

23 JUN
1972

WSS -

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
 File #:
 VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Plans
 SUBJECT : Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service
 (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July
 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August
 1972) Conventions

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).

3. On 17 April 1972 [redacted] C/S/COS, [redacted] met with Mr. Miami USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito at USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for [Station WH/Miami] support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 [redacted] C/S/COS and C/CI/ISN met with Mr. Mastrovito at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS.

4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives [redacted] *444 The 5th NA 474*

a. [Station WH/Miami] would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS.

b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.

c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policy toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.

Released under the
John F. Kennedy
Assassination
Records Collection
Act of 1992 (44 USC)
2107 Note
Case#: NW 65390
Date: 05-01-2023

00576

THE STATE LAW DEPARTMENT

dr. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States w/ 1200 Manley building vicinity of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage, especially targeted against [REDACTED] because it was now considered an internal security function.

JKC(16) 5. On 27 April 1973 [REDACTED] was held at a buffer office of [Station MI/Miami] with the USSS Chief of Communications, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative. It was agreed that radio traces would be handled by Miami Security Field Office, Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice until the USSS established communications links from their command post in Post Office, Box 2015 Baltimore, Maryland which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to [Station MI/Miami] by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted by MI/CIO. Replies to USSS enclosing for your information copy of [REDACTED] letter dated June 8, 1950 from the Industrial Employment Review Board to Mr. Gurney; also copy of Mrs. Gurney's letter to Dr. Rynd, President of University of Maryland, safehouse [REDACTED] know that you will be interested in this. Gurney will provide a letter and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both JFK conventions. You have any further information regarding [REDACTED] Gurney I would certainly appreciate same. I am also interested to know something more about the Industrial Employment Review Board, especially whether or not your records are available to it and the importance of its findings.

JKC(16) 6. [Station MI/Miami] is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing [REDACTED] you for your guidance and cooperation. The location of [Station MI/Miami] has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station [REDACTED] is located very centrally, from buffer office.) Additionally, the [Miami Security Field Office] maintains normal liaison with the local USSS-Miami unit.

JKC(16) 7. The Station [REDACTED] special assistant Attorney General present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment or facilities to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.

ENCLOSURE 6-5744

SECRET

00577

2 - Mr. J. A. Minatz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hettie)
1 - Mr. W. R. Newhall
1 - Mr. W. M. Grogan
1 - Mr. T. E. Bunes

62-116395

July 25, 1975

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

You will note ~~the~~ GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS and 1972,
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
These funds may still be held by the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

account for that use ~~in~~ POLICIES AND PROCEDURES areas where

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-20-00 BY SP-146728

TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would

have the ~~details~~ ~~which was handled through the Executive~~
Reference is made to ~~the~~ letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and
other information from the FBI. Angleton would have

additional ~~information~~ Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of referenced communication requested Committee Staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.

Attached to this memorandum is a list of all retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations of the FBI which may be of interest to you. There were a number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence operations of the FBI which are not included. In the event you desire information concerning these latter items, which include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to discuss them with SSC Staff Members at FBI Headquarters.

MAB

Enclosure

67

Asst. Sec. 1 - The Attorney General

Dep. AG Admin.

Dep. AG Int.

Asst. Secy.

TEB:lek/lbb [hlg]

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

(8)

Admin.

Compt. Secy.

Ext. Affairs

Filer & Con.

Gen. Secy.

Memt.

Inspection

Intl.

Intelligence

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Telephone

Legal Coun.

Telephone Re.

Discre. Secy.

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

E2 IMPDET CL BY 357737

EYES ONLY
ENCLOSURE

SECRET

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-442X

112100 2016
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 NM 1216
DECLASSIFY ON 25 JUN

~~PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION~~
I HATE MOST FILES AT
MY DESK ON THESE
~~BIGGER WORDS~~ / CODEWORDS
FOR RESEARCH NEEDS.

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

**Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice for Operations**

Policies and Procedures Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency

NOTE:

~~No effect~~

1. ~~The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List (PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra, were generated by SA Thomas R. Stuhs, Jr. From a review of the available INTD inspection reports and files, request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse~~ ~~COVERT INTELLIGENCE PPSPL~~ ~~counterintelligence~~ regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

1

JEK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:

 2. International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet-bloc - Centralized compilation of potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.
 - b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DCI.
3. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks conducted by various masters of U. S. intelligence community based on information provided to such intelligence organizations by IRS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.
 - were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel). U
the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.
 - Alem - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States
3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since [36]
gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IRS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further.
 4. Please return the attachment when they have served your purpose.

- 2 -

~~NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3
E2 IMPDET CL BY 05451?~~

SECRET

00593

Further documents pertaining on the Intelligence Evaluation **JFK(1)(b)**
[Concerning the FBI and Department of Justice.] The original
meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
Policies and Procedures and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian
and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
~~NOTE CONTINUED~~ appearing before ~~the secret~~ Jury and it is always
possible that he might draw in the Agency.

7. Bangop - Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer
of funds through Swiss banks. **JFK(1)(b)**
6. Before appointing [Ober] to the IES Staff as the Agency
8. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States - Identification
sides of Chinese, legally entering the U.S. with Helms
intelligence assignments.
9. Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States -
Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
backgrounds for foreign intelligence assets to be
targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC). This
was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
10. Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -
Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments.
11. Chinese University and Graduate School Index - List of
Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or
graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
considered potential candidates for development as U.S.
assets. **JFK(1)(a)**
James Angleton
12. Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed against
foreign intelligence officers. **(S)** **NOTE FILE 65-73750**
13. Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the
United States from Europe through Canada. **(S)**
14. Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart
efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country. **(U) DRC** **MINIS**
15. Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York
University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover
Soviet illegals. **(S)**

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

SECRET

00584

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED] Deputy Director [REDACTED] ~~for security~~

SUBJECT:

16. Proho - [Progress to detect homosexuals who have been compromised or recruited by Soviet intelligence] (S) ~~JFKC~~ 105-146972
17. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments - Investigations conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established criteria. Counter Intelligence Staff, [Police Group] (CI/PG) [REDACTED] is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office.
18. Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries - Interviews of selected U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc intelligence. [REDACTED] purpose of exploring such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.] (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c)
19. [REDACTED] (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c)
20. CI [PG] maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). CI [PG] also administers and supervises Project [REDACTED] and its training facility. (DEN-172) (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c)
21. Sea Survey - Screening of mail to selected European cities. In addition, CI [PG] coordinates a joint OPS/AID Technical Services Division Central Intell [REDACTED] (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c)
22. Sea Survey - Screening of mail originating in New York, New York, destined for specific postal zones. guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining to [REDACTED] (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c)
23. Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets - Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.
- LIAISON WITH OPS/AID
24. Rega - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S. as aliens during certain years. (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c) 105-73474 This is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:
25. Secomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. [REDACTED] (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c) 105-148076 Participants, some of whom have attended DEN-172 courses and who are of interest to Agency components,
- B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,
- C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours of foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions,] (S) ~~JFKC~~ (c)

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

00597

SECRET

REF ID: A655274

DCI Policy Memo
STATES MENTION OF
NAME ITSELF IS
NOT CLASSIFIED

- 2 -

Further documents pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components.

NOTE CONTINUED: ~~TOP SECRET~~

26. [Sobir] - Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence. ~~JFK~~ ~~(b)~~
27. Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet illegals who have applied for documentation as U.S. residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide cover identity. ~~It is believed that one time 65-66/4's 50 CIA employees were covered in Latin America, the Far East and Africa. This total has been reduced during the first several years to 10 serving in Thailand.~~
28. Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow to the United States.
- II. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID
29. [Saluki] - Screening of requests for birth certificates under an established criteria to identify such requests which may have originated with Soviet intelligence. ~~PROJECT IBERIA~~ ~~(b)~~ IDEN-103
30. Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone and microphone installations functioning at certain times. ~~It was incorporated under the laws of the State of California in 1957 and conducts its business in the District of Columbia. It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under an overt contract with OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. (b)~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~
31. Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADE equipment. ~~JFK~~ ~~(b)~~
32. Cuban Refugee - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee channels. ~~(b)~~ ~~JFK (b)~~
33. Desaco - Development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials. ~~Training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security~~
34. East-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite nationals. ~~(b)~~
- * CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as such and will be phased out by June 1974. ~~JFK~~ ~~(b)~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6

00533

~~SECRET~~

CONTENTS

Further Documents Pertaining

to the FBI and Department of Justice

~~CIA~~PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison with Policies and Procedures organization, local or federal, at home or abroad.] When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or IDEN-172 without divulging Agency interest.] OPS/AID has such contacts at home [REDACTED] because of [REDACTED] scope of its activities
NOTE: CONFIDENTIAL

361. At present - Screening of mail sent to the United States from Hong Kong world and the People's Republic of China (PRC) log(j) and federal level - because its personnel are personally JFK 4)(B)

37. ~~Chieflet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
equivalent with enforcement officers employed by the
United States. Members of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified) JPK(1)(c)~~

39. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with the following organizations through its field stations. In the instances and extent thereof

its radio stations.) The existence and extent thereof,
46. while a collection of high-level foreign political and
intelligence by our Legal Attaches abroad for the
information of the White House.]] File 64-41400 25

4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in
Montevideo, Uruguay, made use of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~area~~ ^{area} ~~surrounding~~ ^{surrounding} military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S. Virgins
military bases—to uncover possible Soviet agents. ~~He~~ ^{He}
an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, ~~was~~ ^{was}
a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission.

42. ~~Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly resided in a specific foreign country and whose present whereabouts are unknown.~~ (S) File 65-75008

Classified by 6283, MSS 1, 2 and 3, Indentures. (B)

~~TOP SECRET~~ *James Angleton*
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

SENSITIVE
IF APPROPRIATE

~~DATE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.~~

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

150M

FBT

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committee 10/21/73

1. WHO PROVIDED (check appropriate item. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

3. DATE PROVIDED

X INCIDENTS | IR TERR. | BRIEF | IR TERR. | TESTIMONY | OTHER

7/25/75

For Review

S. To whom does each term add specific meaning if applicable?

1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for
destine collection abroad of information on foreign
arts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic
extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
h Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents); give name or identification number of bribe, defences, witnesses and subject)

Memorandum: The NHICHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

9. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

- a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity
6/14/73, Part 7, Appendix B, Item 14, the hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups

Information Handling ~~here been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters Officers.~~ The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.

~~Information~~ ~~operations~~ Information Handling

Intelligence Collection

Operating Procedures

5. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this box) PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by

Access to all available indices and control files regarding all programs operated by the Intelligence Division from 1960 to present. They are thus used

primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access persons. It should be noted that the MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MICHAOS PROGRAM.

3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
62-106805 conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
described above. The program is and has been managed so
AJD:ISB ORIGINL VIA MAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

TEST AS YOU GO

~~CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE~~

0059:

-3791-10-783

第十一章 亂世

WNA 05380 DocId:32986524 Page 3

~~SECRET~~

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type, or print clearly, in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

JFK URG

1. ~~Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This process involves the selection of companies; research on their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; SYNCIEK arrangements to summarize brief narrative statement describing the substance of information and its relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commissions made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.~~

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in 47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States. To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are researching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies at any given time.

3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has been established policy that no more than two individuals would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total number of companies now being used and efforts are underway to effect further reductions toward the goal of one individual per company.

4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit cards in alias for operational use in the United States and abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being used by 34 individuals.

JFK URG

~~SECRET~~

Number of 005147

00514

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/26/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC* *1A*

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DEvised FACILITIES COVER

SUBJECT: SEMSTUDY 75

Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-stopped notional facilities which were created to provide cover for Agency personnel in the United States and abroad and to provide an attributable source for Agency funds used to support personnel in the United States and abroad. This memorandum records for the record my efforts to meet with Mr. Thomas S. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 6/25/75. The facilities comprise 43 corporations providing personnel coverage, payrollling and tax attribution sources, and other miscellaneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.

On the late afternoon of 7/24/75, Mr. Benson, sole-proprietorships providing status and operational cover, including payrollling and tax attribution; and 207 made available to Liaison Agent Brian Murphy a copy of a "Top Secret" memorandum dated 4/20/75 written by Louis W. Tondella, who was the then Deputy Director of NSA. This Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shamrock, copy of which is attached, makes reference to a file entitled Shamrock available in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army, reporting of Agency salaries without documenting the Agency as the source.

Pursuant to your instructions on the evening of 7/24/75, I personally contacted Mr. Latimer at approximately 8:00 p.m., 7/25/75. In my conversation with Mr. Latimer, I noted that it was imperative that I see him as soon as possible regarding the contents of the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer was informed that the Bureau was attempting to establish the line of authority relative to the Bureau's procurement of foreign government's cable traffic sent through international cable companies in the United States.

REC-88

Mr. Latimer indicated that he had received a call from Mr. Buffham on the late afternoon of 7/24/75 and was aware of the Bureau's interest in reviewing certain memoranda in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer indicated that this was a matter of interest to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense and that he would have to consult with them.

Enclosure
62-116395

8 JUN 21 1975

~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

WOC:lhb *lhb*

(5)

84 JUL 31 1975

NW 63369 DocId:32889624 Page 11

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

JFKW(A) 00515

1	Liaison Agent
---	---------------

Admin. Dir. _____
Dir. AS Adm. _____
Dir. AS Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Admin. _____
Coop. Inst. _____
Exch. Affairs _____
Pubs & Comm. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Meet. _____
Inspection _____
Mail _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rec. _____
Director Secy. _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395 R. WANNALL

FROM: MR. W. O. CREGAR

He advised me he would have somebody from the General Counsel's office, Department of Defense, promptly contact me regarding a review of this file by FBI personnel.

- 1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: July 24, 1975

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. J. L. Snackelord
1 - Mr. T. S. Putnam
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Meet. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rx. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Not hearing from Mr. Latimer by the late morning of 7/25/75, My memorandum dated 7/23/75 mentioned as above advised you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 190 pages of extracted from a 593-page document prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities mentioned in the document concerned the Shamrock operation. It was Latimer's understanding that Mr. Hoffman had gone to the Senate Select Committee on Small Business to advise his constituents of the White House to discuss my request with Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President. Latimer promised that he would telephonically recontact me as soon as he could establish contact with Hoffman. I again reiterated to Latimer that it was imperative the Bureau have access to the Shamrock file assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to its contents hoping to clearly demonstrate that both the then Attorney General Thomas Clark and, in fact, President Truman himself were aware of certain information contained in the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any. I also recommended that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to its contents.

This is to advise that the following pages from the document were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any. Mr. Latimer said he understood clearly what was at issue here and that he would get back to me as soon as possible.

Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 297, 301, 353 and 354

Z

At 1:50 p.m., 7/25/75, I again called Mr. Latimer's office and his secretary informed me that Mr. Latimer had stepped out of his office and that she would give him a message to call me as soon as he returned. As of 4:00 p.m. 7/25/75, I had not received a return call from Mr. Latimer concerning techniques used and/or developed by CIA which may be of interest).

ACTION:

Intelligence Division
Section CI-1

For information and record purposes. REC-88
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 126, 140-142,
298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.

62-116395

TJM:ekw (12)

(Rku)

RECORDED - INDEXED
CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~REF
RE~~TOP SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

DISTRIBUTION LIMITED

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

20 April 1971

M 181.

SUBJECT: SHAMROCK
Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329

Mr. Buffham and I had an opportunity this morning to read the SHAMROCK file in AGSI. Major General Joe McChristian gave us permission to view it but once we had read it after careful consideration he decided that he would not feel free to give NSA either the file or a duplicate copy without personal permission from SecDef inasmuch as SecDef had entrusted the file to ACSI in 1949. All of us agreed that an approach to the Secretary would be unnecessary and perhaps would generate too many questions. He did agree after sealing the file again to limit access to the Secretary of Defense on demand, ~~Pages 188, 189, 283, 330~~, the Director or the Deputy Director, NSA, on demand, Chief of ACSI, and the Chief of the SSO, ACSI. This would be noted in the ~~Section 18-3~~.

The file contained memoranda for record, one prepared after a meeting in Forrestal's office attended by senior officials from ITT, Western Union, and RCA plus Morris Levy (then Defense General Counsel), Secretary Forrestal, and a representative from the Attorney General's office. Colonel Carter Clark from ACSI, who was present, prepared the memorandum. A subsequent meeting was held in Senator Louis Johnson's office attended by representatives of the same three companies and I believe the Attorney General himself. In Mr. Johnson's own handwriting is a note to the effect that he showed the memorandum for record to President Truman and a note that SEC, apparently Attorney General Thomas Clark, either was present or had also discussed the matter with the President. Both memoranda indicated that the companies were informed that the work they were doing was of very great importance to the U.S. and every effort would be made to protect knowledge of its existence as well as to protect the companies in the event of exposure.

The material is filed under TS Control No. 516652-3-5 in the SSO ACSI files.



LOUIS W. TORDELLA
Deputy Director

62-116395-474

~~TOP SECRET~~~~EMALIC~~

Downgraded to Secret
on 10/10/74 for automatic
downgrading
2/2/80

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. [Project Mockingbird] a telephone intercept activity was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified material from Mr. W. Bealefield Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Title Jig McNiff

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 190 pages of extracted from a 655-page document prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved.

Officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Goldwasser), the Director of the Security Division (Mr. Robert McNease), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Mr. Robert Kennedy).

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation, and sources of information. For example, it was observed that through they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all unidentified; 21 congressional staff members, 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were furnished for information purposes as these member of the White House, members of the House, and other sources were part of the activity). It was observed that through these sources the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than the newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, over materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

84 JUL 31 1975

NW 65368 DocId:32509624 Page 14

LAW & LEVIT

PROJECT MOCKINGBIRD

DATE: July 24, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. F. S. Putnam

1 - Mr. W. Bealefield Agency

Assist. Dir. _____
Rep. AB Adv. _____
Rep. AB Inv. _____
Ass't Dir. _____
Attn. Secy. _____
Exec. Affcts. _____
Polic. & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Mem. _____
Inspection _____
Conf. _____
Lawyer _____
Legal Coun. _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rec. _____
Director Rec. _____

SECRET EYES ONLY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
THIS LISTING IS UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. E. Marshall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

~~EYES ONLY~~

SUBJECT: [Section CI-2 Soviet Defector]
Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3

[Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,
defected to a representative of this Agency in
368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 581-583,
and 615.]

1964. The responsibility for
his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
[Pages 188, 189, 283, 330] After initial interrogation by

representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
house in Maryland [Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,
was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote
wooded area.] ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced

that he was a bona fide agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their
content. Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

This Office together with the Office of General
~~ACTIONS~~ Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegal
assessment of the Agency's position in handling a defector under
these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
existsence of the 693-page CIA document and the
information contained therein should be closely
guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know
basis. Legislative liaison counsel, and on 17 October 1967, the
responsibility for his further handling was transferred
to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral [Rufus Taylor.]

The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr.
Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent
that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to
more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

E2 IMPDET

[CL BY 000988]

00023

- 2 -
SECRET (1A)

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

PROJECT MOCKINGBIRD

EYES ONLY

Project Mockingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

~~valuable and economical defector. this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Soviet recruited agents - in several~~

~~Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newsmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 60. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel, (Mr. Lawrence Houston).~~

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

62-116375-4750021

DISCLOSURE

2

00021

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ONLY

EYES ONLY

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE
--

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Defector

I. SURVEILLANCES

A Soviet defector, defected to a representative of this Agency in

A. SIBSIA 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Olandestine Service and he was brought to this country during the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-1 May, and 9-20 August 1964. After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe house in Orlando, Florida, a Cuban national with whom Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom Miss Fitzgerald had become professional and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez was aborted because of a door lock problem.

Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by

B. PARAGON this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 17 October 1965, the responsibility for his further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69 and her associates at various times from May to September 1966. Iden had long been a source of information to the American revolutionary, had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice-President Agnew and the ACT. Surveillance included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solis, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

C. SELOTEX I

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during CL BY 000988 00023

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET

CL BY 000988

00026

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

valuable and economical defector, this Agency has ever since 1971 had and leads which were ignored by the SH Division were pursued and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Soviet Statler recruited agents. Observation several main countries throughout the world has been kept off diving under an alias and secured a divorce from his Russian wife sources and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciates the treatment accorded him and states "while I regret my years of incarceration, I have no bitterness ~~MURKIN~~ and now understand how it could happen."

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.

E. BUTANE

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.

III. POLICE SUPPORT

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division ~~Metropolitan~~ Police Department. ² The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

00027

2

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET
EYES ONLY~~

EPK Act 5 (g)(2)

I. SURVEILLANCES

- A. ~~SIESMA~~ During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department, New York City Police Department, and the ~~FBI~~ ~~California~~ California Police Department. This surveillance was perpetrated upon

ID: GENERAL SUPPORT information that had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic

14. SPINTER
studio operated

~~Since 1953 this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russ [redacted] mail at various times, the same having been received at Kennedy~~

Airport

~~8. Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved~~

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden Os and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. Iden Os, an acknowledged Latin American revolutionary, had long been a source of concern to the WR Division and had given information concerning a plot to assassinate

~~P. AFIADE~~ had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice-President Agnew and the DEB. Surveillances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 during the years 1968-1970. The Office of Security has pre-

During two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by FBI Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in

the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

~~C. SENSORY T~~

C. REDFACED L.

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of [redacted] of the Washington Post during

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing IMPSET contact and

CL BY 888888

~~SECRET~~

3

-EYES ONLY SECRET

~~EYES ONLY~~

-00026

00028

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY
~~SECRET~~

the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine the sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. MUDHORN OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his men, Bruce Weller, Leslie Whittenburg and Joseph Speary, from 15 February to 12 April 1971. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance support was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Michael D. Sparer, BNDD, from 10 March to 20 April 1971. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with and Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

II. POLICE SUPPORT

As a result of a request from the Department of State, during 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided communications by its school monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Security Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well, as a representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at an Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.

00027

00029

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY
~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

JFK/RC

EYES ONLY

B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department, New York City Police Department, and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.

dissident groups in the Washington area, considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition during this period, the Office of Security Field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence

III. ~~GENERAL SUPPORT~~ groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appro-

A. ~~PRIORITIES~~ of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.

G. F. ANTIERS

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport ~~in New York City~~. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected areas of mail. ~~The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.~~

B. ABROAD

For several years the Office of Security has provided support to ~~a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff~~

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

C. REDFACE I

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and

3

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY
~~SECRET~~

00028

00030

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information ~~in his possession.~~ ~~1 May 1973~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

SUBJECT: In January 1971, the Director of Security approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security.

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in Paris Church, Virginia. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, questioning, medical clearance, and training. This has been divided dozen informants at a time, each having been subdivided into three, one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of illegal interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID or a member of BNDD's until she resigned in 1969. Arrangements were made for all the payment of a salary employee benefits. She came from the CIA on security basis does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

3. As a result of a request from the Department of State, she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national, providing protection on a 24-hour basis being done two days of a foreign agent who was attending school in the United States the female. This support includes the financing of the protection and the detail to the Department of State of six armed Agents of this office clerical and secretarial employees of this Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and From February 1967 to November 1971 ran a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

00023

00053

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~IMPORT CL BY~~

~~SECRET~~

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during

this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence in this area. The Office of Security has had such information included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.

6. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban. Several months ago, at the request of a CI Staffer, that individual arranged to move a sensitive defector out of contact with the Agency. The CID employee, and the Cuban, on one occasion, served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to [S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.]

7. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security. As a result, the Office of Security has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.]

8. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

5

~~SECRET~~

00030

00063

~~SECRET~~

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he continues to see them officially. Thus, there is still May 1973 to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.

SUBJECT: at General ~~the~~ Office of Security Surveys known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop.

for, so far the Director's administration. And with this concurrence of the then DD/P, at the Office of Security developed informants in the RID deceptor regarding activities among RID employees on whom his security questions had arisen. With this program, which included ~~the~~ Security's dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.

11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.

The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information to the principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review conducted by the Office of Security, possibly but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

00053

- 3 -

~~COPYRIGHT
CIA~~

~~COPYRIGHT
CIA~~

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED

00061

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations in this country. There are also reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RIO female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban while she was still in RIO. There is also evidence that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent contact with her friend, the ex-RIO employee, and the Cuban. On one occasion she served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.

3 Aug 22 July 1971, newspaper was carried on

American proposals relative to the SALT talks in New York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. George Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with three unauthorized USIS -

sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with three unauthorized USIS -

was informed of the situation early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security. As a result, the Office of Security has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.

Mr. David Young, Staff Assistant to Mr. John F. Herrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

JFP/C

3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals with this information were identified as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY 00060

00065

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's ~~information security~~, although he continues to see them socially. Thus, there is slim reason to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now. It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for a transfer would be difficult to develop for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-
tain one of these courses of action should the other be rejected. The possibility of the employee in ISB Division may be passing me to information on CIA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any possible gains from continuing this CI effort.

Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.

John Q. Lawrence

6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
Iden 184 , and Iden 185 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.

7. Iden 186 , a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

- 3 -

2

00061

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

00063

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director for Management & Services
SUBJECT: Allegations of Agency involvement in press speculations regarding the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier. At this point further, Mr. Egil Krogh has been given guidance by American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of Iden 186. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.

3481-Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

00065

00067

5 June 1973

4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees whom were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty, I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to entertain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile's facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-

vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against common target in the U.S. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their equipment available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.

Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of finding out in the operation. He thought the only examination was performed on my signature to Mr. Dent's Ruc 29 July 1971 (CI Stat). A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
7. Iden 186 State Department defer Presidential representation expenses
Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971,
stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected
of leaking information to the press. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, said he was not sure if the Agency would
July. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political influence
activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

2

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET-EYES ONLY

Logs

~~CLASSIFIED BY _____
EXPIRY DATE 6 MONTHS FROM PUBLICATION DATE
REPRINT OF 15 SEPTEMBER 1962 EDITION
BY G. C. G. (G. C. G.)~~
ONLY **00065**

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional details. He said Senator Russell and Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but

Bureau ~~of Investigation~~ denied this allegation in a letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Item 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Item 186 plans to use a press conference ~~which~~ held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Item 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

-2-

00071

00067

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

5 June 1973

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandum

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973

SUBJECT : Per your instructions

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: " -- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S." *I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Zinberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.*

2. *Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Seley is fully conversant are:* In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building.

JFK(D) -- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D. There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CIA Staff. *Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S.*

3. The second item: " -- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia." *Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.*

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was \$2,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency *John M. Clarke* *JFK(DA)*

00070

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

EYES ONLY
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY	SECRET THIS IS A FINAL RELEASE
SCHEDULED BY	12 JUL 1973
EXPIRES	01 JUN 1974
1. AUTHORIZED BY	2. APPROVED BY
3. DISTRIBUTED TO	4. FILED BY
(initials, name, title, rank or equivalent)	
5. INDEXED BY	
6. SERIALIZED BY	
7. FILED BY	
8. INDEXED BY	
9. SERIALIZED BY	
10. FILED BY	
11. INDEXED BY	
12. SERIALIZED BY	
13. FILED BY	
14. INDEXED BY	
15. SERIALIZED BY	
16. FILED BY	
17. INDEXED BY	
18. SERIALIZED BY	
19. FILED BY	
20. INDEXED BY	
21. SERIALIZED BY	
22. FILED BY	
23. INDEXED BY	
24. SERIALIZED BY	
25. FILED BY	
26. INDEXED BY	
27. SERIALIZED BY	
28. FILED BY	
29. INDEXED BY	
30. SERIALIZED BY	
31. FILED BY	
32. INDEXED BY	
33. SERIALIZED BY	
34. FILED BY	
35. INDEXED BY	
36. SERIALIZED BY	
37. FILED BY	
38. INDEXED BY	
39. SERIALIZED BY	
40. FILED BY	
41. INDEXED BY	
42. SERIALIZED BY	
43. FILED BY	
44. INDEXED BY	
45. SERIALIZED BY	
46. FILED BY	
47. INDEXED BY	
48. SERIALIZED BY	
49. FILED BY	
50. INDEXED BY	
51. SERIALIZED BY	
52. FILED BY	
53. INDEXED BY	
54. SERIALIZED BY	
55. FILED BY	
56. INDEXED BY	
57. SERIALIZED BY	
58. FILED BY	
59. INDEXED BY	
60. SERIALIZED BY	
61. FILED BY	
62. INDEXED BY	
63. SERIALIZED BY	
64. FILED BY	
65. INDEXED BY	
66. SERIALIZED BY	
67. FILED BY	
68. INDEXED BY	
69. SERIALIZED BY	
70. FILED BY	
71. INDEXED BY	
72. SERIALIZED BY	
73. FILED BY	
74. INDEXED BY	
75. SERIALIZED BY	
76. FILED BY	
77. INDEXED BY	
78. SERIALIZED BY	
79. FILED BY	
80. INDEXED BY	
81. SERIALIZED BY	
82. FILED BY	
83. INDEXED BY	
84. SERIALIZED BY	
85. FILED BY	
86. INDEXED BY	
87. SERIALIZED BY	
88. FILED BY	
89. INDEXED BY	
90. SERIALIZED BY	
91. FILED BY	
92. INDEXED BY	
93. SERIALIZED BY	
94. FILED BY	
95. INDEXED BY	
96. SERIALIZED BY	
97. FILED BY	
98. INDEXED BY	
99. SERIALIZED BY	
100. FILED BY	
101. INDEXED BY	
102. SERIALIZED BY	
103. FILED BY	
104. INDEXED BY	
105. SERIALIZED BY	
106. FILED BY	
107. INDEXED BY	
108. SERIALIZED BY	
109. FILED BY	
110. INDEXED BY	
111. SERIALIZED BY	
112. FILED BY	
113. INDEXED BY	
114. SERIALIZED BY	
115. FILED BY	
116. INDEXED BY	
117. SERIALIZED BY	
118. FILED BY	
119. INDEXED BY	
120. SERIALIZED BY	
121. FILED BY	
122. INDEXED BY	
123. SERIALIZED BY	
124. FILED BY	
125. INDEXED BY	
126. SERIALIZED BY	
127. FILED BY	
128. INDEXED BY	
129. SERIALIZED BY	
130. FILED BY	
131. INDEXED BY	
132. SERIALIZED BY	
133. FILED BY	
134. INDEXED BY	
135. SERIALIZED BY	
136. FILED BY	
137. INDEXED BY	
138. SERIALIZED BY	
139. FILED BY	
140. INDEXED BY	
141. SERIALIZED BY	
142. FILED BY	
143. INDEXED BY	
144. SERIALIZED BY	
145. FILED BY	
146. INDEXED BY	
147. SERIALIZED BY	
148. FILED BY	
149. INDEXED BY	
150. SERIALIZED BY	
151. FILED BY	
152. INDEXED BY	
153. SERIALIZED BY	
154. FILED BY	
155. INDEXED BY	
156. SERIALIZED BY	
157. FILED BY	
158. INDEXED BY	
159. SERIALIZED BY	
160. FILED BY	
161. INDEXED BY	
162. SERIALIZED BY	
163. FILED BY	
164. INDEXED BY	
165. SERIALIZED BY	
166. FILED BY	
167. INDEXED BY	
168. SERIALIZED BY	
169. FILED BY	
170. INDEXED BY	
171. SERIALIZED BY	
172. FILED BY	
173. INDEXED BY	
174. SERIALIZED BY	
175. FILED BY	
176. INDEXED BY	
177. SERIALIZED BY	
178. FILED BY	
179. INDEXED BY	
180. SERIALIZED BY	
181. FILED BY	
182. INDEXED BY	
183. SERIALIZED BY	
184. FILED BY	
185. INDEXED BY	
186. SERIALIZED BY	
187. FILED BY	
188. INDEXED BY	
189. SERIALIZED BY	
190. FILED BY	
191. INDEXED BY	
192. SERIALIZED BY	
193. FILED BY	
194. INDEXED BY	
195. SERIALIZED BY	
196. FILED BY	
197. INDEXED BY	
198. SERIALIZED BY	
199. FILED BY	
200. INDEXED BY	
201. SERIALIZED BY	
202. FILED BY	
203. INDEXED BY	
204. SERIALIZED BY	
205. FILED BY	
206. INDEXED BY	
207. SERIALIZED BY	
208. FILED BY	
209. INDEXED BY	
210. SERIALIZED BY	
211. FILED BY	
212. INDEXED BY	
213. SERIALIZED BY	
214. FILED BY	
215. INDEXED BY	
216. SERIALIZED BY	
217. FILED BY	
218. INDEXED BY	
219. SERIALIZED BY	
220. FILED BY	
221. INDEXED BY	
222. SERIALIZED BY	
223. FILED BY	
224. INDEXED BY	
225. SERIALIZED BY	
226. FILED BY	
227. INDEXED BY	
228. SERIALIZED BY	
229. FILED BY	
230. INDEXED BY	
231. SERIALIZED BY	
232. FILED BY	
233. INDEXED BY	
234. SERIALIZED BY	
235. FILED BY	
236. INDEXED BY	
237. SERIALIZED BY	
238. FILED BY	
239. INDEXED BY	
240. SERIALIZED BY	
241. FILED BY	
242. INDEXED BY	
243. SERIALIZED BY	
244. FILED BY	
245. INDEXED BY	
246. SERIALIZED BY	
247. FILED BY	
248. INDEXED BY	
249. SERIALIZED BY	
250. FILED BY	
251. INDEXED BY	
252. SERIALIZED BY	
253. FILED BY	
254. INDEXED BY	
255. SERIALIZED BY	
256. FILED BY	
257. INDEXED BY	
258. SERIALIZED BY	
259. FILED BY	
260. INDEXED BY	
261. SERIALIZED BY	
262. FILED BY	
263. INDEXED BY	
264. SERIALIZED BY	
265. FILED BY	
266. INDEXED BY	
267. SERIALIZED BY	
268. FILED BY	
269. INDEXED BY	
270. SERIALIZED BY	
271. FILED BY	
272. INDEXED BY	
273. SERIALIZED BY	
274. FILED BY	
275. INDEXED BY	
276. SERIALIZED BY	
277. FILED BY	
278. INDEXED BY	
279. SERIALIZED BY	
280. FILED BY	
281. INDEXED BY	
282. SERIALIZED BY	
283. FILED BY	
284. INDEXED BY	
285. SERIALIZED BY	
286. FILED BY	
287. INDEXED BY	
288. SERIALIZED BY	
289. FILED BY	
290. INDEXED BY	
291. SERIALIZED BY	
292. FILED BY	
293. INDEXED BY	
294. SERIALIZED BY	
295. FILED BY	
296. INDEXED BY	
297. SERIALIZED BY	
298. FILED BY	
299. INDEXED BY	
300. SERIALIZED BY	

funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional details. He said Senator Russell & Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity b673 asked not to be briefed in detail.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT: *JFK*

: Item in John Clarke memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May, 1970

Attachment

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."
2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building
- There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was \$3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political/influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

- 2 -

00073

~~SECRET CIVIL RIGHTS~~
~~CHIEF OF STAFF~~
00073 00073

CLASSIFIED BY	00071
EXCERPT FROM GENERAL MEMORANDUM	1970
EXCERPT FROM D. C. FILE	1970
3 APR 1970	1970
AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR DISINFORMATION	1970
DISINFORMATION INSTITUTE	1970
DISINFORMATION INSTITUTE	1970

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time ~~regarding~~ ~~of~~ discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully ~~incongruent~~ ⁰⁰⁰⁷² and possibly Mr. Colby.

All files have been purged.

-- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.

-- WHARNEY and MMUTUAL investments and accumulation of Government capital.

-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZE19) ⁰⁰⁰⁷² for use against a common target in the U. S.

(DATE)


-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of La B. J. trip to SEA.

FORM NO. 101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 54


John M. Clarke

00072

EYES ONLY
SECRET



5 June 1973

07 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
JF1410

SUBJECT: ~~Re: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence~~
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
VIA : Deputy Director of Finance Management and Services
FROM : Director of Finance

SUBJECT: 1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (NUDGEN) for use against a common target in the USSR, authorized the Director of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate \$2,700.00. In a following meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashier checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still active.

Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashier checks were given to NSA who with funds CIA assistance was working on a new gadget for the surveillance Director (NSA) and the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought

the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. May Rosen of the DDCI Staff. There are reimbursable and non-reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by a domestic Agency Security proprietary. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was \$3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

00073

SECRET EYES ONLY
SAC/DOJ 2000 00073
1973-06-05 00073

CLASSIFIED BY	AMERICAN REVIEWERS CLERK 1973-06-05 00073
DATE	1973-06-05 00073
BY	AMERICAN REVIEWERS CLERK 1973-06-05 00073
E2 IMPDET <i>JF1410</i>	
SI: BY: 00073	

WARNING: THIS IS A
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE
AND METHODS PROVIDED

NW 65360 DocId:2269624 Page 13

SECRET EYES ONLY

00077

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
 SUBJECT : Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailees to EPIAB and CIEP. I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By [REDACTED] DATE, more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA [REDACTED] 101 Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State to

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET Cl By (003935) JFL(A)

00105

JKR(A) 07 MAY 1973

.protect foreign visitors. Recently, [John Hart] was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with four other Agency employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services

3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -

Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand there may be those who would question Iden's activities currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still Executive Director-

present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

4. Project TEOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing Project TEOFOLD is in security that should be reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies etc. based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

45. Project TEOFOLD Reimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDO agents by domestic Agency individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of reporting "too much," I would remind you that Contract Personnel Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assignments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped, in the main, in the United States.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567

WARNING: THIS
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET EYES ONLY

00072
00103

CONFIDENTIAL

4 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
Background: This memorandum concerns the Agent in Charge Agency which has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Policy Director, the President's Foreign Security Intelligence May Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries with detailed their employees and certain professional employees on a non-reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time we have no clerical or professionals assigned to the immediate office of the White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to the Communications Section (OL). There are details to DIA, CIA and CIEP. I might point out that we had details to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a brief laborer assigned to the grounds and a chauffeur who designed invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970 more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our details were hired at bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with details. Details have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedicated to the acquisition of arms, and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clerical whom detail to MSG on a non-reimbursable basis. This proprietary is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to obtain information which we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State, both the State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E 2 IMPDET C1 By 003955

00110

00105

EYES ONLY
SECRET

OL 3-2753

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE SOURCE INFORMATION SOURCES

NW 01340 DocId:32894624 Page 36

ACI 20170504 10:10:00

L2 IMPDET C1 By 001777

SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
protect foreign visitors. Recently, John Hard was detailed
to the Secretary of the Treasury along with other Agency
employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's 3 assignments to the White House and Government Agencies as in Discussion concerning the appropriate State license. As similarly, a National Tax College are probably quite desirable. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and Mr Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. [Redacted] 112 "Keyed" for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept close to the vest during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave. In order for the

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

supplier located in Maryland, deals in a wide range of law enforcement equipment.

range of law enforcement, police supplies and equipment.
4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

Proprietary. There is an understanding that if any inquiry is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would immediately Engaged in Domestic Activities. In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of reporting "too much," it would seem you that Contract Personnel Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assignments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped, in the main, in the United States. Most of the transactions are on behalf of the intelligence service with whom liaison is conducted in various foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

2 2

00106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

00111

7. Contractual Relationship - USJPRS: The Agency organization, USJPRS, has a contractual association with approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 40 contract employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research Service) is a part of FBI, in the performance of its research and analysis. They perform a translation service of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated into the Bureau's work Standards and have located in Washington, D. C. They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared in Contract Personnel Division by the Bureau. CIA reimburses the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared

in & Con ~~Request for a Lockpicker~~: This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency. Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resig~~n~~ning in the spring of 1972, Item 38 of EEAB.

received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a
retiree ~~Summers~~ resignee who was accomplished in picking locks. EEAB
Iden 38 advised him from Treasury Hunt ~~Thomas Hester~~ who retired had a
31 July 1970 resignee who was a ~~notable~~ document picker. EEAB decided
to show the date of this exchange, or, but Mrs. Thomas-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
March and May 1972, of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between

MaAll and they above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency. Information was reported to the Office

of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency. Sent to McCord: J. Ross Lambert, a contract

~~the Agency's external placement business units~~ Lambert, a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Services Branch. In his search for a job after retirement, one of the leads given to Lambert was of the James McCord's security business. EESB sent a resume to McCord, but Lambert was not helped. The lead given to Lambert was

James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but Lambert was not interested.

Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by FEAR, 72, but until after this telephone call he had

Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

00107

00107

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) He said he had been visited by a Special Agent of the FBI who told Lambert that his resume had been found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him, Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29 OS were notified immediately. After the Agent left him, Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29 OS were notified immediately.

11837
Harry B. Fisher

JFK(A) Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

00108

CONFIDENTIAL

00108

14 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by the
Office of Logistics

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 6
This memorandum contains information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation and justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters relevant reported, except those actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive areas and the requisites for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows: Identity 10

Acting Executive Officer

RFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

00110

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

2 IMPDET CL 001777

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246

00371

DD/D/DO 7/10/73

JPK(1A)

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary and have assisted us in obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too, have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary.

WII-Comments on Jack Anderson Column

~~REFERENCE~~ Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship to the United States Government is made. ~~referencer for the Agency to a covere~~ ~~to obtain such equipment and hide any con-~~ Government to insert after the Coverto Procurement Staff of the Procurement Division has relied on an established working relationship with ~~an~~ ~~firm~~ ~~in~~ ~~Maryland~~, ~~including~~ ~~wide~~ range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment. The Covert Procurement Staff has had a relationship with an officer in the firm ~~Anforo~~ ~~covertly~~ ~~years~~ ~~between~~ ~~the~~ ~~officer~~ ~~has~~ ~~agreed~~ ~~to~~ ~~allow~~ ~~parties~~ ~~place~~ ~~orders~~ ~~through~~ ~~his~~ ~~corporation~~ ~~to~~ ~~major~~ ~~suppliers~~ ~~of~~ ~~this~~ ~~equipment~~ ~~with~~ ~~a~~ ~~billing~~ ~~to~~ ~~an~~ ~~Agency~~ ~~national~~ ~~proprietary~~. There is an understanding that, if any inquiry is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would immediately disclose the Chief of the Coverto Procurement Staff who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact the Department of Justice to identify the Agency's interest in the procurement action, and he will be the officer true of any responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry about the proprietary from an FBI agent making a routine investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI, the agent was informed that it is an Agency national proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry. Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment. The majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelligence service with whom liaison is conducted in various foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

EXCERPTED BY 9803 R00/gct
M131254... for Gme (JPK)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE FROM

CIA HISTORICAL RESEARCH DIVISION

Gme 3/3/94
(9803 R00/gct 3/27/94)

EYES ONLY

SECRET

JPK
(1A)00111
100 100000
GL BY 001204

00373

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

USSA-EPS FORM 101

6/70

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

INCIDENT REPORT

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.

Chile 4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

Colonel White, 1226 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. In February 1971, Colonel White, then 1706 Market Street, Springfield, Massachusetts, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project.

Colonel White did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project N/A.

At this time, I am advised that the subject is the Procurement Division. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, approximately \$1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.

Sergeant E. Putler and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately 1335 hours in the Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of \$36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of \$11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

USE EPS FORM 102 - SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS

22. PHOTOS
D YES
FBI

24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materials from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of another agency by providing a service for, another Government agency when such

30. INCIDENT STATUS

A-D OPEN

B-E CLOSER

C-D UNFOUNDED

D-E CLEARED BY AGENT

31. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE), NAME
Sgt. Stevens E. Putler
Sergeant Stevens E. Putler

DATE 06/07/71
TIME 1500 hrs.
SECRET

32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE)
Pete J. Martinez
Captain Pete J. Martinez

DATE 06/07/71
TIME 1500 hrs.
N/A

DATE 06/07/71
TIME 1500 hrs.
00376

LAW & LIT
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics

INCIDENT REPORT - SUPPLEMENT

1. SERIAL (CASE) NO. 1000-1000-1000

EX-72-399

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY [REDACTED] 14. APPROVED [REDACTED] 5. NUMBER-FILED [REDACTED]
One agency of the Government to duplicate facilities 321-7721
readily available from another. Atypical example of this
procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In
connection with previously or the separate [REDACTED] [REDACTED] badge # 147,
M.I. [REDACTED] and Officer Michael S. Audilia, Badge # 5310, M.I.D.C. [REDACTED], also M.P.D.C.
Print Ordinor # 735. Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

S/A Michael F. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that PBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing

"many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

JAN 10

4. SUSPECT AND SUSPECTED PERSONS. [REDACTED] ADDRESS, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

N/A

5. ARRESTED PERSONS. [REDACTED] ADDRESS, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

N/A

RACE [REDACTED] HEIGHT [REDACTED] WEIGHT [REDACTED] SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY

LAST NAME [REDACTED] FIRST [REDACTED] MIDDLE [REDACTED] ADDRESS [REDACTED]

6. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items: DATE OF BIRTH [REDACTED] SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY

N/A

7. ARRESTED PERSONS. [REDACTED] ADDRESS, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

N/A

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was prepared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSITION. [REDACTED] NUMBER-FILED [REDACTED]

N/A

OPEN

CLOSED

UNFOUNDED

CLEARED BY ARREST

N/A

15. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION

OPEN

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00113

00377

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of

Logistics

11-14-77

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY:

Herman J. Murphy

4. ADDRESS

S. HOME F-21-E

321-7721

6. OFFICE

75-1715

7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS:

Executive Fellowship. - The book is entitled "Where's Waldo?" and is described as "A Guide to Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information that may be useful to an investigator. At approximately 600 hours, Tuesday May 10, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer Adrián Loría, located at 1310 L Street, N.W., and stated the following items missing: book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June, 1967; (4) Portable Radios; one (1) Sony AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radios; Due to demands, a second printing of 600 copies was made in September, 1968. The title page of the book gives one (1) Testimony AM/FM Stereo; Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver, one (1) Women's Pullover Sweater, and an unknown number of books, attribution to Murphy, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because the Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

 A. OPEN B. CLOSED C. DUNFOUNDED D. CLEARED BY ARREST

II/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION

OPEN

EYES ONLY
SECRET

00378

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE)

Sgt. Herman E. O'Gallagher
NW 03308 Dated: 05/15/77 Page: 44

18. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)

Pete M. Manthos
Captain Pete H. Manthos

20. DATE

05-15-77

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics

Logistics				Embassy of Chile				248-42	
14. EX. COPIES	15. DIST.	16. DEAT	17. ILA	3. STREET ADDRESS 1736 MASS. AVE N.W.				4. HOME PHONE N/A	
18. COMPLAINANT IN connection with the responsibility held by this Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all Agency operating components, the following information is relevant:				19. DESCRIBE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE ► CHILE EMBASSY				6. BUS. PHONE 785-1750	
20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which is Iden 88				21. YEAR MAKE MODEL COLOR was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971.				10. DATE, D.Y. TIME See Facility S-1-1-4-T-7	
CODE: O-OWNER R-REPORTING PERSON C-COMPLAINANT P-PARENT GUAR				11. WEAPONS, TOOLS, FORCE OF GUARDS NEEDED UNK				PHOTOS □ YES □ NO	
The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970 as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site and in keeping with the approved requirement for a complement of five standby safeshouses for all Agency use.				12. METHOD USED UNK				13. CLASSIF.CAPTION	
► The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older high-rise building along Iden 89. ► lessee is Iden 90				The nominal lessee is Iden 90, a security-cleared attorney with offices located at Iden 91.				EUS. PRICE 785-1750	
25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS EXCLUDING REPORTER AND REPORTED BY (Name, Age, Sex, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (Brief description if arrested)				26. NATURE OF INQUIRIES AND LOCATION OF POINT ► with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.				27. HOSPITALIZED WHERE UNK	
28. TRANSPORTED BY ►				29. HIRED BY UNK				30. TYPE CONTROLLED ►	
31. EXACT ADDRESS OF PREMISE ►				32. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				33. SUSPECT ►	
34. PURPOSE OF OCCURRENCE ►				35. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				36. SUSPECT ►	
37. HARM CAUSED ►				38. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				39. SUSPECT ►	
40. HARM CAUSED ►				41. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				42. SUSPECT ►	
43. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				44. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				45. SUSPECT ►	
46. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				47. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				48. SUSPECT ►	
49. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				50. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				51. SUSPECT ►	
52. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				53. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				54. SUSPECT ►	
55. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				56. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				57. SUSPECT ►	
58. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				59. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				60. SUSPECT ►	
61. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				62. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				63. SUSPECT ►	
64. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				65. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				66. SUSPECT ►	
67. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				68. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				69. SUSPECT ►	
70. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				71. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				72. SUSPECT ►	
73. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				74. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				75. SUSPECT ►	
76. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				77. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				78. SUSPECT ►	
79. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				80. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				81. SUSPECT ►	
82. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				83. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				84. SUSPECT ►	
85. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				86. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				87. SUSPECT ►	
88. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				89. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				90. SUSPECT ►	
91. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				92. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				93. SUSPECT ►	
94. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				95. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				96. SUSPECT ►	
97. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				98. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				99. SUSPECT ►	
100. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				101. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				102. SUSPECT ►	
103. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				104. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				105. SUSPECT ►	
106. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				107. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				108. SUSPECT ►	
109. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				110. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				111. SUSPECT ►	
112. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				113. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				114. SUSPECT ►	
115. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				116. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				117. SUSPECT ►	
118. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				119. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				120. SUSPECT ►	
121. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				122. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				123. SUSPECT ►	
124. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				125. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				126. SUSPECT ►	
127. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				128. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				129. SUSPECT ►	
130. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				131. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				132. SUSPECT ►	
133. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				134. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				135. SUSPECT ►	
136. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				137. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				138. SUSPECT ►	
139. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				140. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				141. SUSPECT ►	
142. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				143. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				144. SUSPECT ►	
145. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				146. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				147. SUSPECT ►	
148. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				149. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				150. SUSPECT ►	
151. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				152. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				153. SUSPECT ►	
154. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				155. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				156. SUSPECT ►	
157. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				158. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				159. SUSPECT ►	
160. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				161. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				162. SUSPECT ►	
163. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				164. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				165. SUSPECT ►	
166. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				167. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				168. SUSPECT ►	
169. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				170. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				171. SUSPECT ►	
172. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				173. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				174. SUSPECT ►	
175. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				176. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				177. SUSPECT ►	
178. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				179. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				180. SUSPECT ►	
181. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				182. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				183. SUSPECT ►	
184. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				185. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				186. SUSPECT ►	
187. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				188. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				189. SUSPECT ►	
190. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				191. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				192. SUSPECT ►	
193. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				194. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				195. SUSPECT ►	
196. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				197. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				198. SUSPECT ►	
199. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				200. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				201. SUSPECT ►	
202. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				203. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				204. SUSPECT ►	
205. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				206. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				207. SUSPECT ►	
208. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				209. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				210. SUSPECT ►	
211. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				212. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				213. SUSPECT ►	
214. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				215. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				216. SUSPECT ►	
217. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				218. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				219. SUSPECT ►	
220. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				221. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				222. SUSPECT ►	
223. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				224. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				225. SUSPECT ►	
226. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				227. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				228. SUSPECT ►	
229. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				230. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				231. SUSPECT ►	
232. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				233. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				234. SUSPECT ►	
235. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				236. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				237. SUSPECT ►	
238. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				239. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				240. SUSPECT ►	
241. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				242. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				243. SUSPECT ►	
244. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				245. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				246. SUSPECT ►	
247. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				248. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				249. SUSPECT ►	
250. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				251. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				252. SUSPECT ►	
253. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				254. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				255. SUSPECT ►	
256. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				257. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				258. SUSPECT ►	
259. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				260. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				261. SUSPECT ►	
262. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				263. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				264. SUSPECT ►	
265. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				266. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				267. SUSPECT ►	
268. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				269. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				270. SUSPECT ►	
271. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				272. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				273. SUSPECT ►	
274. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				275. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				276. SUSPECT ►	
277. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				278. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				279. SUSPECT ►	
280. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				281. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				282. SUSPECT ►	
283. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				284. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				285. SUSPECT ►	
286. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				287. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				288. SUSPECT ►	
289. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				290. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				291. SUSPECT ►	
292. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				293. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				294. SUSPECT ►	
295. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				296. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				297. SUSPECT ►	
298. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				299. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				300. SUSPECT ►	
301. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				302. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				303. SUSPECT ►	
304. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				305. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				306. SUSPECT ►	
307. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				308. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				309. SUSPECT ►	
310. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				311. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				312. SUSPECT ►	
313. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				314. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				315. SUSPECT ►	
316. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				317. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				318. SUSPECT ►	
319. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				320. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				321. SUSPECT ►	
322. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				323. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				324. SUSPECT ►	
325. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				326. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				327. SUSPECT ►	
328. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				329. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				330. SUSPECT ►	
331. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				332. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				333. SUSPECT ►	
334. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				335. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				336. SUSPECT ►	
337. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				338. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				339. SUSPECT ►	
340. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				341. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				342. SUSPECT ►	
343. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				344. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				345. SUSPECT ►	
346. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				347. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				348. SUSPECT ►	
349. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				350. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				351. SUSPECT ►	
352. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				353. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				354. SUSPECT ►	
355. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				356. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				357. SUSPECT ►	
358. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				359. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				360. SUSPECT ►	
361. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				362. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				363. SUSPECT ►	
364. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				365. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				366. SUSPECT ►	
367. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				368. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				369. SUSPECT ►	
370. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				371. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				372. SUSPECT ►	
373. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				374. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				375. SUSPECT ►	
376. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				377. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				378. SUSPECT ►	
379. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				380. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				381. SUSPECT ►	
382. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				383. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				384. SUSPECT ►	
385. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				386. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				387. SUSPECT ►	
388. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				389. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				390. SUSPECT ►	
391. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				392. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				393. SUSPECT ►	
394. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				395. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				396. SUSPECT ►	
397. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				398. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				399. SUSPECT ►	
400. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				401. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				402. SUSPECT ►	
403. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				404. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				405. SUSPECT ►	
406. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				407. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				408. SUSPECT ►	
409. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				410. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				411. SUSPECT ►	
412. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				413. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				414. SUSPECT ►	
415. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				416. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				417. SUSPECT ►	
418. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				419. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				420. SUSPECT ►	
421. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				422. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				423. SUSPECT ►	
424. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				425. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				426. SUSPECT ►	
427. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				428. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				429. SUSPECT ►	
430. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				431. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				432. SUSPECT ►	
433. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				434. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				435. SUSPECT ►	
436. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				437. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				438. SUSPECT ►	
439. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				440. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				441. SUSPECT ►	
442. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				443. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				444. SUSPECT ►	
445. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				446. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				447. SUSPECT ►	
448. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				449. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				450. SUSPECT ►	
451. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				452. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				453. SUSPECT ►	
454. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				455. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				456. SUSPECT ►	
457. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				458. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				459. SUSPECT ►	
460. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				461. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				462. SUSPECT ►	
463. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				464. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				465. SUSPECT ►	
466. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				467. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				468. SUSPECT ►	
469. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				470. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				471. SUSPECT ►	
472. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				473. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				474. SUSPECT ►	
475. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				476. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				477. SUSPECT ►	
478. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				479. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				480. SUSPECT ►	
481. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				482. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				483. SUSPECT ►	
484. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				485. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				486. SUSPECT ►	
487. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				488. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				489. SUSPECT ►	
490. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				491. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				492. SUSPECT ►	
493. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				494. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				495. SUSPECT ►	
496. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				497. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				498. SUSPECT ►	
499. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				500. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				501. SUSPECT ►	
502. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				503. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				504. SUSPECT ►	
505. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				506. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				507. SUSPECT ►	
508. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				509. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				510. SUSPECT ►	
511. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				512. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				513. SUSPECT ►	
514. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				515. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				516. SUSPECT ►	
517. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				518. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				519. SUSPECT ►	
520. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				521. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				522. SUSPECT ►	
523. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				524. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				525. SUSPECT ►	
526. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				527. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				528. SUSPECT ►	
529. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				530. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				531. SUSPECT ►	
532. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				533. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				534. SUSPECT ►	
535. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				536. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				537. SUSPECT ►	
538. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				539. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				540. SUSPECT ►	
541. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				542. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				543. SUSPECT ►	
544. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				545. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				546. SUSPECT ►	
547. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				548. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				549. SUSPECT ►	
550. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				551. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				552. SUSPECT ►	
553. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				554. DATE OF OCCURRENCE ►				555. SUSPECT ►	

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics

assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. NH Division ~~is the cognizant~~
operating component on this matter
25 May 1973

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break-in of 15 May 1972

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

2 Atts 1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he
cc: DDWMS any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
in a break in at Identity 61 in Washington, D.C. on
15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but
suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and
the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from
the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated
15 May 1972; Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest
of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,
and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated
15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of
investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61
between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

00116

00389

~~DO NOT~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,3
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,3
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,3
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,3
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	13	1,4
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	10	1,3
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,3
cc: Legislative Counsel Inspector General	11/16/72	Camera Sets	20	6
OG TSD KG:cav	4/17/72	Camera Sets	10	7
Orig - Subject: Watergate Case TSD JKG Signer	11/18/71	Actuators, Recorders	50	4
TSD Chróno	4/19/72	Tessina Cameras	3	7
TSD	12/ 7/72	Camera, Video	1	18,0
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,6
TSD	3/26/71	Tubes, Image, W L 30691	2	4,6
TSD	4/20/73	Cameras, Television	2	18,3

WARNING NOTICE

SEARCHED SERIALIZED INDEXED FILED
FBI-WASH DC 1973 MAR 24 Page 4

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

<u>Requesting Office</u>	<u>Date of Request</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit</u>
TSD	12/14/72	Transmitters, Radio EVCS ONLY	3	3
TSD	10/20/72	Actuators, Recorder	25	5
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Juba 1982 Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,6
TSD	5/26/71	Tube, Image, W L 30691	2	4,6
MEMORANDUM 4/22/71		Mr. William T. Colby	3	1,3
SUBJECT: 4/22/71 Spectro Module; iPlugs			1	1,2
TSD	4/22/71	Power Supply - UWP-39A	1	5
OL	1. 2/25/71	Following telephone Analyzers, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which telephone Analyzers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding [CIA's charter] SPKU(B)	2	1,3
OS	1/30/71	Cable, Special-Purpose	22	1,3
OL	8/12/70	Electrical	5,000 ft.	

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy ~~1/10/73~~ agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I personally managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with ~~IDENT-122~~ the IDEN-123 representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by IDEN-124, James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

JFK(A)

~~SECRET~~
~~EVCS ONLY~~

2.3 REPORT NO. 007789

~~EVCS ONLY~~

00457

11 MAY 1973

~~SECRET//COMINT//
SAC/CDR/CINCPAC/CINCPAC~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

EYES ONLY

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive issues.

the IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which might be considered sensitive issues. On 15 April 1963 DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not

~~Most Sensitive Projects~~ mention it to the public unless the FBI themselves raised it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with Project Officer [redacted] and briefed him on Reason for identification of Telephone McGeorge Project was briefid listing

On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation. Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express


grave reservations [redacted] repeatedly machine that the Type of IDEN-95 be informed directly that work was being done in espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed

these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this retrieval of drug files.

4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crop ~~sensitive Projects~~ and North Vietnam. A second involved a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear installations. Outside the United States Government General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

00135

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET//COMINT//
SAC/CDR/CINCPAC/CINCPAC~~

00459

EYES ONLY

Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, Office Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
PRPHES	John Winnie TSD 3 362-1922 (sterile)	Statistical analysis of psychological data.	Source of data. Contractors are involved with project.

JK DB
TILAO exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me. Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibility of Making PRIM Concise effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between Red 1185/ DCI McCone and Mr. B1254, Agent of the FBI at a French meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to such proposals then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

SPYDER 5. During the period when Des Fitzgerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that Fitzgerald was used for the cooperation of some prominent US businessmen in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some \$300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in Item 48 sections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, OS DEN-128 made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted.

DAVIDC APPRECIATION Red 9288 Red 9338
Waltzot be acceptable in a secure way nor an ITT hearing. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected [the Agency] and particularly, IDEN-36

EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

00136

00459

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
	ISD/DDC Ref 1442	Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention Cooperative program with name grouping with the named organization.	2 APR 1972

SUMMARY:

There is little now evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, 21 to 23 August 1972. The Students for a Democratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstration in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targeting on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of JOHN BESLAMS an indication of North Vietnamese contacts. Director of SDCC Computer Support will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant solidarity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and "send us materials you have."

3

~~EYES ONLY~~

00137

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL DISSEM~~

00556

CONTROLED BY SS/EM

8 May 1973

23 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
 Office of Communications, Operational
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit, which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCO, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DP of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the DDO's Chief, MI, Miami. That the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDO and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities, the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92, Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was discontinued. A member of the Stockholm Conference for the Protection of Human Rights and Democracy was terminated by DDO because of possible legal ramifications.

The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following:

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061947

Demonstrations organized by the San Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267, San Diego, Ca. 92103.

00140

TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

00557

Downloaded to Saint
Paul for Administration
use only
7/13/2017 10:00 AM

CONTROLED DISSEM 8 May 1973

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment ~~in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.~~ In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects NCHAWK, UNION and MUGRAVEL. Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID and RESE. These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HF/DF system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Aft.

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

00141

- 2 -

00553

CONTROLED DISSEM

NO FORWARDING, NO COPIES MADE

*Demands to send
and file forward
by 15 July 1973*

NW 85000 DocId:32890024 Page 53

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTROLLED. LISTEN~~

9 May 1973 14 JUN 1972.

~~JOHANK~~ -> Electronic survey of Iden 63.
~~Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention~~

SUMMARY Jan 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by the Iden 94 Embassy on their diplomatic communication link. SPD/SEO support terminated two years ago. The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. Electronic surveillance of Iden 64 expression of interest by members of the North Vietnamese Delegation to Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning the Paris Peace Talks (attendance at two meetings). antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the election of both major parties. Electronic surveillance and report of both major parties. SPD/CHT personnel performed an

DEVELOPMENT personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording of the spectrum covering .1 to .6 GHz during the

In period 16 May to 20 April 1978, the Plans call for continued support by SPD for the future as requested.

~~WIGGINS~~ - Division D operation involving a Iden 95 code clerk, SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in use of device and stood by in Iden 97 Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed. The operation took place in July 1972. The visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

102

SUSTAINABLE

00142

00559

NO FOREIGN BISSELL® BISSELL AIRPORT

CONTINUED ON BACK

~~HANDLE VIA CERT CHANNELS~~

~~Designated to submit
only for per acre charges~~

Controlled Dissem

28 JUN 1972

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
or Harass the Republican National Convention
in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

REFERENCE : There are no additional indications of any substantial
foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-
tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24
August 1972.

1. The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of \$30-32K
for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given. Mr. Colby
asked that DDO records be checked.


2. DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
project called Iden 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
service for the collection of ELINT intelligence. The activity is
handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.

3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on
13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that
the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount, i.e., \$30 to 32K
and not to two separate allocations.

John C. Richards
John C. Richards

00145

SECRET
SECURITY



No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem

U.S.
GPO: 1972 O-145

CONTROLD D/COMINT

May 1973

2581

26 JUL 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUBJECT: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect
Involvement

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969 with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh, leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The Iden 1 contact was indirect and occurred sometime during the late 1960's when Stockholder Director, Office of Comptroller will participate in technical Division, Office of Convention Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of Convention Services. The Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a computer for been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican National Convention has sent a delegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available. However, indicating that sections of the Republican Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Individual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency

focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3;

I understand

In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that all OPTD employees 14 One village who was attending a funeral whilst not being available until tomorrow U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

of the - aggression

Charles A. Briggs

Director of Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting

00561

Attachment

As stated

SECRET

CONTROLD D/COMINT

00149

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JULY 26 1972	
FBI - MIAMI	
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE	
FBI - MIAMI	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachment
23 May 1973

- of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by the "Republican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on 21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August actions, the PEP's leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.
- (Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention.)
- 7 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy, Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the trip.
- 7 Feb 72 Follow-up from Taylor. Plan 9-S trips for 3 individuals all in FY 72. Cost probably \$10K. Minnick ready to make first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. Edair said OK re Tonkin Conference visit.
- 7 Feb 72 See attached memo from Bill Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and organizing sources from Seymour Bolten (SI Jul 72) and Colby (2a Aug 72) reorded the travel of a delegation of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG).
- 12(?) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/Minnick attendance at a Latin American (see 102) conference on narcotics. He also said Jim Shepherd, White House, was laying it on with Iden 32 for advance party has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the AWU delegation. Although no information is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation and PRG officials.
- 23 Jun 72 Iden 3 documented on Krogh/Minnick interests of the AWU advance party having asked for, including large-scale PRG officials regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain PRQ questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AWU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to "educate the American people on the consequences of voting for Nixon who was traveling when he won the defeat Nixon." Recollection of its being to Mexico City, San Juan and, Iden 32 contacted by Iden 3.
- 6 Jul 72 Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley file. We will send."
- 2 Aug 72 Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel to "educate the American people on the consequences of voting for Nixon who was traveling when he won the defeat Nixon." Recollection of its being to Mexico City, San Juan and, Iden 32 contacted by Iden 3.
- 1 Nov 72 Related? Iden 3 call. Again notes are cryptic: WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32); Survey ENDD problems/ Mexico.

00150

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

K3 FOREIGN DISSEM/DISSEM ABROAD

00552

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DISSEM

On Mr. Colby's copy only:

2 AUG 1972

13 Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved \$30K for sensitive CS project - no details.

20 Jan 72 Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Reminded ExDir re \$32K he said DCI OK'd
of harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen VAN TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention." TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

00533

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY	00154
EXCERPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION	AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
5 52(1), Q. (3) + 13 (including all parts)	1997-06-01
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON	

~~CONTROLLED BY SEC~~

19 Jul 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida. Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement. A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-war faction is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972 for some discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Kenneth DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussion with PRG representatives. Upon his return from been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the McCord-McGovern affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed, and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity.

2. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program and a need for a good security system both before and during the National Convention. Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a problem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

SEARCHED BY Q576-16 00453

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO E.O. 14176, EXECUTIVE ORDER § 14176.11 (3) & (4) (THIS IS A COPY OF THE 14176.11 (3) EXECUTIVE ORDER)
SEARCHED BY Q576-16 00554

4. When Jack declined, he indicated that Mr. Hunt asked for any other recommendations he might have. According to Jack he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the Agency, but he did furnish the name of DEN-108 who might be possibly ready to retire from the Agency.

5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau obtained his ~~name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt~~ ^{1 AUG 1972}. He said that the ~~Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions~~ and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any knowledge of McCord's technical capability or activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida ~~on 14 August 1972~~.

6. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr. Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record and for information of the Director of Security.

Charles W. Kane
Charles W. Kane

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

00150
00365

CLASSIFIED BY _____	EX-REF ID: A65457
SCH-600 OF E.O. 14176	DATE 01-01-2024 BY SP-1
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED UNLESS	
impossible to determine	

~~CONFIDENTIAL DISSEM~~06 MAR 1972
105

~~CONFIDENTIAL DISSEM~~

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: ~~CONTACTS~~ with Individuals Named in the Watergate Master

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' and National Liberation Movements, however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political convention.

My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call. I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for conveying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Head of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed Ideen 17 of the telephone call from Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Ideen 17 as a result of our conversation.

"In the final resolution of the Paris WFTS Assembly, before the peace and independence of the IndoChinese People of 1972, will be held by the Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

WARNING: SOURCE
SENSITIVE EYESORE AND SOURCES
AKD METHODS REVIEWED

E103 CIVY ~~SECRET~~

2	IMPACT ID BY	011018
---	--------------	--------

00153

CONFIDENTIAL DISSEM

with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached.

under various forms such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and

antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will

efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services

Attn:

EWS CDR SECRET

00153

00563

CONFIDENTIAL DISSEM

17 July 1972

CONFIDENTIAL D.D.L.M.

09 MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane Democratic National Convention
Iden 108

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence or exploit actions designed to disrupt the ~~1972 Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-15 July 1972~~ ~~the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam~~ ~~and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina.~~ The Assembly's statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam war activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions. We made no specific call for support of dis- and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subject's employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them.

In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed ~~friend~~ staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed in private ~~with the office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.~~ The Conference member stated that these actions were part of an international campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts.

5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate at the election conventions in July and August." I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen a major organizer had earlier associated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's Action Commission. The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

00160

CONFIDENTIAL D.D.L.M.

00570

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION ALLOWED
REF ID: A65363 DocId:32988624 Page 63

IN TACTIC UNCLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL AGENT

23 MAY 1972

by the fact that Mr. Kane accompanied a technical sweep team to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.

~~Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention~~

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained ~~his name from him~~ limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections ~~are playing~~ signed ^{signed} a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for ~~Deputy Director of Security~~ (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.
Demonstrations organised by Florida
People's Coalition, Box 17521 Tampa,
Florida 33612. 00161

NO FORWARDING UNLESS APPROVED BY DIRECTOR

~~CONTROLED DISSEM~~

8 May 1973

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence re: the Democratic Convention.

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.

b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103 for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction System."

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project which involved the collection of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms terminated this program last Fall.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED

00163

00572

~~CONTROLED DISSEM~~

DO NOT FORWARD OR COPY THIS DOCUMENT

21 May 1973

7 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Research Project on Robert Vesco
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

1. On ~~16 October 1972~~^{SUMMARY} Messrs. Breckinridge and McIntireman, in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic security. One project cited was a query from the Director, apparently at the request of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "What do we know about Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OES's analysts were assigned to the project unit, working through the Domestic Contact Service, spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange Commission. There apparently was some contact also with AID Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because of the current publicity about Vesco and the possibility of continuing probes into the subject by the press and the courts.

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions.

00170

00573

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION WITHOUT APPROVAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22 May 1973

21 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

Bill--

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
~~Attached~~ are the reports Bill Clegg asked to see: activities designed to
disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
~~Florida~~ Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0813/68,
Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America (pages 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (8 August 1969),
No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).
3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look
(12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
Dissem (Copy 98).

Please note that these are our record copies and should
be returned.

Edward W. Proctor
Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence

00171

00171	013329
-------	--------

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CHS

00575

~~SECRET//COMINT//
SECRET//COMINT//~~

EYES ONLY

8 May 1973

4

into the US labor situation, and particularly to try
 MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence and
 Walter Reuther. IDEN-36 steered a very skillful
 course in this connection, but the Agency could be
 FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence
 vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,
 or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
 SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's
 wishes.

Legislative Charter

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project NOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Jerry Houston, Mike Miskovsky, IDEN-131, and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1968 a large amount of cash went with him. I have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break-in at the offices of Ehrberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent \$3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to ~~mitigate~~ the White Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of

10. Under the heading of old business I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

00320/6 00183
00320/6 (EX)

APPROVED FOR PAYMENT 1973
 CIO HISTORICAL RECORDS DIVISION
 GAB 3/3/74
 (1963-1969 3PC)

OPPORTUNITY

Carries 6	013322
6	13
6	13
6	13
6	13

00320/6 (EX)

~~SECRET//SENSITIVE~~

Young: Harry Eisenbeis and Charles Rice of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11652 and the implementing NSC directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.

These responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be viewed as borderline.

11. Also under the heading of old business, I well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby DDCS accepted information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly. Shortly after Admiral [REDACTED] had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how DDCS, for six months in late 1971 and early 1972, did. Don Read was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.

13. Finally, DDCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood! One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas [REDACTED] review satellite imagery. Their arrival from NASA programs to identify photographed the attention of the press and, in due course Mr. John

Wenclaw's Confidential

- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophes and civil disturbances.

6

- OCL, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with Hightowers, US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.

14. The use of IDEN-132 aircraft has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite excited when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the IDEN-132 with the high FBIS has been occasionally supplied linguistic material to work. I explained directly to him, carefully, in perfect private charter but he didn't like it to translate Arabic in Washington.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington; in fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicated by the press service which is now, however, in the Government and stamped "Official Use Only". This has been the case for three decades, without problems. Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the others to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again.

16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope Paul VI, under Department of Commerce cover since 1964, quarters.

JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of unclassified publications in foreign languages.

sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of the CIA-JPRS relationship paper set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

Edward W. Proctor
EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

© 2014, INTERNAL USE ONLY

EYES ONLY

•7 May 1973

7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence:
out that I was very much in the position of the
VIA enlisted man, who knew Director fermate intelligence officers
were aware of these activities and better able to
FROM Director of current intelligence misinter-
pretation.

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970). In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to write a memorandum with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but it came through channels from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially sensitive and was to include material provided by the Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI.

SECRET
GTR INTERNAL USE ONLY

132-57451

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

جعفر بن محبث

E53 - G37

Q0163

00463

~~SECRET~~
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

3. For several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda on ~~Stokely Carmichael's~~ travels abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only, although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program

which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipulations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division Richard Lehman difficult targets in ~~Directorate of Current Intelligence~~ in various parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embarrassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is kept informed on a regular basis.

~~SECRET~~
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090

00163

00483

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
 SUBJECT: students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25
 May 1973. DCS Domestic Activity

7. A Soviet defector was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although his present attitude toward the Agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.

JFK (NBI)

1.

David H. Blee
 Chief
 Soviet Bloc Division

2.

3.

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

4.

- 5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI.
- 6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDO or the FBI.

00181

~~SECRET//COMINT~~

202522 004476

00522

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

7. Attached is the material we requested of Dick Ober:
A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)
B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention
C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Secret Service for Democratic and Republican Conventions
8. 9. 10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.
- Ober advises that the only American we reported on to the FEC is Rennie Davis. (See Foreign 00548)

JFC
(1) (b)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

James R. Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

-2-

OPTIONAL FORM
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
10-101
1 AUG 54
MAY BE USED

00185

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Inspector General	7 May 1973	
2			
3			
4	Director of Central Intelligence		
5	Deputy Director for Intelligence		
6	Director of Current Intelligence		
7	Activity Related to Domestic Events		
ACTION	DIRECT - 2/11	TELETYPE	
AR/POV/IC	DISPATCH	PROMEDICATION	
CURRENT	FILE	RETURN	
CO-CURRENT	TRANSMISSION	SIGNATURE	
<p>In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then Assistant to the President for National Security, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of student dissidence. Confronted by tumult at like Columbia and mindful of the violence enging student outbursts at Berlin's Free University, Rostow sought to idorn whether youthful dissidence was interconnected -- spawned by the same and hence manipulated by forces or influences to the interests of the US and its allies; or under unipical sway to the detriment of US, as it has not been sent through that office -- I gave The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden on the only the key subject and originator assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DD and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the or the President's concerns and to agree on to be examined, the research methods to be f 00547 </p>			
<p>FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER</p> <p>Written during the summer of 1968, the most version of Restless Youth comprised two sections. It was a philosophical treatment of student revolution, history, and tactics. This section depended on overt literature and FBI reporting on Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In my of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page) study of SDS and its foreign ties the same had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)</p>			
<p>SECRET EYES ONLY</p>		<p>checked by 00547 Received from program date in % 18 1973 by [initials] Approved and Dated 15 May 1973 by [initials]</p>	

-SOCKET
EYES ONLY

Classified by EDS & 29
Exempt from present disclosure schedule
as "E.D." in E.O. 14176, dated 1/19/92.
Subject: EDS - EDS - EDS
An agency and contract of the
EDS - EDS - EDS - EDS
An agency and contract of the
EDS - EDS - EDS

ROUTING RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

EYES ONLY

FROM: 4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolised the field of student action here and abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters-- ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself as a review of foreign student dissidence.

TO: (Officer designating team number, and building) Richard Lehman
DATE: 14 May 1975
INITIALS: *[initials]*

[Note: Use this sheet to show from whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.]

1. IDEN-53 Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be attached or *[initials]* attached to *[initials]*.
2. *[initials]* 1. Background note on the Committee per your request.
3. *[initials]* 2. copies of memoranda concerning the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.
4. *[initials]* 3. Secret Service (7 April and 22 June 1970).
5. *[initials]* 7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.

EYES ONLY

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

[initials]

[initials]

6. *[initials]*
7. *[initials]*
8. *[initials]*
9. *[initials]*
10. *[initials]*
11. *[initials]*
12. *[initials]*
13. *[initials]*

SECRET

EYES ONLY

14. *[initials]*
15. *[initials]*

00548
00191

~~TOP SECRET DMRA~~
EYES ONLY

14 MAY 1973

7 May 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce
VIA fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
including studies on demonstrations; subversion, extremism
FROM and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chair-
man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
SUBJECT Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central
Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of
other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive

1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of US organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of those reports, prepared at the request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed between international Communist elements or foreign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.

2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-departmental survey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect whatever information was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCE, which was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the President's Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

~~3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this subject. Although agent reports on Communist front operations overseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of CP activists—and that was quite limited—was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA, tasking which had been similarly tasked by the White House, done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY~~

Classified by L.C. 12-2-7-3
Present from general administration which the
or F. O. "M. everything to except
10 min. (except 10 min. out of court)
Judge's time and time of em.
10 min. (except 10 min. out of court)
Judge's time and time of em.
10 min. (except 10 min. out of court)
Judge's time and time of em.
10 min. (except 10 min. out of court)
Judge's time and time of em.

EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE
SECRET

00333

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

Dorong adalah 76 Street
menggabungkan dua buah
julid T13745780

WW-69369_DocId:32989674 Page 78

~~SECRET UNCLASSIFIED~~

EYES ONLY

4. A draft memorandum was jointly prepared by OCI and CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI on 16 August 1970. At the request of the DCI this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, set forth series of estimates prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from the files of President Johnson's papers at the Library in Austin, February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning activities planned to disrupt the 1972 Democratic National Convention (copies attached). Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and forwarded to the White House on 1 December 1967 and 17 January 1968. According to our best recollection, no further finished intelligence reports on international connections of the peace movement were produced. On 13 July 1972, at the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on Richard Lehman, report for activities planned to disrupt the 1972 Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

~~SECRET UNCLASSIFIED~~

EYES ONLY

00191

EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE
~~SECRET~~

ALL FOREIGN DISSEM TO BE HELD AGAINST
CONTROLLED DISSEM

23 FEB 1972

7 May 1973

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs
1. There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. This memorandum responds to the DDCI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Freedom and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican National Convention. A representative of the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targeting on the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indications that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of the opposition leader of Guyana and the other Project 415 is an adjunct to another LENNOX-supported project, the Election Year Strategic Information Center (EYSC), of which Ronnie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Ronnie DAVIS' representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.)
~~SECRET~~

12 APR 1972 BY 004050

00197

~~CONTROLED DISSEM~~

SUBJECT: The SDCC's involvement in domestic affairs support for its harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere, and (b) broadcasts over public address systems or live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

-2-

~~SECRET~~

00333

00553

~~CONTROLED DISSEM~~

NO FOREIGN DISEM TO PUBLIC SPACES

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONTROLLED DISSEM

5 May 1973

21 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
Sensitive ActivitiesSUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego 21-23 August 1972. The concepts of coordinated international support for antiwar activities in the United States on behalf of the DDCI's staff, and the services as needed for FBIS linguistic support Arabic to French directly for their FBI have short the Conference in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDCI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and coordination of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

At the Service-conducted World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the People of Indochina, held in Paris from 10-15 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to those progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

00554
2 JUN 1972
2 IMPDET CL NO 03441~~SECRET~~

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FURTHER REPRODUCTION IS PERMITTED

~~SECRET~~

TO FOREIGN BROADCAST UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROLLED DISSEM**DEVELOPMENTS:**

JFC-Act 5 19121 (D)

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targeting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which will review, exhibits, displays in part the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that in order to "outflank Nixon domestically and internationally" international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations."

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently taking a second look.

E. H. KROCHIS

Director

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

-2-

~~SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

00203

00555

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy

SUBJECT: in 1971 TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other ~~activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for support of Operations.~~

~~this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used~~

~~Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-~~

3. While varying widely among the different organizations, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, ~~appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before~~

~~disguise, Congress concerning evidence in the U.S. detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.~~

~~identify this operation as CIA instigated.~~

4. In most instances requirements for this support are three received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency level. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.

b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the

5. The attachment lists the military services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

~~CLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098

00463
00215

designed to pick up high quality audio of typing in the office. It was hoped to break these audio signals into clear text using advanced computer techniques developed by Division D. No useful

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational product, however, was ever obtained.

techniques and methods.

c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter and switch concealed in the door of the Embassy, which would supply cryptographic information for NSA. (Produced excellent quality signals until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of battery failure.)

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of

the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited

value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance

of would be validated by the Staff/Departmental Coordination Group because

at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for

of coordination of the operation. ENRD requests are coordinated

with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration

and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs

Staff.

Staff. Staff with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt

renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the

be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has

two countries. The operation was terminated on 31 December

1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting

of the outstanding documentation.

Attachment

Distribution:

O & I - Addressee, w/att

Sidney Gottlieb

Chief

Technical Services Division

00216
00459

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

ATTACHMENT

Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of Department of Defense ~~this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the mounting difficulties about CIA involvement in INDONESIA. This~~ documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing, flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests were coordinated with the ~~the~~ Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identifier documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, special fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

00217
00470

SECRET

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black-letter operations against the United States personnel whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed spread are made. All graphic requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts foreign visas and/or past passports on a priority basis, merge and the individual will receive complete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

Postal Service

f. **Alias IRS Tax Accounts.** 54 Social Security numbers have been registered for the purpose of opening 54 new bank accounts since July 1972. 87 individual tax accounts have been established with IRS on an unmitting basis in 47 cities in the United States. The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent ink, typewriter analysts. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDCI/BAU. The Post Office has furnished PSD 207 lawyers with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

A. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notional company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1 Secret Service proprietary-hire as follows:

Gate passes, CCS/IRS 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8 proprietary entities and 1 national company. Photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U. S. Agency for International Development - 1 proprietary-hire (1 alias) on 3 proprietary entities.

We furnish instructors to a USAID sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terrorist) at Los Fresnos Border Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the *Proprietary Management Company

-3-
-2-

00213

SECRET

00510

request of CI/PG. Trainees represent internal security or national police from all countries participating in AID Police assistance programs.

~~White House~~ sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for this arrangement is provided through CCA-procured Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Non-Police Officers (Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and rest) earned Alexandria Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based on 50 U.S. Code 483g or Internal Revenue Code Section 6041. During the period 1968-1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.

Paragraph 1. deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

~~SECRET~~

00210

00512

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT (optional)

~~SECRET~~

RECOR	Sidney Gottlieb Chief, TSD 203 South Building	RECOR	REGISTRATION x-2831	REG.	DATE 8 May 1978	
TO: (Officer designation, team number, and building)		PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER		COMMENTS (Number each comment to show item when in whole. Draw a line across column after each comment.)		
		DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS			
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED			
1.	- DDS&T 1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) proprietary management companies	Attached hereto with additional explanations is a TSD report and operational support for 10 Agency entities including 13 other U.S. Government agencies, controlled and directed by CCS.				
2.						
3.	2. The three proprietary management companies are staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of entities supporting operations, and provide cover and funding channels for operational activities as required.					
4.						
5.	Most importantly, professional services are furnished in a manner responsive to required security standards and at a cost considerably less than would be charged by bona fide management firms.					
6.						
7.	3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS provide cover for ten individuals in the United States and three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and					
8.	serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventories and aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government					
9.	affiliation or interest.					
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						

00220

00516

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

7 May 1973

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI
TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify 59 or possible masked transmitters were installed. Two have failed and two remain workable. be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter was installed to collect emanations from a cryptographic machine. The system continues to function from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973. Safesite number 583 has made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under (C) threat of assassination. Two transmitters have been elements installed and are operating. One is specifically

designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the 3. SB Division over the past three months has interviewed four graduate students as prospective candidates for assignments under American business cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate cover jobs on their own. post. A third system is not operating probably due to battery expiration. The tape made from this room was made by the National

4. Security Agency before failure. the SB Division has had the cooperation of the Commander of the Morale Division of the District of Columbia Police

(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and consultation covering Identity 62 assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to conduct themselves if placed under arrest. First masked switched transmitters were used in two apartments used as temporary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters

5. and microwave transmitters were installed in seven permanent quarters along with microphone installations, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived. We have learned which are relevant to their counter-espionage responsibilities.

~~SECRET~~

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952

00222

6x

00521

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

(E) Identity 64. This is an operation with additional participation by National Security Agency. It is designed in anticipation of the Identity 64 have been selected and run exclusively for the NHCHAOS program. Instead, in Washington, The listening post was exploitation of obtained by linking Agency's covert mechanisms capability for procuring the property. New systems are of information responsive to the program's requirements being designed and produced by using TSD's covert contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background. Part of the equipment was installed in November and December 1971 at various locations with the November "Movement" assets. The remaining agents to obtain biographic and personality data to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and equipment was installed 17 & 25 March 1972. Tests made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the NHCHAOS program, there have been approximately 100 items which constitutest, which at the present time have engaged in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against a domestic target.

4. The NHCHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive foreign operation.

Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive Agency foreign operation.

- 2 -

00222

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE
~~SECRET~~

00592

~~SECRET~~

TSD/SDB Memo #128-73

B May 1973

5. NMCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
ATTENTION: Executive Officer

SUBJECT: 6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the NMCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrieval

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington Metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security. Ability of information obtained including information received from the FBI is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

/s/ Identity 120

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C/TSO/OPS/r

00223

SENSITIVE
SECRET

E2 IMPDET/CL BY 061073

005313

SECRET//SENSITIVE

73-2380

ORD-2328-73 ER 73-183

9 MAY 1973

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational
SUBJECT : Repeated Survey Position DDF for Potential
Foreign Intelligence Activities
REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May

1973, same subject

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined with respect to all ORD services or dealings with other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In addition, this report covers all our activities dealing with ~~the research and development of intelligence equipment for foreign use which has been tested in the United States and might have collected domestic information.~~ Again, each member of ORD available today was asked either directly or through his supervisor to provide the above requested information, whether he was directly involved or not. We have used all diligence to search our records availability to us during this time period to insure this is a complete and factual list.

~~Director of Research & Development~~

Attachments:

- Attachments: because they contain sensitive agency
1 - Contacts with Other Government Agencies
2 - Domestic Tests operational methods and techniques.

CLASSIFIED BY	<u>357323</u>
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
ACQ. NO.	SEARCHED
SERIALIZED	INDEXED
APR 2 1968	
FBI - LOS ANGELES	

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
APR 11 1968 BY R. W. CO.

~~SECRET~~

CL BY: 057223

00220

0061

SECRET//SPLIT

~~SECRET//SENSITIVE~~

CONTACTS WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH
COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED
TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

d. Question: What is the arrangement re recruiting
of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
Control that is concerned with research support of
the narcotics control program? CSI 50-10 specifically
requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any
(Dr. Leonard Lester, OSZ) recruitment attempt made in the United States
against an American member of the academic

Office of Telecommunications Policy community or a foreign target attending an American
academic institution. This regulation is presently in

Technical surveillance countermeasures and authority
physical security information was exchanged with them is to
be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
for recruitment attempts against American students
outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief
of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions
~~at the present time are those precluding recruitment~~
~~attempts against foreign students here in the United States~~

Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD.

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dowerker/TA)
(Noe/TA)

Technical information was exchanged relating
to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and
Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD)

Acting Chief
Foreign Resolution (Parker/DSP)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their
intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Scott/AN)

00220

SECRET//
SENSITIVE

ATTACHMENT 00612

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET//SENSITIVE~~

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

FR 73-180

7 May 1973

BNDD (cont'd)

BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972 ~~MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS~~ concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) Identity 12³ /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed for the detection of narcotics for application in Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of the instrument risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. (Dr. Lester OST) (Terek/LS)
(Mr. Sten Sobel, BNDD) We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Div continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has been conducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and Navy. amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no other (Noe/TA) than the inordinate amount of time spent by (Noyes/MD) personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts. (Noe/TA) (JFKC)(B)
State Department

b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under cover; [his cover is the Mullen Corporation.] (This is the corporation that employed E. Howard Hunt.) In discussions between NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would be pulled out and reassigned in the United States. FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.

2

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
00230

00611

~~SECRET//SENSITIVE~~~~SECRET//SENSITIVE~~

1000

SECRET//~~SOURCE~~

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

We have decided that the best solution is to have this officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least a year, working towards an advanced degree until there has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever.

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah River Laboratory, are supported by CIA via development of sampling and detection techniques. These Laboratories have used sampling techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear plant releases.

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC)

(Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard Cowan, ~~therapist of the office of the Chairman of the~~ the ABC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction detector.

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC)

(Noves/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the
facts and information about the ORP developed
by the FBI [REDACTED] with close
support in San Francisco. This operation is directed
available to Department of Justice. LEAA is
72. If they developed the system, it would
exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility
for civilian crowd and riot control.
This activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction . JP

APPENDIX (Mr. with Schubin, LEAA)

Identity 125 (LS)

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information were exchanged with LEAA. [The equipment was produced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no CIA personnel have entered the premises.] The operation was deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however, are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is unlikely the finger would point to CIA. (See TA)

3

00235

00615

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//RELATIVES~~

L100 U.S.A

SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement; however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department Attachment reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87. (Leahy/LS)

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Customs/Treasury Department was safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer disagreed to his Office's proposal to detect nighttime aerial intrusions over the proposed Mexico border follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest Martin Lawrence/DSP is summarizing (Lawrence/DSP) of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

This memorandum reports that FBI regularly disseminated assistance was requested in domestic查禁非法 moonshine bestillissuing CEAAs infrared scanner equipment was used in reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passed (Lawrence/DSP) "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the Secret Service. We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

(Van Dwerker/TA)

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was prepared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems

JKW(1)①
the [DD/O] we will not honor any requisition for surveil-
lance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI
Staff of the [DD/O] JPK(1A)

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
following items are pertinent:

The results of our research work in the detection
of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use
in the detection of hijacker weapons. On February 1, 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive project.

JKW(1)
Colonel White did not dis-
close the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on procurement central to
matters since the Office of Intelligence had no information
concerning the mission or purpose of Project [redacted]
sub-
stantive questions concerning the subject should be
addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions (Identity 123/LS)
for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made,
however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately \$100,000, and the technical equip-
ment that has been involved in the undertaking.

LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order
to structure PCRD's CEC/CWD research program to support two
ACDA needs in hand from TSD which would involve reim-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
amount of \$36,900 is for two Westinghouse Identity 123/LS
cameras. The second requisition in the amount of \$11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which
will Technical Information relating to detection of
radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with
them.

c. Over the years, this [Agency] has often supported
Other [Agency] (Walker/DSP) from a contractor's standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
request, supported by a transfer of funds, (the Agency) JPK(1B)
would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
vide a service for, another Government agency when such

00233

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

00113

**SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
SUBJECT: Log Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems**

(b) (1) (A)
Executive Fellowship. - The book is entitled "Where's What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information (cont'd) that may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967. Due to technical difficulties in using IR scanning equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary landfill site it has been conducted by the Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowships. The book is classified (Risinger/PSR), and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of the book can be made available for review if desired.

(b) (1) (B)
At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques (Sometime in 1970, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down) expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because [the Agency] should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

(b) (1) (B)
Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. It is requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

(b) (1) (B)
NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET) requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local police departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from [Agency stock] and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2. (Galinaitis/PSA)
(General Smart)

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

6. In connection with the responsibility held by this Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all Agency operating components, the following information is relevant.

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 52" which is Iden 88

The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experimental program July 1971 in estimating the Soviet wheat crop. A part of the information would be obtained from a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-truth data will be collected on North American crops and in keeping with the approved requirement for a complement of five standby safehouses for all (Briglia/BAS). The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal

USSC Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs located at Iden 91

The cover story utilized is that Iden 96, CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre plot of opium poppies at USD research facility in Washington state, to be used for testing of photo-recognition of opium poppies. a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971, with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby (Officer Quantinjdepar, HEDA) has been used by (Science/BSB) Compounds Garfield, tBND short-term or cras (Chancery/BSB) Control of the standby safe site and its security is the responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of Army, uMilitarmpBdice Agency to Rff. Gordon. However, no record Air Force, Oklaepersone Detachment at the site nor for what Army offices are involved in (measuring, training, etc.). Such information is maintained by the operating component request We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-measures and physical security information with them made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in answer to a telephonic request. (Noe/TA)

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance U.S. responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Mountain, Arched, the Newport Army Ammunition Plant National CollektiaoOrdnance Depot 1972, and the Republican National Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as a meet QRD latest environmental samples from testing, storage and production facilities in the U.S. and rendering

Identity 125/LS)

6

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00235
00115

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
SUBJECT Log Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems

assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant
operating component on this matter.
U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those letters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

Identity 125/LS)

U.S. Navy

John F. Blake

Director of Logistics

BSB/ORD turned over about eight trained dolphins
2 Atts to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
our dolphin program.

cc: DD/M&S

(Lynch/LS)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was
made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means
for night search of life boats.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG)

(Lawrence/DSP)

Identity 174 Sheriff's Office

ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.
Polygraph security findings were compared with the
Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff)

Identity 125/LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
ment methods in 1967-68.

(Sheriff)

Identity 125/LS)

8

00236

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

1

Requesting Office

Date of Request

Item

Quantity

Unit Cost

Receiving U.S. Department or Agency

00413
SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Department or Agency
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	BNDD 0023
TSD	5/16/72	Transmitters, Radio Beacon	8	313	BNDL
OS	5/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	White House Communications Agency
OS	5/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	13	1,400	Air Force
OS	5/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	10	1,350	State
TSD	5/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,375	AIC
TSD	5/23/72	Camera Sets	20	656	FBI
TSD	5/23/72	Camera Sets	10	700	FBI
TSD	5/18/71	Actuators, Recorders	50	488	FBI
TSD	5/18/71	Tessina Cameras	5	700	BNDD
TSD	5/18/71	Camera, Video	1	18,045	FBI
TSD	5/23/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	5/23/72	Tubes, Image, W L 30691	2	4,607	FBI
TSD	5/23/72	Cameras, Television	2	18,300	FBI

REF ID: A6591
WIRELESS NOTICE
SENSITIVE HANDLING SOURCES
AMERICAN LIBRARY WORKERS

EYES ONLY

SECRET

• 6100

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

In 2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

Item

Laser Probe About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed. (Wood/TA)

Quantity	Unit Cost	Department or Agency
513	BND	ATTACHMENT 2
591	FBI	
4639	FBI	
5	Re-	
25	JPN Act 5 (E)(2)(D)	
2	4,639	
5		
1		
1		
1		
1,372	FBI	
1,247	FBI	
568	FBI	
1,350	ATTACHMENT 3	
1,350	FBI	
22	Treasury	
42	Treasury	
1,825	White House Communication Agency	
1,100	Immigration Naturalization Service	

EYES ONLY

131

7/26/71

Transmitter, Radio Beacon

1

728

U.S. PROPERTY

EYES ONLY
CONT'D

JFK (b) OJCS-594-73
MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
c. Telephone Intrusion StudyTHROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive issues.

Many of these are patterned after the U.S. system and, for this reason, I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which intercept equipment in the United States is planned.

Most Sensitive Projects message content is ~~to be monitored~~. Over ~~JCS~~ testing is ~~planned~~; a subsequent date. Reason for ~~identification~~ ~~Telephone Project Listing~~ has been carried out at the contractor's plant. No recordings have been made of such data. Extremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign telephone systems staff ~~object initiated~~ data being ~~selected~~.

[~~HYDRA~~] ~~Richard Ober~~ ~~A special project~~ Type of ~~data being selected~~
 [~~HYDRA~~] ~~John Hutchings~~ ~~Object initiated~~ data being ~~selected~~
 [~~HYDRA~~] ~~Machine index to security files~~ Type of ~~data in index~~
 [~~HYDRA~~] ~~Information storage & retrieval of drug related data~~ Type of ~~data in files~~

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of engineering development tests of special sensors within the United States include
 [~~GRISTAT~~] ~~John Hutchings~~ ~~Information storage & retrieval of drug related data~~ Type of ~~data in files~~

In all these cases, the data output of such testing has been used for engineering development and the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

(DRUGS)	Iden 18	Computer file of drug data.	Type of data in file.
	OMS		
	7792		

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00235
00235

e 2 IMPACT CL EV 036490

SUBJECT: Sensitive Projects [Continued]
Development Efforts

OJCS	Project Officer	Nature	OJCS
Project Identification	Organization, & Telephone	Project	Reason for Listing

JW
e. Remote Physiological Measurements - An ~~SECRET~~ device developed by ~~psychogenic~~ magnetoencephalals being tested at a contractor's site for use as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph). Some test subjects are ~~sterile~~ ~~psychogenic~~ ~~data~~. Some test subjects are ~~witting~~, but most tests are on naive subjects (they do not know they are being tested). The magnetometer is completely harmless to the subject and the test results are closely held. ~~Possibly a Matter for Concern~~

Source of data. Contractors are involved with project.

TSLAC Personal Rebuttal of Defectors

Study - ORD undertook to determine the personality structure of defectors during the period 1966-69. The work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned with a study of the phenomenon of defection itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University. Identity 125/LS)

Nature of data. Techniques of system discussed with FBI.

5071

g.

cies used for support of In-Place-Monitoring-System, a system to identify unauthorized transmitters.

Project originated by James McCord.

DMVREC Iden 48

File of auto- mobile license data.

OS

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In the period from 1970 through 1972 various means were used to check out an intercept system designed to operate against ~~SECRET~~ ~~Walter Kowalecki~~ ~~Agency Staff~~ ~~agents who worked for~~ ~~bids~~ ~~in~~ communications links. Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content.

00240
00243

EYES ONLY
3
SECRET
SECRET

~~SECRET~~
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

<u>OJCS Project Identification</u>	<u>Project Officer Organization, & Telephone</u>	<u>Nature of Project</u>	<u>OJCS Reason for Listing</u>
--	Iden 187 ORD-2274-7 ISD/DDO Red 1447 May. 1973	Cooperative program with Iden 188.	Association with the named organization.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
Technology name grouping
techniques.
SUBJECT : Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
or his representative was instructed to query all ~~PERSONAL INFO'S~~
his people and report back by this afternoon whether
or not they had provided any services or dealt with
any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
The attached list is an inventory of all items we
were able to uncover. If additional information on
any of these topics is desired, we can provide either
a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

Charles E. McGinnis

Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor

to

Director of Research & Development

Attachment:
As stated

3

CLASSIFIED BY	317343
EXPIRES	07/07/1978
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THIS DOCUMENT	HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07/07/1978 BY 60137	
SUGGESTED BY DETERMINED	
(Initials required to indicate date or event)	

EYES ONLY

SECRET

00241

23 May 1973

Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be politically sensitive.

29 May 1973

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be politically sensitive.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT: Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to
Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known Two Notes
in DDS&T.

REFERENCE: D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
A negative report from the Support Staff.
Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or
Indirect Involvement

DDO's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge.

1. The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of \$30-32K Robert Scott performed intelligibility enhancement for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given. Mr. Colby asked that DDO records be checked.

James M. D. Stephards At the headquarters of FBI, we described a Imagery Enhancement Techniques of separation removing Iden 100 distortions from some photography they had on an service to the correction of imagery intelligence. The activity is alleged bank robber. Request for specific support handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff. in processing the imagery was turned down.

3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on 13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount, i.e., \$30 to 32K and not to two separate allocations.

JCR (RA) [John C. Richards]
John C. Richards

PROPERTY
DDO/CI

00242
00145

SECRET

REF ID: A65703

7 May 1973

Executive Secretary

73-3757
2581

May 1973

C. V. NOYES

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

My total contact with ~~other agencies in terms of assistance~~ ~~Involvement~~ with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Specifically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings which included technology exchanges and some equipment exchanges on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial. I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening for Iden 101. Ted Hines of DD/S&T (then ORD) (date unknown) and was an attempt to determine if some anomalies could have details. created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his request, first through ONI, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Individual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency [redacted] Martin Port, DDCI/USCIS/Customs. I understand Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of Memo Martin Seasidey, BASA, Iden 3 and Colby are attached also.

Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI

5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF. One officer who was attending a funeral will not be available until tomorrow.

Major John Langager, ONI/USN

0\bbB\CVB\82\W\13:449(5371213)

Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

J - M E Cojoh

ONI & J - 7qq,as26

Disposition:

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs

Director of Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting

Attachment

As stated

SECRET

SECRET

00243

00149

IMPDET CL BY..

Thomas P. Noe

5/7/73

1. Continuing contacts with intelligence community
23 May 1973

regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and

4 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy, physical security. This is an exchange of information and

travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the travel USISB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.

7 Feb 72 Follow-up from Taylor: P Navy 5 trips for 3 individuals-- all in FY 72. Cost probably \$1CK. Minnick ready to make Air Force US Secret Service first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. DOD said OK re Tehran visit.
Army NSA

7 Feb 72 DNA See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby FBI (2 Aug 72).

12(?) 2 May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/Minnick attendance at a Latin American conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe, one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD

23 Jun 72 Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest contract (Bureau of Standards) in getting CIA activities, including large-scale PM.

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information

4 Jul 72 The 32nd notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film. We will send." ARPA

2 Aug 72 Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel LEAA/Dept. of Justice orders ready; need money this FM (No record in my DNA/DOD notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint recollection of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines Office Telecommunications Policy

1 Nov 72 Office of Army/Payroll Marshal General WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32); Survey LNDD problems/Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon Mexico.

Air Force/Office of the Inspector General

Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

over 27
U.S. Justice

00241

00150

SECRET

On Mr. Colby's copy only:

7 May 1973

JPF
NBB []
13 Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved \$30K for sensitive
CS project - no details.

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

20 Jan 72 Reminded ExDir re \$32K he said DCI OK'd.

1. RDDS(Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by D/ORD.

2. RSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the Navy. Time: December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System. Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

00240

~~SECRET~~

00151

SECRET

29 MAY 1973

19 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management
Committee

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Reported Identity 61 Burglary
SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman] *JKL(DA)*

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the reported break-in of Identity 61. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.
- Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement.*
2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a related question that should be noted. James McCord's testimony indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity 61. He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield, says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he was sure they were subjects of national security wiretaps. Caulfield visited Washington in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt.
- Who in fact, may have been a long-standing telephone tap on the [Jack] Identity furnished a resume to the FBI; about which G.I. Staff believes McCord knew. It is possible that he did not know he was taking possession of some sort of operation against that Identity 61 condition and assumed that it was also a telephone in tap. Such a tap, it is speculated that he played for double insurance, hoping that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped.*
- the, due to some or the requirements of the job. At that time operations, discussed for him a positive and a counteraudio program and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations may lead to exposure of the operations.*
- William V. Broe indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently money was not a problem.*

William V. Broe
Inspector General

5000-0526-0035-00153

Attachment:

As Stated Above

CONFIDENTIAL

EYCS 7/17
EYCS 7/17

REF ID: A65360	SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED	APR 19 1973
FBI - WASHINGTON D.C.		
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE		

JFK/MR)
4. When [Jack] declined, he indicated 24 May 1973 that Mr. Hunt asked for any other recommendations he might have. According to [Jack] MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General people he knew were still in the Agency, but he did furnish the name of JUEN-108 who might be SUBJECT possibly ready to Report on the Identity 61.

JFK/MR)
5. [Jack] informed me that he assumed that the Bureau data [he] had written up about a burglary of Identity 61 13-14 May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it determined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61 registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed. Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject. *Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impression from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as originally reported.*

2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the installation of technical coverage of Identity 61. The opportunity for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name for a contract to renovate Identity 61. Upon securing the connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record and for information of the Director of Security. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community was cited.

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Idea 61 target and national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00332

JFK/MR)
CONFIDENTIAL
cc: EYES
Charles W. Kane

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
APR 26 1971	
FBI - WASHINGTON	
(Initials) (Date)	

00159

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered, installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of equipment in Identity 61. From May to February Agency technicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did they enter Identity 61.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: The Agency requested that investigation of Identity 61, the Watergate Matter stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and might have to advise them again the installation of Identity 61.

JF/PL **Initials:** J. Edgar Hoover advised that the investigation of Identity 61 was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment to the best of the Agency's knowledge were discontinued until 16 December 1972 with when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. Basis of request at this time was undisclosed by the knowledge that a Iden 76 delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on nationalization of foreign holdings.

JF/PL **Initials:** While the FBI was still in the process of reactivating the assignment, the Department of State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage was partially reinstated with full coverage in effect by 26 December 1972.

Initials: Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call.

I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued. *I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman.* Mr. Hunt thanked me for relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from (Mr. Bauman) in December 1971. Attaching is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.

JF/PL **Initials:** 3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

~~SECRET~~ Addendum

ferred to in JC Richards' 24 July 73 memo to IG, paragraph 2 re Identity 61 re Break-in
1. The Foreign Resources Division asset was Identity 77

who owned the Identity 78. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached.

4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related matters now receiving attention in the press.

Charles W. Kane

Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the

Deputy Director

of TSD and Harold Leith of Division of Management and Services

00368

Atts

EYES ONLY SECRET

00153

60-11251-111
17 July 1972

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [Charles W. Kane] -JFK(1)(A)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
[iden 108]

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

JFK (1) 1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI contacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61 worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this nature have been followed up by the FBI with an interview of the time subjects.

2. I discussed the Iden 66 matter with Iden 66 of CI Staff (Rec 1731) who advised that the FBI did have coverage of Identity 61, and Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them /s/ Identity 10

4. The office of the Acting Executive Officer 108 in the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed. *already
Q 7/31*

5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July. I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

CONFIDENTIAL
GSA GEN. REG. UNIT

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246

00233

8 MAR 1973

*JFK/DA
JFK/WD*
 by the fact that [Mr. Kane] accompanied a technician sweep team to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from [Jack Bauman] *MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director for Operations* who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. (Mr. Bauman asked *SUBJECT*) how he WHUObtained Jack Anderson's Column obtained

REFERENCE: Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman. Round Column of 5 March 1973: "Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate"

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that *Jack Bauman* has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him. *WII Division has reviewed the referenced column (copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it contains no new information.* To the best knowledge of the Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that Mr. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and New York.

signed Iden 17

2. Any connection between ITT and these break-ins is purely conjectural and the *Deputy Director of Security* takes care to point this out.

3. Harold Hendrix, ITT Latin American representative, has told us that he had no relationship with Hunt on this or any ITT matter. He had anticipated that Anderson might imply such a relationship in his column and had assured us that this was not true.

8

/s/ Identity-81

Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As Stated

SEARCHED - INDEXED
SERIALIZED - FILED
(MARCH 1973)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA Historian L. Edward Pritchard
GMC 34474
(983 000/000 34474 344)

100-14057
CL BY 001334

00373
00161

RECORDED - INDEXED

6/70

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE

INCIDENT REPORT

SECRET/SENSITIVE

1. INCIDENT NUMBER

EV-12-106

2. DATE OCCURRED

05-15-72

3. DATE RECEIVED

05-16-72

4. LOCATION (NATION)

Chile

5. STREET ADDRESS

1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

6. NATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary I

7. REPORTED BY

Sergeant Stevens E. Putler

8. DATE RECEIVED

8 May 1973

9. CASE NUMBER

321-7122

10. OFFICE ASSIGNED

Sergeant Stevens E. Putler

11. DAY

05-15-72

12. HOUR

0330 hrs.

13. DAY OF WEEK

F (M)

S (T)

A (W)

U (T)

R (F)

V (S)

W (U)

X (R)

Y (S)

Z (U)

14. WITNESS

THROUGH:

Deputy Director for Management and Services

15. HOME PHONE

N/A

16. OFFICE PHONE

N/A

17. OFFICE ADDRESS

N/A

18. HOME ADDRESS

N/A

19. OFFICE PHONE

N/A

20. OFFICE ADDRESS

N/A

21. OFFICE PHONE

N/A

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT

At approximately 1830 hours yesterday, 05-15-72, I was involved

in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

Control Center was advised by Mr. P.D.C., 30, that a burglary had taken place at the

Chancery of Chile, at 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., between 0330 hrs on

Friday, May 13, 1972, and I checked out this date, subversives, terrorists,

etc.

Sergeant Eiley M. Richardson and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately

1835 hours in Crisis Staff and Office of Medical Services program

for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American

Medical Association reports.

The undersigned was advised by Vernon (ET) Navarro, Administrative Counselor

of the Embassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the offices

were ransacked. At 1835 hrs, DDS&T/ORD's program for collection of information

Mr. Navarro indicated that U.S. citizens could be collected via their medical records

upon determination of missing articles. (continued)

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from

New York State and Chicago on the DDCI request (Admiral Rayborn) on

data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PB, I have been aware of five programs with

possible sensitive domestic overtones.

4. DDS&T/ORD's project

which involved the collection

of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms

terminated this program last fall.

5. D. UNCLASSIFIED

6. D. CLEARED BY 05-15-72

7. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

H. H. Marshall

DATE 05-25-72

8. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

Captain Pete H. Manitow

DATE 05-25-72

9. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

J. R. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

10. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

R. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

11. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

S. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

12. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

T. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

13. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

U. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

14. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

V. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

15. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

W. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

16. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

X. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

17. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

Y. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

18. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

Z. [Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

19. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

20. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

21. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

22. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

23. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

24. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

25. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

26. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

27. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

28. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

29. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

30. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

31. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

32. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

33. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

34. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

35. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

36. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

37. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

38. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

39. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

40. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

41. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

42. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

43. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

44. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

45. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

46. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

47. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

48. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

49. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

50. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

51. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

52. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

53. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

54. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

55. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

56. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

57. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

58. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

59. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

60. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

61. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

62. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

63. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

64. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

65. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

66. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

67. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

68. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

69. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

70. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

71. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

72. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

73. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

74. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

75. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

76. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

77. APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGNATURE

[Signature]

DATE 05-25-72

78

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary II

CONFIDENTIAL E-2

3. REPORTED BY:

Norman (NLT) Navarro

4. ADDRESS:

7605 Berle Street, Springfield, MA

5. CITY:

Springfield

6. STATE:

Mass.

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge # 147, M.P.D.C., 3D, and Officer Michael S. Kardilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C., 3D, also M.P.D.C. Print Cruiser # 735.

~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD~~

SUBJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco
S/A Michael P. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

1. On 15 October 1972 [Messrs.] Freckinridge and Heintzelman in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic Reports. One project cited was a query from the Director, apparently at the request of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "What do we know about Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OER's analysts were assigned to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Service, spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously is sketchy. It is cited nor not to suggest any wrongdoing but because of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing probes into the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Freckinridge
H. Henry Heintzelman

TPK(A)

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

M/H

LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
(1)								
RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
(2)								

LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS					
(3)								
RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY
(4)								

9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BLDG&# NO.)	12. DATE	13. REV'D

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSITION	15. USSS-ID CASE NO.		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Closed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dismissed	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Discharged by Arrest	
			M/H

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION

OPEN

00377

17. REFERRED OFFICER (SIGNED)	18. DATE	19. APPROVED INSPECTOR & DATE	20. DATE
<i>Sgt. Stevens E. Butler</i>	05-15-72	<i>Captain Pete H. Pantos</i> 00373	05-15-
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler NW-65368 DocId:32309634 Page 148			

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT

Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY:

Berrien (W.M.) Navarro

4. ADDRESS

7605 Haslet Street, Springfield, Va.

5. HOME PHONE

321-7121

6. OFFICE PHONE

715-3785

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer Adrian Roman-Gonzalez at 1310 L Street, N.W. and stated the following items missing: (4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radios and one (1) Westinghouse AM/TM/SW Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver, one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.

22 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General**Bill:-****Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:**

- 1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68, Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).**

This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America (pages 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more

JAN

(Signature) **Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1968)**

in March 1969

N/A

6. SUSPECT AND OFFENDER IDENTIFICATION: NAME, TITLE, GRADE, RANK, SOCIAL SECURITY NO., DOB, EYES, ETC.		7. LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS	
LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS		8. LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE ADDRESS	
RACE SEX HEIGHT WEIGHT BIRTH DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY		RACE SEX HEIGHT WEIGHT BIRTH DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY	
2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1968) No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).		3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look (12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 98).	
9. ARREST PD Please note that these are our record copies and should be returned 10. ARREST OFFICER NAME & RANK NO. 11. DATE 12. DATE 13. DATE			

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSITION

APPROVED
4/10/73

CLOSING
4/10/73

EXPIRED
4/10/73

CLEARED BY ARREST
Edward W. Prector

15. PENDING CASE NO.

Edward W. Prector
N/A

16. FORMAL CASE DISPOSITION

4/10/73
OPR

Edward W. Prector
Deputy Director for Intelligence

00378

17. APPROVED SIGNER (TITLE)

Sgt. Steven E. Butler
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler

18. DATE

05-12-72

19. APPROVED SIGNATURE & TITLE

Captain Pete M. Martinez
Captain Pete M. Martinez

20. DATE

05-13-72

1. PERSON OR PROPERTY				Embassy of Chile				248-72	
14. SEX: GENDER	15. INST.	16. SEAT	17. H.A.	18. STREET ADDRESS				4. HOME PHONE	
14. M	15. 30	16. SEAT	17. H.A.	18. STREET ADDRESS				4. HOME PHONE	
19. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS WORKED				5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR EMPLOYED AT				6. BUSI PHONE	
19. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS WORKED ► Chile Embassy				5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR EMPLOYED AT ► N/A				6. BUSI PHONE 785-1740	
20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE				21. SEX	RACE	DOB	22. CRIME	23. DATE, CITY, TIME ► See Memo 6-15-72 11:15 AM	
20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE ► M/				21. SEX	RACE	DOB	22. CRIME ► Burg. II	23. DATE, CITY, TIME ► See Memo 6-15-72 11:15 AM	
21. YEAR, MAKE, MODEL, COLOR(S)				24. LOCATION OF CRIME (ADDRESS)				25. PHOTO'S D YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
21. YEAR, MAKE, MODEL, COLOR(S) ► A				24. LOCATION OF CRIME (ADDRESS) ► 1736 MASS. Ave. N.W.				25. PHOTO'S D YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
22. OWNER R - REPORTING PERSON CODE C - COMPLAINANT P - PARENT, GUAR				26. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED				27. CLASSIFICATION	
22. OWNER R - REPORTING PERSON CODE C - COMPLAINANT P - PARENT, GUAR ► C				26. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED ► UNK				27. CLASSIFICATION ►	
23. NAME (S), FST, MIDDLE				CODE	RES. ADDRESS	SPRINGFIELD	HOME PHONE	28. PU TIME	
23. NAME (S), FST, MIDDLE ► NAVARRO, NORMAN				23. NAME (S), FST, MIDDLE ► R	23. RES. ADDRESS ► 7605 Hamlet St. VA	SPRINGFIELD	HOME PHONE ► 501-2121	28. PU TIME ► 785-1740	
24.									
25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Address, Name, Sex, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (With charges if arrested)									
25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Address, Name, Sex, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (With charges if arrested)									
26.									
27.									
28. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY				29. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE				(1) ADULT (2) FELA	
28. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY ► N/A				29. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE ► N/A				(1) ADULT (2) FELA	
30. TRANSPORTED BY				30. TREATED BY				31. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT	
30. TRANSPORTED BY ► N/A				30. TREATED BY ► N/A				31. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT ► N/A	
32. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN				33. LOSS VALUE	34. POINT OF ENTRY				35. VEHICLE FROM WHICH THEFT OCCURRED
32. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN ► UNK.				33. LOSS VALUE ► UNK.	34. POINT OF ENTRY ► UNK.				35. VEHICLE FROM WHICH THEFT OCCURRED ► N/A
36. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY				37. DATE & TIME THIS REPORT				38. DATE/TIME TYPE ID#	
36. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY ► INSIDE EMBASSY				37. DATE & TIME THIS REPORT ► 5-15-72 1500				38. DATE/TIME TYPE ID#	
39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.				40. STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED				41. UCR REFERRED TO	
39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO. ► M.S. Kucdihla 50 3770 X OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED				40. STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED				41. UCR REFERRED TO	
42. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.				43. SUPERVISOR APPROVING ROUT & BADGE NO.				44. REVIEWER	
42. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO. ► C.L. Dunnigan				43. SUPERVISOR APPROVING ROUT & BADGE NO. Sgt C.O. Gill 147				44. REVIEWER ► 00379	
50-251 REVISED 5-11-72 MAILED/SENT ITAM BY 1000 INVESTIGATOR WASHINGTON D.C. NW 25369 DocId:32988924 Page 120									

~~SECRET~~ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

OGC 73-0930

25 May 1973

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: On 24 May 1973 telephoned Mr. James Robinson, General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved in a break in at Identity 61 ~~Legislative Charter~~ in Washington, D.C. on 15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and the Secret Service since they had responsibility for the Executive Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identified two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated 15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest of the Idem 76 Government presented to the American Embassy, and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated 15 May 1972. Myself ~~have reviewed the past and present activities of their components, I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service. three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.~~ improper activities:

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 246-424 filed with the 3rd District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61 between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972. While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCT officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments.

RECORDED - 9803 ROL/gle 00183
on 3/7/94 (JK)

per GMB

CIA 2025 1, UT3329

00384

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA INTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 ROL/gle 3/7/94 JK)

Reported loss at the [redacted] consisted of four am/fm radios and one electric razor. The police investigation identified some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints was made. Since the reported loss was under \$5,000 and there was no evidence of a crossing of state boundaries, the FBI did not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

Young, Harry Eisenbeiss and Ciarus Rice of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11835 and the implementing NSC

directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.

John K. Gandy, Jr., Assistant General Counsel

3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported ec: Legislative Counsel
concerning activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.
Inspector General
OGC:JKG:av
Orig - Within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
Subject: Watergate Case

1 - JKG Signer

1 - Chraco DCS collects information on foreign students studying in the US.

DCS collects information on physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign nationals).

DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly.

DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of US citizens to cooperate with CIA.

DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.

Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

NPIC and COMPLEX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.

00385

-2-

00181

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET//COMINT~~
~~SECRET//FOUO//SI~~
EYES ONLY

- JFK DC*
- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural ^{June 1973} ~~June 1973~~ disasters and civil disturbances.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
SUBJECT: Special Activities (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.

- OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.
- CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining the contents of mail picture film cans addressed to the Soviet and occasionally other foreign embassies to acquire positive foreign intelligence. CRS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for another agency, e.g., to the FBI to assist Arab journalists in Washington. 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, DCI was faced with problems. This has since of Defense documents with problems. ~~THIS HAS BEEN MONITORED AND REPORTED ON BY JPRS~~ ~~BROADCASTS OF STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES OF US CITIZENS SUCH AS THOSE BY US POWS IN Hanoi, Jane Fondan, and Ramsey Clarke~~
- As a result of the developing relationship with IDEN-122 under the CIA Representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by IDEN-124 unclassified publications in foreign languages Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the ^{IDEN-95} ~~work~~ in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents from the CIA-JPRS relationship.

Edward W. Proctor
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

EYES ONLY

-3-

00457

00162

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

the IDEN-126. On 18 June 1962 May DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. Actual ~~Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence~~ occurred somewhat later, and on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed. ~~Director of Central Intelligence~~ agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves waived it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed. On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation, and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1965. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the IDEN-95 be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this operation. In June 1970, Archer Mason of DCI was asked to write a memorandum with respect to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but activities though not beyond the planning stage, there are, to be believed, three examples of such planning which involve the subject to my interpretation. One involved a chemical group of operations against CIA Saigon crops in both Cambodia and North Vietnam, provided it involved a paramilitary operation against the Chi-Costinech board installations US outside the United States Government. General Eisehower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

~~SECRET~~

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

checked by CL22527

Excerpt from report made available under
U.S. D.O.J. Act of 1964, case 99-
CIA-12-41 or 10 vehicles one or more
of which are used to violate the
Communications Act of 1934, or
other laws relating thereto or
otherwise infringe upon the rights

~~ESTD 00453
00183~~

~~SECRET~~
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

JFK 6
exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

Richard Lehman
~~Director of Current Intelligence~~
5. During the period when Des Fitzgerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that Fitzgerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some \$300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, IDEN-128 of IDEN-129

made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN-36

~~SECRET~~
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

EYES ONLY

00459
00183

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EX-1~~
~~EX-2~~

~~SECRET//COMINT//
REF ID: A65368~~

4

into the US labor situation, and particularly ~~to try to~~ to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. DEN-36 steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we ~~were~~ ~~had been~~ ~~behind~~ Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes.

REJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project ROSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Micevsky, DEN-18, and John Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Italy. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent \$3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba. ~~or penetrate of US dissident groups, but only in a~~

~~passive manner and only when the source has refused~~

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the office and over the telephone were transcribed during McCone's so

pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EX-1~~
~~EX-2~~

~~REF ID: A65368~~

00430
00430

~~SECRET//COMINT//
REF ID: A65368~~

2 00430 00430
00430 00430

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Controlled by Executive Order~~
EYES ONLY.

5

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. ^{7. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.} 8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment

^{9. Obtain complete tape records of physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad. Although most are foreign nationals, some are US. The taped information include school present business address date of birth, and specialty}
11. Also under the heading of old business, I well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.
^{10. Acquire soundings regarding the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.}

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Don Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest.

JAMES R. MURPHY

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood! One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Controlled by Executive Order~~

EYES ONLY
SUSPECT/SENSITIVE

00461

00185

سید علی بن ابی طالب علیہ السلام

EES 2019

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

14. The use of IDEN-132 aircraft has been remarkably secure; but DCI McCone himself ~~forgetting about the cover arrangements and~~ had quite excised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport after the Hoppech Convention in 1964 aboard the IDEN-133 with the highly visible Dixie Number C-132. In this case he explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate chopper, but he did not like ~~it~~ related to Domestic Events

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington later stating they gave him Postscript and a luncheon when he left Washington, which National Security indicated was his first visit to the press. His relations with him were however, in the case student Resident Wise Confronted by visitors at Government, like duty bearing pressure on the publisher and company director of the magazine sat McCarthy and Rose University a small and and doubt that this told me why nothing against McCone was interconnected: spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostile to Finland, and this will reflect my Middle likely Western Protestant sympathizing to McCone's dealings with interests. the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, 2. would also could raise eyebrows in certain quarters. with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI, D/OCI 17 and The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, history, and tactics. This section drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense, the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page) typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DDCI's request in December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

Classified as: SDS % 20
Decompose project date: October 2000
by: N. A. Date: 10/20/00
Subject: C-100462
Description: Project number
Status: Pending review
Comments: None

~~Classification~~
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation. A second section comprised 19 country chapters-- ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on worldwide dissent went only to ~~NSC~~ ^{DCI} readers. A copy may be in the Johnson Library. WALTER ELDER

6. Following the paper's favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostow, ~~the DCI~~ briefed the NSC on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.

RICHARD LEHMAN

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

~~Classification~~
EYES ONLY

SECRET

EYES ONLY

00463

00191

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

8 May 1973

SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR
~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD~~

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
 Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program
 Office of Communications, Operational
 Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipu-

JFK 1. Prior to 1969 the EOC CONINT Intercept Unit,
 which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
 with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
 and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
 to these activities in monitoring, identification and
 often exposed to and directed against American Radical, leftist,
 foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
 Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made
 through the DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.

radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset

JFK 2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/
 might become suspected and be accused of being an employee of the
 a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial
 Agency or the Bureau, or it might happen some asset would, for
 The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
 some reasone, became disenchanted with his whereabouts of
 the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
 Agency relationship and his activities, with result in mem 92
 Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
 cepted to minimize potential problems, therefore, each the
 intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage
 case is cleared with the FBI and through C/SO the Bureau is
 complications.
 kept informed on a regular basis.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
 Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
 technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
 for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
 for support of specific activities have been made by the
 Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090

DEGRADED TO SECRET
 UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061090

TOP SECRET

00482 00140

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

~~TOP SECRET~~

S. 03289/73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy

~~TOP SECRET~~

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects MOHAWK, UNION and MIGRAVEL. Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID and ROSE. These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

was mounted by the FBI with the support of [redacted]

4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HE/DF system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area. continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it

appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and

identify this operation as

signed Iden 53

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)
Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.

JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

~~TOP SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

HANDLE BY COMINT CHANNELS

00468

00141

Damaged 10.9 and
on 4/1/94 by [unclear]
71375770

-2-
SENSITIVE

9 May 1973

- MOHAWK** - Electronic survey of Iden 63. This operation was terminated approximately two months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for two days.
- JUNION** - Iden 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by the Iden 94 Embassy on their diplomatic communication link. SPD/SEO support terminated two years ago.
- ORKID** - Electronic surveillance of Iden 64 Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning at this time, (attendance at two meetings).
- ROSE** - Electronic surveillance of Iden 62 . SPD/CMT personnel performed an electronic search of the Iden 62 area and SPD/SEO personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording of the spectrum covering 1-to-.6 GHz during the period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for continued support by SPD in the future as requested.
- WUGRAVEL** - Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk. SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in use of device and stood by in Iden 97, Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed. The operation took place in July 1972.

SECRET
TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

004SS

00142

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

NW 63160 DocId:32909621 Page 132

Downgraded to Secret
on 6/1/06 per auto deletion
Audit 00145220

Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the mounting disclosures about [REDACTED] 7 May 1973 in LOEN-76. This was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining proper security for the listening post which, as with other operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late 1967 [OCID] participated in the preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of US organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of those reports, prepared at the request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed between international Communist elements or foreign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.

2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-departmental survey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect whatever information was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the President.)

3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this subject. Although agent reports on Communist front operations overseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of US activists--and that was quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA, which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY~~

e. Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped accounts have been established for contract personnel whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revoked but who are entitled to Social Security coverage. Following expiration of the contractual relationship, at an appropriate time, the alias and true name accounts are merged permitting the individual to receive complete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

*JK
OCI and CIA staff members were present by this transcript memo dated 15 November 1967 to the President personally. The White House copy is now in the files of President Johnson's papers at the library in Austin.*

f. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security numbers have been used for the purpose of opening 54 new bank accounts since January 1962. 69 individual tax accounts have been established with IRS on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.

*JK
Brief follow-up memos were prepared and forwarded in the White House on 16 October 1967. According to current knowledge, further finished intelligence reports will be submitted on the connections of the peace movement here produced.*

g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities (43 corporations; 61 sole proprietorships; 207 lawyers and 61 telephone answering service addresses) are maintained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

*Director of Current Intelligence
Michael Ladd*

h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notional company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1 proprietary-hire as follows:

JFK Act 5 (a)(2)(D)

*Proprietary Management Company

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY~~

-3-

~~SECRET~~

00510
00191

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirees are currently being handled.

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Non-officials
~~for cover purposes~~. Dividends (interest) earned on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover are ~~not~~ reported to the Internal Revenue Service based on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section 6041.

Individuals under cover may borrow money from the Credit Union ~~if their purchase of real estate however, the mortgagor is recorded in the name of a cleared lawyer and not the actual lender (Credit Union)~~. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes and books either privately, secretly or without acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user. CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking at the import of intelligence addressed to the Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally also provides access to other files from denied areas. It may be addressed to private citizens or organizations or other embassies. These efforts are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign information.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of the opposition leader of Guyana and the other is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CORPORATE COVER

SUBJECT: INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver,

have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CCS personnel.

H. C. EISENBERG
Director, Central Reference Service

3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has been established policy that no more than two individuals would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total number of companies now being used and efforts are underway to effect further reductions toward the goal of one individual per company.

4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function described in paragraph 1, above, CCS maintains continuing contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstamped credit cards in alias for operational use in the United States and abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being used by 34 individuals.

-2-

~~SECRET~~

SECRET	SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	JULY 1971	

00514
00380

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3 May 1973

REVISED FACILITIES COVER


MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-stopped notions~~and additional~~ which were created to provide cover for Agency personnel in the United States and abroad and to provide an attributable source for Agency funds used in operations and requiring concealment of Agency origin~~or use~~.~~Government interests~~.~~The facilities~~ companies~~and~~ corporations providing personal status cover, payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscellaneus~~Support~~ such as~~attribution~~ transparency funding, etc. From time~~et~~ in~~the~~ relationships providing~~is~~ illustrate~~an~~ operational cover, including~~of~~ organizations~~which~~ involved non-registered~~in~~ companies~~and~~ providing~~of~~ undertaker~~high risk~~ operational~~or~~ organization~~the~~ Agency~~or branch~~ the~~carryout~~ of~~main~~ BIS~~sequestration~~ and~~proprietary~~ funding directly for the FBI on a short-term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDCI Agency personnel engaged in~~operations~~ classified and sensitive~~and~~ paid~~by~~ facilities~~and~~ the essential FBIS provided~~and~~ operating~~by~~ reporting off Agency salaries without~~any documents~~ Agency~~in~~ the~~in~~ support work are help~~in~~ in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee~~the~~ facilities~~of~~ provides~~a~~ capability~~for~~ passing~~described~~ Agency~~funds~~ to~~the~~ Agency~~appropriations~~~~including~~ domestic~~compliance~~~~against~~ a continuing basis~~is~~ 225~~in bank~~ Unnecessary training~~located~~~~in~~~~functions~~ throughout the United States provide the mechanisms for transmittal of those funds.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency transmissions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel, and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA, are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restriction. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house, correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright, e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

00515

~~SECRET~~



00202

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

JFK b
 agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently, however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of those items vital to the government's business which we must continue to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against the risk of present procedures.

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently taking a second look.

E. H. Knoche
 E. H. KNOCHE
 Director
 Foreign Broadcast Information Service

00516

~~SECRET~~

2014 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

01203

~~SECRET~~

"SECRET"

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
8 May 1973

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

JFK
CC
SUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible briefing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as ~~delicate~~ or inappropriate. ~~Technical Services Division's support (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities at the request of the Director of Security for approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973~~ safesite number 583 was made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, ~~United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House~~.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participating approximately two years ago the FBI Division of Intelligence, has had the cooperation of the Commander of the Protection, Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police in disguise, Department in training officers scheduled for assignment to the USSR and eastern Europe in how to conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through the Chief of Security or the Director FBI Training courses (to Quantico, UMass) in a service involved response to requests from the FBI. We have shared information concerning one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for we have learned which are relevant to their counter-espionage responsibilities.

Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

JFK
UNA
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059998

00215

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

- 2 -

6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational experience we have invited three FBI officers to be students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25 May 1973.

7. A Soviet defector was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although ~~This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.~~ his present attitude toward the Agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.

David H. Blee
David H. Blee
Chief
Soviet Bloc Division

JFM/AB

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be ~~CIA~~ or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the ~~COS~~ overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with ~~DDO/NARCOG~~. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

~~SECRET~~

Sidney Gottlieb
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief

00522

Attachment

NW 65360 Date 02/28/82 Page 140

O & I - Addressee, w/att

Technical Services Division

00210

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby ATTACHMENT

Attached is the material we requested of Dick Obert.

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Department of Defense Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Headquarters and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Conventions.

Other divisions that handle American overseas personnel identities documents to the DDCI deBennidiglio. Intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI-type casework.

1 AUG 54 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.

1450

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, special fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational.

SECRET

00217

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Inspector General		
<u>Department of State</u>			
3	Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Department. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, foreign visas and diplomatic passports on a priority basis.		
CONFIDENTIAL	FILE INFORMATION	REF ID: A65369	SIGNATURE
CONFIDENCE	INFORMATION		

Postal Service

*JFK
DP*
 Mr. Brock: The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letterhead samples furnished by fluorescent ink typewriter analysis. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDCI. Although there is no OCPA furnished TSD with examples, it has sent through the Office of Security capabilities for those entities to identify subject and originator. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

00547

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO BLINDER

*JFK
DP*
 Gandy and Associates, passes for Presidential campaign emblems for Presidential vehicles, photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM	TO	ROUTER	NO.
	<i>TPK</i> Richard [REDACTED] (CI/PG) Trainees represent internal security or national police from all countries participating in AID Police assistance programs.		2021 May 1973
10. (Other designator, room number, and building)		DATE	
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED
			OFFICER'S INITIALS
COMMENTS (Mark each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)			
1. White House IDEN-73 O/RCI	Stationery, special memoranda, inlets of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements. Attached are a copy of the background rate on the Committee per your request.		
2. Mr. [REDACTED]	Police Representing Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria		
3.	During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.		
4.	EYES ONLY		
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

00548

610 LBJ LIBRARY

 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

00210

EYES ONLY

14 MAY 1973

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff
Sidney Gottlieb

ATTENDANT

x-2831

DATE

8 May 1973

TO: (Office building) 201 South Carolina Street, Denver, Colorado 80202
Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully evaluated national/international intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chair-

OFFICE'S

COMMENTS

(Number each comment to show from whom received, forwarded, etc.)

1. man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary express or otherwise of support to ~~IES~~ attached hereto with additions: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House has insisted that the existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within this Agency has been limited to DCI, DDCI (DDP), C/CI and four officers of this office.
2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).
3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

EYES ONLY
SECRETIVE
SECRET/EYES ONLY

00549
00220

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
FBI - DENVER, CO

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

~~TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following installations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:~~

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached). ~~(A) Identity 59~~ Four masked transmitters were installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.

(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter was installed to collect emanations from a cryptographic machine. The system continues to function when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been installed and are operating. One is specifically designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the other is a straight audio transmitter to collect conversations. A FBI agent is manning the listening post. A third system is not operating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape made from this room was made by the National Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and consultation covering Identity 62

First masked switched transmitters were used in two apartments used as temporary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters and microwave transmitters were installed in the permanent quarters along with mic and wire installations, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~
~~SENSITIVE~~
~~COMINT~~

00550

23 FEB 1972

(E) Identity 65 - This is an operation with additional
SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activists Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
JFK/JOB

in Washington. The listening post was obtained by using the Agency's covert mechanisms for protecting the property. New systems are being designed and produced by using TSD's covert activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972.

(F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices purchased by the FBI. Part of the equipment was installed in November and December 1971, the remaining equipment was installed 17 & 25 March 1972. Tests made by TSD officer from temporary FBI station. Requests were made to the Republican National Convention Coalition (RNCC), one of the domestic action groups targeting the Republican Convention, 1972, requested that the American Delegation & Steering Committee of the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indications that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly. Known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against

3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representative of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' representative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.) Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported project, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC), of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.

~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others ^{PSB/CDB/Mar #138-73} ~~May 1973~~ at the United Nations.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION: Executive Officer

SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

/s/ Identity 120 00553

~~CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

C/TSP/OPS/r

00223

CONTROLED DISSEM

73-2380
21 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

ORD-2328-73

9 MAY 1973

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined with respect to all ORD services) or dealings with other agencies on domestic non-foreign matters. At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

Director of Research & Development

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war ~~is increasing~~: more and more strongly, under various forms, such ~~as~~ ~~conduct evasions~~ desertions, resistance, demonstrations which ~~now~~ ~~affect~~ ~~neither~~ the soldiers. The Assembly calls for ~~support~~ ~~to~~ ~~these~~ progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

CONTROLED DISSEM

00554

DEVELOPMENTS:

~~CONTACTS WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS~~

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targeting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with ~~memoranda, exhibits, displays~~ will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the ~~use~~ ~~of~~ ~~special~~ television network to broadcast video tape messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere, and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank Nixon domestically and internationally," international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations." Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information was exchanged with them.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Van Dowerker/TA)
(Noe/TA)

Technical information was exchanged relating to the development of simple, portable sensor systems for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and
Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD)

(Parker/DSP)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)

(Scott/An)

00555

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 1

~~SECRET~~

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, ~~BNDD took~~ August 1972. The Students for a Democratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at ~~the~~ Republican Convention in ~~haste~~ adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students, in ~~an~~ demonstration in ~~the~~ San Diego area ~~cooc~~ during ~~the~~ ~~confab~~. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting on the ~~Convention~~, ~~Received~~ a letter of ~~solidarity~~ from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indication of North Vietnamese contacts with the SDCC as ~~it~~ reported will be reprinted ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~SDCC's~~ ~~newspaper~~ ~~its~~ ~~newspaper~~ ~~is~~ ~~a~~ ~~newspaper~~ ~~reported~~ ~~plans~~ ~~for~~ ~~broadcasts~~ ~~of~~ ~~NSC~~ ~~public address system~~ ~~during~~ ~~the~~ ~~Convention~~ ~~of~~ ~~private~~ ~~telephone~~ ~~calls~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~Vietnamese~~ ~~in~~ ~~Paris~~.

(Dr. Lester/OST)
DEVELOPMENT (John Sobel, BNDD)

(Terek/LS)

~~At its second core meeting Cambridge, Massachusetts held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to coordinate actions at the San Diego convention, ~~in~~ ~~order~~ ~~to~~ ~~disrupt~~ ~~the~~ ~~Republican~~ ~~National~~ ~~Convention~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~. The proposal, which was ~~circulated~~ ~~among~~ ~~SDS~~ ~~members~~, ~~and~~ ~~students~~ ~~delegates~~ ~~to~~ ~~occur~~ ~~during~~ ~~a~~ ~~fight~~ ~~in~~ ~~Uniglobe~~, ~~where~~ ~~Convention~~ ~~delegates~~ ~~were~~ ~~entertained~~. FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and Navy.~~

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in ~~the form~~ of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity (VCSSAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been ~~circulated~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~SDCC~~ and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys ~~the~~ ~~Committee's~~ ~~best~~ ~~wishes~~ ~~of~~ ~~militant~~ ~~solidarity~~ ~~and~~ ~~friendship~~ ~~fund~~ ~~the~~ ~~VCSSAP~~ ~~wishes~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~SDCC~~ ~~write~~ ~~often~~ ~~and~~ ~~"send~~ ~~us~~ ~~materials~~ ~~you~~ ~~have~~."

(Noé/TA)

CONTROLED D-304

00556

NO FOREIGN DETERMINED BY THE USAID

00230

~~SECRET~~

23 MAY 1972

SECRET

~~SUBJECT:~~ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction detector.

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information were exchanged with LEAA.

August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.

Demonstrations organized by (The/San Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267, San Diego, Ca. 92103.

00557

0023

SECRET

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

JFK/JB
SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Treasury

JFK/JB
Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug enforcement administration. The request for his services was made by Identity 3, the Agency's Narcotics Coordinator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

(Lawrence/DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

JFK/JB
About five years ago, assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared scanners. This was turned down.

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment.

(Van Dewerker/TA)

00553

CONTROLLED DISSEM

14 JUN 1972
C-20-24

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
 SUBJ: Harassance the Republic National Convention Agencies
 Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
 Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
SUMMARY: Problems.

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of interest by members of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plan of the major organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties. (MacAnlis/RP)

DEVELOPMENTS:National Institute of Health (NIH)

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a technician contact whom he knew from the visit he had made to the United States. The North Vietnamese official work was given the visit to New York City. addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, frequently with ACDA personnel in order to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support ACDA needs. (Identity 125 /LS)

(Identity 125 /LS)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)

(Walker/DSP)

00559

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION ABROAD
 CONTROLLED DISSEM

00233

SECRET

SICU.LI

28 JUN 1972

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Foreign Supporter Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, on 21-24 August 1972. have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA)

(Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation:

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

(Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service

FBI

U.S. Customs

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS)

(Noyes/PD)

(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA)

(Galinaitis/IPA)

(Mr. Leonard Jaffee, NASA)

(General Smart, No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad)

00550

Controlled Dissem

CONTROLLED DRUGS

~~20 JUL 1972~~

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUBJECT: Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following:
~~Proposed use~~ ~~Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following:~~ ~~WORLD~~ ~~SECRET~~
leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization ~~(Brigades)~~ which has been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed at those meetings.
~~DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND BUREAU OF NARCOTICS~~
~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE~~ ~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE~~ ~~DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE~~
state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium DEVELOPMENTS.

In (an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of the CPJP), foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ, in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. In the PCPJ representative stated that during the period of 14-15 August, "People's Campaign Against Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materiel for use against Vietnamese, counter that similar actions should be organized in the United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that "dramatic demonstration" protest

U.S. Army
Rocky Mountain Arsenal,
Toxic Ordnance Depot

LS/ORD tested environmental storage and production facilities

Classification of
EXTENT PLATE DAMAGE INDUCED BY
complex from testing.
in Shocks (3) or (4) falls into one of
AUTOMATICALLY ACCORDING TO
Impossible to determine
Initial response, initial drop etc.

AVAILABILITY
INSURANCE
REFERENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLER DASHBOARD

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100

卷之三

~~CONTROLLED BY CSC~~

of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by the "Republican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on 21 August 1972. ~~Comment: apparent reference to the Stockholm Conference. The PCP has added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference envelope Vice Chairman spoke on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.~~

(Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention with EA in field testing an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.)

The Anti-War Union (AMU), a domestic group engaged in organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Convention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the full AMU delegation. Although no information is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AMU delegation and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AMU advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials regarding the stance the AMU should take on certain questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AMU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AMU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to "educate the American people about the consequences of voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations at the Republican Convention will be "unique." ~~LOUD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants. Polygraph security findings were compared with the Sheriff's own security findings.~~

(Sheriff)

Identity 125 /LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assessment methods in 1967-68.

(Sheriff)

Identity 125 /LS)

~~CONTROLLED BY CSC~~

13 FEB 1972 BY CSC

~~SECRET~~

005336

SECRET

2 AUG 1972

SUBJECT: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
or Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

SUMMARY:

~~Chief San Francisco Police~~ There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 24-26 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention." TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

00533

CLASSIFIED BY _____
EXCERPT FROM OFFICIAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE BY E.O. 13526, FEBR/MAR 2010
§ 1.2(d) (O, G) - (D) (b)(6) (A) or (E)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED UN
impossible to determine

CONTROLED BY COMINT

NO FORGEZ MECHE TO COMINT 00533

SIGHT
SLD.LT

00237

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

I. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we conduct experiments and tests in the United States.

A second more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-Corporation Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1973 for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Ronnie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's chief target would be the Republican Convention.

2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed. (Wood/TA)

b. Microwave Intercept System - About 1968, this system was tested in a light aircraft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station in Identity 127, California. This system is designed to permit intercept of microwave telephone communication channels of systems such as Identity 130. It works equally well against the Bell Telephone TD-2, as they are generically the same. Recordings of these telephone intercepts were carefully controlled and were destroyed several years ago.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 2
00564

00233

9 AUG 1972

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

• Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

c. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objective of this current program is to develop a means to monitor foreign telephone systems as or efforts to intercept communication taking advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. The objective is to learn the complete supervisory signalling and sequencing control system hierarchy for the various foreign telephone systems. Many of these are patterned after the U.S. system and, for this reason, limited monitoring to test the operation of intercept equipment in the United States is planned. The data to be collected would be merely the signal tones from which supervisory codes can be extracted. Message content is of no interest and will not be recorded. Overseas testing is planned at a subsequent date. To date, some domestic testing of this concept has been carried out at the contractor's plant. No recordings have been made of such data. Extremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign telephone systems through supervisory tone signalling have been carried out to verify initial concepts. The duration of testing was less than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of engineering development tests of special sensors within the United States include infrared and high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR (FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial effluent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magnetometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks). In all these cases, the data output of such testing has been used for engineering development and the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

00565

2

CLASSIFIED BY	RELEASER FROM GOMBA'S STOREROOM
SCHEDULED BY	10/23/72, FWD, GOMBA
EXPIRES	10/23/72, FWD, GOMBA
ROUTED	ROUTED TO GOMBA
IMMEDIATELY	IMMEDIATELY
impossible to determine	

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES

NW 05300 DocId:02500631 Page 159

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

SOURCE UNKNOWN, UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROLED DISSEM

16 AUG 1972

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention
e. Remote Physiological Measurements

An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is being tested at a contractor's site for use as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph). There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. The magnetometer is completely harmless to the subject and the test results are closely held.

f. Personality Structure of Defectors

Study - ORD undertook to determine the personality structure of defectors during the period 1966-69. The work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned with a study of the phenomenon of defection itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University. Identity 125/LS)

g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained and tested in the United States to carry small intelligence collecting packages such as audio surveillance devices; small cameras, and current measuring devices. Any data collected from unwitting domestic sources would have been used only for engineering purposes and then destroyed.

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In the period from 1970 through 1972 various means were used to check out an intercept system designed to operate against Iden 93 communications links. Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content. The material was impossible to determine.

00536
CONTROLED DISSEM
EX-907 THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY & MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED OR USED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
Impossible to determine
Foreign espionage, terrorist use or other

SEARCHED INDEXED
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
NW 85000 RECORDED 080000ZMAY72 Page 1000

CONTROLED DISSEM

FOREIGN DISSEM/NO SECRET ABOARD

SECRET

00290

06 MAR 1972

~~SECRET~~

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

[ORD-2274-73]

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent ~~World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.~~

BACKGROUND: At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief

~~of the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in Versailles, France, from 10 to 19 February by 1972, is informed of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" contains no stipulations submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 4 April to 19 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."~~

~~a verbal or a written report on very short notice.~~

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly."

Attachment:
As stated

CLASSIFIED BY	377343
EXPIRES	2025
SCHEDULED BY	00568
ROUTED BY	00568
APPROVED BY	
SUBMITTED BY	
RECORDED BY	
FILED BY	
DATE	

CONFIDENTIAL D33EM *Subject to D* 00568
NO FAXING OR TELETYPE USE (unless otherwise indicated, insert date or event)

CONFIDENTIAL - DRAFT

JFK II
under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to those progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the government to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will politically assist in the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known in DDS>.

A negative report from the Support Staff.

ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge.

Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

00569

00242

CONFIDENTIAL - DRAFT
SECRET

03 MAY 1972

7 May 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National ConventionSUMMARY:C. V. NOYES

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, but made no specific call for support of disruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

~~with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance, countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Specifically, it participated in ISCC and AEC Subcommission meetings which included technology exchanges and some equipment exchanges on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.~~

DEVELOPMENTS:

In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed, in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference member stated that these actions were part of an international campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972 and "will culminate at the election conventions in July and August."

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's "Action Commission." The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

Major John Langager, ONI/USN

Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

NO FORXON DISC 240 USEIN AS203

ORF.CRT

00570

00243

23 MAY 1972

Thomas P. Noe

5/7/73

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
 or Harass the Democratic National Convention
 regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and

SUMMARY: This is an exchange of information and

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. Air Force, Elections Argusplayng Service in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.

2. Joint funding of two contracts with State Department (DIA/DILL). Two electrot microphones were furnished

to State Department for test purposes. In mid April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

Office Telecommunications Policy

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.

Office ~~B~~emantry/~~A~~donst~~o~~ganised Goyer Fribida
 People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,
 Army/MiFlexidaPo~~l~~3642 Agency, Ft. Gordon

Air Force/Office of the Inspector General

Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

CONTROLED DISSEM

006724-1

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

7 May 1973

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

- JPK/B*
1. BNDA (Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by D/ORD.
 2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the Navy. Time: December 1969
 3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System. Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

00572
07243

CONTROLLED DISSEM

05/24/73

13 JULY 1973

CONTROLED DISSEM

7 JUN 1972

29 MAY 1973

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary [CIA Management
Committee

SUMMARY:

SUBJECT:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, is 10-13 July 1972, is what expression of interest reported earlier of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans for the major antiwar organizations in the United States and for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the DEVELOPMENTS: Agency's request and with its technical support. This presents a related issue that should be noted. James McCord's testimony indicated that in mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. McCord challenged the visitor to the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield, says McCord called the two named Identity 75 and Identity 61 because he was sure they were subjects of national security wiretaps. McCord in fact there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the Identity 75 run by the FBI about which McCord believes McCord himself stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions. Possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation against Identity 61, and assumed that it was also a telephone tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping that both his telephones and those of the Identity 75 and Identity 61 were tapped, and that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Identity 61 break-in, and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations may lead to exposure of the operations.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe

Inspector General

00351

00573

Attachment:

As Stated Above

CONTROLED DISSEM

21 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

24 May 1973

SUBJECT: Reported Burglary of the Identity 61
There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 on 13-14 May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it determined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61 registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed, Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject. There had been an earlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61 which is described below.

2. On 16 April 1971 (the Agency) proposed to the FBI the installation of technical coverage of Identity 61. The opportunity for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid for a contract to renovate Identity 61. Upon securing the contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate or install material which would be provided him. (The Agency proposed to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community was cited.)

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00362

CL-27-77 ADO/DO

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 21 1972	
(Initials of..., the insert date or event)	

00374

COMPLETED 1972

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered, installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of equipment in Identity 61. From May to February Agency technicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did they enter Identity 61.

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 be stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61 was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972, when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76 delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on nationalization of foreign holdings. While the FBI was still in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage was partially reinstated with full coverage in effect by 26 December 1972.

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued.

John C. Richards
John C. Richards

23 JUN 1972

Addendum

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller, re 73 memo to IG ,
paragraph 2, re Identity 61 Break-in
1. The Foreign Resources Division asset was Identity 77

VIA SUBJECT who owned the Agency support to the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July
1972) and National Republican (26-28 August 1972)
Conventions

to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to \$2500. The final

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive
Director/Comptroller.

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service
for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is con-
tained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from FR in Staff to
the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the
DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached) and worked in the FBI listening

3. On 13 April 1972 the USSS Miami met with the Miami
USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito of USSS Headquarters to
discuss preliminary plans for Station MIAMI support to the
USSS prior to the National Conventions. On 17 April 1972
the C/D/C/ISD and C/D/C/ISD met with Mr. Mastrovito at Headquarters
to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and
to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the
USSS.

4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS
and Headquarters representatives provided that:

a. Station MIAMI would conduct name traces on
all Cubans of interest to the USSS.

b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on
all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.

c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events
in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would
have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during
the convention periods. This would include briefings
on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and
on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which
could affect the security of the conventions.

00576

~~SECRET~~

d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function. In developing its cadre of general support assets

5. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office of Station MI/Miami with the Domestic Counter Service of the Directorate for Intelligence using their assets handled by Miami security field office personnel from the USSS to monitor office until the USSS established communications links from their command post in convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to Station MI/Miami by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted by MI/COG. Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated with CI/SD.

provide access to targets of operational interest.

6. Station MI/Miami has arranged the rental of a safehouse about five minutes from convention center which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TTY to "Miami prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph four above.

of occasional help in operations involving other nationals.

7. Station MI/Miami is daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The location of Station MI/Miami has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station is located some distance from the buffer office.) Additionally, the Miami Security Field Office maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent

8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency nor will they provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.

The Basics also have contact with local Immigration

and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts

are less frequent and less important than the contacts

with the FBI offices.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

00577

00578