

OPTIONAL FORM 10 (MAY 1962 EDITION)
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27, 1962
FBI INFORMATION DIVISION
DATE 06-22-2023 BY TS 06-22-2023

~~SECRET~~

Office Mem

JUN.

UNCLASSIFIED

EX-REF FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION

DATE: January 22, 1958

TO : MR. BOARDMAN

FROM : A. B. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

J. B. ST. HUNTER - Policy
J. B. ST. HUNTER - Policy
ENR. 200 Policy

On January 10, 1958, Harry Stone (M-5), Liaison Representative with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his service had determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and the RCMP only.

On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the (U.S.S.R.), looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.

On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.

Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA approached our Liaison Agent, (Sam Papich) on a personal basis. He indicated that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the coverage of mail to the (U.S.S.R.), and as a result CIA was expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by CIA. He stated the coverage is actually made through the Post Office in New York

(WAB:hum)


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cc: 1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan

SEARCHED 1/20/1958

INDEXED 1/20/1958

SERIALIZED 1/20/1958



273-10070

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MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
 RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year. He further indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the FBI, he was passing this along for our guidance.

It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain, and according to Angleton they have had some success in this regard. At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the (U.S.S.R.) each day. Angleton said they have not come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet.

ACTION:

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1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the (U.S.S.R.). We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might affect internal security matters.

SECRET

MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and Moscow address furnished us by the British, telling CIA that we want to be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the British. (S)(U)

3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as we handle communications intelligence data.

(W)
P.W.

(S)(U)

(K)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHICH IS SHOWN OTHERWISE

February 6, 1958

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

~~Classified~~~~DECLASSIFIED BY~~~~2010~~

1. ~~Director~~
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Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from (Russia). Our Liaison Agent determined that CIA began this coverage approximately a year and a half ago through confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail, microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250,000 names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too numerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.

An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain in the future:

- 1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.
- 2) All correspondence indicating that the (Soviets) may be utilizing a hostage situation, i. e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on (Soviet) citizens who have close relatives in the U. S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U. S.
- 3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes.
- 4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating Soviet control or direction of the CP, USA.

(APL:DEM:mn-10)

cc - Messrs. Boardman
 Branigan
 Baumgardner
 Rapich

Belmont
 Litrenta
 JD Donohue
 Turner

5 APR 9 1958

EX-135

RECEIVED
 MAR 9 1958
 10 FEB 2019
 01 JUN 2021

SECRET

Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58)
 re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks. This procedure will eliminate having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this arrangement can be worked out with CIA in a proper fashion.

In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:

- 1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently engaged in Soviet espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with (U.S.S.R.). This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.
- 2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in Soviet Russia believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of **K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R.**, which, according to information received from MI-5, is a drop utilized by (Soviet) illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meetings.

We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as Bureau Informant 100. Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used.
- 2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "Juse" and then filed and maintained in the Soviet Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "Juse" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.
- 3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.

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- 4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum will not be furnished to CIA.

(1) CIA ADVISED RE TYPE OF DATA OF INTEREST
 70-44 (2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO REVIEW INFO.
 (3) ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR STOPS 102-1025

~~SECRET~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.*(Rev 1/31/63)*
2/13/63~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/07 BY SP/SP/SP~~

6 February 1958

3-1
P-1 (8-1)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: HUNTER Report #1

Spink

1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to (Mr. Papich) will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency.
2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report #1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.
3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:
 - a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.
 - b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.
4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U. S. of mail from (P. KROVAN), whose location is believed to be in Moscow, might result in the following reply:

REC-N 87045
 (105-93089-3)
 EX-135 (e FEB 20 1958) S.R.

~~SECRET~~*ENCLOSURE*
WT

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CLASSIFIED~~

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name In</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Loc</u>	<u>Name Out</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Loc</u>	<u>Rec</u>	<u>Firms</u>
A 57C05C3328	KROVAN, Paraskoviya (*)	ABB	EVOSWA, Wasyl () KM					

This reply has the following meaning:

"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated.

"57C05" is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.

The group "C3328" is our own internal filing number.

The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the USSR.)

The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that KROVAN sent the letter.

The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside the Soviet Union from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of Ukrainian SSR. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the USSR. A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.

The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the USSR. In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or family name is listed first.

The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.

The entry in the second "Loc"(ation) column indicates the state of the U. S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.

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The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.

5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from (P. KROVAN) who is believed to be located in (Moscow) only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that Paraskoviya KROVAN, located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR is identical. If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that (KROVAN) may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.

6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the (Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON) who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name In</u>	<u>Ref Loc</u>	<u>Name Out</u>	<u>Ref Loc</u>	<u>Ban</u>	<u>Firms</u>
A57D23U 57D18	(AVRUNINA, Vera)	(*)	AAA (ESTERSON, Rose)		KKB X	

The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:

"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identification since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 numbers, the outer envelopes and their contents will be reproduced and furnished to you.

7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.

8. If your first request had been for (KROVAN, or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN) located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had

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been for ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON located in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed copies of the envelope and its contents.

9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request, it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not required. The same would apply to the (USSR). The above should be listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known, various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject, at this address to whom the questioned communication might be addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in turn number each card as HUNTER Request No. _____.

10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch List, i. e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a possible hit is made, i. e. photograph outside only; photograph outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give us a white list of correspondents of interest to you who are not Watch List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the receipt of the letter by the addressee.

11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names of all correspondents either addressee, addressee, or both, from any specific area in the (USSR) to the United States or to any specific state or city in the U. S., or vice versa. There are various other combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed

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SOURCE

or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[J. Angleton
James Angleton]

JF
(JFA)

Enclosures (5)

SECRET
SOURCE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

to : A. H. Belmont
 FROM : W. A. Branigan
 SUBJECT : Bureau Informant 200

1 - Belmont
 2 - Branigan
 3 - Litrento
 4 - Schaepple

DATE: 4-21-58

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 10-22-02 BY SP/AM

(Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage of mail going to and from the USSR. This designation was approved in your memorandum to Mr. Boorman dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we felt would be of interest to us. That memo recommended that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review information obtained from that coverage.

CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the coverage of Soviet mail under the caption "Project Hunter." Each report received is labeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report # 196.

The reports received are reviewed in the (Second) Unit. When the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit would have a logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched for identifiable information. Then we can locate no such information, a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of these investigations will be the identification of persons of pro-Soviet sympathies whose dealings with the (Soviets) are of a security or intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who might present logical "hostage" possibilities which could be exploited by the Soviets, and the identification of any (Soviet) individual in the U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.

Investigations in the field would include a check of office indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available information does not dictate against such interview and provided the interview can be conducted without compromising (Bureau Informant 200).

Information from (Bureau Informant 200) would be forwarded to the field, personal attention SAO, utilizing the following or similar phraseology: "Information has been received from (Bureau Informant 200)"

5 MAY 8 1958
 (105-62845)
 (105-93089-9)

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Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Date: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
105-67845

a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been in direct contact with....". The contents of the [Hunter Report] should then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the JF~~R~~ reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and ~~as~~ instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that information obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead purposes. only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of the coverage in effect in this instance and under no circumstances is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have knowledge of his contact with a person in Russia."

In those instances where an opened or closed case file on a person mentioned in a Hunter Report is located at the Bureau, the [Hunter Report] will be forwarded to the appropriate Section Chief or Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner described above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the [Hunter Report] into the subject's main file for information purposes.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis. Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal Security Section, and the Subversive Control Section will be advised of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 10-1305
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 10, 1961

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

SUBJECT: HUNTER P.
ESPIONAGE - P.

cc: Mr. Parsons
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Belmont
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. W. D. Stewart

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/01 BY SP/MSB

JFK (S) Hunter is CIA's sensitive project involving the review of mail going to the Soviet Union. CIA makes available to us results of their analysis relative to this project.

On 3-8-61 during a conference on Soviet illegal espionage activities between Special Agents Papich, Litrento, Buckett and Mr. and Mrs. Angleton, Norton and Hunt of CIA, we were advised that CIA has now established a laboratory in New York in connection with this project which can examine correspondence for secret writing, microdots and possibly codes. We said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize their laboratory, we would contact them.

ACTION: For information.

DEM:td.(7)

DA

✓

(filed
3/13)

Another mixed!

B

(105-93589-25)

REC-22

7 MAR 23 1961

68 MAR 28 1961

SA S. J. Papich
advised 4/1/61
that he had material
but no more about
itself since NY took
it over 20 p. since 4/1/61
and gave it back to
NYDA 4/21/61

648 Rev. 10-28-70

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

March 10, 1972

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

BY CIA COURIER

ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, [JAMES A. DELETOS]
RE: HUNTER PROJECT [fwd]

- 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.
- 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.
- 3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter. REC-50 [10-2-1-62-162]
- 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.
- 5. Please note change in caption of this case.
- 6. Status of case: Complete Incomplete

10 MAR 10 1972

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Director

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Zac.

RECORDED AND INDEXED
REFERENCE NUMBER

Reference is made to your special notation on
Hunter Report No. 27-300, Item 7945AB.
Attached is a list of types of traffic we
would like to receive.

02 MAR 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

[1 - M. J. Triplett]
[1 - W. O. Oregon]

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 10, 1972

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of interest to us:

1. Current and former [Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists.
2. Current and former [Soviet] official visitors.
3. Current and former [Soviet] nonofficial visitors whose U.S. contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their access to classified data or are in a position to be of assistance to the [Soviets].
4. U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have been in the [USSR] with American exhibitions and delegations.
5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the [USSR] who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program. This does not include the short-term student tours but does include individuals who are in the [USSR] for some time. It would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have received special invitations or special treatment from the [Soviets].
6. We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate tourists who visit the [USSR] on regular tours or go to see relatives. We do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the [Soviets] because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters; individuals who appear to have been compromised; and persons who meet with [Soviets] connected with organizations known to specialize in propaganda or in obtaining information regarding the U.S.

7. Communist Party and front organizations (such as [American Russian] Institute, National Council of [American-Soviet Friendship] and [Ukrainian News]), extremist and New Left organizations.

105-99089

L.M.E. Triplett Rec'd

(4)

Original to CIA, Attn: James Angleton by
CIA courier 3-10-72.

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and
declassification

5-19-72

SECRET

8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace.

9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Feathermen, Progressive Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China. For East

10. (Cubans and pro-Castro) individuals in the U.S.

11. Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.

12. Contacts with the (Soviet Red Cross), particularly those made or received by individuals.

13. (Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.,

14. Traffic between U.S. nationals and aliens in the U.S. with individuals attending such institutions as the (Central Komsomol School and Friendship) University. This would include any aliens in the U.S. who have previously been in the (USSR) as students.

NOTE: Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report 27, 226, Item 78A13AH ((105-67845-38348)) reading as follows: "Your 30 October 1968 statement of HUNTER Project requirements does not cover contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to relatives or friends studying at (friendship) University or similar institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and possibly revise, your above-cited requirements statement." Subsequent to 10-30-68 memo, there have been several oral requests for other types (Items 1, 5, 3, 12 and 14) and "Hunter" asked us if we desired information on New Left and Black Nationalist fields on 1-15-69 and we advised them that we did. They had made a similar inquiry regarding P.O. Boxes utilized by the (Soviets by Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) [Hunter Report 27, 226 was dated January 25, 1972, and transmittal letter was signed by James Angleton.]

FBI INFORMATION ONLY

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller
FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200] - Policy

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. J. P. Lee
1-Miss H. E. Triplett
DATE: February 18, 1973
1-Mr. Branigan

joined
CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]
DECLASSIFY ON 2007-02-18

[Bureau Informant 200] is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by them as "PROJECT HUNTER."

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of CIA, has an appointment to meet with Acting Director Gray on February 18, 1973. In this connection, at 5:30 p.m., on February 18, 1973, Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, advised that the reason for General Walters' visit is to discuss PROJECT HUNTER. Specifically, General Walters will raise the question of the Bureau taking the PROJECT over. Angleton stated that Dr. Schlesinger, Director of CIA, had instructed Walters to meet with Mr. Gray prior to his, Schlesinger's, return from overseas planned for February 19, 1973.

Commencing in January, 1968, and continuing to the present time, the Central Intelligence Agency has furnished this Bureau with the product of its highly confidential review of mail going to and coming from the USSR. Arrangements for this review were obviously worked out between the Agency and Post Office officials and we are not privy to the details.

It is obvious that both incoming and outgoing mail is opened and photographed. At one time in March of 1961, we were advised that CIA had established a laboratory in New York where they could examine correspondence for secret writing, microdots, and possibly codes. At that time CIA offered to make these facilities available if we needed them. During the same approximate time, CIA advised that about 500,000 items per month passed to and from the [USSR] and about 200,000 of these items are screened. Approximately 1,200 items per month received "close scrutiny".

On February 18, 1973, Mr. James Angleton advised [REDACTED] that at the present time, he has 9 of his people in Washington working on PROJECT HUNTER, and there are 2 additional personnel working in New York, for a total of 11. Presumably, all or most of these people have Russian language ability. Angleton further

WMB:mk

(S) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS AND WAS ASSIGNED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CONTINUED - OVER

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

5. waR

Mr. Allen	
Mr. Baker	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Cleveland	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Gandy	
Mr. Justice	
Mr. Marshall	
Mr. Miller, R.D.	
Mr. Morris	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Reilly	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Shultz	
Mr. Stoen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Vass	
Mr. Woods	

SECRET

Memorandum from W. A. Bragigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

[redacted] advised that the U. S. Postal Service had raised a question as to CIA's necessity to continue PROJECT HUNTER in view of possible security problems within the Postal Service.

The Bureau has always handled [PROJECT HUNTER] material on a strict need-to-know basis. The material received is handled on one desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division where it is screened for items of possible investigative use and retention. Material of no interest is destroyed. [HUNTER] material can be only transmitted to our field divisions in paraphrased form and can only be used for investigative purposes. The material can never be incorporated in any communication which is intended for dissemination outside of the Bureau. [HUNTER] material that is retained is kept in a Special File Room in the Records Branch at the Identification Division Building. Periodically CIA has been furnished with general guidelines as to the material which would be of special interest to our needs. [For example, we are currently interested in material concerning current and former Soviet exchange students, visitors, researchers, and scientists.] (S) (U) We are likewise interested in Americans who are in the [USSR] for an appreciable period of time. We are interested in American communists and other extremists who may be corresponding with persons in the [USSR].

We have always considered the product from [PROJECT HUNTER] as valuable to our investigative interests. [In this connection, it has provided us with the identities of Americans in contact with [Soviet] exchange students in the United States who offer some potential as informants regarding the [Soviet] students' activities. We know from highly confidential sources that a proportion of these students have already been recruited by one or the other of the major [Soviet] Intelligence Services. We know also that many of the exchange students will subsequently be posted to the United States in some official capacity.] (S) (U)

[PROJECT HUNTER] has identified numerous individuals from the United States and from other areas of the world in attendance at the [Central Komsomol School and Friendship] University. (S) (U)

CIA has permitted us to furnish them the names of specific individuals in whom we have an investigative interest, and this has been valuable in covering their activities. [The product from HUNTER has also been valuable in identifying [Soviets] who plan to and later visit the United States.] (S) (U)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RM: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

The [Soviet Union] is currently building up the number of trade representatives who will be assigned in various areas of the United States where we normally would not have coverage. We anticipate that PROJECT HUNTER would be valuable in providing leads for any necessary coverage of these people. (S) (U)

With the relaxation of tensions between the U. S. and the [USSR], the volume of correspondence has obviously increased. We do not currently know what that volume is. To the best of our knowledge, CIA has maintained this PROJECT smoothly and without hitch. It would be necessary to now examine what security problems the U. S. Postal Service is experiencing.

ACTION:

The above is submitted for possible use by the Acting Director for the visit of General Walters.

(EM)

JUL 16 1973 P
[DOK/ank]

CONFIRMED WITH GEN.
WALTERS FOR 2:00 PM
TUESDAY, 2-20-73

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. [initials] DATE: January 16, 1968

FROM : S. J. Papich [initials]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/01 BY SP/AMH

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Rosen _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Reeves _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Thompson _____
Vance, Ross _____
Whalen _____
Squier _____

C.D.B.

SAC G. L. Smith

On January 15, 1968 (Richard Ober) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union, it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

ACTION:

Ref. 102

(105-73527-9D)

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

- 1 - C. D. Brennan
- 1 - G. C. Moore
- 1 - M. E. Triplett
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb (6)

Stops not warranted
on black extremists
at this time
JAN 16 1968

10FEB 5 1968

DOWNGRADING

STAFF

1980 Jan 10

5-102-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

TO : W. A. Branigan

FROM : H. E. Tripplett

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] BUREAU INFORMANT 200

[1 - W. A. Branigan]
[1 - A. P. Litrenta]

DATE: August 24, 1966

[1 - S. Papich]
[1 - H. E. Tripplett]

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Bale _____
Holl _____
Schoen _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Hoover _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Candy _____

31

C

From 8-14-65 through 8-13-66, 3033 Hunter Reports transmitting 6077 items were received from Bureau Informant 200. This is a slight increase (almost 5%) in number of items over the previous year.

Although items were received on a continuous basis, the number dropped during the period of August, 1965, through January, 1966. This is believed to be due to the reorganization, transfer of personnel and change in supervision over the Hunter Project at CIA which was taking place during this time.

From February, 1966, to the present, there has been a marked increase in number of items received. The average for the past four months has been 627 per month, whereas the average for the same period last year was 421. There has been no significant change in the type of material except that more items are being received regarding subjects on whom the source has not furnished information previously, necessitating more research. The value of this material is shown by the fact that there was an increase of 53% in number of new cases opened on the basis of information furnished by the source.

Approximately 890 letters were written on information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 during the past year. This is an increase of approximately 9% over those written the previous year. More than 960 new cases were opened and 96 cases were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis of travel to the USSR and contacts of U.S. citizens, Latin Americans and Cubans in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR. Information was sent to the field to assist in pending investigations and for information. In some cases, data was extracted from several items, summarized and sent to the field in one communication under more than one caption to show relationships between various subjects.

An analysis of information received from the source during the past year is attached.

ENCLOSURE:

EX-110 REC-5

(05-93017-78)

Enclosure. This is for your information, SEP 12 1966
Enclosure.

3/26

10-30-62

5402

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2900 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 6/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I. Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. (Soviet-bloc) immigrants desiring to repatriate to (USSR). These people are interviewed by INS and IES refers anything of interest to us.
2. Americans traveling to the (USSR) as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the (USSR) while on tour abroad as well as (Soviets) returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.
3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II. Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re (Cuba). This serves to identify pro-(Castro) followers in the U. S.
2. All data re U. S. (Cubans) in contact with (Cubans) attending (Friendship University in Moscow)
3. All material emanating from (Puerto Rico) of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-(Soviet)
4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to (Russia) and while in (Russia)
5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.
6. Data re [REDACTED] (Russia) and while in (Russia)
7. Any data on (Mexico) (Argentina) (Brazil) (Chile) (Peru) (Uruguay) (Ecuador) (Colombia) (Venezuela) (Bolivia) (Paraguay) (Surinam) (Brazilian Communist Party)

• ~~SECRET~~
[RE: PROJECT NORTHERN]

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. students in (Moscow) or to U. S. persons who were former students in (Moscow)
9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the (USSR)

Re: enough now no. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.* Date: 6/9/61

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

(*W. C. Sullivan*)
(*W. A. Branigan*)
(*W. D. Stewart*)

Subject: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200)- POLICY

Telephone _____
Reported _____
Tele. _____
Cable No. _____
Cabled _____
Delivered _____
Received _____
Address _____
Name _____
Title _____
Position _____
Tele. Room _____
Report _____
Grade _____

SK(A&S) Branigan

The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention, as a matter of interest, the increase in the volume of Hunter Reports received from CIA, the additional administrative controls instituted to cope with increased volume, and lastly the desirable type of information (Bureau Informant 200) has been continually furnishing.

(Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by CIA as "Project Hunter" and the reports emanating from this project as Hunter Reports. This informant originated in 1/58 and furnished its first Hunter Report in 2/58. As of 6/6/61, we have received Hunter Report number 5005; many reports transmit as many as twelve items, and some reports transmitting up to twenty items. My memo to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 12/5/60 revealed as of that date 3425 Hunter Reports had been received. You may be interested to learn that in the last seven months we have received 1680 Hunter Reports or almost 50% of the number received from 2/58 until 12/60. On 3/9/61 CIA advised representatives of this Bureau that it had recently established a laboratory in New York City in connection with this project. This laboratory is able to process Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possibly codes. Our liaison representative advised the laboratory would probably increase the Hunter Report volume to us by 20%; however, from the above figures it appears this increase in volume is far greater than 20%.

A memo W. D. Stewart to W. A. Branigan 2/21/61 re captioned matter recommended and received approval for the utilization of a stamped notation on the front of the Hunter Report permitting the interested supervisor to destroy contents of a Hunter Report if found to be of no value after checking the appropriate block on the stamp indicating his reason for destroying same. Approval to destroy these Hunter Reports was received from CIA which can, if necessary, at a later date reproduce any Hunter Report. A memo from Mr. Belmont 3/3/61 to All Supervisors of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Internal Security and Subversive Control Sections instructed all recipients re use of above-mentioned stamp. In addition, above memo 2/21/61 received approval for a procedure whereby Hunter Reports would be screened for destruction by substantive desk handling captioned matter prior to sending these reports to Records Section for handling to preclude any indexing or handling which would later be deemed unnecessary if report is destroyed.

(105-93089).

REC-3

105-210-07
22 JUN 14 1961

EX-101

105-210-07
22 JUN 14 1961

(WDS:slj)

Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re: [REDACTED] BUREAU INFORMANT 200] POLICY
105-93089.

A great deal of material furnished by the informant relates directly to contacts and activities of individuals who are of current interest to us such as top level communists as William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and such espionage subjects as the Maurice Hyman Halperins, who were identified by Elizabeth Bentley, who stated Maurice Halperin was a source of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The Halperins are now in Russia. Pertinent information relating to individuals of current interest is passed to the field for its intelligence interest. In addition, material is received which reveals the (Soviet) sympathies of some U.S. citizens and also indicates certain arrangements with the (Soviets) which may be considered against the best interests of the U.S. Government. The larger amount of data received tends to confirm information already known and it does not require in itself that the field be advised of same.

The informant furnished two specific [Hunter Reports] reflecting that two different individuals were sending post cards to USSR with another post card deliberately and carefully sealed to the first post card. In a case opened entitled "V. Podgoretsky, IS - R" (105-93499), the informant advised that both of the post cards forwarded by Podgoretsky contained a clandestine message on the inner side of the back post card. Investigations concerning James D. Caughon, the former individual mentioned, and Podgoretsky are still in progress.)

Typical data furnished by (Bureau Informant 200) are set out below:

Information concerning travel plans abroad of several SM-2 subjects; one namely, (Martin Field (101-1019)). Contacts in this country of Security Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying abroad; namely, (Mary Lou Patterson (100-136466)). Data relating to a contact by (Berndon Ferguson Mitchell) with his mother in (California). As you recall, (Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin were employed at NSA a short time ago before they defected to Russia). Data that one D. C. Mac Donald Jr., of Brighton, Massachusetts, requested publishers of the (Soviet) "Pravda" to forward to him old issues of that paper so he could distribute some to Americans in various cities here to improve their language skill and to acquaint them with the (USSR). Data concerning numerous individuals who sent New Years' greetings to (Nikita Khrushchev) and expressed their sympathies toward (Soviet) way of life; namely, (Donald A. Sautelle (105-15570)), a New York SI subject. Data revealing a contact by (John Peter Grothe (62-10583)) with the Minister of Culture in Moscow requesting this individual to promise the (Moscow) dancers would perform in U.S. and also indicating to him he expected to visit (USSR) again in the near future. (Grothe) advised him that last year

Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re: [REDACTED] BUREAU INFORMANT 200 3 POLICY
105-93089.

he worked for Senator Hubert Humphrey as a foreign relations advisor and did a lot of work in field of disarmament. He further indicated he was doing graduate work at Stanford but still served as a consultant to Senator Humphrey. Bufiles reveal one Victoria Ivanova Sandor (105-58070), a Russian-born alien and her husband (John Sandor) who is presently employed as an attorney in the Office of the Attorney General, State of Minnesota, are close friends of Orville Freeman, former Governor of Minnesota and present Secretary of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. The informant advised recently in regard to Victoria Sandor that she advised her mother in USSR she expected to move to Washington where her husband will work for Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman; that she and her husband will be friends of Freeman and President Kennedy; and that she hopes through these connections she will be able to obtain a necessary permit for her mother to come to the U.S. She indicated she will go to the President, to his wife, or to whomever it will be necessary to achieve this goal.

Information received from Bureau Informant 200 cannot be disseminated directly as it might tend to reveal this highly confidential source; however, the information is used to great advantage by the Bureau for its own intelligence at the Bureau and in the field. Investigations are opened on data furnished as above and if we can ascertain confirmation of same data from our sources in the field we can then appropriately disseminate pertinent information.

ACTION:

None, above data are furnished solely for your information.

(WBL) WBR
6/20/63

SECRET

Telephone _____
Address _____
Date _____
Cylinder _____
Counter _____
Serial _____
Event _____
Nature _____
Person _____
Subject _____
Topic _____
Title _____
Index _____
Page _____

United States Government

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: 6/21/61

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] *planned*
DECLASSIFY ON 2025-06-21

SUBJECT: ~~BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY~~

Reference is made to memorandum Stewart to Branigan 6/8/61 re same subject wherein it was requested a conference be arranged between Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and an interested CIA representative to explain to CIA specific type of "Project Hunter" material we desire. *JFK CIA*

On 6/17/61 Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart) and CIA representatives, (James Hunt, John Hertz and Thomas Chalmers) conferred at CIA concerning the "Project Hunter." The observations set out on pages 2, 3, and 4 of the referenced memorandum were individually discussed with the CIA representative. They appeared very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and were also pleased with the attention afforded it. (Mr. Hunt, at the conclusion of the conference, requested we furnish a set of guides, similar to ourfore-mentioned observations discussed, for his people. Attached is a blind memo for CIA setting forth material in which we have no interest and a specific interest.

In order to better understand the coverage of Bureau Informant 200, the writer specifically asked the following questions and received the following answers:

traffic? 1. Is the informant covering all traffic or selected

Answer: Approximately 500,000 items pass to and from each month. Approximately 200,000 items are screened. The other 300,000 escape screening because they pass through at hours when no one is on duty. Of the 200,000 items screened, approximately 1,200 items receive "close" scrutiny.

getting? 2. What portion of the informant's coverage are we

Answer: Of the 1,200 items closely scrutinized, we are receiving approximately 250 to 300 monthly.

(WDS:ct)

Enclosure

(105-93089)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

REC-32

on AUG 29 1961

SECRET

61 SEP 1 1961

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

3. Why are we getting specific type traffic, i.e., Exchange Students, (Vladimir Kazakevich) material (Kazakevich) is a prolific letter writer now in USSR who was formerly a pro-Soviet economist living in the U.S., and (Intourist) traffic (general data re arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia)? (S) (U)

Answer: Exchange Student traffic ("Mother writes to son who is a Soviet-bred exchange student in U.S. and sends family love" and vice versa. Letters are synopsized and are of no interest as such) has been sent because CIA is surveying a certain area of traffic. (Mr. Hunt) advised they derived no intelligence benefit from their survey and was interested to learn of our similar results. In regard to (Kazakevich) CIA develops a great deal of foreign intelligence data from material he transmits and receives. (Mr. Hunt) felt material would be of interest to us. He was advised we have derived nothing to date from this material as we are solely interested in the individuals involved and in order to protect this highly sensitive informant we do not route the informant's material around for general intelligence interest. (Mr. Hunt) was advised all of the informant's material is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis and the material retained is under strict control. (Mr. Hunt) was pleased in regard to our secure precautions as only a very few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter." In regard to (Intourist) traffic, (Mr. Hunt) advised we were furnished same because one of the individuals associated with an (Intourist) agency was suspected of being a (Soviet) intelligence contact. (Mr. Hunt) agreed with our observation that all Americans traveling abroad had to obtain a passport from State Department, such travel to the USSR being permissible, we could obtain any necessary data re an individual from State. (S) (U)

In regard to item number three above, it was agreed we would not receive any more (Hunter material) re Exchange Students, (Vladimir Kazakevich) (who alone provided 300 items in 1960) and (Intourist) traffic. In addition "holiday greeting" type traffic will not be furnished. Specific exceptions to the above-mentioned traffic we will not receive are set out in our blind memorandum to CIA and were set out in the referenced memorandum on pages 2 and 3. (S) (U)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089

The matter of receipt of illegible material was also discussed and it was pointed out to (Mr. Hunt) no matter how important the contents may be if the name and address of the U.S. addressee or addressor is illegible the material is of no value. It was specifically requested more legible material be furnished and, if it was obvious reproduction would be poor, we would appreciate it if U.S. person's name and address could be printed or written out. (Mr. Hunt) advised they were aware of reproduction problem and stated Xerox equipment was to be installed in the near future. This, he believed, would help the problem.

In regard to the CIA Watch List, approximately 535 names now appear on this list which is supplemented each Monday morning. (Mr. Hunt) requested we specifically place on this list the individuals on whom we want coverage even though we are presently receiving items re these persons. If their names appear on the Watch List, we will possibly get closer coverage. Attached with the blind memorandum for CIA is a list of individuals presently on the Watch List which (Mr. Hunt) requested. Interested supervisors will be advised and additional names of Communist Party members now in (Soviet-bloc) countries will be furnished CIA via our Liaison Agent.

In regard to CIA's sampling of certain types of traffic and furnishing same to us, (Mr. Hunt) was requested to advise our Liaison Agent what it was doing and after a period of six months we would furnish the results of our observations which would dictate whether we would continue to receive this new type material.

(Mr. Hunt) desired that in regard to any correspondence with CIA wherein a reference is made to a Hunter Report or the Project Hunter in any way that the letter be sent via Liaison as only a few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and CIA does not want such letters in regular mail channels.

As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, the need for this conference was to insure the (Bureau Informant 200) Program will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency to the mutual interests of CIA and the Bureau. It is believed as a result of the above conference that the Hunter material now received will be reduced approximately 50%.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY.
105-93089

At the conclusion of the conference, (Mr. Hunt) and his aides who were obviously pleased with our observations requested a similar conference in approximately six months. SA Stewart will prepare an appropriate tickler in this regard and set same for 2/18/62, at which time a suitable memo will be prepared indicating observations which might be discussed and requesting permission to attend such a conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the three copies of the attached blind memorandum be furnished to CIA by our Liaison Agent as a guide to the [unter] traffic in which we have an interest.

(WBD) WBD

b6
b7c
b7d

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

1 ; Stewart

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

August 21, 1961

RE: [PROJECT HUNTER]

*(C) 1960
CLASSIFIED BY SP-5
DECLASSIFY ON 2023-08-21*

After an extensive review of 5600 Hunter Reports transmitting innumerable items, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it relates to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expanded by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense of furnishing our Bureau this unwanted material.

I TRAFFIC WHICH HOLDS NO INTEREST:

- 1 - (Intestist) traffic (general data concerning arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia). Such travel is permissible and arrangements have been previously made through State Department for a passport. (U)
- 2 - Personal type letters, which have been translated into English, between the United States relatives, sweethearts, stamp collectors, and their Russian counterparts.
- 3 - Letters to and from Exchange Students, which again are synopsized in English and reveal that "Mother writes to son who is an Exchange Student in the United States and sends family's love," and vice versa. (U)
- 4 - No "holiday greeting" type traffic desired.

In regard to the above four categories, your Agency's laboratory processes all Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possible codes and presently furnishes us its observations concerning anyone of these appearing in the traffic.

II EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE FOUR CATEGORIES:

- A. Any traffic in the above-mentioned undesired categories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence significance. Numerous letters have the translator's

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Ehrman _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Salter _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Inman _____

*(WDS:ct)
(6) A*

SECRET

(P) - B. J. — OK

SECRET

Project Hunter

comments indicating your Agency's Watch List shows the person is a suspected intelligence agent or that the text of the letter indicates some type of code,, et cetera.

- B. Any traffic wherein it is revealed United States addressee or addresser is a United States Government employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field.
- C. Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist Soviets, an indication an individual is going to Russia and wants to become a citizen or wherein any individual professes pro-Soviet or procommunist sympathies.

III. WE ARE SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN:

- 1 - All traffic relating to top communists traveling abroad which we have been getting regularly and from which we have been extracting a great deal of intelligence data such as (Mary Lou Patterson, the Pittmans, William Z. Foster, Claude Lightfoot, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn) et cetera.
- 2 - All traffic on specific individuals we place on the Watch List.
- 3 - All traffic on special individuals such as NSA defectors (William Hamilton Martin and Bertram Ferguson Mitchell).
- 4 - All traffic of a clandestine type such as that in the (V. Pedgoretsky) case.

IV

If possible, it would be appreciated if an effort could be made to furnish as legible a copy of Hunter material

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Project Hunter

as possible. In particular, if it is evident paper from which copy is to be made is not type to give a good reproduction, it would be appreciated if a notation concerning name and address of United States recipient or sender could be made from original. Frequently, information of interest is received but United States person's name on reproduction is indistinguishable and information becomes of no value.

V LIST OF PERSON DESIRED ON THE WATCH LIST AS OF AUGUST 19, 1961

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
BERLAND, MARK V.	Fiat 15 Lazovinskaya St. 11 Perm 34, USSR
FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.	Apartment 6B, 1640 Nelson Avenue, Bronx, New York
HASKELL, ROY	12 Crown Street Brooklyn, New York
KAHN, ALBERT EUGENE	1302 Reseda Way, Glen Ellen, California
KOVOLENSK, V. P.	General P. O., Kiev I, USSR
PECHTER, BERNARD DAVID	2161 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, California
ROBERTS, HOLLAND DENITTE	383 Hadenia, Palo Alto, California. During Week Days - 787 Castro Street, San Francisco, California
SUCHOMECK, ALEX (SMI)	1315 Lincoln Avenue, Pacific Grove, California

SECRET

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Project Hunter

TRILUPAITIENE, ALDOVA

131/14-1, Antakalnis Street
Vilnius, Lithuania

TRILUPAITIS, LEONAS
(also card on
Leonas Algeda)

Apartment 1B, 104 Irvington
Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

U.S. GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

to : V. G. Sullivan

from : R. A. Branigan

suspect: [REDACTED] BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

DATE: 11/3/62

[1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart]

Bray

Index _____
Sullivan _____
Scholes _____
Stark _____
Schoen _____
Gandy _____
Clegg _____
Colbeck _____
Shaw _____
Muller _____
Kane _____
Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Shultz _____
Gandy _____

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives (James Hunt, John Marta and Thomas Chalmers) at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

CIA advised that its [Hunter-Dex] coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by [Bureau Informant 200] of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/01 BY SP/ML

WDS:jes
(4)

(105-53068)

Enclosure

ATTACHMENT
65 NOV 9 1962

EX-118

7 NOV 5 1962

RECORDED PAGE NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Guidelines
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart
1 - Denison
1 - DeAngelis
1 - Stangart

To whom	
Relevant	
Name	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Dobson	
Dresser	
McNamee	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Region	
Country	

TO :

W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8-25-61

FROM :

W. A. Branigan

Subject:

BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY

On 8-17-61, a conference took place between Special Agents (Sam J. Papioh, W. D. Stewart) and representatives of CIA in regard to (Bureau Informant 200). As a result, CIA was recently furnished a guide as to Bureau Informant material we desire. This guide was prepared after discussion with several members of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and Internal Security Sections. In addition, CIA was furnished a current list of names previously placed on the CIA Watch List by us. In this regard, the CIA representative advised that, although we are getting coverage on certain individuals, to insure we get complete coverage on each individual we desire it on, they should be specifically added to the Watch List. This Watch List is revised each Monday; therefore, any person not included on this list at present can be included by forwarding a routing slip anytime to (W. D. Stewart, Room 644 HB) bearing the individual's name, his address in U.S., and indicating the period coverage is desired. A list will be compiled by (Mr. Stewart) weekly and furnished to CIA via liaison. The CIA representative further advised that very few people there have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and that any communication referring to this project or a "Hunter Report" should be forwarded to CIA via Liaison and appropriately flagged for our Liaison agent's attention to avoid the communication getting into CIA's regular mail channel.

The CIA representative further advised, if any security subject travels to the USSR and his name is added to the Watch List, CIA will promptly afford him coverage while he is abroad.

RECOMMENDATION:

Exhibit

REC-47 (125-6089-32)

That the above information be discussed at the next conference held by the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and the Internal Security Sections and that all agents in the above-mentioned sections be reminded to furnish (Mr. Stewart) a copy of any letter prepared from Bureau Informant 200 material to assist him in continually evaluating the program.

(HDS:ekg:jk)
(2)

(105-93089)

(MDS) W.C.
9/1/61, Section Chief 5-1000Done at Section 5-1000
Submitted three weeks later
44

10/30/62

RE: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200)

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200:

Information indicating travel plans to the USSR of numerous Communist Party subjects; data indicating pro/Soviet sympathies of U. S. individuals; data indicating a U. S. person may be serving as a Soviet courier; data indicating the existence of particular (Russian) social and art clubs in the U. S.; data indicating a desire of U. S. students to study in (USSR); data indicating pro/Castro sympathies of U. S. persons; data revealing present activity, feelings, and former associates of (Bernon Ferguson Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin, recent National Security Agency (NSA) defectors; data revealing U. S. military personnel are in contact with official establishments and/or individuals in (USSR); data revealing activities of the (Maurice Hyman Halperin), now residing in (Cuba) and of their son (David Charles Halperin, a medical student at the University of Chicago) and data indicating current whereabouts of (Carl and Alice Jerome) Communist Party subjects; and data relating to the current whereabouts of (James M. McMillin, Jr., a former U. S. soldier attached to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia, who previously defected and married a Soviet).

Data of Special Interest:

During the present (Cuban) crisis, we have identified several pro-Castro sympathizers in U. S. through their contacts with (Cubans) at (Friendship University, Moscow) and have been alerted to their activity. We have learned that (Russian) school authorities are greatly displeased with (Hulda S. Clark, daughter of Negro Communist Party subject William Clark of Newark) because of her behavior. She too evidenced discontentment there. Her educational trip to (USSR) served as CP propaganda. We were alerted to (Maurice Halperin's) intended return to U. S. We have been advised of (Yillie Mae Tealich's) intended visit to (USSR). Her daughter in (Moscow) is suspected as being the propaganda-radio announcer (Moscow Molly). We are developing U. S. contacts of (Helen Kageh-Pozner, UN) employee discharged in 1950's for failure to answer questions re possible espionage involvement, through correspondence of her with relatives in (Russia).

(105-93089-54)

10-11-1962

such as Valeriy Tereshchenko. One of (Tereshchenko's) contacts is believed to be a target for contact by KGB and another is the son-in-law of the woman in whose apartment Viktor Kravchenko had been visiting. (Kravchenko) is a (Soviet) defector who recently committed defection. The informant has advised of the activities and contacts of Vladislav Krasnow, Soviet defector to Sweden in 1962. The Bureau was not aware previously that (Krasnow) was in the U.S.

Although much material regarding communists and the Communist Party (CP) is also received from other sources, the informant continues to furnish additional details and new information regarding changes of employment and residence, travel, contacts and activities. Data regarding attempts of the DuBois Clubs to expand nationally and internationally was furnished in items on (Paula Garb) International Secretary, who went to the USSR to marry a (Soviet) if he can obtain a divorce. Items pertaining to (Mary Lou Canache) (daughter of CP leader) told of the birth of her daughter, reconciliation with her (Cuban) husband, plans to go to Cuba to live and that one of her friends, a Security Index subject, was in Ghana when she was believed to be in the U.S.

Data is received regarding travel and contacts of (Mary Bakozy) (widow of suspected espionage agent), who attended the Higher Party School of the Ukraine in Kiev, USSR. Information continues to be received regarding her son, (Andrew Bakozy) who was allegedly studying ballet but actually attended the above school for almost two years. This has included his contacts, change of employment and residence and racial, poverty and Progressive Labor Party activities in Chicago. One of his contacts now at this school has been identified as (Zeddie Kordash) son of Canadian communists. The source has also advised that (Irene Bakozy) and three unidentified individuals plan to study dancing in (Kiev) this summer (possibly at the above-mentioned school which maintains a special section to combine lessons in dancing and indoctrination) and that (Bernard Francis Taylor) (son of CP official), who went to the USSR with a musical and dancing group, remained in (Kiev) to attend school. (Ken Surikov) son of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen residing in State of Washington, is attending school in (Kiev). He is believed to be from the U.S. or Canada.

Additional information is received regarding persons involved in the peace movement, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, women's organizations, "teach-ins" (one has been in contact with a (GRU) officer), racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and other organizations. Items reveal names of U.S. contacts with members of such (Soviet) propaganda organizations as the (Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Committees For Return to the Homeland) and others.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : W. C. Sullivan

FROM : W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200)- POLICY

DATE: March 27, 1963

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Stewart
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Harrell

For approximately one month beginning in February, 1963, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had coverage of mail destined to Cuba which was funneled through New York City from approximately one-half of the United States. The results of this highly confidential project were furnished us under the code ("Hunter-Vince") through special arrangements made with CIA. The project has been temporarily discontinued so CIA can analyze the results and decision will be made as to its reinstatement based on the results achieved.

During the period the coverage was in effect, we received 94 items and opened 15 new cases based on the material. While no specific data was developed indicating clandestine messages were being transmitted, we know that one of the illegal (Cuban) agent networks has plans for mail drops in the New York City area, and this coverage could conceivably lead us to these drops in the future. We have previously furnished CIA summaries concerning positive results achieved through its coverage of (Soviet) mail for its assistance in evaluating whether that program should be continued. It is believed we should do so in this instance.

ACTION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum containing a summary of the action taken by us as a result of the Hunter-Vince coverage will be furnished CIA by liaison for assistance of CIA in evaluating whether the program should be continued.

Enclosure

105-93089

RAM:djw
(s)

ENCLOSURE

for [initials] 105-93089-1067
Ex-102 [initials] 105-93089-1067
to [initials] 17 APR 3 1963
[initials] Mollard
[initials] forwarded to [initials]
plant JCM-2727k3
[initials]

67 APR 4 - 1963

APR 4 1963

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INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data received regarding the following current and former double agents and sources has been utilized to evaluate their reliability: (Lake Chia Liu Yuan; [Pedro Celestino Jimenez Merens] Gordon Philip Polley; Hugo Rodriguez-Santos; Julius (S) Shell; NY 445-S) Phyllis Oja; Samuel Jaffa; NY 2911-S; NY 3656-S; CG 6563-S) Mr. and Mrs. George R. Atkins; and Boris I. Obilevich. The field has been advised of individuals in close contact with Soviets with the request to consider for development as sources.

Information regarding Soviet exchange students (eight are (SSR) agents) includes names of associates, activities, travel, types of material requested to obtain and individuals with whom they continue to maintain contact after they leave the U.S. Similar information is furnished regarding other Soviets in the U.S. as a result of the exchange program. Material is also furnished regarding U.S. citizens who travel to the (SSR) as part of the exchange.

Data regarding current and former U.S. exchange students shows (Soviet) and U.S. contacts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in Russia. A former exchange student has been in contact with a suspected espionage agent regarding (Ralph Maylau) (according to (Neenke), the (SSR) was to attempt recruitment of (Maylau)). The source has received former exchange student (Michael Cole's) travel plans and continued contacts with (Soviet) (she is seen as an espionage agent) and (Henry Buttenbach's) attempts to obtain a divorce in order to marry a (Soviet) girl. Similar information is furnished regarding U.S. citizens who are, or have been, in Russia but are not under the exchange program. These include (Golly Harris, Natasha Kent, Kathy Boudin and Alexander Nikolaiuk). Two of the four U.S. citizens who have applied for entrance to Soviet universities have stated that they desire to become (Soviet) citizens. (Milegros Ruiz Aponte, Puerto Rican nationalist in the USSR) is using an alias in her correspondence. Another (Puerto Rican) went to (Cuba) before he left for the (SSR).

Material has been received regarding three employees of USIA, two U.S. citizens employed by the UN, a Federal employee who intends to marry a (Soviet) girl, three individuals involved with (Soviet) women and two U.S. contacts of (Galina Smirnova (an Intourist guide) who has compromised Americans in the past).

Contacts of foreign exchange students and aliens in the U.S. from Canada, Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Haiti, Italy, France, Iraq and Africa with their friends in the (SSR) who are studying at (Friendship) University or other schools show that

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

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they may be communists. Two foreign students and an exile from (Bolivia) have been acting as intermediaries. Several have applied for admittance to (Friendship) University and other schools in the USSR because of finances or ideology. A Nicaraguan Marxist in the U.S. is acting as an intermediary for an individual at (Friendship) University by forwarding mail to (Bolivia). Data is furnished regarding foreign students who attended school in the USSR and are now in the U.S. One of these appears to have been compromised before he left (Russia) and another brought his (Soviet) wife to the U.S.

Items are received regarding (Soviets) who have entered the U.S. as wives of Americans; Victoria Sandor (now a Federal employee); Alice Anderson; Linda Olsen, who has advised that she was approached by (Soviet) Intelligence when in the USSR in 1965; Irina Berwitz; Nataliya Kentigaford; and Rosita Brdyton, wife of an Alaskan politician and newspaperman, who has become involved with a (Russian) born U.S. Army Captain. The source advised of contacts, travel and study in the USSR of Mrs. Kemp Tolley, (Soviet) wife of former U.S. Naval Attaché, who has admitted furnishing information regarding Americans to the (Soviets) in the 1940's.

Much material has been furnished regarding U.S. citizens' travel plans, including those of known subversives, their (Soviet) relatives and contacts and difficulties encountered by the tourists with (Soviet) authorities. Data has been received regarding (Soviets) and former U.S. citizens who have traveled, or intend to travel, to the U.S., their contacts, activities and relatives. Several had renounced their U.S. citizenship and had been engaged in questionable activities in the past. (Mary Mackler), who recently returned to the U.S., has had numerous contacts with known subversives, at least two of whom were connected with espionage in the past. Material is received on U.S. defectors now in the USSR.

Additional information received includes: plans of seven individuals to repatriate to the USSR; U.S. contacts with current and former known and suspected (Soviet) agents now in the USSR (Vladimir Sosetskiy, Vladimir Posner, Eugenia Olkhina, Leonid Rimjans, Vladimir Ponomarov, Igor Melchik and others); activities and contacts of current and former known and suspected espionage agents now in the U.S. (Aaron Pressman, Josef Zarovich, Victor Perlo, Helen Pozner Wilga and others); the death of (Georgi Lieb) (suspected of working as black market currency operator for KGB) and continuation of his contacts by his wife; activities of Kirill Alexeiev (suspect in (Umbel) case) family; (Soviet) contacts and travel of (D. G. Brennan) who, according to (FBI) was to be approached by (KGB) contacts of (Olga Yarkevitch) (widow of ship designer) with (KGB) agent, travel to USSR as a guest of organization to receive her husband's archives and her illness; the (USSR) contact of Major Abdel Oteil of United Arab Republic who was attending the (FBI-National Academy) with individual in the USSR; U.S. contacts of several defectors and (Soviet) repatriates.

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