

TELEGRAM		INFORMATION REPORT		TELEGRAM	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY					
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COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/500,097		
SUBJECT	COMMENTS OF <u>TRAN VAN LY-ON</u> THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT	DATE DISTR.	28 JANUARY 1962		
DATE OF INFO.	25 JANUARY 1962	PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962)	REFERENCES	IN 18750		
APPRAISAL	3	RETAIN OR DESTROY			
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE ORIGIN IS DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.		FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 7006		
SOURCE	A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS, FROM TRAN VAN LY.				
ON 25 JANUARY 1962, <u>TRAN VAN LY</u> , OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT (FIELD COMMENT, TDCS-3/500,042).					
FVS-8999 BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POLITICAL ADVISOR TO GENERAL NGHIEM. SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). <u>LY SAID</u> HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. <u>LY WAS</u> AWARE THAT CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO MOUNT AN					
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STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF
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A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. **LY BELIEVED** THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. (FIELD COMMENT.

TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP. (CS-3/474,755)  
ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF FVS-5908 HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED SUPPORT TO DIEM BY THE U.S. A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTED THAT WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO DIEM. (FIELD COMMENT.)

LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. **LY'S** SOLUTION WOULD BE

TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SETGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN

TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS

WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

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5. (FIELD COMMENT. **LY** TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON **LY'S** PART IN RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER **LY** IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)

6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

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