monitored being in any telephone contact with any public officials. SA Thomson replied that he could not specifically recall any such telephone conversations, however, during the time SA Thomson was assigned these monitoring duties Martin Luther King was traveling to other cities and it is entirely possible that Martin Luther King could have been in contact with some officials.

SA Thomson was asked for the identities of other persons also assigned monitoring duties during the time he was so engaged. SA Thomson stated that he recalled that SAs John Benton, O. Richard Hamilton, Don Burgess and Brian O'Shea also were engaged in monitoring of the telephones.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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SA Thomson was asked if any stenographic personnel were utilized at the monitoring site. SA Thomson replied in the negative.

SA Thomson was asked for the procedure utilized in handling the logs and tapes used to record the telephone conversations. SA Thomson stated that to the best of his recollection the logs were delivered by the Agent on duty each morning to the office and that the tapes were utilized over and over again for recording telephone calls.

At this point both Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo stated that they had no further questions of SA Thomson and the interview was concluded.



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7

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WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Donald P. Burgess concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Donald P. Burgess commenced at approximately 3:45 P.M. and terminated at approximately 4:45 P.M. At no time during the interview was any mention made to SA Burgess regarding his rights by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.

The results of this interview will not necessarily be in chronological order, but will be to the best recollection of SA Burgess.

At the outset of the interview, SA Burgess was asked when he was assigned to the Atlanta Office of the FBI and SA Burgess replied to the best of his recollection it was at the end of July or the first part of August, 1964. SA Burgess was also asked how long he had been in the FBI, to which he replied since January, 1951.

SA Burgess was asked what his duties were and to what squad he was assigned when he first arrived in the Atlanta Division of the FBI. SA Burgess advised he had been

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

immediately assigned to the Security Squad. In reply to a question as to what type of investigations he handled, SA Burgess replied that he was mainly involved in civil rights type investigations.

Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess when he was assigned to monitoring the telephone tap of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. SA Burgess replied to the best of his recollection he was assigned to these duties from the end of November, 1965, until sometime in June, 1966. SA Burgess was asked if he could pin down exactly the date of his assignment to this monitoring duty and SA Burgess replied that he recalled the general time period quite well as he had recently undergone surgery before this assignment and after extensive sick leave, went almost immediately on the monitoring duty.

Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess what his understanding was as to why this telephone tap on Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. was being used. SA Burgess replied that it was his understanding and recollection that three or four individuals who had heavy and extensive Communist Party or Marxist affiliations and connections had an inordinate influence and control over Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. insofar as policies, objectives and activities of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA Burgess replied it was his understanding that these three or four aforementioned individuals' influence over King extended so far as preparing his speeches and public statements and that it was also his understanding that the Attorney General at the time the telephone tap was instituted, Robert Kennedy, had approved of and insisted upon this investigative technique.

SA Burgess was then asked if he thought the telephone tap on Doctor King was justified and SA Burgess replied that he thought it was fully justified in light of the time and circumstances and the position of Doctor King.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Burgess was then asked about the personal type information regarding personal misconduct, whether or not he felt the collecting of this type of information was justified. SA Burgess replied that information regarding personal misconduct or immoral activities on the part of King was not the prime purpose or interest of the telephone monitoring, but that he did feel that evidence of gross personal misconduct and completely amoral activities was significant in this particular case, bearing in mind the original justification for the telephone monitor and the fact that Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. was a moral leader of world stature and a religious personality. SA Burgess said that he therefore felt a complete double standard of personal conduct as opposed to public image was significant inasmuch as such behavior would make Doctor King subject to pressure or blackmail by the worst criminal or subversive elements in our society.

SA Burgess was asked if the type of information regarding Doctor King's personal misconduct was disseminated to other agencies or the press and SA Burgess replied that he did not know. SA Burgess was asked if he ever disseminated any information regarding the personal misconduct on the part of Doctor King to the press or others, and SA Burgess replied he had not.

Mr. Epstein said that he assumed that SA Burgess was aware of some of the allegations that had appeared in the press regarding FBI dissemination of this type of information, and SA Burgess replied that he was aware of some of these allegations but he had no specific knowledge regarding these matters.

SA Burgess was asked if he ever reviewed the communications regarding Doctor King based upon information monitored, and SA Burgess replied that he merely recorded the results of the interception of telephone conversations.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Burgess was then asked for the physical location from which the telephones were monitored and if this physical location was an apartment in the Peachtree Towers. SA Burgess replied in the affirmative, but said he could not recall the exact apartment number or the floor on which it was located.

SA Burgess was asked if the apartment from which the telephones were monitored was a one or two bedroom apartment and if he knew any of the neighbors or if he recalled maid service to the apartment. SA Burgess replied that he believed it was a one bedroom apartment, did not recall any of the neighbors and insofar as he recalled, there was no maid or janitorial service.

In response to a question as to where the monitoring equipment was located, SA Burgess replied to his recollection it was in the bedroom of the apartment.

SA Burgess was asked if inspectors were at the apartment and if odd-hour shifts were maintained. SA Burgess advised that he recalled that odd-hour shifts were maintained, but he did not recall any inspection of the apartment.

Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess if he recalled what his duties were prior to the time that he was assigned to the aforementioned monitoring and SA Burgess replied, general security work and particularly civil rights cases which included the observation of civil rights demonstrations in various locations.

Mr. Epstein then asked about general policy regarding observation of demonstrations, whether it came from Washington or originated in the field, and whether the instructions to observe demonstrations came by SAC letter to the field. SA Burgess replied that insofar as he knew it was the general policy of the Bureau for a number of years to observe at any type of demonstration involving civil rights type matters

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

where the possibility of violence existed so that firsthand observation of any possible violation of Federal statutes could be had by impartial observers, and that any subsequent investigation would not be dependent upon the sometimes impassioned observations of persons on either side of a controversial issue.

At this point in the conversation, Mr. Epstein was reminded by SA Burgess that the purpose of the interview was the investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mr. Epstein replied that he was interested in observations of civil rights matters insofar as Doctor King was involved.

SA Burgess replied that the only specific demonstration or civil rights activity he recalled in which he acted as an observer where Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. or SCLC was involved was in Americus, Georgia, in 1965, and he could recall very little regarding this matter.

SA Burgess was asked at one point during the interview if, during the time he served as a monitor on the telephone tap of Doctor King, there was a tap on SNCC. SA Burgess replied that he had no recollection of a telephone tap on SNCC, (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).

Mr. Epstein asked why SA Burgess was removed from monitoring telephones mentioned above. SA Burgess said that it was at his request as he had completely recovered from a debilitating illness and was very frankly quite bored with an inactive assignment.

Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess remained on the Security Squad in the Atlanta Office and what type of cases he handled after that period. SA Burgess replied that he did remain on the Security Squad until December, 1966 or January, 1967, and that he had handled general security matters, but not the investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.

Mr. Epstein asked why SA Burgess was reassigned and was advised it was a routine administrative reassignment.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Mr. Epstein then asked SA Burgess if he was quite certain of his period of assignment to monitoring the telephones of Doctor King and SA Burgess replied that he was virtually certain that assignment to these duties was from within ten days before or after Thanksgiving, 1965, until sometime during June, 1966, because of the aforementioned surgery approximately six weeks prior to his assignment on these duties.

Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess could ascertain the date of his surgery from his doctor or hospital records. SA Burgess replied that surgery had taken place at St. Joseph's Infirmary immediately adjacent to the FBI office and he would attempt to ascertain the date. Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess would be willing to telephone the hospital at that time in an attempt to verify this date. SA Burgess replied that old hospital records are sometimes difficult to locate and from experience, it would probably take two or three days.

In response to a question as to whether anyone else immediately available could recall the date of this surgery, SA Burgess replied that his wife might recall. Mr. Epstein then asked SA Burgess if he would be willing to telephone his wife in an attempt to determine the date of his surgery. At that point in the interview, SA Burgess did telephone his wife who informed SA Burgess that she thought SA Burgess had undergone surgery during mid-September, 1965. This was communicated to Mr. Epstein.

Mr. Epstein also asked SA Burgess whether or not any record in the Atlanta Office would pin down the exact dates of his assignment to monitor the King telephones. SA Burgess replied that he knew of no such record.

Mr. Epstein asked if an annual fitness or performance report would show his assignment at that time, and SA Burgess

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

replied that he believed these performance reports merely stated general assignments, such as general security, etc., and the location of these reports were unknown to him. Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess had seen his annual performance reports and SA Burgess replied that he had.

At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Epstein asked if he might have SA Burgess' home telephone number and if he might call him at a later date to obtain from SA Burgess the date of the aforementioned surgery, if SA Burgess was able to ascertain this date. SA Burgess did furnish Mr. Epstein his home telephone number and advised he would attempt to determine the date of this surgery.



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Atlanta, Georgia

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

July 23, 1975

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Alden F. Miller concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Alden F. Miller commenced at 4:50 P. M. and was terminated at 5:29 P. M., July 22, 1975, with the statement that consideration would be given overnight as to whether additional questions would be directed on the following morning to SA Miller. At the outset Staff Member Michael Epstein advised SA Miller of his rights, stating he did not have to answer any questions, that he had the right to legal counsel, and further, that anything he said might be used in a criminal proceeding against him.

The following questions and the responses of SA Miller to these questions are set forth hereinafter in narrative form to the best of his recollection, utilizing verbiage nearly as possible synonymous with statements made. The context of this question and answer interrogation is not necessarily in chronological order. All questions were directed to SA Miller by Staff Member Michael Epstein.

SA Miller was asked concerning his employment and assignment to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Atlanta Office. SA Miller replied that he first was assigned to the Atlanta Office in 1947, was transferred to New York

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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in 1948, and returned to the Atlanta Office in 1951. SA Miller was further asked when he was assigned to the Security Squad in the Atlanta FBI Office, to which he replied June of 1951. Inquiry was further made as to whether still assigned to the Security Squad and SA Miller replied that as of March, 1975, he was no longer assigned security matters and that he was presently assigned to work in conjunction with the General Accounting Office review of matters in the Atlanta Office.

SA Miller was asked when a technical installation or telephone tap was placed on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Martin Luther King. SA Miller replied that it was impossible for him at this date to recall specifically when such an installation was made, but by citing civil rights activities with particular emphasis in Albany, Georgia, in 1962, was reasonably sure that the technical installation was made sometime subsequent to that date. When asked how long the technical installation remained in effect, SA Miller replied that he could not recall the exact duration of the telephone tap, however, was of the opinion it was in effect for several years, possibly three. When asked what telephone facilities were covered, SA Miller replied that telephone service to the offices of SCLC and to the residence of Martin Luther King were covered in this telephone tap.

SA Miller was asked what was the justification or purpose of this technical installation, to which he replied that it was to determine the degree of subversive influence, if any, over the activities of the SCLC sponsored civil rights demonstrations and programs.

Inquiry was made as to who instructed the installation of such technical coverage and SA Miller replied that he undoubtedly received these instructions from his immediate supervisor and/or the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Office at that time. When asked whether these instructions were written or verbal, SA Miller replied that he could not specifically recall, but was reasonably sure that if written they would have also been discussed verbally, both with his supervisor and the Special Agent in Charge.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Miller was asked whether a feasibility study was made prior to the actual installation or a survey conducted. SA Miller replied that he did not recall at this late date whether such a feasibility study was made prior to the installation. SA Miller was asked whether if such a study or survey was made whether it was reviewed by high officials prior to ordering such an installation. SA Miller replied that he did not specifically recall whether such a review as that was made on a feasibility or survey, as if this were done, it would have been done in Washington, and SA Miller would not have been in a position to know of such a review.

SA Miller was asked in making the telephone tap did the Atlanta Office have sufficient equipment here and if not, where did we get such equipment to make this installation. SA Miller replied that the Atlanta Office did not have equipment available for such an installation and at this date it is unknown where the equipment came from, however, a request for such equipment would have been made of FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C. SA Miller was asked whether he dealt with the phone company in conjunction with this installation and he replied that he undoubtedly had requested line information which relates to pair and cable data for phones to be covered in this technical installation. Inquiry was made of SA Miller as to the identity of the person at the Southern Bell Telephone Company who provided such information and it was stated that at this late date it was impossible to say definitely who furnished this data as the phone company during this era was in the process of setting up a security office who would normally provide such information under the proper circumstances and that if such an office were then in existence Mr. Theodore King would have provided the line information desired.

SA Miller was asked whether leased lines were obtained from the phone company in conjunction with this installation, to which he replied he did not specifically recall whether leased lines were utilized or whether other telephone service was ordered with subsequent adaptation enabling the use of this service for the technical installation.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Miller was asked whether charges were incurred for such service, to which he replied payments were made for all services rendered by the Southern Bell Telephone Company, whether it be leased lines or other telephone-type service. SA Miller was asked whether he had issued the orders for leased lines or other service and if so, what name was utilized in issuing such orders, to which SA Miller replied that if leased lines or other service was ordered through the Security Office of Southern Bell Telephone Company, that he had ordered same, however, he could not recall at this time the name utilized for such service.

SA Miller was asked further did he issue the order for having a private working number installed in the monitoring plant, to which he replied he could not recall whether such an order was issued or given by him and if it was, whether it was done through the Security Office or done in a routine fashion like any person requesting normal telephone service.

SA Miller was asked if he recalled where the technical installations were made, to which he replied he did recall and could point out the locations, however, could not recall the addresses of these locations. SA Miller was asked the location of the monitoring point, to which he replied an apartment in an apartment building located diagonally across the street from the Federal Building housing the offices of the FBI.

SA Miller was asked whether he was responsible for renting the apartment which was used for monitoring this technical installation, to which he replied he did not think that he was, but was of the opinion that the case Agent rented the apartment. SA Miller was asked where in the apartment building was the apartment located, to which he replied he could only recall it was in the upper portion of the building, probably above the tenth or twelfth floor and that it was located immediately adjacent to a wire closet. SA Miller was asked the cover name used in renting this apartment, to which he replied at this late date he could not recall the exact name utilized, but was of the opinion

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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it was some sort of engineering company, but at any rate, it would have been the same name utilized in requesting telephone service. SA Miller was asked further whether the owners of this building and top management were cognizant of the real identity of the renters of this apartment, to which he replied he had no way of knowing but was of the opinion for security reasons no one knew or was aware that this apartment was being utilized by the FBI.

SA Miller was asked further whether he had anything to do with the installation of utilities and furnishing of this apartment used in the monitoring operation, to which he replied he had nothing to do with this other than the installation of certain wooden shelves utilized for equipment necessary to such monitoring and neither did he have anything to do as it related to the utilities.

SA Miller was asked whether he ever actually monitored this installation, to which he replied that on several occasions when regular monitors were ill and there were other technical needs at the facility, he would serve as a monitor. SA Miller was asked whether he had ever furnished supplies to this facility, to which he replied the only kind of supplies he would have taken to the facility were those necessary to insure a trouble free technical monitoring. SA Miller was specifically asked whether he ever replenished the supplies or tapes for recording purposes, to which he replied he did not recall such, other than at the initial inception when a sufficient supply of tapes were made available and these tapes were used over and over.

SA Miller was asked specifically whether he ever made any technical installation on phone service at the Ebenezer Baptist Church, the church where Martin Luther King was on the staff, to which he replied that no such installation to his knowledge was ever made. SA Miller further informed that he did not know whether city police authorities or state authorities had made such an installation and further, he was not in a position to be aware of any such activities on the part of these law enforcement agencies.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

SA Miller was asked whether he had ever discussed Martin Luther King with Eugene Patterson, Editor of the Atlanta Constitution, to which he replied that to the best of his knowledge he had never discussed this matter with Mr. Patterson. SA Miller did point out that he was acquainted with Mr. Patterson professionally and socially as previous investigations had brought him in contact with Mr. Patterson and that they were both members of the same church and served jointly on various committees and boards for several years. SA Miller replied further that during this era Mr. Patterson may have directed questions to him regarding Martin Luther King, as it was a timely subject and one receiving considerable newspaper publicity; however, all such inquiries were parried or handled in a non-committal and non-revealing manner. SA Miller further replied that numerous civil rights cases were being conducted by the Atlanta Office of the FBI, which was public knowledge and subject of news coverage by the newspaper of which Mr. Patterson served as Editor, however, to the best of SA Miller's knowledge no revelation was made indicating the FBI had an unusual interest in the activities of Martin Luther King. SA Miller further advised that even though socially acquainted with Mr. Patterson, he did not agree with Mr. Patterson's publicly espoused political position on many and varied interests of the times.

SA Miller was specifically asked that while the Staff Member did not desire to place SA Miller in a bind, did a superior of his at any time ever instruct him to contact Eugene Patterson regarding Martin Luther King, to which SA Miller replied that at no time had any superior of his, or for that matter, any other FBI employee, ever ask that Eugene Patterson be contacted in regard to Martin Luther King.

The interview was terminated at 5:29 P. M. with Mr. Epstein stating that he would like to think overnight regarding the questions and answers as set forth above and would on the following morning advise as to whether he desired to ask additional questions.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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On the morning of July 23, 1975, Mr. Epstein communicated to SA Miller that no further questioning of SA Miller was necessary.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 23, 1975

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by SA Charles T. Haynes concerning an interview of him by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Haynes started at 11:57 A. M., was discontinued for lunch from 1:32 P. M. until 2:34 P. M., and was terminated at 3:10 P. M. Epstein asked all of the questions during the interview. Haynes was not advised of his rights or of the purpose of the interview. Early in the interview, Haynes informed Epstein he was under the impression the purpose of the interview was to obtain information regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and Epstein confirmed this explaining King, the SCLC\* and the marches were so closely related it was necessary to go into some of these things.

Epstein asked Haynes his title and was informed Haynes is a Special Agent Supervisor in the Atlanta Office of the FBI, supervising the Number 3 Squad which is generally known as the security squad. He asked when Haynes became a supervisor and was informed he was appointed in August, 1968. Epstein asked who served as supervisor of the squad prior to Haynes and was advised SA Charles S. Harding, now retired,

\*Southern Christian Leadership Conference

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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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preceded Haynes as supervisor. He asked why Harding was replaced and Haynes stated it was a decision made by the Bureau which was an administrative matter and not pertinent to the inquiry regarding Martin Luther King, Jr. Epstein did not pursue this question any further.

Epstein asked when the investigation regarding King started and if there was a file open prior to the time the investigation was authorized. Haynes replied he did not know when the file was opened or when the investigation was authorized. Haynes was asked when the technical coverage regarding King was instituted and when it was discontinued, and he replied to the best of his knowledge it was instituted during about November, 1963, and Haynes monitored it until about January 4, 1964, when Haynes became ill from a kidney stone attack, thereafter entering the hospital in Atlanta on January 8, 1964. Epstein asked Haynes if he returned to monitoring the surveillance later and Haynes replied that he did not return to the assignment on a full-time basis, but probably relieved other individuals monitoring several times during a period which may have continued as long as a year.

Epstein asked when the King case was closed and Haynes replied he did not know, but felt sure it was sometime prior to April, 1968. Haynes was asked who made the decision to close the file, and he stated he did not know. Epstein asked when the SCLC case was closed and Haynes stated he did not recall, but did remember that SCLC activity "wound down" considerably prior to King's death, and even more so after King's death to the point that the information did not warrant maintaining the file in a pending status. When asked who gave instructions to close the file, Haynes stated that he did not recall but that it was possible that the Atlanta Office took the action closing the file, and it was even possible that Haynes may have approved such action administratively; however, he does not recall.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT ((SA))  
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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Epstein asked if it would be customary for New York to send Atlanta any information they received regarding Stanley Levison and if so what file it would be put in. It was explained to Epstein it would be necessary to know the nature of such information before answering such a question, however, since Atlanta did not have any pending investigation regarding Levison or SCLC there would be no reason for New York to send any information regarding Levison to Atlanta unless they had some reason to request information concerning some pending investigation. Epstein pressed the question of whether New York would continue to send Atlanta information concerning Levison and he was informed, based on information available at Atlanta, there was no reason for New York to send the information to Atlanta regarding Levison, without requesting investigation; however, it was possible that they may have some reason for having sent information to Atlanta for informational purposes.

Epstein asked where the monitoring of the King technical surveillance was conducted and he was advised by Haynes it was conducted in the Peachtree Towers Building. He asked the room number and Haynes replied he did not recall the room number but did recall it was on one of the upper floors of the building. He asked who made the installation and handled the contact with the telephone company, and Haynes replied he did not know, that the equipment was in the apartment when Haynes was instructed to report there for the monitoring assignment. Epstein asked who else was present in the apartment at the time and was advised that SA Alden F. Miller was present, connected the equipment and instructed Haynes in the operation of the equipment. In response to the question of other Agents monitoring the technical surveillance at the time, Haynes stated to the best of his knowledge he was probably the first Agent to monitor the surveillance, with the technical assistance of SA Miller.

Epstein asked the name of the person who rented the apartment at the Peachtree Towers and Haynes replied he did not know. He asked if such information was available in the files of the Atlanta Office and Haynes replied he

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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did not know, explaining that such information may have been made a matter of record, and yet may not have been made a matter of record. Epstein stated that at this point he would stop the questioning in order for Haynes to go upstairs to the FBI Office and review the files to determine whether or not such information was in the files. Haynes explained that such a project would probably entail extensive file review in order to state whether such information was, or was not, in the file. Epstein asked if Haynes could have someone else conduct the necessary file review regarding this matter, at which time Haynes replied he would request a break at this point to consult with an FBIHQ representative in the FBI Office. After consulting with the FBIHQ representative for approximately five minutes, Haynes returned to Senator Talmadge's office and informed Epstein that the clearance for the interview was based on what Haynes could remember regarding King and not on information from the files. Epstein was advised that any request by him for information from the files should be submitted in writing in the usual manner. Epstein did not pursue this matter any further.

Epstein asked if Haynes knew Bill Sullivan and if he recalled him coming to Atlanta. Haynes replied that he did know Sullivan and recalled him coming to Atlanta in the 1960's at least on one occasion and possibly twice. Haynes explained he recalled Sullivan coming to Atlanta in the early or middle 1960's in connection with a regional type FBI conference regarding developing and handling of informants in Klan organizations, and possibly a second visit at a later time, but no other details were recalled.

Epstein asked Haynes if he knew of any instance where an Agent in Atlanta furnished any information regarding King or the SCLC to the news media and Haynes replied he did not.

Epstein asked if Atlanta had a COINTELPRO file regarding King or the SCLC and Haynes advised it did not. Haynes was asked if he knew of any COINTELPRO information regarding King or the SCLC and Haynes stated he did not. When asked where such material would be filed, Haynes stated that since he knew of none he did not know where it would be filed. When asked if such information could be in the case file, Haynes advised it was possible.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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Epstein asked if the Atlanta Office participated in the COINTELPRO retrieval project and was advised by Haynes he thought so; however, Haynes was not familiar enough with the particular project he had in mind to be sure. Haynes explained he had in mind a project around the first of 1975, which had to do with declassifying certain previously identified COINTELPRO correspondence and subsequently classifying some material also connected with COINTELPRO. Epstein wanted to know if any COINTELPRO information regarding King or SCLC was included in this information and he was informed Haynes had no knowledge of such, but the details of the project were handled by another Agent under Haynes' supervision. Haynes was requested to identify the Agent and replied he would have to have a few minutes to consult with an FBIHQ representative in the FBI Office prior to answering this question. Epstein contacted the FBIHQ representative in the Atlanta Office telephonically, requesting him to come down to Senator Talmadge's office and conferred with him for approximately five minutes, during which time Haynes was not present. At the conclusion of this conference, upon advice of the FBIHQ representative Haynes informed Epstein the Agent who handled the above-mentioned project was SA Edward A. Shea.

Epstein terminated the interview at 3:10 P. M.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia

July 24, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/26/01 BY SP-2 Attn: JAS

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following information has been furnished by  
SA Edward A. Shea concerning an interview of him by SSC  
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took  
place on July 23, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.  
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.

The interview of SA Edward A. Shea by the two  
SSC Staff Members commenced at 9:35 A. M. and ended at  
10:37 A. M.

At the beginning of the interview no mention was  
made of SA Edward A. Shea's rights by SSC Staff Members  
Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.

The following information was furnished to these  
two SSC Staff Members and it is not necessarily in chronological  
order:

At the outset of the interview, SA Shea was questioned  
about his service in the Bureau, type work he did, etc., and  
SA Shea indicated that he had been in the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation (FBI) as a Special Agent for almost 25 years,  
having entered the Bureau in March, 1951; after an initial  
assignment at Richmond, Virginia, SA Shea was transferred to  
Cleveland, Ohio, where he was assigned to the security squad.  
SA Shea remained in Cleveland for 20 years doing security  
work for practically the entire time. In May, 1972, SA Shea  
was transferred to the Atlanta Division and once again was  
assigned to security work, which assignment has continued to  
the present time.

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12-111313-496-----  
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions  
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to  
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed  
outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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SA Shea was then asked by Mr. Epstein about a review project he had handled earlier in the year pertaining to the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in the Atlanta Division and what it involved.

SA Shea mentioned that in approximately the latter part of December, 1974, or early January, 1975, he had been assigned to handle a project dealing with COINTELPRO in the Atlanta Office.

FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) had sent out communications to various field offices around the latter part of December, 1974, or early January, 1975, relative to the COINTELPRO-Hate Groups, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, New Left, and Communist Party, U. S. of America (CP,USA). In these communications FBIHQ had indicated it was in receipt of a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for documents relating to the COINTELPRO. As a result, FBIHQ had reviewed its files on COINTELPRO and classified various documents. FBIHQ listed these documents in work papers which were sent out to the various field offices, including Atlanta, as enclosures to the FBIHQ communications. These work papers listed documents that were to be classified in each office and recipients were instructed to review the work papers to make sure all copies of these documents classified by FBIHQ were so classified in the field office files on COINTELPRO. These work papers showed the classification assigned to the particular document, the identifying number of the classifying officer, the exemption category and the date it was classified by FBIHQ.

In addition, these FBIHQ communications instructed the recipient field offices to review its various COINTELPRO files, such as the ones on the Hate Groups, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, etc. to insure that all other documents in these files which were classifiable were so classified. These were to include memoranda and letters to other offices, etc. The office that originated the communication had the responsibility of notifying other recipients of these communications so their copies could also be classified.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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Based on these FBIHQ communications, SA Shea, who handled this project by himself, located all the documents listed in the FBIHQ work papers and classified them according to the information set out in the work papers.

In addition, SA Shea also reviewed each of the Atlanta COINTELPRO files on the categories previously mentioned, for any further documents that should be classified.

SA Shea recalled that in this part of the review he did locate various documents in these files which he felt required classification.

SA Shea could not recall any specific documents that he so classified but did remember classifying a number of documents in the COINTELPRO-Hate Group file and COINTELPRO-CP,USA file. These documents selected by SA Shea were then classified, and copies designated for any other Atlanta files were then located and classified; in addition, FBIHQ and other field offices that had been furnished copies of these documents were then notified by Atlanta to locate their copies of these documents and classify them according to information furnished by Atlanta.

SA Shea pointed out to the SSC Staff Members that he recalled that subsequently FBIHQ had sent back communications to Atlanta relative to documents SA Shea had classified in both the COINTELPRO-Hate Group and COINTELPRO-CP,USA files. FBIHQ instructed that all those classified by SA Shea in the COINTELPRO-Hate Group file be declassified as they did not warrant classification and also a number in the COINTELPRO-CP,USA file also were to be declassified, which was done by SA Shea.

The SSC Staff Members then inquired if during this review of the COINTELPRO files, whether SA Shea had noted any COINTELPRO actions, any recommended actions, or any COINTELPRO suggestions which were directed against Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Coretta King or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA Shea indicated that in carrying out this project, his purpose was first to locate the COINTELPRO documents listed by FBIHQ in their work papers and classify them; next he was also to review the Atlanta COINTELPRO files to see if any other COINTELPRO documents prepared by Atlanta required classification.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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In handling this project, SA Shea was primarily interested in classifying the documents in these COINTELPRO files and little notice was made of any specific COINTELPRO actions actually being recommended in these documents. SA Shea pointed out that in his review he did not recall any COINTELPRO action that had been directed or recommended against Reverend King, his wife, Coretta, or SCLC.

SA Shea was then questioned as to whether he could recall in his review, having to classify any Atlanta COINTELPRO document in which a copy may have been designated for the case file on SCLC, and SA Shea indicated that he could not recall or remember anything specific on this.

Mr. Epstein then inquired if the Atlanta Office had any COINTELPRO files which only pertained to organizations, in which all information relative to a particular organization like the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), or the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) would be located. SA Shea indicated there was no such specific breakdown in the Atlanta COINTELPRO files as they were set up under broad group categories, such as Hate Groups, Black Hate Groups, New Left, etc.

Mr. Epstein then asked if SA Shea had ever been involved in handling any COINTELPRO matters when he was assigned to the Cleveland Office or whether the Cleveland Office ever had any COINTELPRO actions against Reverend King or SCLC. SA Shea indicated that he understood that the questioning of him would be limited to his review of the Atlanta COINTELPRO files earlier in the year, for the classification purposes; SA Shea suggested that this should be discussed with the FBIHQ representative, who was in the Atlanta Office at the time, to resolve this; however, Mr. Epstein did not pursue this.

Mr. Epstein then inquired, that prior to the FBI instituting the COINTELPRO, and prior to the various field offices setting up COINTELPRO files, if some Agent made a suggestion about a counterintelligence action, would such a

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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suggestion, say in the form of a memorandum or letter, be placed in the case file of the organization or the individual against whom the action was being directed. SA Shea indicated he had no knowledge of any such suggestions ever being made in the form of memoranda, letters, etc., suggesting a counter-intelligence action being directed against anyone or any organization prior to the institution of the actual COINTELPRO by FBIHQ.

Mr. Epstein then asked, if when FBIHQ instituted the COINTELPRO and the various field offices set up COINTELPRO files, was there any retrieval of any documents made from any files dating back prior to the commencement of COINTELPRO, that were then placed in any of Atlanta's COINTELPRO files. SA Shea indicated that in his review of the various COINTELPRO files earlier in the year, he had not noted any such indication of this.

Mr. Epstein then asked if SA Shea was aware of any review program dealing with COINTELPRO in which any documents were removed from COINTELPRO files. SA Shea stated emphatically that there was no program to ever remove any documents dealing with COINTELPRO from Atlanta's COINTELPRO files or from any Atlanta files.

On several occasions during the interview of SA Shea, Mr. Epstein would come back to his line of questioning about SA Shea's review of the COINTELPRO files earlier in the year and whether SA Shea could recall any COINTELPRO action or COINTELPRO suggested action against Reverend King, Mrs. King or SCLC. SA Shea on each occasion pointed out that he could not recall seeing any documents in any of the COINTELPRO files which related to any such action directed against the Kings or SCLC.

Mr. Epstein on one occasion asked SA Shea if, during the time he had been assigned to the Atlanta Office, he had ever hear of any COINTELPRO action, or any suggested action, directed against Reverend King, his wife, or SCLC, and SA Shea replied that he had not.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)  
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

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Mr. Epstein also asked if SA Shea was aware of any COINTELPRO action or recommended action being made after FBIHQ has discontinued the COINTELPRO, and SA Shea indicated he knew of no actions or recommendations being made.

During the interview, Mr. Epstein did most of the questioning and Mrs. DeOreo took extensive notes; both SSC Staff Members were pleasant and cordial during the entire interview, which ended at approximately 10:37 A. M.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7/8/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS RECEIVED  
FROM FORMER ASSOCIATE DEPUTY  
ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES A.  
WILDEROTTER, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Adv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Justice Dept. part

At 3:05 p.m. on July 8, 1975, I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler and advised him of the fact that Mr. Wilderotter had furnished certain materials to the Bureau at the time of his transfer to the White House. I told him that Mr. Wilderotter requested an inventory be prepared of the materials in order to assure their appropriate disposition and that such an inventory was prepared. I told him that the Attorney General was advised by memorandum dated June 26, 1975, with a copy designated for the Deputy, each of which enclosed a copy of the inventory. I explained that I took a copy of the inventory to Mr. Wilderotter and requested him to mark thereon his suggestions as to the disposition of each item.

I suggested that some of the items appearing on the inventory could be material pertinent to the current inquiries by the Senate Select Committee and to conversations recently had with the Deputy Attorney General concerning official and confidential files maintained by Mr. Hoover. I told the Deputy that my purpose in bringing this matter to his personal attention was to emphasize my concern that the Department would be aware of the existence and location of the material listed in the inventory and of our interest in having materials returned to the Department or otherwise disposed of at the earliest possible date.

- REC-107  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. McDermott (Attn: Mr. Farrington)  
1 - Mr. Mintz

62-55047-2169

JUL 11 1975

JAM:mfd  
(4)

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2 fm/rm/cr

MAR-16

LEG

JUL 17 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Inventory of Documents Received  
from Former Associate DAG Wilderotter, etc.

The Deputy requested a copy of the inventory marked by Mr. Wilderotter and I furnished a Xerox copy of the original. He said that he would discuss this matter with K. William O'Connor and that he would contact me to discuss further disposition of the materials presently being held by the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*WHD*  
*WHD*  
*JM*  
*JM*

1 - Mr. J. E. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

The Attorney General

August 4, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

220-61

SP4 JOMM  
6076

Enclosed are two copies each of seven memoranda, each reporting the results of an interview of an FBI Special Agent (SA) by Staff Members of the SSC. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

All the interviews took place at Atlanta, Georgia, and all the SAs, except W. John Benton, are assigned to the Atlanta Field Office (FO) of the FBI. Benton is assigned to the Knoxville FO and traveled to Atlanta for the interview at the request of the SSC.

Except for the interview of SA Edward A. Shea, all the interviews were arranged on advance notice of the SSC given to the FBI on July 17, 1975. The SSC request for interview of Shea was made on July 22, 1975. REC-102

Prior to all these interviews, these SAs were informed by an FBI representative that they were being released from any applicable employment agreement for purpose of the SSC interview concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. It was explained to all that they had the right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. They were all told that there were certain privileged areas concerning

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE  
62-116395

I - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

SFP:lhb/hb  
(10)

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

The Attorney General

FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. They were all also informed that an FBI representative would be available in the Atlanta FO for consultation purposes should such a need arise. This procedure, as explained to these SAs, provides that if a question arose during the interview in one of the areas set out above, the SA had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with the FBI representative. The representative did not accompany these Agents to the interviews but was available in the Atlanta FO located in the same building where the interviews took place. Instances of the use of this representative for consultation purposes are indicated in the appropriate memoranda being furnished.

Enclosures (14)

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

NOTE:

The FBI representative referred to above was Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project who, on prior approval, traveled to Atlanta for the dual function of giving the SAs on-the-scene advice on behalf of the Legal Counsel Division and to be available for consultation purposes as indicated. It should be noted that it was necessary during the course of some of the interviews for the SA to consult with Phillips as to whether certain information was to be furnished the interviewers and, notably in respect to SA Charles T. Haynes, consultation resulted in our refusal to at this time acquiesce to a request for information from Atlanta FO files. Also, the interview of Haynes late afternoon 7/22/75 resulted in a request for interview of Shea which was arranged on the scene and took place morning of 7/23/75--details of clearance for this covered

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

in 7/24/75 memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall captioned "Senstudy 75." LHM's were prepared by the seven SAs at Atlanta on instructions of Phillips and submitted to Headquarters by Atlanta airtel 7/24/75 under "Senstudy 75" caption. Copies of airtel and LHM's will be placed in personnel files of respective SAs.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE  
BEFORE COMPLETING.TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/4/75

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

	SSC
	HSC

The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding  
to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of on interviews by SSC Staff  
Members of incumbent FBI Special Agents W. John Renton, O.  
Richard Hamilton, Robert W. Thomson, Donald P. Burgess, Aiden

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

NA

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Surveillance, electronic  
Intelligence collection  
Intelligence activities, domestic

Organization and staffing

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr.,  
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, COINTELPRO,  
Stanley Levison

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP8 ALM/HFG  
*Jmde/b*

FMK:fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395-495  
*S. Wolf*

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

DATE: 8/1/75  
1 - Personnel File -  
Seymor Phillips  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Ad. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Michael Epstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee, requested that Staff interview be arranged with Seymor Phillips concerning the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King. He requested the interview be held at 10 a.m., 8/1/75. He was advised that this was not possible and that sometime next week would be more acceptable. It was agreed that the interview would be conducted at 10 a.m. on Monday, 8/4/75.

In view of the ongoing discussions between the Department, representatives of the King family, and the Senate Select Committee concerning Committee access to information concerning Martin Luther King, Michael Shaheen was contacted concerning this interview.

It was pointed out to Mr. Shaheen that Mr. Phillips had a great deal of knowledge concerning the King investigation and it could be assumed that information would be disclosed during interview which might contravene an agreement with the King family should such an agreement become perfected. Since the Department was to meet with representatives of the King family and Senate Select Committee members on 7/31/75, it was suggested that any decision concerning Mr. Phillips' interview be held in abeyance pending a resolution of this problem. Shaheen agreed.

Shaheen subsequently advised SA Daly that the meeting with the King family representatives, Senate Select Committee representatives and the Department had not resulted in an agreement. He said he had discussed the pending interview of Mr. Phillips with the Committee Staff representatives and they said they would furnish guidelines concerning the topics to be covered during the interview. Shaheen indicated these guidelines would be consistent with the King family's concerns regarding the production of information from Bureau files concerning King.

REC-102

62-116395-494  
AUG 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/17/00 BY SPo Alm/bmk  
JBH/PV  
(8)  
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER



Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Steven Blackhurst, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, later advised Inspector Hotis that SA Phillips could discuss any aspect of the investigation other than information developed through wiretaps or microphone surveillance. Mr. Epstein assured him that he was not interested in the substance of any conversation that might have been overheard, but would inquire into such procedural matters as the number of wiretaps installed and the identity of persons who authorized them.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SA Phillips be released from existing employment agreement for purposes of this interview, consistent with the above limitations.

(2) That an Intelligence Division representative be available but not present during the interview of SA Phillips in the event that questions arise concerning the proper scope of the interview.

I don't feel  
this is necessary  
↑ Agree  
OK ~~DBH~~  
~~Pen~~ MFC

DBH/TDM

#MDR6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS  
[REDACTED] IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

ENCLOSURE

(S) 116395-

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Louisville, Kentucky  
March 20, 1973

Pages 1-5 of LHM, dated 3/20/73, at Louisville.  
Serial 7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP0 A/m/mf

MOR-W

Page 2 of AT dated 3/20/73, from SAC, Louisville, to  
Acting Director, FBI.

Robert Chilton;  
Luther C. Fonner, Jr.;  
Jack Ferguson;  
Reed McWhorter;  
Fred McWhorter;  
Walter "Dee" Huddleston

Mr. Edward M. Steutermann, 1211 Commonwealth Building, Louisville, Kentucky, was interviewed by a representative of the FBI on February 6, 1973. In this interview, Mr. Steutermann stated the information that he provided to United States Attorney Long concerning this matter had been furnished to him originally, in part, by former Kentucky Governor and then candidate for the office of United States Senator, Louie B. Nunn. Mr. Steutermann recalled that Mr. Nunn at the time was running against Walter "Dee" Huddleston, now incumbent United States Senator, for a seat in the United States Senate.

Mr. Steutermann further advised that

Page 2 of LHM, dated 2/7/73 at Louisville.  
. Serial 5

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

March 22) 1973

At the specific direction of the Department, limited investigation has been conducted of an allegation of Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering - Bribery involving the application for a state bank charter in Albany, Kentucky. The U. S. Attorney informed that Walter "Doc" Huddleston, U. S. Senator, was approached in February, 1972, by certain individuals seeking a charter for a bank

ARW:bja 2/23

7 WTC WVC 1  
get Q JK  
3/23 11:34 AM

Note from Special Investigative Division, dated 3/22/73,  
stapled to top of Airtel from SAC, Louisville to Acting  
Director. 3/23/73.

Robert Chilton;  
Luther C. Fonner, Jr.;

Page 3 of LHM dated 2/7/73, at Louisville.  
Serial 5

ROBERT CHILTON;  
LUTHER C. CONNER, JR.;  
JACK FERGUSON;  
REED MC WHONTER;  
ET AL

capacity to function for the Commissioner of Banking and Securities. Mr. Mc Neely stated the Bank of Clinton County, Inc., Albany, Kentucky, was granted a state bank charter on March 21, 1973.

Based upon information developed during the interview of Willis G. Moremen and a review of the Kentucky Revised Statutes pertaining to banks and trust companies set forth in Appendix A that the authority to approve a state bank charter is held only by the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner of the State Department of Banking and Securities.

Page 4 of LHM, dated 4/27/73, at Louisville.  
Serial 9

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *W.O.C.*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

DATE: 8/6/75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This is to record identities of Staff Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC) who have had access to FBI materials pursuant to SSC requests.

On 7/28/75, SSC delivered a "superceding request" for various materials. In partial compliance with that request, SSC Staff has been given access for review to the following:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Staff Member</u>	<u>Date</u>
III B & C	O & C Files	Mark Gitenstein	7/31-8/1/75
III D	Abuse areas	" "	8/6/75
III E	SAC lets & memos	" "	8/4/75
IV C	Foreign Operations Policy Manual	John Elliff	8/4/75
IV D	5-yr. INTD Budget Projection	" "	8/5/75
IV G	INLET material	" "	8/4-5/75
IV H	Insp. Div. material re O & C files	Mark Gitenstein	7/31/75 -
IV F	<b>Surreptitious Entry</b> <small>JRC Act 5/14/75/DO</small> <b>Chilean Embassy</b>	John Elliff	8/5/75

REC-102

62-116395-493

Regarding the 5/14/75 SSC request, Appendix <sup>AUG 8 1975</sup> B, I, 6, Mark Gitenstein on 7/30/75 reviewed inspection reports of Domestic Intelligence Division, January and September, 1971,

62-116395

JPT:lhb|h6

(4)

CLASSIFIED BY *SLA/MJmf*  
DECLASSIFY ON: *25X L*  
MOR-IV

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED

CONTINUED - OVER *W.R.W.*

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

and of San Francisco Division, October, 1970, and Dan Dwyer reviewed Records Section Classifying Unit Guides (9 volumes) on 7/31/75 and 8/1/75.

Jim Dick reviewed materials regarding Photo and Physical Surveillance on 7/25/75.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

*JPT*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. McDermott

DATE: August 1, 1975

FROM : J. C. Farrington

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER TO REVIEW  
HIS FBI FILES

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Eiles & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell.  Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On July 21, 1975, the Attorney General determined there should be a disclosure of material in the files, with certain exceptions (for details see J. B. Adams to Callahan memorandum dated July 24, 1975, captioned "Request by various Senators on Senate Select Committee to Review their FBI files").

On August 1, 1975, Senator Huddleston and Departmental Attorney, Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counselor for Intelligence Coordination, were with James B. Adams, Assistant to the Director, Deputy Associate Director in his office from approximately 10:30 a.m. to 11:05 a.m. During this time Senator Huddleston reviewed the following FBI material pertaining to himself.

94-1-676-300

94-67291

166-5980

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. McDermott

1 - Mr. Farrington

1 - Mr. Wannall  
Attention: Mr. W. Cregar

Enclosures (6)

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DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2/mjw/lmf  
MOR-16

INITIALS OR CERTIFICATE

⑨ AUG 6 1975

FIVE

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

46 AUG 6 1975

B) U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

84 AUG 6 1975

NW 68608 DocId:32989626 Page 86

ORIGINAL FILE IN 94-1-67291

J. C. Farrington to Mr. McDermott Memo  
REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER  
TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES

Portions of file 166-5980 were masked out.  
As these masks will be removed, a Xerox of the pertinent portion of the respective documents have been made for record purposes and attached to this memorandum. *The Senator did not wish to remove the masking which deliberately obscured*

Senator Huddleston inquired if Boggs or Karem, former employees who had been fired, had anything to do with bribery allegation (166-5980) against him. File 166-5980 was reviewed on 8/1/75, and there was no mention of Boggs or Karem in file. — *Scoville checked 8/1/75*

ACTION:

For information concerning request of Senator Huddleston.

*dkw*

*[Signature]*

*MHC*

*PLW*

*JMC*

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

July 30, 1975  
1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

This is in response to SSC letter dated July 3, 1975, requesting copies of all communications from the FBI Director and/or other Headquarters personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities of the SSC.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosures which constitutes our response to this request. A copy of the memorandum and the enclosures is being provided for your records.

Sensitive information pertaining to electronic surveillance contained in FBIHQ teletype of June 13, 1975, (attached) was not excised pursuant to advice received from Mr. K. William O'Connor of your Department during consultation with a representative of this Bureau on July 24, 1975. The June 13, 1975, FBIHQ teletype (attached) has been sanitized only to the extent that the terms "mail surveillance" and "source" were substituted for wording which could tend to identify specific sensitive sources.

Enclosures (19)

REC-102

62-116395-192  
9 AUG 8 1975

G2-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

/ ENCLURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep&AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

RDH:mjg/11  
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/17/00 BY SP2/num/mk

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MDR-1b

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The enclosures constitute all of the communications that have been sent by FBIHQ to all SACs or more than one office regarding the SSC.

Supervisor J. P. Thomas, CI-2, INTD, consulted with K. William O'Connor, regarding possible excisions to G/13 and 13/75 teletypes, to protect electronic surveillance and mail surveillance operations. O'Connor advised that the material should be given to the SSC. He was informed that this would be noted in our memorandum to the Attorney General and he assented to this. Subsequently, Mr. Adams instructed that the code names of the mail surveillances should be deleted.

62-116396

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. R. D. Hampton

July 30, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY COVERT/ENCLINAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: COMMUNICATIONS FROM FBI  
HEADQUARTERS TO FBI FIELD OFFICES  
AND AGENTS CONCERNING THE SSC

Reference is made to the letter from the captioned Committee dated July 3, 1975, which contained their request for copies of all communications from the FBI Director and/or other FBI Headquarters personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities of the SSC.

Pursuant to your request, copies of the following communications are enclosed for you:

1) Teletype dated January 29, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all Special Agents in Charge (SACs) and all Legal Attachés (Legats).

2) Teletype dated March 24, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all SACs.

3) Teletype dated May 2, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all SACs.

4) Teletype dated May 2, 1975, from Director, FBI, to SACs, Alexandria, Baltimore, New Haven, Newark and Omaha.

5) Teletype dated May 28, 1975, from Director, FBI, to SACs, Alexandria, Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago, Kansas City, Little Rock, Newark, Omaha, Philadelphia, Portland, Phoenix, Tampa and Washington Field.

6) Teletype dated May 20, 1975, from Director, FBI, to all SACs.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 11/17/2006 BY SPo Mm/jm

MR-1602 11-375-492

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Communications from FBI  
Headquarters to FBI Field Offices  
and Agents Concerning the SSC

7) Teletype dated June 13, 1975, from Director, FBI,  
to SACs, Detroit, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Sacramento  
and Washington Field.

8) Teletype dated June 18, 1975, from Director, FBI,  
to SACs, New York, Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami,  
San Francisco, Seattle and Washington Field.

9) Memorandum To All Employees dated May 28, 1975,  
from Director, FBI, regarding interviews of FBI employees.

Enclosures (9)

1 - The Attorney General

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated 7/28/75 7/30/75  
U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Communica-  
Caption of Document: tions from FBI Headquarters to FBI  
Field Offices and Agents Concerning the SSC.

Originating Office: FBI 310  
FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Date: 8/5/75

Received by: Mike Colleman

Title: Exec Sec

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 16/11/2000 BY SP/AM/MS

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE  
BEFORE COMPLETING.TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

 DOCUMENT BRIEFING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER

7/30/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum and enclosures**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

**SSC letter 7/8/75****U**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Information handling**

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Forwarding to the Committee all communications from the FBI Director and/or other FBI Headquarters personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities of the SSC

62-116395

FMK:fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

S/Woc/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP/num

MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

**SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY** - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

CODE

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

1-29-75

TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS  
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DESTRUCTION OF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL OF ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON SUBJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT OF THIS COMMUNICATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY STATUTE OR REGULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEIPT.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/11/0000 BY SP2 *sum/mk*

MOR-16

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

3-24-75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT  
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION  
FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN  
OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD  
SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION,  
SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS  
AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLI-  
GENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT  
ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROP-  
PRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS  
INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 am/mf

MAR-16

TELETYPE TO ALL SACS  
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD  
BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

5/2/75

TO SACS ALL OFFICES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK TO /INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.

RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.

THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 ALM/nmf

MUR-1L

TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

PROTECTED. SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL. YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.

THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

5/2/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA  
BALTIMORE  
NEW HAVEN  
NEWARK  
OMAHA

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS ALREADY INTERVIEWED SOME FORMER EMPLOYEES. NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST "ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY," REPORTED ADVICE FROM FORMER SPECIAL AGENT JOHN P. DEVLIN THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN, SSC STAFF MEMBER, CONCERNING DEVLIN'S PART

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/17/2001 BY SP8 ALM/HMF

MDR-16

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TELETYPE TO SSCS, ALEXANDRIA ET AL  
RE: SUNSTUDY 75

IN FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY,  
AUGUST 22-28, 1964.

SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL SQUAD AT ATLANTIC CITY, AUGUST, 1964. EACH OF THESE FORMER AGENTS IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF. THEY ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO BE ADVISED OF THE AREA WHICH MAY BE COVERED IN ANY INTERVIEW OF THEM BY THE SSC. THEY SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS, THEY CAN REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER AGENTS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN THE EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER AGENT NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.

NEWARK SHOULD INCLUDE RECONTACT WITH DEVLIN FOR PURPOSE INDICATED ABOVE AND ALSO FURNISH BUREAU ANY INFORMATION DEVLIN MAY HAVE FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN YOUR TELETYPE.

TELETYPE TO SACS, ALEXANDRIA ET AL.  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ALEXANDRIA: HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1643 NORTH VAN DUSEN,

ALEXANDRIA. WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 8338 WAGON WHEEL ROAD, ALEXANDRIA

BALTIMORE: RONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE

NEW HAVEN: ROBSON H. ADCOCK, 63 GLENBROOK ROAD, STAMFORD,  
CONNECTICUT.

NEWARK: LEO THOMAS CLARK, 1421 ATLANTIC AVENUE,  
ATLANTIC CITY. JOHN PATRICK LEVINE, 39 BIRMINGHAM ROAD,  
LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY. HOWARD J. WILSON, 30 CAMPBELL ROAD,  
SHORT HILLS, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: JOHN J. QUINN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,  
JOHNSON, IOWA

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

5/28/75

TO SACS ALEXANDRIA	NEWARK	
ATLANTA	OMAHA	
BALTIMORE	PHILADELPHIA	
CHARLOTTE	PORTLAND	
CHICAGO	PHOENIX	
KANSAS CITY	TAMPA	
LITTLE ROCK	WFO	
		<u>PERSONAL ATTENTION</u>

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, REC-100 ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE

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DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mf  
MOR-16

TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.

ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET, ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS, 5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.

ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER

BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND; ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

CHARLOTTE: JOSEPH A. SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PINE,  
NORTH CAROLINA

CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO,  
ILLINOIS

KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC

LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC

NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO,  
1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN,  
610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,

TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL  
RE: SMC STUDY 75

5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.

OMAHA: ROBERT L. TAGG

PHILADELPHIA: JOHN B. MEADE

PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS

PHOENIX: MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN,  
ARIZONA

TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH,  
FLORIDA

WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD

ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHELA; HELEN C. SPEAR  
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

TO ALL SACS

20  
MAY 12, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SENSTUDY - 75.

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR INFORMATION.

IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.

IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR, IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.

UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY INFORMATION. FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL INFORMATION FURNISHED.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

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DATE 11/10/00 BY SP2 KMM/bmf  
mcr-16

CODE	TELETYPE	URGENT
TO SACS DETROIT HONOLULU LOS ANGELES MILWAUKEE SACRAMENTO WFO		JUNE 13, 1975
FROM DIRECTOR FBI		
SENSTUDY 75		

IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST,  
FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE ATTENTION INTD -  
W. O. CREGAR.

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT INDICATE  
OVEREARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER  
KING, JR. FOR FOLLOWING DATES AND LOCATIONS:

WIRETAPS

APRIL 24 - 26, 1964  
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

JULY 7 - 9, 1964  
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL  
LOS ANGELES

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DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2/AM/Jmf  
MDR-16

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PAGE TWO

MICROPHONES

JANUARY 5 - 8, 1964

WILLARD HOTEL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JANUARY 27, 1964

SHROEDER HOTEL  
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

FEBRUARY 18 - 20, 1964

HILTON HAWAIIAN VILLAGE  
HONOLULU, HAWAII

FEBRUARY 20 - 21, 1964

AMBASSADOR HOTEL  
LOS ANGELES

FEBRUARY 22 - 24, 1964

HYATT HOUSE MOTEL  
LOS ANGELES

MARCH 19 - 20, 1964

STATLER HOTEL  
DETROIT, MICHIGAN

APRIL 23 - 24, 1964

SENATOR HOTEL  
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

JULY 7 - 9, 1964

HYATT HOUSE MOTEL  
LOS ANGELES

PAGE THREE

OFFICES REVIEW ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AND  
FURNISH FBIHQ FIRST DATE THAT KING WAS OVERHEARD ON ABOVE  
TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS. IF HE WAS NOT HEARD, SO ADVISE.

CODE

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK  
BOSTON  
DETROIT  
LOS ANGELES  
  
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

MIAMI  
SAN FRANCISCO  
SEATTLE  
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

[REDACTED]  
SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP/SP/num/mf

MQR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING MAIL SURVEILLANCE NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING MAIL SURVEILLANCE. NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING MAIL SURVEILLANCE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING MAIL SURVEILLANCE.

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

MAIL SURVEILLANCE  
AND MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED  
FROM  SOURCE  
RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO  
APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE  
SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD  
REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

[REDACTED]

**Unexcised copy**

CODE

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK  
BOSTON  
DETROIT  
LOS ANGELES

MIAMI  
SAN FRANCISCO  
SEATTLE  
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

[REDACTED]  
SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP/SP/SP/MA/

MOR-16

PAGE TWO ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]. NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND [REDACTED] MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED] RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

[REDACTED]



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 28, 1975

## MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES

## RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES

All employees are advised that Congress is conducting an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation with the Congress.

You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement (copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:

"No employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority, produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24."

Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.

Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before furnishing information, testimony, or record material.

Enclosures (3)

*Clarence M. Kelley*  
Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

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DATE 01/17/2000 BY SP/AM/mf

MAR-16



## EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:

- (1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or unauthorized disclosure or production of national security information, other classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of the FBI;
- (2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is in a better position than I to make that determination;
- (3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any material relating to such information or property in my possession;
- (4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.

I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and following termination of such employment.

---

(Signature)

---

(Type or print name)

Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on

---

, 19 \_\_\_\_\_, by \_\_\_\_\_

(Signature)



# Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

January 18, 1973

ORDER NO. 501-73

## RULES AND REGULATIONS

### Title 28—JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

#### Chapter I—Department of Justice [Order 501-73]

#### PART 16—PRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMATION

##### Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpoenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

This order delegates to certain Department of Justice officials the authority to approve the production or disclosure of material or information contained in Department files, or information or material acquired by a person while employed by the Department. It applies where a subpoena, order or other demand of a court or other authority, such as an administrative agency, is issued for the production or disclosure of such information.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301, Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is revised, and its provisions renumbered, to read as follows:

##### Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpoenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

###### Sec.

- 16.21 Purpose and scope.
- 16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Department official.
- 16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.
- 16.24 Final action by the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General.
- 16.25 Procedure where a Department decision concerning a demand is not made prior to the time a response to the demand is required.
- 16.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.

AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C. 301.

##### Subpart B—Production or Disclosure in Response to Subpoenas or Demands of Courts or Other Authorities

###### § 16.21 Purpose and scope.

(a) This subpart sets forth the procedures to be followed when a subpoena, order, or other demand (hereinafter referred to as a "demand") of a court or

other authority is issued for the production or disclosure of (1) any material contained in the files of the Department, (2) any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or (3) any information or material acquired by any person while such person was an employee of the Department as a part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status.

(b) For purposes of this subpart, the term "employee of the Department" includes all officers and employees of the United States appointed by, or subject to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control of, the Attorney General of the United States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S. marshals, and members of the staffs of those officials.

###### § 16.22 Production or disclosure prohibited unless approved by appropriate Department official.

No employee or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority, produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General in accordance with § 16.24.

###### § 16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand for production or disclosure.

(a) Whenever a demand is made upon an employee or former employee of the Department for the production of material or the disclosure of information described in § 16.21(a), he shall immediately notify the U.S. attorney for the district where the issuing authority is located. The U.S. attorney shall immediately request instructions from the appropriate Department official, as designated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The Department officials authorized to approve production or disclosure under this subpart are:

- (1) In the event that the case or other matter which gave rise to the demanded material or information is or, if closed, was within the cognizance of a division of the Department, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of that division. This authority may be redelegated to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.
- (2) In instances of demands that are not covered by paragraph (b)(1) of this section:

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MPR-16

(i) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, if the demand is one made on an employee or former employee of that Bureau for information or if the demand calls for the production of material from the files of that Bureau, and

(ii) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons, if the demand is one made on an employee or former employee of that Bureau for information or if the demand calls for the production of material from the files of that Bureau.

(3) In instances of demands that are not covered by paragraph (b) (1) or (2) of this section, the Deputy Attorney General.

(c) If oral testimony is sought by the demand, an affidavit, or, if that is not feasible, a statement by the party seeking the testimony or his attorney, setting forth a summary of the testimony desired, must be furnished for submission by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate Department official.

**§ 16.24 Final action by the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General.**

(a) If the appropriate Department official, as designated in § 16.23(b), approves a demand for the production of material or disclosure of information, he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and such other persons as circumstances may warrant.

(b) If the appropriate Department official, as designated in § 16.23(b), decides not to approve a demand for the production of material or disclosure of information, he shall immediately refer the demand to the Attorney General for decision. Upon such referral, the Attorney General shall make the final decision and give notice thereof to the U.S. attorney and such other persons as circumstances may warrant.

**§ 16.25 Procedure where a Department decision concerning a demand is not made prior to the time a response to the demand is required.**

If response to the demand is required before the instructions from the appropriate Department official or the Attorney General are received, the U.S. attorney or other Department attorney designated for the purpose shall appear with the employee or former employee of the Department upon whom the demand has been made, and shall furnish the court or other authority with a copy of the regulations contained in this subpart and inform the court or other authority that the demand has been, or is being, as the case may be, referred for the prompt consideration of the appropriate Department official and shall respectfully request the court or authority to stay the demand pending receipt of the requested instructions.

**§ 16.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling.**

If the court or other authority declines to stay the effect of the demand in response to a request made in accordance with § 16.25 pending receipt of instructions, or if the court or other authority rules that the demand must be complied with irrespective of instructions not to produce the material or disclose the information sought, in accordance with § 16.24, the employee or former employee upon whom the demand has been made shall respectfully decline to comply with the demand. "United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen," 340 U.S. 462.

Dated: January 11, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,  
Attorney General.

[FRC Doc.73-1071 Filed 1-17-73; 9:45 am]

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 15, 1956.

ORDER NO. 116-56

It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of department personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department. [This order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated March 23, 1953, and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formalizes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized representatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners. It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated January 13, 1953), insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]

A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT FILES

1. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General, who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signature and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.

2. If the request concerns a closed case, i. e., one in which there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated, the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure shall be followed in such cases:

a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the file is available for examination and set forth the name, telephone extension number, and room number of the person who will have custody of the file to be reviewed;

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m02-16

b. Before making the file available to the committee representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI as well as investigative reports from any other agency, will be removed from the file and not be made available for examination; provided however that if the committee representative states that it is essential that information from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available, he will be advised that the request will be considered by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be prepared which will not disclose investigative techniques, the identity of confidential informants, or other matters which might jeopardize the investigative operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of such summary by the committee representative. The file will not be physically relinquished from the custody of the Department. If the committee representative desires to examine investigative reports from other government agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose reports are concerned.

3. If the request concerns an open case, i. e., one which litigation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may not be made available for examination by the committee's representative. The following procedure shall be followed:

- a. The reply letter should advise the committee that its request concerns a case in which litigation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, and state that the file cannot be made available until the case is completed; and
- b. Should briefly set forth the status of the case in as much detail as is practicable and prudent without jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or administrative action.

#### B. REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL

1. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing, signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee representative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

1. When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney General shall be promptly informed. When the Deputy Attorney General's approval is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;

2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229 (Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning of this Order.

3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS

Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which their public testimony may affect the discipline and well-being of the institution, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners outside the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of being interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees. However, when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the Deputy Attorney General.

1. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony from a Federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.

2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the committee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the subjects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who will be present.

3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be present during the entire time of the interrogation.

4

4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned of the proposed interview or taking of sworn testimony; and shall further advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any other witness who is not a prisoner.

5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the maintenance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at the interview and taking of testimony.

6. The warden or his authorized representative shall be present at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout the interview and taking of testimony.

7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy of the transcript to the Department of Justice.

E. OBSERVERS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a congressional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of the proceeding which should be sent to the division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.

/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Bassett  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Mintz

July 25, 1975  
1 - Mr. Creger  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from John T. Elliff,  
dated July 23, 1975, requesting that a list of knowledgeable individuals,  
who were contacted by the Inspection Division of this Bureau during its  
inquiry into the "official and confidential" files be forwarded to the  
Senate Select Committee.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the  
Committee is the original of a memorandum, with enclosure , which  
is in response to the aforementioned request.

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosure , is being  
furnished for your records.

Enclosures (4)

REC- 102

62-116375

62-116395

② AUG 8 1975

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: E. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Soc'y \_\_\_\_\_

PVD:dkg (11)

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

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# MDR-16

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

NW 88008/Dodd 329890275 Page 126

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE: By letterhead memorandum dated 7-16-75 we made available to the Committee a summary of the Inspection Division inquiry into the "official and confidential" files, along with making available in Bureau space a list of people knowledgeable concerning the "official and confidential" files who were contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry. We have now been requested to forward this list to the Committee's offices. It would appear to resist this request would not be in the best interests of the Bureau. Especially in view of the Department's prior reluctance to resist requests of this Committee.

1 - Mr. Bassett  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
July 25, 1975  
1 - Mr. Daly

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: "OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" FILES

Reference is made to a letter from John T. Elliff, dated July 23, 1975, requesting that a list of knowledgeable individuals, who were contacted by the Inspection Division of this Bureau during its inquiry into the "official and confidential" files be forwarded to the Senate Select Committee.

In response to the aforementioned request, we are attaching a copy of the list of knowledgeable individuals who were contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry concerning the "official and confidential" files.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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RUM

PVD:dkg (12)

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
H. R. HORNBERGER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, N.Y.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

## United States Senate

ELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 23, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Reference is made to your letter of July 21, 1975, providing a copy of the report of the Inspection Division inquiry dated July 3, 1975, and offering access to a list of knowledgeable individuals on the matter of the disposition of the so-called "official and confidential" files. Please provide the Committee for use in its offices the list of knowledgeable individuals now available for review by Committee staff in the FBI building.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff  
Director  
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

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DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2 NM/AM

# MDR-16

62-116393-491

<u>Name</u>	<u>Assignment</u> <u>May, 1972</u>	<u>Current Assignment</u>	<u>Address</u> <u>(Former Employees)</u>
Adams, A. D., Jr.	Director's Office	Out of Service	3280th Student Squadron, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
Baker, Betty, Mrs.		Messenger - Courier Unit Supervisor Washington Field	
Battle, Joseph E., SA	Washington Field		
Bear, Gloria L.		Supply Supervisor	
Bracksieck, Louis, E., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Chicago	
Brandt, Earl T.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	1109 Logan Avenue, Tyrone, Pennsylvania
Brennan, Daniel J.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	501 Brooklyn Boulevard, Sea Girt, New Jersey
Brown, Louis, Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Campbell, Wason G.	Director's Office	Out of Service	206 East Broad Street, Greeneville, Tennessee
Canday, Tommie R.	Security Patrol	Security Patrol	
Carey, Charles L.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Carey, Clyde C.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	4254 East Capitol Street, Apt. 2, Washington, D. C.
Cassidy, Edward, Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Cheshier, Jerry Wayne	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Corbin, Donald F.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Special Clerk (Washington Field)	
Codi, Anthony A.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Cox, Fred	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	

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# mDR-14

Crawford, James E.	Chauffeur	Out of Service	9727 Mt. Piscah, Apt. 604 Silver Spring, Maryland
Crookston, James	Messenger Unit	Service Unit	
Cundy, Wanda M., Mrs.	Secretary	Out of Service	3051 Brinkley Road, Apt. 101 Temple Hills, Maryland
Dembnicki, Paul E., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Boston	
Dowling, Joseph E., SA	Special Agent (Washington Field)	Washington Field	
Downing, Phyllis, Miss	Secretary	Director's Office	
Dudney, Thomas Barden	Washington Field (Chief Clerk)	Chief Clerk (Washington Field)	
Dunphy, John P.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section (Section Chief)	
Durrer, Virginia, Miss	File Locate Unit	General Index Unit	
Felt, W. Mark	Director's Office	Out of Service	3216 Wynford Drive, Fairfax, Virgin
Fields, Annie	Housekeeper	Out of Service	4936 30th Place, N. W. Washington, D. C.
Gandy, Helen W., Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	4801 Connecticut Ave., N. W., Apt. Washington, D. C.
Gerrity, Edward J., SA	Director's Office (Clerk)	Boston	
Gregory, Darwin M.	Mechanical Section (Section Chief)	Out of Service	5714 Belfast Lane, Springfield, Virg
Gunsser, Albert P.		Out of Service	401 Sligo Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland
Haisten, James A.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Clerk	
Hereford, Douglas	Security Patrol	Out of Service	6201 Cheryl Drive, Falls Church, Virginia
Holmes, Edna M., Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	2600 North Fillmore Street, Arlington, Virginia

Hughes, Brent H.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Isner, James D.	Messenger Unit	Correlation Unit	
Jones, Robert B.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Koerner, Julian A.	Security Patrol Clerk	New York (Special Agent)	
Kuhn, Daniel F.		Supervisor	
Kunkel, Robert G., SAC	SAC (Washington Field)	SAC (Alexandria)	
Lockhart, Lois W.	Supply Supervisor	Contract Specialist	
Lovelace, James	Security Patrol Clerk	Philadelphia (Special Agent)	
Lovelace, Melvian	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section	
Lyles, Everett A.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	4561 North Capitol Street, N. W.
Marsden, Robert B.	Mechanical Section (Supervisor)	Mechanical Section (Supervisor)	Washington, D. C.
McCord, Ruth, Miss	Director's Office	Director's Office	
McMichael, G. Speights	Procurement Section	Procurement Section	
Metcalf, Erma, Mrs.	Director's Office	Director's Office	
Mohr, John P.	Director's Office	Out of Service	3427 North Edison, Arlington,
Mooney, Nancy A., Miss	Director's Office	Director's Office	Virginia
Moten, Thomas E., SA	Chauffeur	Chauffeur	
Ness, Ronald H.	File Delivery Unit	Out of Service	3410 Manis Road, Clinton,
	Filing Unit	Mail Room	Maryland

O'Haver, Robert R.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Page, Thomas L., SA	Clerk	Indianapolis (Special Agent)
Peffer, Kenneth Lee	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Peterson, Jesse T., Jr.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section
Peyton, F. Thomas	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Pickering, Michael Wilmer	Mechanical Section	Out of Service
Powell, Excell		Out of Service
Randolph, George W.	Security Patrol	Security Patrol
Riddles, Richard E.	Security Patrol	Philadelphia (Special Agent)
Ruegsegger, Hugh D.	Security Patrol	Quantico (Special Agent)
Ryan, Edward F.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Sabol, Robert J.	Security Patrol	Indianapolis (Special Agent)
Schaeffer, Raymond H.	Exhibits Section	Exhibits Section
Shaffer, Kenneth	Washington Field (Clerk)	Washington Field (Clerk)
Shields, Carolyn	Messenger Unit	Records Unit
Shoaff, Clark S., SA		Quantico (Special Agent)
Singleton, Robert	File Unit	File Unit
Skillman, Dorothy S., Mrs.	Director's Office	Out of Service
		429 N. Street, S.W., Apt S700
		Washington, D.C.

Smith, Thomas J.	Research Section	Out of Service	3410 Memphis Lane, Bowie, Maryland
Smith, Ursula, Miss	Director's Office	Out of Service	11 North Garfield, Arlington, Virginia
Soyars, William B.	Assistant Director	Out of Service	12 Green Winged Teal Road, Amelia Island Plantation, Amelia, Florida
Stewart, Alfred LaFornia	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	Rt. 2, Box 164, Statesboro, Georgia
Sullivan, Cornelius G.		ASAC (Washington Field)	
Thompson, Ronald E.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Thrun, Robert W.	Security Patrol	Quantico (Special Agent)	
Tice, Alvin L.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Tietgen, Gladys M.		Director's Office	
Tschudy, Carol, Miss	Director's Office	Administrative Assistant	
Underwood, Thomas E.	Mechanical Section	Out of Service	12019 Center Hill Street, Wheaton, Maryland
Vane, Helen, Miss	Director's Office	Administrative Assistant	
Walp, Shirley, Miss	Messenger Unit	Teletype Unit	
Washington, William H.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Winear, Ralph A.	Mechanical Section	Mechanical Section	
Winters, Lawrence E.	Director's Office (Clerk)	Director's Office (Clerk)	
Banwarth, Robert F.		Exhibits Section	

Benedict, James P.	Filing Unit
Booch, James D.	Exhibits Section
Brady, Lawrence W.	Filing Unit
Dalton, Terry A.	Exhibits Section
Doxzen, Mildred, Mrs.	Filing Unit
Fox, Wayne M.	Exhibits Section
Greene, Edgar G.	Exhibits Section
Hewett, Bernice R.	Exhibits Section
Larson, Fredrick A.	Exhibits Section
Massie, Laurence M.	Exhibits Section
Nash, William H.	Exhibits Section

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: US Senate Select Committee

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated July 25, 1975

Caption of Document: "Official and Confidential Files"

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor, Jr. Date: 7/30/75 2:20

Received by: Hell J. Zimmerman

Title: Asst Clerk.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

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62-116 395-491  
ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE  
BEFORE COMPLETING.TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central IndexFROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

 DOCUMENT       BRIEFING       INTERVIEW       TESTIMONY       OTHER

7/25/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosure

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

SSC letter 7/23/75

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Operating Procedures

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

List of knowledgeable individuals who were contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry concerning the "Official and Confidential" files.

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DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP04 NM JMK

#MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

S'wef8

62-116395

FMK:lhb      ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN  
(4)            CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-491

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

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#MDL-16

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel *Jan 29/75*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Personnel File - Richard D. Cotter  
DATE: 7/29/75  
1 - Personnel File - Thomas J. Smith  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection  *✓*  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 7/28/75, Loch Johnson requested that former employees Richard D. Cotter and Thomas J. Smith be made available for interview and/or their current address be made available to the Committee so they may arrange interviews. The topic of the interview is to be their knowledge concerning the Houston Plan. Both Cotter and Smith were formerly employed in the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That Cotter and Smith be released from employment agreement for purposes of an interview by the Senate Select Committee concerning the Houston Plan.

(2) That the Intelligence Division arrange to have Cotter and Smith contacted to advise them of the Senate Select Committee's interest in interviewing them and of the fact that should an interview take place, the Bureau will, if requested, make available an Agent for consultation during interview, and insure they are advised that the Bureau Agent will not be actually present during the interview.

REC-102

(3) Prepare the necessary communication so that the Senate Select Committee is advised of the location of former SAs Cotter and Smith.

9 AUG 8 1975

PVD:lad (ad)  
(8)

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DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP/DM/HMC

#MDR-16

84 11 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY - 75

1 - J. B. Adams  
3 - J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
(1 - P. V. Daly)

DATE: 7/29/75

1 - W. R. Wannall  
1 - W. O. Cregar  
1 - V. V. Kolombatovic  
1 - L. A. Crescioli

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Soc'y \_\_\_\_\_

This is to advise that Special Agent-Liaison Officer L. A. Crescioli has been requested to appear for informal staff interview by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) 7/30/75.

On 7/28/75 Mr. James Dick, Staff member, SSC, requested that Liaison Officer Crescioli appear on 7/30/75 for informal staff interview to be conducted by Mr. Dick and Mr. Paul Wallach, both SSC Staff members. According to Mr. Dick, the interview will concern the general liaison responsibilities of Liaison Officer Crescioli with the Headquarters Office of the Inspection Service, U. S. Postal Service (USPS).

Upon learning on the above occasion that Crescioli assumed the USPS Headquarters liaison post in November, 1974, Mr. Dick inquired as to Crescioli's predecessor and was provided the name of Mr. Francis X. O'Neill (currently assigned as ASAC, New Haven Office). Mr. Dick was aware of the fact that at an earlier period SA L. F. Schwartz handled liaison with USPS.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Liaison Officer Crescioli be released from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

REC-102

62-11638-489

2. Inasmuch as Mr. Dick has advised that this is to be a "non-abuse" type interview, it is recommended that a representative of the Intelligence Division be designated to be present during SA Crescioli's interview.

AUG 8 1975  
J. B. A.  
PLM

1 - Personnel file of SA Louis A. Crescioli

LAC:pld  
(10)

LAC *MK*

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# MOR-16

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Gallagher

FROM : L. E. Rhyne

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 7/28/75

1 - Mr. Gallagher  
1 - Mr. Rhyne  
1 - Mr. Rosenquist  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
(ATTN: T. J. McNiff, Rm 4063 JEH)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to memorandum of Mr. Cregar to Mr. Wannall dated 7/24/75, relating to certain pages of a CIA document. Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354 of this document were reviewed and disclosure of this information to the Senate Select Committee will not compromise or otherwise damage an ongoing investigation presently being conducted by the FBI.

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

gR  
GDR/brb (5)

REG-102

62-116395-488

9 AUG 8 1975

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GMDR-46

79 AUG 14 1975

FD-302 (Rev. 7-25-64)

RECORDED FAX - PLAINTEXT

To: ~~AGENCY CITY~~

From: ~~SAC LOS ANGELES~~

Date:

To: ~~Telephone~~

~~Address~~

- Request Rec'd  Request Sent  By  Message  Photo  
 Mail  Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Seal  Cables

Special handling instructions (Show copy to Director.)

AGT DIR. MINTZ RECOMMENDS DIRECTOR PERSONALLY CALL  
ATTORNEY GENERAL.

Assoc. Dir. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Dep. AD Adm. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Dep. AD Inv. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Asst. Dir.: Admin. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Comp. Syst. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ext. Affairs <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Files & Com. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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Training <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Legal Coun. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Telephone Rm. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Director Sec'y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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REC-102

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16 AUG 7 1975

File PMS 11 JUN

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#MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

84 AUG 11 1975

# FBI: Missing the Point

So many disclosures have surfaced so rapidly that the public may have become inured to still more revelations about improper activities of government intelligence agencies. Yet the admissions and announcements Monday by FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley should not be permitted to pass unnoticed.

The FBI for many years engaged in "national security" buggaries, and, presumably, foreign espionage in Washington were among the targets.

The FBI still commits "personal behavior" information on government officials, including members of Congress and prominent private citizens.

In defending the buggaries, Kelley said: "I am convinced that in those matters where there might be some criticism there is an underlying intent to do that which is good for the nation. I have not come across any activities which I would construe as being illegal or being directed toward personal gain or to enhance the personal reputation of anyone."

This analysis, even if accurate—which is doubtful—betrays a misunderstanding of the responsibilities of an agency like the FBI in a democratic society.

A warning some 20 years ago by Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter goes to the heart of the problem. Frankfurter said, "The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority."

Of special significance was Kelley's revelation that the FBI continues to collect personal information on congressmen and others who are not under

criminal investigation. His explanation was nothing less than astonishing. He said such information, which includes sex and drinking habits, "might very well be helpful to us in later investigations." Of course it might, but that tactic is the very essence of a police state.

The bureau, Kelley said, is drawing guidelines, in cooperation with the Justice Department, to control the collection of "personal behavior" information related to criminal investigations. No guidelines are necessary, because no American citizen should be the target of such an investigation.

I did not  
see this  
in your  
class on  
See P 17  
for  
Stern  
1/3

"I have not reviewed files to find out about reporters, congressmen or other public figures," Kelley said, but here again he was wide of the mark. The discretion or lack of it, or the good intention of an FBI director or lack of it, does not meet the issue. Such files should not exist.

After the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Agency completes its investigation, Congress must redefine the roles of the FBI, the CIA and other elements of the intelligence community, which involves thousands of employees and which spends \$5 billion to \$8 billion a year. Their secret operations, and the manpower and billions they command, give them vast power. That power must be hedged under firm control.

Some mechanism must be devised that is more effective than the present oversight committees of Congress, which, based on their record, could be more accurately dubbed the "overlook" committees of Congress.

G said "relaxed"

See pg. 22 for  
info. ✓ volunteered

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# mDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116375-1187

NEWS CONFERENCE OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
JULY 14, 1975

MR. KELLEY: Good morning. I have very few statements to make as an opening. I just want to say that this is a further attempt on my part to be a little more available. Frankly, it is something which I hope we can continue and I have not in the past been premeditatively evasive nor reluctant to appear before you. But, frankly, I've been pretty busy with a number of other things. I want to let you know that we're continuing our efforts to try to improve the rapport between us. We will continue to do some things and hopefully, in the future we can get together more frequently on the basis of some of our past meetings which I think have been very fruitful. So now I'll throw it open for questions and these lights are a little bit strong but I'll try to be able to identify you. Do you have any questions?

QUESTION: Do you have any evidence, sir, or any information leading you to suspect any CIA Agents have been planted in any manner or form in any executive agencies for the purpose of transmitting evidence back to the CIA about that agency?

MR. KELLEY: I have no evidence whatsoever brought to my attention and I certainly know of none.

QUESTION: Sir, do you have ongoing programs trying to check out that sort of thing? Do you look for it?

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# MDR-16

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ENCLOSURE

MR. KELLEY: We have no ongoing programs whatsoever and have had no reports that it has occurred and this is something new to us.

QUESTION: Sir, there have been complaints repeatedly in recent days from Congressmen and Senators on the Hill who are charged with investigating the FBI and its domestic surveillance in past years that they are not getting the information that they need. We heard from Senator Church maybe yesterday. Can you respond to that?

MR. KELLEY: The allegation has been made to the effect that the FBI is dragging its feet, so to speak, and slow to respond to the requests of the Church committee for information relative to past abuses by the FBI in the intelligence field and it's even been said from time to time that this reluctance is reflective of an effort to preserve the image of Mr. Hoover. First, I want you to know that in giving instructions in this matter, it has been consistently my policy to say that we should be completely candid and forthright. And we should respond in whatever manner we can consistent, of course, with some restrictions--those being a matter of confidentiality and right to privacy. Insofar as dragging our feet, the letter which was sent to us was dated May 14, 1975. We immediately embarked on a program to try to respond. In May, 1975, I remember it was

the last half of May, we devoted 323 man days to try to respond and to date have added another over 400 hours and it's a total dedication of personnel--of 102 of our people. We have 102 people who are responding to this request. The reason why it has taken this much time and this great amount of manpower is that we must go through all of this material very carefully to preserve, of course, the privacy of those who may be mentioned and also to assure that matters of grave import are no so disclosed. We are trying at best we can to resolve in favor of making them available. I think this number 102 is very significant inasmuch as in the work of the Freedom of Information, there are also over 102, about 105 people, dedicated to fulfilling our obligations there. So, we have almost 210 people engaged in these two enterprises and this has a great impact upon our capabilities. Does that answer your question?

QUESTION: Can you tell us why Senator Church would be complaining?

MR. KELLEY: Why he what?

QUESTION: Why he would be complaining?

MR. KELLEY: No sir, I don't know. Some of these things, of course, may be thought to be too slow and it's thought perhaps that all you have to do is to remove the material from

the file and send it on up. We have already submitted a great deal of it and intend within the next 10 days to complete the entire matter.

QUESTION: Is in any of that material now in the Justice Department awaiting approval of the Attorney General?

MR. KELLEY: Yes, some of it is in the hands of the Department ready to be transmitted. That's our first step--after we make our survey, to ship it over to them, they review it and then send it on through.

QUESTION: Well, has it been there for a while?

MR. KELLEY: I can't tell you exactly what length of time but I can say that within about 10 days, we'll have ours completed and you can gage thereafter what type of delay is experienced through the Department.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, Senator Church says that you won't allow him and his staff to interview FBI Agents and that's one of the complaints he makes about the lack of cooperation. Is that true that you will not allow the Senate staff to interview FBI Agents?

MR. KELLEY: We have gone through a procedure whereby ex-FBI Agents may have available to them our people in order to consult with them as to any matter which might be thought to violative of some of the confidentiality provisions; and

we have not, to my knowledge, denied the right of anyone presently employed to be interviewed with, of course again, the requirements that if they want to consult with us they may do so.

QUESTION: Well, in other words, you're saying that FBI Agents can be interviewed by the Senate staff. Is that correct?

MR. KELLEY: Let me just check that. Mr. Mintz, is that correct? Have we denied any?

MR. MINTZ: We have not denied any. We've not indicated to anyone we would not let them be interviewed.

QUESTION: What was that Mr. Kelley, about ex--I didn't understand, about ex-FBI Agents?

MR. KELLEY: Ex-FBI Agents, when called, and we're advised, are informed that one of our people can be present outside the interview room for consultation by that interviewee with our people to determine whether or not a certain question is beyond the purview of his capability, and we do not say to him that he cannot answer but we do say here are the rules, the regulations, the law and you can be guided in accordance with your own dictates. But we make available to him a consultant, so to speak.

QUESTION: Is that a requirement or..?

MR. KELLEY: That's an agreement between us.

QUESTION: In other words, when an ex-Agent goes up, he has to have somebody?

MR. KELLEY: No sir, he does not have to have but we inform him that he may have if he so desires.

QUESTION: During your confirmation hearings two years ago, you advocated or said that you would like to see more Congressional oversight of the FBI. You think now that there's too much, just about right, or not enough oversight?

MR. KELLEY: It is true that I said during my confirmation that I do not object to FBI Congressional oversight. One has been established and I have met with them on several occasions to set an oversight committee. There is also a House so-called oversight committee--it's the House Judiciary Committee--there are others who may by virtue of their jurisdiction feel that they, too, have oversight. We do no oppose House oversight. Frankly, I would like to have a joint committee of oversight so that we can know precisely to whom we should report and they, in turn, know precisely to whom any oversight problems can be referred. Basically, in other words, I do not object to oversight--I do think that it would be much better if we could have it well-structured so that it will be clearly understood by all parties concerned as to what they are going to do and how they are to do it.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, do you feel the oversight being conducted now between the Senate and House is probing too deeply into the FBI--do you feel that any of the operations of the FBI have been hurt by the investigations going on now?

MR. KELLEY: I do not construe the activities of the oversight groups as having delved too deeply into the work of the FBI. We do on occasion feel that perhaps some matters need protection, particularly those involving national security, but I have no objection in the exchange in oversight groups of any matter in which we are engaged. I think, as a matter of fact, that this is a proper balance insofar as keeping us in line and I also welcome it inasmuch as it gives us an opportunity to explain just what and how we do things. I do not object to the exchange, in other words.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, you said that you're not attempting to preserve the image of J. Edgar Hoover and, apparently, you know what will be in the information that is to go out of your office in 10 days. Can you tell us, when that information gets up to the Hill and assuming it's made public, are there going to be some more bomb shells about the FBI that we haven't heard about or is this all information which has generally been made public?

MR. KELLEY: I don't know of any bomb shells, so to speak. In the news media, there have been many things discussed, many reports made, and in those matters I think that just about everything that we know about has been already, at least to

some extent, discussed and, to some extent, publicized. I am convinced that in these matters where there might be some criticism, there is an underlying intent to do that which is good for the Nation. I have not come across any activities which I would construe as being illegal, being directed toward personal gain or to enhance the reputation of anyone. I see nothing untoward in these activities, in other words, as they will be reviewed by the various groups.

QUESTION: Now, Mr. Kelley, Mr. Sullivan said about a week ago, that he assumed there had been some national security break-ins over the years and I'm just wondering if there have been national security break-ins, say in the last five years, roughly what number are we talking about and why aren't they illegal? What's the legal authority?

MR. KELLEY: There have been statements made about surreptitious entries and the latest was that statement made by Mr. Sullivan who just retired as the Assistant Director in Charge of the Los Angeles Office; and there have been, of course, reports in the media that the Department of Justice has been inquiring into allegations that our people have engaged in surreptitious entries or, as they are sometimes termed, burglaries. Yes, the FBI has conducted surreptitious entries in securing information relative to the security of the Nation. However, in 1966,

all such activity was terminated with the exception of a small amount of actions which were conducted in connection with foreign counterintelligence investigations which we felt had a grave impact upon the security of the Nation. And again, as I just said, I feel that the FBI personnel participating in or approving such activities acted in good faith with the belief that national security interests were paramount and their actions were reasonable. I'm always mindful of a story I heard many years ago about two neighbors who started some arguments which, obviously, were going to terminate into difficulties. One of the neighbors started a campaign to build himself up with shadowboxing, punching the bag and so forth, and it appeared very likely that he was going to be in pretty good shape in order to beat up his neighbor and so the neighbor, thereafter, concerned as to what would happen to him, started to defend himself. You don't wait until the climax which could be the putsch--you start preparing yourself and so I think that the FBI and its officials construed this as paramount again in the protection of the country.

QUESTION: You said that in 1966, there were a small amount of burglaries. I'm just wondering how small is small and

who gave the OK. Did this come from President Johnson or President Nixon or was this a decision made by Attorney General....

MR. KELLEY: This matter will be discussed in subsequent hearings and in reports, and further than what I have stated, I cannot comment.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, were these directed against Americans or foreign persons?

MR. KELLEY: I would prefer not at this point to make any comments further and particularly not in particularity as to who may have been the ones against whom they were directed.

QUESTION: Well, were they all conducted in this country or were some conducted overseas?

MR. KELLEY: I know of none overseas.

QUESTION: Sir, going back to prior to 1966, why was the procedure changed in 1966?

MR. KELLEY: By virtue of the feeling of Mr. Hoover that, under the then-prevailing philosophy and the feeling that possibly in the context of the times, this was not a viable procedure--they were stopped. It was Mr. Hoover's decision.

QUESTION: Sir, can we infer that there were quite a number, a large number, of burglaries prior to 1966, but fewer since then?

MR. KELLEY: You cannot infer anything because I have not told you of any number. I can only say that they were stopped in 1966. As to the number, I cannot actually tell you how many nor can I say that it's quite a number or very few.

- QUESTION: Why can't you tell us the number?
- ANSWER: Because we're going to make reports to our Congressional groups and to the Department of Justice and, frankly, I can't tell you the number myself. We don't have any....
- QUESTION: They did not entirely stop in 1966? There were some that did get, you say, a small number after 1966?
- ANSWER: There may have been some after 1966 which were, of course, in the field of foreign counterintelligence, and such that it would make a grave impact on our....
- QUESTION: Before that, they were not with the field of foreign counterintelligence?
- ANSWER: Oh, yes, there were some in that field also.
- QUESTION: There were others that were not in the field of foreign counterintelligence before 1966?
- ANSWER: You recall that I said in the context of the time, it may well have been that prior to that time national security or counterintelligence or whatever terminology you might want to use could have included other areas. But, then you began to compartmentize various types of activities and then it became evident that the area of foreign counterintelligence national security certainly should be differentiated from domestic security.
- QUESTION: But, Mr. Kelley, what policy have you followed in the time that you have been Director? Is this type of activity, has it been permitted? Is it policy now to conduct this kind of activity?
- ANSWER: I have not had a single request to conduct such activity since I have been made Director. If ever anything of this type comes up, and I can't foresee this need, but, if it ever did come up and it became a matter of grave concern, a matter which is to be solved only through such activity, I would present it to the Attorney General and would be guided by his opinion as to such activity. Frankly, I have not had any such request since I have come aboard.

QUESTION: Is that in the foreign field, Mr. Kelley. Is that limited to the foreign field when you say such activity?

ANSWER: Yes, sir. Foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, national security, whatever terminology you want to use.

QUESTION: Back prior to 1966, were any of those in say organized crime investigations?

ANSWER: I know of none.

QUESTION: Would you characterize, Mr. Kelley, what areas they were in, please. What areas the pre-1966 burglaries took place? Characterize the kinds of investigations they concern?

ANSWER: I can not at this point characterize them because I just don't know how they were to be characterized. But, it could be that, I would guess, that the great majority of them are what we now term counter-foreign, counterintelligence, or national security. I would say that in all probability the great majority of them were in that area. That's where the grave concern is.

QUESTION: Have you reviewed them from a legal point of view to determine whether any of them at all were conducted without proper legal authority?

ANSWER: We have discussed them with the Department, and will place them in their hands and they will make such a review.

QUESTION: I wanted to ask you if this goes back to World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War or all of them?

ANSWER: They will go back to World War II, I'm confident.

QUESTION: Is it possible to get court authorization by warrant or whatever means for surreptitious entry as distinguished from an ordinary search warrant?

ANSWER: Inherent in the request for a microphone installation there is a matter of surreptitious entry. So, therein you have a natural concomitant. You do have that

permission. There is some dictum to indicate, at present, that this may be brought up later. But, I know of no authorization which can be obtained per se for a surreptitious entry. And, at this point, of course, the feeling is that these confined as they are to foreign counterintelligence it flows from presidential authority as it applies also to the warrantless wiretaps.

QUESTION: Weren't the civil rights groups, Mr. Kelley, among some of the organizations who were burglarized?

ANSWER: I'm not going to say anything about where they were, or against which organizations they were directed, only to say that they were, Mr. Nelson, and I hope that will satisfy you, and I hope that if there is any revelation to be made later that they can be as complete as possible because, again, we feel that the intent was a very good one and there was no illegality concerned. And the impact of it was to protect the country.

QUESTION: Sir, how can you say that there was no illegality concerned if the Constitution says that you have to have a search warrant to make an entry and without, as I understand it, even checking this with the Attorney General, these Agents burglarized private premises?

ANSWER: The resolution of the problem which you now present is up to the Department and the courts, and I, of course, will not engage in anything except to say that in the defense of the men who authorized and participated, that they had this intent and within every criminal violation there is a necessity that there be the ingredient of intent and there was none here as far as I can determine.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, would you say, sir, that most of these requests for surreptitious entry flowed from presidential authority? Is that what you said, sir?

ANSWER: No, I did not say that. I did not give a complete outline as to what the authorization was. And, this again will be a matter which will be discussed in the reviews of the Department and the various Congressional committees.

QUESTION: Sir, would you say that the Cubans who burglarized Daniel Elzberg's psychiatrist's office should not have been convicted then since they thought that they were on a national security mission? They didn't intend to violate any laws. That was their testimony.

ANSWER: I have no judgment insofar as that because my province is in presenting the facts and for the review and determination by the courts and if such an inference was made it was not intended by me to give them any sanctuary. I'm trying to keep in the area of our facts and that particular thing as to whether or not they had any intent or whether or not it is a viable defense is up to the courts.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, did you twice mention that you expect some resolution to this question in the courts? How is it going to get into the courts?

ANSWER: I don't know. It possibly will be some sort of a defense, rather some sort of a presentation to the courts by the Attorney General. He has indicated that perhaps this being a Constitutional question--it being a matter of the executive privilege of the presidential power--that it might well be necessary to have such a review to determine.

QUESTION: Were all of these break-ins conducted with the permission of either the Attorney General or the President at the time? Or were there any that were conducted without such approval?

ANSWER: I cannot, at this point, give you any particulars about the program. I just say, as I did before, and this....

QUESTION: Because you don't know or because you're withholding comment?

ANSWER: I'm withholding comment.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, I'm still unclear about distinction between break-ins before 1966 and afterward. Is the reduction in number the only change that was made or was there change in the limitations on the targets that were used?

ANSWER: There was a change insofar as the targets just being in the subsequent area confined to those matters which were concerned in foreign counterintelligence.

QUESTION: You imply then that the others concern domestic security or did it go beyond that?

ANSWER: This implication is yours, Mr. Rogers, but....

QUESTION: I'm trying to recall what you said initially.

ANSWER: I said that..., the question was asked me whether I included domestic intelligence, and I said I was confident that the great majority was in the area of foreign intelligence or foreign counter-intelligence, whatever you want to call it. And there may have been. I don't know.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, you said that you have not received a request for any type of activities such as this since you have been in office. When did the last one take place?

ANSWER: I do not know. I do not know.

QUESTION: Will the material you turn over to the Church Committee include full details of everyone of the break-ins?

ANSWER: It will be a matter which will be completely presented to the Attorney General, and, insofar as full disclosure by him, that's a question which only he can answer. We will report those about which we know.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, you said it was also for the good of the country that Agents send letters to school boards and principals and others to damage the reputation of people working who have had connections with groups the FBI had infiltrated. Was that also for the good of the country?

ANSWER: Your statement, was that also for the good of the country to do that, to damage the reputation, was not the issue. As you pose your question, you answered substantially my response that would be made. Yes, I think that the purpose here was to do something that would ultimately end to the benefit of the Nation. In other words, I think in the so-called COINTEL Program, which you mentioned, that the intent there was one which had

adequate basis. As to the programs, now, individually activities within those programs may be suspect. I have said and repeated that some of those activities I would not feel are proper today. I wasn't there during the time that all of these programs were developed, nor certainly the approval of the various activities within those programs. Were I to have been there, there is some that perhaps I might have said, "No I don't think this is proper." I have the benefit of hindsight. I have the benefit of experience in local law enforcement which, I think, prepares me to better understand perhaps the impact of some of these types of things. They are not at all unknown in the field of law enforcement. In some degree or another almost all the law enforcement has engaged in some similar types of activities. Not perhaps to the sophistication as the COINTEL Program, but the context of the time is felt necessary in the present day. We realize that different standards should be applied and they are and we do not engage in those activities now. Since April, 1971, we cut them off.

(NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS AND EDITORS: The preceding comment by Mr. Kelley concerning local police use of efforts similar to COINTELPRO may be open to misinterpretation. At his direction the FBI later issued his clarifying statement: "I had in mind that law enforcement agencies have used methods designed to create disunity among the criminal element, particularly in organized crime and hoodlum gangs. Probably most common was labeling a crime figure as a police informant to discredit and destroy his criminal influence. These activities to pit one crime figure against another have achieved success in neutralizing the criminal element.")

QUESTION: You said that you disagreed with some of the activities, that they were not proper programs. Alright, does that mean that there are variations of COINTEL Programs still going on?

ANSWER: In the first place, we delineate certain programs. That's the overall structure of the full system. Within each of these programs there were some activities, individual activities. I feel that the setup of the programs certainly was directed properly, that is, with the intent to preserve the Nation. Insofar as some individual activities, yes, I feel that some

were, in today's context particularly, imprudent and that they were not, again in the present context, the type of thing that certainly I would approve. Be that as it may, we stopped them in 1971 and we have no intention to continue them.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley?

ANSWER: Yes, sir, Joe?

QUESTION: When you were an Agent did you engage in any break-ins or were you aware of any break-ins?

ANSWER: Insofar as the matter which you are now discussing, I think that we can give substantially the same answer to this. This is a matter which is being investigated by the Department and is being investigated by the various committees, particularly the Select Committee of Congress and, I'm not saying that Clarence Kelley engaged in such activites, or did not engage in these activities. I'm merely saying that these have been presented for review and they will, thereafter, be discussed at some length and any publicity that might be given them will be that which will be given by those more knowledgeable than I.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, to your knowledge have any members of the FBI been involved in the planning or execution of assassinations?

ANSWER: No, sir. I know of none.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, how about the break-in of embassies here in Washington. Have any members of the FBI gained surreptitious entry into any embassies in Washington?

ANSWER: Without naming or designating victims or institutions, I can only say that there were a few concerned with counterintelligence--foreign in nature--subsequent to 1966. Further than that I cannot say.

QUESTION: A few is 10, 20, 100? When you say few, I'm sure that I'm lost as to how few is a few.

ANSWER: Not many.

QUESTION: Was a lot of this done in Washington as opposed to other cities in the country?

ANSWER: There were not a lot, I'm confident of that. And, frankly, I don't think that all of the few were confined to Washington, D. C., but I can't tell you absolutely that that is true.

- QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, were any of these done in conjunction with the CIA? With their knowledge?
- ANSWER: I know of none. Now, subsequently, perhaps there may have been information which did go to them but, not insofar as the origin of the information, I'm confident of that. We were not in partnership with CIA.
- QUESTION: How about the NSA? Were there any of these break-ins done to help benefit the NSA in its code-breaking programs?
- ANSWER: That is a matter which will be developed and will be presented and, it's better for them to comment than I.
- QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, the Rockefeller Commission report said that, in discussing the CIA's mail cover operations, said the FBI only learned about this about five years after it was in the works. In 1958, I believe. Mr. Colby's report to the President said the FBI knew about it from its conception. Which is correct?
- ANSWER: It is my understanding it was 1968.
- QUESTION: 1958?
- ANSWER: 1968. Wait a minute, 1958, 1958. That's right, 1958.
- QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, in the last 50 years, as I understand it from FBI officials, there has never been an FBI Agent prosecuted for any kind of corruption or crime in connection with his official duties. Is there any agreement with the Justice Department either in writing or any other kind of agreement not to prosecute people who may stray from or commit crimes but, rather to handle it with internal discipline?
- ANSWER: Mr. Kelly, spelled K-E-L-L-Y, there is no such agreement. I would not abide by such an agreement. I vehemently oppose any such arrangement and would not operate under such arrangement. No, there is none. Yes, anyone that, within the FBI, will be prosecuted if there is evidence leading to that

conclusion. I can assure you absolutely that this is my policy, is the policy of the Bureau, and that we will pursue them as vigorously as we possibly can. There's nothing worse in my estimation than the betrayal of trust and that's what we have when one of your own people defects and gives sanctuary and assistance to the criminal world.

QUESTION: How do you account than for the fact that there has been no one who has strayed across the line in all these years? It's almost unhuman.

ANSWER: Well, I appreciate your compliment, Mr. Kelly, which I agree with, there has been none. There have been, of course, some allegations made from time to time, all of which have been pursued and found to be groundless. I think that it's inherent in an organization which is closely scrutinized, an organization which has a strong inspection system but, more than anything else, is the choice of people who are not susceptible to this type of thing. Unquestionably, in such a screening process some might get through. But, than, within the FBI is a built-in system which further prevents this possibility and that is a tremendous pride in this very matter. That is, that there has been no corruption. And, I am confident that Agents working with one another, although, will, of course, on occasion be sympathetic to an Agent who possibly may be drinking too much or may possibly, for other reasons in the area the morals might digress to some extent, they absolutely will not countenance corruption or defection to the criminal element or otherwise contaminate that splendid reputation of the Bureau. It's a unique situation. It's difficult for some to understand. But, it's a built-in barrier to an extension of this type of activity and, something of which we will have tremendous pride and I personally would not hesitate one second to pursue any allegations such as this, feeling that although it may get wide publicity, although it may, to some extent, harm the credibility of the FBI, it must be done. And, I assure you, will be done. Unusual perhaps, but nonetheless, it is present and we will persist with this type of activity. We don't ask our Agents to squeel on one another, we point out the splendid reputation that is inherent within our tradition and is one of the finest traditions you can possibly build.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, earlier you spoke of the advantages and limitations of hindsight. After having examined the records of the break-ins and other surreptitious activity, you observed that you thought it was well intentioned, I believe, in most cases. Did you also observe that there was any gross misuse of authority in the process of that?

MR. KELLEY: I do not note in these activities any gross misuse of authority. I see a consistent thread of well-intentioned activities. Perhaps now in the present society, and in the context of now and in those times, I do not feel that it was a corruption of the trust that has been placed in us. As now we have determined a valuation that perhaps could be wrong, but in those days there was no intention to engage in activities which were prohibited, illegal, or otherwise wrong.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, why wouldn't an act like the bugging of Martin Luther King's hotel room have been a betrayal of trust? These Agents took an oath under the Constitution and that was prohibited by Federal law at that time.

MR. KELLEY: There have been a number of articles written about this situation. In reviewing this situation, I feel that the authority stemmed from the proper source. It was a matter which was construed in those times as of considerable concern to the country, and the FBI acted in accordance with the request which was made that it be installed.

You say that it was a matter which was then a violation of the law. Within the warrantless wiretaps under ordinary circumstances they could conceivably be construed as a violation, but under the umbrella of the protection of the country they have been authorized, so I don't subscribe to the feeling that they knowingly, in such an installation, violated the law with the intent to violate the law.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, do you still--does the FBI still--compile personal information on the personal behavior of Members of Congress, members of the press, and other people?

MR. KELLEY: The FBI receives a great deal of information from time to time. We are charged when we have a complaint to write up that complaint. We feel that not only are we following the archival rules that such must be recorded, but also we feel in discharge of our duties we should record it because such information might well dovetail with some investigation that we are conducting. People come to us to tell about these things for reasons--not just to spill out gossip and rumor and to possibly put someone on the spot. We inform them, for example, at the time they submit this information a record will be made of this but if it is outside the jurisdiction of the FBI we so state. They know before they leave, for example, that nothing will be done about it other than to record it.

- QUESTION: But it is put in the files?
- MR. KELLEY: Yes, it is put in the files. Yes sir.
- QUESTION: Whether it has to do with sex activities, or drinking too much, or what have you?
- MR. KELLEY: The allegations within the complaint are put into the complaint and are put into the file no matter what they might be. Yes.
- QUESTION: Government officials, Members of Congress and the press, and what have you?
- MR. KELLEY: Yes sir. The Department of Justice and the Bureau are now engaged in a mutual venture to set up guidelines as to our activity in this regard. We will abide by those guidelines.  
We do want it known, however, that some of this information might very well be helpful to us in later investigations. The abuse is the publication of this information, and I know of no abuse, Jack, which we can point to.
- QUESTION: Has it been used at times to try to get a person's job?
- MR. KELLEY: I know of none.
- QUESTION: You know of none?
- MR. KELLEY: Now you say to try to get a person's job? Now I don't know of all of the activities that we're involved in--and I say to you, Jack, that yes there have been some accounts as to this effect. I feel that actually were there any such activity it was on the basis of a

feeling that these things were true and that they were of such importance that they should be passed on. Some of these, of course, are in the COINTEL Program. I was not privy to some of these allegations. I assure you that this will not continue to the present time. I have been asked what about your own feeling about such information. Since I have arrived I have not had a bit of gossip or a bit of rumor sent to me and this is over two years. I have not reviewed files to find out about reporters, Congressmen or other public figures. I do not subscribe to that type of thing. I have a file on me. It is a quite lengthy file. It includes the investigation conducted about me at the time I was being considered. I understand it is quite voluminous. I assure you that I have not read that file. I do not know who made complimentary statements about me. I don't know who made derogatory statements. Perhaps, maybe, some of you may have made such statements. I don't want to be colored in my opinion about you by some statements which you may have made in good faith, and I think this substantially is what it is all about. The confidentiality and the privacy of individuals. If you, Joe Lastelic, want to make a statement about me, you should. I think you should be given that right, and I think that the proper forum is in one of confidentiality. I have not read those so-called gossip, rumor, or other objectionable types of materials. I am

not going to read them, and I certainly do not sponsor any move to revive anything such as may have once existed.

QUESTION: Those files will remain? Rumors, gossips--gossip, whatever is in it?

MR. KELLEY: Yes sir.

QUESTION: You said that you don't question the motives of people who come in to give you information. Do you ever check out the information that was given to you about the people?

MR. KELLEY: If it is within our jurisdiction and makes allegations which may mount into a violation, yes, we check them out. But a mere allegation that so and so is a sex deviate or that he is going around conducting himself other than in a gentlemanly manner and so forth, no, we do not just on the bare gossip stage check that out.

QUESTION: But, nevertheless, that remains in file. You don't check that out, that remains in the person's file unevaluated and raw. Is that correct?

MR. KELLEY: That's right. Now the implication is that you should possibly clear the man. In so doing you would, of course, be violating your charter which is that you do not investigate matters of this type. You might also by virtue of this give it some degree of

statute by investigating it. But more than anything else if we have no business in it we shouldn't be checking it out and we do not.

QUESTION: If you have no business in it, why are you in it at all?

MR. KELLEY: We did not enter into it.

QUESTION: Is this a file that is a part of the FBI records?

MR. KELLEY: Yes sir.

QUESTION: You won't always be the FBI Director?

MR. KELLEY: That's right. I am confident of that. I am with you a thousand percent.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, can you tell us when you first learned of the files that Mr. Hoover kept that were called his confidential or OC files and whether or not anyone within the Bureau knew about those files and failed to tell you about them?

MR. KELLEY: Jack, that's a long answer, but I will try to brief it. I first learned of the possibility that these files existed in January, 1974. I then was presented a list of some of the files and called in one of the Assistant Directors and said what is this all about. Should they be integrated into the general file system, and I mean by that that we have a general file system. We have a section of our files which are kept in a separate room because we don't want everyone to have the capability of going into them. The man who was charged

with the responsibility of looking into this then within a few months retired. The next stimulation of this situation arose after a statement appeared in the paper mentioning these files and we immediately talked about this. Still I did not look at the files. I then instructed that our Inspection Division go over them and make a listing of them, categorizing them. Some of them, of course, were purely administrative, some included information as outlined by Mr. Levi. Such a listing was made and was turned over to the Department. Thereafter Mr. Silberman looked them over and thereafter Mr. Levi looked them over and I made a rather cursory check of them myself. Why did I not look these files over in the first place? I did not construe them as being within the realm of the so-called dossiers that had been mentioned before and during, certainly, my confirmation. I said I did not subscribe to the preparation or retention of dossiers on Congressmen nor members of the Senate. I still persist in that and we have not. My references were about those which were declared improper during Mr. Gray's administration and they were at that time stopped. These were dossiers that were prepared on candidates for Members of Congress and those who failed in their venture were destroyed. Those which were successful were put into the general files. We no longer do that and frankly, in my opinion, this is what was referred to. I feel that these files should be

maintained confidential. I still have not given them a close review. I have not done so for the very reason as I mentioned about my own file. I don't think it will benefit me to go over them. Under archival rules they must be preserved. In the guidelines which are to be established, I will welcome any reasonable guideline which says we either do or do not preserve them. I am anxious for us to do our work the way it should be done. More than that, I cannot say.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Kelley, there have been suggestions that your absences from Washington for family reasons have prevented you from getting the kind of control of the Bureau that you would have if you were here all the time. I am wondering how you respond to that kind of suggestion?

**MR. KELLEY:** My response is that I feel that I have been able to maintain control. I am certainly in constant touch. I have telephone calls that are relayed to me when I have made such trips. I am confident that the executive staff of this Bureau is solidly behind me. I say this inasmuch as I have somewhat a feeling such as may be implied in your question. I must as a result of conditions that you know about make these trips. If I feel that in so doing it will endanger my administrative control and my capability of doing that which I think should be done, I will leave.

There is no question whatsoever because that which I say applies to others should also apply to me. But, I do feel that I have control of the organization. I have known of no disruptive tactics that might have been launched to unseat me and again were there any evidence of that and found, in my opinion, to be one which is well grounded, I would immediately leave.

QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, if I can return for the moment to the subject of break-ins. You said that conditions of national security and foreign intelligence--there may have been other areas. I wonder if you can be a little clearer on whether there were any break-ins that were not related to foreign intelligence or national security?

MR. KELLEY: I know of none.

Thank you Mr. Kelley.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. O. Cregar *WOC* *APR*

FROM : A. B. Fulton *A*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 7/28/75

1-Mr. Cregar  
1-Mr. Fulton  
1-Mr. McCaffrey

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intonation *APR*  
Infell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory *APR*  
Legal Coun. *APR*  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Re Senstudy 75 memorandum dated 7/24/75.

Pages 521-522, Item 5 and Item 6, of a CIA memorandum entitled, "Items For Possible Use in Briefing the DCI," contain references to CIA participation in FBI training and FBI participation in CIA training. Comments appear below in regard to each item.

Item 5. It is true that since late 1972 CIA has participated in numerous foreign counterintelligence (CI) in-services put on by Intelligence Division (INTD). CIA has participated in all seven of our basic CI schools held to date.

It should be noted that CIA's input into these programs has been highly valuable and productive and is designed to give FBI Agents a better insight into the Soviet, Satellite and Chicom target based on CIA's overseas experience against these targets. Two of the lectures usually given at these courses include the structure, function and role of CIA, and the structure, function and role of the Domestic Collection Division and the Foreign Resources Division. *D*

These lectures have been beneficial in teaching our Special Agents about the mutually complimentary roles of CIA overseas and the FBI in the United States in working against hostile intelligence targets.

CIA officers who lecture to our classes have been careful to emphasize CIA's experience against these hostiles from an overseas perspective and their overseas experiences.

*REC-102* *62-111-1-486*  
CIA's presentations can in no way be interpreted as being an attempt on their part to teach us how to work CI in the United States, nor does CIA attempt to persuade our Special Agents to adopt CIA overseas methods or tactics to United States conditions. *AUG 2*

JWM:jvl  
(4)

CONTINUED - OVER *5 JWB*

Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar  
Re: Senstudy 75

Item 6. Three Special Agents, Neil Rice, Larry McWilliams, and John McCaffrey, attended this Soviet Operations course at CIA Headquarters. The course ran from May 14 to May 25, 1973. Special Agent McCaffrey only attended one week while Rice and McWilliams attended for two weeks.

The primary reason for FBI inclusion in this course was because, at that time, the three Special Agents were members of the new Training Unit, INTD, and we were seeking educational guidance and ideas for our basic CI courses then under development. We benefited from this course because we borrowed a few educational ideas and techniques from CIA's method of handling its course.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 7/30/75

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ad. \_\_\_\_\_  
C. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
C. V. \_\_\_\_\_  
Audit \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Lab. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Teleph. one Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Soc'y \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is a "Superceding Request For FBI Materials," dated 7/28/75, which was received from Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Representative, on the afternoon of 7/28/75.

This request is in the form of six categories (Roman numerals I through VI), the first four requested by Friday, 8/1/75, and the latter two by Friday, 8/8/75.

Set forth is a brief description of the separate categories with comments under each, where applicable:

I. Materials to which the Committee Staff has been given prior access and now requests delivery.

II. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

Item E. pertaining to mail surveillances is being deferred pending receipt of guidelines from the Department of Justice since there is a problem with possible future litigation in the areas of mail opening and intercept. The Department, by letter from the Director 7/29/75, was advised of our position in this matter. PEG-88

Item H. refers to materials pertaining to COINTELPRO. During discussions on 7/28/75, the Committee Staff decided to defer the deadline for this material for 8/8/75.

Enclosure

62-116395

EWL:lh  
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP2 ALM/HMF  
CONTINUED - OVER  
MOR-16

34 AUG 6 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

III. Outstanding previously requested materials to be made available for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

Items G., H., and I. in this category pertain to information developed through investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. SSC Staff Representatives on 7/28/75 advised that an agreement is pending but not yet finalized between the Committee and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would govern the type of information to be furnished the Committee in these categories. We are deferring processing of the requested materials until an agreement is reached so that guidelines may be furnished us. The Attorney General has been advised of our position in a letter of 7/29/75.

IV. Newly requested materials for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

Items A. and B. in this category were deferred until 8/8/75 by Committee Staff in conference on 7/28/75.

V. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

In this category Item B. is being handled by the Department of Justice. Items A., C., D., E., and F., have been substantially complied with and Item G. is in preparation.

VI. Outstanding previously requested materials for access at JEH Building.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

A conference was held on the morning of 7/29/75 by Senstudy Project personnel with all Intelligence Division personnel involved in the Senstudy effort. Appropriate assignments were made or confirmed. A conference is scheduled for the afternoon of 7/30/75 to check progress and identify any special problems. It appears at this time that we will be able to meet the deadline of 8/1/75 for designated materials in categories I. through IV., as well as the deadline of 8/8/75 for designated materials in categories V. and VI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

July 28, 1978

~~SECRET~~

SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

- I. Materials to which the Committee staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
- A. FBI file #100-00.
  - B. FBI Inspection Guidelines *3.119/1-2 Rev. 1  
LAW - IPC*
  - C. Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters
  - D. Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO, including all appendices and case summaries (names of authors of analytical appendices may be deleted)
  - E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections 105, 107, and 130)
  - F. All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
  - G. Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents. *3.119/1-2 Rev. 1  
LAW - IPC*
  - H. FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/lmf  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

*MDR-16*  
11/13/2000

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

III. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

- A. Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations, as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.
- B. Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers, proffered by Special Counsel in letter of July 15, 1975.
- C. Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.
- D. Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).
- E. Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept, requested in letter of June 13, 1975.
- F. Sections 8A, 8B, 8P, and 8Q of the Manual of Instructions, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.
- G. Communications regarding the activities of SSC which have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.
- H. Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources).  
  
SAC

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

- III. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.
- A. Materials pertaining to the reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969, other than the "logs" of any surveillance. *1/14/75* *Re: Daily Clearance request on behalf of [unclear]*
  - B. Materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information about individuals, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22. *1/14/75*
  - C. Access via agreed procedure to certain information regarding materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do contain derogatory information about individuals. *1/14/75 (Re: [unclear])*
  - D. Materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding the "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past," requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 23. *1/14/75*
  - E. SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo of June 17, 1975. *1/14/75*
  - F. Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964, *1/14/75* requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b, 8, 16.
  - G. Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975, *1/14/75* Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c.
  - H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 8, 1975. *1/14/75*
  - I. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 14, 1975. *1/14/75*
- SSC  
[unclear]*

~~SECRET~~

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- 4 -

Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

- A. Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from January 1, 1960, to the present *Burns*
- B. The so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA coordination prepared in 1966. *Yoder*
- C. The Manual of Instructions and/or Rules and Regulations for the Legal Attaches *(Foreign Operations Manual?)* *Ward*
- D. The annual five-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present. *Yoder (FBI)*
- E. The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests from 1970 to the present.
- F. Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI at *the Chilean Embassy* *at* *Qigley* from January 1, 1970, until the present. *JQ*
- G. All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated to the President, the Attorney General, or any other recipient during the period 1969 through 1973. *Ward*
- H. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the following individuals: (See O.C. Witness list) *Ward*
- I. Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media Program. *Yoder (FBI)*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OC WITNESS LIST

S.A. Battle  
James Crawford  
Joseph Dowling  
Thomas Dudney  
John Dunphy  
Mark Felt  
Annie Fields  
Helen Gandy  
Albert Gunser  
Robert Kunkel  
Irma Metcalf  
John Mohr  
Tom Payton  
Kenneth Peffer  
Jessie Peterson  
S.A. Clark Shoaff  
Kenneth Shoffer  
Dorothy Skillman  
Raymond Smith  
Carol Tschudy  
Ralph Windear

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

V. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

- A. Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 2. *has gone to Dep't. of Justice 5/5/C*
- B. Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes requested in letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General, dated July 7, 1975. *Dept's ready*
- C. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious entry, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *has gone to Dep't. of Justice 5/5/C*
- D. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to [incommunicado] *lessen* interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.] *(b) has gone to Dep't. of Justice 5/5/C*
- E. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *Dept's ready 5/5/C*
- F. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to the use of informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *Dept's ready 5/5/C*
- G. Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L. Shockley, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources). *7/20/75*

~~SECRET~~

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VI. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

- A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances identified by subject and target which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3.
- B. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.
- C. All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.
- D. Materials pertaining to the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other controversial intelligence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975.
- E. Materials pertaining to "SCOPE" and Operation ORKID requested in letter of July 14, 1975. *(info for deliv. 4/5/76 - (affidavit) 10/10/75)*
- F. Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations and to the general subject of fictitious and cover organizations (political, commercial, or other), requested in letter of July 14, 1975. *(info for deliv. 4/5/76 - (affidavit) 10/10/75)*
- G. Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of July 14, 1965.
- H. Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of 1965, as requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 28. *at White House*

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

July 29, 1975

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to a request for FBI materials dated July 28, 1975, received from SSC Staff Representatives John Elliff and Mark Gitenstein during the afternoon of July 28, 1975. This request is categorized under six sections, Roman numerals I through VI. The first four categories require delivery/access by August 1, 1975, and the latter two categories by August 8, 1975.

We have completed our initial review of this overall request and anticipate we will be able to comply with the designated deadlines with the following exceptions:

II. E. With respect to the request pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening and mail intercept, we are deferring action pending receipt of guidelines from the Department of Justice, and it is suggested that the deadline for this request be deferred to some future date consistent with the Department's decision in this matter.

III. G. H, and I. These requests deal with information developed through investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. It is our understanding that an agreement is pending but not yet finalized by the SSC and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would delineate type of information to be furnished in these categories. Upon receipt of guidelines, we are prepared to process this material on an expedite basis and furnish to the Committee within one week of such notification.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspections \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
EWL:lhb | hb | ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
DATE 10/16/75 BY SP5 DPM/AM  
MOR-16 REC-34 62-116385-485  
17 AUG 5 1975  
18 AUG 1 1975  
MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT   
E. S. GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

It should be emphasized that the above exceptions are the result of a preliminary review of the request. It is possible that unforeseen problems might arise during our continuing research in the various areas of the request which will make it necessary to extend the deadlines; however, we do not anticipate such problems at this time and should they arise, you will be immediately advised. Also, we are mindful of the request by the SSC Staff for a partial proffer of materials and will attempt to comply whenever circumstances allow.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

CODE

TELETYPE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
NITEL

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO SACS LOS ANGELES  
SAN DIEGO  
SAN FRANCISCO  
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

JULY 31, 1975

(1 - Mr. Hotis)

(1 - Mr. Daly)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

REBUTEL JULY 30, 1975.

REPORTING PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW RELATIVE TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF INTERVIEWS OF PRESENT AND FORMER SAS:

FOR INCUMBENTS: IMMEDIATELY AFTER INTERVIEW PREPARE LHM REPORTING AS DETAILED AS POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ASKED AND REPLIES GIVEN. INCLUDE WHETHER OR NOT INTERVIEWEE'S RIGHTS WERE EXPLAINED TO HIM; DURATION OF INTERVIEW; AND IF IT WAS NECESSARY FOR INTERVIEWEE TO CONSULT WITH BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE, SO STATE. ALSO INCLUDE ADVICE GIVEN TO INTERVIEWEE BY BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE AS TO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, PRIVILEGED AREAS, CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES, AND PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW, ALL AS DISCUSSED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE. LHM SHOULD BEAR DUAL CAPTION: "U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)"; "INTERVIEW OF SA (INSERT NAME) BY SSC STAFF MEMBER." SUBMIT ORIGINAL AND SEVEN COPIES OF EACH LHM TO BUREAU BY COVER AIRTEL, ATTENTION INTD

W.O. CREGAR.

REC-88

62-116395-1184  
9 AUG 6 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_

Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_

Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_

Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_

Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Ident. \_\_\_\_\_

Inspection \_\_\_\_\_

Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_

Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

SFP:mjg/MJS  
(9)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 31 1975  
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/2/2000 BY SP2/rum/jmf

MCR-16

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

W.O. CREGAR

4053 675K

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

PAGE TWO

62-116395

FOR FORMER SAs: ANY FORMER SA WHO HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED AND VOLUNTEERS TO FURNISH RESULTS (NOTE THAT SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE SOLICITED BY FBI BUT MERELY ACCEPTED WHEN OFFERED) SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER INTERVIEW AND LHM PREPARED AND SUBMITTED IN LINE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCUMBENTS. SECOND HEADING OF LHM SHOULD USE TERM "FORMER SA."

NOTE:

Referenced Bureau teletype alerted appropriate offices to tentative schedule of SSC Staff Member for interviews re Cointelpro/BPP. The teletype advised of Director's waiver from employment agreements and issued other necessary instructions for briefing of personnel in advance. Instant teletype necessary for reporting instructions and is in line with procedure we have been following for other similar interviews, reporting of which has been mainly by HQ personnel.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *C.O.C.*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 7/30/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Unclif. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is a "Superseding Request For FBI Materials," dated 7/28/75, which was received from Mr. John Elliff, SSC Staff Representative, on the afternoon of 7/28/75.

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Set forth is a brief description of the separate categories with comments under each, where applicable:

I. Materials to which the Committee Staff has been given prior access and now requests delivery.

II. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

REC-88 62-116395-483  
Item E. pertaining to mail surveillances is being deferred pending receipt of guidelines from the Department of Justice since there is a problem with possible future litigation in the areas of mail opening and intercept. The Department, by letter from the Director 7/29/75, was advised of our position in this matter. *AUG 6 1975*

Item H. refers to materials pertaining to COINTELPRO. During discussions on 7/28/75, the Committee Staff decided to defer the deadline for this material for 8/8/75.

**ENCLOSURE**

Enclosure

62-116395 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP/AM/AM

EWL:lhb lhb  
(6)

MDR-11

CONTINUED - OVER

84 AUG 6 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

III. Outstanding previously requested materials to be made available for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

Items G., H., and I. in this category pertain to information developed through investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. SSC Staff Representatives on 7/28/75 advised that an agreement is pending but not yet finalized between the Committee and attorneys representing Mrs. King which would govern the type of information to be furnished the Committee in these categories. We are deferring processing of the requested materials until an agreement is reached so that guidelines may be furnished us. The Attorney General has been advised of our position in a letter of 7/29/75.

IV. Newly requested materials for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.

Items A. and B. in this category were deferred until 8/8/75 by Committee Staff in conference on 7/28/75.

V. Outstanding previously requested materials for delivery to the Committee.

In this category Item B. is being handled by the Department of Justice. Items A., C., D., E., and F., have been substantially complied with and Item G. is in preparation.

VI. Outstanding previously requested materials for access at JEH Building.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

A conference was held on the morning of 7/29/75 by Senstudy Project personnel with all Intelligence Division personnel involved in the Senstudy effort. Appropriate assignments were made or confirmed. A conference is scheduled for the afternoon of 7/30/75 to check progress and identify any special problems. It appears at this time that we will be able to meet the deadline of 8/1/75 for designated materials in categories I. through IV., as well as the deadline of 8/8/75 for designated materials in categories V. and VI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Ewf

RH

JAM  
DR75

wfw

PLM

JW

~~SECRET~~

Phillys

July 28, 1975

SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

- 3/19/75 Report  
Ltrm III - TPC*
- I. Materials to which the Committee staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
- A. FBI file #100-00
  - B. FBI Inspection Guidelines
  - C. Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters
  - D. Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO, including all appendices and case summaries (names of authors of analytical appendices may be deleted)
  - E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections 105, 107, and 130)
  - F. All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
  - G. Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents.
  - H. FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

CLASSIFIED BY SPD/PBM/lmf  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6  
MCR-16  
10/13/2010

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ENCLOSURE

62-110395-483

~~SECRET~~

- II. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
- A. Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations, as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.
  - B. Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers, proffered by Special Counsel in letter of July 15, 1975.
  - C. Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.
  - D. Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).
  - E. Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept, requested in letter of June 13, 1975.
  - F. Sections 8A, 8B, 8P, and 8Q of the Manual of Instructions, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.
  - G. Communications regarding the activities of SSC which have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.
  - H. Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources).  
*q615*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

- to assist you*
- III.** Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.
- A. Materials pertaining to the reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969, other than the "logs" of any surveillance. *Mallott/Daly*  
*Daly re clearance re selected aspects*
- B. Materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information about individuals, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22. *Mallott/Hilfman*
- C. Access via agreed procedure to certain information regarding materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do contain derogatory information about individuals. *Mallott/Hilfman*
- D. Materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding the "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past," requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 23. *Mallott/Daly/Jillings*
- Ready to review*
- E. SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo of June 17, 1975.
- F. Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964, *Malloy* requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b, 8, 16.
- G. Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975, *Shea* Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c.
- H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 8, 1975. *Shea*
- I. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 14, 1975. *Shea*
- Reference  
and may  
be kept at  
the Office of  
the Director  
from 55C  
(Circular)*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

IV. Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

- 8/25 { A. Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from January 1, 1960, to the present Burns
- B. The so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA Nolin coordination prepared in 1966.
- C. The Manual of Instructions and/or Rules and Regulations for the Legal Attaches (Foreign Operations Manual) Mori
- D. The annual five-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present. Mori (from FBI Dir)
- E. The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests from 1970 to the present.
- F. Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI at the Chilean Embassy from January 1, 1970, until the present. [s] Ogleby
- G. All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated to the President, the Attorney General, or any other recipient during the period 1969 through 1973. Wilson
- H. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the following individuals: (See O.C. Witness list) Waller (Hargan)
- I. Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media Program. Johnson (Ryder)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OC WITNESS LIST

S.A. Battle  
James Crawford  
Joseph Dowling  
Thomas Dudney  
John Dunphy  
Mark Felt  
Annie Fields  
Helen Gandy  
Albert Gunser  
Robert Kunkel  
Irma Metcalf  
John Mohr  
Tom Payton  
Kenneth Peffer  
Jessie Peterson  
S.A. Clark Shoaff  
Kenneth Shoffer  
Dorothy Skillman  
Raymond Smith  
Carol Tschudy  
Ralph Windear

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

*labeled*  
V. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

- A. Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 2. *R. Ross has gone to Dept. fn delivery to SSC*
- B. Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes requested in letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General, dated July 7, 1975. *Dept's biling*
- C. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious entry, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *has gone to Dept. fn delivery to SSC*
- D. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to [incommunicado] interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *J(S) has gone to Dept. suggesting briefing Larson*
- E. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *Daley goes to Dept. fn delivery to SSC*
- F. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to the use of informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4. *jms to Dept. fn delivery to SSC*
- G. Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L. Shockey, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources). *Reedie/Schiff*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

VI. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

- A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances identified by subject and target which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present, *Brown/Daley* requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3.
- B. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, *Brown/Daley* requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.
- C. All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, *Brown/Daley* requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.
- D. Materials pertaining to the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other controversial intelligence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975. *Wright*
- E. Materials pertaining to "SCOPE" and Operation ORKID *Hampton* requested in letter of July 14, 1975. *To Dept for deliv. 4 SS - T(S)* *(different things)*
- F. Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations and to the general subject of fictitious and cover organizations (political, commercial, or other), *Ryan* requested in letter of July 14, 1975.
- G. Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of July 14, *Sher* 1965.
- H. Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of *Hampton* 1965, as requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 28. *at White House*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Walsh

DATE: July 29, 1975

FROM : S. R. Burns *cc: PJP*

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training *W.M.* \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The Department of Justice (DOJ) received a letter dated July 24, 1975, directed to K. William O'Conner, Esq., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, requesting that the DOJ provide the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities with a list of all Special Agents assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who had the surname "Kehoe". The unit to which they were assigned and their current addresses were also requested. The letter, which has been forwarded to us for our response, was signed by John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force.

The purpose of this memo is to recommend that the attached memorandum from the Director enclosing a memorandum for the SSC be approved and forwarded to the Attorney General. The memo for the SSC advises (1) that there were two Special Agents, Francis Joseph Kehoe and James Patrick Kehoe, assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who have the surname "Kehoe" (2) that both were assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters and (3) that both are currently employed as Special Agents of the FBI with business address as follows:

Francis Joseph Kehoe *REC-88* *62-116395-1182*  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Gateway I, Market Street  
Newark, New Jersey 07101

James Patrick Kehoe  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
201 East 69th Street  
New York, New York 10021

Enc.  
DCT:pms (7)

- 2 - Mr. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Walsh  
1 - Mr. Midkiff

9 AUG 6 1975

(OVER)

Memo Burns to Walsh  
Re: United States Senate Select Committee  
To Study Governmental Operations  
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Review of our in-service and out-of-service records failed to indicate any other current or former FBI Agents with the surname "Kehoe" who were assigned to the New York Office in the 1960's. Francis Joseph Kehoe, EOD 12-10-51, GS-13, \$26,905, married with six children, was assigned to New York City from 1952 until 10-15-74 when he was transferred to Newark where he is currently assigned. During all of the 1960's he was assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters. James Patrick Kehoe, EOD 3-26-51, GS-13, \$27,632, married with one child, has been assigned to New York City since 1953. Prior to the 1960's through the present he has been assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached memo from the Director to the Attorney General enclosing the attached memo to the SSC be approved and forwarded to the Attorney General.

WOC  
TM

~~TS~~  
~~DP~~

EW/RGH

Pm

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : J. G. Deegan *JGD*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

DATE: 7/29/75  
1 - Mr. J. T. Aldhizer.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. *WV* \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

To advise review of pages 188, 189, 283 and 330 of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document which Senate Select Committee has had access to and which reportedly makes reference to extremely sensitive Bureau operations determined such pages do not compromise or damage FBI operations or sources which relate to IS-1 Section. The CIA document is fully identified in memorandum from Mr. W. O. Gregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 7/24/75 under instant caption.

Re page 188

This page reveals CIA began to follow Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968 and as a result CIA's Directorate of Intelligence published studies on 8/6/69 and 6/12/70. This page revealed in each of these studies there was a single paragraph devoted to ties with U. S. black power movement and primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other U. S. black power activists to the Caribbean. The second study was to pay special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in U. S. This page reveals these studies did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the U. S. and the Caribbean.

REC-88

These CIA studies were furnished FBI, see serials 157-8415-247 and 190-12-324-257. The 8/6/69 study revealed the Jamaican Government had officially banned the travel to Jamaica by Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown and James Forman. These individuals were not further identified and no additional information was set forth in that study concerning their possible travel to Jamaica.

9 AUG 6 1975

WHA:adn adn  
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: SENSTUDY 75

The study on page 13 reports "Unlike its fairly frequent contacts with Black Panthers and other radicals in the U. S., the Castro Regime seems to have refrained from more than occasional communications and expressions of moral support for the Caribbean groups." No specific data is set forth regarding contacts between Black Panthers and other radicals in the U. S. and the Castro Regime. Paragraph number 33 on page 13 of this study notes that the extent of relations between black power groups in the Caribbean and similar organizations in the U. S. is vague. Activities of "the more activist Negro leaders in the U. S. such as Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad have been followed closely in Jamaica and other places. There have been visits by Carmichael and other U. S. black power exponents to some of the Caribbean Islands." The study notes these visits have been limited in the past two or three years because of a ban on the travel of certain U. S. Negro spokesmen by the Governments of Jamaica, Antigua and Trinidad-Tobago. The study notes the latter government had refused to permit Carmichael to enter the country despite the fact that he is a native of Trinidad.

The 6/12/70 study on page seven noted that available evidence suggested that contact between Caribbean groups and the black power movement in the U. S. is infrequent. It reported there was a two-way flow of visitors including occasional speaking tours by Carmichael and one or two other radicals. It was presumed that exchanges of views and sharing of information occurred but the study noted there was no firm evidence of funding or direction by U. S. groups.

There is no data on page 188 or published in the two CIA studies which would compromise or damage FBI operations or sources.

Re page 189

This page indicates that for several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean branch (apparently of the Director of Current Intelligence, CIA) wrote periodic typescript memoranda on Carmichael's travel abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. This page indicates that it was felt these memoranda were for internal CIA use only although a copy of one such memorandum was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Bureau file 100-446080 contains numerous communications from CIA concerning Stokely Carmichael's activities and travel during late 1967 and early 1968. These memoranda included data concerning Cuban Intelligence Service contacts with Carmichael and his travel, including trips to North Vietnam and Algeria.

It is probable these memoranda were furnished FBI due to our interest in establishing the degree of foreign influence or funding in relation to Carmichael's activities in the U. S.

Data on page 189 and in the memoranda furnished by CIA concerning Carmichael's whereabouts during this period does not compromise or damage FBI operations or informants.

Re page 283

This page noted under date of 12/10/70 that "DDI" noted press accounts of Director Hoover's 11/19/70 statement reported that the Black Panthers are supported by terrorist organizations. This page reveals that someone with CIA had examined FBI's related files and also those of CIA and could locate no indication of any relationship between FEDAYEEN and the Black Panthers. This page revealed a CIA employee provided "Director," probably the CIA Director, with a memorandum on this topic.

FBI Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1970 released 10/30/70 revealed the Black Panther Party (BPP) ideology showed an increasing emphasis on the teachings and writings of the Premier of North Korea; that BPP spokesmen repeatedly confirmed their belief in Marxism-Leninism; that the international influence of BPP grew with support groups being organized in foreign countries; and a BPP international staff was operating in Algeria. The Annual Report revealed the head of the BPP International Staff had established a relationship with Al Fatah, the Arab guerrilla organization, which relationship had manifested an outpouring of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist propaganda in the BPP newspaper.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Since the reference to Mr. Hoover's statement concerning support being received by the BPP has been made public, the data on page 283 would not damage or compromise FBI operations or sources.

Re page 330

The three paragraphs under the caption "Black Radicalism" on this page briefly summarized the data reported by CIA on page 188. Data on this page does not compromise or damage FBI operations or sources.

ACTION:

For information.

WRA  
~~WRC~~  
ENR

AM

~~WRC~~  
~~HES~~

PM

~~WRC~~  
HES

WRC

GRM

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

July 21, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter from the Committee to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, which contains request for certain information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a "Secret" memorandum, which responds to a request from the Committee. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

EWL:1hb 1hb

(9)

REC-88

62-116395-480

9 AUG 6 1975

Assoc. Dir. 3  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/15/02 BY SP2 RUM/LMS

MOR-1b

wf wif

EWL/Q

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. B. Adams  
 Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

July 21, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INCOMMUNICADO INTERROGATION

Reference is made to your request to the Attorney General by letter dated May 14, 1975, with specific reference to Appendix A, Request Number 5, g., as well as Appendix B, Request Number 4, a and b. In general, these two requests refer to information concerning the use of certain techniques by the FBI in performance of its investigative responsibilities. The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to information requested concerning the technique referred to as "Incommunicado Interrogation." (S)

For your information, this technique has been used by the FBI on extremely rare occasions during the period of approximately 1959 to 1963. In each instance when this technique was used, the subjects were known, prior to interviews, to be illegally in the United States and to have been associated with the Soviet Intelligence Services as illegal officers/agents. (S)

In view of the extremely sensitive nature, it is requested that any further details concerning the limited use of this technique be given in an oral briefing before properly cleared members of the Committee's Staff who are assigned to this matter. At that time, they will be given access to necessary documentation. (S)

Access, Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ass't. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
 Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Maint. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
 Intel. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

R EWL:1hb 1hb  
 (8) Classified by 6283

INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS CLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 THAT THE INFORMATION  
 CONTAINED THEREIN IS  
 UNCLASSIFIED BY [redacted]  
 DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION [redacted]

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
 Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFIED BY 6283  
 DECLASSIFY ON 25X  
 MORE 1/4

~~SECURITY~~

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 2)

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated 7/27/75  
U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
Caption of Document: Activities. Re: Incommunicado  
Interrogation. (Appendix A, Req No. 5, g., &  
Appendix B, Req No. 4, a & b.)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Douglas Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by: ABerry

Title: Opni Oya

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

~~SECRET~~

<sup>a</sup>  
~~ENCLOSURE~~

62-116395-480

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

REF: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE  
BEFORE COMPLETING.TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central IndexFROM: ~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

 DOCUMENT      BRIEFING      INTERVIEW      TESTIMONY      OTHER

7/21/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

## Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

SSG letter 5/14/75, Appendix A, #5,g and Appendix B, #4, a and b.

S

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Intelligence Collection

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Due to extremely sensitive nature referred to as "Incommunicado Interrogation", it is requested that any further details concerning the limited use of this technique be given in an oral briefing before properly cleared members of the SSC

62-116395

CLASSIFIED BY SP/ADM/JmfDECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

MOR-16

FMK:fmk

(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY  
INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE OTHERWISE SPECIFIED  
3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

ENCLOSURE

TREAT AS YELLOW

S, WOC/G

~~INSTRUCTIONS~~

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~SECRET~~

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg  
- Mr. J. P. Lee

REC-88

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letters dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, and June 13, 1975, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing responses to some of the requests. A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

JPL:cml  
(10)

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP/AM/Lmf

MOR-16

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg  
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

62-116395

July 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COMMITTEE'S  
PRIOR REQUESTS

FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI  
AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)

Reference is made to SSC letters dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, and June 13, 1975.

The letter of June 13, 1975, amplified a request made by letter dated May 14, 1975, with reference to Item 5b in Appendix A and Item 4 in Appendix B concerning the FBI's legal authority regarding the technique referred to as all forms of mail surveillance including mail covers and opening mail.

In view of the statement on page 3, of the letter dated July 15, 1975, from Mr. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, to Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force of the SSC, we are withholding documentation relating to the opening of mail.

With regard to mail covers, they are placed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Section 861 of the U. S. Postal Service Manual.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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DATE 6/11/2000 BY SP/AM/Jmf ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

JPL:cml (w) MDR-16

(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Documents pertaining to the Committee's  
prior request

Further documents pertaining to the FBI  
and Department of Justice (policies and procedures)

NOTE:

The letter referred to from K. William O'Connor  
to John T. Elliff pointed out on page 3 as follows:  
"documentation relating to the opening of mail will be  
withheld at present due to ongoing investigations."



June 16, 1975

TO: Paul Daly  
FROM: *MES* Mike Shaheen

The attached is for your attention,  
action and response.

Please keep me advised as to the  
currency of the Bureau's contemplated  
response. Discuss problems as soon as  
possible.

Thanks.

*FB7*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 06/10/00 BY SP/AM/IMF  
MDR-16

PAUL C. CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 91st CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 13, 1975

Mr. K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

In amplification of Item 4, Appendix B of the Committee's document request to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, I am making the following requests pertaining to the technique referred to as "mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail" and the utilization of this technique "in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities."

REC-88

62-116-395-479

(1) For all incidents of mail opening or mail intercept by or on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from January 1, 1960, until the present, please state the physical location where the opening or intercept was conducted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, the type of mail opened or intercepted, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

(2) For all incidents of mail covers that were physically conducted by FBI employees, whether alone or in cooperation with Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, until the present, please state the physical location where the cover was conducted, the names of the individuals who participated in the cover, the type of mail covered, and the purpose of the cover.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP5 Am/mw

MCR-1b

2 ENCL 1/11/05  
2 ENCL 1/11/05  
c/o to Paul Hart




Mr. K. William O'Connor  
Page -2-

June 13, 1975

(3) Please provide all documents and memoranda which discuss, refer, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct and termination of, and policies and procedures for, the mail openings, intercepts, and covers identified above.

I would appreciate it if you would treat the requests delineated above with the highest priority.

Sincerely,



John T. Elliff  
Director,  
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

JTE:bcm

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated 7/18/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice (Policies and Procedures) Appendix A, Item 5b and Appendix B, Item 4.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Douglas Miller Date Aug 1, 1975

Received by: Office Manager

Title: Office Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SPAN/M/JMF  
MOR-16

62-116395-479  
ENCLOSURE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

**FBI**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOCUMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> BRIEFING	<input type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEW	<input type="checkbox"/> TESTIMONY	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
--	-----------------------------------	------------------------------------	------------------------------------	--------------------------------

**7/18/75**

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SSC
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

**SSC letter 5/34/75 and 6/13/75  
Appendix A, item 5b, Appendix B, item 4****U**

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Intelligence collection**

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Mail covers placed in accordance with guidelines set forth in Section 861 of the U.S. Postal Service Manual. We are withholding documentation relating to the opening of mail

**62-116395****FMK:fmk****(4)**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP01/bm/lmf

**MDR-16****ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75****TREAT AS YELLOW****62-116395-479****5 WOC/JS****3791 (6-75)**

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

**ENCLOSURE**

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Date of Mail 7/18/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

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DATE 10/10/2001 BY SP2 RIM/Lmf  
MDR-16

Object JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY

Removed By 79 AUG 7 1975

File Number 62-116395-478

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns, Jr.

The Attorney General

July 18, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices the SSC requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing a response to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:lek/k  
(9)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

**ENCLOSURE**

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10/10/2001 BY SP/AM/MS

ODR-16

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns, Jr.

62-116395

July 13, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE  
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES  
(Appendix B, Part I, Item 1.a.)

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI; to our memorandum captioned as above dated June 4, 1975; and to the undated note from SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein to William O. Cregar of this Bureau attaching a list of Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Memoranda and Letters selected for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff.

Pursuant to the request to review selected SAC Letters and Memoranda identified in the attachment to the above referenced note, we currently have such material available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/10/2001 BY SPAN/IMP  
MDR-16

TEB:lek/ck

(8) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the  
FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures  
(Appendix B, Part I, Item 1.a.)

NOTE:

The material to be reviewed consists of clean Xerox copies of the approximately 335 selected SAC Letters and Memoranda. Each of the SAC Letters and Memoranda was reviewed by the following Divisional representatives who cleared such material for review by the SSC Staff with respect to their Division's interests: Identification - J. T. Stewart, Training - J. E. Reilly, Administrative - F. Woodworth, Files and Communications - H. R. Hauer, General Investigative - J. W. Hines, Laboratory - R. F. Petty, External Affairs - D. L. Divan, Special Investigative - J. E. McHale, Inspection - F. B. Griffith, Legal Counsel - P. V. Daly, Computer Systems - C. D. Neudorfer. INTD reviewers who cleared the above material with respect to INTD interests for reviewing by the SSC Staff were: J. W. Johnson (1971 - 1972), H. W. Dare (1962 - 1966), R. D. Hampton (1968 - 1973 - 1974 - 1975), R. L. Moore (1964 - 1965 - 1967), K. A. Mendenhall (1960 - 1969), and T. E. Burns, Jr. (1961 - 1963 - 1970). Excisions were made in the material by the above INTD personnel with regard to protection of sources, third agency considerations and with respect to sensitive methods and techniques. Since the material is to be reviewed at FBI Headquarters and in order to expedite the process of making the material available and avoid unnecessary extensive effort, the various SAC Letters and Memoranda have not been classified nor have they been excised with regard to privacy considerations in all instances. The SSC Staff representative(s) will be orally advised of the above at the time of their review at FBI Headquarters. Should the SSC Staff seek certain specific copies of the SAC Letters or Memoranda, those items selected will then be appraised with regard to classification and privacy considerations, prior to furnishing any copies to the SSC Staff for their off-premises perusal. None reviewed pertained to OPE responsibilities.

Dir let and LHM to AG 7/18/75

5/14/75 request, Appendix B, Part I, Item 1a

Re SAC memos and lets selected for review  
at FBIHQs

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

To: Bill Cregar

From: Mark Gitenstein

Bill, attached you will find  
the list of SAC memos and  
letters which we have selected  
for review at FBI headquarters.

## SAC FILES &amp; LETTERS

1960

60-A	1/15	60-30	6/21	60-41	8/23
60-B	1/22	60-G	7/1	60-44	9/29
60-C	1/25	60-32	6/28	60-45	9/27
60-9	2/9	60-33	7/5	60-J	10/20
60-10	2/16	60-34	7/12	60-51	11/1
60-D	2/29	60-H	8/1	60-54	11/22
60-11	2/19	60-36	7/19	60-k	1/13
60-12	2/23	60-38	8/2	60-56	12/6
60-14	3/8	60-I	8/17	60-59	12/20
60-16	3/22	60-43	9/13		
60-E	4/21				
60-F	5/10				

1961

61-A	1/23	61-28	5/23	61-D 61-42	7/24 8/8
61-5	1/24	61/29	5/29	61-47	9/5
61-8	2/21	61-31	6/6	61-55	9/26
61-10	3/1	61-C	6/19	61-56	not dated
61-12	3/7	61-33	6/20	61-62	10/24
61-13	3/14	61-34	6/21	61-E	10/26
61-18	4/4	61-37	7/11	61-F	11/7
61-19	4/5	61-38	7/18	61-G	11/29
61-24	4/27	61/39	7/25	61-71	12/19

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/10/2001 BY SP/ALM/lmt  
MDR-16

5-8

1962

62-A	1/8	62-22	4/17	62-47	9/7
62-12	2/14	62-E	4/26	62-55	10/3
62-11	2/13	62-27	5/8	62-58	10/16
62-B		62-F	5/9	62-H-J-I-K	
62-C	2/19	62-32	6/5	62-61	
62-16	3/8	62-G	7/27	62-66	10/26
62-20	4/3	62-33	6/12	62-70	12/11
62-21	4/10	62-34	6/19	62-72	12/26

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1963

63-4	1/23	63-14	3/19	63-39	8/6
63-A	1/30	63-E	3/27	63-44	9/4
63-6	1/29	63-F & G		63-47	9/19
63-B	2/27	63-27	6/11	63-50	10/1
63-C	3/6	63-26	5/28	63-I	10/23
		63-30	6/25	63-59	12/10
63-D	3/25	63-35	7/19	63-61	
63-13	3/12	63-H	7/27		

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1964

64-4 & 5		64-B	4/1	64-39	7/3
64-3	1/14	64-23	4/28	64-43	8/25
64-A	1/24	64-24	5/5	64-48	9/29
64-13	2/27	64-C	5/20	64-F	10/26
64-20	4/7	64-D	6/22	64-52	10/27
64-21	4/14	64-E	7/6	64-G	11/25

1965

	65-8	65-41	65-50
	65-10	65-40	65-54
5/4	65-A	65-D	65-53
5/11	65-B	65-C	65-58
	65-31	65-44	65-68
	65-36	65-E	65-63
	65-37	65-47	

1966

66-4	1/13	66-41	7/5	66-68	11/1
66-8	2/1	66-A	7/22	66-72	11/15
66-10	2/15	66-44	7/18	66-73	11/22
66-19	3/29	66-45	7/19	66-77	12/13
66-27	5/3	66-50	8/9	66-76	12/7
66-34	6/7	66-56	9/9	66-78	
66-35	6/14	66-61	10/4	66-79	12/15
66-33	6/31	66-63	10/11	66-80	12/20
66-30	6/21				

1967

67-3	1/10	67-23	4/25	67-50	8/21
67-5	1/19	67-24	5/2	67-52	8/29
67-6	1/24	67-25	5/9	67-56	9/12
67-8	1/31	67-27		67-62	10/17
67-10	2/1	67-29	5/24	67-63	10/24
67-11	2/7	67-38	6/27	67-65	10/31
67-12	2/14	67-40	7/11	67-66	11/7
67-13	2/21	67-42	7/25	67-70	11/28
67-14	2/28	67-43	8/1	67-71	12/5
67-17	3/21	67-A	8/8	67-74	12/19
67-20	4/7	67-47	8/4		

1968

68-4	1/9	68-25	4/30	68-40	7/16
68-5	1/16	68-26	5/1	68-41	7/23
68-9	1/31	68-30	5/21	68-51	9/3
68-14	2/20	68-32	6/4	68-52	9/10
68-16	3/12	68-34	6/11	68-54	9/20
68-18	3/19	68-36	6/21	68-55	9/20
68-20	3/26	68-38	7/2	68-63	11/5
68-21	4/2	68-39	7/9	68-68	11/26
68-22	4/9				

1969

69-4	1/14	69-30	5/27	69-51	9/15
69-5	1/21	69-31	6/3	69-55	9/26
69-7	1/28	69-34	6/24	69-58	10/7
69-14	2/25	69-36	7/1	69-63	10/22
69-15	3/4	69-37	7/3	69-67	11/10
69-16	3/11	69-43	8/13	69-69	11/18
69-22	4/3	69-44	8/19	69-73	12/9
69-29	5/6	69-45	8/26	69-76	12/23
69-28	5/13	69-46	9/5		

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1970

70-4	1/27	70-21	4/2	70-43	8/17
70-6	2/3	70-26	5/12	70-45	8/27
70-9	2/17	70-29	5/26	70-46	9/1
70-11	3/3	70-30	6/2	70-48	9/15
70-13	3/17	70-33	6/16	70-61	11/3
70-15	3/24	70-36	7/14	70-64	11/10
70-17	3/31	70-38	7/28	70-72	12/29
70-18	4/7	70-40	8/4		

1971

71-3	1/19	71-20	5/11	71-37	8/10
71-4	1/26	71-21	5/18	71-39	8/17
71-A	2/18	71-24	6/8	71-41	8/24
71-10	3/9	71-28	6/22	71-46	9/21
71-11	3/16	71-30	7/6	71-51	10/19
71-17	4/27	71-34	7/20	71-B	11/8
71-19	5/4	71-36	8/3	71-61	12/28

1972

72-1	1/4	72-21	4/18	14-72	8/1
72-5	1/11	memo 1-72	5/23	15-72	8/8
72-6	1/26	memo 5/72	6/13	21-72	9/12
72-10	2/22	memo 11/72	7/11	22-72	9/19
72-17	3/21	13/72	7/25	25-72	10/10

1973

10-73	3/6	18-73	4/24	31-73	7/31
12-73	3/13	25-73	6/5	53-75	11/23

1974

5-74	1/29	32-74	6/25	50-74	10/17
8-74	2/19	35-74	7/16	52-74	11/5
13-74	3/12	39-74	8/13	56-74	11/26
22-74	4/30	49-74	10/15	55-74	12/10

1975

5-75	1/28	18-75	4/22	21-75	5/13
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5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated 7/16/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee to study Govt Operations. Re; Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice; Policies and Procedures. (5/14/75 request, App.B, Part I, Item 1.a., SAC memos and lets  
Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Dennis Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975

Received by: W. B. S.

Title: Office Dir.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

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DATE 6/10/2000 BY SP/AM/mf  
MDR-16

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SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees						
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)						2. DATE PROVIDED
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DOCUMENT	BRIEFING	INTERVIEW	TESTIMONY	OTHER	<b>7/18/75</b>
<b>FOR REVIEW</b>						
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)						
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<b>Memorandum</b>						
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)						6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)
<b>SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part I, Item 1a</b>						<b>U</b>
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)						
<b>Operating procedures</b>						
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)						
<b>Made available for SSC review at FBIHQ selected SAC Letters and Memoranda</b>						
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<b>62-116395</b>						
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<b>(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75</b>						
<b>TREAT AS YELLOW</b>						<i>S/Welch</i>

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- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
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- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.