

Date : 08/04/95

Page : 1

**JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM**

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10081
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 10-H-13

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : GOODWIN, RICHARD
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 07/10/75
PAGES : 61
SUBJECTS : ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CIA

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

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Vol. 2 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R478

Goodwin

Report of Proceedings

INVESTIGATION
ON 3/2/77
BY EC

Hearing held before

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Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, July 10, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tapes and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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3 Richard M. Goodwin.
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1 EXECUTIVE SESSION
2 - - -
3 Thursday, July 10, 1975
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5 United States Senate,
6 Select Committee to Study Governmental
7 Operations with Respect to
8 Governmental Activities,
9 Washington, D. C.
10 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clock
11 p.m. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church
12 (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
13 Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
14 Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and
15 Schweiker.
16 Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
17 A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
18 Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan,
19 David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea,
20 Professional Staff Members.
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1 PROCEEDINGS

2 The Chairman. We will come back into order.

3 Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

4 Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to give
5 in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and
6 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

7 Mr. Goodwin. I do.

8 The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has
9 been some problem in connection with your appearance here today
10 and that there are some notes that you have that you feel you
11 need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought
12 with you. Is that the case?

13 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. They
14 have been in storage for several years and I just had no access
15 to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They were
16 notes -- my files and everything have been in storage for
17 several years. I've had no access to them. And they consist
18 of the files that I brought from the White House with me.

19 The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the
20 staff and shown certain documents that the staff believes will
21 be pertinent to your testimony?

22 Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with
23 the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

24 The Chairman. And do you believe that you are prepared
25 today to give us testimony relating to Mr. Trujillo or do you

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1 believe that you need to or ought to review those notes before
2 you give any testimony?

3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm of course fully prepared to testify
4 to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think
5 probably in the case of the Dominican Republic, the documents
6 have been adequate. I think there's a good chance that going
7 through the files may very well add something to my recollection
8 of Cuba and Castro.

C 9 The Chairman. Well I will have this suggestion to make.
M 10 We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and
M 11 then -- how long will it take you to get your files and review
M 12 them and come back fully prepared to give us your testimony on
C 13 the other issues?

C 14 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it will take a day or two. It is
C 15 possible I will not be able to get access to them until Monday
C 16 morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello
C 17 and find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.
C 18 But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.

19 The Chairman. So that if the Committee were to give you
20 that opportunity, would you then get those files, review them,
21 and respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the
22 first of next week to testify?

23 Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly.

24 The Chairman. We are most anxious to complete the record
25 and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly

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1 accomodate our need if you would cooperate.

2 Mr. Goodwin. I would be glad to.

3 The Chairman. All right.

4 With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you
5 prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?

6 Mr. Schwarz. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have
7 a chance to get together. I thought we were going to have a
8 chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to
9 speak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps
10 we can work on the material.

11 Before we do so, could you state your full name and your
12 address please?

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1 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. GOODWIN

2 Mr. Goodwin. Richard M. Goodwin, 1536 32nd Street, N.W.,
3 Washington, D.C.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And as a matter of course, we tell all of
5 our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their
6 right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop
7 to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?

8 Mr. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyers.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional
10 rights are?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the
13 Dominican Republic in the winter and spring of 1961?

14 Mr. Goodwin. I came into the White House as Assistant
15 Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin
16 American affairs policy statements in the preceding campaign.
17 I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until
18 I left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a
19 daily basis with President Kennedy and his activities in Latin
20 America which included what was happening in the Dominican
21 Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepared
22 cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that
23 you are interested in, and I was with him every day on something
24 connected with Latin America.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary

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1 material, would you recount for the Committee your understandin-
2 of what the United States government policy toward the Dominic
3 Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions
4 were taken to implement that policy.

5 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of the
6 policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in
7 accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decided
8 to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican
9 Republic and the situation which you know arose was precipitated
10 by the attempted assassination of President Betancourt by the
11 President of the Dominican Republic.

12 So that from that point on when we came in, the feeling
13 was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was even more
14 at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress than
15 had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other
16 relations, that Trujillo's time in office was probably
17 numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade
18 which was often in great domestic difficulty had been the
19 concept of American support, it strengthened Trujillo against
20 his opposition.

21 At that point our policy became one of trying to anticipate
22 at least, the fall of Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing
23 was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern of
24 the President, the one thing he didn't want was for Trujillo
25 to go and a Communist leader to come in. So I think the policy

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1 was to keep up our economic and diplomatic pressure to hope
2 that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or
3 peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would
4 be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of
5 the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in
6 touch with and help out and keep communications open with
7 the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to
8 pinpoint.

9 Mr. Schwarz. What steps did you take during the period
10 of time you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know
11 about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident
12 groups?

13 Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from
14 policy statements, the use of USIA, the use of economic
15 pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile
16 groups principally in New York and elsewhere. A certain number
17 of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn
18 of course was one of the principals, his principal instruction
19 was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was
20 zealous in this because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself
21 and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups.
22 And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and I
23 think they fairly reflect that range of operations.

24 None of them were terribly effective.

25 Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arms,

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1 what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorization
2 was provided to transfer arms?

3 Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And that was at a meeting of the Special
5 Group?

6 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't know because they didn't let
7 me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of
8 some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really
9 know the procedure.

10 Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed?

11 Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. I became aware of the transfer
12 of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the
13 transfer of a couple of carbines and .38 pistols. After the
14 transfer had been made, the message of communication that
15 came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request
16 for the transfer of machine guns which were to be used in an
17 effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns were to be given as
18 Dearborn told me later in conversation after the assassination
19 because these people felt their own lives were in danger,
20 especially if they embarked on anything as risky as trying to
21 kill Trujillo, and they wanted some self-defense weapons, and
22 they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a
23 request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, they
24 wanted a machine gun.

25 Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of people had

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1 tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very
2 risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to
3 try with a .38.

4 And I think also, I mean nobody, I think -- as I say, we
5 had no particular anticipation that this or any other group
6 would be successful in something that nobody had been able to
7 do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arms were passed into
9 the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?

10 Mr. Goodwin. No, I only know what Dearborn later told me
11 in conversation. I only have this fifteen year old memory
12 on my part that he gave them to them in the consulate. I may
13 have known at one time how he got them. There were a lot of
14 guns in the Dominican Republic. 2/1

15 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know that arms were passed through
16 the diplomatic pouch?

17 Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but I wouldn't be
18 surprised, weapons of that size.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as
20 far as you know?

21 Mr. Goodwin. Well I don't know. I don't have the exact -
22 the message is in here. I think it was after President
23 Kennedy took office.

My knowledge of it goes on the basis of the passage --

The Chairman. Is there someone that can help Mr. Goodwin.

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1 with the documents?

2 Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1,
3 a document consisting -- dated May 13, 1961 and headed
4 Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating:
5 "Attached is the special briefing paper of CIA covert activities
6 directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by
7 Mr. Richard Goodwin at the White House," and attaching a
8 several page document with that heading and that date.

9 Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and
10 that's where, I guess, I found out about it.

11 (The document referred
12 to was marked Goodwin
13 Exhibit No. 1 for
14 identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the
2 weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell
3 that?

4 Mr. Goodwin. Yeah.

5 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which indicates when the request for the passage of the arms was made.

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, it says in late January. Of course they weren't authorized until the 12th.

1 Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after
2 the Kennedy Administration took office.

3 || Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice
5 President Johnson, -- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2,
6 a memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is
7 marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961.

(The document referred to
was marked Goodwin
Exhibit No. 2 for
identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin,
2 this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject
3 Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

4 Would you read into the record the second paragraph?

5 Mr. Goodwin. "At one point during the meeting, the Vice
6 President asked about the three carbines which the Agency had
7 turned over to the dissidents, specifically asked about the
8 date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effect
9 that this was done under the previous Administration, i.e.,
10 prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the
11 Special Group."

12 Can you tell me if this his memo I'm reading? I'd like
13 to know.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom
15 of the page, do they help you decide whose memo it is?

16 Mr. Dennin. I believe we were told by Secretary of State
17 Rusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what
18 the U stands for.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

20 Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an
21 inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it
22 would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen.
23 I thought that I wouldn't have made it. I had no purpose in
24 making it. And this is --

25 The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?

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1 Mr. Goodwin. The delivery of the arms was not made prior
2 to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to
3 January 20th.

4 Senator Schweiker. Was when, again? Was what date?

5 Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.

6 Senator Schweiker. What year?

7 Mr. Goodwin. 1961.

8 Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?

9 Mr. Schwarz. Sometime subsequent to January 20th.

10 Mr. Goodwin. Well, now that I look at this, all it says
11 was late January.

12 The Chairman. This is June 1st, this is dated June 1st,
13 and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the
14 meeting the Vice President asked about the three carbines
15 which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and
16 specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin
17 made the statement to the effect that this was done under
18 the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20th,
19 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

20 Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.

21 Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading
22 that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator,
23 so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could be
24 late January. I mean, I don't really remember.

25 Mr. Schwarz. But Mr. Goodwin, you know, independent of

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1 the document which we marked as Exhibit 1, in fact the arms
2 were delivered after January 20th.

3 Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my first
4 knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested
5 which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had been
6 made in late January. I don't know any more than that.

7 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

8 Mr. Goodwin. This is my source of knowledge. I may have
9 learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.

10 Mr. Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were
11 you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?

12 Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the meetings.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remember from the CIA?

14 Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -- I can't be sure who all was
15 there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some-
16 body like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm
17 sure you must have a list.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Now I would like you to testify in answer to
19 a series of questions as to what you were or were not told.

20 Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered
21 had been delivered to persons who said at times that they
22 wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more
23 often that they wanted to use them for assassination purposes?

24 Mr. Goodwin. I was given to understand and told
25 specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they

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1 wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought
2 they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns.
3 I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that a
4 carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an effort of that kind
5 against Trujillo. But they, of course, were interested in
6 assassinating Trujillo, involved as they were in a very life
7 and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered --
8

Mr. Schwarz. The record demonstrates that the Agency was
9 informed in April, prior to the memorandum that went to you
10 which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to
11 undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the
12 means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the
13 road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress.
14 And that they intended to do it whether or not they received
15 the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just
16 to help.

Now, were you informed by the Agency or by anyone else
17 that the dissidents intended to accomplish the assassination
18 with the small arms whether or not they got the machines?

19 Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other
20 groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got
21 reports of assassinations about to occur almost every two or
22 three weeks in the White House. There is a long gap between
23 wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -- but
24 at all times, continually, up into May, there was the very

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1 insistent request for additional arms that would make the
2 plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy,
3 those arms were denied and --

4 Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know
5 what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents.
6 You didn't answer my question. You said you were frequently
7 informed about assassination plots all over the world, but
8 specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you
9 or were you not informed that the Agency had been told by the
10 dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination
11 of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not
12 they received the machine guns?

13 Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. I
14 wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that
15 wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you
16 mean Dearborn, or --

17 Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

18 Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency
19 in this instance?

20 Mr. Schwarz. There were Agency people in the Republic.
21 Did you know there were Agency people in the Republic?

22 Mr. Goodwin. I knew they were in and out.

23 Mr. Schwarz. In and out?

24 Mr. Goodwin. They ran some guns in at one time, as I
25 remember, and they also were engaged in the collection of

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1 intelligence about dissident groups.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was
3 in charge of the Dominican Republic, or the Agency personnel
4 was in charge of the Dominican Republic?

5 Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the
6 instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all
7 instructions from the President went to Dearborn.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Apart from instructions from the President,
9 was it your impression that the Agency was in charge of the
10 Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the
11 Dominican Republic.

12 Mr. Goodwin. My impression was that Dearborn was in charge
13 of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision
14 from Washington.

15 The Chairman. Dearborn was the --

16 Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. We had no formal
17 relations.

18 The Chairman. He was the Consul?

19 Mr. Goodwin. Right.

20 Wasn't that true?

21 Mr. Schwarz. The paper record makes it look quite likely
22 that the Agency, at least from their point of view, thought
23 that they were in charge.

24 Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We
25 sent all of our messages to Dearborn.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the
2 location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?
3 Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in here somewhere
4 in the paper.

5 (Pause) :
6 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question.

7 Did you know that the machine guns were sent to the
8 Dominican Republic ²⁴ through the diplomatic pouch?

9 Mr. Goodwin. I know now.
10 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?
11 Mr. Goodwin. Now, I knew, when the issue arose in May
12 that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the precise
13 method by which they were brought in I never asked about.

14 The Chairman. I am having a little difficulty following.
15 We began with your being told that it was the policy of
16 the previous Administration to encourage dissident groups and
17 do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down
18 the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of
19 President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these
20 dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of
21 assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President
22 Trujillo.

23 Now when did you learn that weapons had been in fact
24 passed to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after
25 President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first

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1 learn?

2 Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we requested from
3 the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in
4 the Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the
5 Dominican Republic.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from
7 whom?

8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for
9 the President.

10 Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?

11 Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.

12 The Chairman. From the CIA, and that briefing paper has
13 been identified for the record?

14 Mr. Goodwin. That is correct.

15 The Chairman. All right.

16 When you found out that these weapons had been transferred
17 in January to certain dissident groups for the purpose of
18 assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?

19 Was it then your understanding that this was President
20 Kennedy's policy?

21 Mr. Goodwin. No.

22 The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received
23 that information?

24 Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator,
25 and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction

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1 between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of
2 personal type side-arms, the self-defense attendant to any
3 project and the desire for assassination weapons which would
4 have consisted of machine guns.

5 Our response to this briefing paper was immediately to
6 try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic
7 and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks,
8 instructions to the Consul about the nature of future relations
9 with dissidents, because the President felt that things
10 might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the
11 Dominican Republic.

12 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I
13 said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to
14 push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen
15 next, because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than
16 a Communist leader. And secondly, that the United States
17 not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in
18 the telegram that was --

19 The Chairman. All right.

20 Now when the President told you that those were his
21 two concerns, what action was then taken to implement the
22 President's policy?

23 Mr. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to take
24 and set aside the original instructions from the State
25 Department and at the President's instructions, I typed up the

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1 telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and
2 did go, slightly revised to --

3 Mr. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your
4 hand as Exhibit 3.

5 (The document referred to
6 was marked as Goodwin
7 Exhibit No. 3-A for
8 identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -- you
2 know how to do this as well as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and
3 3-C.

4 Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course
5 of rewriting --

6 The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' books
7 where these documents appear?

8 Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3-A?

9 Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.

10 (Pause)

11 This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears
12 on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.

13 And then page 256 is the final. And the same page, 242,
14 page 237 and 242.

15 The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message
16 that went out?

17 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

18 The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

19 Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

20 The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?

21 Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they
22 are both my drafts. I received a draft from the State Depart-
23 ment, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction
24 prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State
25 Department on my own, and adding to it two major points aside

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1 from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and
2 the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we
3 must not run the risk of U.S. association with political
4 assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general
5 policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is
6 overriding and most prevail in doubtful situations."

7 That was inserted at the instruction of the President,
8 a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State
9 Department draft, and it finishes again with -- it says,
10 "Clearly, at the present time we are unable to transfer arms
11 to dissidents." We feel that the transfer of arms would serve
12 very little purpose."

13 (The document referred to
14 was marked Goodwin
15 Exhibit No. 3-B for
16 identification.)

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1 The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it
2 before it was sent by State?

3 Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.

4 The Chairman. But you said that the State Department
5 changed the language.

6 Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft,
7 which I changed and redrafted. Now that is here too, including
8 a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their
9 draft.

10 The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that
11 you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy?

12 Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction
13 of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.

14 The Chairman. It was shown to the President?

15 Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

16 The Chairman. Very well.

17 Then, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now
18 approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here
19 with one major exception. You are not to request a pre-
20 signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."

21 Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.

22 There was a proposal made in the State Department version
23 that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case
24 they managed to take over the government and there was some
25 kind of fighting that they should request help from Venezuela.

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1 Columbia, a few of our allies and therefore we ought to prepare
2 them in advance for such a request. The President thought that
3 putting such a document in their hands would amount to a
4 declaration of war and wanted it struck.

5 The Chairman. All right.

6 Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that
7 you continue to work" -- well, before we go on with the second
8 paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has
9 now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here
10 with one major exception."

11 Now, what were those contingency plans that had been
12 discussed?

13 Mr. Goodwin. They have them here, I believe.. I think --
14 this is a very thick document, where you have a series of
15 contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest
16 of the United States is to assure that Castro-Communist
17 elements not take over." It says Trujillo is weak, and then it
18 is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the
19 weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into the covert
20 activities, which, I think probably -- is that your principal
21 interest at this time?

22 The Chairman. Yes.

23 Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all the
24 covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States,
25 not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform pro's.

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1 dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an
2 acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help them
3 and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing --

4 The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency
5 plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?

6 Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that
7 he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.

tape 5b 8 The Chairman. But if he were assassinated, it would have
9 presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group
10 to overthrow his regime?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

12 The Chairman. All right.

13 Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message -- the President's
14 message to Mr. Dearborn, "We consider it essential that you
15 continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissi-
16 dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable.
17 However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with
18 political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general
19 policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is
20 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

21 Now that language, it has been suggested by some members
22 of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoiding
23 any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the
24 United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved
25 in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, "however

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1 we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political
2 assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general policy
3 cannot condone assassination. This last principle is over-
4 riding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves
to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the
United States should not get caught?

8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because
9 I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as I
10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S.
11 association with political assassination. That means not
12 be associated with the process of political assassination in
any form.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?

In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second,
is it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had
already been dispatched?

Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.

10 Senator Baker. I'm not talking about how many, Fritz.
11
12 Sung had been dispatched.

Mr. Schwarz. But this telegram refuses the passage of
four machine guns.

23 Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am
just saying that guns had been dispatched.

Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this telegram?

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1 Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination,
2 two days before the assassination.

3 Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched.
4 Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over
5 to the dissidents.

6 Senator Baker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite
7 sure -- or there's no indication that the guns were actually
8 used in the assassination, although they may have been in the
9 back seat. Is that about the way it stacks up?

10 The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine
11 guns.

12 Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has
13 said we thought the signals for assassination efforts for
14 machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead
15 with the material in hand.

16 Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their
17 own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.

18 Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important,
19 because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassination
20 against a heavily armed --

21 Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards in a
22 heavily armed car.

23 Also, if I might add, Senator --

24 The Chairman. Just to understand what you have said,
25 as the author of this instruction and having conferred about

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1 it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you testifying
2 that it was your understanding that the meaning of that
3 sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr.
4 Dearborn a prohibition against involving the United States
5 in an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Trujillo?

6 Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my first draft, I did it
7 in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase
8 about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the
9 President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul,
10 because I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and
11 I crossed it out, in my handwriting.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you
13 changed it?

14 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it's not very grammatical, it's
15 embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't read the hand-
16 writing on the xerox.

17 "However we also must not" -- something -- "permit any
18 danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political
19 assassination or intervention in the Dominican Republic,"
20 it says or intervention. All that was struck.

21 Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman
22 asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please
23 don't get caught.

24 Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why I changed it.
25 Senator, to read "However, we must not run risks of U.S.

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1 association with political assassination since the U.S., as a
2 matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination."

3 Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it to
4 be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this
5 document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to me like
6 the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught
7 the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.

8 Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this
9 time.

10 Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time.

11 I need reassurance, and I think the record does, that the
12 coincidence of that this cable, this wire, going out, say two
13 days before the assassination, after guns in fact had been
14 dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under
15 the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.

16 This witness says it does not. There is no evidence to
17 the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need
18 to pursue the issue any further.

19 Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Senator --

20 Senator Baker. And it also, as Smothers points out, that
21 there was another communication saying destroy anything you've
22 got, all those communications except this cable.

23 Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is the standard
24 practice for covert operations.

25 Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines

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1 and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent
2 to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking
3 office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. I haven't
4 seen any indication of the date of that transfer. I do know
5 that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns,
6 because he told me he was not aware of it, until we finally
7 requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of
8 our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at
9 which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred.
10 I still don't know the date of that transfer.

11 And then it was the basis of that briefing paper, which
12 obviously the Dominican Republic was not the first matter on
13 President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on the
14 basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent
15 this telegram.

16 The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call
17 off any further involvement by the United States government in
18 an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo.

19 Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United
20 States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to
21 slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The President was
22 not that anxious to see Trujillo thrown out.

23 Senator Tower. That doesn't totally answer the question.

24 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.

25 The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,

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1 that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had been
2 transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had
3 expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Correct.

5 The Chairman. So there was a connection, the connection
6 being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished
7 weapons to a group that had communicated its interest, if not
8 its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.

9 So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the
10 message was meant to call this off, this involvement. What
11 exactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.

12 Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.

13 The Chairman. But at the same time, you were saying, don't
14 transfer the machine guns, were you not?

15 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what
16 we were saying is --

17 The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?

18 Mr. Goodwin. We were saying that we didn't want to do
19 anything that would involve us further, the United States
20 further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.

21 The Chairman. I see. I see.

22 Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.

23 Senator Baker. The distinction is --

24 Senator Tower. Well, it says here in number 3, it says,
25 continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support of their

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1 position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn
2 from this is that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead
3 and have the other guys on, because their position would be to
4 assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is saying,
5 let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support
6 for what they are doing.

7 Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our support for what they
8 were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency
9 paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office
10 we wanted to be our man, that is correct. And so we were going
11 to support and try to retain relations and say we would support,
12 which is not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any group
13 that might take office and be moderate and pro-United States.
14 That was all we were interested in, was having a pro-American
15 government.

16 Senator Schweiker. Well, there are two other references
17 here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or
18 overthrow" -- obviously you still had a reference there, whether
19 initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the
20 planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we
21 feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and
22 expose the United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure
23 in participation in an assassination attempt," and that is
24 scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that
25 there was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate

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1 since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

2 So what interpretation? I mean, this is rift here with
3 assassination propositions, and the fact that you have "ultimate
4 disclosure," fear of ultimate disclosure of participation,
5 meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that
6 ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this
7 pass through.

8 Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did,
9 it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,
10 but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there
11 were many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information,
12 that there were various groups planning to assassinate
13 Trujillo.

14 Senator Schweiker. Well, if that's what it meant, then
15 why did you delete it?

16 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --

17 Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why
18 in fact did you delete those four words, "ultimate disclosure
19 of participation?"

20 Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell me what page you're reading
21 from?

22 Senator Schweiker. Page 3.

23 The very words that you interpret one way were in fact
24 deleted, which shows to me that you meant them another way, or
25 they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words

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1 for it.

2 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --

3 Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they
5 were words that were going to give exactly the impression you
6 are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, we
7 were afraid of being found out and what we didn't want was any
8 association with the assassination attempts, so the reference
9 to disclosure was struck and the words association were

10 inserted.

11 Senator Schweiker. But you still call off -- you still
12 left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms
13 would serve very little purpose and expose the United States
14 to great danger of association with assassination attempts.

15 That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had
16 other language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation"
17 which implies to me you were concerned about other things you
18 were doing and things that had already been programmed and an
19 operation that you were as much concerned about those being --
20 or you wouldn't have changed the language to still say the same
21 thing with that one distinction about something else being
22 afoot. I don't --

23 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I changed it, I believe, Senator -- I
24 mean it's hard to be held responsible for language that was
25 rejected because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one

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1 of disclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated
2 with assassination. That's why I struck it out.

3 Senator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first
4 part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the
5 transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose
6 the United States. So while you changed the language, you had
7 the same condition there that you were not going to supply those
8 arms.

9 Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --

10 Senator Schweiker. But why were you not concerned about
11 the other language, because --

12 Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other language
13 was that, well, we were worried about being found out, when in
14 fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be
15 involved. So I struck the implication.

16 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of
17 our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have
18 been any closer to this plot would have been to become one of
19 the dissident group. They told him everything they did, down
20 to and including when the car was coming down the road. And
21 we knew that, didn't we?

22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to
23 us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his
24 instructions was to keep in very close contact with these
25 dissident groups. I wouldn't be surprised if they dropped by

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1 and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But
2 it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kill
3 Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.

4 But I was not aware, as I can remember, that he had any
5 kind of detailed information.

6 Mr. Smothers. His messages back to CIA, in fact, convey
7 those details, don't they?

8 Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these --
9 none of them that --

10 Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that
11 the dissidents intended to use the small arms, carbines and
12 pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended
13 to use the weapons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in
14 precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know
15 that before you wrote the telegram, or not?

16 Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I'm responding to is a
17 request that says we can't do it unless we have the machine
18 guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. We are
19 saying, don't give them machine guns.

20 Later on they said to Dearborn, I mean he did tell me
21 that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, we'll
22 do it, whether or not we get the machine guns. I mean, that
23 might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying,
24 well, you might as well give it to them anyway since they're
25 going to do it. I don't know why anyone would take on

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1 Trujillo with a .38. I wouldn't have thought that, if I thought
2 about it.

3 President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When
4 the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by
5 surprise, so that Dearborn had detailed knowledge of when it
6 was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called
7 an emergency meeting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent
8 to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announced
9 by Pierre Salinger.

10 But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to
11 make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in
12 assassinations.

13 Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think
14 you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Eisenhower
15 Administration, they decided to supply arms to this dissident
16 group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Then,
17 as these documents show, at some point very near to the time
18 that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was
19 sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with
20 this.

21 Why didn't we also say stop it, tell these people not
22 to proceed further, in light of the fact that they may have
23 thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to
24 assassinate Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, there
25 is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should have

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1 suggested --

2 Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to
3 inform dissidents of U.S. support for their position."

4 Senator Mondale. In other words, if I were one of those
5 dissidents and I got that from the United States pursuant to
6 this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that
7 I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, and
8 that we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our govern-
9 ment was not really neutral, that it encouraged them.

10 It is true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it
11 is true, apparently that what you understood was that they
12 wanted the machine guns for assassination and they wanted the
13 other weapons for personal defense, but there was still, it
14 would seem to me, reason for them to believe that they had our
15 support.

16 Why didn't we say or communicate to them we want you to
17 stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you
18 to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

19 Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more
20 point --

21 There was a similar telegram sent just before Diem was
22 assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and
23 I appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're
24 worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting a
25 policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,

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1 the way to really disassociate it is to say stop, and that is
2 really what I don't understand.

3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, let me say, Senator, first of all,
4 that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's
5 minds. There is no doubt that we hoped that Trujillo would be
6 overthrown. Not only was their no doubt, but there was a
7 unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it
8 be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that it
9 might happen. And that occurred ever before we took office and
10 we were in full agreement with it.

11 There are papers here which talk about the event of a coup
12 of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out
13 of the country. Assassination was always a possibility, but
14 a coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole
15 range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that
16 Trujillo was going to be overthrown one way or another and
17 not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi-
18 nation because -- in fact, it would seem at that time to be the
19 most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and
20 protected, ordinarily. They knew more about it than we did.

21 And when that happened, which we favored that happened,
22 because we felt that the establishment of a democratic regime
23 in the Dominican Republic was something not only beneficial to
24 the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we're
25 talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,

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1 the man was not only a Fascist, but he was a murderer. He used
2 to have a freezer room in the back of his house where he would
3 take people and show them the bodies of enemies.

4 But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real
5 concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we
6 wanted to be associated with the new government.

7 Senator Mondale. I understand, but the argument is made
8 with respect to that last telegram that it was a fig leaf
9 telegram designed to cover our tracks should assassination occur
10 and you argue, and I think persuasively, that you intended much
11 more than that, you intended to make it clear that we were not
12 supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going
13 to be used.

14 If that was our intent, and I take it that it was, why
15 we didn't we go one step further and say please communicate to
16 these dissidents who have every reason to believe from past
17 history that we may be supporting the overthrow, including
18 assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

19 Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of
20 the business?

21 Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I
22 suppose, clearer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's
23 their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted
24 to. It was not going to be us that dealt with him in this
25 fashion.

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1 Senator Mondale. Yeah, but see, if we were completely
2 neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate
3 Trujillo that's their business. I agree with it, that's none
4 of our business.

5 But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like
6 being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day
7 before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seems to
8 me you should say, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do it.

9 The Chairman. I've changed my mind.

10 Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.

11 Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's
12 been described to us where people were beyond control and you
13 couldn't communicate with them after the forces had been set
14 in motion.

15 Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, I don't know that there
16 ever was any statement that those guns that were authorized on
17 January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequent, for
18 the purposes of assassination or otherwise.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Well, there were :scores of those;
20 and whether they reached you or not is a separate and important
21 question, but there are four or five examples of communication
22 to the Agency, and I think passed on to the State Department,
23 and that those guns were to be used for an assassination effort
24 whether or not the machine guns were obtained.

25 Senator Mondale. Well, you see, that could be important.

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1 because if your understanding was as you have just described
2 then the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were
3 implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --

4 The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I
5 think it's very important to understand this matter, to look
6 at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He
7 was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having
8 received the instruction, the following -- now this is at Tab
9 J, book 2 of 2, the second J.

10 It says -- first of all, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

12 The Chairman. It says: "One, I believe we can hold pro-United
13 States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis
14 set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tell
15 them you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr.
16 Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

17 "Two, following our observations for Department and CAS
18 considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States' friends
19 to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations against us
20 and the best we can do is see there is no proof."

21 Senator Baker. To see there is no proof.

22 The Chairman. "The greatest danger point is Thomas Stockard.
23 He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold
24 several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained
25 these items from Consulates. Stockard told me saying, I have

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1 informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he
2 requested me supply arms through him for dissidents, I told
3 him it was impossible. He is greater danger because of
4 personal ambition against CAS, a matter of which CAS head-
5 quarters is fully informed."

6 Then he goes on to say that "since local CAS is now to
7 engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I
8 recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three
9 CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materialize
10 they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-
11 type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer
12 now. These three have engaged in fully authorized activity
13 which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public
14 position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage
15 and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR,
16 foster Leftist activities."

17 Now there's a vote on.

18 I read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a
19 different message than the one you say you intended to send.

20 (A brief recess was taken.)

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21 The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, to me, Senator,
23 Paragraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of
24 instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear.
25 He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms

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1 to the dissidents, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course,
2 had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know
3 whether or not he could supply arms.

4 So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure,
5 quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram.

6 The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he
7 has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms.
8 That's clear enough. But if you go down to B -- are you with
9 me now?

10 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

11 The Chairman. "Since local CAS" -- I guess that should
12 be Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station, then" --
13 and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief
14 of Station is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection
15 and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican
16 Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot
17 should materialize" -- now that in itself, if I may digress a
18 moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might
19 be imminent. For he says "If simmering assassination plot
20 should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked
21 up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by
22 quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling
23 that an assassination might be imminent, otherwise, why transfer
24 them. "These three have engaged in fully authorized activities
25 which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public

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1 position."

2 Now I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn
3 anticipated at least the real possibility of assassination
4 attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending
5 that those CIA officers that had been connected with having
6 supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic
7 right away.

8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I would agree with a good part of that,
9 Senator, although I think that there were assassination plots
10 simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this
11 in fact took place. And I think he was concerned that the
12 assassination would be unsuccessful, that Trujillo would pick
13 up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of
14 guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had
15 been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill them.

16 And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in
17 the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing,
18 I think, in the telegram that was sent to him that denies the
19 possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there
20 might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of
21 Dearborn's, because if the assassination was successful, there
22 was no need to get the CIA out.

23 The Chairman. But there is something more, really. If
24 the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing,
25 always on the mind of Dearborn, why does he respond to this

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1 instruction by saying, get these men out now?

2 Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had
3 relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt
4 anyway, with or without the machine guns. He thought the attempt
5 might be abortive, and if so, he thought that all Americans or
6 people that worked for him or with him would be in danger.

7 The Chairman. Then you would have to agree with me,
8 wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had
9 evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt
10 was imminent.

11 Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, I think it was.

12 The Chairman. And he took this sufficiently serious to
13 recommend getting the three CIA agents out without further
14 delay?

15 Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely
16 true, because I think he believed that there was a serious
17 attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he was absolutely
18 right and he was doing his job well.

19 I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of
20 the telegram, is that I sat in the office with President
21 Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he
22 wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which I
23 did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, because he cannot
24 testify to that matter, so it's not a question of reading the
25 text so much as deciding whether or not I'm telling the truth

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1 about that instruction.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --

3 Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.

4 Mr. Schwarz. We have to explore whether something went
5 wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some
6 information in front of you and then see if you can help us
7 explain what, if anything, went wrong.

8 Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.

9 Now Exhibit 2-A is a cable dated March 20th from the Agency
10 in the Dominican Republic to the Agency in Washington. And
11 reading in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which -- it
12 describes a plot.

13 In Paragraph 4, it says the following: "To do, they need
14 five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds
15 ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use
16 quiet weapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently
17 the assassination.

18 Now again, were you told -- now, in Exhibit 1, you were
19 told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the
20 carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense
21 weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.

22 Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Right. I understand that.

24 Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that
25 the weapons had been passed for personal defense purposes, do

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1 you think that is consistent, is candid, in light of the
2 fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons were
3 going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are several communications
5 regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously
6 inconsistent.

7 Mr. Schwarz. They are.

8 Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand,
9 a carbine or pistol is hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would
10 regard that as saying I am going to strangle him. And if
11 you're going to have a fire fight with machine guns, I mean
12 in other words, it seems to me that somebody is interpreting
13 what they say, or they might have had five or six different
14 plans.

15 The request that came to the White House, finally, was
16 very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are
17 needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. I mean,
18 however you read this, they do say they need additional weapons
19 to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President
20 at that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about
21 the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that
22 he had established or any directions that he had given. Immediately
23 said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting
24 involved in assassinations. They can do what they want, but
25 we are not going to get involved.

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1 Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was
2 advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we
3 were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of
4 it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that,
5 and that is what you thought you had done?

6 Mr. Goodwin. I would phrase it a little bit differently.
7 Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who
8 wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns
9 and his response was probably like, you mean some idiot gave
10 them guns? I said, yes. He said -- this is a paraphrase --
11 you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or President Kennedy,
12 I mean, he said, well, let's make it clear. And if you compare
13 my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as
14 they point out, because their draft says, we're trying to get
15 this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have
16 to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of
17 course, than the President.

18 It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear
19 that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condone
20 assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at
21 assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And I did
22 that because he told me to do that.

23 The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy
24 policy as one of getting the government no further involved
25 because there had been a past involvement? He knew that and

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1 you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished
2 dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating
3 Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram
4 was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration
5 wanted no further involvement in this --

6 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the President
7 found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that
8 preceded his coming into office that a couple of carbines and
9 pistols had been transferred in order to mount a major assault
10 on a government that had lasted for thirty years, and it seemed
11 at that point like a formidable threat to Trujillo.

12 He wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out
13 that anybody who wanted to assassinate Trujillo in the Dominican
14 Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the
15 United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out
16 no more weapons and this is why he said we do not want to
17 condone assassination or be associated with it. And that's why
18 I wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

19 Senator Towar. Well, may I ask you, then, what you
20 interpreted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3,
21 "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for
22 their position?"

23 Mr. Goodwin. They were -- their position was that, what
24 they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaced
25 by a moderate government. We supported that position, as did

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1 the other members of the Organization of American States, and
2 we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that
3 position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish
4 that position and if they did we would recognize their govern-
5 ment and send them assistance, which we did.

6 As a matter of fact, we took much greater efforts to
7 get rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the
8 assassination than anything that preceeded it, including bringing
9 the American fleet practically into the harbor at Ciudad
10 Trujillo at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Instead
11 of carbines and pistols, we brought in destroyers, aircraft
12 carriers and Marine battalions so that they would know what
13 the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they got
14 out.

15 If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that
16 the countries of South America are full of guns sent there
17 by the American government to be used to kill thousands of
18 people over the last several decades, and with the lone
19 exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies
20 from on top -- of course you're well-acquainted with that --
21 sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal
22 struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo
23 happened to be the head of State, which is a practical
24 distinction, but you could hardly make a moral one.

25 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question in

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1 that respect?

2 The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that;
3 although that is a philosophical argument.

4 Senator Baker. Are you telling us, Mr. Goodwin, that
5 assassination, not of heads of state, but assassination of
6 lesser figures was a common, ordinary occurrence in South
7 America at the behest of America or with American support?

8 Mr. Goodwin. No, I am talking about that we supply arms
9 to revolutionary groups or to armed groups which we did in
10 say Bolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile
11 we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with
12 the knowledge that our assistance would be used in internal
13 struggles.

14 I don't have to use the word assassinations.

15 Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then,
16 as opposed to assassination?

17 Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struggle in the
18 Dominican Republic.

19 The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction,
20 because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is
21 a difference between first degree murder and manslaughter.
22 There is supposed to connote a certain difference in moral
23 connotations, and undertaking deliberate action that is
24 targetted against a particular person with the intention of
25 murdering that person is normally regarded under our criminal

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1 laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore
2 definted as murder in the first degree. So there must be some
3 gradation there.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are gradations, although I do
5 think that many of the activities against, say, someone like
6 Allende or others are equally targetted in Latin American
7 countries and not just general conflict or the killing of
8 particular -- Mexicans, of course, traditionally go out and
9 shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurgents, but
10 not necessarily with our guns.

11 The Chairman. But in any event you're not testifying here
12 to your certain knowledge the United States government participa-
13 ted in an assassination attempt or assisting in an assassina-
14 tion attempt --

15 Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that
16 subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acts.
17 In any event, I do want to return to this.

18 This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to
19 yours.

20 Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took place,
21 President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we
22 looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President
23 Johnson was interested in finding out what had happened and you
24 had a review of this, and discussed in that review that the
25 weapons had been passed, the small arms and the machine guns

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1 hadn't been passed and the assassination occurred.

2 Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, as
3 a matter of more general, governmental policy, the policy which
4 is expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy's
5 instruction?

6 Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.

7 (A brief recess was taken.)

8 The Chairman. Do you have any more questions?

9 Mr. Schwarz. I don't have any more questions.

10 The Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you
11 can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enlighten-
12 ment?

13 Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?

14 The Chairman. On the assassination.

15 Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through
16 all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have
17 something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do
18 think this is pretty complete.

19 The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again early next
20 week, on the Cuban phase of your testimony.

21 Mr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.

22 The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been up all night,
23 would like to ask two questions.

24 Mr. Dennin. Well, when you said there were no more
25 questions, I just raised the possibility and you discussed it

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1 about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington
2 when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held
3 after the assassination before he came back, at which the
4 whole matter was discussed, initially with Vice President
5 Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last one, with President
6 Kennedy.

7 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a series
8 of emergencies. We had an emergency meeting, and cabled the
9 President who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind
10 was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who was the son of Trujillo,
11 from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first.
12 It took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at
13 least indicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it
14 wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found he
15 was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to
16 detain him, but it was too late. By the time we found out, he
17 had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to
18 Ciudad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort made to
19 bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight,
20 diverting it to some American airport, but he didn't do that.
21 and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of
22 our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle,
23 Hector -- and I forgot the other fellow's name -- out of there
24 so that the kind of moderate government that we wanted could
25 be installed.

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1 And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make
2 various inducements like he could take his money out, it was
3 discussed that if he would leave peaceably, but what finally
4 happened was when McNamara moved the fleet in over the horizon
5 and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end,
6 he got on his boat and left.

7 The Chairman. Air Force General?

8 Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Force General.

9 He decided that was an easier target than the American
10 fleet.

11 The Chairman. Was the bombing done at our instruction?

12 Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't believe so. I was trying to
13 remember that, but I don't believe it was. As I remember,
14 it was quite a surprise to us that this fellow had taken the
15 initiative. The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of
16 a threat that if they didn't get out we might come in and get
17 them. There was no, however, no, at that point, no country
18 attempted to do that, just to scare them. And the fleet was
19 actually cheered in the Dominican Republic, a very rare
20 occasion.

21 But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make
22 himself dictator and two of his own officers arrested him. They
23 all had been trained in American military schools.

24 Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to
25 the telegram. We had Dearborn's reaction. We will read into

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1 the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in
2 response to the telegram Mr. Goodwin drafted.

3 Assume -- reference B, that's the telegram. "Final word
4 on present policy in which KUBARK" -- that's CIA -- "work here
5 must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that reference, are for
6 practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However,
7 Headquarters aware extent to which ODYOKO" that is, the United
8 States -- "already associated with [REMSCEW]" -- that is the
9 assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try 'cover
10 up tracks' KUBARK personnel directly involved in [REMSCEW]
11 preparations must be withdrawn now."

12 I don't know if that merits comment or not. It just
13 happens to be how it was interpreted by CIA.

14 Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also reflects
15 Dearborn's own disappointment that --

16 Mr. Schwarz. CIA.

17 Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable.

18 The Chairman. Any further questions?

19 Senator Tower?

20 Mr. Smathers?

21 Mr. Smathers. Mr. Chairman, I'd rather wait till the return
22 of the witness.

23 The Chairman. Yes.

24 Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to
25 meet with the staff so that the pertinent documents that will

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1 up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be
2 reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We
3 want you to be fully aware of whatever documentation we have
4 so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the
5 policy at the time.

6 Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and
7 then duplicate it.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the
9 staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony
10 Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and
12 getting the things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, if
13 that's not too inconvenient.

14 The Chairman. Wednesday?

15 All right. Thank you very much.

16 (Whereupon, at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,
17 to reconvene at 8:30 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)

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