

DDO 93-1586

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25 June 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group
Chief, Information Management Service
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John Berg
Special Assistant to the Associate Deputy
Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records

REFERENCE: A. Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June 1993:
Subject: Release of JFK Assassination
Records -- Differences;
B. Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993:
Subject: JFK Assassination Records-- Proposal
for discussion

1. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos, it appears that a further interpretation is required.

--On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale approval for their release, but if the crypts have been previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate to existing or another project and does not contain a valid digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would, when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which refer to other operations or projects cannot be released.

--On the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been previously blown, there is no objection to its release. Note that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with assets/operations and this "guilt by association" could lead to further, undesirable, exposures. Care must also be taken so that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so as to enable a researcher to accumulate through an inspection of numerous documents the approximate size of a given station. (The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of pseudonyms would be considered for release.)

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records

--On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers, there is no objection to the release of this information as it pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released as can dispatch numbers to Mexico City. The release of cable/dispatch numbers from other Stations can only be done if there has been prior public identification of a Station in that location. The release of file numbers *pe se*, however, would reveal the methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information-- which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it on a blanket basis. Blanket release of 201 numbers reveals similar information as well as targeting/acquistion methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.

2. I realize that the above guidelines continue to mean that much information will be "blacked out." As bad as it may appear, none of this information is substantive and its omission does not detract from the "story." Its release, however, could permit detailed analyses of our commo, methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.

New Subject: Release of William Pawley's name

3. It is agreed that an attempt will be made to locate Pawley's next of kin to request their permission to release information pertaining to his relationship with CIA. If the next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can be revisited. (Note: the information in the Congressional record or in the book "Deadly Secrets" notes that there was contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does not identify the full extent of that relationship.)

for Andy Zelt
John Berg

S E C R E T

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1 November 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Linda Flor
C/MRS/LA/MRS

FROM : Joanne Harris

SUBJECT : JFK Project - Review of Cuban Files

I reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets, pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation. Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection from public disclosure.

a. AMIRE/1 - 201-274049

A Career Agent, AMIRE/1 died of natural causes in October or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.

b. WILDCAT - 201-294213

FBI Double Agent. PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico. He was still active as of March 1982.

c. WKSCARLET/3 - 201-300985

Formally terminated in 1974. Caracas Station had contact with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of a Cuban plane and was incarcerated in Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still involved in questionable activities.

d. AMICE-14 - 201-307337

Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.

e. AMMUG/1 - 201-749651

Cuban defector. He was terminated in 1967, but was used through 1971.

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7 June 1995

Memo for File

Subject: ARRB request re "slug line" deletions

The policy of deleting ALL crypts & designators in the slug line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting with CIA. The DO representatives present (Sander & McNair) deferred to the Office of Communications.

Per 6 June 1995 discussion with Don Hatch, DA/IRO, "the slug line is strictly an internal distribution line", and the release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is not a communications issue; slug crypts are not "commo generated". The DA has no objection to the release of otherwise releasable crypts in the slug line of CIA cables.

The DA response was provide to J. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.


Barry Harrelson

CC: HRG reviewers
DO reviewers

Assassination Records Review Board

600 E Street NW ■ 2nd Floor ■ Washington, DC 20530

June 6, 1995

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear John:

As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous meetings with ARRB staff members, CIA's current practice of redacting the sluglines from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination Records Review Board. As a result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting, the Board in fact asked those present from CIA to provide it with any additional information available in support of this practice.

If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable cryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.

With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,



David G. Marwell
Executive Director


27 September 1995

Note to: HRG and DO reviewers

Subject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, re AM crypts

Bill left the following message on my voice mail:

"I have just talked with Peg Sanders, DC/LA Division, and unless we see a specific incident where giving up an AM crypt will betray an asset, then let it go. I don't believe there is any place we will see that. She is will to give up all AM crypts simply because there are so many iterations going back...and things have been changed."



Barry
HRG Senior Reviewer

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JFK

1/11/82

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.

Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational interest files in those instances when the credibility of the narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.

Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

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DRV HUM 4-82

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SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we will release names of employees who have retired in an overt status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a document. We will continue to protect the true names of employees cited as serving in a field position. References to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between Headquarters and the field.

for Johnny Lewis
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

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(do not file)


8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
ARRB Staff

FROM: Barry Harrelson,
CIS/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, Country
Designators, Action Indicators and
Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)



Attachment

Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.

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CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

FROM: 
Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June 1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration (DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the release of ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC.

2. On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms together with the term MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must be withheld in their entirety and the DA determined that ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC must be withheld as well. Please be advised that the association to this Agency of the locations referred to by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that the locations, themselves, are under military cover. Accordingly, any crypts, slugs, or other words associated with the locations and linking them with the CIA must not be released.

3. We hope the information provided above will assist you.

Attachment: As Stated

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16 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta *Frieda Omasta*
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is in response to your request that we review the attached material and provide you with a determination as to whether ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC can be released. We also reviewed the material with respect to MKCOSMOS as well.

2. The Directorate of Administration (DA) has completed its review and we have determined that ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC must continued to be withheld. We forwarded your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) and DS&T has determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must continue to be withheld as well. I have identified below the documents in which these terms are used.

Document No.	Crypts
104-10177-10248	ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
104-10177-10228	ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
104-10177-10231	ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC
104-10177-10230	ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS

3. Copies of the documents referred to above are returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for deletion. Also returned are three documents that did not contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This concludes DA action on this request. If you have any questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachments: As Stated

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JFK

OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) This memorandum responds to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.

4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- and by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.

5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:

- what information was compromised?
- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
- what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?
- what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?

6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.

12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:

- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

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SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.

Lee S. Strickland

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SUBJECT: Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym

OIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998)

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

- 1 - EXDIR
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- 1 - Principal Deputy General Counsel
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- 1 - DO/IRO
- 1 - DI/IRO
- 1 - DST/IRO
- 1 - LSS signer file
- 1 - OIM/IRG Chrono
- 1 - Subject File: ARRB

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CIA TALKING POINTS
re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)

26 AUGUST 1998

- The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.
 - We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).
 - It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would:
 - provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,
 - result in concomitant damage to US counter-intelligence interests, and,
 - have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.
- Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:
 - a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER) in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,

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- if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a **valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts.**"
- As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.
 - The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.
 - It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
 - It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, **IJDECANTER**).
 - It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA].."
 - **It is this final fact which is critical.**
 - **By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.**
- I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

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- The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:
 - what information was compromised?
 - what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
 - what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?
 - what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?
- The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
- Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.
- Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.
- Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.
 - If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.

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- If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.
- This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.
- In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the *Los Angeles Times* article.
 - The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;
 - they know or suspect what he told the US;
 - they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;
 - they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.
 - And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.
- In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key.
 - The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.
 - But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

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of course, information on the public record via the media.

- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER.
- Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.
- It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.
- Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).
- Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know from experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
- There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.
 - ONE, is foreign relations.

- In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.
- This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

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- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.
 - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.
 - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- THIRD, is an equitable issue.
 - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;
 - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
 - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.
 - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.
 - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.

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(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)

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CL REASON: Section 1.5 C

DECL ON: X1

DRV FRM: COL 1-82

25 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob Skwirot

FROM: Charles A. Briggs-Y-

OFFICE: DCI/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Mexico City Station History

REFERENCE:

The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the most part concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period 1947 to June 1969. In every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief parenthetical phrase to several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOIA requestors concerning CIA activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.

The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the digraph - the location indicator. What I've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole history of Station activity for subsequent curiosity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is familiar with the decision to release almost all LI-crypts in full - while protecting identifying information. The major relevant LI projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the full cryptonym and most of the details released. ^{N4}

Station and Operation Directorate division histories are among the most sensitive documents in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within the area divisions - they are not available to cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story, is very great.

CC: