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The United States Senate

R 323

Report of Proceedings

APR 20 1977

Hearing held before

2/5/77  
P.C.

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7 6 0 0 0 1 1 4 0 4

Thursday, June 19, 1978

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Maste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL  
416 FIRST STREET, S. E.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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1 EXECUTIVE SESSION  
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5 Thursday, June 19, 1975  
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8 United States Senate,  
9  
10 Select Committee to Study Government,  
11 Operations with Respect to  
12 Intelligence Activities,  
13 Washington, D. C.  
14  
15

16 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m.,  
17 in Room S.123, The Capitol, Senator John G. Tower presiding.  
18 Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.  
19 Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick  
20 A. G. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow and David  
21 Aaron, Professional Staff Members.  
22  
23

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1 Senator TOWER. Mr. Angleton, I understand that you came  
2 on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating  
3 the Committee.

4 You will have to be SWORN.

Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?

6 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about  
7 to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and  
8 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

10 Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

12 Mr. Schwarz, I would like to first get your name and  
13 address on the record.

Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.

Mr. Schwarz. Just some procedural matters. You have a right to counsel, you understand that?

Mr. Agoston. Yes, I understand it.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop to ob-  
19 tain counsel you have a right to do that. And if you wish  
20 to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right  
21 to do that, you understand those things also, do you?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.

Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what period of time?

Mr. Aspinwall. From the beginning until December, the

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1 end of October.

Mr. Schwarz, 19747

Ms. Amistad, 1974.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligence at the CIA for that period?

No, Franklin, I was.

Mr. Schwartz. For that entire period of time?

See annotations, No. from 1954.

What are the main functions of a police licence agency?

 You're right. That is correct.

11 Re: ANGIELOM. Page 20  
In briefly state the connection, if any

12 Mr. Schwartz. Can you briefly state the

~~13. between your counter intelligence work and the Johnsons' party  
14. or put even more generally, how did you happen to have both~~

15 those jobs?  
16 Mr. Angleton: Well, if I could ask you some clarifica-  
17 tion, are we addressing ourselves here in terms of  
18 this meeting to the ~~SRG~~ business, or are we trying to take  
19 up everything?

Mr. Schwarz: No, we are not going to try to take up everything. We may try to take up a few things beyond the cyclic business. What we are trying to do --

22 Mr. Singleton. I can direct my amanuensis to you better  
23 where we are going.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the ~~Sculc~~ business, but it

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1 It would be helpful to have a few background first.

2 Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that Mr. Angleton  
3 will not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things that  
4 I would like to discuss. The nature of that material would be  
5 similar to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller,  
6 having to do with the Oswald situation and other things.

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, I went into OSS in  
8 1943, in 1943 from the Infantry. And then I was assigned to an  
9 embryonic counter intelligence unit under General  
10 Donovan. My immediate chief was James R. Murphy, who had been  
11 a protege and obtained a law degree in General Donovan's  
12 office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington.  
13 And he was Chief of X-2, which was the counter intelligence.  
14 And during that time a number of us were put together who  
15 had never had any experience in that subject. And that included  
16 people such as Connie Oaks, who was the head of the editorial  
17 page of the New York Times, and Ben Wallin, and a tremendous  
18 cross-section of American life.

19 And there was a training intensive in this country, and  
20 I was sent to London. And the purpose of that was to ab-  
21 sorb the British experience, and more importantly the breaking  
22 of German codes.

23 The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to  
24 our activity, was really done in England. And by way  
25 of aggression, the Germans were using a receiver machine called

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1          the blue prints of which were originally obtained by  
2          a Frenchman. And I might add that the Frenchman never re-  
3          ceived credit for it. And yet that perhaps was the most  
4          single important breakthrough of the entire war. And he had  
5          obtained it about eight to nine or ten years prior to the out-  
6          break of war, when it was non-operative. And he had the  
7          prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing,  
8          that it would be operative in a time of war.

I give this digression simply to point out that the  
fruits of that breakthrough would first go to the military  
and the military operations. And the counter intelligence  
use of it would be the bottom of the list of priorities, in  
one sense.

14 But it would mean that a compromise of the material  
15 in any fashion to the Germans would destroy their military  
16 uses. And during the war or when the Germans went into the  
17 war, they brought it up from 10 percent recovery to about  
18 100 percent.

19 And I believe it was in the neighbourhood of some 25,000  
20 operational messages from the German high command. I know  
the battle of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.

So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence  
for the purpose of playing back German agents to their high  
command. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the  
war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents

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1 that the Germans had were under our control. And in fact  
2 while many of the German hierarchy tried to escape to the  
3 west under aliases, their only point of contact for most  
4 documentation and money was to our agent under control.  
5 And it was called the Safe Haven program.

6 So London was in a sense a staging area with full access  
7 to British, or the fruits of British activity, going back  
8 through their entire history. And it was the advance head-  
9 quarters for General DeGaulle, and Mr. Murphy.

10 I was then sent to Italy in 1943. And I took over the  
11 counter intelligence for Italy, the OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces  
12 Headquarters.

13 Subsequently I became the chief of OSS Italy. And  
14 I want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of  
15 espionage and all the other branches of OSS. And I re-estab-  
16 lished the counterintelligence services. And I brought the  
17 French back into existence, particularly those who  
18 originally acquired the code, and who worked on it for many  
19 years. And at this time it was shifted to the Saudi blee.

20 I left Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, and was  
21 discharged and went into the Agency immediately. And during  
22 the period I was in the Agency, of course, I had both agent  
23 operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,  
24 and some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.

25 And probably the first overnight operation that there was

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which was known as Plan Hope, which is simply putting the  
Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to the  
Romanian border and make very primitive photographs of the  
whole region.

~~5 And I was sent back to the Air Force, but then I had  
6 code operations, embassy penetrations, and so on.~~

7 So, in essence the reconstitution of the Italian service,  
8 Army and Navy, Air Force, and the Minister of the Interior,  
9 was American rehabilitation. And I am not going to go into  
10 the details of the political situation. There was the  
11 civil war in Greece, and the revival of the international  
12 Brigade and in fact the Soviets had built up, when they were  
13 not fighting the war, in the post-war period, assassinations,  
14 and instability.

15 And throughout this we had very close supervision from  
16 Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had special interest  
17 in the Vatican, and what was happening in Berlin behind the  
18 curtain.

19 And he then acting Secretary of State for the Vatican,  
20 Montini who is the present Pope. And so there was much  
21 to do through our channels, and General Donovan, with Montini,  
22 the Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems  
23 the cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to us  
24 and we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the  
25 opposition, we began to find that we were not getting the

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1 Germans, we were getting the Soviets.

2 But the penetrations and the operations which we ran  
3 during the military phase began to take on a character of  
4 their own in the civilian phase in the very long-term Soviet  
5 objectives against the U.S. In particular, and against the  
6 allies.

7 And then I got into all fields of labor, subversion,  
8 illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I was in Greece.  
9 And our penetrations at that period were fairly high level and  
10 sophisticated, because of the reaction to Stalin.

11 And as the Soviet troops occupied new territories, it  
12 was faced with these difficulties, the defectors coming  
13 over to us at very high levels.

14 And in the course of this, of course, was the Israeli  
15 immigration. Technically we were still a part of AFHQ, which  
16 was a combined and Allied Headquarters. And the British desires  
17 were that our activities be directed in supporting their  
18 responsibilities in the Middle East, and, therefore, to pre-  
19 vent the immigration.

20 And I think the only policy cable that was ever re-  
21 ceived during that period was one we sent to Mr. Murphy, and  
22 through General Donovan to the President. That  
23 was where we exercised our influences on the Italians to  
24 prevent immigration. And they addressed themselves to this  
25 issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leaned

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**new girl**

1 toward the general proposition that we should not  
2 encourage the British nor hurt the British directly but  
3 we should not interfere with the Italians to support the  
4 British position.

And so my dealings were with Admiral Passerini, who had been Chief of the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was then the Commanding Admiral of the Tunisian Fleet generally south, where all these illegal immigrants collected and were sent down.

10 And then they blew up the Ergum, and blew up the British  
11 embassy in Rome, who were by opposite numbers. And the men  
12 with whom we had set up is the Italian intelligence through  
13 the rest of the **Israelis** -- we had the members of the  
14 group, and then we had the dilemma again as to whether we  
15 turned them over to the British authorities, and so on.

16 And we were in a position to make decisions one way or  
17 the other. And eventually we came down on the side of re-  
18 lessing them.

18 And there is so much more of it. I am trying to keep  
19 the thread of it.

Mr. Schwarz. So you developed some kind of a relationship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of Israeli back in the 1940's?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

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Mr. Schwarz. And was there any other significant reason  
why you kept the Israeli account, if that is the right ex-  
pression?

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't one after I left there,  
nor was there one here in Washington.

But the other side of the Israeli problem was that you  
had thousands coming from the Soviet Union. And you had the  
Soviets making use of the immigration for the purpose of  
sending illegal agents into the West, and breaking down all  
the travel control, identifications and so on.

And so there was both a security problem and a political  
problem. And one of my men married, I might say, the head of  
the Zionist movement in Italy, the underground. So I had  
a connection to this man. He was very important.

So, coming back to Washington, I was Special Assistant  
to Colonel Donald W. Galloway, who was head of the  
clandestine side and covered the world, on all sides of  
clandestine activity.

And subsequently I was Chief of Operations for Es-  
pionage.

And in 1954 I had a special operational unit, and was  
the head of the counter intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and lasting  
until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any  
relationship -- is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it?

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Mr. Angleton. It is all right. It is as good as my  
number.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you have any relationship with the

5 - Singleton. No. That began in 1951. There was no  
- connection between the Agency and the Central Intelligence.

~~Mr. Secretary.~~ You mean at all, or prior to 1951,

Mr. Anderson. There wasn't any from 1947 -- 1946 on.

Mr. Schweig. When it began in 1951. And all

10 I am trying to establish and not spend a lot of time with it.

12 gence, JBF (the S Database) account on behalf of the Agency between  
13 1951 and 1974.

14 Mr. Angleton. It was reconstituted in 1951. And I was the  
15 negotiator of the arrangement. <sup>Felix</sup> The Mayor of Jerusalem, Peter  
16 Kollek, was at the other end of the negotiation. He was  
17 stationed in Washington. But during the Jewish Agency period.  
18 he was head of the intelligence in Turkey, during the war and  
19 prior.

Mr. Miller, How was that agreement negotiated?

21       Mr. Angleton. It was negotiated by finding wafer  
22       dis which we have in common. It was reviewed by Admiral Hillenmeyer  
23       who was then Director. And he was to be succeeded by General  
24       Walter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the  
25       period that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles returned

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1 to this activity, that we would go ahead and re-establish a  
2 relationship. And after a lot of bureaucratic problems, they  
3 gave me the account.

4 Mr. Miller. What was the nature of the arrangement that  
5 was agreed upon between the two services?

6 Mr. Angleton. In most simplistic terms, they were informed  
7 that we would not work with them against the Arabs,  
8 that we would work with them on Soviet intelligence and  
9 Soviet bloc intelligence and communism, where it existed.

10 Mr. Schwarcz. Did that agreement -- which I take it was  
11 more flexible than -- but did it remain in effect throughout  
12 the period of your service with the Agency?

13 Mr. Angleton. More or less.

14 Mr. Miller. Was this agreement in the form of a  
15 paper?

16 Mr. Angleton. Paper and operations discussion.

17 Mr. Miller. And under whose authority was the agree-  
18 ment made?

19 Mr. Angleton. Under the authority of the Director of  
20 Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister of Israel on  
the other side.

21 Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of resources  
22 of both countries?

23 Mr. Angleton. The term "resources" is not quite  
24 correct. Everything except their own people. It was giving  
25

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up papers and signals, communications intelligence, and all  
JFK Act 5 (g) (2)(D)  
the other products of intelligence action.

Mr. Miller. So the Director of Central Intelligence was  
aware of the agreement. Was the President?  
Angleton. The President was aware of it. And the  
Secretary of State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of the  
CIA, and eventually was very much involved.

Mr. Miller. Where is a record of this agreement kept,  
as an instrument of the U.S.?

Mr. Angleton. The internal papers would be in the Agency.  
The letters, copies of the letters from Ben Gurion to the  
President or to the Secretary of State I assume are still in  
the Agency. I dealt with other departments in connection  
with Africa, and so on, underdeveloped areas.

If you are speaking as to whether there was a representa-  
tive treaty which was cleared -- and people wanted these  
things cleared -- I don't think there were any clearances  
obtained from the Hill.

Mr. Miller. Was it regarded as an obligation or a  
commitment from the U.S. to Israel on certain matters?

Mr. Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while you  
may use it as contracting officers and all that, there was  
very little reduced to writing. And it is a custom of  
intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And  
there have been very few directors to my knowledge that would

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put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some understanding. It is based on a fiduciary relationship and common understanding.

So, these were all understandings that were generated by events. NS had the arrest of the nine doctors, and the treason in Russia. And obviously you didn't go through a lot of bureaucracy, it was there for everyone to see. And it had a direct impact on the question of immigration of agents, and everything else that goes along with it. And which other characteristics any good operation.

~~Mr. Miller. How was it possible for succeeding directors of the intelligence agency to understand what the agreements were between, in this case the Israeli intelligence service and the U.S. intelligence service?~~

Mr. Angleton. Very simple. They saw the production to begin with. And they met with directors at the head of Israel intelligence. And they met with Ambassadors and prime ministers. And they were very much involved.

~~Mr. Schwarz. Just one more background question and then we will turn to the principle subject.~~

Following through on the subject of Israel to your  
question in 1974, is there any connection between John de-  
parture and handling of Israel? And if there is, what is  
the connection?

Mr. Angleton, Well, I think I have said it all to the

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1 commission -- I don't know how wisely. You can always get  
2 different information from different people. But Colby  
3 did them, so I would like to give him the benefit of the  
4 doubt on it. But over a period of time Colby [who is not my  
5 cup of tea professionally or in any other way, and in my  
6 view is on the negative side of life -- and Dr. Schlesinger,  
7 before he went to Defense, said that Colby was the only other  
8 person on Matayim]. So you have got certain persons who  
9 were prominent. And there was the negative aspect of  
10 self-inspection, and inferior reporting on superiors, until  
11 they came through the snail-mail.

12 And in the course of all of this there was time when  
13 he assumed the authority, and in total contrast to Schlesinger,  
14 he began to regard the Israeli accord as some-  
15 thing where we had to open the windows and let the air in.  
16 And he used phrases such as, we must help out Henry and a few  
17 other things.

18 Any position was that it was a political relationship,  
19 and that we were not bound, or should not be bound, to using  
20 the Agency on tactical ventures when we had relationships  
21 which had strategic implications.

22 But one must remember that there are still three  
23 million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship is the  
24 only place where you do it with high level agencies who work  
25 for ideology and do not work for money. So it is unique.

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And my second point was that everything should begin  
on the grounds of need-to-know, and should not go into the Arab  
division until there was peace in the area. There was no  
identity of interest or fundamental interest between Israelis  
and an example is 500 Polish intelligence officers who were  
JFK Act 5 1g(2)(D)  
Jewish who immigrated to Israel. They knew more about Polish  
intelligence than the Poles. And the Soviets had worked with  
the Poles in the West, and trained them in Moscow, where you  
had the cohesion of 27 bloc services working together through  
their own congress party apparatus into a collective with  
Moscow.

And most important, which was to preserve the integrity of the immigration from the bloc, because the problem  
of escape to Israel is a religious problem, it is not a  
political problem. There could not be a prime minister who  
would survive the day if he did not go along with the idea of  
the return.

And, therefore, there is a certain kind of parallelism,  
you might say, between handling the communications intelligence  
during the war and where a low priority makes use of it and  
endangers the whole with the question of immigration,  
where the fruits of that immigration come to this government.

(Recess.)

Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the questioning?

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Mr. Schwarz. You were in the middle of an answer.

2 believe.

3 Mr. Angleton. What I am trying to say is that immi-  
4 gration is a source of very high level information, and it  
5 is very comparable with its problems as communications intelligence.  
6 during the war when the lives of men were involved in troop  
7 movements.

8 And, therefore, the idea of opening up the doors and  
9 things, and so on, to me seemed absolutely contrary to the  
10 spirit, and what had been maintained for 22 years.

11 And during that time we had obtained, for example, by  
12 way of production, Khrushchev's secret speech which prac-  
13 tically created revolutions in Hungary and Poland.

14 I was just simply reiterating the problem of the immi-  
15 gration. This idea of opening the doors and letting the light  
16 in, and breaking down compartmentation, and breaking down  
17 the need to know, would inevitably put in jeopardy the immi-  
18 gration, if the Soviets should learn the extent of the ac-  
19 tivities.

20 Now, the production ran from everything, such as the  
21 secret speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran into  
22 the first hard information on nuclear explosives, and it  
23 ran into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a cer-  
tain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports deal-  
ing with the Soviet bloc which were unique. And much of this

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1 came from, say, an engineer that had a factory, or what ever  
2 in other words, it had a very direct bearing on our own  
3 and our own defense budget.

4 Now, our own way of handling it was to give false  
5 attribution, reports, so that if the report was ever compromised,  
6 I could not compromise the operations or the immi-  
7 gration. And, therefore, that was one of the issues.

8 On the other issue was that to politicize the Agency,  
9 as I stated, on the tactical problems, which are going to  
10 be with us for a long time.

11 And to break down the fiduciary relationship-- which is  
12 after all a personal business-- all the men I have had were  
13 men who stayed in it and came back to headquarters and went back  
14 to Tel Aviv, they went to the National Security Council, and  
15 went back to Tel Aviv (at various) small group of men. It  
16 was probably the most economical operation that has ever been  
17 devised in the U.S. Government. I don't think there was more  
18 than 10 people that were hired in the same process.

19 I started from the south side with two Jewish men who  
20 worked with me during the war. He sent them over as ordinary  
21 people under cover to establish the working hours of things,  
22 and I brought over six others and put them through nine months  
23 of training, outside of the structure.

24 And one of them rose to be [redacted] Deputy Chief of the Service.  
25 But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.

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19

For example, we had certain political overtones where  
2 we were used in an affirmative way under President Eisenhower.  
3 We wanted to make a real attempt to see if there could ever  
4 be a peace in the Middle East. And with Alan Dulles, his  
5 brother, and myself, and Kermit Roosevelt, we put up a plan  
6 to bring in Robert D. Anderson, who had been Assistant  
7 Secretary of the Defense.

8 And he was accredited as special emissary from the  
9 President. And I handled his base in Israel, which was secret,  
10 black, as we call them, to see Ben Gurion -- and Shaffetz was  
11 the Foreign Minister -- and Kollek, who was in the Prime Minis-  
12 ter's office, and later Mayor.

13 And we took him back to Rome. And Kermit Roosevelt  
14 would take him over to see Massari. And this went on back  
15 and forth on many trips, until the conclusions were reached  
16 that there could not be any peace.

17 But those types of initiatives could be done without  
18 publicizing or without destroying it.

19 Mr. Schwarz. In any event, some dispute in connection  
20 with these Israeli matters underlay your dispute with Mr.  
21 Colby, which underlay your leaving the Agency?

22 Mr. Angleton. Yes. He offered me jobs or what not.  
23 But these are matters of principle, as far as I am concerned.

24 Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduciary  
25 relationship. Were there points along the way where the U.S.

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1      interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?

2      Mr. Angleton. We never got into that. Of course you  
3      only had to read the paper every day to see that.

4      Mr. Miller. But how did they come up? You say they  
5      didn't come up at all?

6      Mr. Angleton. Of course, they came up. There  
7      wasn't anything secret about it.

8      Mr. Miller. But what example can you give?

9      Mr. Angleton. The recent visit of Raben is a classic  
10     case. The so-called reassessment of the Middle East. The  
11     Times has better accounts of it than the Agency has.

12     Mr. Miller. I mean at your level.

13     Mr. Angleton. I don't quite get the thrust of your  
14     question.

15     Mr. Miller. What I am saying is that you had an unusually  
16     close relationship --

17     Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual. I have had it  
18     with many ~~chiefs of services~~ in different countries, ~~so~~  
19     it is not any more unusual than a lot of others. The French-  
20     man will get the code is closer to me than the  
21     Israelis are.

22     Mr. Miller. Similar to the relationship --

23     Mr. Angleton. I don't like the word unusual, because to  
24     me it is usual.

25     Mr. Miller. Delete that. If your working relationship

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1 with the **Israelis**, where you had conflict of U.S. interests --  
2  
3 Mr. Angleton. Give me an example of what you regard  
4 as a conflict.

5 Mr. Miller. Can you think of any?  
6 Mr. Angleton. You are the one who is posing it. I think  
7 a lot of these things are illusions. But what would you regard  
8 as a conflict? I don't think there is a conflict regarding  
9 the Soviet Union or the balance of power. I don't think there  
10 is any question in my view --

11 Senator Mathias. May I suggest Suez as a conflict that  
12 might have posed --

13 Mr. Angleton. Which Suez are we talking about?  
14 Senator Mathias. The Israeli-British-French attack on Suez.  
15 Mr. Angleton. The U.S. government position was that we  
16 had no commitments with Israel and we had no binding treaties.  
17 We had two allies that had just fought a war with us, and  
18 both of whom betrayed us. And Eden's head went with it. And that  
19 is very clear and well documented. The Israelis were not  
20 blamed because we didn't have any agreements with them, they  
21 had violated no agreements. The British had agreements.  
22 The British tried to give us a deception plan, should they  
23 have naval vessels in the Mediterranean, and they were there  
24 a different purpose.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me see if I can make a point on just  
common sense level.

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1 Senator Mathias. Let me follow this same question a  
2 little more closely.

3 That is a point at which the U.S. policy differed from  
4 the policy which was adopted by Britain and France and Israel?  
5 Mr. Angleton. Correct.

6 Senator Mathias. And would a situation of that sort con-  
7 front you with difficulties in your operations because --

8 Mr. Angleton. There have always been crises with them.

9 Senator Mathias. And how do you resolve a crisis of  
10 that kind?

11 Mr. Angleton. You don't see the fellow for a few  
12 days.

13 Mr. Miller. I see.

14 So your method was to deal with them on those matters --

15 Mr. Angleton. A total neutrality of interest.

16 Mr. Schwartz. Could we turn to the subject of atomic  
17 technology?

18 Mr. Kizbow. Excuse me. I think for the record we should  
19 make it clear, I think Mr. Angleton has had an interview  
20 with the staff, and he has been made aware that a witness  
21 testified here under oath as to certain matters, and that that  
22 is the approach that we are going to take now.

23 Is that clear?

24 Mr. Schwartz. I want to ask the question generally  
25 first and then come to the other testimony.

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Mr. Angleton, has the Central Intelligence Agency directly or indirectly transferred any atomic technology or know-how to

Israel?

Mr. Angleton. From my knowledge, the answer is an absolute. That would be one of those grounds that Mr. Miller was referring to, where the Agency, in the person of Mr. John McCone, had some of the sharpest words probably in the history of the relationship.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned those at lunch, and you might just put that on the record.

Mr. Angleton. I want to state that to my knowledge the Israelis themselves never raised the question of their atomic capability or their atomic interests, with one or two small exceptions, which was where there had been somebody who had been PGed from the U.S., were he ever to get his visa to come back and attend some meeting, something on that level.

Mr. Schwarz. I wanted to make sure that I have asked the question broadly enough.

Did the Agency take any steps to make available to the Israelis any personnel who had knowledge about atomic matters.

Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. And specifically with respect to a man -- let's go off the record for a minute.

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(off the record.)

Mr. Schwartz. Back on the record.

Do you know a scientist called Dr. Wilfred Nees?

Mr. Ansister, I do.

Mr. Schwarz, Does he have any knowledge of atomic patterns?

Mr. Angleton, Yes. He was one of the participants.

~~Mr. Schlesinger. To your knowledge has he ever put in one -~~

~~Landlord/lessee person's street address~~

Mr. Addleton. Not to my knowledge, never.

Mr. Schaefer, Do you

**Mrs. Angleton.** I do.

Mr. SCHWAKES, *et al.*

~~Mr. Angleton, in March,~~

Mr. Schwartz, 

Mr. Angleton at the house of Ben Wells

Mr. Schwartz. And did the three of you then go for dinner place?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

~~Rey Schwartz. At that meeting did you discuss --~~

Mr. Angleton. We went as Soule's guests somewhere to

Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did he raise with you the

subject of the transfer of atomic technology from the USA  
JFK Act 5 (g) [2] [D]  
to Israel? 2

Mr. Angleter. Yes.

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Mr. Schwarz. What did he say to you?

Mr. Angleton. They prefaced his remarks by saying that  
he was not a professional scientist, but he was a Jew, and  
so was his good friend Hersh. And they had some strange ESP  
working on, which one said to the other, have you heard what I  
have heard, and the other one said, I think, may have heard  
what you have heard. And then this thing went back and forth,  
and then it finally devolved, one said, did it have anything  
to do with Angleton, and the other one said yes, and it went  
on to where they discovered that each had had separate sources  
that I had been instrumental in acquiring plutonium for Israel  
Izamalik, and as a follow-up to help the Israelis on their  
know-how by sending Dr. Mann to Israel clandestinely. And they  
both had their stories, and they had a gentleman's agreement.

And the matter was published without notifying the  
other.

Mr. Schwarz. And what did you say in response?

Mr. Angleton. My response to him was, It was wrong. But  
he had not identified the scientist. So, I asked him --

Mr. Schwarz. When you say it was wrong --

Mr. Angleton. His statement was wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. So you denied the story that atomic  
technology had been transferred to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is. It

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1 does constitute a denial.

2 Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.

3 Senator Baker. Let me ask you, Mr. Angleton, do I  
4 understand by that that you mean every material aspect of  
5 the story was wrong and incorrect?

6 Mr. Angleton. I didn't mean quite that. I was more in-  
7 terested in the fact that, one, he knew Ted Soule -- I am sorry,  
8 that I knew Hazeley -- and that Hazeley told him that his source  
9 was the man who gave him the December 23 article, and whether  
10 he "had been set up".

11 Senator Baker. What December 23?

12 Mr. Angleton. That is the time they kicked off the  
13 entire focus on the past espionage thing.

14 Senator Baker. Against American citizens?

15 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

16 Senator Baker. Did they do that once?

17 Mr. Angleton. No, because neither disclosed their inde-  
18 pendent sources to the other.

19 Senator Baker. The point I am trying to clarify for my  
20 own purposes is that the conversation you just related you said  
21 was wrong.

22 Do I understand you to mean that every material aspect  
23 of that statement was wrong?

24 Mr. Angleton. Yes. But I didn't know my motives on  
25 lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the

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1 first live human being I saw that had actually allegedly  
2 heard from Harsh. And he thought they had been set up--  
3 and that was the biggest agony in the Agency.  
4 Senator Baker. And the person who set him up--  
5 Mr. Angleton. Harsh told him, according to Szulc, that  
6 he was worried of the story, because this was his source on the  
7 December 22 article. And therefore he wondered aloud whether  
8 he had been set up.

9 Senator Baker. Did he say who had been the source of the  
10 December 22 information?

11 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely no.

12 Mr. Kirbow. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

13 Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure, in your conversa-  
14 tion with Mr. Szulc as opposed to your testimony here today  
15 on the merits, did you deny to Mr. Szulc that you or

16  
17 the Agency had facilitated the transfer of atomic technology  
18 to Israel? JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)

19 Mr. Angleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted  
20 rapidly, because Szulc was talking about a very great agent  
21 that he had in the Agency. And he was bragging about the fact  
22 that he had more sources than Harsh had. And then he said, do  
23 you know Australia?

24 And I said, yes, I know Australia.

25 Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?

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1 Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.  
2 Do you know who is bicycling in India?  
3 And I said, I am afraid I am not with you.  
4 And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one of our most  
5 sensitive employees who retired, and is bicycling in India.  
6 And I give this as an illustration of the cat and mouse  
7 business of this whole evening.  
8 And he said he got that from his source.  
9 Now, that man's name is Sidney Gottlieb. And he was the  
10 head of our technical services department, which means that  
11 there is a cross planting in our business. And the man who  
12 was bugging and performing all the hundreds of technical  
13 services, has access, unfortunately, to many of our operations.  
14 There is one juncture point in the business where there  
15 is a breakdown of compartmentation, and for him to indicate  
16 that he knew Gottlieb, and the sources that had been raised in  
17 my mind, since I was talking about a scientist, plutonium,  
18 atomic energy, and all these matters, that this source might  
19 be in our Technical Services Division, which, as he was, he  
20 would know everything, or could get into everything.  
21 But I didn't tell him that.  
22 In fact, I expressed little or no interest in his source  
23 other than asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, and this  
24 that and so on.  
25 Senator Baker. Could I ask you a question at this point?

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Mr. Angleton, Surveyor,

Senator Baker. What you are relating to me seems to imply that Seulic's information was very, very good on sensitive information?

~~Mr. Angleton. No. That information, sir, could have been unclassified.~~

~~Senator Baker. I am speaking more of the Sidney X Gottlieb relationship.~~

9           Mr. Angleterre. But he only said that he was bicycling  
10          in India. But the way he went about it, do you know Australia,  
11          do you know Sidney, do you think this, and so on --  
12          It was that sort of thing.

Senator Baker. Do you think he had a source in India?

14 Mr. Angleton. It started to worry me, because he was  
15 talking plutonium, which was scientific. Gottlieb,  
16 before he went to that whole department of his, was transferred  
17 to Carl Buckett, and that is the reason Gottlieb left.

18 Senator Baker. You mean he didn't want to work for  
19 Duckett?

~~No explanation. That is part of it.~~

21 and there are also questions of principle. You take it  
22 from one director -- it is lifeblood -- and get it to another  
23 director.

84 Senator Baker. Is this the same Gottlieb who was in charge of processing the photographs that were taken in Brazil?

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Fielding's office?

2 Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.

3 Senator Baker. Do you know of that situation?

4 Mr. Angleton. No, except --

5 Senator Baker. Let me ask you this and I will turn it  
6 back to Colby.

7 Was there any conversation in which Szulc or Hersh talked  
8 to Colby about these matters? Did you ever get any impression  
9 that they were implying that Colby was their source?

10 Mr. Angleton. The only thing that came up is that when  
11 I saw Colby yesterday -- which is the first time since  
12 December -- he told me that he had bought a theory of mine on  
13 Szulc, but he did not look upon any misgivings on Hersh. He  
14 said that one year before he had seen Hersh about the submarine  
15 article, and that had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets  
16 would not have permitted the operation to take place.

17 And I told him that he was erroneous, that to use that  
18 guide was simply not to understand what the game is all about.

19 And when Philby was stationed in Washington he helped  
20 the FBI in working on some communications intelligence which  
21 led to the identification of Klaus Fuchs. But in spite of  
22 Philby being a Soviet agent, the Soviets were prepared to let  
23 Klaus Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt Philby.

24 Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?

25 Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

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He was a more valuable agent. If he had not been uncovered he would have been today Chief of British Intelligence.

In the case of George Blake, who was in the British secret service, he gave to the Soviets one year in advance the entire plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love, that is, the tunnel to be built in Berlin -- very elaborate -- to tap all of the Soviet military lines.

Now, even one year in advance, they took no preventive action in order to save George Blake.

Now, what has happened since December 22 to the U.S. intelligence community, in the position that Hersh enjoys, with the prestige and the impact on the U.S. public, it stands to reason that you can't get them to give any baby talk as to what the Soviets would or would not do, when you see something that is the objective from the end of the last war to the present, and destroy the agents.

**Senator Baker:** Do you think Sarah is a Soviet agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am not saying that he is a Soviet agent. To begin with, when I went back to see Wells, who was in counter intelligence with me in London during the war, I told him I could not buy Saul's article regarding Mersh, the alleged meetings and that they had certain sources, and the introduction of Dr. Mann's name and so on simply didn't hold water, and something was wrong.

But Dr. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of

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Burgess, and a friend of Philby. And the home background which is a factual thing, is only known to very self-service. And for him to introduce it into this scenario gave it a taint that lifted it out of just simply possible.

How would he ever know the name Maxine?

~~Senator Baker. That is what I was driving at, is it fair to infer from that conversation that there was an indication that Sisco had a very good source within the Agency?~~

Mr Angleton. Rather than, or the way I look at it. I am prepared to admit, because of an article he wrote, in the *Cryptonym Easy Chair* in the *Official Office* of the White House.

~~Senator Baker. Talking about the bugging situation?~~

14 Mr. Angleton. That cryptic Easy Chair was the most  
15 sanctified word in the Agency. And what it dealt with was --  
16 it was called EasyChair for the simple reason that if the  
17 Soviets were blocked, people abroad were moving into this  
18 house or this office.

~~Senator Baker.~~ off the record.

(with the record.)

21        He said, I called Ben Wells to see you, because I wanted  
22        a safe place in which to raise all this stuff.

Mr. Schwarz - This is guilty?

No. 390000 - This is Sample.

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1 And in fact, I think they had been talking sometime before  
2 I arrived.

3 And with Wells' background, the New York Times abroad, ad  
4 Gaul's time abroad, apparently --

5 Senator Tower. Excuse me. Will you go back just a bit  
6 here? You raised a question of how did Gaul know the name of  
7 Mann and know about his association with Murphy and Burgess.

8 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

9 Senator Tower. You raised the question but did not an-  
10 swer it.

11 How do you think he would have known it?

12 Mr. Angleton. This is what bothers me, that he is  
13 either unwitting, or has someone who has knowledge and is  
14 working for an opposition, or he has a source who is mis-  
15 chievously exploiting him by, who may be retired, and does  
16 know some facts, and therefore it is 10 percent true and 90  
17 percent false.

18 I would assume his financial situation is such that he  
19 is very hungry. I mean that is my general observation, and  
20 that he is having a rough time of saving a very lucrative  
21 contract with Penthouse for supplying a number of articles.  
22 I mean, that is my general feeling.

23 Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You say that he  
24 could have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess-Philip  
relationship through an external source?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Yes, either witting or unwitting.

2 Senator Tower. The KGB knows this, and, therefore, it  
3 could have come directly or indirectly from that source?

4 Mr. Angleton. That is right.

5 Senator Tower. That is a possibility.

6 Mr. Angleton. That is a possibility. And he has some  
7 brains about the fact that he does have contacts -- he knows  
8 the Romanian Ambassador better than anybody in Washington,  
9 and he knows the Poles, and he knows this. And it goes on  
10 and on.

11 So, he is dealing with these people who will be reporting  
12 back to their headquarters and detailed -- assuming he is  
13 totally innocent, and given his position in Washington,  
14 Saule would be a normal, witting or unwitting, channel for  
15 them in disinformation and for other motives.

16 So, as to whether he is himself knowing what he is  
17 doing, whether he's a dupe, is an outstanding question.

18 But for a man who goes and socializes with the black --

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Saule ever work for the Central  
20 Intelligence Agency?

21 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. He may have got some of  
22 our people in the field.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?

24 Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Have you heard that?

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Mr. Angleton. I have heard that, but I haven't looked at

the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention  
basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Sullivan-Wells-  
Angleton meeting?

Mr. Angleton. This basically -- the thing that began to  
really disturb me was, number one, his comment, as I said before,  
the Hersh told him that the thing that really bothered him  
about this story was that it came from the same source who  
gave him the 22nd of December, without identifying him, and the  
fact that when he was going through this business that he had  
the best sources in the Agency, and that was Sidney Gottlieb,  
and here was a scientific suggestion, plutonium and the  
scientist and all the rest of that.

And again, if he did have a live source in that  
area, that means he would have a live source across the board.

When he asked me about my successor, I told him that  
I was not prepared to respond to that, that every new man was  
entitled to one free shave.

Andale says, I know your successor. And I didn't think he  
actually mentioned the name. But in this article which has just  
come out he mentions him with his biographical sketch.

Senator Baker. Who was your successor?

Mr. Angleton. George Kalaris.

I had never known him before.

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So obviously he was talking to me as somebody dis-  
affected from the Agency, et cetera. I mean that is my view  
of why he was doing all this. Whereas my concerns were quite  
different than his.

Mr. Schwartz. Do you think it is possible, because of  
those different concerns, that your effort to deny the story  
did not get across to Mr. Bausle?

In other words, you are saying you had some concerns that  
dealt with the scientist being involved, that dealt with the  
newspaper source, that dealt with Guy Chair, that dealt with  
the statement that maybe the December 1974 article was inaccurate.  
And he pursued all those matters with some vigor and interest.

Do you think it is possible that because of that that  
whatever denial you pose of the transfer of atomic parts of  
the story didn't get across to Mr. Bausle?

Mr. Angleton. No, I think it got across to him.

Mr. Schwartz. Can you recall your words to him that  
denied the atomic transfer?

Mr. Angleton. My chief words to him was, I said, do you  
realize what a thing like this implies, and what it would  
do, depending on how the media picks it up, in destroying all  
our efforts in the Middle East?

Mr. Schwartz. But words like that are as consistent  
with being true as being false?

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Mr. Angleton. They were consistent, but they weren't stated in that fashion. They were stated in the fashion that Mann is a person who fits within the Philby, et cetera, complex in a false story of this sort, which comes to the British, who pull out a file on Mann, and then read down and go back into the fact of Mann's association with me, Mann's association with Philby, all this stuff of my actions with the Israelis and all that, regardless of what the U.S. Government tells the British or the French, or the Canadians, or the Australians, or the New Zealanders, all of whom have fundamentally the basic information -- it would be a confirmation to them based on very high level secret information, that the story was true.

Senator Tower. Let me pursue just about three questions here.

Did Szule specifically ask you whether or not, during the early sixties, fissile material, along with nuclear technology and technological assistance, was passed to the Israelis?

Did he ask you to confirm or deny that?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely that type of precision. The story that he gave was a very lucid, straightforward story without any if's, and's and but's.

Senator Tower. Did you deny only in part the validity of the question that he asked?

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In other words, if he asked you about the passage of

both fissionable material and technology, did you deny wholly  
JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)  
or in part that there had been a passage of fissionable  
material?

Mr. Angleton. No, I denied his story -- would like to  
keep that in his story, something he came up presented. And  
then when he got down into the other things, which had to  
do with technology, all I can say is that anyone who follows  
closely the Wasser, and then later Sadat accusations against  
CIA, it is voluminous in terms of their spelling out the sophis-  
ticated gadgetry which they discovered, which came from  
Central Intelligence.

This is a thing that has always concerned us, because  
in the last war we lost -- and we will do this today, we  
don't know the extent of this -- we lost some of the installations  
which we had put in there.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say "we", you mean the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. The CIA -- the Israel ~~host~~ entirely --

Mr. Schwarz. When he say we put in there, you mean  
the CIA put in there?

Senator Baker. What installations?

Mr. Angleton. The line of sight, electronics --

Senator Baker. You are not talking about --

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intelligence.  
And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in

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there. And I want to complete this -- because of the fact  
that most of the information which we gained from the SAM's,  
which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in Vietnam, we  
gained through Israel. We could read a whole lot of the compu-  
ters and so on of those SAM's. And therefore we were pre-  
pared to give highly sophisticated equipment to Israel to  
work against that Russian business in order to transfer the  
knowledge to Vietnam.

So I told them, I said, yes, we have worked on questions --  
we have always helped them out technologically. And I think  
I made the comment that any piece of gear we ever gave them,  
that they turned it to a greater sophisticated use  
than we had, which was true in many instances.

And they would cannibalize, and we would get the product.

But there was no -- so that this is clearest, there was  
no attempt to lead him on regarding the nuclear one, because  
the nuclear one was very clearly stated to him, that the injec-  
tion of Mann into the story had a certain significance of its  
own.

And I think Wells will hear me out very clearly on this,  
that the injection of that could not be magic. It had to come  
from somebody who is in the INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.  
<sup>(SAC/CDR)</sup> Given that  
element -- and if this story without the introduction of Mann  
had been told, it would be just another of the many rumors.

And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want

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get back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets sent out  
a bargeege of propaganda in Arabic fto the Middle East from  
Radio Moscow that the CIA -- and then mentioned Bill Harvey,  
whom was working for us, and whom I had put in touch with the  
**Israelis**. During the Cuban business -- had met on a ship with  
Merris, the chief of the British Intelligence, who had a back-  
ground in the war with the Israelis, and had met there and pre-  
pared and carried out all the strategic part of the Six-Day  
War. And this is all true. And there was a tremendous pike  
of Soviet materials -- they never got much into our media, be-  
cause it is directed to the Middle East in Arabic, and which  
obviously they knew.

They used Harvey's name instead of my name, because pro-  
fessionally we were very close, and more important,  
I had introduced Harvey as the only officer to the **Israeli op-**  
**erational people** on the Cuban business. And, therefore,  
it showed the allied knowledge of Harvey's, and so on.

The query then raised was whether the penetration was  
here or was it in **Israel**.

Mr. Hirsh. Did you express any concern to Mr.  
Saul about the use of Dr. Mann's name in this article?

Mr. Angleton. Not Dr. Mann's name. My expression was  
that if you -- I said that article, false as it is, with the  
many things injected in it -- I will be very frank with you,  
I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story of

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these two journalists was so implausible, and I looked over  
to Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he had  
absolutely a stony expression, no expression on his face.  
And that was something very, very queer, and the whole thing  
was initiated by him. And that was why I asked Mr. Szulc,  
did he come to you or did you come to him.

Senator Baker. Did he come to you?

Mr. Schwarz. We came to us.

Senator Tower. Let me ask you one specific question,  
yes or no.

Did you confirm to Szulc that during the late fifties  
subsequent to the Suez War that the CIA made available to the  
Israeli Government technical assistance and the availability  
of one or more distinguished nuclear scientists or physicists  
for the purpose of developing atomic weapons?  
JEK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

Mr. Angleton. That is completely false.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, did you confirm or deny that  
to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. I am stating that I never made any such  
statement. And I stayed off of the nuclear business.

Mr. Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn't deny,  
is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respond  
to that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussion  
covering an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in the

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back of my mind was the fact that we had problems with

the ~~Israelis~~ <sup>in April 5</sup> in the nuclear field.

Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?

Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive problems. And I don't think that they really shed any light on things that you are talking about here.

Mr. Hard. Do you recall a conversation with me and Mr. Schwarz in which, in discussing this same matter, you said you felt under no obligation to either confirm or deny this story with Mr. Studd?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I know I used that phrase. There was a denial. And I think Mr. Wells would second the fact that there was a denial. But when I got down to a lot of the other questioning, my thinking would try to lead him around back into the meeting with Herzl, and lead him back to this source that had to do with Sidney Gottlieb, and so on.

Senator Tower. Are you saying in effect, then, that any questions he raised with you about the transfer of visual material or deeper technology, or manpower, for that matter, to the ~~ISRAELI GOVERNMENT~~, was couched in circumspect terms of some kind?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.

Senator Tower. That you got no direct questions of that sort?

Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. When

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I left there -- and I think this is a very important point --  
1 first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he  
2 invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent about. And we  
3 were there. And here in the restaurant the entire discussion  
4 was an acapitulation by him, in a restaurant that was fairly  
5 full of people. Herch was a person who had requested a secret  
6 meeting in Wells' house, and then proceeded in a restaurant to  
7 regurgitate this entire matter.

8 Senator Tammie. Which restaurant was it?

9 Mr. Angleton. It was the Sea Catch.

10 Senator Baker. Did you ever have any impression that  
11 it might be recorded, in what you are driving at?

12 Mr. Angleton. I didn't know. The thought crossed my  
13 mind. I looked at him, and he sort of -- he could hide a lot  
14 of things.

15 And so we got back to Wells' house. And it was very  
16 late. And he tried to get me to come back to his place. And  
17 I told him I just wouldn't do it. And that's how the thing  
18 broke up.

19 Mr. Kishbow. Mr. Angleton, in your long relationship and  
20 position with the Agency, did you ever express your concern to  
21 anyone out there that you thought this might have been  
22 setup by a foreign source, or from internally?

23 Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?

24 Mr. Kishbow. That this whole Scoul interview, story and

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everything else.

Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this with anybody  
in the Agency until we had this lunch.

Senator Baker. Do you suspect that --  
Mr. Angleton. I do not -- I don't know what to suspect,  
because I don't have access to files. And I think one has  
to review a lot of material. I think one has to review  
Scole's files.

Mr. Miller. You spoke of that earlier, you described  
it as a dossier.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there is a file on it, a  
security file. I think he was one of the journalists, the  
first one, who made a reputation for blowing the whole Bay of  
Pigs, and so on. And I think the fact that he is foreign-  
born, and the allegations and so on. And so the Bureau has  
a similar file. And many of these files are created -- and  
they get to be accredited to the Pentagon, and therefore a  
routine security check is made.

Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any surveillance of  
Mr. Scoble?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Post surveillance?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of it.  
As I say, I don't think I have ever seen his file for five or  
ten years.

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1 Mr. Kishlow. In your official capacity in the FBI you never  
2 had any occasion to cross Mr. Seale's trail or consider him  
3 some person --

4 Mr. Angleton. I separated him once from fight with a  
5 friend of mine.

6 Mr. Kishlow. But nothing in an official capacity?

7 Mr. Angleton. No.

8 Mr. Miller. Let me ask another question on this  
9 file matter.

10 You said that to your knowledge there were files on Mr.  
11 Seale. Were there files on other newspapermen?

12 Mr. Angleton. Yes, there are files on other newspaper-  
13 men.

14 Mr. Miller. And other Americans?

15 Mr. Angleton. A lot of them.

16 Senator Baker. Herah wrote a story about -- what did  
17 he say -- 7,000 files. Was that right or wrong?

18 Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many more. I have  
19 never counted them.

20 Senator Baker. How many? A hundred thousand, a million?

21 Mr. Angleton. Well, when you consider all visa checks --  
22 and we do 500,000 visa checks on foreigners -- and the investigation  
23 of American sponsors and so on -- this thing on all of this  
24 is a question of the gradual deterioration of our efficiency  
because our staff was cut in half, and we had the problems

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of the Watergate, and we had all of these things. And so a great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't being professionally worked upon.

4 Senator Baker. You have mentioned the Watergate twice,  
5 Mr. Anderson.

6 Can you shed any light on that period in the Agency's  
7 life, the impact that the Watergate investigation had or any  
8 involvement of the Agency in any of the so-called  
9 Watergate affairs.

Mr. Angleton. Of the Agency itself.

1 Senator Baker. On anybody connected with it.

12 Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, that is a debatable  
13 question there, and I want to get it accurate.

## 14 | What Was That Again?

18 Senator Behan: I don't want to narrow it. I want to make  
19 it broad.

Re: Angleton. I want to make sure I understand you.

16 Senator Baker. There are two parts of the question.

19 One, do you know of any Agency involvement of those who were  
20 working in the -- working with the Agency in the Watergate,  
21 in your break-in or the preparation for the cover-up or the  
22 attempted cover-up?

23 Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not. And  
24 say that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things from the  
newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well.

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Senator Baker. Are you aware of the letters that McCord wrote to the DCI after the Watergate suggesting how you could avoid having this blamed on the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I am aware of what was in the press.  
And Paul Cabanis recently died who wrote those letters, and it made great sense to me, and I had personal relationships beyond an official relationship.

Senator Baker. He wrote two to Gaynor and three to Helms.

Mr. Angleton. I didn't know.

Senator Baker. I believe so.

Mr. Angleton. In any event, I can say that Gaynor's connection, because he had great trust in Gaynor -- and he was a very stubborn man and he left the Agency on conviction, I assume, or troubleshoot the Office of Security.

Senator Baker. In connection with Watergate?

Mr. Angleton. He left much earlier.

Mr. Miller. He being McCord?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Miller. Why did he leave?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. And I was really surprised that he didn't come by and say goodbye.

Senator Baker. Was he a prominent official at the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. He was not.

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1 Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent responsibility?

2 Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very difficult  
3 case abroad, which meant that it had to be handled no leakages.  
4 And I guess him twice, and one was a pretty lengthy use of him.  
5 And he followed instructions to the letter. He stayed on the  
6 one. And that's not important. It is just something that  
7 he did something that wasn't very wise.

8 Senator Baker. Do you know why he went into the Watergate  
9 Complex?

10 Mr. Angleton. I don't understand it, because I would  
11 say it was ideological with him. There wasn't any difficulty  
12 in understanding his views on a given subject.

13 Senator Baker. The equipment that was used, I am told,  
14 was a fairly primitive sort for that sort of operation.  
15 Does that agree with your appraisal of him?

16 Mr. Angleton. That is what I read. And that surprised  
17 me also, because as a rule -- let me put it this way, what  
18 I am saying is, it was the Soviets who made the allegation  
19 that in a certain country very close to us they were using  
20 a laser beam on a window of the Minister of Defense, and  
21 acquiring everything.

22 So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine side, I  
23 took McCord and the group and sent them to that country for  
24 six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great  
knowledge of the -- he knows the counter electronics. And

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so now that you have got to know the other.

Senator Baker. He was familiar with the most exotic  
sources of intelligence gathering?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

And that is why I can understand -- I mean, if the  
papers are correct in what they have stated, although many

7  
8 Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away from  
9 the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing what  
10 if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.

11 For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it have  
12 a file on Lee Harvey Oswald?

13 Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more  
14 than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they  
15 have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission  
16 through Mr. Raymond Roosa, who is my deputy.

17 And then there is a lot of undigested material that was  
18 brought out after the Warren Commission.

19 Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you  
20 have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?

21 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know  
22 the time factor, I will try to shorten this.

23 But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should  
24 not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that  
25 the Commission, in the life of the Commission -- that these are

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1 the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact  
2 that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under  
3 the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of  
4 Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future  
5 generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the  
6 door, that it would really mean the investigation would be  
7 suspended.

8 Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was  
9 queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of  
10 certain people, including Oswald.

11 Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.

12 Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that  
13 time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that  
14 Soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate-  
15 gorical terms?

16 Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission  
17 we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko  
18 going under the record, on a question of bona fides.

19 Senator Baker. Why?

20 Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.

21 Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?

22 Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who  
23 was sent to mutilate the leads of very high grade Soviets  
24 whom we had acquired prior to that.

25 Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy

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MR. HANCOCK: MR. SCHAFFER: 51

1 assassination?

2 Mr. Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents,  
3 ~~espionage~~, the British agents, and many agents in France, a  
4 alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.

5 Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?

6 Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that  
7 a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this  
8 interview recently with Sher, I called his executive officer  
9 Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever  
10 allegedly to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides?

11 And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too  
12 well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.

13 And he said, well, I will give it to you.

14 And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man  
15 who would not have made this statement. He has total recall.

16 Senator Baker. I am sure he does.

17 Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was  
18 ~~indeed~~ a Soviet agent?

19 Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.

20 I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too  
21 many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in-  
22 formation that has been developed later.

23 For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is  
24 a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograph  
25 of a man called Alexiev, real name Shchetsov, KGB, with the first

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1 Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was  
2 the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican  
3 police arrested Castro as a student, they found in his note-  
4 books the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.

5 Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for  
6 Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible, 75 percent KGB staff.  
7 Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.

8 Now, we had a double agent after the assassination,  
9 who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the  
10 Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov.  
11 Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on a state  
12 visit. And he pulled an American journalist aside, and totally  
13 out of context, expressed the view that there was a con-  
14 spiracy, and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.

15 The thing was totally out of context. And he planted  
16 this bug in this fellow's ear.

17 We had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of  
18 their personnel for six months on working on the assassina-  
19 tion, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business  
20 under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking  
21 about petty informants. I am talking about men who were esca-  
22 tained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.

23 And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have  
24 never been followed up. One is because of lack of manpower.  
25 Two, the general problem in Washington and the government

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1       that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the  
2       intelligence community of a counter-intelligence nature.  
3       I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in  
4       high office. But there isn't anyone, embidmen or somebody, to  
5       whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and  
6       pull the bureau and ourselves and everybody together.

7                     Senator Baker, Could you give us at your leisure a memo-  
8       andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might  
9       be constituted?

10          Mr. Angleton. It would not be a pleasant one. I have  
11       submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence --  
12       such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted  
13       a personal letter to the Vice President. And my whole plea  
14       was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and  
15       beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as  
16       Vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these  
17       matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's death,  
18       and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the  
19       counter-intelligence forces.

20                     And this added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final  
21       blow.

22                     Mr. Chairman, I have another question, and I think I have  
23       asked you this question, but can you make an evaluation of  
24       the effectiveness of the Hoover, in particularly its counter-  
25       intelligence activities, during, I think, the

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1 Mr. Angleton. Very, very poor.

2 I have put in there, and I think it is very conservative,  
3 that it has put us back 20 years. But I think in the eyes of  
4 every intelligence service in the Western World, where we  
5 have had the leadership and we pulled everything together, and  
6 where they have looked to us for guidance and for traces and  
7 for understanding, that we have lost all of our prestige.

8 Senator Baker. Two more quick questions, and I will  
9 yield my turn.

10 Do you know or have any substantial information about  
11 Russian KGB activities in the U.S. such as the infiltration  
12 of Congressional offices.

13 Mr. Angleton. There is a whole history of information  
14 that relates to the past and to modus operandi and to targets,  
15 and so on. And that is inclusive of all the American life,  
16 and in particularly visits to the Soviet Union, and so on.  
17 There are communications intelligence more sensitive which was  
18 broken during and after the war, KGB communications, New York  
19 to Moscow, and Washington to Moscow, et cetera. And there were  
20 cryptonyms given. And it runs into hundreds of thousands of  
21 messages, of which a small percentage have been broken.

22 And they relate to Miss and many things. And most of  
23 those cases will not be subject to prosecution, because they  
24 would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems  
25 there. We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the

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1 Canadians, and New Zealanders and Australians, because we have  
2 this common denominator of the military and other agreements  
3 where they do share common information.

4 And there are many unresolved cases.

5 Senator Baker. Do you know of any cases, though, dealing  
6 with penetration of a Congressional office?

7 Mr. Angleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything,  
8 because I can assure you that it is the last thing I have  
9 been concerned with, in some months. But I have seen these  
10 allegations in the paper, I wouldn't be surprised. And this is  
11 the second time in my life, or the third time, I have ever  
12 been here. To come here and see how this whole set up is  
13 quite a shock.

14 Senator Baker. What about communications intercept,  
15 Congressional conversations, are you aware of any methodical  
16 effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a-vis Congressional tele-  
17 phone conversations?

18 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- I am assuming now  
19 that the people in NSR are correct, they usually are, that the  
20 telephone, the formal telephone company traffic apparently,  
21 without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shifted to  
22 microwave. That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone  
23 calls.

24 Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the  
25 penetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it

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1 is a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an awful  
2 long time before you finally get into a code room and  
3 place where you can do something securely.

4 What I am trying to say is that if you go through  
5 depth in any target or any installation you begin to know much  
6 more about that installation than anybody who occupies it.

7 Senator Baker, if I were trying to confirm the rumor  
8 that the KGB has the capability and in fact record as many  
9 as 30 or 40 thousand simultaneous telephone conversations,  
10 mostly related to governmental officials, and transmitted them  
11 to the Soviet Union, and kept individual files on them, would  
12 you confirm that for me?

13 Mr. Angleton, I would state that that is absolutely in  
14 my view correct. And I would say that the man who technically  
15 could respond to that would be Dr. Leon Tordelle, a retired  
16 Chief of NSA who is now, I think, still a consultant there.  
17 And he is probably a more sophisticated person to relate the pro-  
18 ducts of NSA to the realities of the question you asked.

19 And I think the other point I would make is simply that  
20 what the KGB has, which we never will have, is manpower.  
21 In other words, we have to narrow the size of the target some-  
22 day and way the British did, and expel that 10%.

23 Our State Department says that what happened in  
24 England has no relevancy here, because we have had a different  
setup, because among those expelled men who served in Washington,

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1 and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on the  
2 Anglo-American Desk, which meant that there was an  
3 American whom they had handled in Washington who had been  
4 transferred to London where the case officer follows the agent.  
5 And that statement, official statement, was put out with-  
6 out any consultation with the Bureau or ourselves. So, we  
7 are living in a dream world here in terms of Soviets, and time  
8 is short, it is <sup>for us</sup> detente, and it is all the fallation kind of  
9 discussions and documents one hears on the subject. We have  
10 come to detente for information through operations and our  
11 understanding of it, not thoughtful thinking.

12 And our views are shared by professionals all through  
13 the Western World. And they laugh at the U.S. in terms of what  
14 detente has done, but what it has done to the intelligence  
15 services, or to the FBI, the FBI is only a shadow of what it  
16 once was. And so there isn't any real internal security protec-  
17 tion.

18 The Bureau's problems -- and I had the case of a KGB  
19 officer threatening one of the people we are dealing with  
20 in the Mid-west, he was from the United Nations, a young  
21 KGB fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a \_\_\_\_\_?

22 And they said, we put him to bed.

23 They didn't put him to bed, he was where he wasn't  
24 supposed to be. And I tried to get the department to go in with  
25 him. And I am still up there.

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*OR/LoV*

1 And we had hoped to have General Orloff, who was  
2 senior KGB, going back to the days of Reginsky and Staline  
3 and Lenin, who had been the head of the KGB, in Spain at the  
4 time of the Spanish Civil War. And we had his stakeout in  
5 Ohio under an alias, and they found out about it.

6 But my point is that the counter intelligence, the old  
7 ways have gone on. There is no consultation by that of Mr.  
8 Bocca and myself and Mr. Hood, all of us at the same time, as  
9 to successors or auto organization or as to anything.

10 Senator Baker. Why did all of you leave at the same time?

11 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Hood was an associate of mine  
12 from the beginning under both corporals in the military. And  
13 he left for his own reasons, financial.

14 Mr. Schwartz. At the same time as you?

15 Mr. Angleton. He left. It was with motivation,  
16 it was financial. And he pronounced that he was going to leave.  
17 Bocca left with me simply because we shared common beliefs and  
18 we worked together for 11 years.

19 Senator Baker. Did it have anything to do with Herash  
20 article of December 27?

21 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. Mr. Colby has not confided  
22 in me.

23 Senator Baker. Did he fire you?

24 Mr. Angleton. He offered me a job, as he had done so  
25 prior to all that. And I refused, and took a certain position.

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1           on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights  
2           under the CIA, and so on.

3           But he said, I have got to run, and it was about five  
4           past five. And I asked him if he understood in effect what  
5           he was doing, the implications.

6           And he said, that is the responsibility I would assume.

7           And I said, what about Mr. Moyer, and building up to be  
8           our successor?

9           And we were about the same age. And he introduced  
10          Moyer over the years into more sensitive operations, and all  
11          the foreigns with whom we worked, agents and what not. And  
12          the reaction to him universally was, he was to be the successor.

13          And he said, that is something I will have to negotiate.

14          And I said, what do you mean negotiate?

15          And he said, we will talk about it next week.

16          So, I got up and shook hands with him and walked out.

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EXCERPT FROM  
SENATE INVESTIGATION

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(7)

Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone having electronic surveillance conversational recording in the Oval Office other than the Presidential (?) capability?

Mr. Angleton. Never.

Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone who ever penetrated the Presidential apparatus?

Mr. Angleton. Never, Senator.

What has come out about the Joint Chiefs and all that stuff in the paper?

Senator Baker. I am speaking of anyone who might have penetrated the taping capability in the Oval Office?

Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?

What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?

Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation.

Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.

Mr. Schwarz. And was Leontov there in Mexico, or --

Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent whom we believe was actually controlled by the Soviets.

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Phone (Area 202) 520-5000

Bytakov, gave us information which we would now regard as private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any implication with Oswald.

Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources the information that the KGB had spent some six months --

Mr. Angleton. We only acquired the hard stuff of six months and what they did from one man who was very high in the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was, when did you acquire the information?

Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.

Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had reached its conclusions?

Mr. Angleton. Did you have any such information during the life of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko -- Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived at a very brief time after the assassination as a KGB defector.

Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as a planted agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. They thought he was sent on a mission.

Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission.

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Case File No. 5-C-10000000000000000000

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1                   Mr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons  
2 you suspected Nosenko was a double agent, or a planted agent,  
3 rather, was because he was saying things that were contra-  
4 dictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had  
5 been giving you information before Nosenko came to this  
6 country?

7                   Mr. Angleton. That is right.

8                   Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information  
9 relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality  
10 person had given you?

11                  Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little  
12 more sense.

13                  In December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected  
14                  <sup>54-1541</sup>  
15 to us. His name is Golitsen. He has never been in service,  
16 except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it,  
17 alleging that he had stated there was a plot to assassinate  
18 Nixon. He did not make such a statement.

19                  Mr. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on  
20 the record?

21                  Mr. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after  
22 the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.

23                  Now, his is probably without any question the most major  
24 defection since World War II as far as Soviet intentions,  
25 Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned.  
And the reason, among others, that it was so important was

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ceratin about.

Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approximately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to, although he may not have had. And it is interesting to note that after his assassination, in a search of the quarters, the Bureau, or whoever did the search, found six of my letters to NSA relating to information from Golitzen.  
Syn

Senator Baker. Did you speak of the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. What did you say?

Mr. Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop?

Mr. Angleton. After his suicide. I am sorry.

Mr. Miller. You used the term assassination.

Mr. Angleton. I meant suicide.

Mr. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is charged, as you know, that he was assassinated.

Mr. Angleton. Maybe I was thinking out loud or something.

In any event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic. And there was a question of whether he passed them before or after.

Mr. Schwartz. Now, what we were on was, I was asking you, you testified earlier --

Mr. Angleton. I just wanted to say Golitzen was so enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved on

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those cases which were perishable, the French, the British, and ourselves, et cetera. And we had never had a second Chief Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet defector in our lives, and all of this out of the blue, and no contact as in Geneva six months after the defection of Golitsyn.

Mr. Schwarz. And the date is when in relation to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. Well, this was a contact, this was not a defection. He came to us once for information prior to the assassination.

And then in Moscow the Soviets -- and I am not going into a lot of names, a member of the Second Chief Directorate, gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the Second Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating to how they got , and others of our agents, which showed they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got it through a on our side.

So the leads ran into the thousands from Golitsyn, and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interrogation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of that came the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess, and all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some other cases, and many cases in France and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Did Oswald show up at that time?

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Mr. Angleton. No, not from Golitsyn.  
But when the assassination took place --  
Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination?  
Mr. Angleton. When the Kennedy assassination took place,  
Golitsyn called me immediately and stated that the modus  
operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet  
Union required that he go through processing by the 13th  
Department of the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is their assassination department?

Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department, which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.

And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army for future activity.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the nature of assassinations?

Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or  
intelligence, or whatever.

AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military defectors.

Now, when the Soviet Government turned over to the US all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating processing by Department 13. Then after the assassination

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Rosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow. And in my view he would have never come back on the scene because they brought this Chereponov thing in to have the focus shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the importance of Golitsen's defection.

But the tourist gave the documents to the American embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be appropriate.

Mr. Behrman. These are not the official documents dealing with Oswald but the documents that the man tried to pass in Switzerland?

Mr. Angleton, The Second Chief Directorate, he took all of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.

So there is the assassination. Cherapenov allegedly was chased to the Turkish border and shot. And in my view this is a myth, because in 1948 Cherapenov was stationed in Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time tried to establish liaison and contact with the British MI-6, at a time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and

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then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the  
Second Chief Directorate.

That is enough of Cherpanov. But it is important only  
from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.

And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have  
seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and  
tells us he wants to defect.

Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was  
inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.

So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career  
so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing  
he tells us is that while he was in the Second Chief  
Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went  
over his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that  
it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down  
to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.

Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald  
was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and  
therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff  
of this sort.

And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetra-  
tions, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging  
of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had  
something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And

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1 in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitsyn in  
2 contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination  
3 of Golitsyn, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one  
4 where logically you would bring them in and have two bodies,  
5 one from the First Chief Directorate, that is, Golitsyn, the  
6 CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the  
7 system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance  
8 against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were  
9 certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And  
10 as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have  
11 answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they had  
12 to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the  
13 2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of  
14 1959, presided over by Shlapin and attended by many members  
15 of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet  
16 Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence  
17 operations has a political objective. And this is a part of  
18 the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him  
19 unwittingly chronologically through his career, he omits  
20 all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test  
21 things, where their damage report would not show that Golitsyn  
22 had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and  
23 breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no  
24 evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he

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looked wrong to you?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?

ME. Assistant. Precisely.

Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot?

Mr. Angleton. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenko --

Mr. Angleton. Coliton -- from Coliton -- information suggested the normal practice was for Department 13, had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassinating, to interview military defectors. And we had observed when the Russians transferred documents concerning said, that there was no reference in there to any such briefing by Department 13. And another important part of is that there was a man who was handling George Blake from on, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he turned he became head of the 13 Department, General Bodin. He was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what was his connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department 13, and was head of Department 13 at a time -- I mean, he had a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of

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Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination department. The Soviets have always had an assassination department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the organization. People from the outside know very little about what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who in turn report to the Politburo. And therefore it is an entirely sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action, whether it be sabotage -- an illegal sabotage or what, an illegal directorate which is independent of the rest of the KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders in West Germany.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes more significant the absence of any reference to Oswald because you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, or did you recount it because there is a more direct connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. This is related to what I told Mr. Dulles. I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the life of the Commission, and instead there should be a statement that we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to us during the given period, these are our conclusions. And

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then to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization  
— and the burden of proof shifts. Not not only the burden  
of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's  
head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on  
the entire story.

Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of  
Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your  
mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the  
documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US.  
And you have recounted the strange nature of the information  
provided by Nosenko.

Mr. Angleton. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions  
about each one of these items. As to the Nosenko information,  
you stated that that information was suppressed from the  
Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the  
right word because, I will be very honest with you, I was told  
the other day that the information was given classified, and  
it was given to Helms or somebody, or Mr. McCone, who passed  
it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I  
haven't seen it.

Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment ago that it was  
suppressed?

Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. When

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1 Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man  
2 was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted  
3 the fact that the man was a provocation.

4 Mr. Schwars. Do you mean provocation, or providing  
5 false information?

6 Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.

7 I said he was false. My man said he was false. And it  
8 isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and  
9 analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitsyn,  
10 who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in  
11 Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that  
12 because of the enormity of his defection they would send a  
13 provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.

14 So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who  
15 knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.

16 Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is  
17 no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector  
18 General went into all this -- he is today the NIC dealing in  
19 Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet  
20 Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named  
21 Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley,  
22 and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now  
23 in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through  
24 these other people who have been dispersed. But the record  
25 will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individuals

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- 1                          was that Kosenko was sent on a mission.  
2  
3                          Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?  
4  
5                          Now, is it your current understanding that what was  
6                          provided to the Warren Commission was the raw information  
7                          brought by Kosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided  
8                          with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you  
9                          have recounted that he was providing false information?  
10  
11                        Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was  
12                        ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Soltis  
13                        or Kosenko.  
14  
15                        Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was  
16                        suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no,  
17                        it is your understanding now --  
18  
19                        Mr. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right  
20                        word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed  
21                        by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --  
22  
23                        Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to  
24                        the usefulness of the material?  
25  
26                        Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the  
27                        Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which has to give it  
28                        prominence and have it come out as an official part of the  
29                        record and documents and articles, and so on.
- Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the information was provided?
- Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in

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1                   public.

2                   Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the  
3                   Commission?

4                   Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.

5                   Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time  
6                   that at least certain experts within the Agency thought it  
7                   was false information?

8                   Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in  
9                   spite of our feelings, either Holmes or McCone made a  
10                  presentation of it.

11                  Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings,  
12                  certain experts thought that it was false?

13                  Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.

14                  Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from  
15                  Golitsen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the  
16                  documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put  
17                  it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not  
18                  include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that  
19                  information provided to the Warren Commission?

20                  Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all  
21                  I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect  
22                  the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents,  
23                  secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their  
24                  agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history,  
25                  the way they falsified the official record, they had it with

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Source: CIA Staffer

1 the Italians in 1953, Constantinople, and cases on diplomatic  
2 issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And 3 there is no way of testing them, the security is such that  
3 they can't be tested.

4 So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to  
5 state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him  
6 the following questions.

7 Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes  
8 there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission  
9 was fooled?

10 Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I  
11 didn't follow the Warren Commission, <sup>either</sup> Reha followed it, and he  
12 was running over there all the time, and so on.

13 Mr. Khrushchev. Let me ask you. There would have been no  
14 reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known  
15 that as a matter of everyday business that they did in fact  
16 run every defector through Department 13?

17 Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you  
18 see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to -- I used to  
19 see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an adviser officially  
20 to him on a lot of headaches, and I did a lot of leg work for  
21 him. And I regarded him as a very personal friend. And I am  
22 Executor of his papers, among other things.

23 But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him  
24 guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the  
25

Source: CIA Staffer, U.S. Government, GIC 2000

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FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and so on, so that he would be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director, that were no longer germane to his position on the matter.

Mr. Schwartz. Was there a connection between the FBI and Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the full FBI story. I knew there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the best men they had in my view is a professional a man called Bert Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Bert Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in the US, one of the analysts. And he was in the Washington Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources -- that Bert Turner was handling the Oswald ~~etc~~ related matters at the time the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the information on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit, or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was responsible for the death of the President. And he was pretty forceful about his position. And as a result, this was expunged or something to that effect. And that is the reason he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in

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And then he retired. And I think his retirement had something to do with this fact.

But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service seizing on facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send it to Texas.

What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And we know enough about the Second Chief Directorate and the controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him. There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that. There would be total encapsulation of that individual until it was certain beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent back as an agent.

Mr. Schweiss. A moment ago in talking about the line-up, as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the views of a number of people. And you said that one person had changed his mind or recanted subsequently. And you made a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's

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report. What was that report?

Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this -- and it was much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the Inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko matter and see if there is anything there that he should know, because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole question of bona fides, and it bothered him, because I had brought him in touch with Golitsen, and he was fully aware of all my activities, and travels and so on.

And so this person who was chosen began to interview everybody and reopen the whole thing. I mean, there were 21 safe leads of stuff if you really get into all of the Golitsen and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed out, to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has happened, of 27 years of experience of myself and my two colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases --

Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean Rockefeller?

Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, Rockefeller.

There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence officer in our business should know before he even begins to get his feet wet.

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1 Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing  
2 all of these things of management by objectives, and synergistic  
3 and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which  
4 we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought  
5 I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians  
6 in to take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of  
7 every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize  
8 how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to  
9 this elemental stage of being able to be launched.

10 That was sort of a preparatory business. And they  
11 figured it out and they said it would take 22 man years, we  
12 meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11  
13 man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and  
14 Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all  
15 this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring  
16 people back and forth and all the rest of it. And I never chose  
17 anybody in that job as a rule who had either been in the FBI  
18 or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence.  
19 [cmt]  
20 And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business  
21 -- I had men who stayed with me for 11 years. Rocco was with  
22 me for 11 years, even though they went into operational situa-  
23 tions abroad and returned, and so on.

24 And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and  
25 Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany,  
where we used to have two or 300 new people --

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1                   Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Emane?

2                   Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon  
3                   Stewart -- and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine  
4                   executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the  
5                   really top-notch men.

6                   But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce  
7                   in terms -- so he would talk to people and get their views  
8                   and so on.

9                   When I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division,  
10                  who was then stationed in Paris -- and this is only hearsay,  
11                  I never read the report -- the former Chief of the Soviet  
12                  Division stated, when I took back it, perhaps I have given  
13                  too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yes  
14                  or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past  
15                  *revised* -- that this man was an agent provocateur.

16                  Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the  
17                  handling of the matter with the Warren Commission?

18                  Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this  
19                  may be something. I don't think I have ever seen the review  
20                  -- in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in  
21                  the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the  
22                  idea that it was just the CIA staff that had this view. This  
23                  was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had  
24                  dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of  
25                  all is Golitsen himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew

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~~Mr. Harvey was involved in the Cuban business. He was in touch with the Israeli's during the Cuban business. And we have had a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, so we are moderately well aware of his activities.~~

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry.

Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvey is and we have had a fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done. What was the connection between him and the Israeli's during the Cuban business?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it very briefly --

Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?

Mr. Schwatz. The witness used the expression Cuban business. I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the Cuban business, and second, was there a connection between Mr. Harvey and the [redacted] Israelis on this matter?

Mr. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me, not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being

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planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and it was foredoomed.

Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami?

Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything, and so on; there was no cover or second investigation or anything.

So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I decided that since we were very close friends that I would try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown to everybody. And I went to the israeli's. And I had them assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well.

He was born in Bulgaria. He can speak Russian and the Balkan countries' languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet intelligence. He was a young officer in the days I am speaking of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he was -- and the communications were from him in a one time pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course, Dick Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. McCone?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone would have known, but he wouldn't have been interested.

What I am trying to say is, he knew.

Mr. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was DDP --

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Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and so on.

And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is, I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and to Havana and then put it someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and such a place and find the radio, and then have some men come in and talk some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust the whole setup.

So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly. This individual established his cover. They only had two or three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go. And he would spot one of the waiters or a headwaiter who was Jewish and it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are from the Israeli Embassy, and pretty soon one thing led to another, and his production was without question the greatest production there was.

Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on, that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey together secretly with this individual, the only person I put in touch was an Israeli in this context. So later on the Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on the

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with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the rest, a little thing involving one man was not a thing that you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about.

MR. BEHMANN. DID YOU KNOW MR. HARVEY PRETTY WELL, WAS HE SOMEONE YOU KNEW?

Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called him the other day, his mother died.

Mr. Schwarz. I heard that,

Did you know anything about his use of underworld figures in connection with --

MR. ANGLETON. I know the allegations.

ME. SCHWARTZ. At the time did you know of that?

MR. ANGLETON. I only know one incident.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Mr. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in Mexico, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had surveilled the Hafis all the way from California to National Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who was the physical description of Bill to a tee. And they

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thought it was Bill. And they were checking with Pepich.  
what to do.

2 Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?

3 Mr. Angleton. I think it was.

4 Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill  
5 Harvey?

6 Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey.

7 So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And  
8 I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone  
9 and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to  
10 do anything until they hear from you.

11 And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on  
12 this and I will be back in touch.

13 And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how  
14 he had gone over from California and followed him in this  
15 thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.

16 Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey  
17 went to Rome?

18 Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was, I think  
19 quite a long time before.

20 So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on  
21 this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection  
22 with the Mafia and all that, but I did know him well enough  
23 to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing  
24 happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public  
25 opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left

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1                   the FBI.

2                   So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill  
3                   around?

4                   And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.

5                   And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble.  
6                   Would you please tell me where I can locate him?

7                   And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert's. And I called  
8                   Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. And I turned the  
9                   phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the  
10                  record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera.

11                  And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear  
12                  the discussion. It was something about, I will see you  
13                  tomorrow.

14                  And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people  
15                  to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.

16                  And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what  
17                  Anderson and everybody else has stated.

18                  Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge  
19                  did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in  
20                  Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down  
21                  there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard?

22                  Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.

23                  Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire  
24                  contact with the Israeli's?

25                  Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

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Senator Tower. He will take a recess for about two minutes while we go up and vote.

(A short recess was taken)

M.R. Schweitzer

Mr. Schwarz, I don't have anything more.

~~Scholar Tower. You have read this, and Sculic will in  
this gallery -- this is a gallery of the Sculic articles in  
Sculic's house.~~

"Although the details of the Israeli nuclear enterprise are still top secret, it is known that in the wake of the 1956 Suez war, the Eisenhower Administration resolved to provide Israel with all possible help in developing an atomic weapon. The Israelis had no theoretical knowledge, but they needed technological support to their Dimona nuclear research center in the Negev Desert."

"According to these top intelligence sources, the CIA was charged with the responsibility of providing this support to the Israelis." <sup>11</sup>

Do you have knowledge that the CIO was charged with such responsibilities?

Mr. Justice: Absolutely to the contrary.

~~Section 704~~. "Pakistan directed the strike?"

**Assistance - False.**

Question 8: What is totally false?

(c)  $\text{H}_2\text{O}$  contains water in totally false.

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"Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Dimona  
to work with Dimona scientists."

Mr. Angleton. False. I will interject here that the  
French sent 400 as a matter of the original deal with the  
Israelis to Dimona.

Senator Tower. The reference here is to nuclear weaponry.  
And this was sent by the CIA, as you interpret it.

Mr. Angleton. It is false.

Senator Tower. "The most important of them, according  
to intelligence sources, was a British-born physicist, now an  
American citizen working for the US Government in Washington,  
with special and extensive ties to the CIA."

Mr. Angleton. No. The allegation is false.

Senator Tower. The answer to your previous question would  
cover that one, too, I assume.

"Persons close to Angleton have confirmed this account in  
recent interviews. Reflecting Angleton's own position, however,  
they have denied assertions from other sources that the CIA  
team made fissile material -- plutonium -- available to  
the Israelis from United States stocks."

Mr. Schwarz. As far as your are concerned is that  
statement right or wrong?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying, when he says deny it, I deny  
it.

Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that

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second paragraph, is where all the questions are raised.

Really, the CIA would be hard put to transfect any fissionable materials without the knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission, would it not?

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure you that the CIA -- I don't really know what the word fissionable means anymore. There is so much use of the atomic energy. We have atomic battery --

Senator Tower. By fissionable materials, I think the reference here is that could be converted to weapons.

Mr. Angleton. I may don't categorically -- in my whole history in the CIA, nothing ever involved fissionable material except intelligence about it or speculations regarding leakage and so forth.

Senator Tower. In other words, the CIA doesn't have control over any stocks of fissionable materials independently.

Mr. Angleton. No.

Senator Tower. And therefore the CIA could not acquire such materials except through the knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission?

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nitpick, but I want to simply state that there was a problem in the Agency once where you have, say, somebody simply approach you and state, I have access to fissionable materials, and therefore if it is a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question

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how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where someone allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to sell the stuff? The purpose then was to penetrate, try to penetrate. And I wonder if there wasn't a question at one stage as to what we do about it, and what the consequences would be if we use the diplomatic pouch, and therefore be thousands of questions. And it did happen in the Far East. And it was a false case, confidential case. But it did happen. There was an offer to sell us atomic fissionable material or something. But my point is, there has never been initiative to my knowledge, or an interest of the CIA in any shape or form wanting any fissionable material.

**Senator Tower, David**

Mr. Aspin. Two small points. Mr. Sculc said that "In effect Mr. Angleton said at one point that should I surface Mr. Mann's name, Dr. Mann's name, he may go as far as to commit suicide."

~~Did you say that to me - really?~~

Mr. Abbotton, I don't think I said it to him. But in the back of my mind -- after I left you -- was what I think I told you -- and maybe I didn't tell you, maybe I told Colby, that's what bothers me -- the Royal Canadian Mounted Police still have an open espionage case in which a report of theirs alleges that either Dr. Mann being present or something that someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in

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Washington, when Philby was stationed there. Now, whether we had the report or not I don't know. So I am a little confused as to that statement. Because I don't think the question of using Mann's name came up other than the context of the allegation that Mann was sent by me, and would this mean if it came out in terms of the Head of Services, who had called for phrases, British, French, et cetera, and they would have his confirmation, one do they know anything about my Israeli activities now, and then the most damaging would be the entire information on Mann and Philby, et cetera.

Mr. Aaron. Let me just add one other segment of his testimony: "Angleton said after recounting the story of the transfer of atomic technology Mr. Eswal went on and said, Angleton said that he was rather taken back by this information, said that in effect he could confirm it with corrections: one, the timeframe was wrong, that it was not the early '60's, but indeed the late '50's after the Suez War, and number two, that as far as he was concerned there was no delivered by the CIA, or anyone to his knowledge any fissionable material such as plutonium or other material."

Mr. Angleton. I don't follow that at all.

Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?

Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.

Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?

Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.

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2 Senator Tower. He is reading -- actually what he said  
3 a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to bring out  
4 that you did not agree with his story, that you do not  
5 confirm the validity of it.

6 Mr. Angleton. That part is correct. But I am not follow-  
7 ing the last part you are reading.

8 *NBR* Mr. Nixon. Let me show it to you and you read it.

9 Mr. Schwartz. Would you identify the page and the line?

10 Mr. Aaron. The page is page 40, beginning at line 19 and  
11 running to the end of the page.

12 Mr. Angleton. Now say in effect he could confirm it,  
13 that is the "it" business.

14 Mr. Aaron. Start back further and get the general  
15 story.

16 Mr. Angleton. This is false, on page 40, from line 8,  
17 "Mr. Angleton told me that essentially this information was  
18 correct," that is absolutely false.

19 And I never made any such statement that I could confirm  
20 it -- lines 19 and 20, "Angleton said he was greatly taken back  
21 and in effect he could confirm the two corrections." That is  
22 false.

23 Mr. Aaron. I think that covers it.

24 Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or more  
25 distinguished pure scientists or physicists whose services  
were available to the US Government", that is totally false.

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Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.

Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance, it is a quite different matter.

~~Mr. Kirbow, You do not mean technical assistance in the nuclear field whatever?~~

~~He's Angleton. He knew what I was talking was this stuff that has come out in volumes of Sadet's assume of CIA's help to the Iraqis, which was accurate.~~

~~Senator TOWER.~~ By technical assistance here, as I understand it, he means technical assistance and nuclear weapons development.

~~Mr. Angleton. That is right. And that is deliberately on his part a misstatement of the fact. And that is what I am trying to say.~~

Senator Tower, we did administer technical assistance in terms of intelligence.

~~Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn't a question of my admitting, I told him that it was well-known that in the whole field of science and other things, that we have worked together with the~~

Israelis  
interior Tower. But not specifically, technical assistance and nuclear weapon development?

Mr. Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, is it possible that one source of this story could be alleged operations by the Israelis

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intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts to acquire nuclear technology or material?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Let me just state my own feeling about some of this. After Mr. [redacted] talked to me about having all those great sources which were better than Hirsch's, he said, I also have talked to **ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE**. Well, I know right away that that was a lie. I said, after 22 years' work with some people, they would have been having me out of bed at 3 in the morning. In other words, in 22 years I have never known them to withhold anything germane to our common activity. So that for American journalists to go and try to pump things out of me regarding the subject, he wouldn't have got home before -- that is the first thing. That is the fact. And he said this Israeli fellow said something about, something I don't discuss, or words to that effect, I can't remember that part of it.

So there isn't much more to say about that.

Mr. Angleton. Were there **ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE** efforts in the US in the 1960's or at any time aimed at acquiring either nuclear technology or information that would have a bearing on this story?

Mr. Angleton. There have been many efforts by many countries to acquire technical knowledge in this country, and that doesn't exclude the Israelis.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instances

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1 Mr. Angleton. Interrogated, or processed;

2 Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of  
3 this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through  
4 this process, and that therefore at least that he might have  
5 been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that  
6 right?

7 Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying  
8 to say. His English is such that it is very difficult.

9 Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years  
10 later -- my recollection is that you said it was in 1967 or  
11 1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of  
12 employment of their top operators in the investigation of the  
13 Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind  
14 negate the implication of the original Golitsyn call or that  
15 they were involved?

16 Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that  
17 man is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko.

18 Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?

19 Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are  
20 treading on, Golitsen gave us information regarding the  
21 penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an  
22 identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking  
23 about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work.  
24 And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and  
25 the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we

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1 advise that you send it to the Army.  
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And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X" was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept that. And in 1967 a Soviet -- on whom we had a dossier on this thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore we knew who he was, and all the rest of it -- with an unknown coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he alleged -- and he was a TDC, temporary duty in Washington here -- and he established contact with the first Mrs. Neime. And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefinition or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went into the whole background, that this man was one of the highest grade illegals that they had ever had, and he was in our Agency.

So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because he was one of the two interrogating officers. And I can't talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.

So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know about George Blake?

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Geo Blaha

And then his response was, he says, we think he is dead.  
Now, here is a man who is supposed to be Special  
Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose  
mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore  
from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was  
the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of  
Nosenko's father. And Golitsen had told us that men chosen  
for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came  
from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fathers  
and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.

So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is good.

Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from Scrubb's Needs to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the exfiltration plans of George Blake, which would have been simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TDC.

So we handled him for six or seven weeks.

And some of the most selling parts of the interrogation was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what cryptonyms that we wanted him to work up so and this would

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1 relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitsen --  
2 what did Golitsen know that they did not know he knew? What  
3 Agents in the West could be under our control as a result of  
4 Golitsen's disclosures regarding those things?

5 And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of  
6 almost getting from our men those four or five crytonyms,  
7 which would have told them what they wanted to know, because  
8 there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn't  
9 know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.

10 So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was  
11 sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken  
12 feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he  
13 said, if you do these things for me, I have an opportunity,  
14 because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American  
15 Department of the KGB.  
16

17 And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the  
18 Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he stated  
19 there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to  
20 acquire all the information possible on the whereabouts of  
21 Golitsen and Nosenko. And I was actually in Wisconsin. And  
22 I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any  
23 proposal put up by that individual that would expose -- and I  
24 use the crytonym name of Golitsen -- don't.  
25

A week later is when he got to Moscow and he sent a cable  
to tell us that he can give them word on everything on

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Golitsen.

Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of the fact that for six months the place was immobilized for this investigation, of all the high level all over the works, in the way he put it.

Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russians treat a returned defector, and the way we treat them. And in that connection, do your knowledge was Oswald every interrogated when he returned from Russia?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I probably would know, but I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall within the jurisdiction of the military, since he was a military man who defected. So I don't know the answer to that.

Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.

Senator Mathias. Or at any time?

Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.

Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.

Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did?

Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did.

Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.

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1 This is the very last question. You referred to files  
2 that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the  
3 Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to  
4 pursue that in a personal way.

5 About two years ago Arborev was in this country, and he  
6 came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of  
7 Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of  
8 record?

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9 Soviet Embassy, then my answer would be yes.  
10 Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came with one  
11 person with him, whose name I don't remember.  
12 Mr. Angleton. If the Bureau had him under surveillance,  
13 and he came here -- now, I am getting off ground I don't  
14 know -- the newspaper said Mr. Noeckel gave an order that the  
15 Hill was off-base, and when the Soviet came here he was never  
16 surveilled, and whom he saw -- unknown. That is what the  
17 newspaper said. My own observation would be in any technical  
18 coverage of an installation, the doings of an individual, would  
19 result in dossier on all people who had contacts, if the  
20 man was suspect or there is a reason.

21 Senator Tower. Excuse me. You are talking about a  
22 Soviet person visiting members here on the Hill?

23 Senator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to get at  
24 is the circumstances under which a file or dossier might

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Opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself as a  
guinea pig that Arbakov lunch as a starting point.

At this point my question is on purely hypothetical  
policy. I plan to go next week with the Senate group which is  
making a parliamentary visit to Russia. And you see Arbakov  
in Moscow. I would assume it would be likely. Would that  
become a continuing entry in such a dossier as far as you know?

Mr. Angleton. We don't have any coverage in Moscow.

Senator Mathias. Is that the kind of thing that --

Mr. Angleton. We are not living in a very ideal world  
in the Agency. We can't even access the hard material.

Senator Mathias. Since it is a hypothetical question,  
let me make it even more hypothetical. Let's say our mission,  
instead of visiting Moscow, visits Rome or Paris or someplace,  
where it is very easy for you to operate. And there were  
meetings with Russians who were known to have visited me in  
Washington. Would that be the kind of thing which would get  
to a Congressional file?

Mr. Angleton. No. I imagine the British MI-5, though,  
because of the Russians in London, would pass through liaison  
to us, if there was something suspicious, would pass through  
a report on the meeting. And we have examples where Czech  
defector told us about a member of Parliament, a Soviet agent.  
And what the cryptonym was, and how he was recruited. And you  
have got other cryptonyms on British members of Parliament.

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that you have not then identified. We know what they passed  
or some of the stuff which was passed.

Senator Mathias. Assuming a file was set up in that  
lunch two years ago --

Mr. Angleton. The file wouldn't be set up there on the  
fact -- with your name on it, it would be the Soviets, and  
you would be buried in the file, which would probably be that  
thick, of that Soviet activity in the US. And there would be  
the fact that he was here, and that he went to New York, and  
he did this or that.

Senator Mathias. So this wouldn't show up in Mathias'  
file, that would show up in ~~an~~ Khrushchev file?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. That is the way it is  
supposed to be. And the only time where I can see a file  
would be opened on an American Congressman or Senator would  
be where there was a substantial basis for opening up that  
file. But that wouldn't be at the initiative of the CIA, it  
would be a letter that would go to the FBI and the Attorney  
General, and then there would be somebody in the Senate or  
the Congress who would be contacted and notified, and so on.  
And I think Mr. Hoover's practice was that he would learn  
through his own sources that a person who is not good was  
going to have lunch with a Congressman or was cultivating him,  
and he would pick up the money -- or this is what they say.  
And I think this is the way he handled it -- he would simply

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call him on the phone and say, I think you should know the following, and there would be a notification that Mr. Hoover notified, et cetera. He called me once when there wasn't enough time factor for him to send a letter to me. He said, you are doing something at such and such an hour, you should know that this man is a homosexual, or so on and so on. And it may have been useful to change the source in a hurry. But it is formalized in the Bureau. When Mr. Hoover intervened on these things, it was either a question of time or a question of emphasis. But the formal part goes on regardless, if a person, regardless of who he is, is involved, or is passed a document, or comes up in a telephone tap, or any number of things, their file is zapped on it.

Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying what a political friend of mine once said, that you don't get news unless you make news?

Mr. Angleton. That is one way of looking at it.

Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Angleton. I want to comment you again on that question, because that fixes several things. Because if there is one thing I regret about leaving the Agency, it is the unresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest, because we know so much about that person when he was in India. And he was the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intelligence person.

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Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintelligence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating. What things in particular would you do?

Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that the Agency has to go through the purgatory that -- these fires that no man would put out -- and therefore let it be shocking or whatever. And let all the political repercussions take place, and if you go to purgatory, my view is, the bigger the fires, the better. So my view is, let it all come out. And let people take the consequences. I am never believer that an agency can have two fathers. And I don't believe in inferiors reporting on their superiors by directive. And I don't believe that the Agency below the Director has to be responsive to two authorities.

Senator Baker - What two authorizations?

Mr. Angleton. I mean the Congress and the Executive. In other words, if Colby is asked, what do you know about Chile, my view is that on Chile would you please ask the White House? And that is what I am trying to get at, at least so that they can come back with Colby after the Executive part has told Colby what it might be. But to throw the burden on the Director to respond to a question on Chile, gives him - he is always in that dual position. And something doesn't seem to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, even to

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prepared to sit down and discuss the question of liaison, because liaison is a tiny part of the question of penetration and double agents and all the rest of it.

And in fact that happened, and everybody thought, we had got our captain that didn't make admiral aboard who will settle this. And then we will have his demise.

And then you had Mr. Buckley come in as acting Director. And then the Watergate and all of that. So there has never been a stabilizing factor in his Government as it relates to, not counterintelligence alone, but the intelligence community. And now I am strongly opposed to professionals being Directors.

I would say that a promotional Director of the Agency doesn't work, he doesn't have a basis on the outside, or the perspective. And I think the Rockefeller Commission's observations were first rate in terms of the idea of two Deputy Directors who have to be confirmed and whatnot. And I think that no directorate should be expected to follow the nuts and bolts and at the same time handle all the duties of meeting and all the rest of it and try to keep an eye inside the business.

Senator Baker. What do you think of the Rockefeller Commission reports?

Mr. Angleton. I don't see anything wrong with it.

Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?

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Mr. Angleton. I really don't know this area. So I am not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile and the packages and the damage that is done to US posture abroad, how much of it does this take?

Senator Baker. It wouldn't take many. That is an argumentative thing.

Mr. Angleton. All the cases we're discussing, in the hands of the wrong people, and our files in the hands of the wrong people, would have very decisive political impact upon our elections. That is what I mean, to be very frank about it.

Senator Baker. How would that happen?

Mr. Angleton. There are all kinds of information which, if it falls into the wrong hands or should they want to use it for their own ulterior motives, would be absolutely damaging.

Senator Tower. In other words, this information could be used by politicians as a political football?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely. But a man who would do it damages --

Senator Mathiess. Would you give an example?

(Off the record discussion)

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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