

~~SECRET~~

8 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE: 7 January 1965, 2130 Hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Manolin Hernandez arrived from Central America and reported that Vico Starke and Frank Marshall, with the support of General Anastacio Somoza of Nicaragua, were planning a coup against President Francisco Orlich in Costa Rica. A-1 planned to depart Miami for Managua at 0700 hours, 8 January on Lanica airline to check this information with General Somoza and to attempt to ensure that his equipment is not being used to carry out the coup. A-1 will have his private communications pad and promised to send us a message as soon as he talked with General Somoza and with the Orlichs and Starke in Costa Rica.


2. A-1 agreed to try to return to New York on Saturday, 9 January, for a meeting with Mr. Archer (Chief, WH). A-1 will call as soon as he arrives in New York at which time arrangements will be made to bring him to Washington for the meeting.

3. A-1 reported he and Al Burt had signed a non-aggression pact. A-1 feels there is little to gain from his point of view in continuing the squabble with Burt.


Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Tel Conversations
Costa Rica
Pic
Press

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(00-7-22d 101)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		1. FILE NO.		
		2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	3. DATE	
		4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	5. DATE OF INFO.	6. EVALUATION
7. ANALYST	8. DATE PROCESSED	9. DISSEMINATED TO	10. DATE	
11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		12. TRANSFERRED TO BY FILE NO.		

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

<p>ARTIME, MANUEL 201-267437 SEX M DOB ?</p> <p>CIT CUBA OCC ? RE ALLEGATION BY ELOY GUTIERREZ PENOYO 201- 269349 OR HRR WAS WORKING DIRECTLY UNDER THE ORDERS OF A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF US AND THAT SUBJ WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SINKING OF SPANISH SHIP SIERRA ARANZAZU.</p>		019-300-003 DBA - 96789 27 JAN 65 P2
R 6502082325		

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 

SECRET

(01-40)

FORM 887 AND PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

OK

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL LENGTH 6 1/2		<input type="checkbox"/> COPY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FAX
SECRET		PRODUCTION PRIORITY			
FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1	2	3	4
JM WADE					
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY	ISSUED	ROUTED	TIME	BY
DC/AD/H/SP 3				1400	<i>Jm</i>
INFO	VR, FILE, DDP				

*AM 1004-11 201 13 FEB 65 IN 80247
security*

~~SECRET~~ 132358Z

PRIORITIES DIR CITE WAVE 8261

PRIORITY TYPEIC YODITE AMWORLD

~~SECRET~~ 1. ANCLATTER/1 TOLD 13 FEB 65 BY FRANK FIORINI THAT MANUEL ARTIME'S HOUSE AT 1278 NE 85TH STREET MANNI WAS RANSACKED DURING EVENING 12 FEB. ARTIME TOLD FIORINI THAT INTRUDERS HAD STOLEN JEWELRY, NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS AND TELESCOPIC LENS RIFLE THAT FIORINI HAD GIVEN ARTIME AS GIFT.

2. ARTIME ASKED FIORINI HELP HIM OUT BY GETTING IN TOUCH LOCAL AUTHORITIES (UNSPECIFIED) WITH REQUEST THEY KEEP MATTER QUIET.

FIORINI SAID ARTIME DOES NOT WANT INCIDENT PUBLICIZED.

3. FOR SECURITY REASONS WAVE HAS MADE NO EFFORT OBTAIN CONFIRMATION FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, WAVE HAS RECEIVED NO OTHER REPORT ON THIS MATTER AS OF PREPARATION THIS REPORT.

~~SECRET~~

*note: Artine confirmed this
11 Feb - Event was silent
3 Feb - No
sensitive documents taken, per se, from*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET 181509Z

DJR CURE WAVE 842B

RENT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF WAVE 8419 (1983360)

ITEM: JOSE ANTONIO MOLE ROSALES.

SECRET

-CPU

SECRET

SECRET 181509Z

DIR CLASS WAVE 8419

BYRON TYPIC TOBITE ANWORLD

WAVE 8261 (in square)

AMSLITTER/L PROVIDED ALL INFORMATION

I. ANCLATTER/I PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REF 15 FEB 65 BY STATING RANSACKING AMBIDDY/I'S HOUSE ACTUALLY OCCURRED SOME TIME BETWEEN 1-3 FEB AND DISCOVERED BY MAID LUCY ACOSTA 3 FEB. FIORINI HOWEVER LEARNED OF RANSACKING ABOUT 1330 HOURS 13 FEB WHEN RCVD PHONE CALL FROM AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) WHO TOLD FIORINI THAT ALTHO HOUSE BURGLARIZED 8 FEB HE DID NOTHING UNTIL FIRST SPEAKING WITH AMBIDDY/I WHO OUT TOWN. AMBIDDY-I RECOMMENDED IDEN CONTACT FIORINI WITH REQUEST FIORINI CONTACT LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF ABLE DO SO WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

2. FIORINI, AFTER RECEIPT TELEPHONE CALL FROM IDEM CONTACTED

PERSONAL FRIEND FRANK CAMPBELL, FORMER CHIEF INTEL METRO, WHO ADVISED FIORINI CONTACT POLICE CAPTAIN LEE NAPIR USING CAMPBELL'S NAME. FIORINI, WHO ALSO KNOWS TO CAPTAIN NAPIR, CONTACTED NAPIR WITH IDEM. NAPIR PROMISED MAKE INVESTIGATION WITHOUT MAKING "REPORT."

MTB 13 FEB 1968 SHOWERED MAPIR 24 PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING

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SECRET

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140000
PAGE 2

BROKEN DOOR AND LARGE NUMBER DOCUMENTS SCATTERED OVER FLOOR. IDEK ALSO GAVE HAPIR FOLLOWING LIST MISSING ARTICLES: (A) ROLEX WP151 WATCH; (B) ANOTHER INEXPENSIVE WRIST WATCH; (C) RING WITH FOUR TWO CARAT DIAMONDS AND LARGE ZIRCON; (D) TWO EIGHTEEN CARAT GOLD NECKLACES; (E) ONE WOMAN'S IDENTIFICATION BRACELET, AND (F) ONE HIGH POWERED 308 MAGNUM RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC LENS AND TRIGGER GUARD INSCRIBED "AMBIDY/I, LEADER OF REVOLUTION, FRANK FIORINI."

ALTHO SOME DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM A/I'S HOUSE IMPORTANT PAPERS KEPT HOUSE SAFE WHICH NOT DISTURBED. IDEM WHO CONDUCTING OWN INVESTIGATIONS, TOLD HAPIR IDEM SUSPECTED HOUSE REPAIRMAN WHO RECENTLY WORKED A/I'S HOUSE WALDO BADO PEREZ, 1285 NW 29TH STREET TERRACE, MIAMI. BADO WHO HAS NO REGULAR MEANS INCOME RECENTLY BOUGHT WIFE 68 CORVAIR (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4378) AND PAST WEEK MADE PERSONAL GIFTS NUMBER FRIENDS. ALSO PURCHASED FOUR NEW TIRES HIS OWN 61 FALCON (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4382).

4. IDEM ALSO LOCATED JEWELRY STORE 964 WEST FLAGLER STREET WITH A/I'S ROLEX WRIST WATCH FOR SALE. IDEM HAD WIFE A/I VISIT STORE AND PURCHASE ROLEX FOR \$200 CASH PLUS \$45 STILL OWED SALESMAN NAMED GUILLERMO TABRAUE. WIFE A/I ABLE IDENTIFY WATCH BY TWO MARKS BACK WATCH. HAPIR PROMISED IDEM WOULD HANDLE INVESTIGATION JEWELRY

SECRET

SEARCHED	INDEXED	SERIALIZED	FILED
APR 15 1968			
25-2861			
FBI - MIAMI			

SECRET

SIGRE AND SUGGESTED IDEM PUT SURVEILLANCE CUBAN COFFEE SHOP
MIAMI EL GOZO.

5. ANCLATTER/I SAID THAT IDEM HAS NO CURRENT INFO INDICATE
"ESPIONAGE" OR "REVOLUTIONARY MOTIVATION" BEHIND ROBBERY.

6. INSPECTOR (CAPTAIN) F. L. MAPIER ASSIGNED DETECTIVE BUREAU
MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL CAPT MAPIR PARA TWO
ABOVE. FRANK CAMPBELL PROBABLY IDENTICAL FRANK KAPPEL FORMER METRO
CHIEF INTEL WHO RESIGNED WORK WITH STATE RACING COMMISSION.

7. NO SPECIFIC WAVE TRACES WALDO BADO PEREZ ALTHO ONE
WALDO PEREZ REPORTED MAY 62 AS HAVING HELPED ORGANIZE PROPAGANDA
AND MILITARY PLANS LIBERATION CUBA IN CUBAN LIBERATION ARMY (UFG
992; 14 MAY 62). WAVE TRACES GUILLERMO TABRAUE INDICATE HE POSSIBLY
IDENTICAL GUILLERMO TABRAU NUECER (281-283992).

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CFB

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL COPIES	6
SECRET			
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			TIME 12:00 PM
INFO			1988-02-17
FROM SAN JOSE			
ACTION DCF/NB/SAC 3			
INFO MR. FILE, DDP			
SECRET 201400Z		201	84348
DIRECTIVE CITE SJOS 7483			
FORMAT TYPIC YOB SITE ANH/WORD			
MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 17 FEBRUARY ON PAA FLIGHT 301 FROM MIAMI.			
SECRET			
CFB			
SECRET			

JF
100

←

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL CYP 44	REF ID: <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		
24 SECRET		5	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED		
PERSON/UNIT IDENTIFIED					
FROM	JRWAVE	X73			
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SECRET 201927Z
DIR WAVE 8522
~~DECODED BY TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD~~
REF: WAVE 8521 (IN 85083)
IDEN: JOSE ANTONIO MOLE ROSALES

SECRET

201925 IN 85084

PF

← *LJH*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL COPIES 6	DATE REC'D BY MSG
SECRET			FEB 20 1968
FROM <i>JMWAVE</i>		TO <i>AMWORLD</i>	TIME 1000
ACTION <i>DC/WH/SAT-3</i>		ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> <i>100000</i>	UNIT <i>DDP</i>
INFO <i>MR. FILE, DDP</i>		<input type="checkbox"/> CLATTER <input type="checkbox"/> TAPE	TIME <i>0000 05</i>

~~SECRET~~
SECRET 281927Z
DIR OATE WAVE 8521

~~REF ID: A~~ TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REFS: A. WAVE 8261 (IN)
B. WAVE 8419 (IN ~~86077~~)
C. WAVE 8428 (IN ~~86077~~)

1. AMCLATTER/I, AS FOLLOW UP REFS, REPORTED 19 FEB 68 THAT MIAMI POLICE CAPTAIN NAPIR PHONED FIORINI 18 FEB AND ARRANGED FOR FIORINI AND AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) MEET WITH TWO POLICE SERGEANTS FORM POLICE HEADQUARTERS AT 1145 NW 11TH STREET MIAMI. MTG HELD FROM 1330 TO 1430 HOURS 18 FEB MAYFLOWER RESTAURANT NORTH MIAMI AVENUE AND 36TH STREET WITH SERGEANTS (FNU) DOWDA AND (FNU) MCCRACKEN.

~~SECRET~~
OF POLICE BURGLARY SQUAD. BOTH SERGEANTS SAID NAPIR INSTRUCTED THEM "KEEP CASE OFF REPORT". THEM TOLD SERGEANTS THAT AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HE AND AMWORLD BOTH CONCLUDE ROBBERY WAS "G-2 SPONSORED", POINTED UP FACT \$500 LEICA CAMERA AND TWO \$300 TAPE RECORDERS VISIBLELY ACCESSIBLE NOT TOUCHED. ALSO SUSPECT SOME DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED. SURMISE INTRUDERS WANTED GIVE OUTWARD APPEARANCE ROBBERY.

2. FIORINI SAID ADDITIONAL INFO ON SUSPECT VALDO BADO PEREZ INDICATE HE FORMER BRIGADE MEMBER. POLICE SERGEANTS AND THEM ADD

FBI-B1004-1001
Security
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL COPIES	15	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
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TO/TO	DELAHAN/SA-3	<input type="checkbox"/> TELETYPE	<input type="checkbox"/> TELETYPE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 0000 0000 0000 0000
SINFO	MR. FILE, 20 P. C/MIN			

SECRET 231620Z

DIR INTELLIVE PACY SJOS CITE CARA 00003

KARO TYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

MANUEL ARTIME AND RAFAEL QUINTERO ARRIVED CARA FROM PACS 20
FEB PAA 513. PLANS REMAIN CARA UN 24 OR 25 FEB WHEREUPON

WILL DEPART FOR COSTA RICA.

SECRET

CFN

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102

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL COPIES	7	REFUGEE/DETENTION PROF-BYED	
PERSONALITY IDENTIFIED				1	2
				3	4
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FILE 102-4468

SECRET 241300Z

DIR PACY CITE SJOS 7468

RTBAT SECRET YOBITE ANWORLD

~~REF ID: A1140000000000000000000000000000~~ MANUEL ANTUNEZ BUESA LEFT SAN JOSE 26 FEBRUARY FOR PACY ON LACSA

629.

SECRET

CFB

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8 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phase-out of ANTINE Autonomous Group

1. On the night of 5 March 1968, the case officer for Manuel ANTINE Buena met with him and outlined the policy decision reached by the SOS Committee on 4 March. ANTINE was told the decision was to terminate our operational relationship in as friendly and cooperative manner as possible, but not later than 1 May 1968. The case officer had been empowered to convey this information and to conduct an exploratory discussion of the problems and possible solutions connected with a phase-out program. The two main points the United States Government was concerned with were (a) fair but reasonable demobilization support to the personnel of the autonomous group, and (b) ANTINE's assistance in insuring that the balance of power in Central America was not upset, particularly by preventing the weapons of his group from falling into the hands of political extremists or free-booters.

2. ANTINE had been on notice for several months that a phase-out might be ordered at any time, and had an inkling that the decision had been made because his regular monthly subsidy had not been received on schedule. He had obviously given the matter considerable thought and made up his mind as to his course of action when he arrived at the meeting. He began the discussion by summarizing the things he might have done had he been so inclined. Among the possibilities mentioned, he included loading up his troops and weapons and taking over Haiti as a base against Cuba, intervening in Costa Rica to bring down the liberal PLN administration in favor of a rightist junta of dissidents, or throwing in completely with General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua the weapons, personnel and equipment of the autonomous group. He has the capability of fielding an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery (4.2 mortars), supported by air and maritime elements, with a cadre of trained and combat-experienced Cubans, provided he teams up with an organization

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-2-

who can furnish about 1,000 men to flesh out the unit. Case officer acknowledged that we recognized his potential for harmful action, had considered it thoroughly, and hoped he would not do anything of the kind. ARTIME said he had also considered all the possibilities and concluded there was no point in his being childish and trying to "bite us about the ankles."

3. ARTIME accepts the decision and will cooperate in a phase-out program. He does not understand the rationale, and, of course, does not agree with the decision, but he acknowledges our prerogative to make it. If we really wish still to be friends, he is willing, just as he told Mr. Fitzgerald originally. He asks only that we help him make it possible to remain friendly and makes two requests from us: (a) help take care of his men and their families until they can rehabilitate and resettle themselves, and (b) do everything possible to get his parents out of Cuba.

4. The major elements to be considered in a phase-out were discussed with the following results:

a. Personnel. The first priority is support payments to dependents which were due 1 March in the total amount of \$100,000. This must be done soonest if ARTIME is to maintain control of the situation. The next most immediate problem is re-entry permission for fifteen of his men who have been stranded in Nicaragua trying to return to the United States since December. These men were exfiltrated "black" from the United States with our assistance and require special authority for re-entry from Department of State and Department of Justice, which we thought was arranged in early January.

The demobilization plan proposed by ARTIME seemed as realistic and effective as could be hoped for. He proposes to return the bulk of his men, approximately 200, to the United States during March and give them one month's pay on 1 April as a mustering out payment to support them and their families while they seek other employment. The balance of his men, less than 100, will be held in Central America for one month longer as a security and administrative force muster the group's equipment at Monkey Point from which disposition can be made during the month

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-3-

of April. The security force will be returned during April and will be paid a mustering out payment on 1 May. This will terminate the project.

The cover story which ARTIME intends to use for demobilization is to inform his men that their mother ship is out of commission and will require about six weeks for repairs. This is true enough so that it will be believed. He will then grant leave to all men with dependents to get their personal affairs in order before operations commence again. He will publicize the fact that it is less expensive and better for morale to send them on leave than to have men sitting around the camps with no operations to run. When all the first contingent are back home, individual notice will be given each to start looking for other work as operations have been postponed. They will be told that the salary payment of 1 April will be the last one and should be considered as a mustering out bonus. ARTIME feels this method will soften the impact and lower the noise level as the men will be home with their families and scattered throughout the community instead of being in an organized group in Central America when they realize they are being demobilized.

b. Funds. ARTIME had done his homework and brought with him facts and figures upon which phase-out costs could be estimated. These cost estimates are outlined below:

1 March - \$100,000.	Dependents support and salaries
25,000	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 200 men
50,000	Accrued debts due 1 March, mainly food and other expenses for camps in Central America
\$175,000	(In lieu of regular monthly subsidy of \$225,000)

1 April - \$100,000	Mustering out payment for 200 men and salaries for security and administrative details
12,500	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 100 men
12,500	Estimated food and other camp expenses
\$125,000	

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-4-

1 May - \$ 50,000 Mustered out payments for approx. 100 men and final contractual obligations of project

\$ 50,000

c. Weapons. ARTIME agreed that it would be in nobody's interest for his weapons to fall into the wrong hands. He was asked for ideas on disposition of the arms and came up with the following suggestion which appears to be an excellent one. The mothership, MV SANTA MARIA, is in need of repairs and must go into a shipyard. Tentative arrangements have been made to put her in the yards at Galveston, Texas, some time in March or April. ARTIME can order his security detail to store the arms aboard the ship for "security" reasons before she leaves for the yard. They will simply remain on board when the ship leaves and we can take control of the ship and the weapons from that point on.

d. Maritime.

(1) MV SANTA MARIA. See above. The ship would be sailed from Monkey Point with a contract crew supplied by Chester, Blackburn, & Roder, Inc. of New York, who are agents for the ship's owner, Liberian Corporation, a CIA proprietary company. One of ARTIME's senior officers would accompany the ship as his representative, with orders to turn over control of it and the arms upon its arrival at Galveston. CIA officers, possibly documented as Customs officials, would accept custody and Office of Logistics could recover the weapons and any other equipment which might be shipped by this method. The ship would then be disposed of according to Headquarters wishes at any time after 17 April when the charter arrangement with General SANCZA expires and the ship legally reverts to control of the owner.

(2) Swifts, V-20's, Boston Whalers, rubber boats and other operational craft are all owned, technically, by ARTIME's group. He has had title to the Swifts legally transferred from a Costa Rican politician to one of his own senior officers. He wants to retain these craft for the time being, hoping against hope that lightning will strike and he may, after all, be able to use them in the next

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-5-

two months. Case officer recommends we go along with him on this, at least for the time being, as it could be sticky legally and might antagonize him at the time when we most need his cooperation. In the end, he should be reasonable about disposition of these craft if we shoot square with him in the meantime.

(3) Support craft, LCMs, Barges, etc. Disposition arrangements to be worked out together on these craft.

e. Aircraft.

(1) DC-3. ARTIME is willing to release the aircraft back to its "owners," TABA, a CIA proprietary company in Panama. However, one month's charter payment of \$1,250 was due 1 March, and another will be due by the time the aircraft can be returned. ARTIME was reluctant to let the plane go back without payment, but also reluctant to squeeze the \$2,500 out of his budget. Case officer voiced his opinion that the owner would probably be glad to get the plane back and would not likely think it worth going to court. However, in view of the fact that it would be a "closed-circuit" transaction and would actually cost the Government nothing, it is recommended that a special authorization of \$2,500 be channeled to ARTIME for payment in order to maintain ARTIME's reputation for fiscal probity. He will surely appreciate this gesture.

(2) L-30 Beaver and Cessna-180. These aircraft technically belong to ARTIME's group and recovery would be a sticky matter, legally. ARTIME hopes to hold control of these aircraft for the time being, and it is recommended that we go along with him, saving disposition arrangements until later.

S. ARTIME again emphasized at the close of the meeting that he must have soonest the March payments for families as an absolute minimum, before he could face his people and maintain control of them in order to insure an orderly phase-out program.

cc: C/WH
DCWHD/C
C/WI/C/CA

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
19 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Chief, WH remarks on Termination of AMWORLD

1. At a meeting with DCWHD/C and Mr. Jenkins on 18 March, Chief, WH expressed general satisfaction with the status of termination of AMWORLD and the plans therefor. He stated specifically that he was pleased with the cooperation of AMBIDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 and would make it a point to inform higher levels in the Agency and the U. S. Government and put a good word for them on the record. He also directed that they be told:
 - a. He personally appreciates their cooperation and the good sense, goodwill and maturity they displayed in accepting and executing the U. S. Government decision to terminate their operations.
 - b. He wants to meet with them personally, at the earliest mutually convenient time, in order to discuss the situation with them.
 - c. After termination of the paramilitary project is completed, he has some other ideas for ventures of mutual interest which he wishes to pursue with them.
2. The gist of the above points had been passed to AMBIDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 previously by Mr. Jenkins, and on the night of 18 March he confirmed by telephone to AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH had expressed the above sentiments.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDY-1 201
AMJAVA_4 201
Policy

SECRET



7-1

DISPATCH~~DESENSITIZED~~~~SECRET~~

TO:	Chief, WSD
FROM:	
SUBJECT:	Chief of Station, Caracas

RECEIVED BY	RECORDED
DATE	TIME
INITIALS	

PRIORITY

PRINCIPAL AMERICAN - Future of AMBIDET 1/AVIAYA 4

Other American Representations

Action Required: For your information

Reference : NM 96189

1. Ref cable raises a number of fundamental issues of concern to Caracas Station. In brief, we do not welcome an activation of the movement's center in Caracas, an event which would greatly complicate our operational situation. We have reasons for believing that the host government likewise would probably be embarrassed if AMBIDET 1 chose Venezuela as a base for whatever program he is planning to undertake. Repeated failures of his attempts at being received by President LEONI are significant in this context.

2. Since we must assume that AMBIDET 1 has alluded to his close ties with SECKHOFF (and more specifically with SECKHOFF), the Venezuelan security services may well jump to the conclusion that AMBIDET is in fact a SECKHOFF operation and sooner or later we would be forced to disavow AMBIDET 1, a circumstance of which he would be bound to learn with consequent embitterment. All these predictable developments, Caracas is most anxious to forestall. Needless to say, both SECKHOFF and GUTIERREZ are unhappy about this situation of conflict since it involves a man whom both admire and who (in their opinion) has served GUTIERREZ faithfully, at times to the detriment of his abiding cause to liberate PARAGUAY.

3. For the above reasons, we would welcome indeed if formal and institutional ties between AMBIDET 1 and AVIAYA 4 could be put in abeyance, at least to the extent that AMBIDET 1 be prevailed upon to pass up Venezuela as a base of operations. This discriminatory approach reflects our awareness that

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WSD

BT/LJ72	201-56743
BT/MIS	
BT/VM	

201-567437

OPTIONAL FORM GPO: 1960 O-1000	RECEIVED DISPATCH POINT OF ORIGIN	DATE
	SECRET	2 April 1969
	NYCA-12230	REGISTRATION NUMBER
		901 - AMBIDET/1
		901 - AVIAYA 4

AMBIDY 1 to be operational in Venezuela. We have had a long and difficult negotiation with AMBIDY 1 and his associates to establish the necessary standards of operational safety and to get a guarantee, reluctantly, with regard to surveillance. We know that AMJAYA 4 has been a penetrating influence w/ Somoza's AMBIDY 1 & get himself and his associates into trouble. The Station could not help but interfere with diplomatic damage to our standing with the Italian services. We can further predict that the Venezuelan trade union movement (which is belligerently anti-American) may view an active AMBIDY 1 sponsored program with disfavor and would accordingly bring strong pressure to bear on the Government to curtail or suppress the movement.

4. We realize that the Station's position, as set forth above, saddles Headquarters with an exceedingly delicate task. While as a last resort we could of course drop discreet hints to our Venezuelan liaison contacts suggesting the inadvisability of affording AMBIDY 1 and his associates sanctuary in Venezuela, we would only entertain that disastrous prospect as a last resort and with the full approval of Headquarters.

5. Another approach, only slightly less unsatisfactory, would be to restrict AMBIDY 1's radius of activity to an extent tantamount to denying him all freedom of political action while in Venezuela. But all in all, it would probably be best for EMBARK if AMBIDY 1 could be dissuaded from going through with his proposed move in a manner which does not hurt his pride and which does not alienate him from EMBARK. Headquarters may be able to suggest palatable alternatives to Venezuela.

6. As regards AMJAYA 4, we share some of Headquarters misgivings about surfacing him to Liaison. What prompted us to suggest this approach was a desire to overcome the difficulties which would be facing AMJAYA 4 in any case should he decide to make his home here. We are inclined to doubt that he could obtain permission to enter Venezuela in immigrant status without powerful intercession. He would be used by the Station on projects which we (and presumably the host government) view as compatible with Venezuela's national security interests.

7. Some of the doubts raised by Headquarters are altogether valid and were considered before we made our proposal. We are least concerned, however, about the issues of dual loyalty and dual control etc, because it happens to be one of our objectives in building a more durable relationship with liaison, esp DIGEPOL, to entice them into joint ventures where dual control does exist. We find AMJAYA 4 temperamentally suited (esp since his basic loyalty belongs to EMBARK) to serve as an operational link between Station and liaison, without acting to the detriment of either. Although the tenor of our relationship with DIGEPOL has undergone a notable improvement, there are still deep-rooted reservations and suspicions which a man of AMJAYA 4's personality traits might help to dispel.

8. With regards to the substance of our operations against PRINCEPS, especially those which are CB-oriented, there is a natural congruity of interests between CBTOKE and Venezuela which renders joint pursuits in fact most desirable. More likely than not, DIGEPOL will do Station the favor of facilitating the admission of AMJAYA 4 and of providing him with viable cover, maybe including official (DIGEPOL) documentation, and let it go at that. We rather doubt that unless prodded by Station DIGEPOL would avail itself of AMJAYA 4's services, let alone use him to penetrate Station's operational program. This leaves in the balance the pros and cons of surfacing a valuable EMBARK asset to liaison.

9. The general concepts guiding Caracas Station in desiring to secure the services of AMJAYA 4 were spelled out in GENE-MARSHAL.

10. In presenting Station's proposal to AMJAYA 4, the following points could be made:

- A. We do not propose that he sever his longstanding personal and political links with AMBIDY 1.
- B. We do not expect that he disconnect his links with the movement, let alone cease supporting its program.

- CONFIDENTIAL
- REF ID: A65124
- D. We would expect AMATA to compartmentalize himself to the extent that he treats any knowledge acquired in his clandestine role as operational subject to the station as privileged in the sense of not imparting it to anyone whom he need to know. Specifically, this information would have to be withheld from AMBERT I and other members of the movement.
- E. AMATA will have to make a clear choice between serving "the cause of FREEDOM" liberation by actively associating himself with AMBERT (a desired understanding if our reading of the situation is correct), or by countering FREEDOM's progress to support Venezuela under Station control.

f. *Matthew H. Gandy*
Matthew H. Gandy

		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		ROUTING SHEET	
		SECRET		REF ID: A650512	
FROM	PANAMA CITY		TO		REASON FOR TERMINATION
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~AMERICAN EYES~~

~~AMERICAN WORLD~~

~~SECRET~~ 222224Z

222224Z 15 APR 63

DIR INFO CARA BOGO SJOS MABA GUAT CITE PACY 6363

RXED TYPIC AMWORLD

AMBIDIO-Y-1 TOLD ZABOEN HE HAD MEETING PRES LEGONI IN MARCH, PRES VALENCIA 7 APRIL, AND PLANS SEE PRES ROBLES 22 OR 23 APRIL. PLANS RETURN VIA COSTA RICA FOR TALKS PRES ORLICH AND FONMIN ODOBER AND NICARAGUA TO SEE PRES SCHICK AND GEN SOMOZA. THEN TO GUATEMALA FOR MEETING PRES PERALTA AND GIVE HIM COMPLETE BRIEFING ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP PLOTTING, WHICH INCLUDES SOME FORMER HRR PEOPLE FOR WHOM A-1 WISHES DISCLAIM ANY RESPONSIBILITY. DURING WEEK 3 MAY HE HOPES MEET DAINOLD TO REPORT ON TERMINATION AMWORLD AND DISCUSS ANY OTHER

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AMERICAN EYES
AMERICAN WORLD
AMERICAN WORLD

~~SECRET~~

TOPICS DAINOLD WISHES.

~~SECRET~~

IN SD 512
PAGE 2

2. A-1 FUTURE PLANS APPEAR INVOLVE SELLING IDEA OF PROGRAM TO CASTRO/CUBAN THREATENED COUNTRIES WHICH INCLUDE (1) INTERDICTION CUBAN INFIL OPS, (2) PENETRATE AND ELIMINATE INTERNAL CASEROITE OPS, (3) POSITIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM BASED ON "COMANDES RURALES" WHICH WAS BASIS FOR STRENGTH RURAL CUBA AND CONCEPT A-1 DEVELOPED WHICH CASTRO CONTINUED AFTER A-1 DEFECITION. HE BELIEVES SMALL TEAMS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED CUBANS WORKING DIRECTLY WITH LOCAL GOVT COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO LATIN AMERICA COUNTER INSURGENCY PROGRAMS. FEELS WOULD BE IN OXYGEN INTEREST TO ASSESS BUT WILL LEAVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO LOCAL GOVT.

4. INDICATIONS ARE A-1 MAY ASK DAINOLD IF IN RETURN FOR OPS INTEL AND POL ACTION ON HIS PART, KUBARK CAN CONTINUE ASSIST HIM IN BROADCASTS TO CUBA, MRR MAGAZINE, DELEGATES IN CARIBBEAN AREA, AND CONTINUED CONTACT WITH THE ANLASH GROUP INSIDE CUBA (THEY ARE STILL IN COMMUNICATION). HE INSISTS HIS BASIC ORGANIZATION CONTINUES AND WILL SURVIVE, WITH SOME MEMBERS WORKING IN FLORIDA, NICARAGUA, AND OTHER PLACES, PLUS EXPANSION LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTERESTS BY PEOPLE SUCH AS

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Chavez

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1 APR 17
1968

LAZO MESA, PICADO ARIAS, MAROLIN HERNANDEZ, ETC. LAZADA AMUAVA-E BOTH SAY THEY INTEND MOVE FROM FLORIDA AND ESTABLISH RESIDENCE CENTRAL AMERICA OR VENEZUELA TO ESCAPE FATE OTHER EXILE LEADERS WHO STYMIED IN MIAMI AND ABLE ONLY TO TALK, NOT TO CONTINUE USEFUL WORK.

5. A-1 APOLOGIZED FOR ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FRANK HE PLAYED COLOMBIA. SAID HE MET AND ACCOMPANIED BOTH BY CUBAN WELL KNOWN KUBARK AGENT AND A-1 CONFESSED SOME EXAGGERATION AND SHOW JOBS FOR HIS BENEFIT. HOPES REPORTS WILL BE CONSIDERED THIS CONTEXT AND TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF SALT. SAID HE ACTUALLY HAS NO COMMITMENT FROM COLOMBIA, MET WITH PRES VALENCIA FOR TWO HOURS, ONE HOUR TALKING POETRY, ONE HOUR TALKING OPS. NO DECISION BUT VALENCIA WISHES TALK AGAIN AFTER TIME TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES. ABOUT THE SAME RESULTS FROM VENEZUELA ALTHOUGH LEONI APPEARED MORE INDECISIVE BECAUSE NOT SURE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SUPPORT.

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CABLE

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CFB

27 April 1968

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27 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Arturo Bustos

1. Present Activities:


During the past six weeks Manuel Arturo has devoted his time to the task of disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Arturo has returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by this Agency. This includes the mothership, nearly all of the heavy weapons such as mortars, machine guns and artillery pieces, as well as other miscellaneous items such as communications vans and earth-moving equipment. The small arms not recovered from Arturo are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans:

During the same period Arturo has attempted to gain support for a plan by which he, and a small nucleus of his paramilitary forces, would conduct counterinsurgency-type operations against Castro-supported rebel bands operating in several Latin American countries. Arturo has outlined these proposals to Presidents Leon Valencia of Colombia and Marcos Robles of Panama, and endeavored to obtain an interview with Raul Leoni of Venezuela, but has been able to conduct conversations on this proposal only on the Venezuelan Cabinet level.

To implement such a scheme Arturo envisions using a small group of highly-trained individuals plus

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-3-

two fast motor launches originally provided to him by this Agency. Artimo would use this force to patrol the coasts of one or the other of the aforementioned countries to prevent the smuggling of arms and/or general contraband. In exchange for this service, Artimo would receive the permission of these governments to keep any arms which he might capture in the course of these patrols. In addition, he would be allowed to maintain bases of operation from which to launch attacks against Cuba. So far none of these governments has made any commitment to Artimo. He claims, however, that both Presidents Valencia and Robles have expressed interest in his proposals.

Artimo has requested an interview with this Agency, presumably to discuss his future, during which it is expected that he will bring up his scheme as outlined above.

John L. Hart
DCMHD/C

MEP/WK/C/CA/EA/ADMhlfing:bh (27 Apr 65)

Distribution:

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1 - WK/C/CA/EA

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25 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT: Present Activities and Possible Future
Plans of Manuel Artime Díaz

I. Present Activities

For the past six weeks Artime has devoted his time to disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. He has:


- a. returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by us,
- b. returned the mothership,
- c. returned nearly all the heavy weapons including mortars, machine guns, and artillery pieces.

The small arms not recovered are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

II. Future Plans

Artime has attempted to peddle a plan to the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Panamanian governments utilizing the nucleus of his paramilitary force. Essentially this program is the same for all three countries and involves a

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gold pro quo arrangement whereby:

a. Arturo would use his forces to patrol
the coast of those countries and prevent
smuggling of arms and/or general contraband;

b. Arturo would receive, in exchange for
this service, permission from those governments
to keep any arms which he might capture and be
allowed to maintain bases from which to launch
operations against Cuba.

Some of the specifics follow:

Colombia

Arturo wants petroleum, food, and clothing
from the government for a group to be stationed
there and a beachhead to establish a camp.

If there is a landing in Cuba, Arturo wants
immediate recognition by the Colombian Government
as head of a government in exile.

Arturo would guarantee to wipe out smuggling
and would patrol from Riohacha to the Panama border;
he would also guarantee to police the guerrilla
problem by using two MIG groups. One group to
conduct operations against Cuba and the other to
act as instructors and field advisors to the
Colombian army.

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-3-

Artine would seek private financing from wealthy Cuban exiles and Latin American sympathizers.

Panama

Artine would start a "comandos rurales" operation, similar to that which was the base of MNR strength in rural Cuba.

Artine would launch a civic action program and also would interdict Cuban infiltration operations.

The above plan would be carried out mainly in Chiriqui Province.

Miscellaneous

We have no information on what Artine proposed in Venezuela but assume it is much the same as for Colombia and Panama. We also believe Artine may ask CIA to continue to assist him in radio broadcasting to Cuba, financing the MNR magazine, and helping him maintain continued contact with the Cuban group. This would be in return for his counter insurgency program outlined above.

JOHN L. MARY
INWED/C

~~SECRET~~

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701

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT : Proposed Meeting Between
Chief, WH and AMBIDET-1

1. AMBIDET-1 went to Nicaragua on 11 May 1965 to remove his remaining men and equipment from that country and to complete secure storage arrangements for the small arms which he has retained. He has a meeting scheduled with General Peralta in Guatemala later this week and expects to be back in Miami by 17 May.

2. He hopes to meet with Chief, WH at any convenient time thereafter to report on the disbanding of ANWORD and to discuss any other matters which may be of mutual interest. AMBIDET-1 has indicated that he is willing to continue cooperating with the Agency by furnishing information and undertaking political action tasks as required. He hoped that the Agency, in turn, will be able to assist him in financing a limited publicity program consisting mainly of radio broadcasts and the KHR magazine. This would help to keep his movement alive and maintain him as a recognized exile leader who would thus be of continued value to the Agency in activities of mutual interest.

3. We suggest that his witting deputy, AMJAVA-4, might be invited to visit Washington at the same time to participate in other discussions concerning possible activities in the future. It would be appreciated if Chief, WH were able to set a convenient date for a meeting in order that we may notify AMBIDET-1 in advance.

John L. Hart
SCORD/C

NSC/WH/C/CA/EA/CRJenkins:bb (12 May 65)

Distribution:

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1 - WH/C/CA/EA

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17 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with AMJAVA-4

1. In addition to the matter of meeting the ANWORD Swifts on their arrival in New Orleans, AMJAVA-4 indicated he was even more interested in talking with me about AMBIDET-1's present frame of mind and plans for the future, about some of which he is a little concerned. AMJAVA-4 intends to see AMBIDET-1 for a few days the first part of this week and will try to get a complete and current reading from AMBIDET-1 during this time. AMJAVA-4 wants to discuss this in detail with me prior to the meeting of AMBIDET-1 with Chief, WH, presently planned for the week of 24 May.

2. AMJAVA-4 also wishes to discuss the two job offers he has received from the Agency, i.e., a job with Caracas Station, or to go into university level training in a holding capacity for future commitment to a post-Castro Cuban regime. He has some topics for discussion concerning last-minute questions in the close-out of ANWORD and disposition of some of the key personnel of the organization.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Policy
AMJAVA-4 201
AMBIDET-1 201

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Meeting with AMJAVI-4 in New Orleans, 21-22 May 1965


Subject: AMRIIDOT-1 Activities

1. AMJAVI-4 said he had talked only briefly with AMRIIDOT-1 on his return from Guatemala and Nicaragua (21 May, just before A-4 left to meet me in New Orleans). A-1 said he had talked with General Peralta in Guatemala and had determined any connection with Roberto Alejos' coup plotting or the former MNR Cubans who had been involved with it. He had also outlined his proposal for Peralta to consider whereby A-1 and the MNR would undertake, at the invitation of the local government, to assist in countering Castro/Communist infiltration and subversion, and to help develop rural civic action programs as a positive counter-insurgency program. A-1 claimed that Peralta seemed very seriously interested in the proposals and appeared quite appreciative that A-1 had been able to visit him. A-1 expects that Peralta will wish to talk to him further in regard to his counter-insurgency proposals.

2. A-1 also talked again with President Schick in Nicaragua about the above proposal. Schick had thought over their previous discussion and approves a pilot program to be run on the east coast, with the rural civic action program near Bluefields. This will allow A-1 to keep a few of his men in the country to work on the program while maintaining security of the weapons he has stored there. A-1 also talked with Luis Somoza, at the latter's invitation, but indicated there was nothing new or interesting from this source.

3. A-4 is not sure himself how much A-1 has been able to accomplish in his visits in Central and South America, and how much of his reporting is wishful thinking. He is not ready, however, to call A-1 short and has watched him "molling ice-homes to Mahimes" successfully over too long a period of time.

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-2-

4. A-1 decided to come to New Orleans on the night of 24 May in order to meet the two Swift boats at Morgan City on 25 May (their latest ETA). Having done all the preliminary leg work and made all the arrangements, A-4 decided both of them would not be necessary and he planned to return to Miami the night of the 24th. I promised to contact both of them by phone on Tuesday night (26 May) to make sure the Swifts get in with no problems, and to inform A-1 a firm time for his meeting with C/WH (scheduled for 1500, 27 May).

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Guatemala
Nicaragua

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67P

2 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Interview between Mr. George Cabot Lodge and Manuel Arturo Buesa

1. Pursuant to your conversations with Manuel Arturo on 27 May 1965, the latter has expressed a desire to meet with Mr. George Cabot Lodge in order to further discuss practical means of implementing a civic action program in Nicaragua.

2. Arturo's current plans and schedule are as follows: 2-4 June in Miami, Florida; 4-12 June in Nicaragua; 13-14 June in Panama; 14- possible trips to Colombia and Guatemala.

3. Arturo emphasized, however, that he could review this schedule if need be in order to meet with Mr. Lodge in Cambridge, Mass. or any other location at Mr. Lodge's convenience.

(Signed) John L. Hart


John L. Hart
SCWHD/C

BSP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (2 June 65)

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C.A.Y

3 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WFO/B

ATTENTION : Mr. J. De Stefano

SUBJECT : Background Sketch on Dr. Manuel Artimo Buena

1. Manuel Artimo Buena, a non-practicing medical doctor, began his political activities in Cuba during the year 1959 when he participated in the formation of a civic action type program known as the "Comandos Rurales." The Comandos Rurales actively participated with the Castro regime during its initial agrarian reform, but eventually broke with it due to Castro's shift to Marxism-Leninism. It was at this point that Artimo formed the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution), a political organization which he heads up to date. The degree of Artimo's activities in the civic action program was reflected by the fact that Artimo, prior to his break with Castro, had been appointed a deputy in the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (INRA) for Oriente Province. Artimo's first contact with the Agency took place just prior to his open break with Castro and he was exfiltrated from the island by the Agency. Artimo dedicated himself to the continued development of the MRR until called upon by the Agency to be the political representative for the Cuban Brigade 2506 which landed at the Bay of Pigs. Artimo was captured and sentenced to be executed. This was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 Artimo was among those repatriated to this country under the prisoner exchange.

2. In mid-1963 the Agency again asked Artimo to head an autonomous paramilitary organization made up and trained exclusively by Cubans and funded by the Agency. Subject met

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SRR : C. E. JENKINS:16		MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES 26	ON <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN TO SENDER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FILE <input type="checkbox"/> INDEX
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FROM: DIRECTOR

CWT: WH/c-3 INFO: FILE NO COPY, WH 1, C/003, C/003, 11,
SOD 6, 1TO: GUAT INFO: WAVE, PACT, LAST CWT: 16781
REF: GUAT 4922 (IN 80580)

TYPIC AMBIDOT ONE

1. AT MEETING WITH DAINOLD ON 27 MAY, AMBIDOT ONE REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS WITH PERALTA AND PONCIANO. SAID PERALTA HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. AMBIDOT ONE SAID HE TOLD PERALTA FORMER MNR MEMBERS IN RECENT ROBERTO ALAJOS COUP ATTEMPT HAD NO CONNECTION AND NO SUPPORT FROM AMBIDOT ONE. MAIN THRUST OF TALK WITH PERALTA WAS ON COUNTER SUBVERSION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. AMBIDOT ONE SAID PERALTA ASKED AND GOT HIS FRANK OPINIONS ON EACH SUBJECT. SAID HE TOLD PERALTA THAT YON SOSA WAS MAIN THREAT. PERALTA SAID HE UNDER CONTROL, BUT AMBIDOT ONE TOLD HIM SO LONG AS YON SOSA SURVIVES AND HAS FOLLOWING WITH EXTERNAL CONTACT AND SUPPORT HE IS NOT UNDER CONTROL. AMBIDOT ONE SAID PERALTA MUCH INTERESTED HIS IDEAS AND ASKED HIM COME BACK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS SOON.

2. AMBIDOT ONE ALSO TALKED WITH PONCIANO BRIEFLY. SAID PONCIANO CLAIMED ~~HAD~~ HAVE ORGANIZED SUPPORT AND READY MOVE AGAINST PERALTA. IN AMBIDOT ONE OPINION, PONCIANO IS SIMPLY ANOTHER INVETERATE PLOTTER.

(CONTINUED)

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IP

Under Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-21947

Iden A - **Rolando MERKLO Alfonso, A 12 829 707** (AMOT subsource)

Iden B - **Nilo MESSER Pujol** (201-294655)

Iden C - **Carlos MARTINEZ Baraque** (AMOT subsource)



3 COPY

UFGA-21947

201-267437

SECRET

ME/C 65-226
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA : Chief, ME/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative
in **Bern** to contact the bank in **Zurich** to cable transfer
the amount of \$14,000 to the **First National City Bank,**
New York, for credit to the account of **Gregory Cardinal**
or Charles Rooney.

Carl E. Jenkins
ME/C/CA/EA


cc: ME/DAF

MEB/ME/C/CA/EA/ABRohlfing:bh (8 June 65)

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SECRET

W/C 65-302
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA : Chief, W/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative
in Frankfurt to contact the bank in Zurich to cable
transfer the amount of \$12,000 to the First National
City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory
Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
W/C/CA/EA

CC: W/BDF

EDP/WC/CA/EA/CEJenkins:ba (19 Jul 65)

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DIG INFO MANA CITE WAVE 4157

22.Ju.E5#16327

Typical Amworld Amot

1. DURING WEEK 4 - 18 JULY 65 ROGELIO JHONES AND LUIS H. VIDANA
(PLS PROTECT) TOLD AMOT-128 FOLLOWING:

2. AMBIDDY-1 HAS TRANSPORTED STEEL BARGE LOADED WITH EQUIPMENT TO PORT EVERGLADES, FLORIDA. CARGO BELONGED DISMANTLED BASE NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY-1, USING KING (FNU) AS MEDIATOR, OFFERED TEOFILIO BABUN OF ANTILLEAN MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION BARGE FOR \$25,000, WHICH 50 BY 27 FEET AND IN VERY GOOD CONDITION. BABUN DID NOT AGREE ON PRICE FOR BARGE BUT MADE OFFER FOR PURCHASE BOTH BARGE AND OTHER EQUIPMENT OF INTEREST HIM.

3. KING OFFERING SELL CONSIDERABLE RADIO EQUIPMENT, SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS, RAFTS AND BOATS, WINCHES, ELECTRIC GENERATORS, ALL OF WHICH KEPT IN TWO WAREHOUSES IN WAVE AREA.

4. ACCORDING PEDRO ACEVO, FORMER HEAD AMYUIN'S BASE NICARAGUA, AMBIDDY-1 PLANNING SELL ALL EQUIPMENT THAT WAS USED IN NICARAGUA FOR HIS OWN PROFIT. WIFE OF AMBIDDY-1, IN TALKING WITH CLOSE FRIEND SAID HER HUSBAND THINKS HE WILL BE ABLE SELL ALL EQUIPMENT FOR \$200,000, WHICH SUM ADDED TO THEIR SAVINGS OF \$300,000 WILL MAKE

CONTINUOUS

SECRET

N 16327 PAGE 2

TEN HOLDERS OF \$520,000. SHE SAID THIS MONEY WILL BE AVAILABLE
TO COPE WITH FUTURE EMERGENCIES.

5. ACEVO SAID HE KNOWS SOME OF AMBIDDY-1'S TRICKY WAYS
HANDLING ANYTHING FUNDS. AMONG THEM WAS ONE IN WHICH ACEVO APPEARED
ON PAYROLL AS HAVING BEEN PAID \$32 FOR SPECIAL EXPENSES. ACEVO
CLAIMED HE NEVER RECEIVED ANYTHING MORE THAN HIS \$400 MONTHLY ALARY.
OTHER OF ACEVO'S FRIENDS ALSO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING RECEIVED
\$32 DAILY, BUT THIS ALSO UNTRUE.

6. ACCORDING AMOT-128, VIDANA SAID THAT AMBIDDY-1 BLAMES KUBARK
FOR HAVING BROKEN INTO HIS HOME RECENTLY. VIDANA, HOWEVER, SAID HE
KNOWS IT WAS "COJO MORIN" WHO ROBBED AMBIDDY-1.

SECRET

CFN 4157 4 18 JULY 65 ROGEVIO JHONES LUIS W. VIDANA AMOT-128

AMBIDDY-1 PORT EVERGLADES FLORIDA NICARAGUA KING (FNU) TEOFALO
BABUN ANTILLEAN \$25,000 SP BY 27 FEET NOT AGREE PEDRO ACEVO \$200,000
\$300,000 \$300,000 \$30 \$400 \$300 AMOT-128 VIDANA "COJO MORIN"
SECRET

RT

SECRET

W/C 65-332
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA: Chief, W/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT: Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative.
In **Bern** to contact the bank in **Zurich** to cable transfer
the amount of \$12,000 to the **First National City Bank,**
New York, for credit to the account of **Gregory Cardinal**
or **Charles Laney.**

Carl E. Jenkins
W/C/CA/EA


cc: G/WB/DAF

DOD/WC/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bb (6 Aug 65)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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www.shts

261-63

TO: K-12 curriculum, new teacher, and student

— 1 —

100

ANSWER (Number each comment to show from whom it came. Draw a line across where you have commented.)

201-26707

Subject: Manual ARTDE

6 to 1: Herewith document classified to 201-267437 subject of which is **Nikolay BARABELIYA** (Barabelya).
Attache at Soviet Embassy in Paris.
Please review for reclassification
so subject's 201-267437.

RENTES

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201-267437

FORM 61G VOL. 1994

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

COUNTRY CUBA/URUGUAY

TDCS -314/00124-64

DATE OF 2 JULY 1964
INFO.

DESTR. 2 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

SERIOUS SITUATION OF PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME
BUESAPLACE &
DATE ACQ. SPAIN, MADRID (2 JULY 1964)

REF

IN -20035

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL **AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE.**

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ACCORDING TO A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HAVANA, CUBA, ON 2 JULY 1964, THE PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, LEADER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER, AND IF THE FATHER IS ARRESTED, HE WILL PROBABLY BE SHOT. **(SPANISH SERVICE)**

COMMENT: THE INFORMANT SAID THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY TO ORDER ITS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN HAVANA TO GRANT THEM ASYLUM.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of which to any person by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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REPORT 1
Revised from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE/MSN DIA ARMY/ACB NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NMIC XNS USAIA OCI ONS OCR OMN CO FBI INS
TREASURY

6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)
SUBJECT : AMBIDOT--Proposed Meeting between
Chief, WH and AMBIDOT-1 in August 64

1. AMBIDOT-1 has expressed a desire to meet with Chief, Western Hemisphere Division after the rains in August 64.

2. We have replied via ANJAVA-4 that Chief, WH will be glad to meet with AMBIDOT-1 at that time.

3. We intend to hold on to the ~~Maryland~~ safehouse until after the meeting has taken place. Preferably AMBIDOT-1 should be routed via San, Puerto Rico, to ~~Baltimore Friendship Airport~~ whence he would be picked up at a nearby motel and taken to the safehouse.


Henry D. Heckscher
W/SA/SD/MM

HDM/gt (6 July 64)

Distribution:
Orig - C/WHD

File:

SECRET



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31 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMJAVA-4
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 31 July 1964, 1300 hours

1. AMJAVA-4 complained that the regular budget funds for August had not arrived at their bank and inquired as to the reason for the delay. Martin stated he would check into the matter and Carl would have the explanation at their meeting tonight. In the meantime, A-4 will ask ANWORLD-2 for a loan. A-4 also asked for an itemized account of the deposits still remaining in Bank Account II.

2. A-4 claimed he spoke to Mr. Dunn recently concerning the exit of ANWORLD personnel from Miami. According to A-4 it is presently impossible for their people to leave.


3. A-4 asked that we obtain **radio cryptographic pads** since their supply is running short.

4. A-4 stated that ADELAIDA is being repaired at their base and, in his opinion, the ship will be able to carry out operations in the early part of August. A-4 suggested that Mr. Hitchcock go to the base and talk to Francisco MIN Morales who is handling the repairs on the ADELAIDA. A-4 felt that these are only temporary repairs and the ADELAIDA will have to go into drydock. A-4 believes that a meeting of the minds between Hitchcock and MIN would be beneficial on how to best keep the ADELAIDA operational. The undersigned stated he did not know if this would be possible for security reasons and the results would be passed through Carl.

5. A-4 stated he had received the spare parts for the 80 caliber machine guns and the 20 mm. cannons.

All information contained
herein is unclassified
and may be distributed freely
unless otherwise specified by
the originating organization.

SECRET



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	MR. S.	MR. S.	MR. S.
2	MR. S.	MR. S.	MR. S.
3	MR. S.	MR. S.	MR. S.

66-44129

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : YOGURT (Temp for MR Sanchez WHRA 0300 6/6/68)

ACTION: DCI WBSA 2

INFO : DDP, VL

SECRET 868545Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE YOGU 1304

TYPE

ANWORLD LASBAR TYPIC

FOLLOWING RECEIVED AT 06/0548Z

GROUPS 53

action 201 IMMEDIATE

IN 44129

FOLLOWING RECEIVED ON THE AMBIDY PRIVACY LINK (THO NOT SLUGGED AMBIDY)

XXXX SEIXX ENTER ADOPD RGALL INAKG AJLIN ANISP ADRES TIENE
BITUACION DIFIC ILRPT DIFIC ILENC UBAKC UBAKS UPLIC GEISV
RSIX SIPUE DENCO NSEGU IRCON GESTI ONESE NEMBA JADAD EMEJI
TIENE OJOE NCUBA KCUBA CHAAS ILUPA RAELL OSKIR EALFA MANZA
MAPAR AVERA LFACA RLOSK CARLO SOMAV IERNE SSIET ENGRA CGASK

END

END OF AGENT MESSAGE

SECRET

TRANSLATION

Informed my Uncle that my parents are having difficult situation in Cuba.
Request you see if arrangements can be made with Mexican embassy in Cuba
for their asylum. I will go to Panama 7 Aug. to meet Carl. Thank you. Ignacio

TYPEWRITER NUMBER

DATE RECEIVED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN P0091 PAGE 2
23 Apr 64

UNCAN CENES AAYUD AQUER ECISE YANKE EQUES ISHIF ICALA ULTI
ACPOR - UNID ADDEL IREPA CIOMD EMIPA TRIAE SCLAV AAYER POKES
PANAK ESPAV ATANK EEHOY POREL COMUN ISMOX RESPE TUSSA KENTE
KHUEV O----

ABOVE MESSAGE RECEIVED ON FREQUENCY 14355 KCS. FIELD
ENDED SCHEDULE WITH "VA VA" VICE LONG DASH, WHICH INCORRECT
PROCEDURE.

VASH S/C NOTE: NO AMBIGDY/I SLUG USED.

SECRET

14. MR PRESIDENT OF THE "CONSEJO DE LIBERACION": 1) I ASSUME FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ERROR THAT WAS COMMITTED. 2) I GUARANTEE THAT IT
WAS AN HONEST MISTAKE. 3) FORTUNATELY WE DISCOVERED A CLANDESTINE CARGO
GOING TO BENEFIT MANY CUBAN COMMUNISTS. THE ERROR HAS PARALYZED 12 SUGAR
MILLS. FORTUNATELY MARITIME INSURANCE RATES GOING TO CUBA HAVE INCREASED
30%. 4) FORTUNATELY THE COUNTRY THAT OWNED THE SUNKEN SHIP HAS NEVER BEEN
A LOYAL FRIEND OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IS REQUIRED BY ITS FORMER
COLONIES WHICH TODAY ARE FREE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. 5) NEVERTHELESS,
I AM AWARE OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THIS ERROR AND
BECAUSE OF IT, IF NECESSARY, I OFFER MY RESIGNATION OF MY DUTIES AND MY
SEPARATION FROM THE CUBAN PROBLEM BUT I REQUEST OF THE CONSEJO THAT NONE
OF MY FIGHTING MEN OR ORGANIZATION BE DENIED THE AID THEY ARE RECEIVING
WHICH SIGNIFIES THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO LIBERATE MY ENSLAVED HOMELAND
YESTERDAY BY SPAIN AND TODAY BY COMMUNISM. RESPECTFULLY, ANTUNEZ.

SECRET