diff-jfk: record 104-10332-10009 - Page 1 - (diff between 2025 and 2023)
Highlighted changes between 2025/104-10332-10009.pdf and 2023/docid-32404522.pdf
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Date: 03/14/05

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10332-10009
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJFILES-DECLASS STDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : ARRB-CIA ISSUE: YURI NOSENKO
DATE : 05/30/1978
PAGES : 76

SUBJECTS : NOSENKO YURI
JFK ASSASSINATION
UNIT INDEX
ARRB ISSUE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/01/03
COMMENTS : JFK-M-17 : F10 : 2009.02.14.15:37:00:280044 : UNIT INDEX: 4 PAGES DIF.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 [44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW 53360 Date: 06-01-2023

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10332-10009

104-10332-10009
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
diff-jfk: record 104-10332-10009 - Page 2 - (diff between 2025 and 2023) - fresh pages only

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

OLC 78-1012/8
30 May 1978

Executive Registry
JUN 5 10 04 AM '78
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A) to provide access to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately below.

I

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case, addressing the actions and conduct of various officers of the Agency. These matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed and the analyses of those handling the matter. Blakey states in his letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

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4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1968 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security which prevailed has been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the SE studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.

4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1968 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security which prevailed has been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the SE studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after an extended period during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after an extended period during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

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II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue not part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter includes the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate something in terms of the man's bona fides, but so far we relate the two concerned best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been left to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacle coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue not part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter includes the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate something in terms of the man's bona fides, but so far we relate the two concerned best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been left to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacle coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

2

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8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real purpose of the Committee, as we believe it is, then it should be faced in some terms. No one would disagree with these being called into inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an interest being taken in turn against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious and reflects a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available.

11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review in this foreign liaison basis selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of such material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

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that if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of General Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified unclassified version of the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned, agreed to limit use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED
General Counsel — Date 31 MAY 1978

Chief, SE Division — Date

Chief, CI Staff — Date

Director of Security — Date 1 JUN 1978

APPROVAL: /s/ Frank C. Carlucci
Director of Central Intelligence — Date

DISAPPROVAL:
Director of Central Intelligence — Date

NW 63360 Docid:32404322 Page 5

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
1 - C/SE Div
1 - C/SE Staff
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - D/OS
1 - OLC/Subj
1 - OLC/Chrono

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1 - OLC/Subj
1 - OLC/Chrono

OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASED IN FULL
2006

11 March 1993
11 March 1993

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Peter Earnest
FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations
Chief, Media Relations

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination
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The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination.
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With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.
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The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a $250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday, 3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko who said he was satisfied with how the interview was conducted and with the financial arrangements.
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Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the individuals named. I told them that developing information in response to their questions would probably take a good deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.
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Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone would be willing to undertake research on their questions, I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would be grateful for making such a person available even if
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SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them would be seen as a gesture of good will.

Peter Earnest

Attachment:
As stated

_____Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is available.

_____No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the Nosenko information.

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
specialist in the Kennedy Assassination
specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)
DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)
Distribution:
Distribution:

Original	Addressee
Original	Addressee
1	SA/DDO
1	DD/Registry
1	D/Registry
1	D/DDI/CIC
1	C/DO/EROC
1	C/DO/EROC
1	C/DDI/CE
1	C/History Staff
1	C/History Staff

Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the JFK assassination:

1. General Eugene M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov instructed him after the JFK assassination to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB. Seventh

2. Anatoliy Korolenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minsk, he and Korolenko were going over the chronology of Oswald's stay in Russia, and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald—when a KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders to review it and give it to a superior. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveev, deputy chief (I think) of First (or American) Department, Second Chief Directorate. Unsure first name.

3. Chief of the First Department was Col. Fedosyev or Fedoseev and presumably he would have had a hand in the supervised preparation of the journyka, or summary.

4. Gribanov and about four other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection, according to Nosenko. The right other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection.

5. Maj. Georgi Rostovtsin, Nov. 22, 1963 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist matters. Nosenko says that Rostovtsin was the man who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rostovtsin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko checked out with his superiors. Wanted to be back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell Rastbach, Intourist official, to deal with him. Nosenko was told to tell Intourist official and let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of Foreign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that ministry and beyond, to Khrushchev office deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald

6. In the fall of 1962, a KGB colonel, M. G. Turulin, Service No. 2 (counterintelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko really that Mexico City station had just sent a cable about a request by Oswald for visa to the Soviet Union. What should be done? Nosenko said he asked Turulin a second time, How come he's back in America? At that point, Nosenko said he hadn't know Oswald had gone back. How come he's back in America? At that point, Nosenko said he said he talk to a senior chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chernekov or Chernenko (but later seemed to say he thought it might be, or that somebody else may have been chief of Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, "Forgetter, forgetter, forgetter." Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, "Forgetter, forgetter, forgetter." Tell them we don't have any interest. Tell them we don't have any interest. Tell them we don't have any interest.

3 March 1994
3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG
Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation
Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/[redacted]) that the JFK collection contains a significant number of documents on Nosenko (5000 pages) which may impact on the Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold litigation is over the Angleton files and has several years to go. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, several years ago Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of current cases with Theresa Wilcox who is the point of contact with the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the documents involved. She will consult with [redacted], the lawyer on the case, and get back to me.

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I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold or other considerations we address, we can do so after the HRG review is complete.

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Barry
Barry

9 Nov 94
9 Nov 94

Re: NOSENKO

Having Reviewed Box 45 — we note several reports, not completely identified as to author.

(1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" (Le Sale Report) - 264 pgs
(this is in Box 45 Folder 8)
(it has been released in JFK) - JFK 62-F9
(it concludes Nosenko is good)

(2) "Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" (835 page study) dated February 1967
(no indication that this has been released)
(believe this was prepared in SB (perhaps by Bagley — overlaps with CI/Staff)
(it concludes Nosenko is BAD

(3) "A Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" - TSH #197124 dated FEBRUARY 1968
(unclear)
(this is found in RIS Box 62 JFK FK 9)
(not released except for Annex A which is found in Box 45 F. 23.
(it concludes Nosenko was not Bona fide)
(Dick McKanna author)

JJA

INTERNAL USE ONLY
INTERNAL USE ONLY

23 March 1994
23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG
Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation
Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from [redacted], OGC, this morning concerning Nosenko files. I described the files again. Some 4000 pages that include transcripts of the interrogations and reports on the Agency studies of the Nosenko case by the Agency including the Soviet and Nosenko's important figure in the JFK assassination. Since Nosenko and the files are part of the sequestered collection, HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some documents were part of the Mangold litigation and wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

[redacted] said that the Mangold litigation should not be a factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act. When the review is complete, a list of the documents released should be provided so that OGC can treat them the same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were the agency's plans. She said for years the agency granted Nosenko except for the public information, which was only once Nosenko became public knowledge. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how he was treated does not. The Agency up until a couple years ago had not released some of the studies (the medical ones) because they were concerned that this would establish a precedent. Still, it was possible not outside to deny that this was still the case. DO has provided information to Nosenko's other DO has provided information for possible treatment. This type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling of Nosenko's files. We are considering the handling of the studies. We are considering all of the story and have made a recommendation including parts of the studies. We have deleted information provided by other sources and operational information. Where also recommending release related to the JFK studies. Although they contain potentially embarrassing information, the Agency has not identified any grounds for denying under the JFK Act.

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5/94

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in declassifying material files pertaining to the career and "bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in declassifying material files pertaining to the career and "bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft. Specific information in the files about KGB targeting of American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the Russian services continue to target Americans, this information should continue to be protected.

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft. Specific information in the files about KGB targeting of American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the Russian services continue to target Americans, this information should continue to be protected.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR) remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities. Russian intelligence services since the Second World War have tried to track their defectors. There are indications that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO case.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR) remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities. Russian intelligence services since the Second World War have tried to track their defectors. There are indications that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO case.

- At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some [redacted] in his possession. The US Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this material was passed [redacted]

- At the time of his arrest, [redacted] the US [redacted] in his possession. The US Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this material was passed [redacted]

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the United States, both were questionned by the Russian service about NOSENKO's activity and place and residence.

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JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

Legal position
CI

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

Mr. Robert Bugliosi
2009 Rich Harvest Court
Herndon, Virginia 22071

Dear Bob,

It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.

I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowledge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the Agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968 report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 report by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report contains a copy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach of my personal security.)

I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now been seriously damaged.

This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes. For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few journalists, and only when the Agency advised me to do so. I have never sought

on my own to publishing a story in an article or book. But now, the CIA has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive information that pertains to me without speaking to me first.

Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the following:

1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey, and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and Historical Review Staff so that they are aware of what has happened.

2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from these responsible for why this release was done.

3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which have already been released, aside from the two reports that I already have seen. I would like to receive copies of any other major studies that have been released (for instance, if there are reports released by Peter Bagley, Newton Miller, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)

4. I would like to be given the agency's written assurance that further releases will not occur without consulting me first.

Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troubled by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency for an explanation.

Bob, I apologize for troubling you with this matter, but I have no one else to turn to for assistance.

Please let me know if there is any response as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

SEP 16 '94 09:50AM

Secret

Draft letter to Nosenko from the DDO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Dear

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter expressing concern that US Government declassification of material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have already been released, rest assured that I have directed officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care in reviewing information concerning you in light of your special circumstances. We will make full use of all possible exemptions to FOIA mandated declassification in order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required all US Government agencies to release any records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I am of course committed to fully supporting the CCI in meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern about the files on you that are related to the assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer in the DO to meet with the officials in the agency's historical staff who are involved in the declassification program. This officer has had extensive discussions with members of the staff and has worked closely with them to identify those portions of the files that include personal and operational information.

As a result of this effort, we have postponed release of any information touching on your private life or on operational information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK law, a presidential Review Board will make the final decision on the disposition of the material. This agency values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we will present the Board with the strongest possible case for protecting information that could affect your privacy and security.

Best wishes,

Secret

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

17 April 1997
17 April 1997

[redacted] SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry Harrison, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files entitled:
[redacted] SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry Harrison, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files entitled:

1: "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"

2: "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"
"DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by [redacted] in the vault.
found by [redacted] in the vault.

Received 17-APRIL-97

Gary M Brenneman

~~Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only~~

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

RELEASE IN FULL 2000

30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft (or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date from the Warren Commission period, or were created in 1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection (OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Nosenko material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is not indexed document by document).

~~Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only~~

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised [redacted], SA/CIC, that most of the documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald. These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB staff. She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs, ARRB staff, on her next visit.

Barry

SECRET
~~SECRET~~

TO: Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: [redacted]
DATE: 07/31/97 10:54:03
SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers
SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: [redacted]
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board present such information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know.
Jim

From the Desk of [redacted]

NOTE FOR: Ben L. Sabinson
FROM: [redacted]
DATE: 07/31/97 10:44:28
SUBJECT: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: [redacted]
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) on 7 August. Eileen said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko material with her. Eileen wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is taking. I said yes. Eileen said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns in explaining our position to the ARRB.

1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the ARRB needs to know.)

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

SECRET
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SECRET
~~SECRET~~

According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair: [redacted] Nosenko wrote in 1964 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently [redacted] Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, work in to address the ARRB if this appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. [redacted] flown in to address the ARRB if this appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. [redacted] hinted that Combs alluded to the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:
CC:

CC: John R. ENGBERT, Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Bennis D. Lamb, Curtis L. [redacted]
CC: [redacted]

SECRET
~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

August 5, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

To: T. Jeremy Gunn

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.

Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the extent this is correct, we should process them as "NBRs."

Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became the single most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency's history to date. Nosenko's information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in

December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these false defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko's bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.

Nosenko's first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley) who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for watching American visitors in the USSR.

With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964, to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three years of severe treatment, Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "confession" was forthcoming, and no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.

On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to date, and concluded that he was what and who he had claimed to be all along. After a review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the Sunbelt.

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File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wnd

6 October 1997
6 October 1997

Note To: DO
Note To: DO

From: Barry Harrelson
From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group
Historical Review Group

Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection
Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK sequestered collection as "not believed to be relevant" (NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a description of all NBRs to be made available to the public. Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions, call me on 31825. Thanks.

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK sequestered collection as "not believed to be relevant" (NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a description of all NBRs to be made available to the public. Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions, call me on 31825. Thanks.

Barry

Per phone call from [redacted] 8 Oct 97
1:30 p.m. CIC has no problem with
attached description of Nosenko
files.

BH

Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK Assassination

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8A and B

Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13
Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," by Peter Bagley. It records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.
This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," by Peter Bagley. It records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17
Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the transcript is also included.
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the transcript is also included.

Reel 45, Folder 19
Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.
This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20
Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21
Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.
This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24
Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 45, Folder 25
Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2A
Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko," prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2B
Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to Chief, SR/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.
This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to Chief, SR/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3
Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 139-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services' handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.
This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 139-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services' handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5
Reel 46, Folder 5

This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.
This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2
Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.
This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3
Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.
This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.

Reel 62, Folder 5
Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.
This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6
Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.
This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7
Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.
This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8
Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.
This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9
Reel 62, Folder 9

This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.
This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10
Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.
This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

16 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DO JFK Board Focal Point

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM:
JFK Project Office

OFFICE: CSI/HRG
OFFICE:

SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997
SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:
REFERENCE:

The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:

1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.

If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010, please provide them to me by 23 October.

2. [redacted] JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting. I recommend that you review the material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other components that should be consulted on this issue? [redacted] was involved in discussions in April.

3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is a long standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.

CC: John Pereira @ DCI
CC:
[redacted] @ DO

Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

FAX Rec'd TODAY 10/31/97 Re NOSENKO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
28000

22 October 1997

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

1. The Board intends to digitize and release for public consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency, even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention the breach of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his right of privacy and, above all, his security. This stance was reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDCI, Ted Price, in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko's private life or on operational information pertaining to his debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would be made to protect information that could affect this privacy and security. The question has been asked before. Should we not show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their lives on the line in defense of our national interests?

2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high intelligence value has always been this Agency's top priority. Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the US would cause any potential source to think twice before placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr. Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past, entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal

CL BY 0635534
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL OADR
DRV FROM 2-82

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT:

and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously erodes this Agency's credibility and undermines our Research Program.

SECRET

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL on: X1
DRV FROM: COC 5.82

5 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pavitra @ DCI
Fred Hitchcock @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
[redacted] @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: 17 November JFK Board Meeting - CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:

1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:

- (S) Reconsideration of the release of [redacted], Va. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of [redacted] (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per the JFK Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DD explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010 date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.

- (S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under Categorized State cover.

We have provided written evidence (DD note coordinated [redacted] and copy [redacted]). According to the ARRB staff, some Board members consider CIA use of [redacted] as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

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- Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.
- Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR. ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR. Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/RD. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them to me by COB Wednesday.
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- Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)
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The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.
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(S) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warren and/or Stone cases. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the material and prepare their presentations for the Board.
(S) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warren and/or Stone cases. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the material and prepare their presentations for the Board.

CC: Eileen Walitch @ DO
CC: [redacted]
Becky Kent @ DA

JFK Act 6 (g)(2)(D)

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SECRET

CL BY: 611637
CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 c
CL REASON: Section 1.5 c
DECL ON: X1
DERIV FROM: COV 2-87
DERIV FROM: COV 2-87

21 November 1997
21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Frederick E. Hitchcock @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
[redacted] @ DCI
[redacted] @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrison
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: OSWGC
OSWGC

SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November: Results
ARRB meeting 17 November: Results

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of [redacted] at CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration, postponed until 2017.
The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration, postponed until 2017.

2. Citations: State Cover — JFK Act 6 (g)(2)(D)

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive, released.
The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive, released.

This determination affects 15 documents / 3 duplicates that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and DCI for reconsideration/appeal review.
This determination affects 15 documents / 3 duplicates that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and DCI for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release date of [redacted] records:

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.
The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Citation: Mandatory Secret (1952) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records for January 1958 and to January 1963 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 1,000 remaining pages of financial records dated after 1963 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 5,100

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3

[illegible] The Board [illegible] the [illegible] Memorandum be declared NBR. The [illegible] the Agency and [illegible] governmental organizations for support and funding of [illegible] operations. Other [illegible] mentioned in the Report's article. The [illegible] US.

6. Book Orders Elsewhere Mentioned:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book orders be [illegible] even if they contain stations that are [illegible].

7. Document # 104-10332-10002 :

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the [illegible] The document has been sent to the DO for reconsideration and [illegible] review.

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency [illegible] the Board's recommendation [illegible] appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has requested that [illegible] the Agency's decision. We expect the latter on or around Dec. 1st; the Board's recommendation will be published in the Federal Register shortly thereafter. As mandated by the White House, the Agency has seven days after notification to appeal the Board's decision to the President.

CC: [redacted] DO
Kathryn Dyer, OGC DCI
Becky Ryan, OGC DA

Sent on 23 November 1998 at 05:06:45 PM

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
NOTE FROM: Hollany Harckham @ DO
FROM: Frederick C. Wickham @ DO
DATE: 10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
REFERENCE: 10/10/97 12:19:34 PM
SUBJECT: Nosenko Records

I have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While I see this as a success to have them support our position and have some concerns about the detail included within the descriptions. We had no question in the past to ask Jane Lewis, Nosenko's attorney, a former employee's request to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Accordingly, has always assertedly expressed in a letter to the Agency, his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. I think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy Act.

I trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and I trust the judgment of those that have released these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and object to classification, but I just want to raise a valid concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder contents. I will not object to the release if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved so long as they are determined to not be in violation of his privacy rights.

In future efforts to protect NSR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.
In future efforts to protect NSR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.

CC: Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO, Lee E. Carle-Y- @ DO
CC: [redacted] @ DO, Lee E. Carle-Y- @ DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM

Classification of Material Transmitted
Classification of Material Transmitted

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

****

CLASSIFIED FAX

SUBJECT: Nosenko

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson

SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3010

DELIVER TO: [redacted]

RECEIVING FAX NO. 893-4346

DATE TRANSMITTED: 10/10 PAGES TRANSMITTED: 11
(including cover sheet)

TRANSMITTED BY: [illegible]

****

MESSAGE:

Classification of Material Transmitted
Classification of Material Transmitted

MEMORANDUM

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

NBR Folder Summaries

Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family background, early career, and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then current) incarceration by the CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SK) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SK's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8B

This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1968 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" written by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the transcript is also included in this folder.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 623-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released to the public. The NBR documents include 14 reports of interrogation sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to SR/CI/X on the 15 Deryabin/Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-175 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Sole Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents in this folder have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include a five page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress and a disciplinary problem and its resulting impact on his promotion schedule.

This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress and a disciplinary problem and its resulting impact on his promotion schedule.

Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Case." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Case." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released

to the public. The 97 pages of NRR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.

Corbett \nosenko1.wpd
File 4.20.5, 4.62 and 2.4

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 22, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not Believed Relevant to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages of material on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA sequestered collection microfilm unrelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on Nosenko produced as a result of the search for records related to the Kennedy assassination. This material either duplicates or is the original copy of the sequestered collection microfilm material previously declared NBR. For example, many of the original tapes from which transcripts were produced are found in the working files. The Board previously declared the transcripts, which are found in the sequestered collection microfilm, to be NBR. The files contain no new material which would add to the understanding of the Nosenko story.

I recommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes of working files on Nosenko to be NBR.

c:\combs\nbr\nosenko.wpd
file 2.4, 4.02, and 4.20.5

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

CI-277-94
31 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages relating to the case of former KGB officer and current CIA independent contractor Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The documents are being reviewed for declassification and release as required by the JFK law.

2. The Declassification Problem: CSI's declassification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko classification. This human resources Directorate of Operations officer is representing the DO in the review process. Mr. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two parts:

- Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's information on Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union and his relationship with the KGB.
- A body of counterintelligence staff studies, interpretative reviews and bona fides studies on Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material. For example:
  - [redacted]
  - Information on how CIA conducted operations in Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on how we evaluated the KGB's operations.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

diff-jfk: record 104-10332-10009 - Page 49 - (diff between 2025 and 2023) - fresh pages only

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases) and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets. One US citizen the KGB developed is now a senior professor of history in California.

3. Nosenko's Sensitivities: I discussed with Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release of information on his personal life. I informed her of Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the release of material related to his association with CIA, and of his concern that future releases would endanger his privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great detail on Nosenko's personal life, including his problems with venereal disease and his relationships with women. Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man who has served as a CIA employee for more than three decades.

4. Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended that CIA move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy--strongly suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He told me in closing that later this year the Agency would have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center and said I believed we could provide the justification.

Robert Pringle

Robert Pringle

13-00000
diff: record 104-10332-10009 - Page 50 - (diff between 2025 and 2023) - fresh pages only

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

CONCUR:

CONCUR:

/s/ 2 Sept 94
John Pereira (AD/CSI) Date

/s/ 2 Sept 94
John Pereira (AD/CSI) Date

/s/ 2 Sept 94
Barry Harrelson (CSI) Date

/s/ 2 Sept 94
Barry Harrelson (CSI) Date

/s/ 6 Sept 94
Ellie Neiman Date

/s/ 6 Sept 94
Ellie Neiman Date

NW 65360 DocId:32404322 Page 50

diff-jfk: record 104-10332-10009 - Page 51 - (diff between 2025 and 2023) - fresh pages only

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94)

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94)

Distribution:
Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman
for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
1 - AD/CSI
1 - CSI (Harrelson)
1 - Neiman
1 - C/CIC Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Defector File

Distribution:
Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman
for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
1 - AD/CSI
1 - CSI (Harrelson)
1 - Neiman
1 - C/CIC Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Defector File

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

NW 65360 DocId:32404522 Page 51

13-00000

1 Of the factors I had to consider in connection
2 ed it, and I will continue to accept it until
3 dence, not opinion.
4 ge that Nosenko states is that the KGB sends
5 They didn't interview Oswald when Oswald
6 ey didn't interview Oswald when they decided
7 d want him to Minsk.
8 your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your know
9 d on your knowledge of KGB procedures and
10 credible when he says they never interviewed
11
12 what is meant by interview, a formal interview
13 KGB headquarters, if that is what is meant
14 ing to be a KGB office speaking face to face with
15 d himself as a KGB officer, but speaking to him
16 mean, Nosenko says that never happened. Is
17 he credible?
18 best of his knowledge, I will have to—I wo
19
20 ment that?
21 ours.
22 the KGB didn't have a large book on Mr.
23 or done to check out the feasibility of Oswald
24 ing to see what the experiences of other defectors
25 debriefed by KGB officers? Was that ever done

1 individual had been interviewed for some other
2 the Oswald case because the Oswald investigation
3
4 some who were in Russia in a permanent posit
5 d, it is very possible. You would expect have to
6 ewed at your leisure the international situation
7 ne might even should be within the appropriate
8
9 how many defector tests, to your knowledge?
10
11 2 or all of these tests to have been valid
12 test to be a completely valid test; that is, the
13 ld be in actual operation concerning the poli
14 ds from our side because I am not an operator,
15 ut I will only ponder Oswald as question relat
16 the defector information into your report.
17 ondition then to be valid, is that correct?
18 ay to not be valid, to be completely invalid,
19 ld that Lee Harvey Oswald was a minor agent
20 been done?
21
22 during the Oswald report?
23 ld to be considered.
24 It involves the full consideration and the
25 Lee Harvey Oswald report?

1 a matter of investigation done in 1964.
2 ed that Nosenko was not credible in his rela
3 Lee Harvey Oswald, would that be significant as to
4 of some kind?
5 I would have to consider.
6 able that he could be lying about Oswald and
7
8 e was lying about Oswald.
9
10
11
12 he was lying about Oswald, do you think that
13 whether he was true, too?

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

INTRODUCTION

Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who believed him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko during the years 1964-67, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement. Among other things, he was asked about the reason Nosenko was placed in solitary confinement, about why he questioned Nosenko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.

Deposition of Honorable [illegible] Murphy, Washington, D.C., August 9, 1978

Mr. Fenton. When Nosenko defected in 1964, where was the United States, was it in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't recall. I don't recall. I mean, I haven't exactly an idea of the legal—I mean what the legal situation was. I mean, he was in the custody of the CIA.

Mr. Mason. What division or staff of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. The Soviet Union Division.

Mr. Fenton. Of course, you were chief?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mason. And what year did you leave the Soviet Bloc Division?

Mr. Murphy. Nineteen [illegible].

Mr. Mason. And up until what year did the Soviet Bloc Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the spring of 1967.

Mr. Mason. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet Bloc Division to another division?

Mr. Murphy. My recollection is that it changed in the early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security, of which Solie was a member.

Mr. Mason. As Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, did you have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he was kept, who he saw, etc.?

Mr. Murphy. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. Mason. Okay.

Mr. Murphy. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the division.

Mr. Mason. But they would report to you?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Mason. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed to the harsh interrogation began. Is that correct?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.

Mr. Mason. Well, continue.

Mr. Murphy. My recollection is that the previous pattern of solitary confinement and reasonable conditions changed and Nosenko was subjected to the more punitive treatment to decide what he would or would not tell the agency.

Mr. Mason. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before as to the conditions and how it was changed?

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Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Well, the picture before was one of pretty much permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation, and we wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but the procedure was not to sit with the [illegible] tactics, to wait to see what [illegible] then, which made it difficult the next day to continue to talk with the most convenient speech. I think, on the contrary, was the decision to continue on with [illegible] so as not to harass, which he said we [illegible].

Mr. [illegible]. What about the [illegible] living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Well, he was not permitted to have [illegible]. He was not permitted to [illegible].

Mr. KEARNEY. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interrogation [illegible], but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.

* * * * * *

Mr. KEARNEY. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. That is right.

Mr. KEARNEY. And how were the particular subjects on which he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people thought across the [illegible] approaches to get at defectors and so forth, on that. In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collected on [illegible] that I mean other information which said that Nosenko is saying it for the truth or this man does not know, [illegible] to get at him here or [illegible] and so it was a [illegible] decision. There were [illegible] considerations relating to [illegible] of information in the hands of the interrogators which they felt offered the best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

[illegible] I'm not [illegible] it was [illegible] in normality the case, [illegible] other [illegible] Chronicle. The decision on what [illegible] to be interrogated [illegible] a function of the [illegible] of the [illegible].

Mr. KEARNEY. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, to [illegible] to expand [illegible] to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your [illegible] security? In other words, [illegible] of the expression.

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. That is an reasonable impression. The reason is yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man was not what he [illegible], that parts of what he was saying were known to be [illegible] false, therefore, [illegible] no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then. It did not appear to make sense to assume valid any data in might provide cause you would be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was not considered acceptable.

* * * * * *

Mr. KEARNEY. Were you aware of the existence of what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. Even the only time I recall, when he first said it back in February or March.

Mr. KEARNEY. Do you recollect the substance of it?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. No, not exactly, anything. I said would be critical to so much here and there. I know that the issue of the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never approached by them, and it was questioned that because I was personally involved in the about. There is more detail, but I can't really recall it.

Mr. KEARNEY. Did you ever see any documents or exercises?

Mr. MOSKOWITZ. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have received information as to the arrival in 1960 in Moscow of a former Marine radio operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later I think, that as the Nosenko case got the scope, it seemed that begins to emerge that it seemed to me that the events story became even more [illegible].

[illegible] I mentioned, one other day, if memory serves, he have been called on or to have been added as though it didn't have to be part of the real body of or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of

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Mr. MOORMAN. I honestly couldn't find anyone, as I am sure, aware of anyone that the Division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Secret Service officer or other investigative agency to whom they spoke about this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. RIZZO. During the interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it be fair to say that an excellent relation to Oswald and the problems which you have just been describing relating to Oswald constituted a matter even for questioning and to interrogating Oswald?

Mr. MOORMAN. Probably not.

Mr. RIZZO. Why would that not be so, sir?

Mr. MOORMAN. Because there were many other areas which would equally interesting aspects, yet about which we knew much, more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral investigation, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the Secret Service.

Mr. RIZZO. Who in the Secret Service division made the decision as to who would question Oswald, subsequent to April 64?

Mr. MOORMAN. Both engineers, chief of the group.

Mr. RIZZO. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his interrogators?

Mr. MOORMAN. Some knowledge of Russian, as Oswald's English was not good, the fact that he was from Oswald. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You do not do an on the spot people fluent and fluent. In the first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to expose his young officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to display before a lot of people in, you know, people who should the case only because it should know it in depth and therefore, as they use the officers that they had available, and there was a variety of criteria.

Mr. RIZZO. As I mentioned to you in our conversation about a week ago, this was subsequently that the person who interrogated Oswald about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald. He didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell me?

Mr. MOORMAN. I am not sure I understand. I don't see the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI interrogations or interrogations. I wasn't aware of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure how many of us knew very much about Oswald then was available at the time.

Mr. RIZZO. Two points——

Mr. MOORMAN. The reason that the chap was there was because he was level-headed, extremely longheaded, and was going to be with the case for the next year. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And he became alone than has been set the judgment of many, he has very good offices.

Mr. RIZZO. But wouldn't——

Mr. MOORMAN. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't whatever, anything, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I don't think different to believe. But I don't know.

Mr. RIZZO. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Oswald, would you think that was unusual, that they would use, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald or at least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?

Mr. MOORMAN. I would certainly think so.

Mr. RIZZO. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, he was to break, we spoke to the psychiatrist, officer in a organization, so that our knowledge is gained from that, it is possible that some I have not seen the report on, or whatever that what I say might not be exactly what the interrogation was, but my recollection of it is that he was just kind of on prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be——

Mr. MOORMAN. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people. In the Division of Inland Operations who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very major hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,

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one, or I am not aware of anyone
these officers associated with this
of any former Soviet businessmen
and they under what the name
Lawrence ask, I never heard of it.
of, beginning in April 1964, begin
a decade and the problems which
Soviets constituted a major area

or areas which posed equally inter-
and since and which had growing
which obviously is not easy for an

you made the decision as to who
to?
with.
Did that be used to pick his inter-

as Nosenko's English was not good,
it is one of the ironies of the CIA
who's because now does look. In the
it hardly put the of Ilyka to go
any work, and so you don't want to
d a good idea to simply bring a lot
that the can and Russian in Russia
to others that they and available

proceedings about a week ago, it is
posted Nosenko about the Oswald
Oswald. He didn't know anything
Oswald at all. Is there any reason
can tell us?
Through the point was that he had,
to CIA debriefings or interrogations.
Bent Oswald. I am not sure very
was available at the time.

choice was because he was level-
ing to be with the case for the
that to why he was used. And his
of money, he is a very good officer.

not he wasn't what you are saying,
find that difficult to believe. Not I

a hypothetical situation, where I
know neither about Oswald other
you know that was connect that
Soviet who knew about Oswald, at
a A to Z, everything that the CIA
assumed, that they didn't do that?

was the other point I made to you
, let me be frank, we spoke to the
y knowledge is colored from that,
and we determined that what I say
, but my recollection of it is that
release, and my question is would

same there were very few people,
and elsewhere who had a lot of
of very many Soviet CIA Devel-
probably otherwise, either abroad,

might have had experience, but I know of no such source. There just wasn't
people and people of higher ranking Soviet Russian speaking CIA experienced
interrogators.

Mr. Slatkin. The thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a
number of tapes, and all of the work I have listened to was really in English.
There was no problem.

Mr. Morgan. Yes.

Mr. Slatkin. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major
operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. Morgan. It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. Slatkin. And you have was heavily into interrogation experience, who
could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. Morgan. I can pick some of the people had interrogation experience. I
mean, I'm a newcomer. Russian was a lot of interpreters in that area. I can't remember
exactly the officer who debriefed him on Oswald and the Warren Commission. I can't
remember what I mentioned to you the other day, because I was not a native speaker
he thought he was going to get through us, because we were weak in that
area at that time.

Mr. Slatkin. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. Morgan. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Slatkin. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about
whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. Morgan. There were many, many conversations on the case about various
things that could be done, all the techniques that are known to get him to talk,
but as far as I know we did not, consistent with the medical ethics, we hadn't
the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use drugs.
Because some of these techniques to be ready to produce results and they will would
be very upsetted and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. Slatkin. Between 1964 and 1967 when you last worked over the case, in
those years, it is your testimony that if any drugs were given to him to get him
to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. Morgan. That is correct.

Mr. Slatkin. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964,
in April?

Mr. Morgan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Slatkin. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Morgan. He indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. Slatkin. Do you have any reason to believe that test was inaccurate?

Mr. Morgan. No.

Mr. Slatkin. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in
1966?

Mr. Morgan. Yes.

Mr. Slatkin. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Morgan. Same thing.

Mr. Slatkin. Are do you have any reason to believe that test was inaccurate?

Mr. Morgan. No, I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the
same operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. Slatkin. That is correct.

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES G. MICHAELS AND ALESSO FONTAMOR, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims that his statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his prior testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978

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WASHINGTON : 1979

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Washington, D.C. 20402

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[illegible] Notary Public in and for the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

On September 31, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony.

September 31, 1978

The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 31, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Oswald case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes at such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Tenney or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Tenney is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have a more recollection of the meeting.

I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While

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[illegible]

this calendar does not refresh my recollection [illegible] this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore [illegible] change my testimony. If did seem to me that in fairness to both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you. Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

[illegible]

cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell
cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.
Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.

[illegible]
[illegible] my residence and therefore would [illegible]
[illegible] and in [illegible] therefore would be [illegible]
[illegible] to you, with the
would make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,
Respectfully yours,

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]

Thursday, April 2, 1964

Harold Reis	)	9:25 a.m.	SAWA
Sol Lindenbaum	) Civil	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
Harold Reis	) Rights	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
Joseph Dolan	) Briefing	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
John Douglas	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
John Douglas	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
Jack Rosenthal	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
Jack Rosenthal	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
Burke Marshall	)	9:35 a.m.	SAWA
Burke Marshall		9:35 a.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		11:55 a.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		12:27 p.m.	SAWA
William Foley		1:40 p.m.	SAWA
William Gorick		1:40 p.m.	SAWA
William Gorick		1:40 p.m.	SAWA
Marshall McShane		2:37 p.m.	SAWA
Marshall McShane		2:37 p.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		3:10 p.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		3:10 p.m.	SAWA
William Geoghegan		3:25 p.m.	SAWA
William Geoghegan		3:25 p.m.	SAWA
Edgar Cahn, Esq.		3:30 p.m.	SAWA
Edgar Cahn, Esq.		3:30 p.m.	SAWA
Burke Marshall		3:32 p.m.	SAWA
Burke Marshall		4:07 p.m.	SAWA
Burke Marshall		4:07 p.m.	SAWA
[Lawrence Barron, CIA]		4:08 p.m.	SAWA
[illegible]		4:08 p.m.	SAWA
[illegible]		4:08 p.m.	SAWA
[illegible]		4:08 p.m.	SAWA
[illegible]		4:08 p.m.	SAWA
[William Foley, Crim. Div.]		4:08 p.m.	SAWA
[Defector Case]			
[Defector Case]			
Professor Brandeis Daly, Students (40) in [illegible] Office		4:40 p.m.	SAWA
Sol Lindenbaum		5:45 p.m.	SAWA
Sol Lindenbaum		5:45 p.m.	SAWA
John Douglas		6:55 p.m.	SAWA
John Douglas		6:55 p.m.	SAWA
William Gorick		7:00 p.m.	SAWA
William Gorick		7:00 p.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		7:21 p.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		7:21 p.m.	SAWA
Joseph Dolan		7:49 p.m.	SAWA
Joseph Dolan		7:49 p.m.	SAWA

Friday, April 3, 1964

John Douglas (Conference Room)		7:45 a.m.	SAWA
Sol Lindenbaum	))	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Harold Reis	) Civil	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Harold Reis	) Rights	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff	)	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
David Ilyaroff		9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Burke Marshall	Briefing	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Jack Rosenthal	))	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Jack Rosenthal	))	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Joseph Dolan	))	9:30 a.m.	SAWA
Joseph Dolan		9:30 a.m.	SAWA

Depart to Puerto Rico
Depart to Puerto Rico 12:45 p.m.

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

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SECOND SESSION

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NARA#: [illegible] Page 01

have a say in what happens with respect
certainly was involved with decisions on
to end, but I was not the controlling

re were three major agency reports that
the Nosenko case, specifically there was
the Soviet Russia Division, another
the Office of Security report, and then a
red to as the Hart report
ether you are familiar with all three of

l any longer whether I read the first two
ied on their contents, the Hart report
the agency in early February 1973 and I
the agency in early February 1973 and I
immediately with it since
ng his defection in 1964 and upon his
ng his defection in 1964 and upon his
tes was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

I missed the question.
missed the question.
ecking security during his defection in
in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko
in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

That was an accepted procedure under
agency Defector Committee that deb-
ntry were handled by the CIA through
which were handled by the CIA through
sessing period, whatever had to be done
sessing period, whatever had to be done

at the legal authority under which he
at the legal authority under which he

k that perhaps Mr. Chairman, if you
like to answer that question a little bit
dates me
age me.
ly.

20. In September 20, 1978, I received a
before this committee in executive ses-
reviewing that transcript I noted that
st, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's
between 1964 and 1968 in a number of
as an area of obvious interest to the
take this opportunity to describe my
greater detail as to what Mr. Rosen-
intelligence Agency was
a lawyer nor a judge so I was not
conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure
Agency. I'm sorry I am not prepared
Geneva, Switzerland Mr. Nosenko re-
d to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's
ported to a claim that he could give a
Oswald's contacts in Russia
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be-

s the significance that Yuri Nosenko's
westigation of President Kennedy's as-
turned out to be a bona fide defector, if
turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

information were to be believed, then we could conclude that
the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey
Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President
Kennedy's murder.

On the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programmed in
advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald. If
Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's com-
tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962 it was fair for us to surmise
that there may have been an Oswald KGB connection in November
1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent
when he shot President Kennedy.

It was never shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent
when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences for the United
States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been
staggering. First, it became a matter of the utmost importance to
the Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko.
Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end
of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen-
ko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I along with
David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division and Mr. Lawrence
R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA met with Mr. Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-
sion of the Justice Department, Mr. William E. Foley, who was
then Mr. Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi-
sion, and Mr. Harold F. Rose from the Office of Legal Counsel in
the Justice Department.

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice
Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-
ko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind
of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's
ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.

The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the
record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing the meeting
on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the
substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley's office delivered
April 3, 1964. These documents were in part delivered by the
Agency on September 18, 1978 and I would like to make them part
of the record of these proceedings.

During the meeting of April 2, 1964 the Department of Justice
was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and
the Department's opinion was requested as to the propriety of the
Agency's custody authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

As Mr. Houston's memorandum states, Mr. Nosenko's legal
status in the United States was one of "defection and asylum,"
which meant that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had
technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States and had
also temporarily paroled him to the custody of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.

It was my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that
Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency until it was
determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or
whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

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statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Director [illegible] he was supposed to be the most [illegible] Soviet [illegible] custody in this country by [illegible] talk to him or [illegible] at [illegible] in the country [illegible] under the [illegible] with [illegible] gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll. [illegible] gave up and gave him some emolument and put

And only then gave us the first questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any [illegible] Mike Holmes. Has [illegible] Mr. [illegible] believe that. And that is [illegible] I don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that would be asked to OK enough. Hasn't you would [illegible] OK enough that [illegible] not responsible [illegible] OK enough that [illegible] not responsible for as far as I am aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel, [illegible] I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, [illegible] and [illegible] status is one of exclusion and parole—or more technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2.

After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives [illegible] Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know, and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone. [illegible] reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation [illegible] General Counsel Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. [illegible] the director of security, the director of security, the director of security,

LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 80 STORIES

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ABC NEWS

SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)

August 27, 1993

Transcript # 1337

TYPE: Show; Show

SECTION: News; Domestic

LENGTH: 8240 words

HEADLINE: Case Closed

GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attorney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr. PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; ORI NOSENKO, former KGB agent; ROBERT OSWALD, Brother

HIGHLIGHT:
Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, and was not a tool of KGB agent.

BODY:
BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I'm Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is on vacation. This is 20/20.

ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.

Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, with a powerful new book and the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - 'Case Closed.'

And-

SELNA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: [sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying in your 20's or 30's?

ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.

KERI SCARBORO, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are, the harder it is to detect.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate of up to 40 percent in young women versus a rate of less than 15 percent in older women.

ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.'

Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife.

JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.

RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what you're asking.

ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-

'ALEX,' Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of my life, I feel alive.

ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash.

GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.

ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they 'Born or Bred?' These stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.

[Commercial break]

Case Closed

BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event continues to haunt us all.

The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?

[voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you'll want to see Lynn Sherr's report now.

LYNN SHERR, ABC News: [voice-over] No period in an American presidency has been as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life.

1st NEWSCASTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.

SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph, medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.

ANN: [?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead. Let us pray.

SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far too convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or from a railroad overpass just beyond.

MARK LANE, Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connally [sp?], one bullet missed, struck the curb.

SHERR: [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission was wrong, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to identify the President's assassins.

Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the CIA, the DI [?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see - the cover-up is continuing.

SHERR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him directly to the only person who could possibly have shot the President.

GERALD POSNER, Author, 'Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy, acting alone.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win over many conspiracy buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.

Mr. POSNER: Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they went around to prove that case.

SHERR: [voice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren Commission believed.

Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than anyone realized - just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is overlooked by most experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and

turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the next two.

The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connally. After passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last year.

SHERR: [voice-over] This is the so-called 'magic bullet' that seemed to zigzag through the two men.

Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no magic. Because of the way the two men were lined up, this bullet passed directly through them. It turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connally's wrist - no zigs, no zags.

SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with no flaws on it, really, whatsoever?

Mr. POSNER: I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged so clean because that it went through Kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through Connally's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist, which everybody thinks would change it, it was travelling at half or a third off its speed - fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the bullet.

SHERR: [voice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many to believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it to arch back.

And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.

Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace bandage.

SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?

Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn't fall forward. I think you'd have to fall backwards or aside.

SHERR: Because?

Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.

And WENGCASTER: [?] At approximately one o'clock, the President is dead. The doctors were working too frantically to revive him to notice the exact moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy sometime standing next to him.

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Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and she was just holding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car came to Parkland. Sad moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential limousine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where in Dealey Plaza, the shots came from.

Mr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's sixth-floor window is right in the center of it.

Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going to hear about the tooth fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.

SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-

Mr. LANE: I know that.

SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it happened.

Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there, and they testified, and two-thirds of them said they know shots came from the wooden fence.

SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles [sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictaphone recording of a Dallas police motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't hear any.

[interviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?

Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.

SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?

Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle slowing down, see?

SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.

Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.

SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select Committee's tape?

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20/20 (ABC), August 27, 1993

Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.

Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot at all, even, to hear.

SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings, that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or himself became a victim of a conspiracy.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.

3rd NEWSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!

SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly, there was a connection there.

Mr. POSNER: No question. As a matter of fact, I think the Warren Commission underplayed Jack Ruby's organized crime connections.

SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their behalf to wipe out Oswald?

Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would erase the stain and the stigma attached to the city that had been done by the President's murder.

SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself, a lone-gunman theory once again?

Mr. POSNER: Without any doubt.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy theories about the assassination.

ROBERT F. KENNEDY: Did you say, 'That S.O.B., I'll break his back'?

JIMMY HOFFA: Who?

Mr. KENNEDY: You.

Mr. HOFFA: Who's the 'who'?

SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.

Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or '63, sat at a

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table with some of its key hoodlums, and discussed killing President Kennedy. They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no link between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for him to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.

SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial complex?

Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have some reason to knock off Kennedy.

JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved, and there is no question about it.

SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?

Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it's a disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the American public. Here was a man who knew better. I think his behavior actually crossed the line to being criminal.

SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that I can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.

SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB? After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married a Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.

Mr. POSNER: A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA's possible list of targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.

URI NOSENKO, former KGB Agent: [sp?] I do not think that Oswald will be trusted by any intelligence.

SHERR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know. Before defecting to the United States in 1964, Nosenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face.

Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.

SHERR: [voice-over] But unlike Posner, Nosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald could have shot the President for a very simple reason.

Mr. MOSKENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would you believe it? He never shot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifles on a long distance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds.

Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that he couldn't kill the President? Just talk to those who actually knew what Oswald was like with a gun, his brother who used to go out with him.

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run, okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.

SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 14.

Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he usually got his game.

SHERR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald, a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something.

DAN: [?] Lee Harvey Oswald, O, S, W, A, L, D.

REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I emphatically deny these charges.

SHERR: [voice-over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the KGB or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why did he kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was to be almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three days before Kennedy arrives in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass in front of the Depository. It's not ideology, it's not because he's Communist, but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.

WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?

SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes so, but our experience is that people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey Plaza-

WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.

SHERR: -which is where it took place-

WALTERS: Yeah.

SHERRY: It's so much smaller in real life-

WALTERS: Really?

SHERRY: -than it appears-

WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-

SHERRY: Right.

WALTERS: -kind of highway.

SHERRY: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses who have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded that day.

WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more to come. Is that going to settle anything?

SHERRY: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree - unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even so, this is going to be argued for generations to come.

WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.

Next, most people feel that breast cancer only attacks women over the age of 50.

[voice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are discovering they have a special battle to fight. What should you know? After this.

[Commercial break]

[It Could Happen to You]

BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer in younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.

[voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 40, much of what you previous learned about the disease may not apply to you.

TERESA NORDSON, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they turned out to be cysts. But I knew this was different.

GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in my family, so I was very surprised.

MERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-over] A disease they thought they were too young to get, but more and more, the woman on the

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LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 80 STORIES

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October 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: TEMPO; Pg. 1; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 1949 words

HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY;
GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY

BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.

BODY:

The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a Turkish restaurant near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting him.

When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George and his wife, as he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to a private table in the back room.

George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nosenko had suggested that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of two couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.

"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the KGB files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period of Oswald's life."

A chapter in Posner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald.

As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be Kennedy's assassin, acting alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose notions of making a mark in history.

Posner is as surprised at the book's conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are riled.

"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people. If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.

Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and what wasn't.

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Invoice of Mead Data Central, Inc.

Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

Poking in the garbage

"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was garbage on the record. I didn't know how much."

After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he assured there would be some issues that would require further investigation, perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.

Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.

"I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was overwhelming," he said.

Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.

He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive editor of Random House, took his own poll at the week meeting of the publishing house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.

"Bob told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren Commission was right," Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest, best-informed, best-educated people in New York City, and no one raised a hand except Bob Loomis."

Posner was not dismayed. "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90 percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, I say I'm surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."

'JFK' an 'abomination'

A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books, including those that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters, motives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make bestseller lists, while the others don't.

"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy," Posner said. "A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment called 'The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' "

And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $40 million movie, "JFK," released in late 1991.

"Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1963. Stone's movie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.

"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have exaggerated, but there's got to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's not."

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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.

"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty, and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors had to go to the bathroom."

Stone has said "JFK" was a "counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren Commission.

The no-longer magic bullet

Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK," Posner noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas Gov. John Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in midair, and was probably planted.

"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy and Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said. "At the time the bullet was found, the conspirators couldn't know if the bullets fired at Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.

"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots. More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match ballistically with remnants of the other rounds?"

And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the spur of the moment?

"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was a coincidence, so you're off and running with a conspiracy."

Posner's account of Ruby's life and his actions during the assassination week demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.

According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance.

Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people are buying the book."

Thumbs up from the critics

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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's list of Chicago's best sellers.

U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes: "Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of political smoke, layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer ..... Lee Harvey Oswald." It quotes Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon: "The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely brilliant, absolutely convincing."

New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy theories."

In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is "utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of all that has transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."

Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes of his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of lawyers. He said, 'Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe!' "

So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley, where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm, leaving two years later to form his own firm.

In 1988 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Joseph Mengele, the notorious Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding in South America.

"It was a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German government," Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 250,000 documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."

"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was published in 1986, prompting Posner to leave the law and write full time.

"Case Closed" is his fifth book. "A weakness of mine is that I tend to underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I could get answers to."

The real cover-ups

Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation was flawed.

"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go into detail in exposing these cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."

The Warren Commission's work also was terminated by a dubious finding of the 1978 investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.

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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio traffic on Dallas police channels and said they were 95 percent certain there had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."

A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting, Posner said.

Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulous examination of Oswald's entire life, culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two months before the assassination. "Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald. But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said. "It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a patsy.

"My technique was to go to original sources. Too many books quote secondary sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is discovered again and again, becoming fact.

"Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until the day after he killed Oswald."

Posner paused. "I can go on."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC
CAPTION (caption): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Beyth School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles Cherney.

GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 11, 1993)
See microfilm for complete graphic.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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