

diff-jfk: record 104-10400-10311 - Page 1 - (diff between 2025 and 2023)

Highlighted changes between 2025/104-10400-10311.pdf and 2023/104-10400-10311.pdf

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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PAGE 01

IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76

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CITE LONDON 68796

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

NELSON FRUM MEYER

REF: ROGER CHANNEL 09548

1. REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW IT WORKS.

2. TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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PAGE 02-02

IN 795558

TOR:151902Z JAN 76

LOND 68796

ADVISED THAT BRITS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR HART WANTS BUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE. HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD HOOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND WITH MR. ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED BY MR. TONKIN AT A LATER DATE.

3. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.

4. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.

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1-71 MFG. 2/75

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			TORI1500522 JAN 76		CNBR 21033		

S E C R E T 142302Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 21033

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE 12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION BRIEFING AT 0830/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0930). CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN GIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.

2. CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY AT 0830. WITH **CUNNEELY** PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN **AUSTRALIA**, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HQS IN MANAGEMENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF **LIAISON**, STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO

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PAGE 02

IN 794546

TORI150052Z JAN 76

CNBR 21033

PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SPECIFIC DETAILS OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT WITH TARGETS AND USE OF **LIAISON -** STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS! THE "LIVE WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY

COS RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND HQS MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE **WELCH** INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.

3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

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SNOODGRASS HAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND IT
 IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE (CANBERRA 21027). AT (IN 793209)

SNOODGRASS REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING
 WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GDB OFFICIALS. THE DETAILS OF THAT
 MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF
 THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029. ON
 BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THOSE
 MEETINGS, SUGGEST CEA AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED
 CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION
 BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT.

4. THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRESSMEN
 INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD
 BEEN COVERED. COS STRESSED THAT HE WERE AVAILABLE TO
 CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY
 WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN
 ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT
 WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS
 DEPARTED ON THEIR "V IS IT" IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE,
 AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH,
 ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300. E2, IMPDET.

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TOR:122154Z JAN 76.				CNBR 21007	

S E C R E T 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21007

TO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

REFS: A. JAKARTA 35606 (w787635)
 B. JAKARTA 35661 (w790579)

CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING

ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE
 WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.

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IN 791004

TOR:121111Z JAN 76

JKRT 35674

S E C R E T 120939Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **JAKARTA** 35674*g*

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO

REF: **JAKARTA** 35661 (190579)

1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY, REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.

2. MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS.

HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR. SNODGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK OF ONE STATION WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL

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7-71 MFG. 2/76

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IN 791004

TO R:121111Z JAN 76

JKRT 35674

RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE ^A RELISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNODGRASS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS OPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN **JAKARTA** WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS.

3. MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.

4. THUS IT SEEKS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC ABOUT IT.

5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF CODEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET

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PAGE 01

IN 790651

TOR:112233Z JAN 76

CNBR 21000

S E C R E T 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 21000TO: IMMEDIATE **WELLINGTON** INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: WELLINGTON 15837 (in 787572)

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800 AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.

3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO **BRIGADIER GILBERT**.

4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

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TOR:112313Z JAN 76					CNBR 21001

S E C R E T 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 21001

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH

SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, D/JIO AND SOTERN/44, EACH FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON, DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET.

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.

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IN 798579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

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S E C R E T 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **JAKARTA** 35661.TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE **CANBERRA, SYDNEY.**NIACT **CANBERRA**

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF **COVER WORK** ^{AT} **PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS**, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY, **INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES**, DIA ROLE IN INDONESIA, AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP ^{CU} SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE

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IN 790579

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- CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).

3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.

NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR OUTLOOK.

4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.
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IN 789314

TOR:091229Z JAN 76

CNBR 20992

S E C R E T 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 20992TO: **WELLINGTON** INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: **WELLINGTON** 15837 787572)

1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.
2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY **JAKARTA** INFO **CANBERRA, WELLINGTON-Y**

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: **JAKARTA** 35600 [IN 787573*] Y

1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN
 MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP
 DISCUSSIONS HERE-Y

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS.
 OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF
IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT, ^{IF PUBLISHED} WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT
 WITH **INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT** PLUS
 CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES
 IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
 IN **INDONESIA** WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN **INDONESIA**.
 ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL
 PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF
 PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH-Y

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED"
 VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

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Mr. Waller *gj*

RELEASING OFFICER

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WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.

4. FOR **CANBERRA, WELLINGTON:** IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/ BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION **AS JAKARTA MATERIAL.** E2, IMPDET.

H

DATE: 8 JAN 76
 ORIG: B-J-HOUSTON
 UNIT: DCEA
 EXT: 9373

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO
RELEASING OFFICER

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THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

AUTHENTICATION OFFICER

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CITE **JAKARTA** 35606TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE **CANBERRA** ROUTINE **WELLINGTON**.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: **JAKARTA** 035600 **(P) 787573** *

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congratulations
travel*

1. CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN **INDONESIA**, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF **INDONESIAN** MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD SAID. COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL **INDONESIAN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE"** PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES

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JKRT 35606

RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS.

2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN **INDONESIA**. THEY APPEARED HIGHLY INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH MADE MENTION OF **INDONESIA'S** CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE HE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR **INDONESIAN** COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT HE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF **PRESIDENT SUHARTO**, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING THE **INDONESIAN** U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM **JAKARTA**.

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BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT
PRESIDENT SUHARTO HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE **INDONESIAN** UN.
 DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS displeasure KNOWN
 TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT MARCOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S., AND NATURALLY Affected CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO. HE ASKED FOR COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO

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DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT. COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS **INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS** THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.

4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS. GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY. CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN **SUKARNO** ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED, "LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!" THEY EXPRESSED VERY LITTLE OF THEIR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CUNDOF OF MR. COLBY.

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5. GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR CONVERSATION WITH COS. ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT UP TO THAT TIME, SINCE THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FROM THE **INDONESIANS** THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADQUARTERS ADVICE TO TREAT WITH THESE GENTLEMEN SEPARATELY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, WHOSE INTERESTS SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS'. E2, IMPDET.

*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on 7 January.

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7-73 MFG. 12/75

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CITE JAKARTA 35600

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMMCONGA

REF: A. DIRECTOR 788143

B. DIRECTOR 788139

C. DIRECTOR 788390

D. DIRECTOR 785722

1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO CONTACTED CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON AND LATER MR. TED LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY.

2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REFD. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WEREVER CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES.

3. MILFORD WAS SERIOUS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL, OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED

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IN STATION'S **LIAISON** PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE **INDONESIAN** GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIEVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WERE LARGEY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DOG. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. COS OUTLINED A FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE HIM.

~~PAGE 52 JAKARTA 35600 S E C R E T~~

4. OFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND GY

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THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED
COULD NOT BE BASIS AND MCHD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND OQ SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE ^{KE} PRESENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOED THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ^{YI} SEEING THAT IT WOULD HAVE ^{NO} MHQ LEGISLATION ^{NO} AUTORITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.

5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS' VIEWS ON THIS LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES^S, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST HAVE ^{some} ^A SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD ^{AT} BE OUT OF BUSINESS. COS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT

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TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.

6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATION ACTIVITIES. COS POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE **RIVES** AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED **GENERAL YOGA** IF **YOGA** FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN **INDONESIAN** AFFAIRS. **GENERAL YOGA** REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP **BAKIN** SOMEWHAT FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF **BAKIN** ARE CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. **YOGA** CONTINUED THAT **BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATE** IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC GOAL. **YOGA** ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON

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RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH, THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JAPANESE,

WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED MARY WHO WAS ~~HAS~~ BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT. SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE; HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.

9. MILFORD ASKED FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PASSED ON TO HIM. THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.

10. OVERALL BELIEVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILFORD EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED THAT IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO WOULD BE IMPRESSED.

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11. WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING
 WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE **CANBERRA** 20980

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMMCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555

1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY

ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH **SOTERN REP**

(PROBABLY SOTERN/44, D/JIO AND SQUASH/D-Q.

2. COS **AND BONHAM** DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH
EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME
FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN
EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE WELLINGTON 15837

TO: CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959

B. DIRECTOR 787555

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS WELLINGTON CAN ARRANGE
15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NZ SECURITY INTELLI-

GENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H. E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN

MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION
DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY

PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN

CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR

FLIGHT TO MT. COOK WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH
GILBERT. PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN

CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT.

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TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON-4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 4

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 1*

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON
OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH
LIAISON. E2, IMPDET-H

*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.

DATE: 2 JAN 76
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THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA

BILL J. HOUSTON DCEA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO.4

RYBAT PLMHCONGAY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} |*|

B. DIRECTOR 787555 {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} |**|4

1. BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDRESSES AS FOLLOWS:4

JAKARTA - MORNING 7 JANUARY

CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY

WELLINGTON - EVENING 14 JANUARY 4

2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE {PIKE COMMITTEE}, HAS BEEN MOST INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HQS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES

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AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE LIAISON CONTACTS.

3. FOR **JAKARTA**: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CONTACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.

Mr. Lou Bonham

4. FOR **CANBERRA**: **(BONHAM'S)** MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET AND DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITY WITH **MR. [REDACTED] BONHAM** IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF 30 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT **FACILITY AT TIPENBILLO**. IF SO, SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE PRIORITY.

5. FOR **WELLINGTON**: MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY **WELLINGTON** SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION.

6. FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS REST STOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO

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7. REQUEST ACTION ADDDEES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HQS HAS PROVIDED MILFORD NAMES COS'S IN **JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON.** REQUEST STATIONES CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATIONOFFICER ASSIST MRS. MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET.H

*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.
 **CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.

DEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT {DRAFT}
 OLC - R. CHIN {DRAFT},

DATE: 3 JANUARY 76
 ORIG: R. CHIN
 UNIT: OLC
 EXT: 7030

Theodore G. Shackley, CEA
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

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BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA
 BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA

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CITE **JAKARTA 35549 (SHIMA ACTING)**

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMMCONGA CONGRESSMAN

REFS: A4 DIRECTOR 787555

B4 DIRECTOR 785722

1. **CHARGE MIKE RIVES** HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A, WILL ARRANGE BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL.

2. ON 2 JANUARY **HAFAWN/1** TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY **BAKIN** FROM **HACLAUSE/1**. HE PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **INDONESIAN** PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON **PRESIDENT SUHARTO**. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT **GENERAL MURDANI** BRIEF THE GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. **BAKIN** HAS SENT CABLE TO **MURDANI** TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT **BAKIN** HQS ON 7 JANUARY. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS BRIEFING. STATION ARRANGED **BAKIN** BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHARGE.

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TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 785722 |*|

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE:

ETD	JAKARTA	1200	8 JAN FOR BALI	Y
ETD	BALI	0800	9 JAN FOR CANBERRA	Y
ETA	CANBERRA	1740	9 JAN	Y
ETA	WELLINGTON	1515	14 JAN	Y
ETD	WELLINGTON	1000	15 JAN FOR MT. COOK	Y
ETD	MT. COOK	1400	15 JAN FOR CHRIST CHURCH	Y
ETA	CHRIST CHURCH	1500	15 JAN	Y
ETD	CHRIST CHURCH	09 16 2330	16 JAN FOR HAWAII	Y

NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY
 MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574.Y

2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH
 COS, JAKARTA 10 JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS,
 WELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES
 THIS CASE. MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW

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SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME.

3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC {MR. ROBERT CHIN}
BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975:

A. NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT
REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW
TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS **IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND**
INDONESIA WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.

B. **AUSTRALIA:** THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA,
MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT
SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET,
CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN **AUSTRALIA.** IT
WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH
UNILATERALLY **AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS** WITH THE **AUSTRALIAN**
LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE **53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, 66 CHINESE,**
8 HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS, 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS
AND 17 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT
BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL **AND JOINT**
OPERATIONS WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST

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EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY IN **AUSTRALIA** BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN **AUSTRALIA**. HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTON OF KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN **AUSTRALIA** BUT WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDERSCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON **AUSTRALIA** ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S **LIAISON WITH ASIO, ASIS AND JIO**.

C. **NEW ZEALAND**: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD **THREE** PEOPLE IN **WELLINGTON** WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING **JOINT OPERATIONS** WITH **THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE** AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC

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AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON AUSTRALIA.

D. INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA, MEDAN AND SURABAYA. CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA. THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PERSPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO INDONESIA. THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA. THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF

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STATION'S EFFORTS IN **INDONESIA** WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN **INDONESIA**. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN **INDONESIA**.

E. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS.

F. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN **AUSTRALIA**, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF **AUSTRALIAN** LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES' REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.

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PARTICULARLY IN **AUSTRALIA**, WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSONALITIES.

4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2, IMPDET.H

* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.

DATE: 31 DEC 75
 ORIG: B-HOUSTON
 UNIT: DCEA
 EXT: 9373

OLC Rchm
 DDS&T
 SA/DDO
 EA/PMI

BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, DCEA
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RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

- REFS: A. **CANBERRA** 20866 [IN 774560*] {RELAYING **JAKARTA, WELLINGTON**}
 B. DIRECTOR 784159 ** {RELAYING **JAKARTA, WELLINGTON**} 4
 LARG NUMBER
 1. THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO **JAKARTA, CANBERRA,**

SYDNEY, AND **WELLINGTON**. GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND

the only WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WHO ARE GOING AT THIS TIME. NONE FRANK SLATINSHEK OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. DEPT OF DEFENSE REQUESTED CHIEF COUNSEL OF COMMITTEE FULLY CLEAR AND TRAVELLING BY HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP. CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH WITH SYDNEY AND EXPECT YOU MAY CONTACT YOU IF COMMITTEE STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO TRAVELLING WITH GROUP. INTEREST DEVELOPS.

2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (DEMOCRAT, TEXAS) WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE (HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE) WILL ACCOMPANY THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN

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MILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS A BALANCED ONE. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS.

3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT IS LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.

A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS. STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION

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DOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC. 4

B. AGENT ACQUISITION: STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. 4

C. AGENT AUTHENTICATION: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHORIZED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. 4

D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED.

5. ~~RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION CYCLE~~

~~RECOMMENDATION FOR APPROVAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION CYCLE~~

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FOR **CANBERRA** AND **WELLINGTON**: SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION FROM **LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS.** (FYI: OBJECTIVE K HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM **CANBERRA** OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.) THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING **LIAISON AS**

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EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. POINT OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED.

E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS. WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON.

F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO underscore ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS.

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DIRECTOR

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4. WHERE APPLICABLE (SUCH AS **JAKARTA**) BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS. 4

5. FOR **CANBERRA** AND **WELLINGTON**: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN **AUSTRALIA** AND **NEW ZEALAND**. HE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES. 4

6. FOR **JAKARTA**: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF **SUHARTO** REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. 4

7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS, CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574. 4

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. 4

9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF VISIT. ~~888 888888~~ ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: 4

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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* INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.

** HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.

DDS&T/OEL

OLC

SA/DDO

~~RECD~~

EA/PMI - J. Walpert

DATE: 24 DEC 75
 ORIG: B.J.HOUSTON
 UNIT: ACEA
 EXT: 9373

DAVID BLEE, A/DDO
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TOR1280501Z NOV 75

SEOU 25948

S E C R E T 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25948

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25761 (73 b898)

*With regards to
 Congressman Milford
 Request for letter
 from General Hollingsworth*

1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT. GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD, FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH.
2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:

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7-71 MFG, 2/76

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GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRY THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL. THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY VIEWS.

AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RESOURCES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.

ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS VIABLE. THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR

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OWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.

LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF HIS READINESS AND THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS, US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.

NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WE

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STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE ^{CMIC SU} SUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING WOULD COME LARGEMLY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF INFORMATION.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE **TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED**

CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF

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DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.

IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED **A HIGH ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS**

TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S

ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTED **SYSTEM** INCLUDES A **DOWN LINK**

CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A **NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA**

COLLECTED. OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND

NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE **DOWN**

LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED **OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS,**

WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION

SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONTHELESS, GENERAL

HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR

PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE

YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE,

AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES

IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP

TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT

NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

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SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE

E2, IMPDET.

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SECRET 100322Z NOV 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25761

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25730 (*N 732789*)

*File with
Traveling
Deputy
Congressman*

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264382 (ROGER CHANNEL)

10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN
 MILFORD. REF: SEOUL 8531. * 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED
 TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED
 PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE, Owing TO
 SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER
 LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE.

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

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TOR:310345Z OCT 75

SEOU 25687

S E C R E T 310314Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25687

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25649

(724591) *

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION
 WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY
 ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS
 BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED
 HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).

2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE
 DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. R PROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY
 TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION
 WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL
 PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY
 OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.

3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED
 COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN
 DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY
 REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE XAGE OR WE UI
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FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75

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TUR:310345Z OCT 75

SEOU 25687

STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.
 THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS. COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.

4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.
 E2, IMPDET.

CS COMMENT: *COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D-Texas) on 25 October 1975.

* Bonus Src'd

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S E C R E T 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 1 OF 4

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TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PL MHCONGA

REF: A. SEOUL 25646

(723/38)

B. DIRECTOR 759641

FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING
 MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS
 WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975.
 BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND
 DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING
 ROOM.

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION
 BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.
 IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT ASSESSMENT, HE STATED
 THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE
 REPORT WILL STATE THAT:

A. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN
 MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.

B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS

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TOR: 280440Z OCT 75

SEOU 25649

IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,

C. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLY
JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.

2. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE
INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION
THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS
DID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY
OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO
THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS
OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF". HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH
THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH
COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT
ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE.
HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS
APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT
ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP
OF THIS PROPOSAL, HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS
YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.
HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED
LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES. HE IS

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ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HIS STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR Sanguine THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN.

3. COS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES. COS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED. HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER, OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE ASSIGNMENT.

4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE

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OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE MANNER. THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT THE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY THE HOUSE MEMBERS.

5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WHETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION. IF CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL HEADLINES. HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHICH WAS WORSE.

6. THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE

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A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED IN A NON-OBJECTIVE MANNER. HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER IS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT A WORKING MONTH, THIS GIVES HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT. SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND CHAIRMAN OF ONE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT. HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS TO APPEAR, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE AND BALANCED PRESENTATION. THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE "DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HE ALSO FORESAW NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE MAJORITY REPORT. HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS'

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ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL PERMITTED. HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT. IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

7. THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE

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S E C R E T 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL, AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE "ALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE". HE STATED THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER REMEDIAL ACTIONS. COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL

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WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".)

8. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER, SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLNGED (ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY).

9. COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN WOULD BE RECPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION. GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD

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DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART THE COURSE. IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD. COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PROGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION.

TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT M. HUNT, THE DEPUTY J-2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR. DELMAR C. LANG INTO THE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANNELS WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE. COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,

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REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCID'S UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S. HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS RETURN.

10. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE DECISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL. LONG, THE DEPUTY J-2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE EMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND TO DELAY THE MORE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE; TO STIFLE DISSENTING VIEWS; AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED SUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO CONTROL AND REVIEW. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY

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STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL REPORTING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE ON HIS "WILD-EYED" LIBERAL PEERS.

11. COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE DCI TO FURTHER REFINISH THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, MRS. EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN AMERICA. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS. THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS

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A MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY.

COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.

12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE FIELD. LOCAL COORDINATION WAS EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S REPORTING WAS STRESSED. COS STATED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER HAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS

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TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

NOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.G., THE OFFICE OF THE CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY. COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH

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INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT,
CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL
LEVEL SYSTEM,

13, THE COS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR
COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE
ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY
J-2, COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES
SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY
ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER
DCID 5/1.

14, THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT
HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND
WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT
FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE
SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE
THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND
EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY
SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE
ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS
DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES

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TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.

15. ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES. LANG ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION.

THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD. COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER

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EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT ESO TERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION. BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRABLE DUPLICATIVE TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT RESPONSIBILITY. MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED.

16. DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN

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MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH. THE CONGRESSMAN LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.

17. IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE OF HIS CONCERN IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO A MINORITY REPORT. HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA. HOLLINGSWORTH TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY

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SCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION. THE GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL, PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM. HE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS. HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT. HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT NO INTEL OFFICER. WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA. HOLLINGSWORTH ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING, NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY

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TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

AND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL. THE GENERAL DECLINED TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, BUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM"; CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO HIS REPORT.

18. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS, THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DDCI BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA

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REQUIREMENTS. HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE HIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR. HE BELIEVED THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE.

19. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE DAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE. HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE

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COMMITTEE STAFF.

20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH
 CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER. WILL ADVISE,
 E2, IMPDET.

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TO: PANAMA CITY 4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

REF: PANAMA CITY 34339 IN 7231354

1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS, NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION. 4

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 1972 CASE OF MAIL INTERCEPTS INADVERTENTLY SENT TO PANAMA.

SA/DDO - NORM SHEPANEK {TELECOORD}

DATE: 28 OCT 75
 ORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM:EME
 UNIT: C/LA/CAM/PA
 EXT: 1805

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DATE-TIME GROUP
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CITY

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759842

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CONF: C/0A 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF,
 DDO, DDO/00, S/0DOP

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KODE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,

SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. *

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA *

REF: DIRECTOR 759843 *

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM 8888888888 PLMHCONGA. *
2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS {PLMPTACT} PRIVACY CHANNEL. *
3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET-H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}
 EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: CEA/ESEC
 UNIT: S.M. LABAR
 EXT: 1709 *

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

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CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF CS/RF,
000, 000/00, SAT/00 IN FILE # 112

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOBÉ, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,

SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. 4

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA 4

REF: DIRECTOR 759842 4

B1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.

2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}

EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: CEA/ESEC
UNIT: S.M. LABAR
EXT: 1709THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
REL. ADDRESS OFFICE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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DIRECTOR

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C/EA 3

INFO: FILE

DCI/REVIEW STAFF, ASRF,
200, 000/00, 00/000, 000
REF: A. SEOUL 25645 |IN 722803|
B. SEOUL 25646 |IN 723138| 4

DISSEM BY:

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IMMEDIATE SEOUL. 4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

REF: A. SEOUL 25645 |IN 722803|

B. SEOUL 25646 |IN 723138| 4

1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: 4

A. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. 4

B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE

DATE: 24 OCT 75
 ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM
 UNIT: C/EA
 EXT: 1428

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DIRECTOR

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OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.

THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. 4

20

20

C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET ARE STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. 4

D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. 4

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E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. 4

F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART 1 AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. 4

G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO underscore ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

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EXT:

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DIRECTOR

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- INDEX DISSEM BY:
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- IP FILES #

PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS

AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. Y

2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES. Y

3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y

4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.H

AC/EA/JK Melvin
 DC/EA G. G.
 C/EA/COPS TJ

DATE: 24 OCT 75
 ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM C/REVIEW STAFF S. G.
 UNIT: C/EA C/OLC

DDO
 RELEASING OFFICER

A/DDO
 C/REVIEW STAFF
 C/OLC

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E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 061991

Theodore G. Shackley
 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Senator's Travel File

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IN 722803

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SEOU 25645

S E C R E T 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25645

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT CODEL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492

B. DIRECTOR 758427

1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23 OCTOBER AT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.

WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE/F NOT

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		TOR:240650Z OCT 75		SEOU 25645

SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.

2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.

3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECUPERATION. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.

E2 IMPDET

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DATE-TIME GROUP

231741Z DIRECTOR

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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INFO: FILE

dcy/Review staff c7RF

DOD, DOD/DCI, DOD

758926

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TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA, Y

ADMIN Y

0 IN FILES # 112

1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.Y

2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET-H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD
 UNIT: NE/COPS
 EXT: R-1562

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TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-4

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ADMIN Y.

REF: DIRECTOR 758926

IDEN: PLMHCONGA E2 IMPDET-H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
 ORIG: **SAMUEL H. RICKARD**
 UNIT: NE/COPS
 EXT: R-1562

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CONF: C/EUR 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF CS/RF
DDO: DDO/00 SA/DDO

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TO: ROME 4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

FOR ACOS AND OZGA 4

1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTROY PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST MR. OZGA PLAN REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. 4

2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET-H

21 OCTOBER 1975

PHILIP F. FENDIG

DC/EUR

1283

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICERSA/DDO CIN DRAFT
COORDINATING OFFICERDC/EUR CIN DRAFT
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CS/RF, DDO. ~~DCI DDO.~~

DATE-TIME GROUP

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211745Z DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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DISSEM BY: 38

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NO INDEX

RETURN TO PER DDO

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TO: LONDON, BONN.4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON.
PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED
TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF
UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC
AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 OCTOBER 75
ORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG
UNIT: DC/EUR
EXT: 1883

in C/EUR

Philip F. Fendig
DC/EUR

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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
17 OCT 1975

DDA/DO 75-5767

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List

1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.
2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad.
3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.


Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO

Distribution:

C/AF	C/SE
C/EA	C/CCS
C/EUR	C/CI
C/DCD	C/OPS
C/DIVD	C/PS
C/FR	C/SS
C/LA/	SA/DDO
C/NE	SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796

13-00000

17 OCT 1975

DDO 75-47

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975.

Peter V. Raudenbush
Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO

Distribution:

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Philip F. Fendig
DC/EUR

EXTENSIÓN

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

RECEIVED FORWARDER

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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SAV DDO

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John

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S E C R E T 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 66194

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

REF A. DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:

A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

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IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON

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COLLECTION OPERATION. AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY **COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS** TAKING PLACE IN **THE U.K.**

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US. AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIALE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE **COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH** REPRESENTATIVES SERVICING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

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COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET

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

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IN-716059

CITE BONN 43387

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 752556

1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY STIGGINS [HIBBERT] AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15 OCTOBER. AARON HAD LUNCH WITH [HIBBERT] AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE COLONEL OLIVER RAY. HE MET FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR HILLENBAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.

2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY. AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED. HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS, AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPTABLE. IN PRACTICE, HE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. HE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS IN RECENT YEARS;

3. MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLLECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED MILITARY ODS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL

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CONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN WHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS PROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY.

4. TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZABLE ALLOTMENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR SALARY AND EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER (HERZFANZ NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON.

5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT "FANCY" POLITICAL SOURCES, ALONG LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW IN NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT THESE LONG-STANDING CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD FRIENDSHIPS. FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATIONS ACTUALLY REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL OUTLINE OF "HILTON AFFAIR" (WITHOUT NAMES) AS EXAMPLE HOW DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESONE. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS.

6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED. WE RESPONDED THAT IN GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS KEY ELEMENT, PLUS FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES.

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7. MR. AARON ASKED ABOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMBASSADOR INFORMED ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAN FIELD. WE REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE SOURCES LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS, MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS" PROVISION OF OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED OUT THAT EACH CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY CONSULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON OTHER HAND HE CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN.

8. MR. AARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER STRENGTH AND GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REPORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED HQS BY TM DATED 25 SEPT 74.) WE EXPLAINED THAT BREAKDOWN SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY AND SAID THAT FOR NUMBER OFFICERS (THOSE ENGAGED IN LIAISON, SUPPORT, ANALYSIS, FOR INSTANCE) IT NOT ALWAYS EASY TO CATEGORIZE THEIR EFFORTS.

9. HE PROBED IN SOME DETAIL ON OUR NOC STRENGTH AND WE ANSWERED CANDIDLY. MR. AARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS NOC OFFICERS IN STATION AND SAID HAD HEARD OPINION FROM SOME CIA OFFICERS THAT NOC PREFERABLE TO OFFICIAL COVER. WE SAID FELT THIS DEPENDENT ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE IN GERMANY ARMY COVER READILY AVAILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY AND COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN NOC COVER. AARON ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER NOC. WE EXPLAINED NOC PRIMARILY USED FOR PERSONNEL WE PLANNED KEEP ASSIGNED GERMANY SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE NOC PROBABLY MORE SECURE AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. WHEN HE PUSHED FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTLY CONSIDERED PUTTING OFFICER UNDER STUDENT COVER IN HEIDELBERG WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE STUDENTS SIGNIFICANT TARGET REPRESENTED BUT THAT THIS PLAN DROPPED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. WE MADE NO MENTION USE JOURNALIST COVER AND DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY COVER FIRMS BY NAME.

10. AARON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT AARON'S ENVISAGED AS THREE PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME. AARON OUTLINED HIS DUTIES AS MANAGEMENT OF STATION, EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SAID MANAGEMENT OF

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STATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION,
THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS
TIME AND EFFORT.

11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR
TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. E2 IMPDET.

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BONN 43389

S E C R E T 161855Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 43389

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF BONN 43387(1W716059)

WEN ✓
DHRB S
Pax

1. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR. AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL SOURCES" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.

R 2. ON POINT QMA. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE. THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.

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THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY CONTACTS.

3. REGARDING PARA 1.B., AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS. COS EMPHASITICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE STATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM. HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PERSONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT

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COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW. LOOKING BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF FLAPS WOULD SUBSTANTIATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RESPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.

5. MR. AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM AS A MISSION HE WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW IT PROBABLY NEED A STAFF OF AT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO CARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR. AARON THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSADOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THE AMBASSADOR, AN APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE. THE AMBASSADOR WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION BY MR. AARON THAT AT LEAST A NUMBER OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE

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GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF
 INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE
 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. E2-IMPDET.

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S E C R E T 161302Z OCT 75

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SITE BORN 43369

~~*Recommended dissemination~~
~~to DOLC & DCI (Review)~~

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLKMBALL

1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON ~~15 OCTOBER~~. SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED.

2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY

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COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG. MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. EE IMPDET.

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TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLKMBALL

WEA

REF A. DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES.

2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:

A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

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IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.

B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.

C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED

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COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND HE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY **COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS** TAKING PLACE IN **THE U.K.**

F. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIALE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE **COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE** FOR GRAPHS REPRESENTATIVES SERVICING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

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COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.

4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET

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6 Oct 75 1658

Review Staff: 75/3149/aDate 6 October 1975*Marge file*

TO : CIA Task Force
 FROM : The Review Staff, Walter Elder
 SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request
 RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905

The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Comments:

*1st Meeting - Briefing
on 8 Oct 1975 by DCI/DRR Feindig*
2nd Briefing - 10 Oct 75 by Feindig

Action Info

SC/DCI		X
A/DDA		X
A/DDI		X
A/DDO	<i>S/XIG</i>	
A/DDS&T		X
OGC		X
OLC		X
IG		X
B. Evans		X
<i>SA</i>	<i>DDO</i>	<i>✓</i>

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 2, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, **Embassy Station** officers and military commanders... As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

Bob

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 91st CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1975

REVIEW STAFF

75-3150

Mr. William G. Hyland
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA

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3. File

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

M stabs
 Attached is
 worth reading.
 Report on a
 trip of Daniel
 Aaron and Bell
 Richardson (both ssc)
 to Latin America.
 Neto Acre (8,
 BRIL 24723.

Thanks!
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Signature

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TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NACT BUENOS AIRES

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1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER. GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING IN URUGUAY. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL. MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".

2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM.

3. THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID

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AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN **URUGUAY** WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING **PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS.** COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.

4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?

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COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT HOW TO HANDLE HIS OVERT CONTACT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO DISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER: THE SAME.

5. THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER. HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART SAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND THEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECRUITING THEM. COS POINTED OUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT HERE IS PROSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS SOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SURCE REGISTER. COS ADDED THAT MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.

6. TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO DO SO, WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES, PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE **LIAISON** TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS

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BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.

7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT HE WORK WITH LIAISON ON THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE HAS ADVISED LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCE OF A SOVIET OFFICIAL, HE SAID PROBABLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO FLAP POTENTIAL. AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT.

8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OF NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS OF INFLUENCE. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON THEIR REQUEST, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO OR

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BEING ASKED IF WE HAD BEEN DOING ANYTHING IN URUGUAY FOR THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS ENOUGH. ALEXANDER REPLIED THAT HE WAS ASKED TO DO THIS KIND OF THING FOR YEARS.) WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN THE DOCUMENT WAS SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL. IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON, WHILE THEY UNDERSTOOD THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO MAINTAIN A COORDINATED POSITION, THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF LIAISON PERSONNEL.

A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE.

ANSWER: NO. DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN

URUGUAY. ANSWER: NO, ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES.

THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF

INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY

COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER:

TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO

OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY

IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF

INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF

MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT

THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S.

COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY. WE ANSWERED THAT URUGUAY IS

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CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FRIEND OF THE U.S. AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF OTHER STATIONS IN **LATIN AMERICA**, I.E., TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT KNOW. CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER. WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS THROUGH AN EBA? YOU AND HE PLANNED TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOMORROW. HE TALKED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. THEY TALKED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

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TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NI ACT BUENOS AIRES

RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO. TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES. TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE AMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.

9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET. HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER

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OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET PROVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUT MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE.

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OF OTHER THINGS TO DO.

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WE H

NONE IN URUGUAY. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

1 SAIDDO
J. WALLER

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.

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2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G., LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

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THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

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UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE **NOC** PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR **COVER COMPANIES**, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR **NOCS** (**SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND**) IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING **NOCS** (NO, DIRECT **INSIDE C/O CONTACT** UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND **NOCS** WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (**CONTACT REPORTS**) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT **(PENETRATION OF****LIAISON** AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELSTAPS,

SURVEILLANCE, ETC,--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON

COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HQS

BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A **MEDIA OP** AND A **COVERT POL** ACTION OP.

MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR

POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO

THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN

POL ACTION IN **BRAZIL** FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS

SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION,

THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723 6 E O E~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS

EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL **MEDIA CAPABILITY** AS WELL ASAN **AGENT OF INFLUENCE** PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY

RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE

CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO

KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL CO'S SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

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THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES V/S/A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

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TOP IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS
 CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE
 AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
 ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE
 CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF
 THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE
 POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
 OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE
 PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS
 PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
 CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
 SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
 SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
 ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

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COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL **PENETRATION EFFORTS** FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIDS AND THE GIRLS AND TAILED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT **SPORLON ACTIVITIES** IN **RIO** EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT **NSA** WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE **SPORLON PRODUCTS** (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE **INTERCEPT** PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO **AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION** ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF **AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,** ETC.

14. **AARON** EVINCED GREAT INTEREST **IN THE COVER** PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT **COVER** COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS **WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,** THAT THEY GAVE **ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME** ON THE ACTUAL **WORK OF THAT SECTION**, THEN SPENT **THE REST OF THE WORK** DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE **ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK** FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EquALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (AT) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

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A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF BUENOS AIRES 34511

(n 64826S)*

1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT

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BUEN 34519

HQS APPROVAL. OTHER INFO COULD BE SHOWN AT DISCRETION OF COS. SUBJ OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS TO AMB PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY AMB. AMB SAID HE TOOK POSITION THIS WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD TO BE SOLVED IN WASHINGTON AND HAD SO INFORMED ROGERS. (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER TO ROGERS TO THIS EFFECT.) AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM (HAVANA MERIDIANO 80 IN SPANISH 1-15 JUL 75 PP 5-6, ARTICLE BY CARLOS MARIA GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS CIA AGENT IN ARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE BE SHOWN TO VISITORS IN CAR. AMB TRUEHEART READ ARTICLE AND COMMENTED SOMETHING TO EFFECT THAT ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING TO BE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT. MR. AARON DID NOT READ IT. POUCHING COPY. (AMB SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.)

2. ON WAY TO AIRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB, TRUEHEART MENTIONED AMB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS. SINCE THEY HAD NONE, THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD ASKED TO SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) COS INFERRED THAT VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK BY AMB'S REQUEST BUT MEETING WITH AMB

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WAS NONTHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)

3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN **ARGENTINA**. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF **COMMUNICATIONS**: AMB BELIEVES STATE DEPT **SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS**; HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO BKHERALD **HAVING ITS OWN COMMO**. ALSO, REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW. VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST

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CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT **SPORCON**
 EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST **NORTH AFRICA**. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF
 HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT
 BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF
 BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING
 26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE
 DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE
 FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:

(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-
 BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE
 IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THE
 FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.

(B) HE SAID HE THOUGHT BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL
 SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.

(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE
 PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR
 OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE,
 HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL
 VISIT OF PECKING ORDER.

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5. VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON
SCHEDULE.

6. AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD
SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED
DIRECTOR 744995.

7. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

CS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS
and DCOS.

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO **MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.**

RYBAT PLVHCADET

REF DIRECTOR 745626

1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING THE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.

2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)

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3. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS, POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS OFFICERS. NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HQS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A ~~SOVIET PHASE~~, WHEREAS IN EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS.

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4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF **GOVT OFFICIAL** PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUNCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE-HEART.)

5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATION'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.

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ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORTING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO.

6. IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS **ONLY STATION OFFICERS DECLARED TO LIAISON**, ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH INTEL REP. ANSWER: YES; BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-

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SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE **SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES.** ANSWER: WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS AND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.

7. SUBJECT OF **NOCS** NOT RAISED.

8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER: NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS **UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM.** WE STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL SCENE.

9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTIONING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE OFFICERS. WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM

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CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND
PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSELF NOT PROVIDED.

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO **MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,**

RYBAT PLVWCADET

10. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (**MONTONEROS AND ERP**) AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT. ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.

11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING

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UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THESE WILL BE COVERED IN NEXT CABLE.

12. WISH THANK INFO ADDRESSES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.

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CITE BRASILIA 24777

TO : BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PL VW CADET

REF: BUENOS AIRES 34519 (rn 699594)

REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT
 BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS
 HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE."
 FYI, AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON,
 DCM, WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART'S VISIT TO
 BRASILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,
 CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO
 BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE
 OFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET
 ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2, IMPDET.

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BRIL 24723

S E C R E T 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, **MONTEVIDEO** ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G., LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

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THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCiated IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPEd TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES. AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD

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UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (**PENETRATION OF LIAISON** AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A **MEDIA OP** AND A **COVERT POL ACTION OP**, MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR **POLITICAL ACTION** OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN **POL ACTION** IN **BRAZIL** FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE F N SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 - BRASILIA 24723 6 E O E~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL **MEDIA CAPABILITY** AS WELL AS AN **AGENT OF INFLUENCE** PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COB SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT STAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)

7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE

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THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN

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S E C R E T 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS
 CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE
 AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
 ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE
 CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF
 THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE
 POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD HE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
 OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE
 PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS
 PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
 CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
 SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
 SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
 ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

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COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL **PENETRATION EFFORTS** FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIDS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT **SPORLON ACTIVITIES** IN **RIO** EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT **NSA** WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE **SPORLON PRODUCTS** (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE **INTERCEPT PROGRAM** WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO **AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT, ETC.**

14. AARON **EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY,** HE WAS TOLD THAT **COVER COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,** THAT THEY GAVE **ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL WORK OF THAT SECTION,** THEN SPENT **THE REST OF THE WORK DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.**

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EquALLY GOOD WORK IN THE DSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (at) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS. IS

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A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

--
S E C R E T

File under
SSC travel

S E C R E T

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing
the Intention of SSC Staffers to
Visit Latin America

1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the
SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing
travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC
Staffers. This is for your information. You will
be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary
is established.

2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving
guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should
be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers
before they go and a notification of the stations
involved as to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller
SA/DDO

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
2 - SA/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

6/25/75

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES

WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.

Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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
United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 91ST CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975



*Re: C/LA + 3 LA/Han
Completed by [unclear]
17 Sept 1975
[Signature]*

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Seymour
Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

Bell

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

ROUTING MESSAGE

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TO: PRIORITY LONDON.4

REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 4

DH3

1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE {ASC} AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE {SSC} INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND ^{1TH} WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR ~~ON 7 JULY.~~ 4

R 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH SERVICE CONTACTS. 4

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR

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ISSUING OFFICER

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ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET-H

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DATE: 2 JULY 1975
 ORIG: GEORGE B. HOLMES
 UNIT: EURBC
 EXT: 1413

RELEASING OFFICER

{TELECOORD}
 SA/DDO - WALLER IN SUBSTANCE
 OLC - MILLER R. CHAN
 COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO: IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH. 4
AVIAT BONN MUNICH

LIAISON 4

REF: MUNICH 30382 (IN 62156?) 4

DAB -

1. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. 4

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN **THE FRG.** SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED, BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE WITH **THE BND,** OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS **FRG** LIAISON CONTACTS.

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THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. 4

10 THG

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, ⁱⁿ EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY {CONSULATE} AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 1 JULY 1975 *Reed*
 ORIG: GALEN PEABY/HPC selct *Knicks*
 UNIT: E/G/CIL *new staff*
 EXT: 1582 *SA/1000 Waller*

W.H.
in draft

Miller
DCI/EY

CIA

RELEASING UNDER E.O. 14176

JOHN L. MILLER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.
C/SS/CAG 3D0004		R9125	DATE 28 July 1975
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. Mr. John Waller SA/DDO 2B1415	29 JUL 1975		Comments (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) <i>Only Alaron to Review in DIRECTION</i>
2.			
3. Mr. Seymour Bolten Review Staff 6 D 0120			
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28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDC

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our **past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway.** With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist **the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela,** which was provided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.



Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

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28 July 1975

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Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller
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/s/ Donald J. Purcell

Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

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SENSITIVECovert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing RegimesCATEGORY I

1. **ETHIOPIA:** A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the **labor movement** as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in **Ethiopia**. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was **\$291,006.** Covert support to the **Ethiopian labor movement** was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.

2. **SOUTH VIETNAM:** From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly democratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers.

3. **GUATEMALA:** In 1972-73, **the Guatemala City Station** with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against **Belize**.

4. **HAITI:** As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana."

5. **Dominican Republic:** In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.

6. **GERMANY:** From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its **European** counterparts.

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SECRET**SENSITIVE****CATEGORY II**

1. **SOUTH AFRICA:** In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of \$165,000 to a leading South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The activity was terminated in 1962.
2. **SOUTH AFRICA:** A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization. State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of \$311,705 was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.
3. **KOREA:** In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members.
4. **KOREA:** The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a newsletter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.
5. **ARGENTINA:** Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.
6. **BRAZIL:** From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to 1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.

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7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors.

8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train 15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements.

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22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations
Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,
Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the
following comments on those paragraphs which concern
European Division.

13. **GERMANY.** While this case is somewhat
bizarre and does not represent a productive operation,
we pose no objection to its being presented to the
Senate Select Committee.

14. **SPAIN.** We have no objection to the
presentation of these programs to the Senate Select
Committee for review although we share concern expressed
by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detri-
mental to the base negotiations.

Sighted/William W. Wells

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75)

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25 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff
SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right
Wing Regimes

1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations **in Africa**, cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.

2. In the case of **Ethiopia**, we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the **labor project** has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the **new Ethiopian regime**.

3. **The Ethiopian labor program** was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing **\$20,000 or less**, it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.

4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of **two Ethiopian labor leaders** who are former assets under this project, and accusations in

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the [Ethiopian] press that the [trade union organization] received support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the [labor organization] potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets nor the [labor organization] have been accused of CIA involvement. An admission now of CIA support to [Ethiopian labor] or to the two [Ethiopian labor leaders] in jail could be a sentence of death for them.

5. In the case of [South Africa], CIA support to a leading [South African] political figure to encourage the creation of a [new political party] remains a very sensitive matter. The principal agent is still a [leading and respected spokesman] for the [opposition party in South Africa] and is a [leading member] of the [South African parliament]. Exposure of the operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our government's relations in [South Africa]. For these reasons, we believe it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee only.

6. The [European philanthropic organization] which was used to fund the development of a [multiracial trade union organization] in [South Africa] was the [Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)], located in [Germany]. The [South African labor officials] and organizations which received funds from [FES] were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, [FES] was used to support a number of other covert action operations in [Africa] and elsewhere and exposure of the [foundation] would have ramifications other than in [South Africa]. The Director should be briefed on [FES] and its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed.

Clifton R. Strathern
Clifton R. Strathern
Deputy Chief, Africa Division

Attachments:
As Stated Above

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21 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against
Right Wing Governments

REFERENCE : Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated
18 July 1975
Subject: "Summary of Covert Action
Operations Against Right Wing Governments"

1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments". None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in **Korea**) and TUMIX (which took place in **Vietnam**) -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U. S. Government hand was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking participation in the governmental process.

2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in **South Korea**. As noted above, the purpose of this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in **South Korea**. The Agency today


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maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in **South Korea** and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in **Korea** as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.

3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.



Robert D. Brown, Jr.
Acting Chief, East Asia Division

cc: DC/Operations Staff
C/SS/CAG

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SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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CITE LONDON 628897

WE W
DIPS

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF DIRECTOR 712872

1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.

2. AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 28 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN

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TRIP, U.K. EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE
 THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR
 YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS.
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S E C R E T 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE BONN 41001

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

FROM GRAVER

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF

BERLIN, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE **BERLIN AND MUNICH** PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.

2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH **THE BND**" SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, **THE BND** IS LOCATED IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUIALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE **WESTPORT** FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT **WESTPORT** IS A

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		T0R12716512 JUN 75	BONN 41001

PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING **AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS,** THERE
 IS NO **WESTPORT** FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS
IN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON **WESTPORT**
 ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR
 PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN
 ADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.

3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST
 ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,
 REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
 PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK
 IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,
 IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS
 OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN
 AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED, E2 IMPDET,

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IN 619109

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TOR:271119Z JUN 75

LOND 62823

S E C R E T 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62823

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 708791

B. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE (u*)

C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE (u*)

1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING ~~LONDON~~ ^{LONDON} 28 JUNE
 DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON
 VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY
 EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT
 WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS
 LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?

3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET

*NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

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TO: LONDON 4

RYBAT 4

REFS: A. LONDON 62701 |IN 616087|
B. LONDON 62615 |IN 613590| 4DHB
JW copy sent ✓

AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT

NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE

MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,

WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-
ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S
KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN
HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT
ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING
SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT
ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED
AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET-H

DATE: 25 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1012

h. h wells
 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John Waller
 JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE 01

IN 616087

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LOND 62701

S E C R E T 241451Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62701

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 708791

B. LONDON 62615 (613590)

WEN

DHB

JW

1. RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC,

INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WORKS.

2. SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR REPS.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.

E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

SECRETReview Staff: 75/1009
24 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk
to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.

The agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958 through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service. At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various European countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief visit to the Congo, but took no actions.

On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.

We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.

Walt Elder
Walter Elder

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET**SECRET**

SECRET

Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed
Contact With QJWYN

1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.
2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.
3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.
4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

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Ex-Officio Registry

75-6905

Review Staff: 75/868
20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.

You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.

In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.

For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1951.

/S/

Walter Elder

Elder forwarded
orig to DCI.

EY

CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

More facts, per your request, on the QJWIN matter.

Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.

H. Knoche 6-24-75
(DATE)

PROPOSED DOD
CHANGES SHOWN
HERE, PP 2 AND 5,
WITHIN THE HEAVY
BRACKETS,

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND
THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE
ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE
INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that

25 June - latest version, incorporating
proposed changes by DOD.

could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strong neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

*W.H.
-B.M.Z.*
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members

would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES

WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such

a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

[Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved.]

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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PAGE 01

IN 613590

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LOND 62615

S E C R E T 201745Z JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62615

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REF A. DIRECTOR 707518

B. DIRECTOR 708791

1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN ALERTED.

2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US:

A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS ~~HAVE?~~ B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS? C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD

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		TOR:201921Z JUN 75		LOND 62615

SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED. ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONS TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO TOHAWKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATION IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET

APPROV'D 4/22/75
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WFA
OHCTO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS **INFO OSLO, HELSINKI.**

RYBATY

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 {NOT NEEDED **OSLO, HELSINKI**} Y

1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.} Y

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {1 DAY} AND BONN {2 DAYS}. NO DECISION *(DIRECTLY FROM)* YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ~~BY~~ VIENNA. Y

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. Y

4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

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AIRCRAFT-Y

5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR-Y

6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT *(GERMAN EMBASSY AND THE BND)* WITH THE *(BND)*

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE **WESTPORT** FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. Y

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET-H

DATE: 17 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS E.H. KNOCHE *E. H. Knoche*
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1012

W. W. Wells
 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
 RELEASING OFFICER

John Waller
 JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
Room 2E-45SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed
Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

- a. 30 June - 1 July: London
- b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day
- c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the Paris stop, one day.

In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need **Station contact.**

2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control". It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.

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Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world" operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter-relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.

3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control". Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve the Agency's go-between.

4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German Embassy.

5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence".

8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.

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9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:

1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Wells
1 - Miss Page
1 - Mr. Leader

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VIEN 26877

SECRET 168853Z JUN 75 STAFF**CITE VIENNA 26877****TO: DIRECTOR.****RYBAT****REF: DIRECTOR 787518**

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1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION **WITHIN EMBASSY**, PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAME NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

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CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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CONF: C/BUR 6 INFO: FILE DCI, D/DCI, DAO, CS/RF, OLC,
 C/IPLAN, DOO/DD, C/CIOPS, C/OPS, C/LSN/IO,
 C/PS/EG2,

TO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS. 4

RYBAT 4

SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE
 AT THE END OF THE MONTH. 4

1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR # COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. 4

2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. 4

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL SUGGEST TO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW, YET
 HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE. 4

DATE:
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CL BY: 012866

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4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER **CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL.**

LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. 4

5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY - VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON; 9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S. 4

6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. 4

7. FOR BONN. SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT **TO WESTPORT.** 4

8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETH

9. MORE specific guidance on operational discussions to follow. E.H. KNOCHE E.H. Knobche

LC Ross Chen

SA/DDO

William W. Wells

DATE: 13 JUNE 1975
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS
 UNIT: C/EUR
 EXT: 1032

W.E. Wells
 DCI
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

DDO AUTHENTICATION OFFICER

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CL BY:

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SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:

- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.
- Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.

- Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
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6/18/75

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems.

The following specific guidelines are applicable:

I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions.

that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.

In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U. S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.

Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.

IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT
PERSONNEL.

Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.

V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.

VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered

essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.

VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.

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