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Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
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R1124

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

3/17/77  
EE

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7 6 2 0 0 1

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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1                    EXECUTIVE SESSION  
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Tuesday, September 9, 1975  
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United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with respect to  
Intelligence Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m.,  
in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F.  
Mondale presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale (presiding).  
Also present: Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron,  
Professional Staff Members.

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1 Senator Mondale. Do you swear the testimony you are  
2 about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing  
3 but the truth, so help you God?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I do.

5 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have  
6 the right to counsel here today?

7 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

8 Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here  
9 today without counsel?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

11 (At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608,  
12 Carroll Arms Hotel.)

13 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your  
14 Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, includ-  
15 ing your Fifth Amendment rights?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

17 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have  
18 the right to cease answering questions at any time and  
19 consult with an attorney?

20 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I gather that was implicit in what  
21 you said in the Senator's office.

22 Mr. Baron. It was.

23 Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence  
24 I would like to make it clear to you that you are under no  
25 obligation to continue testifying, although the Committee

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1       would obviously appreciate it if you would.

2       Are you willing to do so?

3       Mr. Tweedy. I have no intention of not cooperating.

4       Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify  
5       to the truth as best you can?

6       Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.

7       Mr. Baron. Perhaps we should begin by putting on the  
8       record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading  
9       to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of  
10      the African Division.

11                   TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

12       Mr. Tweedy. I came aboard the Agency in the first of  
13      May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland. I  
14      returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was known  
15      as the Central European Division, I guess, and went through  
16      a number of different assignments at that time, until May  
17      of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station to Vienna, Austria.  
18      I was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very  
19      briefly to the States, went to London as Deputy Chief of  
20      Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in the  
21      middle of 1958 and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in  
22      London early in October 1959, and I took over the  
23      African Division I should think somewhere around between the  
24      15th and 18th of November 1959.

25       That brings me up to date.

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1           Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chief of  
2           the African Division?

3           Mr. Tweedy. Until September of '63.

4           Mr. Baron. In that position did you consult frequently  
5           with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?

6           Mr. Tweedy. Well, as I was explaining to you as we  
7           were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes.  
8           These consultations would take many, many different forms.

9           On the Congo, for example, the State Department  
10          obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the  
11          U.S. Government and they had a Congolese task force. I  
12          would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would  
13          attend their meetings. They took place almost daily,  
14          sometimes I guess even more than once daily.

15          Mr. Baron. During what period of time?

16          Mr. Tweedy. Oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thing  
17          really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the  
18          Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the  
19          task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those meet-  
20          ings were State's meetings, they weren't CIA meetings, they  
21          weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but  
22          we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the  
23          policy was.

24          Mr. Baron. If we could focus our attention on the  
25          period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60  
and the announcement of the death of Lumumba in February of '61.

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1 Mr. Tweedy. Who was that month of his death?

2 Mr. Baron. The month the death was announced.

3 As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his  
4 death and the probable cause of his death. AS far as the U.S.  
5 investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps  
6 January 18, 1961.

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with  
9 the State Department during that period of time?

10 Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of this is far less  
11 Congo and far more general, as I was mentioning to you as  
12 we strolled, and particularly my talks with Jim Penfield, to  
13 whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated.

14 Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for  
15 African Affairs, and Penfield and I were colleagues in Vienna  
16 together. He had the minister. But we did a great deal of  
17 talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was  
18 forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot  
19 of things to negotiate with him about South cover for 72

20 about and he naturally had his views on a lot of the things  
21 we wanted to do, and we spent a great deal of time arguing  
22 these things out, making arrangements and so on and so forth.

23 To be frank with you, I have far less recollection about  
24 intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that  
25 particular group than I did after 1961, the beginning of

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the Kennedy Administration.

1                   Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration  
2                   that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were  
3                   geared up.  
4

5                   Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely.  
6

7                   Mr. Baron. Do you remember discussions with Livingstone  
8                   Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminis-  
9                   trations?  
10

11                  Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific  
12                  discussions with him I really do not recall, no. Later on  
13                  I remember having a couple of meetings along with Mr. Rusk.  
14

15                  Mr. Baron. Did any of those meetings concern Lumumba?

16                  Mr. Tweedy. No, Mr. Rusk, I think they exclusively  
17                  concerned Portuguese Africa.  
18

19                  Mr. Baron. Do you remember having any meetings alone  
20                  with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumba?  
21

22                  Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure I have had a meeting with Mr.  
23                  Herter.  
24

25                  Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with Secretary  
26                  Herter or Douglas Dillon or Livingstone Merchant?  
27

28                  Mr. Tweedy. Never met Mr. Dillon.  
29

30                  Mr. Baron. About Congolese affairs?  
31

32                  Mr. Tweedy. Never met Mr. Dillon and I do not recall  
33                  having met with Livingstone Merchant on the Congo. I may  
34                  have done so but I really don't recall, I had very little  
35

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1 professional contact with Mr. Merchant. I knew him mostly  
2 slightly socially.

3 Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with Mr. Satterswate  
4 or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the  
6 sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-  
7 tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo  
8 was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the  
9 African situations, individual African country situations.

10 We would spend a great deal of time, their points of  
11 view, our point of view, our perspective, their perspective,  
12 but never as an action matter that I can recall.

13 Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba  
14 ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Never.

16 Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period  
17 between Congolese independence and the announced death of  
18 Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the White  
19 House?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example, if  
21 President Eisenhower had an African representative the same  
22 way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he  
23 was. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes  
24 me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador  
25 and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of

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1 time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of  
2 Advanced Studies in Princeton.

3 Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did  
4 you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster  
5 with reference to Congolese affairs.

6 You are shaking your head and we have to put it on  
7 the record.

8 Mr. Tweedy. I am almost convinced that the answer is  
9 no. I am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. I  
10 don't recall ever having policy discussions with him at all.  
11 nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.

12 Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had  
13 attended only two National Security Council meetings in your  
14 memory and that those two meetings were both long after the  
15 death of Lumumba, is that correct?

16 Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have been  
17 because this was well into the Kennedy Administration. I  
18 wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.

19 Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John  
20 McCone at CIA?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And  
22 McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been  
23 well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following  
24 year.

25 Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower

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1           Administration when events in Congo were heating up, after  
2           Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in  
3           the State Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba,  
4           the general attitude toward Lumumba?

5           Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by  
6           saying what was the general assessment of the situation in  
7           the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you  
8           came down to.

9           The worry in Washington about the situation in the  
10          Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression  
11          in Africa that threatened to go up in smoke, up because the  
12          Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because  
13          it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that  
14          those African countries in their early years were at least  
15          vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it  
16          happened there the side effects would have been infinitely  
17          greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.

18          Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?

19          Mr. Tweedy. All one could do was assess those, but it  
20          would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring  
21          country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria  
22          and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid  
23          that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there  
24          was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it  
25          really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.

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1      This was the concern.

2      Mr. Baron.   Were these political side effects only  
3      that were being taken into account or were there also  
4      fears for American business interests in the Congo that  
5      were part of the side effects?

6      Mr. Tweedy.   Insofar as my assessments were concerned,  
7      and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall  
8      with the State Department, American business was just not a  
9      great factor.

10     If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of  
11    course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to  
12    succeed resulting in the great involvement of both the U.N. and  
13    the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that if you  
14    put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct-  
15    ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.

16     Mr. Baron.   That is because Katanga is the home of  
17    most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.

18     Mr. Tweedy.   That is the only thing that keeps that  
19    country going.

20     Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-  
21    siderations in back of that but these were political  
22    economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is  
23    what was going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-  
24    far as I recall.

25     Mr. Baron.   So the primary concern was for political

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1 stability in Africa.

2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, political stability in Africa. In  
3 a quick phrase you put your foot right on that.

4 Mr. Dawson. During the summer of 1960 you mentioned  
5 earlier that in the time frame you did not think the  
6 Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with  
7 you but --

8 Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to say this was nothing that  
9 anybody was worried about but it was not the primary concern.

10 Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest  
11 in infiltrating and taking advantage of the situation in the  
12 Congo?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I think it would be much more accurate  
14 to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet  
15 intentions with respect to Africa, which I suspect in those  
16 days like a great many other things about African culture  
17 round the globe were ill informed at that point, and un-  
18 doubtedly seeking their own policies in Africa just the way this  
19 country was. It was obviously a worry.

20 Mr. Baron.. Was it also our assumption if the Soviets  
21 moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?

22 Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have been  
23 little doubt in our minds that that would have been the case.

24 Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the general perception  
25 at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba

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1                   posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mere threat of  
2                   political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets  
3                   or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?

4                   Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese more binding but I  
5                   don't think we had any information indicating there was  
6                   any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it  
7                   was potentially there.

8                   Mr. Baron. And that potential --

9                   Mr. Tweedy. This increased one's nervousness about the  
10                  situation.

11                  Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African  
12                  Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive  
13                  orders?

14                  Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was  
15                  through DDD, Dick Bissell and --

16                  Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard  
17                  Bissell during this period of time?

18                  Mr. Tweedy. Regularly would be a big word. Not  
19                  necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To  
20                  say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It  
21                  would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but --

22                  Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the  
23                  Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook  
24                  any major operation.

25                  Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by

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1 major operation. Major operation per se, if you are not  
2 talking about just intelligence operations, call for in-  
3 structions and formalization either inside the Agency or out-  
4 side.

5 Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be  
6 formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the  
7 DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels  
8 than that.

9 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that  
10 was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the  
11 DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-  
12 tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from  
13 conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and  
14 funnelled down to me.

15 I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-  
16 ceived instructions.

17 Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from  
18 Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that  
19 instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above  
20 the level of DDP?

21 Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the  
22 basis that he was authorized to give me instructions  
23 and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered  
24 to tell me to do.

25 I couldn't run his affairs for him to that extent, but

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1 by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way  
2 it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to  
3 say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to  
4 Allen Dulles first I would think is nonsense.

5 Mr. Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question  
6 Bissell about the source of authority for some covert action  
7 he was asking you to undertake?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if  
9 I felt that it was necessary to do so.

10 I can't recall having done so. He and I used to have  
11 disagreements philosophically on operations. We were very  
12 good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him  
13 when I thought he didn't make any sense but --

14 Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical  
15 difference, or is it describable?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. I think Dick was  
17 by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was  
18 possible, you know, in the clandestine service, if they put  
19 their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.

20 Mr. Dawson. Thank you.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the question of  
22 assassinating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing  
24 came up in the first instance. I can't remember how it came  
25 up except undoubtedly we had a conversation.

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1           Mr. Baron. Do you recall when it came up?

2           Mr. Tweedy. No, I don't. It obviously must have  
3           come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no  
4           way of putting a date to it.

5           Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or  
6           perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one  
7           discussion or a series of discussions?

8           Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discussed it more than  
9           once. I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have  
10          said we probably better be thinking about whether it might  
11          ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which  
12          case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we  
13          could do it or not successfully.

14          Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

15          Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him  
16          in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning  
17          exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed  
18          to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether  
19          such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of  
20          Station be thinking along those lines as well.

21          Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move  
22          ahead at least as far as developing the capability to  
23          carry of an assassination if an order should be given?

24          Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for  
25          doing that.

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1           Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you  
2       won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation  
3       with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can  
4       narrow it down a little bit.

5           Would you assume that it would be after the proclama-  
6       tion of the Congolese independence on June 30, 1960?

7           Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes.

8           Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before  
9       Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on  
10      September 15, 1960?

11          Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. I  
12       didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.

13          Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the  
14       summer or early fall of '60?

15          Mr. Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?

16          Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United  
17       Nations force from mid-September until late November and  
18       it was in late November that he left to go traveling  
19       towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops  
20       at that point in very early December and from early December  
21       until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in  
22       prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was  
23       flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death  
24       was announced shortly thereafter.

25          Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it

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1 was sometime after September 15th. I don't know.

2 Mr. Baron. When you say "after" --

3 Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he  
4 came under. The only thing is I have no recollection that  
5 it would have happened as early as, say, early August or  
6 early September.

7 Mr. Baron. It was in August or early September that  
8 Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

10 Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a struggle for power  
11 between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on.

12 Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question.

13 Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.

14 Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have  
15 considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.  
16 If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think  
17 any more precision in the date would necessarily be productive.

18 Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would  
19 be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have  
20 a plan when he was in nobody's custody.

21 Mr. Baron. That would have been before --

22 Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense  
23 to me, September, because --

24 Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.

25 In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that

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1                   went back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after  
2                   he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollec-  
3                   tion about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at  
4                   that time.

5                   Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

6                   Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would  
7                   only make sense to you that --

8                   Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me  
9                   but --

10                  Mr. Baron. -- that this initial consideration of the  
11                  feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell  
12                  and yourself?

13                  Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have  
14                  been during the period when he was in effect in power. I  
15                  should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.

16                  Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell  
17                  where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina-  
18                  tion of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to  
19                  an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking  
20                  steps to carry out.

21                  Mr. Tweedy. I cannot recall a conversation with  
22                  Bissell where in effect he said, let's move from A to B or C  
23                  to D or something like this. I do not recall that. My  
24                  recollection of the whole interval when this was under con-  
25                  sideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point

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1 can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody  
2 would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was  
3 go-able. or anything really very close to it. It was  
4 always my assumption that at the time anything like this should  
5 occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the  
6 problem at probably a very considerable policy level within  
7 the Agency at which somebody would have said something  
8 more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call  
9 or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say  
10 go to it.

11 Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would  
12 merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.

13 Mr. Baron. You didn't have any action plans for  
14 assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware  
15 of?

16 Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever  
17 got anywhere.

18 Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was done?

19 Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one  
20 asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of  
21 access one might ever have had to Lumumba for whatever purpose.  
22 It was this kind of thing, as best I recollect.

23 Mr. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of  
24 gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating  
25 him?

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1           Mr. Tweedy. I suspect that was the first cable that  
2 ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever  
3 went out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he would  
4 have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were  
5 running even though it was purely a contingency.  
....

6           Mr. Baron. I am sorry. I don't think I understood  
7 that.

8           You say the first cable that went out.

9           Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman was  
10 ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in  
11 Washington, was via our cable. I am sure he wasn't back in  
12 the States over anything of this kind.

13           Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?

14           Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distinct-  
15           ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it  
16           was a cable which asked him to be thinking of that.

17           Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversation  
18           with Mr. Bissell?

19           Mr. Tweedy. That was.

20           Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell  
21           send that cable.

22           Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable I  
23           would have written and probably released by him.

24           Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?

25           Mr. Tweedy. God knows, I don't.

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1           Mr. Baron. For the effect of the language in the cable?

2           Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable  
3           would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.

4           Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?

5           Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the eventuality that we  
6           might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.

7           Mr. Dawson. Is that language you think might have  
8           been used or that is how you think it might have been done?

9           Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the  
10          cable.

11          Mr. Baron. Did you send a number of such cables to  
12          the Chief of Station?

13          Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a period  
14          of time. It was not an intensive correspondence as I  
15          remember it.

16          Mr. Baron. It wouldn't be thenormal practice to  
17          have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject,  
18          would it?

19          Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever  
20          had one but I have had very sensitive subjects, operationally  
21          sensitive subjects that I have dealt with in extensive  
22          cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this  
23          nature whatsoever.

24          Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to  
25          the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially

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1      restricted channel?

2      Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in  
3      various types of restricted channels I am sure you aware.

4      Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and  
5      closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would  
6      flow to the Chief of Station?

7      Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair statement,  
8      yes.

9      Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-  
10     structions to destroy it after reading it?

11     Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.

12     Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this  
13     such an instruction would have been given?

14     Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of  
15     Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station  
16     what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he  
17     needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in  
18     the future.

19     But, he was perfectly capable of keeping a file  
20     which would be accessable only to him and the station and  
21     if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't  
22     think this would have been a problem for him, but to answer your  
23     question I don't know what Hedgman himself did.

24     Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from  
25     Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?

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1           Mr. Tweedy. It was a serious answer. I can't do  
2 better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn't argu-  
3 mentative, I guess it started to discuss, not the pros and  
4 cons of policy, at least I don't recall it did, but what it  
5 was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply  
6 to an instruction from headquarters.

7           Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that  
8 he had of gaining access to Lumumba?

9           Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall now. I don't recall. I  
10 think he said it was certainly not beyond the question that  
11 means could either be developed or might arise but I certainly  
12 do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in  
13 the first instance. On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgey.

14          Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the  
15 Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access  
16 to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this  
17 access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of  
18 personal access that would be needed? . . .

19          Mr. Tweedy. I am sure that must have been covered  
20 at some point, i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.

21          Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would  
22 this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

23          Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might  
24 have been considered.

25          Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of --

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1 finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply  
2 snatch Lumumba from custody, this was clearly access to assassi-  
3 nate him, is that correct?

4 Mr. Tweedy. That would certainly be my recollection.  
5 Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even  
6 considered, at least I don't remember it.

7 Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Richard Bissell  
8 about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to  
9 you that he had had similar discussions with Justin O'Donnell?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of Justin O'Donnell's  
11 role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you  
12 and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten  
13 that Justin O'Donnell played any role whatsoever and now  
14 that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it.  
15 I recall it almost in detail.

16 I remember being told that he had expressed reservations  
17 or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I  
18 think my response to you was if he said that I would believe  
19 him but I didn't recall it.

20 Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you  
21 that he had asked Justin O'Donnell to go to the Congo to  
22 assassinate Lumumba?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me  
24 that he was going to ask O'Donnell to go to the Congo to  
25 examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever

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25

1 saying, I am going to send O'Donnell to the Congo to knock  
2 off Lumumba, not in those words.

3 Mr. Baron. When you say examine the thing on the ground  
4 you mean he would send O'Donnell to the Congo to take a  
5 first-hand look at the means?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, conceivably I suppose this all  
7 might have resulted in a climax there but at least my recollec-  
8 tion certainly was never that he told me that I am sending  
9 O'Donnell to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words  
10 but that he, I am sure the philosophy was that if anything  
11 was done you would want to keep it as separate from the  
12 station as possible and thus a man from the outside.  
13

14 It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.

15 Mr. Baron. The man from outside?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station.

17 Mr. Baron. The CIA station in the Congo?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Right.

19 Mr. Baron. That such a man would be necessary to  
20 carry out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?

21 Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would  
22 obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would  
23 protect the security of the station or involvement of the  
24 station.

25 That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.

26 Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that O'Donnell,

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1        was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for  
2        assassinating Lumumba rather than to mount some sort of kid-  
3        napping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put  
4        him in the hands of Congolese authorities?

5              Mr. Tweedy. That is certainly my recollection but I  
6        would not want to put too high a value on it. I  
7        just don't recall kidnapping as a factor is all.

8              Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever mention to you that  
9        lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA  
10        laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum-  
11        ba? Or they were available for such use?

12             Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD  
13        probably had the capability or had the agent or whatever it  
14        was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I  
15        heard that, yes.

16             Mr. Baron. Would this have been under [Sidney Gottlieb's]  
17        auspices or direction in TSD?

18             Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would  
19        have been. I don't recall. Was he? I think he was.

20             Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you  
21        directly that [Sidney Gottlieb] was involved in developing  
22        poisons that might be used for assassination?

23             Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all.

24             Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about  
25        the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons

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1 come up as one means that was being considered and which  
2 the Chief of Station should explore?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all,  
4 there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison  
5 him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something  
6 like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency  
7 plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the  
8 involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it  
9 in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right  
10 word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the  
11 list of possibilities.

12 Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make a  
13 response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex-  
14 ploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible  
15 use of poisoning -- purpose of poisoning him.

16 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I  
17 don't recall specifically, but that effect is what he was  
18 charged to do in the first instance, examine the possibilities.

19 I would be very surprised if Hedgman didn't come back  
20 and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments  
21 I really don't recall.

22 Mr. Dawson. When you and Bissell had your conversa-  
23 tions, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he  
24 mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest  
25 authority to undertake to assassinate Lumumba?

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1           Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no. I guess I was under  
2           the impression when he talked to me that -- I don't know  
3           whether this is fair or not -- I honestly don't know what  
4           my impression was at the time whether this was something that  
5           Bissell had in effect sucked out of his own thumb as a  
6           contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and  
7           because it was contingency planning I don't think at that  
8           stage I was particularly concerned. But to answer the  
9           question I just don't know.

10           Mr. Dawson. You stated earlier you knew Gordon  
11           Gray very well.

12           Mr. Tweedy. I didn't say that. I have known Gordon  
13           Gray far better since than I did then. I knew Gordon Gray  
14           very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure I ever had a --  
15           while he was in office -- that I ever had a personal conversa-  
16           tion with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the  
17           President's Board.

18           Mr. Dawson. That answers my question.

19           Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation  
20           to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from  
21           any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of  
22           assassinating Lumumba?

23           Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall so.

24           Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you  
25           that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in

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1 Leopoldville or that he had means of dealing directly with  
2 the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through  
3 you?

4 Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course,  
5 that has the capability, and right, it was never my impression  
6 that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he  
7 did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he  
8 certainly had the right and capability to go into it.

9 Mr. Dawson. Can we go into how the right was able to be  
10 exercised?

11 Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He  
12 could establish his own channel to Leopoldville with his own  
13 set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division.  
14 He has the right to do that.

15 Mr. Baron. It would not be improper for a DDP to send  
16 a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another  
17 country?

18 Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness.  
19 He obviously had the authority. My relationships with  
20 Bissell were such that I do not believe it.

21 I never had the impression that he ever had any intention-  
22 tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.

23 Mr. Dawson. Who else other than the DDP or DCI  
24 would have such authority?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

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1           Mr. Baron. Would the President?

2           Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would probably have to come  
3           to the Agency to find out how to do it. I imagine the Presi-  
4           dent could send a personal representative, I am damn sure he  
5           would have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there.  
6           He would make a muck of it if he did.

7           Mr. Baron. Did you learn at any point that lethal bio-  
8           logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chief  
9           of Station in Congo?

10          Mr. Tweedy. This was mentioned when I talked to you and  
11          Mr. Wides and my answer was that I don't recall it, but that  
12          it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.

13          Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent?

14          Mr. Tweedy. They could have been sent one or two ways,  
15          they would have been sent through the pouch with the whole  
16          thing wrapped in and addressed in such manner that it would be  
17          opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out  
18          by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be  
19          done.

20          Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger  
21          from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide  
22          the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry  
23          out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also pro-  
24          vide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination,  
25          namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?

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1           Mr. Tweedy.    No, I do not.

2           Mr. Baron.    Let me represent to you that we have  
3           testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that  
4           point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that  
5           a messenger would arrive in the Congo and would be  
6           someone that he would recognize and this messenger would give  
7           him instructions that he was to carry out.

8           Did you ever know of such a cable being sent to the  
9           Congo?

10          Mr. Tweedy.    I should be very surprised if I didn't,  
11          but I certainly have no recollection of it whatsoever.

12          Mr. Baron.    And the Chief of Station further testified  
13          that shortly after receiving such a cable he received a visit  
14          from [Signey Gottlieb] who arrived in Leopoldville and  
15          made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of  
16          Station said that he immediately recognized [Gottlieb] as an  
17          officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this  
18          cable referred to.

19          Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings  
20          with [Dr. Gottlieb] in his apartment in Leopoldville where [Dr.  
21          Gottlieb] gave him instructions that he said came from the  
22          headquarters to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and  
23          [Dr. Gottlieb] also, according to the Chief of Station, gave  
24          him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with  
25          which to administer them.

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1           Were you aware of that chain of events?

2           Mr. Tweedy. That sounds far more definitive than any-  
3           thing I have any recollection of at all.

4           If I understand what you said was, <sup>in other</sup> ~~Gottlieb~~ would have  
5           left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have  
6           empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their  
7           conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any  
8           further recourse or reference to headquarters?

9           Mr. Baron. That is --

10          Mr. Tweedy. If that is the case I don't believe it.

11          Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the testimony that  
12         the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious  
13         to carry out an assassination mission. He didn't think it was  
14         practical or wise and he probably would have gone back  
15         to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he  
16         was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assass-  
17         ination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision  
18         had been made and that he had authority to move ahead  
19         although he doubted --

20          Mr. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go anywhere near  
21         that far.

22          Mr. Dawson. He checked that authority by immediately  
23         cabling back to headquarters saying, this guy has made himself  
24         available to me as well as he has delivered something and  
25         has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority

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1       in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got  
2       another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying  
3       yes, what he told you is correct.

4       Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, which surprises  
5       me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't  
6       have been privy to those.

7       Mr. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson  
8       outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it  
9       were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, if it had  
10       said simply I have seen your messenger and received instruc-  
11       tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out,  
12       would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had  
13       seen such a cable?

14       Mr. Tweedy. I can't be at all sure it will refresh  
15       my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable  
16       was sent, I am not going to gainsay it.

17       Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which  
18       confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?

19       Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be-  
20       fore or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me. This  
21       is the way, this would be the way I should have thought any  
22       two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when  
23       each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking  
24       about and, of course, you don't have to use unnecessary words  
25       but beyond the likelihood of this I can't say that is what

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1           Mr. Dawson. This leaves us with one or two alter-  
2           natives,either the Chief of Station who has appeared and  
3           testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly  
4           reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling  
5           us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were not  
6           privy to what was going on.

7           Mr. Tweedy. Or I literally don't recall it. This is my  
8           problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things --

9           Mr. Dawson. It is 15 years ago.

10          Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this. I  
11          had to be reminded of so many things about the things that  
12          I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences  
13          were basically the things I was basically concerned with all  
14          the time which was putting this division together and the  
15          rest of it.

16          When it comes to operational detail I start getting  
17          fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking  
18          about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to  
19          bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this  
20          wasn't the case.

21          I spent days in a row not even giving Lumumba one  
22          single bloody thought. This is my problem.

23          Mr. Dawson. Let's try to jog your memory on this.

24          Do you recall any time during that period of any dis-  
25          cussions of the use of Dr. Gottlieb <sup>or</sup> [redacted] whatsoever as a courier?

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1           Mr. Tweedy.    No.  
2           Mr. Dawson.   All right.  
3           Mr. Tweedy.   But if he went as a courier, I will bet  
4         I knew it, but I don't recall it.

5           Mr. Baron.   Having heard this story, would it be your  
6         assumption it is more likely to be true than not?

7           Mr. Tweedy.   Well, I put it purely this way.

8           Mr. Baron.   I am asking you for your expert opinion  
9         here as someone experienced.

10          Mr. Tweedy.   Expert opinion.

11          Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for  
12         promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him  
13         Chief of Station, I assume?

14          Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His  
15         appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and  
16         I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which,  
17         if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to Lon-  
18         don to discuss an operational matter with me which had  
19         nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good  
20         discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to  
21         headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division  
22         that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station  
23         in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no  
24         exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may be  
25         made before I came they had to be they couldn't wait for me

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1 to get the word.

2 Mr. Dawson. Have you ever had any occasion to doubt  
3 his veracity or integrity?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I have not.

5 I think when I say yes to your basic question, it would  
6 be that I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his  
7 integrity.

8 Mr. Baron. We don't question it.

9 Mr. Tweedy. All of this happened pretty much the way  
10 you gave it to me.

11 Mr. Baron. That would be your --

12 Mr. Tweedy. The aspect of it I find very difficult to  
13 believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of  
14 these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very  
15 difficult to -- I do not recall and I find difficult to believe  
16 and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was,  
17 reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as  
18 hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did  
19 it.

20 Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe  
21 such an instruction would have been given?

22 Mr. Tweedy. That way I would have said in such a  
23 matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a  
24 last word up to the last minute.

25 Not one of these things that ~~Gottlieb~~ runs off to the

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1 Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given his instruc-  
2 tions and all of which could have been four or five or six  
3 days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it  
4 even then set about his leisure to do it or without further  
5 reference to headquarters that is not the way my organization  
has ever run operations.

7                   Mr. Baron.   Was it likely at all that Dr. Gottlieb,  
8                   would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the  
Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I should have said quite impossible.

Mr. Baron. Without an instruction from the DDP at least?

Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible.

14 Mr. Baron. Would Dr. Gottlieb have proceeded to the  
15 Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the  
DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid I don't quite understand.

Mr. Baron. If the DCI had given [Dr. Gottlieb] an instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting with the DDP?

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose so.

But I don't believe it. I don't believe it ever happened.

24. To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a personal private instruction from the DCI, and was instructed

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1 to proceed without reference to anybody else he would pre-  
2 sumably go ahead and do so.

3 Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this  
4 assassination of Lumumba had been discussed, this was not such  
5 a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum-  
6 vented?

7 Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the  
8 person with whom the division first discussed the matter en-  
9 tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen  
10 Dulles. I am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell dis-  
11 cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter  
12 which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville  
13 station insofar as I was aware, and to this day I don't  
14 believe it ever was.

15 Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about  
16 earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together,  
17 it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl-  
18 edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that  
19 time that the testimony, the basic testimony we have received  
20 about poisons being delivered to the Congo by Dr. Gottlieb with  
21 <sup>Colleagues</sup> instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba,  
22 if possible, would be true testimony?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr.  
24 Baron, is to say I see not the slightest reason and do not  
25 believe that you would have been lied to on this point.

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1           But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency  
2           which would really bear on that point whatsoever.

3           Mr. Baron.     Did you travel to the Congo shortly  
4           before the independence of the Congo was declared?

5           Mr. Tweedy.   That was my first visit to the Congo as I  
6           recall, it was two weeks before independence.   I made a  
7           long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in  
8           a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flew from Sambura, I  
9           guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville  
10           and that is thefirst time I ever saw Leopoldville.

11           Mr. Dawson.   Do you know whether Mr. Hedgman was  
12           there at that time?

13           Mr. Tweedy.   Mr. Hedgman I am almost sure was  
14           not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I  
15           can't remember his name.

16           Mr. Baron.   And you left the Congo before  
17           independence was declared.

18           Mr. Tweedy.   Yes, I was only there for, I suppose I  
19           was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to  
20           end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually  
21           I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected  
22           problem.

23           Mr. Baron.   For the record would you agree with me  
24           that independence was declared about June 30, 1960?

25           Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

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1                   Mr. Baron. Did you make another trip during which  
2                   you visited the Congo at some point before the death of  
3                   Lumumba?

4                   Mr. Tweedy. Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgi-  
5                   tated finally which must have been as near as the early  
6                   part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome  
7                   in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi  
8                   followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo,  
9                   then briefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.

10                  Mr. Baron. And this meeting in November '60 in  
11                  Rome was a meeting of Aftican --

12                  Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs.  
13                  The Maghreb and these would have been chiefs of stations of  
14                  Morocco, Algeria, Libya, |||,|||

15                  Mr. Baron. And the Congo?

16                  Mr. Tweedy. No.

17                  Mr. Baron. So the Congo Chief of Station would not  
18                  normally have been --

19                  Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see  
20                  Bissell.

21                  Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on  
22                  this --

23                  Mr. Tweedy. No.

24                  Mr. Baron. -- tour to Rome and Nairobi?

25                  Mr. Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose

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1 of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of  
2 our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip  
3 around Africa, which he hardly had time, he used a device  
4 which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at  
5 a central point to which these people could have ready access  
6 and, therefore, it was easy for people on the north Mediter-  
7 ranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to  
8 Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station  
9 Chiefs to proceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there,  
10 each one two or three days, I suppose.

11 Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo  
12 attend the meeting in Rome?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not. In other words,  
14 if he saw Bissell he would have merely come to Rome and have  
15 seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in  
16 fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a  
17 man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely  
18 raised the question whether Hedgman was there.

19 Mr. Baron. What region in the CIA organization chart  
20 would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?

21 Mr. Tweedy. We change around there. We had in  
22 those days, we had the North African branch, we had the  
23 East African branch, we had a southern African branch, which  
24 included South Africa, Rhodesia, probably Portuguese Africa,  
25 maybe the Congo in those days. Later on the Congo was sort

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1 of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it  
2 fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure.  
3 It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.

4 We always had a ~~French~~ <sup>French</sup> West Africa, an ~~English~~ <sup>English</sup>-speaking  
5 ~~West-Africa~~ <sup>West-Africa</sup>.

6 Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief  
7 of Station in the Congo at that point that he did come to  
8 Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he believes that he also  
9 met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines'  
10 house.

11 Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr. Karamessines. It  
12 would only be because Mr. Karamessines was host as Chief of  
13 Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any  
14 policy problems with Mr. Karamessines who had absolutely no  
15 jurisdiction over them in those days whatsoever.

16 Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental,  
17 but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and  
18 yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?

19 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely not.

20 Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intensity of  
21 activity in the Congo at this point and the intensity of  
22 concern over that activity?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming more  
24 and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and  
25 thus the agency. I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this

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1 was the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo  
2 at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become  
3 a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division  
4 and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the  
5 field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.

6 Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about  
7 this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and  
8 yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you  
9 were together?

10 Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things  
11 that we discussed by cable traffic were discussed.

12 The other thing I am sure must have been discussed was  
13 what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese  
14 situation and what the station might be required to do, thus  
15 the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give  
16 the Station.

17 Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination  
18 of Lumumba or the prospect of --

19 Mr. Tweedy. I would be immensely surprised if it  
20 wasn't discussed but I don't recall in what context it was  
21 discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn't discussed.  
22 It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I  
23 assume it was, at that point.

24 Mr. Baron. The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con-  
25 tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that

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1 Lumumba was actually dead?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall. You probably are much more  
3 knowledgeable on that than I am. I don't recall when in  
4 effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a  
5 factor. I just don't remember.

6 Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that  
7 would have the case?

8 Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it was still on  
9 the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was  
10 off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.

11 Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic  
12 between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a  
13 series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed  
14 into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N.  
15 custody.

16 In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the  
17 attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N.  
18 custody --

19 Mr. Tweedy. Okay.

20 Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy  
21 Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the  
22 Director.

23 (The document referred to was  
24 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for  
identification.)

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1           Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed.  
2 I see he sent one specifically to DCI.

3           Mr. Baron. Off the record.

4           (Discussion off the record.)

5           Mr. Baron. On the record.

6           Let's turn back now.

7           I believe while we were off the record and examining this  
8 cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that  
9 this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but  
10 rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville; is  
11 that correct?

12          Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

13          Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation  
14 "Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was  
15 a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief  
16 of Station.

17          Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have  
18 drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.

19          Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to  
20 the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is  
21 the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high  
22 office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at  
23 worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with  
24 disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for  
25 the interests of the Free World generally.

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1           Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an  
2           urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditi:  
3           this should be a high priority of our covert action.  
4

5           Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?  
6

7           Mr. Tweedy. I do.  
8

9           Mr. Baron. And why would three L's have been used in  
10          the cable?  
11

12          Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.  
13

14          Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure  
15          that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?  
16

17          Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.  
18

19          Now, that isn't the normal way to do it at all. I  
20          honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.  
21

22          Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion that  
23          LLL does refer to Lumumba?  
24

25          Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.  
26

27          Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense  
28          of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency and :  
29          State Department?  
30

31          Mr. Tweedy. It accords much more with my recollect:  
32          of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situation  
33          the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obviously  
34          was always in the background.  
35

36          Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his  
37          removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under  
38

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1 existing conditions this should be a high priority of our  
2 covert action, close quotes, -- is that consistent with the  
3 policy towards Lumumba as you recall it?

4 In other words, that Lumumba's removal was a prime objective  
5 of the covert actions of the Agency.

6 Mr. Tweedy. We would have given our eye teeth to have  
7 Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would  
8 agree with that.

9 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated  
10 September 16, 1960.

11 (The document referred to was  
12 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2  
13 for identification.)

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1           Mr. Baron. This contains references to the fact that  
2         "the station was flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup".

3           And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N.  
4         troops had interferred with Congolese troops and prevented  
5         them from arresting Lumumba.

6           Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters  
7         from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective  
8         custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu  
9         coup where Mobutu took over the government.

10          In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency  
11         it now reads:

12          "Station advised two moderate Congolese politician  
13         try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate  
14         Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity  
15         to organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him  
16         from scene soonest".

17          WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point,  
18         as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba  
19         was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a  
20         threat in the Congo?

21          Mr. Tweedy. I don't really recall but I think the  
22         chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody  
23         might very well result in his early release or his ability still  
24         to control matters. I should think that is very probable.

25          Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be

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1           this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was  
2           protected by the U.N. --

3           Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is probably true.

4           Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated  
5           September 20, 1960, which is sent -- off the record.

6           (The document referred to was  
7           marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for  
8           identification.)

9           (Discussion off the record.)

10

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1 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

2 Although the top of this cable does not indicate where  
3 the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the  
4 cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking  
5 at the designations that this cable must have been sent from  
6 Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?

7 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

8 Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to paragraph  
9 7 which says:

10 "Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba  
11 reconciliation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny  
12 possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly  
13 as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will  
14 do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt  
15 come out on top".

16 Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station  
17 in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned  
18 that Lumumba should not be allowed even a minor role in the  
19 government of the Congo?

20 Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

21 Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated  
22 January 19, 1961.

23 (The document referred to was  
24 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4  
25 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to --

2 Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville info  
3 headquarters, information headquarters.

4 Mr. Baron. So that headquarters would have received  
5 a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Elizabethville  
6 to the Station Chief in Leopoldville?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Right.

8 Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of this cable says:

9 "Thanks for Patrice. If we had known he was coming  
10 we would have baked a snake".

11 Do you have an independent recollection of this  
12 cable?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason  
14 of that phrase, which is another way of saying, a lighthearted  
15 way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived  
16 in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.

17 Mr. Baron. So this cable does not indicate that there  
18 was any connection between the CIA and Lumumba's eventual death,  
19 the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?

20 Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? I am not quite  
21 sure I understood that.

22 Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that  
23 the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba's  
24 death at the point when it occurred?

25 In other words, that they were connected to the people

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1 who caused his death?

2  
3 Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the  
4 question. This means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo-  
5 lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at  
6 Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't  
7 know very much, didn't presumably know very much about what  
8 occurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.

9 Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.

10 On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?

11 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

12 Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations con-  
13 cluded that it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba  
14 was actually killed in Kutanga.

15 I was asking you before whether this cable would indi-  
16 cate that the United States would have been involved in  
17 bringing about the death of Lumumba?

18 Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in-  
19 dicates that this part of the Agency, i.e., Elizabethville  
20 had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate  
21 except these few phrases that he put down here and would impli-  
22 although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a  
23 little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignorant  
24 Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter.  
25 We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able  
to follow the event except after the event.

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1 Mr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the  
2 events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?

3 Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.

4 Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly  
5 Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tysville  
6 out to Katanga where the authorities were known to be so  
7 hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there?

8 Mr. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely  
9 an African event.

10 Mr. Baron. At what point did you learn of Lumumba's  
11 death?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the  
13 world did. No one had a beat on this.

14 Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu in-  
15 tended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am sure the cable  
17 traffic would reflect it if I had.

18 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was  
19 sent from Europe, where he had been recruited by Arnold → 03  
20 [REDACTED] Silver, to the Congo in the fall of 1960?

21 Mr. Tweedy. I think I was reminded of this when I talked  
22 to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago.

23 Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the  
24 cryptonym of QJWIN.

25 Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym

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1 I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number  
2 of cryptonyms when reminded of them.

3 Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall 03  
4 there was an asset who had been recruited by [Arnold Silver] in  
5 Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission  
6 in November and December of 1960?

7 Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that  
8 conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that  
9 my recollection doesn't go any further than that.

10 But unlike some of the things I have been reminded 03  
11 of, I think recalled that asset of [Arnold Silver] had been  
12 involved. That is just as about as deep as my recollection  
13 goes.

14 Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection.  
15 first, by relating to you the testimony of JUSTIN O'Donnell  
16 who said that he did make use of QJWIN in the Congo as  
17 a kind of "alter ego" of his, a general operative of his.

18 Does that remind you at all of the nature of the  
19 mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?

20 Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.

21 Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase executive ac-  
22 tion?

23 Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers.

24 Mr. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you  
25 never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of

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1 a CIA program or plan.

2 Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington  
3 terms of executive action.

4 Mr. Baron. Meaning administrative action?

5 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

6 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to  
7 develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of  
8 a foreign leader, if required?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?

10 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project  
11 which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mean-  
12 pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin-  
13 ations if required?

14 Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?

15 Mr. Baron. Yes.

16 Mr. Tweedy. No.

17 Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had  
18 with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating  
19 Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the  
20 Agency about assassination capabilities?

21 Mr. Tweedy. Never.

22 Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with  
23 the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of  
24 assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in  
25 Congo?

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1           Mr. Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it  
2           was my deputy.

3           Mr. Baron. That would be?

4           Mr. Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that  
5           sense.

6           Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in relation to that  
7           plan or consideration?

8           Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he  
9           would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is  
10           all.

11           Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey?

12           Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't  
13           seen him in a long while.

14           Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey  
15           was in contact with [REDACTED] to develop the standby  
16           capability for carrying out assassinations?

17           Mr. Tweedy. I don't know anything about it whatsoever.

18           Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William  
19           Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?

20           Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.

21           Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document now that we will  
22           Mark Exhibit 5.

23           (The document referred to was  
24           marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for  
25           identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. This is a dispatch from the Chief of  
2 KUTUBE/D, which I believe is --

3 Mr. Tweedy. That is Staff D.

4 Mr. Baron. In the Foreign Intelligence Division, is  
5 that correct?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

7 Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station in Dakar [REDACTED]  
8 and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AF and  
9 Chief ME.

10 Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African  
11 Division?

12 Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?

13 Mr. Baron. The date is November 2, 1960.

14 Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.

15 Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would have been Chief of  
16 KU2D?

17 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was  
18 Chief of Staff D, in which case he could have, that is  
19 what he would have been then.

20 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the  
21 record you have had a chance to review this document and  
22 tell me some things about it. I would like to repeat on the  
23 record.

24 First of all, on this copy of the document there is  
25 typed the words Daniel M. Pressland, under the space for

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1                   officer's signature, and you said to me a moment ago that  
2                   you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonym  
3                   of William Harvey, is that right?

4                   Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

5                   Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to --

6                   Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief  
7                   of ID at the time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told  
8                   me he was Chief of ID than, I put those two together  
9                   and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was  
10                  Harvey, I can't swear to it, but I am virtually sure.

11                  Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollec-  
12                  tion of the subject matter that is discussed in this document?

13                  Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bell  
14                  at all.

15                  Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document  
16                  do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the  
17                  Congo would be, would have been?

18                  Mr. Tweedy. No.

19                  Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo --

20                  Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to  
21                  work with O'Donnell and whom O'Donnell went out there I  
22                  guess he was going to look into a number of things for  
23                  headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.  
24                  When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't  
25                  recollect by any means what the full auspices of O'Donnell's

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1 visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QJWIN  
2 was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going  
3 to work for him and act as his general assistant.

4 Mr. Baron. That was the way Mr. O'Donnell described  
5 it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes  
6 the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of Mr.  
O'Donnell.

7 Mr. Tweedy. This I don't think necessarily has anything  
8 to do with O'Donnell's mission whatsoever. This, I think, is  
9 generic mission, seems to indicate that he is going to  
10 muck around with Corsicans. I don't recall Corsicans, I  
11 know O'Donnell in the Congo at all.

12 Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been  
13 written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the  
14 Chief of the African Division?

15 Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote  
16 the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather  
17 from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don't  
18 know what the reference is about. But I gather that Dakar is  
19 brought into this activity because they wanted to act in a  
20 support capacity to this headquarters activity.

21 Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission  
22 in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con-  
23 cerned with?

24 Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.

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1                   Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of  
2                   Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without  
3                   going through the African Division although keeping the  
4                   African Chief informed?

5                   Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive.  
6                   You can't have one without the other. To answer your first  
7                   question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred  
8                   that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station  
9                   without the African Division being informed. This, however,  
10                  makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African  
11                  Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terms of  
12                  headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been  
13                  sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate  
14                  this with the Division and if the Division had perceived  
15                  any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it  
16                  before the dispatch went out.

17                  Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems  
18                  with this, if it did, and say so.

19                  Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would  
20                  Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?

21                  Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of  
22                  Staff D was.

23                  Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surrepti-  
24                  tious entry.

25                  Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals

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1 intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.

2 Mr. Baron. Would it be surprising to you that QJWIN might  
3 have been used in some manner in connection with an assassina-  
4 tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised  
5 by William Harvey without your knowledge?

6 Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and  
7 would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn't occur.

8 Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a  
9 moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN  
10 was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.

11 Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly  
12 I hadn't heard before. This sounds as if he was going to  
13 have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those  
14 two together but I know nothing about it at all.

15 Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, "In view of the extreme  
16 sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform  
17 his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do."

18 Do you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that  
19 QJWIN was asked to do?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I do not.

21 Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:

22 "The operation we have in mind is too sensitive  
23 to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets  
24 must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored --  
25 "minimum risk".

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1       What would these assets have been used for, what was  
2       the search for assets all about?

3                   Mr. Tweedy. I just do not know.

4                   Mr. Baron. Let's turn now to a document ..that we will  
5       mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which is a memo  
6       for the FN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI  
7       Division D.

8                   In this memo I will direct your attention to the  
9       sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told  
10      to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QJWIN was  
11      being used for FI/D purposes."

12                  Do you know what FID purposes QJWIN was being used  
13      for?

14                  Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

15                  Mr. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:

16                  "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensi-  
17      tive operational purpose which has been completed".

18                  Were you informed by William Harvey that QJWIN's  
19      mission was completed?

20                  Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall  
21      any aspect of the mission or its completion.

22                  Mr. Baron. Okay.

23                  Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the  
24      Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after re-  
25      ceiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by

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1 his fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the  
2 Congo?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I do recollect that and you brought it  
4 to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this  
5 a couple of months ago. I do remember the cryptonym and  
6 remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as  
7 a sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought  
8 if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be helpful  
9 and he was recruited on that rather general basis, and when you  
discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which  
indicated that he landed running and made some rather irresponsible  
remarks and we commented on them to the station.

10 My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed  
11 on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a  
12 somewhat useful intelligence source, but Hedgman would  
have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember  
quite well his dispatch. He had been seen by two or three  
members of my Division, including my deputy. I don't  
recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo.  
If I did I just don't remember. But I remember he was assessed,  
as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on  
a general purpose mission.

13 Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major  
14 assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?

15 Mr. Tweedy. How major I don't know. He was an

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asset. Only time would have told how major it would have been. He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety of things in the Congo by Hedgman.

Mr. Baron. Would one of those things for which he was qualified have been an assassination mission against Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr. Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division, not by me personally, Glenn Fields personally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the Division.

The Division knew nothing about the balance of this thing.

Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel outside of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known --

Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.

Mr. Baron. -- would not have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being considered?

Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.

Mr. Baron. And --

Mr. Tweedy. If they did learn of it I never knew that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it through me or Fields.

Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and training of this asset to other people in the Division than

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1 yourself and fields would indicate to you that he wasn't  
2 being considered at that point for an assassination mission?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I will put it differently. As far as  
4 I know he was never considered for an assassination mission  
5 at all.

6 He thought he was presumably being sent out for deeds  
7 of daring in the PM field and began to talk rather lusty when  
8 he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.

9 Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?

10 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

11 Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark  
12 Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is a cable to  
13 the headquarters, marked to Director from Leopoldville dealing  
14 with WIROGUE on an approach he made to agent QJWIN.

15 (The document referred to was  
16 marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7  
17 for identification.)

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Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we discussed two months ago and this happens all the time.

Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QJWIN's report that "WIROGUE had offered him \$300 per month to participate in intel net and be member". --I am sorry -- "member 'execution squad'".

Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this as a result of your having previously brought it to my attention and I recall it, it was a typical example of an agent or asset full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brief and he was certainly put back on the track very early on.

But in this business do not confuse execution squad with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or anything else. It had nothing to do with that.

Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you would assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made to QJWIN was probably not a part of that mission.

Mr. Tweedy. It was quite specifically not a part of that mission. There was a chapter of accidents. You have seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times before, two people who are peripherically involved in the same thing and run into each other and one smells something on the other.

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Mr. Baron. Again, why are you so sure that this would not have been connected in any way to the assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I thought I made that clear because this man went out up to a point through what I would call the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been handled that way.

Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr. Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He could have been but Hedgman would also have been required and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him. That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally in the PM field.

Mr. Baron. Did this report create a flap at headquarters at the time when the cable was sent?

Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly usual --

Mr. Tweedy. It is not.

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Mr. Baron. -- example of free wheeling by an operative?

Mr. Tweedy. It is the sort of thing that can happen.

What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem.

The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo  
with Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. Have I ever discussed events in the  
Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?

I can only assume I must have seen Sid during this period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions. In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo it would have been at that time.

Mr. Baron. Why would that be so?

Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney Gottlieb would have had no interest in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. So you mean if there had been any discussions between yourself and Sidney Gottlieb it probably would have --

Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.

Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological substances in his laboratory?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because I think that would have been Sidney Gottlieb's business as to what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest presumably would have been was there anything in his inventory

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that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.

Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory conversation with him on that subject?

Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if I didn't.

Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then I followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that probably the first conversation would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb, but this is merely what I would suspect was the way it occurred.

I don't say that that is the way it occurred. But other than that no conversation with Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo at all.

Mr. Baron. I am at the end of my questions on specific facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leading up to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want to say that I appreciate tremendously and know that the Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and unpleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.

I wonder if you have any facts that you would like to add to the record that you think are necessary to put our discussion today into context?

Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about

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my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo -- let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S. involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.

Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme sense of urgency, the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly State, the White House. I must say the Executive Department was very much working as a team during these days. Again forget Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off into left field or that I didn't know the way the White House was thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking about things, and the National Security was thinking about things, and I have no reason to believe they ever felt that they didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. It was an extraordinarily close thing.

I remember Mennen Williams trying to form a Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I was

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given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one, which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been a total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed, and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it a chance to move the way it has.

There are going to be ups and downs with the things but that is the way it is. I feel very strongly about it.

Does that somewhat answer your question,  
does that help?

Mr. Baron. I simply wanted to give you a chance.

Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very strongly and no other assignment that I have ever had was this kind of government team and cooperation ever really required because we weren't engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.

Mr. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you are talking about one that was primarily put together to carry out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the latter part of the 60's, '62, '63.

Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over whatever activity the United States Government felt it needed

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1 to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as  
2 purely policy questions of what the Ambassador to the U.N.  
3 might say to the Secretary General of the U.N. or what the  
4 President might want to say conceivably I suppose to the  
5 Chief of the Belgian state on such matters. Everything  
6 certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be  
7 involved in. It was the whole policy ball of wax with res-  
8 pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which  
9 the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.

10 Mr. Baron. Did this high degree of organization and  
11 intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba  
12 or had it gotten rolling?

13 Mr. Tweedy. I think --

14 Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly  
16 seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating  
17 Congo that started in the earliest days of independence  
18 and continued and, of course, when the Tschombe-Kutanga  
19 thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N.  
20 was there, then, of course, that was it.

21 In other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S.  
22 concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read  
23 them in the press just continued and continued, but one thing  
24 was perfectly clear, was that the U.S. was quite determined  
25 to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than

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the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings. He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he was continually goosing his staff to do just that , but in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer.

Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and analysis in the intelligence community generally and there may be other members of the Committee staff that would like to call upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long experience in Agency activities.

But I want to thank you now for your complete cooperation and the tremendous amount of information that you have provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you anything I can do to help the Committee in other areas I will be glad to do it and if I don't think I can help because I don't think I know enough about the subject I will just say so, otherwise I am not afraid to put in, two bits in.

Mr. Baron. As far as your two bits goes, we would be interested in your two bits worth on policy recommendations in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make,

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1 and we will take that up at some point in the future. But  
2 you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy  
3 level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that.

4 That is all, thank you.

5 Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.

6 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)  
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