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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms. We focused on Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force W.

Background:

1938-43 1943-44 1944-46 1950-53	Marine Corps OSS Parachute School Marine Corps Office Police Coordination; headed Plans Section for Western European Division
1953-56	Chile to of Stations (Station)
1956-60	Deputy Chief, European Division
1960-3/62	Headquarters, U. S. European Command
	(U. S. representative)
3/62-65	Deputy Director: Task Force W
1965-71	Chief of Stationer House Market 2-12
1971	Retired from Agency
3/64-2/65	Deputy Chief, Special Operations
	Branch (developing paramilitary capabilities for Agency)

Apparently selected for Task Force W because of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.

Prior to his Task Force W assignment, Harvey was known to Cheever by reputation only. He described Harvey as one of the finest operatives the Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel.

Cheever understood that Task Force W was Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro regime; that the Cuban operations had White House backing; and that the Agency had been given an operational carte blanche, with the caveat that each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval prior to getting off the drawing board.

Cheever told us: "You don't pull in fast-rising men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid backing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's representative and that Task Force W would not suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA without Lansdale's approval.

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