

diff-jfk: record 104-10332-10007 - Page 1 - (diff between 2025 and 2023)

Highlighted changes between 2025/104-10332-10007.pdf and 2023/docid-32404520.pdf - fresh pages only

Date: 03/11/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10332-10007  
RECORD SERIES : JFK  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJFILES-DECLASS STDS

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : ARRS-CIA ISSUES: EMPLOYEE NAMES  
DATE : 01/07/1994  
PAGES : 24-35

SUBJECTS : JFK ASSASSINATION  
UNIT INDEX  
ARRS ISSUES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER  
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/01/03  
COMMENTS : JFK-M-17 : F8 : 2000.02.14.15:12:41:437044 : UNIT  
INDEX: 54 PAGES ARE DIPS

45

Released under the John F. Kennedy  
Assassination Records Collection Act of  
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:HW  
55360 Date: 05-10-2023

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10332-10007

document had 47 pg Diff.

50 page count is wrong

104-10332-10007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL7 January 1984  
7 January 1994

~~file~~  
~~(DO guidelines~~  
~~(DO guide~~  
~~Name's~~  
~~Cuban~~  
~~Cuban~~

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Barry Harrelson @ DA  
**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Barry Harrelson @ DA

**FROM:** Bryant Rogers  
**FROM:** Bryant Rogers

**SUBJECT:** MEETING WITH LINDA FLORES  
**SUBJECT:** MEETING WITH LINDA FLORES

**REFERENCE:**

On 6 Jan we met with Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well known Cubans and Cuban Organizations. On 6 Jan we met with Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.

The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agreed that we can release the names of these major players with whom CIA worked with during as we can within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap late 1964 (or earlier), when needed. With whom CIA discussed our relationship with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could release the fact that we had funding vehicles for the US Govt. CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may feel it necessary to release gross budget figures for overall budgets. The DO would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were gross ballpark specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individual results claim that one was paid more than another. In reporting these organizations, it was acknowledged by the DO that we could release generic operational activities such as publishing journals or financing peasant revolutionary groups in Central America. The DO remained as that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, if we maintained our practice of no published agents and assets and any specifics on intelligence relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel, agents and assets and any specifics on tradecraft.

When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that they have been mentioned in open literature. Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that they have been mentioned in open literature.

With regard to DO location numbers (18 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA Div. She had no problem with the release of the DO location numbers (18 for Cuba) since it was no longer valid 60-63 time frame but would check with LA Div. She had no problem with the release of the Bell location in cables since it was no longer used.

**CC:** J. Barry Harrelson @ DA  
**CC:** Richard F. Kovalik @ DA  
John F. Pereira @ DA-Y @ DA  
John F. Pereira @ DA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

8 November 1995

8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,  
ARRB Staff  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,  
ARRB Staff  
FROM: Barry Marrelson,  
CIS/CSI/HRG  
FROM: Barry Marrelson,  
CIS/CSI/HRG  
SUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, Country  
Designators, Action Indicators and  
Employee True Names (U)  
SUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, Country  
Designators, Action Indicators and  
Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)

Attachment

Attachment

Unclassified When Separated  
From Attachment.  
~~Unclassified When Separated  
From Attachment.~~

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SECRET

SECRET

JFK  
JFK142 95  
142 95

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chief, Historical Review Group  
**FROM:** Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.  
**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chief, Historical Review Group  
**TO:** Focal Point for ARRB  
**SUBJECT:** Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country  
 Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True  
 Names  
**SUBJECT:** Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country  
 Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True  
 Names

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

~~During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.~~

~~Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.~~

~~In this manner, it will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.~~

~~Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational files in those instances when the credibility of the interest narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.~~

~~Subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.~~

~~Action Indicator Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the action indicator line is long.~~

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CL BY 0695930  
 DECL OADR  
 DRV HUM 4-82  
 CL BY 0695930  
 DECL OADR  
 DRV HUM 4-82

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SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action  
Indicators and Employee True Names Designators, Action  
Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a specific liaison service.  
~~Context identifies a source or a relationship with a specific liaison service.~~

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we will release names of employees who have worked in an overt status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a document. We will continue to protect the true names of a employee cited as serving in a field position. References to field personnel in true name are unusual; however, since pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between Headquarters and the field.

*for Johnny Sons*  
*for Charly Sons*  
Frederick C. Wickham, Jr.  
Frederick C. Wickham, Jr.



**Assassination Records Review Board**  
**600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530**  
**600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530**  
**(202) 724-0888 • Fax: (202) 724-0457**  
**(202) 724-0888 • Fax: (202) 724-0457**

November 9, 1995  
 November 9, 1995

HAND DELIVERED  
HAND DELIVERED

Mr. John Pereira, Director  
Mr. John Pereira, Director  
 Historical Review Group  
Historical Review Group  
 Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Center for the Study of Intelligence  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, D.C. 20505  
Washington, D.C., 20505

Re: ARRB requests for evidence  
Re: ARRB requests for evidence

Dear John:  
Dear John:

I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and point to where we would like to proceed in the future.  
I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and point to where we would like to proceed in the future.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.  
I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.

We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we perceive that the task has been more difficult and time-consuming than Congress anticipated, we have found that the careful education process in which we have been involved has helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.  
We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we perceive that the task has been more difficult and time-consuming than Congress anticipated, we have found that the careful education process in which we have been involved has helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.

We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties are understandable — and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which we are engaged — we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of records at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of records will be reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.  
We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties are understandable — and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which we are engaged — we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of records at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of records will be reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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 DECLASSIFY AND RELEASE CIA INFORMATION  
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 IN THIS DOCUMENT. INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. John Pereira  
Mr. John Pereira  
November 9, 1995  
November 9, 1995  
Page 2  
Page 2

We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, specific information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an informed judgment regarding release of the information.

*We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, specific information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an informed judgment regarding release of the information.*

informed judgment regarding release of the information.

The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the postponement of this issue. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote the December (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.

*The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the postponement of this issue. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote the December (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.*

Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests now in an attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible of which records we will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995.

*Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests now in an attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible of which records we will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995.*

We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a briefing is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.

*We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a briefing is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.*

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely yours,

David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Executive Director

Enclosures

Enclosures

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET11 December 1995  
11 December 1995

## NOTE FOR THE FILE

## NOTE FOR THE FILE


SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

1. On 1 December, Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the Office of Central Governing, briefed the Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board and other Board staff members. Also participating from CIA were John Atkins and Alexander Neiman of the HRG IMS; Linda Cipriani, OGC; and Barry Harrelson and Jeff from HRG IMS; Linda Cipriani, OGC; and Barry Harrelson and I from HRG.

2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect the names of former Agency employees that appeared in the JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people who participated under cover of law. They were identified in the public record and former CIA employees were identified in the records of other agencies. He discussed the efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.

3. The purpose of the briefing was to assist the Board in its review of business when it meets on 12-13 December. The Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing, evidence of a mistake for each of the names that will be discussed at the Board's meeting.



John F. Pereira  
John F. Pereira

CL BY: 0185964  
~~CL BY: 0185964~~  
 CL REASON: CCA-12-12-12C  
~~CL REASON: CCA-12-12-12C~~  
 DRCL ON: A-7  
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# MEMORANDUM

## MEMORANDUM

March 20, 1996

**March 20, 1996**

To: Review Board  
 To: Review Board  
 cc: David Marwell  
 cc: ~~David Marwell~~  
 CIA Team  
 From: T. Jeremy Gunn  
 From: ~~T. Jeremy Gunn~~  
 Subject: Board Guidelines on Release of CIA Officer Names  
 Subject: Board Guidelines on Release of CIA Officer Names

**CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
 DECLASSIFICATION AND TO  
 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
 APPROVING THE BOARD  
 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT**

The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines on the release of true names of CIA officers:

**the release of true names of CIA officers:**

When the true name of a CIA officer (i.e. past or present employee of CIA) appears in a document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part II (below).

**Part I. Categories of Officers.**

**Part I. Categories of Officers.**

1. Living officers. For living (present or former) officers, CIA must prove that:  
 (a) ~~If the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future), (b) the officer is either working or retired under cover, and (c) the officer objects to the release of his or her true name.~~ If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board prescriptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the officer's true name until the year 2010.

2. Where current status of former officer is unknown. Where CIA has been unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has made a good faith showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may postpone the true

- 2 -

- 2 -

name beyond June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997, additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or category 3 (below).  
~~Name beyond June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997, additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or category 3 (below).~~

3. Names having effect on current intelligence interests. If CIA believes that the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide evidence that: (a) the other person is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of the true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living person (including family members); or (d) the release of the true name would cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until such other date as CIA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could be made without causing harm.

be made without causing harm.

#### Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.

#### Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.

The Board presumptively will postpone the release of names consistent with categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear in a context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of the importance of such a person and provide CIA with the opportunity to provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~**From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani**

**NOTE FOR:** Barry R. Blane G DO  
 Daniel J. O'Connell G DO  
 Blaine S. Staples G DO  
 Daniel S. Williams G DO  
**FROM:** Linda C. Cipriani G DO  
 *cc: Barry R. Blane G DO*  
**DATE:** 03/04/96 09:26:53 AM  
 *03/04/96 09:26:53 AM*  
**SUBJECT:** JFK - Central Cover appeal

The General Counsel and I met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things, how to deal with the potential public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel they are not getting enough information to make that decision.

Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provide you with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which I will pass on to you including how to deal with Whittom. I would at the very least like to be able to suggest that we attempt contact again (either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course, any suggestions you have at this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting privacy is something everyone at CIA and want to appeal just on the principle of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. Until we work out an agreement with the Board, you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting.

In the meantime, can you please provide me the following figures:  
 In the meantime, can you please provide me the following figures:

1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. (Isn't it 150?) and the following breakdown if available:
  1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. (Isn't it 150?) and the following breakdown if available:
    - # living abroad
    - # living abroad
    - # of those retired under cover vs. those whose cover has been rolled back or lifted
    - # of those who still work for us in cover/cover capacity
    - # of those who still work for us in cover/cover capacity
2. The # of responses we received to date.
3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don't release.
4. The # of responses to date saying that they don't care.

I realize you are all out of the office these days, but I would appreciate getting this as soon as you can. Thanks.  
*Please note you are all out of the office these days, but I would appreciate getting this as soon as you can. Thanks.*

**CC:** J. Barry Harrison  
 J. Barry Harrison  
 Eleanor E. Roman G DO  
 Eleanor C. Neiman G DO  
 Frederick Wickham G DO  
 Frederick Wickham G DO

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~8 March 1996  
8 March 1996**MEMORANDUM FOR:**  
**MEMORANDUM FOR:**J. Barry Harellson  
John Pereira  
John Pereira**FROM:**  
**FROM:**  
**SUBJECT:**  
**SUBJECT:**  
**REFERENCE:**  
**REFERENCE:**Linda C. Cipriani  
Linda C. Cipriani  
DCUOGC/LD  
DCUOGC/LDJFK - March 18 Board Meeting  
JFK - March 18 Board Meeting~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani  
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani**NOTE FOR:** Paula A. Sweeney @ DCI  
**NOTE FOR:** Robert G. Davis @ DCI  
Robert G. Caudle @ DCI  
**FROM:** Linda C. Cipriani @ DCI  
**DATE/TIM:** 03/09/96 02:50:08 PM  
**SUBJECT:** JFK/March 18 Board Meeting  
**SUBJECT:** JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

I have been informed that Dave Edgers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should go as well. I have been informed that Dave Edgers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should go as well.

The issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.

Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.

1. Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a "window" in which all stations would be opened (1990-64). Of course, if there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon presentation of substantive evidence.

- HBG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable them to avoid raising potential appeals every month
- Dave Edgers needs to be aligned with this idea that would enable them to avoid raising potential appeals every month
- Jeff has informed me he has no objection to Dave, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. Jeff and Dave should be prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.

2. The Board recently released the names of 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or so I am told). The thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that they were really interested in having Jeff and the Board come to a mutually agreeable way to deal with 16 cover employees. I contacted Bob Caudle from Jeff that the consensus is that CIA will appeal on just the principal. If this is true, the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this. In that case we are willing to compromise with them to find a suitable alternative (using pseudos or generic descriptions like "case officer").

3. I will be out all next week but Samy Harellson (MHC) (30292) and John Pereira (CSI) (30373) will be happy to fill you in on the details. Barry will be contacting Bob Caudle next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~29 July 1996  
29 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group  
FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.  
FROM: DO, Focal Point for ARRB  
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names  
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

1. Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the organizations that cooperatively work with us to provide those cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage an inappropriate release could cause.

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a common ~~a~~ ~~We will release the occurrence of a name when a common last name appears by itself or in conjunction with a common first name such that it does not tend to specifically identify the individual.~~

b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it remains ~~b~~ ~~We will release the occurrence of a name if it remains unidentified after a reasonable search is conducted.~~

B. Identifiable names for employees that retired overtly:

In most cases, overt employees' names will be released, but in some cases overt employees may have a portion of their employment remain under cover. Such cases will require the same review as that of an employee who remained under cover into retirement.

~~In most cases, overt employees' names will be released, but in some cases overt employees may have a portion of their employment remain under cover. Such cases will require the same review as that of an employee who remained under cover into retirement.~~

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~  
~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names  
 SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

C. Identifiable names for employees that retired covertly; Identifiable names for employees that retired covertly:

a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a current address and contact the person. If the person objects to the release of his or her name for reasons associated with current life style issues, we will pursue objections to the release of the name if the person does not have objections based upon personal circumstances we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the current address, but it can be determined that the individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to continue to protect the name since source of income or benefits can not be altered without prior notification to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or other active benefit, we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

c. We will make a reasonable attempt to review the name to look for identifiable harm to the person's safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national security or foreign relations. Assuming that none of the previous concerns are identified, we will review the potential damage to the cover mechanism of cover provider by the specific occurrence of the name if released.

2. Because families of deceased employees could be the beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees cover legend or practice review them the same as we would the employees employee legend. We also have second and third generation officers following in the footsteps of their parents that could be negatively impacted by the revelation. parents that could be negatively impacted by the revelation.


3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include all internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names  
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

within the documentation when requesting continued protection of  
the name.

4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during  
our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based  
upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover  
arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an  
unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.

  
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.  
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY  
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names  
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)  
IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)

Distribution:

Distribution Addressee

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1 1 - C/OGC

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1 1 - ~~IMSG/HCS~~

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1 1 - ~~ESG Chrono~~

1 1 - ESG Chrono

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~~CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS~~  
~~CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS~~  
RELEASE IN FULL  
~~2000~~  
~~2000~~

11 February 1997  
11 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC  
FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC

SUBJECT: Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re  
SUBJECT: ~~Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re~~  
~~Treatment of CIA Officer Names in JFK~~  
~~Collection~~  
~~Collection~~

1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to
  1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to compare a 20 March 1996 ARRB memorandum written by T. Jeremy Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response dated 20 July 1966, authored by Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. Both deal with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in the JFK collection -- when they will be postponed and when they will be released.  
~~they will be released.~~
  2. First the ARRB Memorandum. Gunn describes in legal terms the Board's position on the postponement or release of CIA officers' true names. He makes a proffer which states that there is a presumption in favor of release akin to a legal evidentiary rule which causes a burden to shift to the other party (CIA) to prove something. In this instance, it is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift the burden not only back to neutral but to the other side of neutral which permits postponement.  
~~permits postponement.~~
  3. The Gunn memorandum then sets out the criteria required to meet the burden under several situations.  
~~3. The Gunn memorandum then sets out the criteria required to meet the burden under several situations.~~

A. For officers who are still alive he states that the  
A. For officers who are still alive he states that the

proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in  
proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in  
number and all three must be met.  
number and all three must be met.

i. The officer must be living outside of the U.S.  
i. The officer must be living outside of the U.S.

OR,

OR,

(Reasonably be expected to travel outside of  
(Reasonably be expected to travel outside of  
the U.S. in the foreseeable future;  
the U.S. in the foreseeable future;

AND,

AND,

ii. The officer is either working ... (presumably  
ii. The officer is either working ... (presumably

a current staff officer, contract employee,  
a current staff officer, contract employee,  
or independent contractor) ... or is retired  
or independent contractor) ... or is retired

under cover;  
under cover;

AND,

AND,

iii. The officer objects to the release of his or  
iii. The officer objects to the release of his or

her true name.

her true name.

COMMENT: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing  
COMMENT: Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing

and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note again  
and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note again  
that the three elements are joined by an ~~§ AND~~ meaning all  
that the three elements are joined by an ~~§ AND~~ meaning all  
elements must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the  
elements must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the  
first requirement of living or traveling outside of the U.S.  
first requirement of living or traveling outside of the U.S.  
is not tied to ~~§ cover~~. Many officers who do not work  
is not tied to ~~§ cover~~. Many officers who do not work  
under cover all of the time are, in fact, provided cover  
under cover all of the time are, in fact, provided cover  
for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might  
for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might  
~~§ reasonably~~ be expected to travel outside of the U.S.  
~~§ reasonably~~ be expected to travel outside of the U.S.  
would warrant postponement of his true name. This would  
would warrant postponement of his true name. This would

seen to include every CIA employee, contract employee and independent contractor past and present.  
~~seen to include every CIA employee, contract employee and independent contractor past and present.~~

With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the Board are simply in error. To my knowledge they have no authority to require that an individual be consulted concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having his or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover, thus having the name released. This decision does not lie in the first instance with the individual but is an institutional decision which lies solely within the purview of the Agency and the executive branch of the government.

CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if release of an officer's true name will compromise an existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, expose others who share or have shared the same cover. It alone knows if release of an officer's name will expose CIA sponsorship (a cover entity) of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if release of an officer's name will violate a promise of confidentiality to a commercial cover sponsor which could cause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to the sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.

Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer (either current or retired) via a via staying with his or her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current

employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If, after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer should be permitted to decide. He or she should be should be permitted to decide. He or she should be counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency does not object to the removal from cover, the individual does not object to the removal from cover, the individual should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum with respect to # cover into retirement, # cover for with respect to # cover into retirement, # cover for life, # etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard life, # etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any circumstance.

By way of summary, it is CIA not the Board and not the By way of summary, it is CIA not the Board and not the individual officer who makes the initial decision concerning individual officer who makes the initial decision concerning the maintenance or lifting of cover.

B. Former officers, status unknown. While the B. Former officers, status unknown. While the heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue. officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue. Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under

cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board  
and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is  
and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is  
a ~~good faith showing that reasonable attempts~~ were made  
a ~~good faith showing that reasonable attempts~~ were made  
to locate the officer and failed.  
to locate the officer and failed.

The section contains the additional provision which  
advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June  
advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June  
of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the  
of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the  
board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either  
board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either  
category 1 or category 3. Such ~~additional evidence~~ must  
category 1 or category 3. Such ~~additional evidence~~ must  
be provided by 1 May 1977.  
be provided by 1 May 1977.

The requirements or tests of this section for the  
The requirements or tests of this section for the  
Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of  
Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of  
uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to  
uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to  
locate each ~~current status unknown~~ officer. The record  
locate each ~~current status unknown~~ officer. The record  
of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in  
of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in  
support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO  
support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO  
Memorandum mentions of the possibility of asking the IRS or  
Memorandum mentions of the possibility of asking the IRS or  
the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should  
the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should  
probably be done. I recall however, that the Service will  
probably be done. I recall however, that the Service will  
assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but  
assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but  
only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the  
only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the  
individual and then contacting him and ask that he be in  
individual and then contacting him and ask that he be in  
touch with his former employer. I have no current knowledge  
touch with his former employer. I have no current knowledge  
of cleared contacts at the OPM but they existed in the past  
of cleared contacts at the OPM but they existed in the past  
and I assume they continue.  
and I assume they continue.

C. Names having effect on current intelligence  
C. Names having effect on current intelligence

interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher  
interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher

level of concern to this section and its criteria than the level of concern to this section and its criteria than the previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the criteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets criteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year 2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate 2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4 ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4 and "OR." They are: and "OR." They are:

- i. The officer must be currently engaged in  
i. The officer must be currently engaged in clandestine activities; OR, clandestine activities; OR,
- ii. The release of the officer's name would  
ii. The release of the officer's name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations with current intelligence value (presumably, the latter with current intelligence value (presumably, the latter permits a review into the officer's past activities, agent permits a review into the officer's past activities, agent relationships, and cover positions); OR, relationships, and cover positions); OR,
- iii. The release of the officer's true name would  
iii. The release of the officer's true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living person (including family members); (read broadly, this person (including family members); (read broadly, this provision would include, the individual, former agents, provision would include, the individual, former agents, anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, i.e. a anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, i.e. a dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy); OR, dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy); OR,
- iv. The release of the officer's name would cause a  
iv. The release of the officer's name would cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to drive the proverbial Mack truck through). drive the proverbial Mack truck through).

4. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of harm. Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name being considered for postponement is important to the assassination story, the Board will release it. This means for those few individuals who may be viewed as important to the story, truly substantial evidence must be brought to bear. Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and the only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to the President.

the President.

5. The Directorate of Operations Memorandum. The

basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained within the memorandum is as follows. For officers who retired under cover, the first step will be to contact them and ask if they want their true name released. Per the comments on page three supra, this should be the last step of the review, not the first.

A. Other Comments. The resources and data bases which will be researched for each name should be clearly established and followed in a uniform manner. Deviation from a set, orderly process will open CIA determinations to criticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name that should be postponed.

that should be postponed.

B. In addition to the data bases described --

retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of

security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given  
to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases  
such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union  
might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an  
address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact  
an individual and ask that he be in touch.  
~~such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union  
might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an  
address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact  
an individual and ask that he be in touch.~~

C. A comment must be made about the idea of  
~~C. A comment must be made about the idea of~~  
universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To  
~~universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To~~  
~~the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,~~  
~~may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release~~  
~~receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas~~  
~~mission and possibly, place his life in danger.~~  
~~the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,~~  
~~of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will~~  
~~receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas~~  
~~mission and possibly, place his life in danger.~~

6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as  
~~6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as~~  
~~we commence to sort out the manner in which we will deal~~  
~~with the true names. Clearly, we need to begin to quickly~~  
~~identify those names which can be released, those on which~~  
~~there is some question, and those few on which we really~~  
~~need to dig in our heals.~~  
~~we commence to sort out the manner in which we will deal~~  
~~with the true names. Clearly, we need to begin to quickly~~  
~~identify those names which can be released, those on which~~  
~~there is some question, and those few on which we really~~  
~~need to dig in our heals.~~

6. I would be glad to discuss with you any of the  
~~6. I would be glad to discuss with you any of the~~  
~~issues raised herein.~~  
~~issues raised herein.~~

Gary M. Breneman  
Gary M. Breneman

~~SECRET - WORKING PAPER~~5 March, 1997  
5 March, 1997

Memorandum For: Chief/HRG  
 Memorandum For: Chief/HRG

From: Barry Harrelson  
 From: Barry Harrelson  
 Subject: Name Issue / Status of Review  
 Subject: Name Issue / Status of Review  
 Reference: Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)  
 Reference: Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)  
 4 March 1997  
 4 March 1997

Name Issue  
Name Issue

I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you. Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively. They found the proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they could not predict the Boards reaction. Per Marwell, one member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a person worked for the CIA it should be known.

Apparently our timing is excellent. Marwell is planning to propose to the Board that they change the process from the focus on individual postponements to documents. Under the new approach his staff would have the authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would be placed before the Board. Marwell is convinced that even with an additional year they will not finish the project with the current approach. He sees our proposal on the names as an example of how the process would work.

Marwell recommends that we include examples of documents containing names of little or no connection to the story. Bob Skwirzot (he was in the meeting with Marwell) said that there were a number of names that appeared in only one document and that the number of names had reached 590. Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint list of important/releasable individuals.

Action: Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to reopen the name issue (how?). Need to decide what level would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the memo. If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to Linda and Fred for background use.

HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO should focus on any person on the list that needs protection and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue to be resolved).

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~~SECRET~~ - WORKING PAPER

### New ARRB Review Process

#### New ARRB Review Process

Marwell and I spent some time discussing how a new process would work. He would like to test the process for the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my comments:

1) HRG reviewers would review the documents the same as they do now (postponements would be blue highlighted), [no change in our procedures] the same [no change in our procedures] would be blue highlighted).

[no change in our procedures]

2) ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted document. ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted document.

a) If they agree, they would stamp the document "ARRB If they agree, they would stamp the document APPROVED" and return it to HRG to process for NARA.

b) If they disagree they would highlight in yellow [If they disagree, they would highlight in yellow (creating green highlighting)], if the two staff cannot resolve the issue, then the document would go before the Board.

would go before the Board.

(Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the "grid" to determine what happens.)

3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB staff when ready for NARA. At that time the ARRB staff would prepare a simplified final determination notice and letter to the Agencies.

[No action would be required; HRG would file the final determination notice with the document.]

4) "Green" highlighted documents that go to the Board would be handled the same as today.

(The expectation is that a lot less documents would require Board action.)

Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998. Completing the entire project will depend on how quickly the "non-related" material and the "addition records" are reviewed by the ARRB staff, and the "addition records" are reviewed by the ARRB staff.

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~~SECRET~~

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

Pending Issues  
Pending Issues

As part of the change in process, Marwell wants the Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed to micro managing the review. We discussed the following:

- 1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related material and make a recommendation to the Board. Marwell leans toward creating a file of Nosenko as assassination related to avoid getting involved with Nosenko or Board members. Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell thinks they would react favorably.
- 2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have his staff confirm that only a portion of a file is related and that those documents are in the released material.
- 3) Gibson. FBI file issue; we need to present case to the Board.
- 4) LI 9. Continuing to protect will be a hard sell given that Newman has published identity; we need to present case to the Board.
- 5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review
- 5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review

Annual Report and Extension  
Annual Report and Extension

Marwell ask me to draw your attention to the Annual Report and the request for an extension. He would still like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him) along these lines: "reviewed Annual Report along these lines that the Board has ask for extension" "support the request/feel it is in interest of Agency and public /or something along these lines"

Other issues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)

Other issues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)

Linda (OGC) says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his notes. Linda (OGC) says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his notes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from the OIS histories he reviewed. Gunn indicated in his notes that some of the pages should be released and might be considered assassination records. We are going to run into similar problems with the other histories. Gunn will be in HQ tomorrow to see his notes. She will discuss the "pages issue" with the goal of having him drop the request to release". As to the question of designating the pages as assassination records, she will inform him that CI will oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.

-SECRET-  
SECRET



C O V E R  
C O V E R  
S H E E T  
S H E E T

FAX  
FAX

To: J. Barry Harrelson  
~~To:~~ ~~J. Barry Harrelson~~  
Fax #: 703-613-3063  
~~Fax #:~~ ~~703-613-3063~~  
Subject: Segregated Collections  
~~Subject:~~ ~~Segregated Collections~~  
Date: April 23, 1997  
~~Date:~~ ~~April 23, 1997~~  
Pages: 7, including this cover sheet.  
~~Pages:~~ ~~7, including this cover sheet.~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.  
Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.

From the desk of:

T. Peter Golen  
General Counsel  
Assassination Records Review Board  
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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
IN THE INTEREST OF HUMANITY  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

### Assassination Records Review Board

#### ~~Assassination Records Review Board~~ **Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections** **Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections**

~~Adopted: April 23, 1997~~

~~Adopted: April 23, 1997~~

#### **Background**

In order to ensure that the Review Board will have adequate time for reviewing all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. First, on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing "Segregated Collections" with regard to information that is "not believed relevant" (NBR) to the assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to extend its tenure for one additional year. In April 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to extend its tenure for one additional year.

It is the Review Board's judgment that, even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of additional information and records. Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed claimed postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.

#### **Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections**

#### ~~Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections~~

In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.<sup>1</sup> (These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first, continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established guidelines for postponements that have emerged over the past two years; second, establishing guidelines consistent with the Review Board's decision regarding NBR records; third, establishing reasonable and workable guidelines that will enable the

---

<sup>1</sup>The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" as including first, FBI records that were requested by: (a) the House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") in conjunction with its investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies (e.g., Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that retain the Kennedy by other bodies assassination; and second, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Segregated Collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records (box 64), and (b) several boxes of CIA staff "working files."

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~~-2-~~

Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the significant amount of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA and FBI records.

The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the Segregated Collections.<sup>2</sup>

### CIA Sources and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements

There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CIA sources. Like FBI informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of information over the long-term. When providing information to the Bureau, FBI informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case, although not always, that FBI informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a criminal prosecution and that they may need to testify in court. Foreign CIA sources and FBI national security assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore, unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that their names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course) that their identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United States than it is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security assets.

Despite these differences -- differences which would generally suggest a greater degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.

The existing "NBR" guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the assassination. Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections contain records that shed some light on issues that the HSCA explored as potentially relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply to all records in the Segregated Collections, including records containing some NBR redactions.

~~03/23/07 100 15 54 FAX 202 724 0457 AKNO~~~~- 3 -~~~~- 3 -~~**CIA Sources****CIA Sources**

The Review Board established guidelines, during its December 1996 meeting, for handling CIA source issues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting. These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA sources in cases where the identity of the source is of low public interest or peripheral to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the concern that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm if their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced in CIA records appear infrequently and are of relatively low public interest. Therefore, in records where the identity of the source is of importance for understanding the assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.<sup>3</sup> In cases where the identity of the source is peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.

**FBI National Security Assets****FBI National Security Assets**

FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.  
**FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.**

**FBI Informants****FBI Informants**

Informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's Segregated Collection, as they do in the "core" FBI assassination files. They also provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process. Currently, there are ten members of the Bureau's JFK Task Force who are responsible for investigating individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board. They retrieve and review the informant's files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and other database searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review Board standards for "core" files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support redacting the informant's name, regardless of whether the informant provided information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the Segregated Collections would free up significant resources that could be deployed to reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.

The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect informant-identifying information.  
**The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect Informant-Identifying information,**

<sup>3</sup>An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.). The Board found that his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a continuing need to protect the identity. In this case, "Scelso" documents would continue to be scheduled for release in five years.

\*Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to informant evidence.

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without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants, "PSIs," "POIs," established sources, "panel sources," and the like – designations that indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who requested that their identity be protected in an isolated contact with the FBI or to local and state law enforcement officers.

and state law enforcement officers.

The "informant-identifying information" to be protected would include the customary (i.e., informant-specific) portions of informant symbol numbers and file numbers, informant names, and (at least potentially) descriptions of, and information received from, the informant. How much, if any of the latter type of information should be redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede that protection of the informant's identity is important to understanding the assassination in order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.<sup>5</sup>

order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.<sup>5</sup>

The presumption will be that an informant's identity will be released if the informant provides "positive" information about an assassination-related issue. To overcome this presumption of release for informants with "positive" information, the FBI would need to make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released. To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.

To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.

### CIA Employee Name Postponements

#### CIA Employee Name Postponements

Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time, the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650 names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been processed. While some of these employee names are important to the assassination story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add little, if any, important information.

If any, important information.

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<sup>5</sup>In HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.

There typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.

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CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. First, CIA's argument to protect employee names on the basis of national security is irrelevant, since many employees are "under cover," the maintenance of that cover is critical to gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover provider and jeopardize operations. Second, although the majority of names are of retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not want their past Agency affiliation released. The argument here is that release may jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such arguments have already been presented to the Board. That argument can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual-case review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents and ultimately lead to less total information becoming available to the public.

CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released if their identities are important to the assassination story unless the CIA is able to provide specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to national security or to personal safety would result from the release of the employee name.)

#### FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements ~~FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements~~

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for disclosing "FCI" activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the HSCA subjects reflect "FCI" activities against other nations that have not been addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, unless the information in the proposed redaction meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

#### FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements ~~FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements~~

The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. In practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies, although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign government is the source of particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information is to any assassination-related issue, the more information would be released under these guidelines.

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### CIA Stations and Other Issues


#### CIA Stations and Other Issues

Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period 1960-69. Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations, except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report, (i.e., January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be postponed. Cable prefixes, dispatch prefixes, and field report prefixes would be postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they refer. CIA job titles also are redacted or opened along with the station at which the officer served.

Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. All "U" crypts, except those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as are "AM" crypts and U.S. government crypts. In other areas, only the diaphragm is protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts, except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For example, crypts pertinent to Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)

Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material bearing on information related to the assassination unless CIA provides evidence demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, in which case the information will be released in 2017.

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Central Intelligence Agency  
**Assassination Records Review Board**  
 606 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530  
 (202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

Washington, D.C. 20505

December 11, 1995

15 April 1997

BY FACSIMILE

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** David G. Marwell  
 Mr. John Pereira  
 Executive Director  
 Director  
 Historical Review Group  
 Center for the Study of Intelligence Employees  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, DC 20505

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA  
 once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the  
 issues discussed below.)

As Mary and I discussed with Barry late last Friday, CIA's long-awaited response to  
 ARRB's request for evidence about the true names to be considered at tomorrow's  
 Board meeting was disappointing and inadequate. For several months, the Board has  
 been encouraged by the CIA to provide a comprehensive presentation of specific  
 evidence relating to its desire to protect the true names of CIA employees. The Board  
 has delayed action on hundreds of assassination records in anticipation of this evidence.  
 We are frankly concerned not only by the impact the CIA's action will have on our  
 work, but also by the fact that we feel we have been misled by the Agency in this  
 instance. ~~instance, to date, approximately 600 true names of CIA  
 employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some  
 of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA  
 will continue to work with the Review Board to release as  
 many of these names as possible. Many names, however,  
 appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and  
 are years to add nothing to the historical record.~~

*Sincerely,*  
 3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board  
~~on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are  
 presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence  
 to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to  
 the employee would likely result from such release. Since  
 these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly  
 clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases,  
 their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this  
 approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to~~  
 David G. Marwell

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Board Members: John R. Tunstall; Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson  
 Executive Director: David G. Marwell

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Subject: CIA Employees

JFK Act 5 (a) (2)(D)

2. THE UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH CCS/OSB, IS AS FOLLOWS:

~~protect national security information and the Review Board~~

~~SUMMARY: TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE FOR ASSASSINATION IN~~  
~~WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS MORE THAN 15 YEARS WORKING AND~~  
~~LIVING IN~~  
~~THE COUNTRY. ELEMENTS OF THOSE YEARS WERE THE SUPERVISORY~~  
~~AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIA WHICH THEY HAD~~  
~~OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY. TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES APPROPRIATIONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON MERCANTILE, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THIS WAS COMPLETED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM MAJORITY AS WELL AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THOSE COMMITTEES. IN MEXICO, MAINTAINED FRUITFUL CONTACT WITH BARBED MEMBERS AND WAS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE BALANCE AND POLICY GUIDANCE BUILDING UP TO LINTER ATTAJ, THE DEBT NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSURING COMMERCIAL OPENINGS.~~

~~information on behalf of CIA to prevent the Review Board~~

~~from publicly take more time and effort than any of us had anticipated.~~

~~This will have obvious ramifications for how~~

~~DEBILIS when the Review Board releases information to the~~

~~public. More importantly, the decision to publicly~~

~~acknowledge members of Congress having for over 30 years under cover is a critical one that should be made not~~

~~by DRAPTOR AND/OR COORDINATOR ON NATIONAL POLICY POSITION~~

~~AND CHARGE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR~~

~~RELATIONSHIPS WITH [REDACTED] MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT~~

~~HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE NSC FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE COMPLEXITIES OF~~

~~THE EVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN [REDACTED]~~

~~the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy~~

~~for releasing names of sources of intelligence~~

~~DURING ISM 1978 LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN [REDACTED] that time that there would be~~

~~a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where~~

~~IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, DEAL EXTENSIVELY~~

~~WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE NSC,~~

~~GAVE TO HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS OTHER AGENT SPECIES ON A~~

~~VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN~~

~~there was an overriding national security interest, the name~~

~~would be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there~~

~~are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not~~

~~apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and~~

~~operational similarities, which are described herein, that~~

~~justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is~~

~~further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes~~

~~that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting~~

~~employees in [REDACTED] PERIOD WORKED IN THE NSC SECTION, WITH~~

~~LEGISLATIVE ASSETS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERSEAS RELATIONS~~

~~WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RECEIVED~~

~~A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF~~

~~APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES.~~

## II. Legal Considerations

-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. WHICH FARED NEGOTIATING AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION AS APPROPRIATE.

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-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. WHICH FARED NEGOTIATING AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION AS APPROPRIATE. many of the same laws apply. Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong governmental national security interests in protecting the true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is

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Subject: CIA Employees

important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which protect classified information, because they clearly reflect a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA employees from disclosure.

7. (U) By Executive order and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his definition of 22 January 1946 that established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d)(3), codified at 50 USC §403(3)(c)(5), requires the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d)(2) requires the DCI to ensure that disclosure to the United States and those involved in the collection of intelligence through human sources are minimized. I promise that all statements which I make to unauthorized persons concerning my Agency's employment will be consistent with my SAE and limited by its content. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

11/05/1987 Minister M. P. Khan  
Signature

9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected the names of CIA employees from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of CIA employees who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the

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Central Intelligence Agency

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defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great.

10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Memorandum 50-500-6421 that criminalizes the revelation of a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a "covert agent" to prosecution and provides up to 10 years in prison and \$50,000 fines as punishment. This act specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an officer or employee of an intelligence agency..."

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA as soon as the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issue discussed below.) effective in October 1995. Although it requires generally that agencies make greater declassification efforts under the prior executive order concerning the Review Board regarding the release of CIA names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem might be addressed. information that is over 25 years old and having historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.

2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA or other employees are important to protect CIA employees from disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory obligation, the Review Board should give serious weight to appearing only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and appearing to add nothing to the historical record.

3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to the employees would likely result from such release. Since the guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases, their connection to the JFK story, make this a problematical issue. The Review Board should take steps to minimize the risk to CIA personnel to enter and work effectively in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to

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**Subject: CIA Employees**  
**Subject: CIA Employees**

certain individuals of intelligence interest to prevent protect national security information and the Review Board's embarrassment to host foreign governments and to permit timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a "suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons, even though they might have legitimate needs to protect their identities.

4. (D) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In addition, the ability to friendly country should the local service become aware who the CIA employees are. It would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to evict those Americans, disrupting liaison and diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in friendly countries, an employee could face some personal risks as well as risks to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among in otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the field, and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover is important to a career with CIA.

5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy for releasing true names or sources of intelligence information. It was agreed at that time that there would be a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where a source was particularly important to the JFK story and there was no overriding national security interest, the name would be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and operational similarities, which are described herein, that justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is further detailed in Section IV, CIA therefore proposes that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting employee names that appear in the Collection, with exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are important to the JFK story.

6. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work under official (e.g., State Department), cover, or non-official (e.g., private company) cover. Disclosure of a covert employee would not only re-official acknowledgement of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission of the cover provider, especially those who provide non-official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the provider's business interests and activities. It would also cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community.

7. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is

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~~SECRET~~**Subject: CIA Employees**  
**subject: CIA employees**

not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees do not want their past affiliation with CIA reflected in their current friends' family or contacts. CIA are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional relationships.

8. (U) By executive order and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protecting sources of intelligence information. In his business, where a revelation of CIA affiliation threatens their business interests and personal safety, other former employees may be concerned about the safety of their employer. One example of an employee in this category is Milton, whose name apparently appears on a recent collection of intelligence sources. With the establishment of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI sole responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 14(d)(3) (iii) (Security), at 50 USC 5403(3) (c)(5), requires the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, 5403(3) (d)(2) requires the DCI to ensure that additional protection is provided to sources. A similar example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State security. He is now working in Russia and several East European countries for a private firm. He does not want his minimally furnished, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status.

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 6404g, Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization's functions, members, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. Public employees could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some 20 years. In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving information potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected the names of CIA employees from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e. constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera review of hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of CIA employees who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in open court. (U) In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, in subpoenaed in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the nondisclosure. The Agency proposes that in most cases a

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**Subject: CIA Employees**  
**Subject: CIA Employees**

substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board substituted legal rights bearing that information employees throughout the country, the defendant would never have known that CIA even had been involved in the case, as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, unless CIA has the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution if the Coase of the risk to national security is less than approximately 84 of 500 instances or only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals' identity can add to Congress's need to protect CIA employees by passing the Intelligence Identifications Protection Act of 1982 which uses §421 that criminalizes the revelation of a covert employee's true identity or a resource's true identity. Subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies him in the JFK Collection, or any other collection, to a third party, or to CIA itself, and provides it up to 30 years in prison and \$50,000 in fines and punishments. This act specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "any officer or employee of, or in the intelligence agency and why his name even appeared in the Collection, since he had no recollection of being involved in the assassination." Most recently, President Clinton signed the Executive Order 12958 on classified national security information that became effective in October 1995. Although it requires generally that agencies have greater than 500 names declassified efforts than under the prior executive order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of intelligence information, which would include employees, extra protection from the declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and having historical value must be declassified after 40 years. However, information revealing the identity of a old human source may continue to be protected.

Alexander Bracke. His name appears numerous times in the Collection, simply because he served off and on trace requests. Mr. Bracke was a cover agent retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with no additional significant information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection, but has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores retired under cover to living in South America and objects to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to CIA is also attached for your consideration.

The Agency, of course, recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such employee is former SAS Member Winston Scott, who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA spy. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA must take the Review Board and its staff identify these individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be released to the public. These names will carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result.

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**Subject: CIA Employees**  
**Subject: CIA Employees**

from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether release would pose national embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign countries. We can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review of the ~~sequestered collection~~. The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it is known covertly for the US Government ~~my staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.~~ Acting General Counsel

15. ~~(b)~~ Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work under "official" (e.g., ~~[redacted]~~) cover or "non-official" (e.g., ~~[redacted]~~) cover. Disclosure of a covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission of the cover provider, especially those who provide non-official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the ~~[redacted]~~ interests and activities. It would also cast suspicion on that ~~[redacted]~~ employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community.

16. ~~(b)~~ Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are

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**Subject: CIA Employees**  
**Subject: CIA Employees**

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**DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)**  
 not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional relationships. Some former employees still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can threaten their business interests and personal safety. One example of an employee in this category is Robert Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the Collection. Fulton retired under [redacted] cover; he currently has a consultant business and frequently travels to China. Release of his name would jeopardize not only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under [redacted] cover. He is now working in Russia and several East European countries for a private firm. He does not want his name published, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status.

17. (S) Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.

18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure.

#### IV. Proposals

19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
Secret

Subject: CIA Employees

26 June 1997

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

~~Substitution for names~~ name be used. If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for a particular ~~name~~ employee.

## JFK Project Office

20. (g) CIA believes that this approach will not undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act. ~~Review of the Employee names scheduled for public release~~ of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals' identity can add anything of significance to the historical records, yet there may be some security concerns still associated with these individuals. For example, ~~this memorandum and its attachments~~ he ~~believed~~ ~~retired under cover~~ and is currently living in Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and believed such a release could pose personal and security problems. Furthermore, he would not understand why his name even appeared in the Collection since he had no recollection of being involved in anything related to the assassination, and the changes in status of names.

201 List. (g) With regard to the approximately 500 names that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast majority of these individuals played almost no role in the ~~current employee retaining continued protection~~ (see ~~JFK story~~ One example of this is former DO officer Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30 times in the Collection simply because he signed off on name trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with no additional significant information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to CIA is also attached for your convenience.

22. (g) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be released to the public. These names would carry a presumption of release unless specified evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm would result.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

APR 15 '97 05:02PM US GOVERNMENT


~~SECRET~~

Subject: CIA Employees


Key Figures (A) List

from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether ~~releases~~ <sup>FNU Connally</sup> would pose national security concerns for the US Government or personal safety concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the ~~JFK~~ <sup>George Pisko</sup> story, expediting the review of the sequestered collection.

23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not undermine the important principle of protecting those who work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.



Michael J. O'Neil  
Acting General Counsel



Barry Harrelson

## Attachment

A. Tom Flores' letter

## Attachments:

Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF]

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Subject: CIA Employees

CONFIDENTIAL  
(This is filled in)

#19-1297

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)

OGC-97-50971

SECURITY AGREEMENT

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1. I, Michael Mankay Laiyer, understand that upon entering on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the President and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the security of the United States of America. I understand that in the course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title 18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter.

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to disclose any classified information relating to the Agency without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 368 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS  
1 DEC 55

~~CONFIDENTIAL  
(When Filled In)~~

2

~~SECRET~~

6. I understand that for all grievances and complaints there are established procedures within the Agency permitting appeal by any employee of the Agency and to carry any such grievance or complaint outside the Agency. <sup>26 June 1997</sup>  
~~Memorandum to: Jeremy Gurne~~  
~~Will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in~~  
~~ASRB Staff~~  
~~paragraph 3. If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation,~~  
~~I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any~~  
~~employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint.~~  
 From: Barry Harrelson  
 To: JFK Project Office

CIA/CSI/HRG  
 Subject: Employee Names Scheduled for ASRB Review  
 Compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.

Reference: 201 File and "A" Names Lists

8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right, in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific prior approval by the Agency.

9. The above reference lists identify the protected CIA employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ASRB staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ASRB at its 9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial response to the ASRB's request for evidence and addresses those individuals on the list currently employed by the Agency and the changes in status of names.

201 List

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

Current employees requiring continued protection (see attached Cover Staff reports):

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 9<sup>th</sup> day of  
July, 1962.

Robert F. Litviak

Release: FNU Coplewood

Joan Field

M. Judkins

FNU Patten

Harrison L Scott

Carl Trettin

W. Walker

*Robert M. Murphy Palma* (Seal)

Witness:

Corrections: Remove Kurt Johansson (source) <sup>2 JUL 1962</sup>

incorrectly identified as an employee

Add Barbara Graham (B. Graham) <sup>Date</sup>

incorrectly dropped from latest list

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CL BY: 611637  
 CL REASON: 1.5(c)  
 DECL ON: X1  
 DRV FRM: COV 2-87

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

**2. THE UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH  
CCS/Key USpersons List**

SUMMARY: RELEASED SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICER (DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962-1990) WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, MORE THAN 10 YEARS WORKING AND LIVING IN LATIN AMERICA (ECUADOR, URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, PERU AND MEXICO). ELEVEN OF THOSE YEARS WERE IN SUPERVISORY AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN POLICY (TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS). THIS WAS COMPLEMENTED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM MAJOR FOR ACCOMPLISHED PROTECTION AS AVAILABLE. By 7 July you should have either specific intelligence or basic status of search WAS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE DEBT NEGOTIATIONS, POLICY GUIDANCE BUILDING UP TO (INTER ALIA) THE DEBT NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSUING COMMERCIAL OPENINGS.

DETAILS:

-TOP SECRET AND SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES.

-DRAFTER AND/OR COORDINATOR ON MYRIAD POLITICAL POSITION AND GUIDANCE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEXICO. MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE EVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MEXICO.

-DAILY INTERLOQUOR WITH MEXICAN CABINET OFFICERS DURING STAYS LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN MEXICO CITY.

-IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE USG [available in CIA SCIP] GAVE IN HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS INTER AGENCY SPEECHES ON A VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

-1980-1984 - FLAGGED THE THEN EMERGING SENDERO LUMINOSO AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PERUVIAN SECURITY AND WAS THE FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL TO INSIST THAT PERUVIAN COCA PRODUCTION WAS TEN TIMES THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. (SADLY, BOTH OBSERVATIONS HAVE TURNED OUT TO BE ALTOGETHER ACCURATE.)

-IN 1978-1980 PERIOD, WORKED FOR THE OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES.

-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. HIRED, FIRED, NEGOTIATED, AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION AS APPROPRIATE.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~REF ID: A61116~~

#197297

## SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Mark Wombray Palmer II, understand that upon entering ~~understand that the~~ ~~the~~ ~~employment~~ ~~(SAE)~~ ~~defining~~ ~~and the~~ ~~National Security Council~~ ~~for~~ ~~intelligence~~ ~~relating to the~~ ~~security~~ ~~of the United States of America~~. I understand that in the ~~course~~ ~~of my employment~~ ~~may~~ ~~acquire~~ ~~information~~ ~~about~~ ~~the~~ ~~Central Intelligence Agency~~ ~~and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency~~. ~~Agency. I further understand that disclosure of information~~

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title ~~about my Agency employment, which is aware that unauthorized disclosure~~ ~~of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter.~~ ~~constitutes a violation of my Secrecy Agreement. I promise that all statements which I make to unauthorized persons concerning~~

~~my Agency employment will be consistent with my SAE and limited by its content~~  

11/20/1987 *Mark Wombray Palmer II*  
~~Date~~ ~~Signature~~

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to disclose any classified information relating to the Agency without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FORM NO. 368 ~~REPLACE PREVIOUS EDITIONS~~  
1 DEC-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

OCC-95-149  
 6. I understand that for all grievances and complaints there are established procedures within the Agency permitting appeal by any employee of the Agency and to carry any such grievance or complaint outside the Agency will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in paragraph 3. If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation, I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any employee with Associate Deputy Director for Operations.

**MEMORANDUM FOR Assessment Records Review Board**

VIA: employee with Associate Deputy Director for Operations

Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Security, CIA  
 7. I further understand and agree that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.

FROM: Eric D. Quale

SUBJECT: **Proposed CIA Name Release**  
 Chief, Office of Central Cover  
 8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right, in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific prior approval by the Agency.

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover providers.

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency remains the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information and intelligence in my possession.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering into employment with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee never to reveal information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, I have set my hand and seal this the 1<sup>st</sup> day of July, 1962, to the benefit of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees (see Hargan Seal) separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e., Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:

JUL 1962

Date

Doris Shea  
 \* the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE  
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
 OR METHODS INVOLVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CL 0489932  
 CL REASON: 1.5 (c)  
 DECL ON: X1  
 DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SECRET

SECRET

~~CO V E R~~

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

~~FAX~~~~S H E E T~~

- the second careers of former employees;  
 To: Mr. Barry Marshall  
 Fax #: (703) 351-2114  
 Subject: December meeting  
 Date: December 11, 1995  
 Pages: 5, including this cover sheet
- the cover and identity of other employees who worked with the covert employee whose name is released as CIA; and,

~~COMMENTS:~~

- the protection of sources and methods (what types of information that the Board needs to know about each of the four names on individualized CIA protection and clandestine relationship with American intelligence knowing the secret
1. Is the individual a current or former CIA employee? If so, in what capacity did that individual serve, and did he or she serve overtly or overtly? If currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?

~~4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will affect individuals follows.~~

~~2. If not a CIA officer, did the individual serve CIA as an agent or asset or in any other capacity?~~

- Mr. Walter McCabe, retired under Department of State cover and is currently working in Russia and several Eastern European countries for a private firm which converts "wartime refugees into productive assets." Revealing his name would damage his relationship with his current employer, his position with the firm and would cause resentment regarding the host countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied as a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed secrecy agreement.

~~From the desk of...~~

Morton M. Palmer  
 Supervised Readout for Research and Analysis  
 Assassination Records Review Board  
 100 E. Capitol St., Room 2000, Second Floor  
 Washington, D.C. 20540  
 (202) 724-1020  
 FAX (202) 724-0477

- Attachment D is a signed acknowledgement from John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which shows that he was aware that he would be denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date he entered on duty through the date of his departure. Attachment E is a personal letter received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that his name might be released in connection with declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
- Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr. Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in his SAE and understands disclosure of other information would be in violation of his secrecy

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

**SUBJECT:** Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

W.L. O'Brien  
104-10017-10042

Dr. Stanjevic  
104-10017-10051

P.N.U. Pares  
104-10017-10163

Boris Turovoff  
104-10017-10051

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Palmer resides in Mexico.

Hilda  
104-10017-10006

Telephin Tomas  
104-10018-10062

5. Our relationships with cover providers would be jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could well raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency operations which in turn could severely damage national security. In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities and substantial monetary damages.

D.W. Schaefer  
104-10017-10042

Franklin Anthony Wheelock Garcia  
104-10015-10192

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's regulation on cover after separation, states that "the determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon the judgment that separation in covert status could result in damage to the national security by compromising intelligence sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis." Please note that all Agency employees who retire abroad must retire under cover.

Robert Shivers  
104-10017-10031

Zelmer Rink  
104-10017-10036

Mr. Knight  
104-10015-10149

John W. Sullivan  
104-10017-10035

Mr. Williams  
104-10015-10149

Tom Ryan  
104-10015-10026

Mr. Williams  
104-10015-10149

John F. Quinn  
104-10015-10024

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

~~SECRET~~  
NAMES WHICH CIA CONTINUED TO RETAIN IN DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR  
 THE DECEMBER 12-13, 1995 ARRS MEETING

8. After your review ~~104-10315-10001~~ consideration of the above information, we would appreciate notification of your final decision prior to taking any action.

*Chadwick Abing*  
*Anderson*  
 104-10309-10001

*Charles Black*  
 104-10325-10001  
 Gudy  
 104-10313-10043

*Ray Berger*  
 104-10315-10001

*Peter Bensonfield*  
 104-10314-10013

*Bogdon*  
 104-10316-10023

*Baquero*  
 104-10317-10262

*Leona Carter*  
 104-10318-10059

*Dashiel*  
 104-10318-10042

**Christine W. Whaley**

*Duncanson*  
 104-10315-10043

**Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs**

*DeGaudenzi*  
 104-10313-10062

*D'Alato*  
 104-10315-10305

**David N. Egan**  
*P.L. Dillon*  
 104-10317-10343

**Associate Deputy Director for Operations**

*Enders*  
 104-10317-10052

**Eric L. Harkenbush**  
*John Harkenbush*  
 104-10313-10458

*Hutchinson*  
 104-10318-10042

*William Johnson*  
 104-10315-10096  
 ("Johnson" released to 104-10315, 10375)

*Jian Jiang*  
 104-10317-10002

**DEC 08 1995**

*Tom Koenig*  
 104-10315-10004

**Date**  
*Pass Lee*  
 104-10315-10160

**Date**  
*Melby*  
 104-10315-10110

**Date**  
*Manch*  
 104-10315-10339

**DEC 08 1995**  
*Anne McDonald*  
 104-10315-10178

~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Overall) Proposed C-A Name Release

**FROM:** Elaine Matriss  
DC/CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

**EXTENSION:**

37676

**TO:**

10

DATE REC'D REC'D BY DATE SERVED

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

BY

1. Sue Tupper  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

2. Barry R. Gellman  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

3. Eric L. Gia Lombush  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

4. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

5. ADDO Secretary, DC/CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

6. Christine W. Wiley  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

7. David H. Edger  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

8. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

9. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

10. CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

11. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

12. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

13. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

14. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

15. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

NO.

10

DATE SERVED

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

BY

DATE REC'D REC'D BY DATE SERVED

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

BY

1. Sue Tupper  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

2. Barry R. Gellman  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

3. Eric L. Gia Lombush  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

4. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

5. ADDO Secretary, DC/CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

6. Christine W. Wiley  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

7. David H. Edger  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

8. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

9. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

10. CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

11. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

12. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

13. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

14. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

15. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

DATE REC'D REC'D BY DATE SERVED

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

BY

1. Sue Tupper  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

2. Barry R. Gellman  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

3. Eric L. Gia Lombush  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

4. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

5. ADDO Secretary, DC/CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

6. Christine W. Wiley  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

7. David H. Edger  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

8. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

9. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

10. CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

11. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

12. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

13. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

14. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

15. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

DATE REC'D REC'D BY DATE SERVED

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

BY

1. Sue Tupper  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

2. Barry R. Gellman  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

3. Eric L. Gia Lombush  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

4. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

5. ADDO Secretary, DC/CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

6. Christine W. Wiley  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

7. David H. Edger  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

8. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

9. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

10. CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

11. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

12. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

13. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

14. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

15. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

DATE REC'D REC'D BY DATE SERVED

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

INITIALS

BY

1. Sue Tupper  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

2. Barry R. Gellman  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

3. Eric L. Gia Lombush  
C/CCC  
SB4401-OHR

4. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

5. ADDO Secretary, DC/CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

6. Christine W. Wiley  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

7. David H. Edger  
ADD/OHR  
SB4401-OHR

8. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

9. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

10. CCC/OGC  
SB4401-OHR

11. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

12. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

13. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

14. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

15. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

TOP SECRET  
-SECRET-

610 (EF)

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

FAX

OCC-95-249

S H E E T

07 DEC 1995

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** **To:** Mr. Barry Harrelson  
**Re: #:** (703) 351-2114  
**Subject:** December meeting

**VIA:** **Date:** December 11, 1995  
 Associate Deputy Director for Operations  
 Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and Programs

**FROM:** Eric L. Qualkenbush  
 The type of information that the Board needs to know about each of the true names on  
 the attached list for which CIA employees continued protection are listed below:  
 Chief, Office of Central Cover

**SUBJECT:** Proposed ~~Proposed~~ ~~Dec 1995 Release~~ ~~whether he or she serve overtly or covertly? If currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?~~

1. Is the individual a current or former CIA employee? If so, in what capacity  
 Proposed ~~Dec 1995 Release~~ ~~whether he or she serve overtly or covertly? If currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?~~
2. If not a CIA officer, did the individual serve CIA as an agent or asset or in any other capacity?

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work true under cover in addition to breaching their obligations to the cover providers.

Of course, you do not need to do anything other than identify those individuals whose true names CIA no longer seeks to protect.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

From the desk of...  
 Noelle D. Gray  
 Research Analyst  
 Assassination Records Review Board  
 CIA  
 Washington, D.C. 20500  
 (202) 724-2000  
 (202) 724-2457

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees who have separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

or JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

for their entire

Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:

- the personal safety of former employees;

**WARNING NOTICE**  
**INTELLIGENCE SOURCES**  
**OR METHODS INVOLVED**

CL 0489932  
 CL REASON: 1.5 (c)  
 DECL ON: X1  
 DRV FROM: COV 2-87

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

**SUBJECT:** Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board  
**W.L.O'Brien** **Dr. Stanishev**  
**P.N.U. Peters** **Boris Turovoff**  
**104-10015-10163** **104-10095-10001**

- the second ~~careers~~ careers of former employees ~~of the Agency~~ **Doris Turner**  
**104-10016-10006** **104-10018-10082**
- the cover ~~and~~ and identity of other employees who worked with the ~~cover~~ **104-10014-10010** employee whose name is ~~released~~ released as CIA; and, **(Same as Mr. Walsh in 104-10017-10037)**  
**Dave Reardon** **104-10095-10001**
- the protection of sources and methods (what ~~Milly Rodriguez~~ **T. Hill** individual would agree to a clandestine relationship with American intelligence knowing the secret ~~relationship~~ **Wollock Davis** association ~~would become public knowledge~~ **104-10018-10192**  
**104-10015-10163**

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will affect individuals follows **104-10017-10026**

- Mr. Walter McCabe **104-10015-10298** retired under **D.W. Schroeder** **JFK Act 5 (g)(2) (D)** cover and is currently working in Russia and several Eastern European countries for a private firm which converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use. Revealing his name would damage his relationship with his current employer, his position with the firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied as a CIA ~~employee~~ **104-10015-10298** employee and Attachment C is his signed secrecy agreement.
- Attachment D is a signed acknowledgement from Mr. John Whitten who retired under ~~SECRET~~ cover in 1970 which shows that he was aware that he would be denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date he entered on duty through the date of his departure. Attachment E is a personal letter received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that his name might be released in connection with declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
- Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr. Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in his SAE and understands disclosure of other information would be in violation of his secrecy

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board  
~~NAMES WHICH CIA CONTINUES TO PROTECT IN DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR  
 THE DECEMBER 12-13, 1995 ARRC MEETING~~

Charles Abey

Charlie Flick

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr. Palmer resides ~~in Mexico~~ 104-10015-10001.

104-10015-10045 (b)(2)(D)

5. Our relationship with cover providers would be jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing cover to CIA employees. Peter Shultz ~~should~~ very well raise objections to our future use of ~~cover~~ cover. Increasing importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying cover relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency operations which in turn could severely damage national security. In addition, in the past it ~~posed~~ CIA to legal liabilities and substantial monetary damages. Jim Jung 104-10017-10002

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's regulation on cover after separation, states that "the determination that an employee will retain all or part of his or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon the judgment that separation in an overt status would result in damage to the national security by compromising intelligence sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm to foreign relations. This determination will be made ~~case-by-case~~ on a case-by-case basis." Please note that all Agency employees who retire abroad must retire under cover.

~~SECRET~~

7. Release of names of former employees who separated under cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish the impact of the documents.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional) Proposed CIA Name Release  
**SUBJECT:** Report on JFK Assassination Records Review Board

<b>FROM:</b> Elaine Mathias DC/OCC/OSG	<b>RECEIVED</b>	<b>FORWARDED</b>	<b>EXTENSION</b>	<b>NO.</b>
			INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment, to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
6B4403-B After your review and information, we would appreciate notification of your final decision prior to taking any action.			17076	consideration of the above 7 Dec '95
1 Sue Burggraf C/OSG 6B4403 OHB				1. Please call [signature] and car [signature]
2 Barry R. Gibson DC/OCC 6B4403 OHB		27	BSF	EXAC L. Qualkenbush IMS/HRS of delivery (to JFK assassination Records Review Board)
3. Eric L. Qualkenbush C/OSG 6B4401 OHB		27	WU	
4. CONCURS:				
5. DDO-Secretariat of Defense 7F27 OHB			DR	
6. Christine W. Lee ADDO/HRP 7E1 Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources		3	WU	3 Dec '95
7. Davion N. Pader ADD/Programs 7E30 OHB			✓	Date
8. [Signature]				6 X/11 '95
9. Associate Deputy Director for Operations				Date
10. OCC/OSG 6B4403 OHB				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board OGC-95-149

07 DEC 1995

DC/OGC/OSG/EMathias:iss/37076 (6 Dec 95)  
MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board

Distribution:  
VIA: Orig 6 1 - JFK Assassination Records Review Board  
1 - IMS/HRS  
1 - ADDO  
1 - ADDO/HRP  
1 - DDO Secretariat  
1 - DO/IRO  
FROM: 1 - ELIC L. Qualkenbush  
1 - Director, Office of Central Cover  
SUBJECT: 1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani  
1 - OCC Chron  
1 - OCC/OSG Chron  
1 - OCC/OSG File 785-120-034

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees who have separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e., Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:

- the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL 0489932  
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)  
DECL ON: X1  
DRV FROM: COV 2-87

S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL  
(When Filled In)~~**SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board**~~SECURITY OATH~~

I, ~~John M. Whitten~~, am about to terminate my association with the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that by virtue of my duties with that Agency I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States of America. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SWEAR, SWORN, WITHOUT RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF GODNESS, AS FOLLOWS:

~~With the second careers of former employees;~~  
~~the cover and identity of other employees who worked~~  
~~with the seventh employee whose name is released~~  
~~CIA; and~~  
~~the protection of sources and methods (what~~  
~~individual would agree to no longer have relationship~~  
~~with American intelligence knowing he was secret,~~  
~~association would become public knowledge?).~~

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations, sources, methods, personnel, financing, or security measures to anyone, including but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative. ~~Example of how identifying covert employees via CIA will affect individuals~~  
~~Mr. Walter McCarter is currently under Department of State~~  
~~cover and is currently working in Russia and several~~  
~~Eastern European countries for a private firm which~~  
~~converts wartime intelligence into peacetime use.~~  
~~Revealing his name would damage his relationship~~  
~~with his current employer, his position with the~~  
~~firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host~~  
~~countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCarter's acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied~~  
~~future claims as an employee and Attachment C is his signed~~  
~~Secrecy Agreement.~~  
~~the date he entered on duty otherwise than the date of his~~
2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described here. It has been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning my present or future claims I may, at my option, file a claim with the appropriate court or agency without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.
3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency, having regard to my possession as a result of my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency. ~~John Whitten who returned under cover in 1970 which shows that he was aware that he would be denied as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date he entered on duty otherwise than the date of his~~  
~~Attachment D is a signed acknowledgement from Mr.~~  
~~the date he entered on duty otherwise than the date of his~~
4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official recognition. Hence, I am not aware of any information, which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intelligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.  
• Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr. Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in his SAE and understands disclosure of other information would be in violation of his secrecy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 305 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS  
4-62

~~SECRET~~

121

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY AGREEMENT~~**SUBJECT: Member, MK Assassination Records Review Board**

I understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Group, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

**5. Our relationship with cover providers would be**

I agree that I do not now nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in said information. I doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert relationships is solely your problem. I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either orally, in writing, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

**6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's regulation on cover.**

I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will affect my obligations under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States. HR 240-2, the Agency's regulation on cover after separation, states that "the determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in damage to the national security by compromising intelligence sources, methods, activities, and/or information or cause harm to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-by-case basis." Please note that all Agency employees who retire abroad must retire under cover.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 22nd day of AUGUST 1947

7. Release of names of former employees who separated under cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish the impact of the documents.

(711)

~~SECRET~~

My Commission Expires March 22, 1960

PL0251110

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

To Bert Mills:

JFK Ass R (b)(3)(D)

B. After your review and consideration of the above information I would appreciate notification of your final decision prior to taking any action for some reason.

1. I emigrated to Austria twice, first in 1971 and again in 1983. Both times I had to fill out and submit lengthy forms about my background. I used my ~~Father J. Frankenbush~~

~~Attachment~~  
As stated above, thereby committing perjury twice under Austrian law. My old friends in high places who might have been able to protect me have all retired or, even more, died.

~~CONCUR:~~ CONCUR: Austrian justice is notoriously untrustable. Do you want me to go to jail?

2. Living since retirement in Austria from 1971 to 1983

~~As Associate Deputy Director for Operations Human Resources and Programs in various medical bodies, Board of Directors and Presidents of the Johann Strauß Society and Vice President of the Vienna Philharmonic Society, and I am personally~~

~~Chairing the~~ ~~to serve~~ ~~recent~~ Austrian ~~President~~ ~~now~~  
~~Associate Deputy Director for Operations~~ reporter and radio figure. I suffered a shooting stroke in December 1993 and my wife and I both 75, can continue to visit her below our 2,000 sq. ft. apartment in walking distance of 2 post offices, several small supermarkets, my family physician, our dentist, my urologist, and our eye doctor and optician. We are within walking distance of the concert hall and the opera. Where can you duplicate this for me?

3. During my active career in Vienna around 1958 I interrogated and broke an intelligence prisoner who had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him secrecy if he confessed, but the US Army put out a "fair notice" forcing him to move to Germany. I am now

SECRET

163a  
REFERENCE

~~SECRET~~

**SUBJECT:** ~~Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board~~  
 I am second assassination, son of a city councilman, by  
~~the~~ in recent years. Under Australian law & as a  
 foreigner, can not even get a pistol license. You must have  
 about the kidnapping and killing of our colleague  
 around the world.

DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

**Distribution:** I have twice testified before House and Senate  
**Orig & T - JFK Assassination Records Review Board:** This will  
~~be~~ ~~IMMEDIATE~~ about the Kennedy assassination. This will  
 1 - ADDO  
~~DDO/HRA~~  
 2 - DDO ~~SECRET~~  
 3 - DO/IRO  
 4 - OCC/ID ~~Linda Cipriani~~  
 5 - OCC Chron ~~OCC/CSG Chron~~ called historians.

1. ~~My~~ ~~Memorandum~~ ~~in 12 pages~~, it will obviously have  
 to leave Vienna, with the whole house full of  
 furniture, pictures, library, clothing, etc. which I packed  
 and friends have moved over here in 1983. Because  
 of my stroke, I will be unable to do any packing and  
 the move will be very expensive. Where can I  
 reside in an 2000 sq ft. apt. so conveniently  
 located.

6. My wife and I love living here for many reasons,  
 and leaving would be a sad and needless fate.

7. I regard this law as dishonorable and  
 unworthy of the United States of America. If you  
 decide against me, I want to appear before the Board and  
 mention the President, whom I happen to admire. I will  
 pay my own way back to do so, I served in WWII  
 and never spared myself; in the outfit I worked hard,  
 was pleased in dealing with my superior (Cord Meyer  
 and Dick Helm can testify to that) and my adversaries.  
 I would even think of threatening to expose things  
 to possess you. I will be employing an attorney  
 or two, familiar with our affair, to represent me.

I will not deny, that I consider you and  
 everyone else implementing this law to be

~~SECRET~~  
 unworthy & in dishonorable conduct, unworthy &

8 In the late 1960s while serving in Vienna under  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 Tom Karamanis, I was ordered by HQ to

return to Austrian Military Intelligence that a low-  
~~SECRET ORIN~~

ranking Austrian diplomat serving as their informant

I, ~~John M. Shitter~~ ~~had also been approached by a man associated with the Central Intelligence Agency.~~ I realize that, by virtue of my duties with that Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States of America. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically provides the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MEDIAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

~~accepted our recruitment and put forth on some  
 will and opportunity to betray a young agent who had been  
 dedicated to him and his cause~~

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations, sources, methods, personnel, facilities, or security measures to anyone, including but not limited to any future governmental or private employee, private citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise from my area and able to be made available if so requested.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information, which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intelligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments done to honor every promise

lead to a good country's doing its best. During WWII when we were investigating German POWs, we promised them no one would ever learn they had "spilled their guts," and we all believed we were being true to our word. But about 25 years after WWII the British

FORM 1045 v. 1968 Edition  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
 NW 65360 Decid:324045a. Page 64... all the ADI(K) reports (that's what the

~~SECRET~~SECRET  
SECURITY AGREEMENT

- of the concentration POWs had in their rooms.
1. I, JOHN WHITTEN, understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Group, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Section 10), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.
  2. I agree that I do not now nor shall ever possess my right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which hereinafter shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in such matters.
  3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.
  4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath nor that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my service with the United States.
  5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Group is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security" Regulations and the appendices thereto.
  6. I make this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 22nd day of AUGUST 1961.

on my left side from a ~~glove~~ in all. I  
I was nearly fully rehabilitated when in May  
1944, I was hit by constant ~~noise~~ ~~noise~~ ~~noise~~ all  
up and down my left side. ~~John W. Whitten~~ (Seal)

Sworn to before ~~condition~~ ~~Adelphi~~ ~~and~~ ~~Aug 1961~~ ~~in~~ ~~London~~ ~~England~~  
at Wardour Street with ~~after effects~~ lasting until  
the next session have made it increasingly  
difficult for me to stand John W. Whitten D.D.S.  
up so very long. I am few days when all

(711) SECRET ~~London~~ ~~England~~ ~~March 22 1961~~  
The many medicines are here, will begin a  
20-week homeopathic cure for the sprain  
under Dr. Schwann, a leading

To Bill Miller will be contacted immediately by one of my  
 attorney. I will also be in touch with my  
 regarding violation to the revelation of my name  
 regarding the last <sup>donation</sup>. Here are some reasons:

1. I immigrated to Austria ~~but~~, <sup>but</sup> first reside, and again  
 in 1983. Both time I had to fill out and ~~John M. W. Holloman~~  
 form about my background. I used my retired State cover  
 both time, thereby committing perjury twice under Austrian  
 law. My old friends in high places who might have been  
 able to protect me have all retired or, even more, died.  
 Austrian justice is notoriously inimicable. Do you want me to  
 go to jail?

2. Living since retirement in Austria from 1971 to 1980  
 and from 1983 to the present, I have achieved high  
 position in various musical bodies, Board of Directors  
 of the Johann Strauss Society and Vice President of  
 the Vienna Min Singers Society, and I am personally  
 known to several recent Austrian Presidents, many  
 reporter and radio figures. I suffered a disabling stroke  
 in December 1993 and my wife and I both 75, can  
 continue to exist here because our 2,000 sq. ft. apartment  
 is within walking distance of 2 post office, several small  
 super markets, my family physician, our dentist, my  
 urologist, and our eye doctor and optician. We are  
 within wheel chair distance of the concert hall and  
 the opera. Where can you duplicate this for me?

3. During my active career in Vienna around 1955  
 I interrogated and broke an intelligence swindler who  
 had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him secrecy if he  
 confessed, but the US Army put out a "burn notice"  
 on him, forcing him to move to Germany. I am sure  
 he would love to find me and shoot me.  
 Vienna is full of Islamic terrorist. There have

~~SECRET~~

been several assassination, even of a city councilman, by  
others in recent years. Under Austrian law, I, as a  
foreigner, can not even get a pistol license. You must know  
about the kidnapping and killing of our colleagues  
around the world.



## 4. RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)		WHITTEN	STAFF OR DIVISION	CGS FILE NO.
GRADE & SENN		G5-16/5	SPECIAL SECURITY BUREAU	FIPS 3562
GRADE & SENN		G5-16/5	DATE OF BRIEFING	22 Aug 1949
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RETIREMENT		SURGEON	NAME & GRADE	SP-1601 ATTACHED
<input type="checkbox"/> RESIGNATION		BRIEFED	DATE OF RESIGNATION	LAST WORKING DAY
AGENCY JOB TITLE		6. If my resignation is accepted, I will resign July 30, have to leave Vienna, with the whole house full of to clear Vienna, with the whole house full of 6. If my resignation is accepted, I will resign July 30, have to leave Vienna, with the whole house full of to clear Vienna, with the whole house full of		

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (EXCLUDING ESTATE PAYMENTS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED AS PREFERRED APPROPRIATE PAYMENTS)

FROM	TO	AREA OF ASSIGNMENT	COVER	NON-MILITARY	INTEGRATED
Aug 47	May 48 in Washington D.C.	Austria, Vienna			
May 48	Sept 51 in Vienna	Austria, Vienna			
Sept 52	Mar 53 in Washington D.C.	Austria, Vienna			
Mar 55	Oct 55 Austria, Vienna	Austria, Vienna			
Oct 55	July 60 Austria, Vienna	Austria, Vienna			
July 60	Mar 62	Austria, Vienna			
Mar 62	18 Sept 70 in Washington D.C.	United States of America			
19 April 70	19 April 70 in Washington D.C.	United States of America			

CIA IS A MATTER OF RECORD AT (Include information in this box)

PLACE DATE ISSUED PLACE DATE ISSUED

No

I would even think of threatening to sue you  
to pressure you. I will be engaging an attorney  
or two, familiar with our affair, to represent me.  
I will not deny, that I consider you and  
everyone else unimportant in this law to be  
engaging in deliberate conduct unworthy of  
any government service.

~~SECRET~~~~REF ID: A6525~~

10-9-12-211

diff-jfk: record 104-10332-10007 - Page 68 - (diff between 2025 and 2026) - fresh pages only  
 I was serving in Vienna under  
 Tom Karakassis, I was ordered by HQ to

SECRET

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS		OVERSEAS		GOVERNMENT	
RETIREMENT		OVERSEAS		GOVERNMENT	
FOREIGN TRAVEL PLANS					
<p><i>Ranking Captain, diplomatic service, was informed to return to    Budapest and also been instructed by HQ and    was reporting to me, I refused to carry out this    order and offered my resignation. To me, it was    dishonorable to betray a young agent who had    accepted our recruitment and put faith in our    promises of safety. To my mind an agency without    principles cannot survive and in itself should    not survive. Tom Karakassis, my superior, did not    accept my resignation and overruled HQ's order.</i></p>					
<p><i>EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED AS COMPROMISED</i></p>					
EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN	DECLARED	COMPROMISED	EXPLANATION		
<p><i>I have never been declared as compromised.</i></p>					
<p><i>CREDIT BUREAU RECORDS INDICATE</i></p>					
<p><i>AGENCY HONORABILITY</i></p>					
<p><i>ACCRIMBLEY COVERS UP IN VIENNA AND ME ABOUT \$15,000 IN   旅費 and expenses. I will never get on my    feet again and won't be made whole if you expose me,    because and can't go to the courts. I am a retired    Agent of the Agency.</i></p>					
<p><i>THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY ON PAGE 1 IS THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE. THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER    STORY CONTINUED FOR USE AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AGENCY EMPLOYMENT.</i></p>					
DATE	FROM	TO	AREA OF ASSIGNMENT	TYPE OF COVER	COVER ORGANIZATION OR TITLE
Aug 47	May 48	Washington	Wash DC	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
May 48	Sept 52	Germany	Germany	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
Sept 52	Mar 55	Washington	Germany	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
Mar 55	Oct 55	Atlanta	Atlanta	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
Oct 55	July 60	London	London	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
July 60	Mar 62	Borneo	Borneo	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
Mar 62	1962	London	London	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
1962	1970	Vienna	Vienna	AD1(K)	UK AD1(K) (2210)
<p><i>1962-70 were called, and in the "room conversation," transcript</i></p>					

of the conversations POWs had in their rooms  
and including those found valuable spectators  
from the ~~SECRET~~ front line.

TYPE	HEALTH INSURANCE CARD ISSUED	NAME	GENL	HOME	STATION
LIFE INSURANCE		GRADE	WEPS	USLIC	STATION
VILL COMSEY	REG T-2 COMSEY				
DEPARTING EMPLOYEE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT					

~~SECRET~~  
I acknowledge that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on the date  
noted below and do understand that I will be ~~SECRET~~ priority 6  
as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date I entered on duty through  
the date of departure in accordance with instructions as outlined above.

I have been informed as to the employment references applicable in my case.

~~SECRET~~  
I recent year, at least one Luftwaffe  
veteran association, that of J.G. 2, The Richthofen  
Geschwader, sent people to London to get  
copies of the interrogatory reports of their fallen. They  
did it chronologically and even so, I checked at  
the vast amount of vital data revealed by their  
friends that, in acute rounds, they stopped  
looking. I found them that everyone had  
"talked". This is true.

11. I am 75 years old partly paralyzed  
on my left side from a stroke in Dec. 1993.  
I was nearly fully rehabilitated when, in May  
1994, I was hit by constant muscle spasms all  
up and down my left side, this rather rare  
condition, basically a sudden super-hem-~~SECRET~~ tetany  
full the muscle, with after effects lasting until  
the next spasm, have made it increasingly  
difficult for me to stand up, walk, or even sit  
up for very long. Just few days, when all

COORDINATION

CGS/OCM

CGS/OCB

CGS/OCO

CGS/RC

SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER

~~SECRET~~  
As many medicines are here, well begin a  
20-week ~~SECRET~~ homeopathic cure for the spasms  
under Dr. Schramm, a leading  
specialist he. I don't very well leave

~~SECRET~~  
for Dr. Schramm.

## TAX BRIDGING SUMMARY

## BANKING INSTRUCTIONS

You will be contacted immediately by one of my  
attorneys. I will also be in touch with my  
Congressman and Senator.

N. A. With bitter resolve,

*John M. Whited*

## FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER

	CLOSE RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL	YES	NO	DATE
II	NOTIFY OFFICE OF FINANCE TO HANDLE THE CSC COMPUTATION FORMS IN A COVERT MANNER FOR BLOCKING RECORDS AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	YES	NO	DATE
III	OBTAIN REFUND OF CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT FUNDS IN A COVERT MANNER	YES	NO	DATE
IV	RETURN OF CSCD FUNDS FROM CSC		EVEN	COVERT
V	APPLICATION TO PURCHASE CSC CREDITS		EVEN	COVERT
VI	CREDIT UNION CHECKS		YES	NO

## MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE

FORWARDERS ADDRESS	NEW EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS

IDENTITY AND ADDRESS OF EMERGENCY CONTACT

IF SUBJECT HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CSC WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE DID SUBJECT USE?

HAD SUBJECT BEEN QUESTIONED TO ASSURE HE OR SHE DID NOT USE AGENCY PERSONNEL FOR REFERENCE	YES	NO
SUBJECT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HAS <input type="checkbox"/> HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION - TICKETTY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.		

IF BACKSTAFFING IS NECESSARY GIVE REASON
Under court protective period of employment. Plan to divide abroad after retirement

ARMED PAYMENT TO BE CHANNELLED BY	CHECK	BANK TRANSFER	WEC
CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS		1980 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS	

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT	DATE RECEIVED	DATE APPROVED
MEDICAL RECORDS	WILL REQUEST	WILL NOT REQUEST

SHOULD NOTICE OF RESTORATION BE RESTORED EXPENSE	YES	NO

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

709-78

## SECURITY REMINDER



I, I, Walter C. McCabe, have been reminded  
 that, by virtue of my duties with the Central Intelligence  
 Agency, I have been the recipient of classified information and  
 information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and the  
 that my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to pro-  
 tect such data. Moreover, I have been given an opportunity to  
 review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.

**GRADE & GRADE** GS-16/5 **213-12-1338** **VOUCHERED FUNDS** **UNVOUCHERED FUNDS**

**RETIREMENT** **RESIGNATION** **EXIT COVER** **BRIEFING** **22 Aug 1947**

**RESUME** **31 May 1947** **LWOP** **31 Aug 1970** **AGENCY** **any such documents or materials.**

3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information that I am pledged not to disclose and will advise said authority of my secrecy agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established before I am required to do so. D.C. **DAC**

May 48	Sept 52	Germany	DAC
Sept 52	Mar 55	Washington D.C.	DAC
Mar 55	Oct 55	austria, Vienna	DAC <del>CIA, W.C. McCabe</del>
Oct 55	July 60	austria, Vienna	signature State <del>in Fife</del>
July 60	May 62	Korea, Seoul	Feb 26 1986 1986
May 62	18 Apr 70	Washington, D.C.	Date State
Witness: 19 Apr 70		Washington D.C.	State

Brian J. Quinn  
Signature

29 Feb. 1978 LETTER OF RECORD AT (include acknowledgement by OP)

DATE	PLACE	DATE USED	PLACE	DATE USED
No				

FORM 2554 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS  
5-70 EDITIONS 305 REVISED  
2-22

FORM 2554 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS  
5-70 EDITIONS 305 REVISED  
2-22

SECRET

GROUP I  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
REFRESHMENT

(4-9-12-21)

~~SECRET AGREEMENT~~

I, [REDACTED] (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"), the obligations contained in this agreement.

~~SECRET~~

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner any of the following categories of information or materials, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive them:

~~SENSITIVE INFORMATION WHICH IS CLASSIFIED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER AND WHICH I HAVE OBTAINED DURING THE COURSE OF MY EMPLOYMENT OR OTHER SERVICE WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:~~

b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive Order and obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency but which, because of operational circumstances or oversight, is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order and which I knew or have reason to know has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency.

c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that identifies any person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a United States foreign intelligence organization, which relationship the United States Government has taken affirmative measures to conceal.

EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED  
EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN DECLARED COMPROMISED  
4. I understand that the burden will be upon me to prove whether information or materials within my control are AGENCY considered by the Central Intelligence Agency to fit the descriptions set forth in paragraph 3, and whom the Agency has authorized to receive it.

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including words of fiction which contain any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information classified pursuant to Executive Order, which I contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter, prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence Agency.

~~ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT~~

6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an opportunity to determine whether the information or materials which I contemplate disclosing publicly contain any information which I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit and make a response to me within a reasonable time.

THE EMPLOYEE UNDERSTANDS THAT ALL INFORMATION OR MATERIALS WHICH I MAY ACQUIRE IN THE COURSE OF MY EMPLOYMENT OR OTHER SERVICE WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHICH FIT THE DESCRIPTIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS AGREEMENT ARE AND WILL REMAIN THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I AGREE TO SURRENDER ALL MATERIALS REFLECTING SUCH INFORMATION WHICH MAY HAVE COME INTO MY POSSESSION OR FOR WHICH I AM RESPONSIBLE BECAUSE OF MY EMPLOYMENT OR OTHER SERVICE WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UPON DEMAND BY AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OR UPON THE CONCLUSION OF MY EMPLOYMENT OR OTHER SERVICE WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

May 40 1962 Washington D.C.  
Sept 52 Mar 55 Washington D.C.

7. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or congressional authorities to testify about, or provide, information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.

8. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities which I consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to any successor body which the President may establish. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand that any information which I may report to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information.

July 60 Mar 62 - Korea Int State  
Int. Pol. Off.  
May 62 1840d 70 Washington Int State  
44-368 C.I.A. Bureau  
14 Apr 70 Washington Int SECRET State -  
Present office -

~~RESTRICTED~~

70978

## SECRET AGREEMENT

SECRET

I, Walter C. McCloskey, understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof. *(Handwritten note: I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on the data)*

I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest as an employee or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by the virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters. *(Handwritten note: been informed as to the employment references applicable in my case.)*

I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

SIGNATURE

**REMARKS** 4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations CIA", and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 16<sup>th</sup> day of February 1953


 (Seal)

Witnessed by me this 16<sup>th</sup> day of Feb. 1953  
at WASHINGTON, D. C.

COORDINATOR

CCS/OCM

CCS/OCG

CCS/OCB

CCS/OC

COORDINATOR

CCS/OCM

CCS/OCG

FORM 60  
SIGNER: Rebecca D. Vaughan  
CIA COVERT OFFICER

COORDINATOR

CCS/OCM

CCS/OCG

FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

K4

## FAX BRIEFING SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~

## BANKING INSTRUCTIONS

N.A.

## RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING

Mr. (Last, First, Middle)	R-9278 McCabe, Walter A.	STAFF	START ON DIVISION Z90	END DATE NA
S-15 115 30 90321 167653		OVERT	YES	COURSE
BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL	EMPLOYEE NO.	OVERT	X	DATE
20 August 28	061360	OVERT	X	DATE
A STEP NOTIFICATION NOTICE TO CHANNEL CSC COMPUTATION FOR THIS COVERT		LAST WORKING DAY DATE		
IN MARCH 1980 BLOCKING ACCESS AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		2/29/80	YES	NO
RETIREMENT	RESIGNATION	MATERNITY LEAVE	YES	NO
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CIA <input type="checkbox"/> CSC <input type="checkbox"/> DIA <input type="checkbox"/> DDCI	U.S.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOVERNMENT <input type="checkbox"/> CONTRACT	DATE OF RETURN	DATE IN POSITION
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS OVERSEAS		NONGOVERNMENT	NONGOVERNMENT	COVERT
APPLICATION TO PURCHASE CSC CREDITS				
TRAVEL PLANS				
TODAY'S TO WHETHER ENGAGED -- ON CONTRACT --				

CIA

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE				
FORWARDING ADDRESS	NEW EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS			
NOTICE, SPECIAL OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS				
IDENTITY AND ADDRESS OF EMERGENCY CONTACT				
EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED				
EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED				
EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED				
EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED				

HAS SUBJECT BEEN APPROVED TO ASSURE HE OR SHE DID NOT USE AGENCY PERSONNEL FOR REFERENCE		COVER BRIEFING	YES	NO
ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT				
SUBJECT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HAS <input type="checkbox"/> HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION		IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED		

DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW

ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELOW  
 IF BACKSTOPPING IS NECESSARY GIVE REASON

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE AGENCY

DATE	TYPE OF GREEN CHECK	BANK TRANSFER	JOB TITLE
ANNUITY PAYMENT TO BE MADE	CHANNELLED BY	OPEN ORGANIZATION	HOD
TO	OF ASSIGNMENT		
CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS			
1099 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS			
JFK Annex 5 (b)(2)(D)			
SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT		DATE RECEIVED	DATE APPROVED
MEDICAL RECORDS		WILL REQUEST	SOCIAL SECURITY CREDITS
SHOULD NOTICE OF RESIGNATION BE RESTRICTED INHOUSE		WILL NOT REQUEST	YES
			NO

SECRET

DRAFT ACT 5 (a)(2)(D)

70978

## SECURITY REMINDER

SECRET

## FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER

BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES	NO	EFFECTIVE DATE EOD / Feb 53
BLOCK CREDIT RECORDS <i>that, by virtue of my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, I have been the recipient of classified information and information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and EOD</i>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES	NO	EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
BLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATION RECORDS <i>that my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to protect such data. However, I have been given an opportunity to review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.</i>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES	NO	EFFECTIVE DATE EOD
X FORM 1501, 1971, 1977 MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE IF EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PLEASE INDICATE WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USED				
<p>2. I have also been reminded that I am not permitted to retain any documents or other materials which are the property of the CIA or the custodial responsibility of CIA, and I affirm that I do not have in my possession, nor am I taking away from CIA any such documents or materials.</p> <p>3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information that I am pledged not to disclose and I will advise said authority of my secrecy agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established before I am required to do so.</p>				

## DEPARTING EMPLOYEE'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I understand that:

- I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the instructions set forth in Information Briefing Section above.
- I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date  
February 23rd 1980

I have been informed of the employment references applicable in my case.

Witness:

25 Feb 1980

DATE

John C. McCabe

SIGNATURE

## REMARKS

*Bogdan Jagnow*  
ID # 116985, 9-8-78, Up 1985.  
29 Feb. 1980  
Date

Retirement address:

Local office  
2701 N ST NW  
Wash, DC

Clerks 303-40

## COORDINATION

FORM NO. 1501 EDITION CCS/CCB/S	CCB/CCB	CCB/CCB	CCS/CCB
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER <i>John C. McCabe</i>	COMPONENT CCS/CY	DATE 2-25-80	

SECRET



10. I understand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agency taking administrative action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government may institute a civil proceeding to seek compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense.

11. I understand that the United States Government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that I might make, choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver of my right of any possible defense I may have in enforcement proceedings, civil or criminal, proceedings that may be brought against me.

12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, I hereby assign to the United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any oral, written, recordings, representations, and emoluments that have resulted or will result or may result from any investigation, publication or revelation of information or material by me that is caused due to a breach of paragraph 3 of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of this agreement.

13. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always

14. I understand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, as specified in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

15. These restrictions are cumulative and do not supersede certain laws or otherwise limit the employee's obligations under Executive Order 13399, section 7101 of the United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of the 1980 United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the Military); section 4406(b)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (30 U.S.C., 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government Agents); and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section 793, 793, 794, 795, and 852 of Title 18, United States Code, and section 4(e) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1990 (30 U.S.C. section 710(e)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, remedies and liabilities created by said Executive Order and United States law are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affects any provision of criminal or other law that may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and 795 of Title 18, United States Code) and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200; 30 U.S.C. 421 et seq.).

17. Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable, I understand that all remaining provisions will continue in full force.

18. Witness this agreement is good fully and without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States.

Signature

Date 14<sup>th</sup> day of February 1953 (Seal)

The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency at a prior conclusion of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.

WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:

Signature

FORM NO. 20-22  
OCT 1960

Printed Name

RESTRICTED

Date