

**File #:**

~~602-116395~~

# Serial Scope:

~~51 THREE 100  
1<sup>st</sup> NR 1203x, 1204x, 1<sup>st</sup> NR 1204x, 1206-1210x  
1212, 1214x, 1214x1, 1215, 1215x~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy  
Assassination Records Collection Act of  
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). See also  
Case No. 44-2008 Date 03-18-2025  
Received by FBI - Dallas  
1223 (44 TBC 2107 Note).  
Case No. TX 55013 Date:  
03-18-2025

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

- 1 - 2 - Mr. S. F. Phillips  
1 - Mr. Mintz - Encls. (2)  
1 - Mr. Adams - Encls. (2)  
1 - Mr. Bassett - Encls. (2)

DATE: 12/5/75

- Mr. Newman - Encls. (2)  
Mr. Oregon - Encls. (2)  
1 - Mr. Hotis - Encls. (2)  
1 - Mr. Daly - Encls. (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/5/75 BY SP-100

## 2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum  
representatives of captivated Committee: Chief Counsel F.A.O. Schwartz; Assistant Counsel Paul Michal; Staff Member Mark Gitzenstein; Staff Director of the Domestic Task Force John T. Elliff; and Staff Member John Bayley. Representing the Bureau at this meeting were Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams, Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul W. Daly.

## 4. SUBJECT OF CONTENTS:

The meeting discussed the forthcoming testimony on 12/9/75 of the Director before that Committee and Elliff furnished the Bureau two draft papers discussing the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction and issues the Committee Staff feels perhaps Senate Select Committee must address from a legislative standpoint. Copies of these papers are attached. The original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare the necessary list and make it available for review by the appropriate cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.

RECORDED DATE OF SUBMISSION: 3/8/76

100

7 JAN 22 1976

100

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75

Under Part 2, the document discusses options available to the Committee. These options ran the gamut from abolition of the Bureau's domestic intelligence functions to administrative oversight by the Attorney General or Congressional oversight or enacting legislation providing for domestic intelligence investigations with legislative limits imposed on such investigations. Included is the consideration of creating an independent inspector General.

63-44395-1245X

NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in consultances in Senstudy 75.

7 JAN 22 1976

CONTINUED - OVER

PVD:led (9)

(9)

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

63-44395-1245X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-11-88 BY [initials]

Intelligence Division  
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams

RE: SENSTUDY 75

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 4/25/75

You were previously advised that John T. Elliott begins by a six-page statement of the Bureau's current authority to conduct intelligence investigations. He then lists activities of the American Indian Movement (AIM), after being confronted by AIM leaders, admitted being a confidential informant for the FBI. Option 1 is for Congress to pass the existing FBI authority as set forth by and Executive Orders.

Attached teletype from Omaha advises that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl of Special Prosecution stated he received a telephone call 4/24/75 from Durham and that Durham told him he had been contacted by representatives of the Office of Sen. George Mitchell, Washington, D.C., requesting Durham's presence in Washington during the week of April 28, 1975, for purpose of attending staff meetings to determine his potential as a witness before committee investigating operations of the FBI. Durham indicated he intended to comply and would have no further contact with the FBI. We are following this matter closely and you will be kept advised.

Option 2 considers setting up a general intelligence investigation division. In this Option 1 - Legal Counsel Division, that the FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct intelligence investigations only as Congress intended. Criminal investigations would not provide participants or prevent the use of violence in law and that incidents of the use of violence are of a serious nature and threaten the

WDN:ljj

*IGD/wb* *PPV/ra*

For purposes of the Director's appearance before the Senate Select Committee, it is to questions concerning the aforementioned that the Bureau has received copies and

## COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE: SENSTUDY 75 APR 24 1975

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Flic & Com.	_____
G.m. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____

TELETYPE

NR 005 OM PLAIN

ELLIFF indicated during this meeting that the Director during his appearance may anticipate being asked a question by one of the Senators relating to his statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal concerning the necessity for the sacrifice of certain individual rights at the expense of investigations. He also anticipated the Director might be asked a question concerning his position on COINTELPRO. Regarding the question concerning the Director's statement before the American Bar Association in Montreal, the Legal Counsel Division will draft a proposed response. Concerning COINTELPRO, a response has been prepared and will be put together with the briefing material for the Director.

ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. OHL, ADVISED HE

RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING

RECOMMENDATIONS HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28,

(1) That the Director respond to questions concerning the attached position papers as set forth above.

SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH

COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI.

SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE

WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division draft a proposed response concerning the Director's statement made in Montreal relating to the sacrifice of certain individual rights.

APR 24 1975

(3) That the Intelligence Division make a detailed review of the various Options set forth in the two attached position papers. (FOR SUBSEQUE NT SWF CONFERENCE)

16 MAY 2 1975

JMA RPL KJW JWD RPTA

ROUTED FROM 121121Z MAY 1975  
5 MAY 30 1975 FILED 121121Z MAY 1975  
62-116325-11  
NOT RECORDED

- JUN 11 1975 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Issues and Options for Discussion with  
Former Attorneys General Rogers, Katzenbach, and Clark

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE April 22, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

Asstn. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Cmp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## I. Background

#MDR16 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HITACHI IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/9/01 BY SP/CH/MLB

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE INVESTIGATION~~ In the past few weeks the staff has presented the Committee with evidence suggesting the following about the FBI's internal security intelligence program:

The purpose of this memorandum is to record that on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President's Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter advised ~~these individuals were not alleged espionage agents, but citizens who fell within the FBI's vague definitions of "subversives" and "extremists"~~ ~~interfere with the Select Committee~~ ~~in its investigation of the FBI's massive internal security intelligence program~~ ~~and was furnished to the Senate Select Committee~~ purely homegrown "threats to the national security".

With reference to the study entitled ~~Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction~~, Mr. Wilderotter requested that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition, Wilderotter advised ~~he has been informed by the FBI that groups were investigated whose threats to the national security were tenuous, if not non-existent.~~ ~~the approval of the US Senate Select Committee on National Security Council interest.~~

ACTION: 2. collection of information on the personal life and political views of subjects unrelated to the national security.

For information and record purposes.

3. the continuance of investigations well after it should have become obvious that there was no legitimate predicate.

Particularly invasive collection techniques were used, including electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entries. Although these have been terminated, the predominant and perhaps most insidious continues today through the FBI's huge informant/confidential source network.

E. Information collected in the course of these investigations is disseminated regularly throughout the federal government and to local law enforcement.

F. Until 1971, information collected through these investigations was disseminated as part of the COINTELPRO program to the subjects' friends, relatives, employers, and others in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "subversives" or "extremists".

84 MAY 7 1975

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

- 2 -

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO : M. J. [Redacted] The FBI's internal security intelligence program was used by Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon to serve their political interests, usually by collecting information on critics or political opponents.

FROM : Mr. W. P. [Redacted] (SENSTUDY 15) SUBJECT : INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Ctrs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. Lab. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Other Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

I. The program is not authorized by statute but is founded on a series of secret or ambiguous Presidential orders, which in turn are based upon a questionable assertion of "inherent constitutional authority".

Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing on Hoover memorandum dated 8/24-25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter. The program continues today, albeit on a much more limited basis than in the late 1950's and early 1970's, and the basic machinery for the program -- the huge informant/confidential source network -- is still operating. The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.

K. There is no statute or internal Bureau or Justice Department policy prohibiting a new Director, Attorney General, or President from ordering the Bureau to expand the program to its earlier dimensions.

On 9/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9:20 a.m. to 10:12 a.m., President Roosevelt and Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant. Among the issues and options which might be discussed with former Attorneys General in response to what the Committee has learned are the following:

A. Abolition. Elimination of the FBI internal security intelligence program as Attorney General Harlan Stone, reflected in 1934 when confronted with abuses growing out of the FBI's first internal security intelligence program, such as the infamous Palmer raids.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

ACTION: Whether there are not some functions (e.g., protecting the President, preventing or at least predicting violence by terrorist organizations, or predicting civil disorders) which require intelligence collection.

5 ENCLOSURE  
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2. Whether FBI intelligence reports are valuable in that respect, especially in light of a recent GAO report suggesting that such reports are rarely useful in predicting violent activity.

J. H. Mortimer

3. Whether such information, assuming it is valuable, could not be obtained through more traditional criminal investigations.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. Tamm

FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER

DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936  
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY  
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936

4. Whether the value of the information, marginal or otherwise, justifies the risk to civil liberties inherent in such intelligence collection.

On this date, SA Alonso L. Lacey of the Intelligence Division delivered the above-captioned memorandum to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memorandum and the date of introduction of the type style employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether, notwithstanding the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memorandum, the same were used on the files supporting the recommendations of the "Memorandum for Mr. Tamm" (see determination at the "Memorandum for Mr. Tamm" from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936) was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1935. The examination concerning the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25, 1936" was limited upon the length of investigations, (b) the kinds of information which can be collected and disseminated in use since 1935, the subject irrelevant to the alleged criminal act, (c) the utilization of warrantless electronic surveillance and other particularly invasive collection techniques, and (d) the utilization of huge informant/confidential source network without judicial or Justice Department supervision.

RECOMMENDATION: The result of this examination be forwarded to the Authorizing Statute. Recognition of the value of internal security intelligence, but placing limits upon the program designed to minimize the infringement upon civil liberties, an option being actively considered by the present Attorney General.

- 1 - Mr. Wanamaker  
1 - Mr. Lacey  
1 - Mr. White  
1 - Mr. Mortimer  
1 - Mr. Tamm  
In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out under the first option and, in addition:

WSO:mrg  
(6)

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1. Whether meaningful and stringent guidelines can be written which do not so hamper the administration of ~~FBI Internal security intelligence program~~ as to make the product not just marginal, as GAO suggests, but worthless.
2. In light of the possibility that the present Attorney General may address this matter via internal Justice Department guidelines, whether this approach does not ignore the legal authority question which can only be resolved by statute.

New letter 3. Whether or not Congress could draft a statutory version of the guidelines which could be flexible enough to meet an evolving threat and at the same time place meaningful restrictions upon the program.

st

4. Even assuming there is no absence of legal authority, is it safe to leave these guidelines in the form of a departmental order which can be rescinded by the next Attorney General?

C. Delegation of Authority to Attorney General. Simply ratifying the present program via enactment of a statutory charter which grants the FBI authority to conduct an internal security intelligence program subject to its own internal guidelines or departmental guidelines as proposed by the Attorney General.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and:

1. Whether such a statute would not be an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the Executive Branch.  
*RECORDING INDEX*
2. Whether enactment of such a statute would not represent a failure by the Congress to confront the issues raised above.

AUG 18 1976 P.M.

\*A preliminary staff analysis of the Attorney General's draft guidelines suggests that, despite months of conscientious and painstaking work by a departmental task force, the guidelines are not adequate. This analysis, which will be presented when Attorney General Levi testifies on December 10, indicates that several of the more questionable FBI investigations (e.g., of Dr. King and the women's liberation movement) would still be permissible under these proposed guidelines.

62-66727-18842  
62-716395-

[View Details](#)

Director

2

#### General Telephone and Telegraph Company

- D. Legislative Inaction. Expect no new statute affecting the FBI's legal authority or the internal security intelligence program. Washington, D. C.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider many of the issues set out above and, in addition:

1. Whether this failure to act might not leave the status of the program in doubt and subject to court challenge.
  2. Whether this failure to act after full disclosure by the Bureau might not be taken by the FBI and the courts as a ratification of the program.

- E. Administrative Oversight by the Attorney General. The Justice Department should be required to exercise greater administrative oversight over the FBI's internal security intelligence program by Attorney General Levi, regardless of whatever other options Congress accepts.

In weighing this option, the Committee should consider the following issues:

1. Whether it is practical for the Attorney General or his staff to review thousands of such investigations each year.
  2. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should review all or just the so-called "full" investigations.
  3. Whether, to facilitate the conduct of such reviews, the Attorney General or his staff should be given "complete" access to Bureau files, including information regarding the identity and reliability of informants and confidential sources.
  4. Whether it is possible to develop a staff of career attorneys within the Department with both the access and independence essential to the conduct of searching reviews.
  5. Whether the Attorney General or his staff should not also be required to review various informant and so-called "intensification" programs, and the establishment of specialized indices (which have a significant impact upon which cases are opened) instead of just reviewing individual investigations in a vacuum as provided by the Attorney General's draft guidelines.

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~~62-66727-18612~~

100% DESTROYED  
NW 55319 DocID:92993632 Page 9  
NW 55319 DocID:92993632 Page 9

March 10, 1975

F. An Inspector General. In addition to the above options, an independent Inspector General should be created to investigate improprieties by the FBI. This option is advanced by those concerned about the inadequacy of the FBI's investigation of the disappearance of former

On 3/10/75 Mr. DONALD P. SCHEWE, Assistant Librarian in the Reference Area of Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY was advised of our interest in locating any communications bearing upon a conversation between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former

Secretary of State GORDON HULL in the latter part of August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J.

EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI participated in the independence conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT allegedly related to the subject that he was responsible to a memorandum of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General, regarding the same conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY on 3/12/75.

Whether it is possible to maintain the independence of an Inspector General within the Department of Justice when both the Inspector General and the Director of the FBI will be responsible to the same official, the Attorney General, regarding the same conversation.

Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY on 3/12/75.

Whether an Inspector General with access to extremely sensitive information might not become a serious threat to the independence of the Bureau from political influence and the civil liberties of American citizens more interested in involving FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (FDR), HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on approximately 3/10/75.

Congressional Oversight that in addition to the above options, the creation of an oversight committee(s) in the Congress, to which the Bureau would be required to report and which would have the power to investigate abuses.

Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more than a copy of a memorandum utilized to transmit communications which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this "buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum for the Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

H. Public Reporting and Disclosure to Subjects. In addition to the above options, the requirement that the FBI make frequent public reports on the details of its internal security intelligence programs and policies and reveal the details of improper intelligence investigations to the subjects of those investigations.

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that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added the following issues:

that this was the only document he was able to locate which may have some bearing on the desired information.

SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the referred to memorandum may be located among the collection of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

2. Whether such disclosure might not increase the number of law suits filed against the FDR personnel

Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewers personnel the White House Appointment Book which was hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment book contained the following pertinent information:

Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM  
FDR departed the White House for a visit to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned to White House at 8:45 AM.

9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from 9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.

(Note \* - There is no entry in this book for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr. HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that it is interesting to note that FDR met Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for his office in the White House. SCHEWE also pointed out that this meeting was significant since FDR met with Mr. HOOVER on 8/24/36, immediately after returning from an extended trip. This, according to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's usual practice.

There was no record in the White House Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that date. This book indicates that FDR departed the White House on Tuesday, 8/25/36, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North

DRAFT  
MEMORANDUM

Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore. December 4, 1975.  
return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936,  
at 10:02 AM.

~~FBI LEGISLATION - PROPOSED OPTIONS Book~~  
~~The White House Ushe's Appointments Book~~  
further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10, 1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House in preparation for the testimony of FBI Director ~~in preparation for the testimony of FBI Director~~  
campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on ~~8/13/36~~ and remained there until ~~8/13/36~~, when he again departed on a trip and returned on ~~8/24/36~~ and 10, the ~~Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various~~  
~~Domestic Intelligence Task Force is pulling together various~~  
proposals for legislation dealing with FBI intelligence.

Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing ~~This paper sets forth some of the basic options~~  
~~This paper sets forth some of the basic options~~  
reflects all of FDR's office appointments. A review ~~of the current Statutes and Executive Orders~~  
~~or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office~~  
~~during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this~~  
~~appointment book does reflect that during this period~~  
~~which reads as follows:~~  
at 1:00 PM.

The Attorney General may appoint officials:  
Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally reviewed the following and was unable to locate any documents or references which could possibly shed some light on the matter of interest to us:

- 1.) ~~Papers kept in FDR's safe.~~
- 2.) ~~Papers kept by his secretary in a separate White House safe.~~

Clauses (2) and (3) are a possible statutory basis for intelligence investigations going beyond the investigation of specific federal crimes. Under (2), the FBI may "assist" the Secret Service in the protection of the President by providing

- 5.) Individual agencies files.

- 6.) J. EDGAR HOOVER ~~Mobile~~.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2/NM/SP

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7.) Attorney General's file.  
intelligence on persons or groups who may endanger the President's safety.  
8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.  
A formal agreement between the FBI and the  
Secret Service sets forth the types of intelligence information  
provided by the Bureau. However, this agreement states that:  
9.) National Security file.  
10.) Internal Security file.

11.) FBI file

The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute

In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that pertinent document of interest to us is now at the FDR Library at Hyde Park, N.Y. SCHEWE added that if any such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and S. such document is at the Library, it is misfiled and S. as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts which the FBI has jurisdiction. It would be impossible and documents at the Library, it would be impossible

to locate same.

Clause (3) recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations other than criminal "buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e., X20, X25 and X67. SCHEWE stated that these investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters" notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference under the control of the Department of Justice. This is a and could locate nothing further regarding the matter possible statutory basis for at least two broad areas of FBI pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".  
intelligence investigations — civil disturbance intelligence and intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program.

The most recent legal advice to the FBI from the Justice Department on the gathering and reporting of data regarding civil disturbances notes that on April 1, 1969, the President designated the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the government's response to civil disturbances. The FBI is instructed to gather and report on "all significant incidents of civil unrest" and on "all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations . . . are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them." The

FBI is specifically advised to make reports "even when no specific violation of Federal law is indicated." On the other hand, the FBI is instructed not to report "every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature coming to its attention." (Tab B)

2856  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 24, 1936.

The Justice Department has given the following recent instructions to the FBI regarding intelligence for the Federal Employee Security Program. Executive Order 10450, as amended by Executive Order 11785, is interpreted as requiring an FBI

investigation of organizations "with a potential" of violating federal or state statutes prohibiting unlawful advocacy of violence or the commission of any unlawful act of violence. The next FBI is advised that "it is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order." The FBI is instructed to apply "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals who are affiliated with such organizations. The FBI is specifically advised that "it is not necessary that a crime occur,

F. D. R.

before the investigation is initiated." (Tab C)

Clause (3) also recognizes that the Attorney General may direct the FBI to conduct investigations, other than criminal

investigations, regarding certain undefined "official matters under the control of the Department of State." This is a possible statutory basis for FBI intelligence investigation of foreign intelligence activities within the United States or to

ENCLOSURE

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142

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ass't Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Exchangers \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Teleph. Ctr. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Secy. \_\_\_\_\_

collect positive foreign intelligence. The best example is  
11:45PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975, WMM  
the Attorney General's authorization of warrantless FBI electronic  
TO electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. However,  
FROM ALEXANDRIA (SAC) (P) MAY 06 1975  
there is apparently no instruction from the Justice Department  
to the FBI directing the Bureau to initiate investigations  
~~SENSITIVE~~ individuals or organizations which have a marked potential  
use by a foreign intelligence service, but about which there is  
no information indicating intelligence activity. (See Staff  
Report "Counterintelligence/Cointerespionage: The Law and  
ALEXANDRIA, October 14, 1975.) AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS  
CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEE, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE  
INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST  
PRESENCE OF FBI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSITIVE  
TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.

INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WINGFIELD DR.  
Instead, he placed sole reliance on a series of Presidential  
DRIVE NO. 1-1A, W. ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT  
directives extending from 1936 until the 1960's which the FBI  
interprets as authorizing it to engage in "domestic security  
INTELLIGENCE. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 1975  
intelligence investigations". The Attorney General has codified  
these directives in a Justice Department regulation instructing  
THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT  
the FBI to:  
LEINBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.

CARRY OUT THE PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE  
of September 6, 1939, as reaffirmed by Presi- REC-106 62-16261-98  
dential directives of January 8, 1943, July 10 MAY 7 1975  
24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, designating  
the [FBI] to take charge of investigative  
work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,  
subversive activities, and related matters.  
28 C.F.R., Section 0.85(d).

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MR 002 BA PLAIN  
 The FBI also cites directives of President Kennedy on June 2, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy on March 5, 1964, which are the latest charter for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, composed of the FBI Director and the chiefs of the military intelligence agencies.<sup>45</sup> This group is authorized to coordinate "all investigation of domestic espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security." (Tab D)

RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975.

DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE.

INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING

The theory behind the FBI's position is that the President has inherent constitutional powers, at least in the absence of contrary legislation, to authorize FBI intelligence activities. The only judicial support for this theory is THE FUTURE.

language in the Supreme Court's opinion in the Keith case,

which declared warrantless wiretapping of domestic groups unconstitutional.

The Court acknowledged the importance of "national security in its domestic implications . . . especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history." Under such circumstances, the Court stated, the President has a "fundamental duty" under the Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." The Court added, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means." Hence, the Court appeared to

Assoc. Dir.
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Dep.A.D.-Inv.
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Laboratory
Plan & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
DIRECTOR Sec'y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Dep.-A.D.-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
    Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
    Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Investigation \_\_\_\_\_  
    Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Intell. Analysis \_\_\_\_\_  
    Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Training \_\_\_\_\_  
    Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Planes Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
    Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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recognize that the President's "domestic security role" has a "constitutional basis"; that the President through the Attorney General may need "to obtain intelligence information about those who plot unlawful acts against the Government" and that "threats

NR 09 0M PLAIN  
7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SM  
~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~  
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~DATE 11-19-01 BY SP-2000~~

and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in sufficient numbers to justify investigative powers with respect to them."

FROM: ~~OMAHA (42-NEW)~~ ~~CHIEF~~  
~~SENSTORY 10~~  
TO: ~~DIRECTOR, FBI (42-NEW)~~ ~~CHIEF~~

The Court applied the general principle that "unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of the people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered."

AND Nevertheless, the central holding of the Hecht decision was that of ARMED FORCES, CONSTITUTIONAL HE HAS APPROPRIATE POWER TO EXERCISE THE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT HE WOULD DETERMINE AN AGREEMENT BE PRESERVE U.S.C. 297 (1972).

Even though the President may have the authority under the Constitution to direct the FBI to conduct intelligence investigations in the absence of legislation, Congress has the ultimate authority to substitute statutory authorization in place of the Presidential directives. As Justice Robert Jackson declared in the Steel Seizure Case, "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." 343 U.S. 579, 637.

REC-106

102-446395-96

16 MAY 7 1975

COPY RETAINED IN  
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

~~Amendment~~  
B. Option One - Ratifying Existing Powers

April 30, 1975

The first option for Congress is legislation ratifying the existing authority granted to the FBI by current Presidential directives and orders. Such legislation would be cast in extremely general terms. Its main advantage is that it would

1. **TITLE/SUBJECT:** Policies and Procedures of the FBI provide a basis for Congressional oversight. It could also

2. **ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:** FBI reinforce the Attorney General's role as the immediate supervisor

3. **NATURE OF MATERIAL:** Letterhead memorandum with enclosures described below

authorise the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

4. **DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified except for one enclosure to conduct investigations of "domestic espionage,

counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities;

5. **NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP:** Should have

2. to gather and report information on civil disturbances;

6. **SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:**

Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:

3. to conduct investigations of other related intelligence matters affecting internal security and

(a) Table of Contents.

(b) ~~Private Guidelines for FBI Investigations~~

4. to conduct investigations of official matters relating to the Department of State.

(c) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret")

(d) Section 84. Registration Act.

(e) Section 86. Sabotage.

(f) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive

In addition, the statute would require the Attorney General

(g) Section 88. Sedition. REC-106

to report annually to the appropriate Congressional committees

(h) Section 95. ~~President~~ REC-106

on the volume and type of investigations and reports, the

(i) Section 97. Voorhis Act.

(j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil

Unrest.

Investigative techniques used, and the policies and procedures

adopted by the Justice Department and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

The weaknesses of this approach are obvious. Congress

would have legislated a wholesale delegation of power without

~~SEE NOTE PAGE TWO~~

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

Dep. AD \_\_\_\_\_

Dep. AD MR. \_\_\_\_\_

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_

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Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_

Files &amp; Com. \_\_\_\_\_

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Inspect. \_\_\_\_\_

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Intell. \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_

(4)

Plan. &amp; Eval. \_\_\_\_\_

Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rx. \_\_\_\_\_

Director Secy. \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

standards or limitations other than the supervision of the Attorney General and oversight by Congress. In view of the instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations Select Committee's findings as to the vast overbreadth of FBI material excluded but available for review by appropriately domestic intelligence investigations and the abuses committed in the name of "counterintelligence", Congress would in effect be permitting future expansion of FBI operations to match past policies.

7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSO. 5/19/75

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75

C. Option ~~to~~ creation Separate Security Intelligence Agency

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:

creating a separate Security Intelligence Agency within the No direct relation.

Justice Department. It would perform the functions of the present Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI Intelligence Division, dealing with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence/counterespionage. The FBI itself has considered this option as part of the larger question of separating all FBI intelligence functions from the law enforcement functions of the Bureau. (Tab E)

A separate agency would be justified only if it was authorized to conduct investigations of a wider scope and using different techniques than would otherwise be permitted. In other words, Congress could decide that foreign counterintelligence investigations should go beyond investigation of specific crimes, that techniques such as electronic surveillance should be used without a warrant or with a special type of warrant,

To: SAC:

- Albany
- Albuquerque
- Alexander
- Anchorage
- Atlanta
- Baltimore
- Birmingham
- Boston
- Buffalo
- Butte
- Charlotte
- Chicago
- Cincinnati
- Cleveland
- Columbia
- Dallas
- Denver
- Detroit
- El Paso
- Honolulu
- Houston
- Indianapolis
- Jackson
- Jacksonville
- Kansas City
- Louisville
- Las Vegas
- Little Rock
- Los Angeles
- Louisville
- Memphis
- Miami
- Milwaukee
- Minneapolis
- Mobile
- Newark
- New Haven
- New Orleans
- New York City
- Norfolk
- Oklahoma City
- Omaha
- Philadelphia
- Phoenix
- Pittsburgh
- Portland
- Richmond
- Sacramento
- St. Louis
- Salt Lake City
- San Antonio
- San Diego
- San Francisco
- San Juan
- Savannah
- Seattle
- Springfield
- Tampa
- Washington D.C.
- Quantico

TO LEGAT:

- Beirut
- Bern
- Brasilia
- Buenos Aires
- Caracas
- Hong Kong
- London
- Manila
- Mexico City
- Paris
- Rome
- Singapore
- Tel Aviv
- Tokyo

and that operations should be conducted to intelligence activities by means other than "non grata" proceedings. On the other hand, the investigation of foreign intelligence acts as a criminal investigation, then the FBI sh

Any statute in this area must use general diplomatic reasons. For example, Congress

Date 6/6/75

RE: SENSTUDY 75

authorize deception operations or efforts to **PERSONAL ATTN.**  
intelligence officers, even though such techniques are envisioned. Such techniques are dealt with

Retention For appropriate

- For information  optional  action  Surep, by \_\_\_\_\_
- The above does not apply to \_\_\_\_\_
- Enclosed are completed cases from report of SA \_\_\_\_\_ dated \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

The legislation should be more specific. Attached should be brought to the attention of the investigation and other operations division. With his information, the SSC has exhibited an interest in Cammarota than non-resident aliens in Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was a foreign power. He thus may be contacted by SSC personnel.

Investigated if they have a marked potential for intelligence service, but no information indicated.

Enc.

Bufile **22-11599** **ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED** **HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED** **DATE 1-14-04 BY SJA-PBM/PB** **FILE 518**  
- Unfile

The statute should also set out standards

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 2/7/75.

like the Palestine Liberation Organization.) If the group fits

FROM J. B. ADAMS *JBA* #mD16

the criteria for foreign domination, there should be an additional finding that it may engage in intelligence activities or

SUBJECT: CENSTUDY 1976

DATE: 1/19/75

in activities involving the use of violence in violations of

federal law. On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee.

If the group meets all these standards, Congress may a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing authorize the investigation of its activities, going beyond that the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence regular criminal investigations. Such investigations could

In the intelligence agencies.

extend to all individuals who are members of, or express support for, the organization, as well as to the efforts of the organization to influence and control other groups. However, to prevent such abuses in the future.

it may be sufficient to authorize only the investigation of

Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central active members and supporters. This would prevent a revival intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies involved in domestic intelligence.

political and social activity where Communists might be involved 40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in this regard.

The Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO considered the need for special supervision of foreign counterintelligence furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance. Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that of a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Commission to make decisions Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard with regard to the necessity of a classification of particular wiretaps had written us off indicating that if we made classified foreign counterintelligence techniques. (Tab F) This proposal

JBA:am's (8)

- 1 - Mr. Jenkins
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland
- 1 - Mr. McDermott

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Hotis

1975

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Att. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Secy. \_\_\_\_\_

FAR 1/5/71

CONTINUED OVER

has merit in view of the limited amount of time the Attorney  
Memorandum for Mr. Callahan

Re: SENSTUDY 1975

General can give to personal supervision and the after-the-fact role of legislative oversight regarding the separate agency.

information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted to members only, legislation to create a separate foreign

public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report counterintelligence agency must deal with relationships to the

which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I advised him that not by us and it was our information

foreign intelligence agencies. The current FBI-CIA agreement

on their respective jurisdictions is only a "memorandum of understanding" of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of

committees. It being the CIA to undertake certain clandestine activities within the United States, in coordination with the other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have

FBI. (Tab C) Proposals are currently circulating in the Executive Branch for a new National Security Council intelligence

that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he indicated to clarify this matter, as well as to regulate CIA

coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large electronic surveillance of American citizens abroad. (Tab H)  
number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information from the intelligence agencies.

A full draft of a statutory charter for a separate

foreign counterintelligence agency is not included here, since Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive to the focus is on domestic intelligence issues. However, one

President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator implied that such a statute going to talk to that President in regard

order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants.

He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their

D. Option Three -- Elimination of FBI Domestic Intelligence

ACTION The basic assumption behind Attorney General Levi's effort to develop "guidelines" for FBI domestic intelligence is that regular criminal investigations are not adequate to

**CODE** **TELETYPE** **NITEL**  
supply the information needed to anticipate or prevent the use  
of violence in violations of federal law. That assumption  
**1 - Mr. T.J. Jenkins 5/2/75**  
should ~~BEAC~~ ~~ALL CRIMES~~ ~~Regular criminal investigations are~~  
~~likely to produce a substantial amount of information which~~  
~~1 - Each Assistant Director~~  
~~can be used to anticipate or prevent future crimes.~~ For example,  
~~SENSTUDY 75 PERSONAL ATTENTION~~  
~~intensive criminal investigations of Ku Klux Klan violence in~~  
~~the South during the 1960's would have required the FBI to look~~  
~~into a wide variety of Klan activities. Another example is the~~  
~~search for Weatherman fugitives, a regular criminal investiga-~~  
~~tion which involves broad inquiries across the country. The~~  
~~CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK~~  
~~FBI has not yet demonstrated that the preventive information~~  
~~/INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.~~  
it has obtained came from intelligence investigations which  
**RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS**  
would not have been conducted as regular criminal investigations.  
**INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED**  
The fact that an FBI investigation was supervised by  
**THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.**  
its Intelligence Division does not necessarily mean that the  
**THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE**  
law enforcement jurisdiction of the Bureau. Any FBI investigation under  
**TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE**  
of federal law falls within that jurisdiction. Moreover,  
**DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND**  
**METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY**  
**attempts, or conspiracies to engage in such activities.** **REC-16** **4-93**

Adm. Dir.    
Dep. AD Adm.  

Dep. AD Inv.  

Asst. Dir.  

Admin.  

Comp. Syst.  

Elec. Affairs  

Files & Com.  

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Plan. & Eval.  

Spec. Inv.  

Training  

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Telephone Rm.  

Director Secy.  

One suggested difference between intelligence-type and  
**(1B) (1)(D) SEE NOTE PAGE TWO 1975**

regular criminal investigations is that the latter are

terminated after a reasonable time, if sufficient evidence to

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 02 1975

REC-16

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JUN 11 1975

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TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES

RE: SENSTUDY 75

~~justify~~ prosecution is not obtained. However, there is no legal reason why the prosecutor cannot request that the investigation continue indefinitely as long as there is information that violent activities and plans for violence are still underway. The degree of evidence needed to justify a prosecution is certainly greater than the degree of evidence needed to call. ~~BY INSTRUCTION TO CONCERN LEGAL COUNSEL, FWD, BY DIRECT CALL.~~ justify an investigation. ~~YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH~~

All this is not to say that no further standards are ~~OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER~~ needed to guide regular criminal investigations when they may ~~PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.~~

touch on sensitive First Amendment or other constitutional

~~THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES~~ interests. This is especially true of criminal investigations ~~OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD~~ of individuals or groups engaged both in lawful political, or

~~BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC~~ social activities and in unlawful violence or plans for violence.

NOTE: To what extent is the advocacy of violence a proper basis for initiating an investigation? Should an investigation

be initiated on the basis of allegations or other information

~~The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the~~

~~Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence for an organization which has stated one of its objectives~~

~~Antonino Scalia.~~

the use of violence? Should an investigation be started on all members and public supporters of an organization, some of whose members have acted in concert to use violence?

These questions are addressed in the draft Attorney General's guidelines for domestic intelligence investigations under the heading "preliminary investigations". (Tab I) Since

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

the guidelines assume that there should be intelligence investigations, they do not consider whether such investigations might be permitted as regular criminal investigations.

TO: ~~MR. W. R. WANNAMAKER~~  
FROM: ~~MR. W. O. O'REGAR~~  
SUBJECT: ~~SENSTUDY 75~~

Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director, Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The Klan and Weatherman examples again illustrate the point. Once it has been established that a particular Klan group is engaged in or planning violence, it would be reasonable to conduct at least preliminary inquiries to determine whether

~~Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the members and supporters of the group are involved in the Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.~~

violence or the plans for violence. Similarly, the search for

Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its Weathermen fugitives, (2) memorandum 4/10/75 concerning other acts (if letter 4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format. violence would appear reasonably to include preliminary instructions in attachments and arrived at the following understandings.

supporters have harbored the fugitives.

The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents, to the other hand, it would seem unreasonable to furnish to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed with regard to all members and supporters of Klan groups across communications to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format, the country on the ground that some Klan groups have used enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee." all members and supporters of SDS because the Weatherman faction engaged in violence. The scope of the investigation must be logically related to its specific purpose, and not an excuse for wide-ranging collection of intelligence. *62-776395-92*

62-116899 is one possible exception to the requirement that the FBI only conduct regular criminal investigations. The Attorney General (and the President) do require reports on (6)

REC-88

16 MAY 6 1975

*E! S!*  
*ENCLOSURE*

57

84 MAY 6 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

major civil disturbances which may not involve violations of

11 April 1975

federal law. The FBI should be authorized to gather such data and make appropriate reports as part of its law enforcement

responsibilities. However, the data and reports should be

Group on Congressional Reviews

limited to information provided by local or state law enforcement authorities or obtained in the course of a regular FBI

SUBJECT : Central Community Index

criminal investigation. Where local authorities provide information about individuals and organizations which are not the

1. The central indexing capability detailed in the subject of a regular FBI criminal investigation, the data and preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community Index is ready to receive material. The address of the Community Index is

name index.

Room 6E25

In periods of widespread civil disturbances, the  
CIA Headquarters  
Langley, Virginia 20505.

Attorney General may require a more systematic procedure for

2. The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is critical and you are requested to make this information available to the appropriate organizational components within your agencies.

was the case in 1967, when Attorney General Clark created the

Interdivisional Intelligence Unit in the Justice Department.

The IDIU stored and indexed civil disturbance reports separately from the FBI. The data was used to help anticipate or ameliorate disorders. John M. Clarke

Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

of evaluating reports on civil disturbances is still performed

Attachment by the Justice Department. This function should also be

authorized by statute, and the intent of Congress should be

that the Attorney General must obtain specific legislative

authorization for any future IDIU.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-14-01 BY SP-5200

ENCLOSURE

62-11-395-92

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20545

IDIU was not perfect. Under Attorney General John

Mitchell it supplied a list of names of American dissidents <sup>10 April 1975</sup> ~~to the CIA~~ <sup>DATA</sup> ~~INVESTIGATIONS~~ to the CIA. (Tab J) It also was used in conjunction with grand jury proceedings inquiring into terrorist bombings.

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

Both of these activities should be forbidden by the statute

SUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional authorizing the Justice Department to evaluate intelligence disturbance information.

Finally, legislation may be needed to make clear that

1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, the ~~ABBA~~ is not authorized to conduct investigations of organizations or individuals for the specific purpose of compiling progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are the ~~formally~~ being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this applies to FBI assistance to the Secret Service, under the present FBI-Secret Service agreement.

2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the of investigations. This registry will be an Administrative Index (ASEX) of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and subjects of current domestic intelligence investigations. The past history of the FBI's Security Index and other target lists

3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include: (Key Activists, Agitator Index, Key Black Extremists) suggests the need to enact legislation banning the compiling of lists each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, or convicted for specific crimes and the list is used in connection with the investigation of such crimes. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.

These proposals to limit the FBI to regular criminal investigations and civil disturbance reporting must be tested against the actual past experience of the Justice Department and the FBI.

General instructions from the Department to the Bureau may be overly vague, even within the framework of criminal investigation. Two examples are Attorney General

<sup>W. E. Colby</sup>  
Clark's memorandum on riots in 1967 and Assistant Attorney

<sup>Attachment:</sup>

<sup>As stated</sup>

General Yeagley's memorandum of campus disorders in 1969. (Tab

K) The Nation of Islam exchange between the Department and the FBI in 1973-74 is another illustration. (Tab L)

Thus, there is no automatic panacea in restricting the FBI to criminal investigations. The need for careful scrutiny of actual investigative policies and practices by Congress and the Attorney General is just as great as if the FBI were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations.

Legislation must focus on procedures for ensuring accountability by regular reports from the Attorney General to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The following are some of the basic elements which should go into a statute embodying this option. It would authorize the Attorney General to direct the FBI:

1. to investigate violations of federal criminal laws, provided that the scope and duration of the investigation are logically related to its specific purpose;

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO  
USIB AD HQC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

2. to take only such investigative measures as are sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized or accepted ~~material for the Senate (House) Select Committee investigating Intelligence Activities~~ investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law;

1. ~~3. TITLE/SUBJECT:~~ to seek legal advice from the Attorney General or his designee whenever a proposed action may be perceived, with reason, ~~nature of material~~ (Report, briefings, chart, etc.) to unfairly affect the rights of citizens, provided that this responsibility to seek legal advice is the duty of both the FBI as an institution and FBI agents as individuals;

6. ~~4. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:~~ (Brief narrative statement law describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or recommendations agencies regarding major civil disturbances, provided whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)

ed that such information is not entered into the FBI general

7. DATE OF REQUEST:

files and name index;

8. RELEASING AUTHORITY:

5. to disseminate information obtained from criminal

9. DATE OF SUBMISSION:  
investigations for the following purposes, under regulations

10. LOCATION OF FILE COPY:

promulgated by the Attorney General and published in the Federal

11. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify Register:

a. prosecution of violations of criminal laws;

b. prevention or anticipation of violations of  
criminal laws;

c. assistance to the Secret Service in the performance of its protective responsibilities; *more 16 SP2 A.M. 7/26*

d. determination of the suitability of individuals  
for employment by the federal government;

Ad Hoc Staff

75-358

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

6. to report civil disturbance information obtained  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

from state and local law enforcement agencies to the Attorney General for the purpose of determining the need to use federal military force under 10 U.S.C. 331 et seq.;

Mr. L. Frank Schwartz,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Room 4637  
J. Edgar Hoover Building  
Washington, D. C.  
to compile such lists of persons arrested or convicted for specific crimes as may be necessary for use in connection with the investigation of such crimes;

Dear Frank:

8. to provide to the Attorney General or his designee

Reference is your request for comments on the sample full access to any information in the possession of the FBI provided to the Senate Select Committee.

which he may deem necessary for the performance of his responsibilities.

As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as accessible as possible to appropriate Congressional committees on FBI activities; be provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract or summary of the document or documents and standards con-

sistent with this statute which the Attorney General may prepare an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the described, provided that such procedures and standards shall be

published in the Federal Register or, if publication would submit more "indexable."

stantially interfere with the conduct of investigations,

a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject reported to appropriate Congressional committees.

abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the title of the Senate Committee.

b. The date at the head of the page should be the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.

c. The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified the organization with authority to release the document.

file 62-116395

5

92

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-92

E. Option Four: Setting Standards for Domestic Intelligence

be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is being provided. The FBI should be authorized by statute to conduct domestic intelligence investigations only if Congress finds (1) that regular criminal investigations as described above

single sentence now used to describe all of them covers would not provide information to anticipate or prevent the use

of violence in violations of federal law, and (2) that the incidents of the use of violence in violations of federal law are

so numerous and so serious as to constitute a significant threat from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered

to the internal security or domestic tranquility of the United States, or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is the place to identify them. We are beginning to use

The fact that there are individuals and groups who obtain release clearance when we are dealing with

engaging in violence, advocate violence, or believe in the desirability of the ultimate use of violence to advance their

reason why they should be concerned about release of political or social objectives is not enough to justify FBI

domestic intelligence authority. There must be additional findings that regular criminal investigations are inadequate

5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all that is needed by the registry.

6. The mailing address of the registry is:

Community Index

ROOM 5E25

CIA Headquarters

Furthermore, if FBI domestic intelligence is authorized by statute, it should be an annual authorization which must be renewed each year upon reconsideration by Congress and the Attorney General of these factors. Past experience indicates

that the annual appropriations process does not provide an appropriate forum for considering the FBI's basic authority.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO  
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY

Attorney General Levi's draft guidelines provide a basis for the consideration of a domestic intelligence authorization.

**MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE**  
~~They do not cover the investigation of foreign-related~~

activities which may be directed by, subsidized by, or otherwise conducted in active collaboration with a foreign government,

2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: a foreign organization, or their agents. (See Option Two above.)

3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.) The guidelines deal with five different types of threats

4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: of violence which may constitute serious dangers to the country:

5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)

1. overthrow of the government (revolutionary violence);

6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement describing ~~any interference in the U.S. with the activities of a foreign government~~ recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Senate Committee, attempting to assassinate a visiting foreign leader);

8. ~~RELATIONSHIP WITH~~ interference with the functioning of the government or the flow of interstate commerce to influence federal policies (violent protest activities; terrorist bombings);

11. ~~DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS~~ (Klan violence, violent protest against busing);

5. incitement of violence which may require the use of federal military force (riots, major civil disturbances accompanying protest demonstrations).

The guidelines also refer to violence directed at state governments, either overthrow of a state government or interference with the functioning of a state government.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD Adv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

# Memorandum

Autorizing legislation should indicate whether domestic

TO ~~MR. W. R. WANNALLI~~ intelligence is necessary for any or all of these specific prob-  
~~MR. W. R. WANNALLI~~ DATE: April 21, 1975  
lems. For example, revolutionary violence in an attempt to  
FROM ~~MR. W. O' MREGAR~~ 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips  
overthrow the government may be a remote and speculative danger;  
SUBJECT ~~SENATE INQUIRIES~~ while terrorist bombings may be substantially interfering with

the functioning of the government. Klan violence was unquestionably a serious danger to civil rights in the early and mid-

On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President for Congressional Inquiries, 1960's, but is it so today? Major riots and civil disturbances furnished the following four documents with a request that he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available were to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence not in more recent (2) years. Violent interference with 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study on Subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director, J. Louis Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director normally be dealt with by state and local law enforcement. of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

intelligence can be simplified. The Attorney General's draft

On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief William O'Meara that the above four documents were intended for delivery to the Senate Select Committee. I

ACTION: For information and record purposes,

1. to ascertain facts or information which serves to anticipate and prevent the use of violence in violations of federal law intended to

a. interfere, in the United States, with the

activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives; and

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/9/01 BY SP2 ALM/HB

DEC 88  
16 MAY 6 1975

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

b. interfere with the functioning of the government

**The Attorney General** April 28, 1975  
of the United States or the free flow of interstate commerce in  
order to influence policies or decisions of the federal government  
Director, FBI Mr. H. R. Callahan

1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan.

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

This formulation concentrates on the most likely current serious danger to the country, namely, politically motivated terrorist violence. FBI Director Kelley's recent public statements have

Enclosed for your information is the original of a statement concerning the increasing nature of terrorist activity. Staff memorandum from the captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson. A copy of the memorandum is enclosed for your use in the event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

However, this increasing threat is not the only factor Enclosures - 2

to be considered. In the course of the FBI's regular criminal investigations of these bombings and other incidents of terrorist violence, can it obtain as a by-product substantial information which may serve to anticipate and prevent future violence?

1 - 67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson) If so, the need for broader intelligence-type investigations is less evident.

The draft guidelines provide that the FBI would conduct full-scale intelligence investigations on the basis of "specific and articulable facts justifying the conclusion"

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Flics & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mem. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laborato. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Re. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Therefore, any legislation should authorize the FBI:

56 MAY 06 1975

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

NW 55913 DocId:32999682 Page 34

2. to conduct full domestic intelligence investigations  
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams

on the basis of specific and articulable facts justifying the  
conclusion that an individual, or individuals acting in concert,  
~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~  
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

are engaged in activities which are likely to involve the use  
of violence as described in 1 above.

~~DATE 2-20-1975 BY SA DOWD~~

~~6026~~

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

1 - Mr. S. F.

~~STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)~~

The draft guidelines also discuss the surveillance techniques to be used in full domestic intelligence investigations.

~~RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI~~

including informants, ~~small~~ covers, (see ~~electronic~~ electronic surveillance).

~~STAFF MEMBER~~

The guidelines note that additional techniques may need to be covered, such as inquiries made under "pretext", photographic surveillance, "trash covers", etc. However, the legislation may deal with techniques more generally by providing that the FBI

~~SSC Interview of Retired FBI SA Lish Whitton~~

is authorized. On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitton personally appeared at the office of an FBI official, stated that he had taken only such investigative measures as were

Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the sanctioned by rule of law, procedure, or judicially recognized

or accepted investigative practices, and are not in violation of state or federal law.

On April 23, 1975, Mr. Lish Whitton arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters, to which Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he

Moved detailed registration of investigative techniques for full investigation will be considered elsewhere.

assigned at Headquarters December 10, 1941, attached to the

Federal Intelligence Division and served in that Division until his retirement.

The current date for that Division is

(Kosciusko Division). It is known that Whitton has been

the draft guidelines is broadened considerably under the pro-

know that Whitton had at one time mailed a package to

~~vision~~ Martin Luther King, Jr., in Miami, Florida, and that Whitton

to relate the details concerning this matter. Whitton thereupon

initiated on the basis of allegations or other information that

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

an individual, or individuals acting in concert, have advocated

activities which may involve violence, or are members of, or

(11) *NPF 3/8/75*

SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE

62-11639-90

*EXCLUSIVELY FOR FBI*

Acting Dir.

Dep. AD Adm.

Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir.

Adm.

Comp. Syst.

Ext. Affairs

Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection

Intell.

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval.

Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.

Telephone Rec.

Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 200-346

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY CIVIL RIGHTS  
INVESTIGATION OF SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ACTIVITIES (SICA)**  
have expressed public support for an organization which has  
as its objective activities which may involve violence. The  
**REVIEW OF RELATED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY**  
**SSC STAFF MEMBERS**  
purpose of the preliminary investigation is to verify or refute  
the allegations or information. However, the vagueness of the  
~~the subject and in the late summer of 1967, former FBI  
agent to the Director William C. Sullivan had telephoned  
standard is obvious. Therefore, to be consistent with the~~  
~~Whitton at his home one Saturday and told him that into~~  
~~FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wanted Sullivan to develop a package~~  
~~criteria for full investigations, the FBI should be authorized:~~  
~~to Miami, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Miami~~  
~~airport to conduct preliminary domestic intelligence inves-~~  
~~Whitton did as directed and upon calling Sullivan, was~~  
~~investigations on the basis of allegations or other information that~~  
~~accordingly, Whitton had the package weighed, put postage~~  
~~an individual, or individuals acting in concert,~~  
~~stamp on it, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not~~  
~~Mrs. Martin Luther King or Captain bad indicated). The~~  
~~a. advocate the use of violence as described in 1~~  
~~following day, Sunday, Whitton flew back to Washington and~~  
~~above the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his~~  
~~instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to~~  
~~Whitton "b. you're engaged in activities which are likely to~~  
~~involve the use of violence as described in 1 above;~~  
~~c. are members of or have expressed public support~~  
~~to mail the package and Whitton said that he had probably done~~  
~~so utilizing per diem money. Epstein asked whether he had~~  
~~further organizations engaged in activities which involve, or are~~  
~~the negative. Epstein asked if Whitton had gone to the Miami~~  
~~likely to involve the use of violence as described in 1 above,~~  
~~and whether Whitton had discussed this matter with anyone.~~  
~~provided that other members of the organization are currently~~  
~~that no agent had met him, and that he had discussed the matter~~  
~~the subject of a full domestic intelligence investigation or a~~  
~~only with Sullivan. At this point, Epstein asked Whitton to~~  
~~rebut the charge. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply~~  
~~to the question.~~  
Unless these changes are made in the guidelines, they would per-  
mit investigations similar to past investigations which have in  
~~A memorandum regarding this matter, to which Whitton replied in~~  
~~the negative. Epstein asked if Whitton had ever seen a memorandum~~  
~~been seriously criticized. For instance, they would allow in-~~  
~~on this matter and Whitton again replied in the negative.~~  
vestigations of all SDS members or all Black Student Union lead-  
ers on the ground that their activities may involve violence,

even though there is no specific allegation of likely involvement with respect to MEMPHIS CRIMINALS (MCC) in violence.

**16. INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY**

~~Another reason for the revision is to exclude those~~

investigations which would be justified as regular criminal investigations. ~~On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FBI official responsible above on the occasion to report additional information which Epstein had received from Whitson by telephone on an individual or individual basis, in concert, have engaged in or plan to engage in activities which involve the use of violence, that is, how it was paid for. Whitson told him he had issued a Government transportation coupon (GTC). Epstein asked whether there was any prior written authorization for Whitson to make the trip and Whitson told him there was none. Epstein furthered at the preliminary stage to cover advocacy of violence trip and Whitson explained that the only record he knew of would be the original voucher he supported covering the expenses involved and possibly the copy of the GTC which he had issued. Whitson in or likely to be involved in violence. Full investigations aspinced to Epstein that the voucher could hardly be that the GTC had been issued for a round-trip to and from Miami and how much per diem had been claimed in connection with the plans for violence. Epstein inquired as to whether Whitson had registered at the Airport Hotel in Miami, and, if so, whether it was under his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under his name at this hotel.~~

Additional Information Furnished to FBI By Whitson

In addition to the foregoing, Whitson furnished to the FBI official the following information on April 23, 1975, which information he did not furnish to Epstein.

~~Ron Sullivan told Whitson he wanted him to fly the package to Miami, he stated that only he, Sullivan, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Tolson, (then FBI Associate Director) and Mr. Belmont (then FBI Assistant to the Director) knew of this situation. (At the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.) Sullivan never did complain to Whitson anything more regarding thi. incident.~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

U.S. GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL  
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SOC)

TO : RE: Mr. J. B. Adams DATED: 12/6/76  
SCC STAFF MEMBER

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: ~~Senate Select Committee; Attorney General's Testimony~~  
~~including a copy of the package was unknown to Whitton but who~~  
~~added that the "Whitton," turned over to him a package~~  
~~DECEMBER 10, 1975~~  
Whitton said that when he arrived at the North  
Terminal of National Airport following Sullivan's telephonic  
instruction, a young man was unknown to Whitton but who  
which was wrapped in brown paper and sealed with sealing tape.  
It is Whitton's recollection the package measured approximately  
eight inches by eight inches by one inch.

At 3:01 p.m. on December 5, 1975, Mark Wolf of the Attorney  
General's staff, called me at the instructions of the Attorney General  
and advised that the Attorney General requested:  
to receive the ~~total files~~ or probably had already gone  
abroad. It is Whitton's recollection that shortly  
after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to Whitton  
that the package had not yet been received by King. Because of  
the report, Whitton is of the belief that the package was  
mailed to King at the ~~headquarters of the Southern Club~~  
~~Leadership Conference and not to King's residence. Further,~~  
Wolf said that the Attorney General is currently enroute  
had mailed the package to King's residence. Therefore,  
Mr. Hoover in the letter, the requested materials should be delivered to the Attorney General  
no later than Monday morning, December 8, 1975.

Whitton observed that in his opinion, the information  
~~which was the source of Epstein prior to interviewing~~  
~~RECOMMENDATION:~~

Whitton must have originated with Sullivan. Whitton noted that  
Mr. Hoover or Mr. Tolson, ~~the Intelligence Division~~ prepared an appropriate  
response to the Attorney General's instructions in time for delivery by  
9:00 a.m. on December 6, 1975. One other factor that  
causes Whitton to feel that Sullivan was the source of the  
information was a question Epstein raised as to whether Whitton  
had put ~~Mr. Tolson~~ address on the package when he addressed it to  
King. - Mr. Tolson ~~replies~~ he recalls that when he was in Miami and  
received ~~Mr. Tolson~~ telephone instructions, ~~regarding~~ Sullivan's address  
told ~~Mr. Tolson~~ should put a return address on ~~the package~~  
and ~~Mr. Tolson~~ pointed out to Sullivan that if he did so,  
and the name of the addressee ~~was~~ required, the package  
would ~~be~~ ~~marked~~ ~~as someone's mail~~ ~~other than in the~~

(6)

Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AB Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mem. \_\_\_\_\_  
Magazine \_\_\_\_\_  
Insel. \_\_\_\_\_  
Liber. \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Ctr. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Trunking \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Disaster Rec'd. \_\_\_\_\_

LEAD SOURCE



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT  
OPERATIONS WITH FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (SFC)

W.H.

RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
STORY NUMBER  
File No. (SC) 62-7721

May 13, 1966

dead letter office. Sullivan concurred that no return address should be used. ~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL~~, Sullivan would probably have reason to have commented ~~regarding the use or nonuse of a return address.~~

RE: NATIONALIST PARTY OF PUERTO RICO  
INTERNAL SECURITY - PUERTO RICAN NATIONALIST

On April 24, 1975, Whitton furnished by telephone to the ~~Attorney General~~ ~~presently maintains an authorized technical surveillance at the residence of Rosa Collazo and her daughter, Lydia Collazo-Turner, 1755 Anthony Avenue, Bronx, New York. This surveillance was originally installed on April 13, 1962, King was "away" at the time.~~

Rosa Collazo is the wife of Oscar Collazo who is serving a life sentence in connection with the killing of a White House guard during an attempt to assassinate former President Truman on November 1, 1950. Both Rosa and her daughter are active in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in New York City. During the past six months, this surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding activities of Puerto Rican independence advocates in New York. Through this surveillance, we have obtained information concerning the movement of Puerto Rican nationalists between New York and Puerto Rico. Included in this information was advance notice that Rosa Collazo planned to attend the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico during February, 1968, in Puerto Rico. Upon her return, details were obtained concerning the proceedings of the General Assembly. In addition, we were able to obtain advance notices of demonstrations in New York City in which nationalists participated. This enabled us to inform police authorities and interested Government agencies in advance of the demonstrations. Information herein taken from two memoranda of

NOTE: Original and one copy to the House Committee on Un-American Activities in this connection. Assigned Intelligence Division. Voucher and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer Systems Division.

Very truly yours,


J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

SECRET

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
APR 26 1975	
FBI - NEW YORK	

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 18, 1975

June 3, 1965

1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

UNITED STATES SENATE  
Re: DOMINICAN SITUATION  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - INTERNAL SECURITY -  
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 18, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically regarding policies and procedures military advisors to the deposed Dominican President Juan Bosch in the latter's efforts to regain control of the Dominican Government. Diego Bordas is a wealthy shipping executive currently residing in exile in San Juan, Puerto Rico, having been born in the Dominican Republic on January 11, 1923. He served in various high posts under Juan Bosch during the latter's short occupancy of the position of President of the Dominican Republic in early 1963. Bordas spends much of his time at 888 Ashford Avenue in San Juan, using an apartment at that address as his residence during the absence of its owner, Jose Antonio Benitez Jimenez, from Puerto Rico. Jose Benitez is the cousin of Jaime Benitez, the latter the Director of the University of Puerto Rico and a close associate and advisor of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas also maintains a residence at 21 V, Floresia, Pueblo Viejo, a suburb of San Juan, near the current residence and headquarters of Juan Bosch. Diego Bordas and his brother jointly operate a shipping business known as Bordas and Company at Highway Number 2, Puerto Viejo, Puerto Rico, and his financial dealings in support of the Bosch efforts can reasonably be expected to be conducted from this commercial establishment.

16 MAY 2 1975

NOTE: The Bordas brothers have both been the subjects of numerous allegations indicating their cooperation with procommunist and pro-fidelist factions of Dominican politics and are apparently opportunists who have seized the current situation to enhance their political and financial futures. Luis Bordas is currently in the Dominican Republic acting as the Director of Military Operations of the rebel forces supporting Bosch.

Asst. Dir.  
Dept AD Adm.  
Dept AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.  
Mktg.  
Comp. Syst.  
Ext. Affairs.  
Files & Com.  
Gen. Inv.  
Memt.

109-12-21 Cor 4B

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL ATTACHED  
Laboratory  
Plan. & Eval.  
Spec. Inv.  
Training  
Legal Coun.  
Telephone Inv.  
Dir. Sec'y Inv.

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

REC 4

MAIL ROOM 11 TELETYPewriter  
Date dictated: 109-12-21  
Date received: 109-12-21  
Transcriber: 109-12-21  
Dictator: 109-12-21  
Page 40

4 JUN 15 1965

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. R. H. Horner  
 1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SPLK Act 5 (1) (c)

April 18, 1975

[redacted] clearance for technical coverage of the business he operates jointly with [redacted] was obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 1, 1965.  
**WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

In view of the pressing nature of the international situation as it relates to the Dominican Republic, it is requested that you authorize technical coverage of the residences of [redacted] mentioned above and of the business address of the joint venture operated by the [redacted]. Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which to which the mentioned residences or business may move in the future.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Respectfully,  
 This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request to the United States Department of Justice, Edgar F. Hoover, Communication Director.

APPROVED RLWDATE The Attorney GeneralTEB:vb  
(8) JL

#moe16  
 INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 D-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/tfg

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
 File & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
 Intel. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
 Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Training \_\_\_\_\_  
 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT 

SECRET

GPO 954-546

*See pg*  
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/3/00 BY SPRAED

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 2 in that letter.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a copy of the document in response to Item 2 which is being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2) REC-51

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination JAN 22 1976

PENNSA 04

(9)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1214

NOTE:

A copy of the SSC letter 12/4/75, is attached to the file copy of enclosed letterhead memorandum. Exact copy of the memorandum being furnished is maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY 75 Project. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the document being provided to the SSC. As indicated in the enclosed memorandum, Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC Letter are being handled separately. Items 1 and 3 requested in referenced SSC letter are being handled by the IS-3 and CI-3 Sections respectively. Item 4, a restatement of prior request submitted by the SSC is being handled separately by SA V. E. Thornton of the IS-1 Section.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AS Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AS Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Secy. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Compt. Sect. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-1214  
NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 42

ENCLOSURE

SECRET//EXTERNA//REL TO USA  
62-116395-1214

GPO : 1975 O - 091-702

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
62-116395

FROM The Attorney General

Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregor 1954  
1 - Mr. P. E. Nugent

December 19, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/00 BY SPANKY

Declassify 4/16/24  
108/114

SUBJECT MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE  
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 4, 1975, containing requests for materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., California, U.S. 120, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of microphones installed in connection with FBI vs. rel William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, at the White House, Washington, D. C., dated October 27, 1964.

It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone surveillance It is noted that in addition to requesting a copy of of this letter the SSC requested materials reflecting this letter such as hand-delivered to the White House by Mr. DeLoach on the October 28, 1964, alliance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of evidence for prosecution. It is noted that the upper right-hand corner of commttee Hoover's letter to Mr. Moyers and to the notation appearing thereon reading "personally delivered 10/28/64, Dfts No additional materials are available in FBIHQ files reflecting delivery of this letter beyond the aforementioned notation which, it appears, bears the initial of Mr. DeLoach. The reported practice approval use of microphone surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.

Items 1, 3 and 4 requested in the referenced SSC letter are being handled in separate responses.

I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That case is The Attorney General on its facts. The language of the Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investigations.

It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as a lack of discretion of installing a microphone in response to your request and is not for dissemination of such messages over television. Its use is limited to official presentation of major events or demonstration in open court. It is not to unauthorized persons. The FBI & Com. Courts Committee and the committee may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons. The expressed approval of the FBI the need for discretion and restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all cases, including internal security.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AS  
instalation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some personally intimate location should be avoided whenever possible. If this must appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion that under such circumstances the use of a microphone is not prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

- 2 -

December 8, 1975

Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones, suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow

~~TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director~~ It is realized that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection with the installation of a microphone.

~~From: Michael E. Shsseen, JR.~~ The question of whether a trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the practical necessities

~~SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request~~ of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected. It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore,

~~I invite your attention to paragraph numbered 4, which amends an earlier request of the Committee (Elliff letter of November 25, 1975, Item 6c) which request was the subject of a telephone conversation on December 3, 1975, with Mr. Seymour Phillips of the Bureau.~~

cc: Paul Daly

*1/18*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/31/00 BY SPGR/MS

1/18  
12/10/75

62-716395-1214X

**U.S. GOVERNMENT**

**United States Senate**

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Deg. AD Ndn. \_\_\_\_\_  
Deg. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO MR. WALSH

FROM : L. C. GROOVER

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

~~Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination~~

Coordination  
Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike,

~~Dear Sirs:~~ Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security intelligence ~~and~~ ~~and~~ ~~intelligence~~ ~~and~~ ~~intelligence~~ matters, operations or activities, together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations ~~Delivery of all materials pertaining~~

~~The purpose, timing, methods, and duration and termination of the electronic surveillance referred to in the response, attached herewith, to the above request.~~

the Committee on Decentralization, mentions internal security, intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has been constrained by the traditional two categories of internal security and counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the data for both of the other categories as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

~~RECOMMENDATION:~~ was hand delivered by Mr. Carbone Beboach on October 28, 1964. REC-100 134

3. Delivery of all materials with pertaining to the surveillance of Mrs. Anna Chapman to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal and November Board which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

The Committee's request in my letter of November 27, 1975, item 6c should be revised to read as follows: "All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum, including a summary of the recommendations of relevant Bureau personnel pertaining thereto." **SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE TWO**

**SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION ADDENDUM PAGE THREE**

sincerely,

ENDS  
21 1975

Page 1 of 22 2019-2020 Year Book 43

Use the following table to calculate the number of days between two dates.

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh  
Re: Senate Select Committee on  
Intelligence Activities

WOC

ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75

The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends that the ~~Attala~~ Counsel ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~ the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability in ~~12/19/75~~ this attachment in an effort to ~~D.S. the SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~ request identified as III C.

Caption of Document:

JWR/HHW 12/4/75 request - Martin L. King.

Originating Office: (FBI) FBI

Delivered by: DD Conf

Date: 12/3/75

Received by: Carla H. J.

Title: Research Analyst

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/3/00 BY SP/AM/MS

- 2 -

JVER

62-116-1214X

ENCLOSURE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: ~~Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committee~~ *dy 4-14-75*

1. FOR WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was not available for review but set traced, check relevant) **REGARDING THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION**  
 DOCUMENT  INFORMATION  RECORDS  OTHER **concerning the making available the amount of manpower** *12/19/75* **to**  
 counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:
2. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

*To [redacted] Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.*

3. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewer, classifier and subject)

*(2) Before making any determination as to whether we make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.*

**SSC letter 12/4/75, item 2**

- (3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for information handling. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.*

4. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

*Materials relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.: Copy of a letter from Mr. Hoover to The Honorable William D. Moyers 10/27/64 along with notation that shows letter was hand delivered by Mr. DeLoach 10/28/64.*

*See memo. Cigar to [redacted] dated 11-11-65  
woc + ekw*

*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/21/02 BY SP/ALM/MS*

*62-116295*

*FBI:smk*

*(4)*

*ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75*

*- 3 -*

**TREAT AS YELLOW**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~100-10654  
OK  
4-NOV-76  
CLASSIFIED BY SIEBOLD  
1-18-01INSTRUCTIONSTHE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO  
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract and offices, it has been determined that matters relating to
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SAC is later sent to BSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the changes indicated. Special Agent

In Charge

In Charge

Supervisors

Special Agents

Total  
Equivalent Full-  
Year Agent  
Employees

EXCLUSIVELY

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.2%	12.6%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

Classified by \_\_\_\_\_  
Exempt from CDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams **SSC LETTER 12-4-75 DATE: 4-14-75**

FROM : Legal Counsel *Jack Fuller*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ITEM 2

Adjoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sign. *SP-2 ALM/216*

*4-14-75*  
*ALM/216*

On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure was excellent.

On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller, extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.

## RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/31/00 BY SP-2 ALM/216

*SP-2 ALM/216*  
*62-116395-87*

APR 23 1975

*R. Letourneau*

*62-116395-12 141X*

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO: MR. W. R. WANNAMAKER

DECLASSIFIED BY SP204 MIL  
ON 10/13/2000

FROM: MR. W. R. CREGAR

SUBJECT: Honorable William D. Moyers  
Special Assistant to the President

The White House  
Washington, D. C.

9/4/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence"

Dear Mr. Moyers:

Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh re: Mr. Blodden  
forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review

the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to

internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-

intelligence matters, operations of activists. This was in response

to requirement in Senator Church's letter dated 6/19/75.

Wigington was described as a member of the Democratic

Party Correlation Committee, Austin, Texas. Blackwell

as an assistant to Martin Luther King, Jr., at the Southern

Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Georgia. In response to

provide these type figures to the SSC.

Wigington indicated to Blackwell a desire for

King to write "an anti-Goldwater letter" which Wigington's

Committee intends to distribute in Texas among labor groups

Blackwell stated that King may go to Texas prior to the

forthcoming presidential election and Blackwell inquired

as to whether King would be in any danger. Wigington

stated that he would contact one Harry Goodman concerning

any possible danger to King in Texas. This Bureau's source

had no information concerning the identity of Goodman.

intelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to

identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned

overseas. Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff

Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names

and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA

should inform the Director of the SSC that CIA is willing to furnish

overseas officials in the Department of Justice

information as it is being furnished to

officials in the Department of Justice.

RE: APP DA 578

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SPP:kml 1801 BY JAD

(13)

200-106670 (King)

1-100-442529 (CIA)

100-106670 (King)

1-100-442529 (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75  
Honorable William D. Moyers

AC NOTE:

Classified "Secret" as information reported is  
from AT 1380-S\*, a highly sensitive source with respect  
to the racial situation. This source is of continuing  
value and the unauthorized disclosure of this information  
could compromise its effectiveness and thus be detrimental  
to the national defense. Information obtained from Atlanta  
teletype 10/29/64 will be shown to Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to  
demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.

wizw/tac

Addendum

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

1 - Mr. Bassett - Encls.  
1 - Mr. Cleveland - Encls.  
1 - Mr. Gallagher - Encls.  
1 - Mr. McDermott - Encls.

*S/*  
**ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COUNSEL DIVISION**

1 - Mr. Mintz - Encls.  
1 - Mr. Walsh - Encls.  
1 - Mr. Wannall - Encls.  
1 - Mr. Motis - Encls.

*Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence*  
*Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SCA.*

**TESTIMONY BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 7/20/02 BY SPAC/MS

*Det. memo D-56  
with undivided  
Halt*  
On November 21, 1975 Inspector John B. Motis of this Bureau met with Doug Marvin, Counselor to the Attorney General; Mark Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General; and Michael S. Shaeen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, concerning your forthcoming appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. At this meeting this Bureau was requested to provide write-ups on certain phases of this Bureau's operations which are to be used in the preparation of a briefing book for your testimony.

Attached are the following individual write-ups as requested on November 21, 1975: "Investigative Techniques"; "Organizational Structure and Functions of the FBI"; "Allegation of Misconduct Involving Special Agent in Charge, Miami Office"; "Director Hoover's 'Official and Confidential' (OC) Files"; "Allegations of Possible Misconduct by FBI Agents, Houston, Texas"; "Allegations of Personal and Official Misconduct of a Former Special Agent in Charge of the Baltimore Office"; "Allegation of Bribery by FBI Agent, New York"; "Allegation of Possible Misconduct by an FBI Agent, Detroit, Michigan"; "Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents, Richmond, Virginia, Field Office, in Connection with the Investigation of Illegal Wiretapping by the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department"; "Allegations of Violations of Gun Control Act by FBI Agent"; "Review of Appropriations Testimony for Fiscal Years 1973 thru 1976"; "Tenure of FBI Director"; "Transfer of Drug Enforcement Responsibilities to the FBI"; "Office of Special Review, Department of Justice"; and "Major Topics of Primary Concern to Congressional Committees."

*717-77 RIC 62-116395-1212*  
With respect to the material requested by memorandum of Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,

10 DEC 29 1976

SEE NOTE - PAGE 2

62-116895-5-406

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mem. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspections \_\_\_\_\_  
Intel. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
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DocId:32989628 Page 32

000-000-0-00-00

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

The Attorney General

Mr. W. R. Wannall  
to Inspector John S. Notis of this office dated November 26,  
1975, which requested additional information, we are gathering  
the necessary material on an expeditious basis and the results  
will be furnished as soon as possible.

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75  
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS  
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
APRIL 11, 1975  
Enclosures (15)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Asst. Attn. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Attn. \_\_\_\_\_  
Attn. \_\_\_\_\_  
Camp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Int. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

*\* morib*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/HB

On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and ~~members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD.~~ Briefed by the Deputy Attorney General from the Committee Room, Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., ~~Enclosures (15)~~ Mr. Frederick A. Schwartzenbach, Special Counsel; and Messrs. Mark Wolfstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members.

The first hour of the briefing was occupied with the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the ~~NOTE: See Legal Counsel Memorandum to Mr. Schaefer dated 4/24/75 concerning "Testimony By The Attorney General Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities."~~ On 12-1-75 Mark Wolf, ~~Special Assistant to the Attorney General,~~ requested the attached information be furnished as soon as possible in writing, ~~than 12-2-75. This response was coordinated and incorporates material prepared by the Inspection, Special Investigative, General Investigative, Files and Communications and Intelligence Divisions. Due to the time constraints we are furnishing interim responses as completed. Additional agents, material will be furnished to the Department programs designed to assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the additional investigative effort necessary to counter the mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investigation of more and more American citizens, Mr. Wannall conceded~~

62-116395

REC-106

62-116395  
6 APR 29 1975

EWL:jvl  
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
Briefing for Staff Members  
by Intelligence Division  
April 11, 1975

The Attorney General

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. G. Gregar  
January 14, 1976

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

*POL*  
*62-16395-1010X*  
that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investigating policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional rights and right of privacy of such individuals.

*RECORDED*  
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)  
of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the predication, duration and administrative controls of investigations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again, Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy, and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out in effect that these investigations are founded on statutory authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept these answers and no critical or negative attitudes on the part were evident. Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is an original of a memorandum in response to Item 4 in the December 4, 1975, request and Items 7c and 8c of the November 25, 1975, request.

The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing and indicated it had been most instructive. They indicated a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

*PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANT* of all questions posed was the final question by Mr. Schwarz, in which he inquired as to what advantages and disadvantages the FBI could be anticipated as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of

*NOTE:* *VTR:adm* *Intelligence Coordination* *Enclosure*  
the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the investigative resources of the intelligence effectiveness of the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as documents being provided to the SSC. Copies of material being furnished to SSC being retained with Senstudy 75 Project.

*None. For information.*

Asst. Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.

Admin.  
Comp. Syst.  
Env. Affairs  
Files & Com.  
Gen. Inv.  
Mem.  
Inspection  
Email.  
Laboratory  
Plan. & Eval.  
Spec. Inv.  
Testing

*EX-1*  
*ENCLOSURE*

*124-16395-1010X*

*WPA/HB/MLM*

- 2 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

*Memorandum*

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

62-116395

FROM : W. R. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/14/96 BY ERICKSON

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

## FORMER SUPERVISOR TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO ASSIGN STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

1 - (1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar

1 - Mr. V. R. Thornton

Assoc. Dir.   
 Dep. AD   
 Dep. AD   
 Asst. Dir.   
 Admin.   
 Comp. Syst.   
 Ext. Affairs   
 Files & Com.   
 Gen. Inv.   
 Ident.   
 Inspection   
 Info.   
 Laboratory Ma.   
 Plan. & Eval.   
 Spec. Inv.   
 Training   
 Legal Coun.   
 Telephone Rm.   
 Director Sec'y

January 14, 1976

At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear for an interview Reference is made to, SSG letter dated December 4, 1975, Select Committee of which requests materials concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.; and SSG letter dated November 25, 1975, Items 7c and 8c of which request materials concerning the Washington Spring Project and Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, employ respectively been requested to appear for an interview by any member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that he was proceeding with the preparation of his testimony propounding the SSG of materials in response to referenced requests. The purpose of this memorandum is to effect delivery answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be classified at the time of the interview. In respect to Item 4 of the December 4, 1975, request, news that only indication of any action taken concerning the recommendation contained in the pertinent memorandum dated March 29, 1968, captioned, "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Martin Luther King)" is the true staff pencil notation "Handled 4/3/68," appearing on page one and to initials which are believed to be those of former Special Agent sensitive Harold P. Leinbaugh. Among the documents being furnished basis the SSG is a memorandum dated July 18, 1975, captioned, installing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., along with supporting documents, on the committee's agenda for the Attorney General concerning black instigation leading September 1968 to the proposed action recommended by the members. March 29, 1968, memorandum. It includes results of an interview of Leinbaugh in view of this, it was his intention to be responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he could be but if in response to Item 7c, the only indication of any revelation as to what he then suggested (recommendation) contained in the memorandum dated March 26 to 1968, Epsteined, advise him "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, is availing Intelligence by Washington Spring Project" is the pencilled notation "Handled 4/4/68," appearing on page two of that memorandum and initials which are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

Assoc. Dir.   
 Dep. AD   
 Dep. AD   
 Asst. Dir.   
 Admin.   
 Comp. Syst.   
 Ext. Affairs   
 Files & Com.   
 Gen. Inv.   
 Ident.   
 Inspection   
 Info.   
 Laboratory Ma.   
 Plan. & Eval.   
 Spec. Inv.   
 Training   
 Legal Coun.   
 Telephone Rm.   
 Director Sec'y

WW:JW  
WRW:JW  
(5)

Mr. Adams' document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is to be treated as official correspondence by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons until without the express approval of the FBI.

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

SA 144-291975

1/14/96

Page 5

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT EXCLOSURE 

Page 53

NW 500-13 Docid: 32959802

Memorandum to Mr. Adams

Re: SENSTUDY 75  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)  
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON  
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

prior approval. Whitson stated that if the writer had no objection, he would telephone again after his interview with Epstein as to the event and matters came up which he felt would be of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had no objection. Whitson would appreciate any observations which he could add to his notes. On 3/28/68, there is a penciled notation appearing on page one, "Signed 3/28/68," and initials which again are believed to be those of former SA Leinbaugh.

ACTION: The Attorney General

For information and record purposes.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AMENDMENT  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/PLG

By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained to the legal authority for investigations.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum and two memoranda concerning subject of legal authority for investigations.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided for your records.

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Caption of Document:

Enclosures - 10

12/4/75 request Item 4

AFW:vb (6)

11/25/75 request Items 7c and 8C's

NOTE:

Originating Office:

FBI

Delivered by:

D. J. Carl

100

CC Box

62-116395-83

Received by: [Signature]

Title: [Signature]  
an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75, letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself, appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72 study, would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, these two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee, are being furnished.

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mem. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

Director Ser. No. 12-20000  
Date 12-06-75 Page 57

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT  ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1010X

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central IndexFROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committee

1. NEW PROVIDED (check appropriate box. If a document was made available  
for review but not transmitted, no note.)

X DOCUMENT SIGHTING INTERVIEW TESTIMONY OTHER

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. G. Cregar

1/14/76

April 22, 1975

2. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate box. Add names if no box checked)

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

X	SSC
	HSC

**RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES**3. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,  
interviewee, testifier and subject)Memorandum and enclosures Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the  
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting  
certain documents and other information from the FBI.

4. IN RESPONSE TO FIRST DATE AND ITEM NUMBER IF IN RESPONSE TO FORMAL REQUEST, OTHERWISE STATE VERBAL REQUEST, CHECKED INDIVIDUALLY, INFORMATION ATTACHED

Attached are the following documents responsive to Party  
The Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities": Codeword  
SSG letter 12/4/75, Item 4 and SSC letter 1/23/75,  
Items 7c and 8a5. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
D, E, S, T, or  
Codeword)1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned  
"FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence Information."6. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are  
used underline for emphasis)2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned  
Operating Procedures  
Intelligence Matters,"  
Information Handling

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI

7. SUMMARY OF REQUEST FROM DIRECTOR LOUIS PATRICK GRAY III, dated May 19, 1972.  
Delivery of materials regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., and  
the Washington Spring Project and the Sanitation Workers Strike,  
Memphis, Tennessee, respectively, intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

1 - The Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP/AM/JP62-116395  
(6)AJD:lhb (4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE STUDY 75.ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/11/01 BY SP/AM/JP**TREAT AS YELLOW**

3781-14-761

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

FBI - WASH D.C. - 1/16/76 - 1210X

NW 55013 DocId:32989628 Page 12 TYPE UNIT



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~INSTRUCTIONS~~

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

146-100-19

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.  
**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS**
- "FROM" entry ~~should clearly identify the organization providing the information.~~

**RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES**

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the

~~Senate Select Committee on Intelligence~~ **RE: Legal Authorities** ~~concerning a brief narrative statement describing substance of interview and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.~~

2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned "FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."

3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.

4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.

Enclosures - 4

# 100-16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-8 ATT/MS

62-16515-83

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Dalbey

DATE: 5/16/72

FROM : J. A. Mintz *JAM*SUBJECT: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL  
INTELLIGENCE IN ~~SSCR REQUEST~~ 12-4-75ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2/AS/MS

ITEM 4

You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory jurisdiction in criminal matters.

"The gathering of criminal intelligence information" describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement. There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yet, by the very nature of their associations, little actual participation in criminal acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer. Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior has been detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal intelligence."

For years, the FBI ~~has been faced~~ of the need to identify these resources of the criminal ~~area~~ ~~area~~ Congress responded to this need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes are subverted. The problem was declared to be of national concern both as to our economy and the domestic security.

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

\*UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey  
RE: DISPOSITION; CRIMINAL  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

To: \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Daly \_\_\_\_\_  
Dobson \_\_\_\_\_  
Dugger \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Casing \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 28, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore *Moore* The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making  
criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting  
racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the  
use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE Long-established suspicion of the FBI's treatment of officers  
(MARTIN LUTHER KING) the Congressional findings but statutory enactments

did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains  
PURPOSE: task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national

menace and developing probable evidence of Martin Luther King's "hypocrisy" collection is one means by which this responsibility may

be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity  
BACKGROUND: of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis. *King* found an anonymous note on the east of his car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a

Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only  
RECOMMENDATION: established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a Hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis. *King* (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ) and Enclosure

TJD:ted More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of (7) speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. *King* (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)) relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligence is that, when in direct conflict, the collection effort must yield. Such is the case.

This memorandum is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

PHOTO BY D. J. D. 280

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey  
RE: FBI JURISDICTION; CRIMINAL  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

March 29, 1968

not to label criminal ~~as I say, NOT AS I DO~~ merely the product of malpractice, but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being safeguarded.

~~Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared, susceptible of being characterized as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an~~

~~The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white be patronized, was the place to "cool it". There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers. or openly attends organizational meetings where his presence inhibits communication and the transaction of the business of the assembly (Long v. 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948) ). However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971) ) and secret monitoring of criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) ) and informants (Gandy v. United States, 385 U.S. 295 (1966) ) have met with judicial approval.~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP/SAW/DP~~

Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by unreasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having the requisite standing.

Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970). New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection effort to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with the First Amendment.

100-441606 - 93  
3  
ENCLOSURE

Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey  
RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL  
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

- REC-87  
1 - J. B. Adams  
1 - W. R. Wannall  
1 - D. Ryan  
1 - J. G. Deegan

W 100-16670-3765 July 18, 1975  
However, the court order to destroy the Intelligence files excepted instances "where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, ~~Attacks on~~ <sup>Information may be</sup> ~~Harmless~~ <sup>DATE 10/3/68 BY SP4</sup> ~~intelligence~~ information where political or social factors are involved.

The following information is submitted regarding the background leading up to the proposed action recommended in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence, (Martin Luther King)." (copy attached) that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to

protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly constituted the harborage of violence. This memorandum recommended that information be furnished to a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showing King as a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on March 28, 1968, he disappeared into the police van. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in a white owned and operated Holiday Inn Hotel (also known as the Riverton Motel).

A notation on the above referred to memorandum indicated that the recommendation was "handled" on April 3, 1968, by Mr. Harold P. Leinenagh of the Crime Records Division (see notation on memorandum dated March 29, 1968, attached). Efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity con-

with Committee on Civil Rights. By way of background it should be noted that at about 6 p.m. on April 4, 1968, while standing on second floor balcony outside room 306 of the Hotel Lorraine, Memphis, Tennessee, King was shot and killed.

Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, reflects that King and other Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) officials were due to arrive in Memphis at 10:15 a.m. on April 3, 1968, via Eastern Airlines from Atlanta. (copy of Memphis teletype dated April 2, 1968, attached)

After King's death, an interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy, a close associate of King, reflected that he and King registered into the Hotel Lorraine in Memphis.

SEE NOTE PAGE 3

(ENCLOSURE)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.  
Mr. Dalboe

DATE: 5/18/72

FROM : Tennessee, at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968. (Information contained in report of SA Joe C. Hester dated April 17, 1968, Memphis, captioned "UNSUB, aka, Eric Starvo Galt, et al., Civil Rights", page 45. See attached FD-302 reflecting interview with Reverend Ralph David Abernathy).

DATE 5/18/72

For further background regarding the basis of this proposal Atlanta teletype dated March 28, 1968, captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr. Investigation" with second caption "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that on March 28, 1968, King and other SCLC people were in room 301, Holiday Inn, Memphis, Tennessee, at 4:30 p.m. (copy of Atlanta teletype attached)

It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one of the more important areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing, a Memphis teletype dated March 29, 1968, captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters" reflects that King participated in the march of sanitation workers on March 28, 1968. When violence erupted including the breaking of windows and looting by the marchers, King and a few associates ran to a nearby car and left the march proceeding to Rivermont Motel where they remained through the afternoon and evening. (copy of Memphis teletype attached)

political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for

proper purposes may be disseminated to the news media. On July 17, 1972, Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh, after having had all the facts set out above reviewed with him including the fact his notation of "handled" appeared on the March 29, 1968, memorandum, advised that he has absolutely no recollection of this memorandum and can unhesitatingly state that he cannot now recall whether or not proposed information was ever disseminated to any news media source. He indicated that his notation "handled" would not necessarily mean that he did disseminate this information. In explaining this he stated that the notation could mean that he was merely clearing this document through Crime Records Division and at this late date there would be absolutely no way that he could make any positive statements as to whether or not the information recommended was ever disseminated to a news media source.

From the above recorded sequence of events as reflected in various communications identified above, it is evident that King returned to Memphis, Tennessee, from Atlanta

- CONTINUED - OVER

- 2 -

Memorandum to Mr. Dalbey

RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another, the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very limited information concerning domestic intelligence matters. On April 3, 1968, and checked into the Hotel Lorraine since matters approximately 10:30 a.m. The notation indicating that the proposed furnishing of information to the news media was "handled" on April 3, 1968, would, of course, preclude any such information from appearing in the press prior to King's checking into the Hotel Lorraine at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968.

The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular concern about the appropriate afflles maintained at FBI Headquarters fails to reflect any newspaper article which could have been an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in the G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968.

A review of the "Memphis Commercial Appeal" for the period March 28 to April 1, 1968, maintained on microfilm in the Library of Congress failed to reflect any article which would appear to be an outgrowth of the proposed recommendation contained in G. C. Moore memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated March 29, 1968. References were noted indicating that King held a press conference at the Holiday Inn Rivermont Motel on March 29, 1968. It may be developing in the courts in several recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that government information gathering which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects, may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights.

These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills, Enclosures (5), 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323 F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971).

NOTE:

The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal functions of the Bureau is to gather information jaw violators, agitators of See memorandum J. G. Beegan to Mr. W. R. Wrennall, dated 7/18/75, captioned as above, prepared by HAN/eah, (D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et al., 70-Cv. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to

Memorandum L. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey  
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Iehord, 442 F2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970), although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional Committee's investigation of them, the Court found there was

insufficient justiciability in their claims. At INFORMATION CONTAINED  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE  
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)  
PURPOSE:  
To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King. Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitution

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike Court of Appeals in大局. In contrasting the potential impact on

Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, the Court pointed out that violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right

RECOMMENDATION:  
The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibition apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop REC-20  
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore  
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media) 3 - WORK II log  
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

Deficit

Handled 4/3/68 - 106670 - 3100  
100-448006-93  
#REFRESHED

5

March 29, 1968

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey  
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC  
DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exinity Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King only for his followers.

To compile information on law violators, agitators of violence, and possible subversives. It has always been recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is exercised under the direction of the Attorney General. Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department, and the information compiled is only ~~information contained herein is unclassified~~ or to affect his liberty in any way except through the action of the courts.

As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable. See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment rights).

The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police. 385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 290 (1966) and Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963). *100-1000-696-93*

ENCLOSURE

24

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey  
FBI WASH DC RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

FBI MEMPHIS Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate the Constitution's justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit his conversations with defendants to other agents.

FROM MEMPHIS 157-1692 3P

If the use of undercover government informants without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra, SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENN., conversations with defendants and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visual

ON APRIL TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, LT. E. H. ARKIN, MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, advised that police in plain view by informants at public meetings PD, INSPECTATIONAL BUREAU, ADVISED THAT THE FUNERAL OF LARRY PAYNE,

SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD NEGRO WHO WAS SHOT BY MEMPHIS PD OFFICER in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See AFTER STORE LOOTING GROWING OUT OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT RACIAL DISTURBANCE, MEMPHIS, WAS HELD, WITHOUT INCIDENT, AT CLAYBORN TEMPLE, MEMPHIS, ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED IN ATTENDANCE DESPITE FACT Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

CHURCH CAN SEAT TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED. BODY INTERRED IMMEDIATELY More difficult questions are presented where the investigation AFTER FUNERAL into ARKIN ADVISED THAT ANOTHER SANIGATION WORKERS SYMPATHY MARCH IS SCHEDULED FOR DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS AFTERNOON OF APRIL TWO. 100-166790

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED ON APRIL TWO THAT REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) AIDES; RALPH D. MCKEEBETH, BERNARD LEE, AND ANDREW M. YOUNG DUE TO ARRIVE MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, APRIL THREE, FROM ATLANTA.

END PAGE ONE *Albert C. Hayden*

1 APR 5 1968

I.D.I. This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official purposes and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons and Attorney General. Date *4/5/68* Express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey  
Re: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment  
line of cases dealing with the "shillings" concept offers any substantial  
impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ON APRIL TWO A SOURCE ADVISED THAT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLAYBORN TEMPLE, APRIL TWO, REV. COLEMAN JACKSON OF SCLC'S OPERATION  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BREAD BASKET, SHOULD BE PREPARED, THEREFORE, TO MEET ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE NEED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION. THE SOURCE ANSWERED, WHICH SHOULD SIMPLY  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMPHIS AND REV. EDWARD L. BROWN, MT. PISGAH CME CHURCH, ADVISED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THAT WITH SCLC PERSONNEL IN MEMPHIS THAT NIGHTLY MASS STRIKE  
SUPPORT MEETINGS WILL BE RESUMED, THE FIRST AT MASON TEMPLE ON  
NIGHT OF APRIL THREE WITH KING AS FEATURED SPEAKER. THEY SAID  
MASS MARCH WILL BE HELD FRIDAY, APRIL FIVE, AND THAT THEY WILL  
HAVE SCHOOL CHILDREN PARTICIPATE SINCE MARCHING WITH "MARTIN LUTHER  
KING, JR., THE GREATEST LIVING AMERICAN," WOULD BE MORE EDUCATIONAL  
THAN BEING IN SCHOOL. WHEN ASKED BY PRESS IF KING WOULD PERSONALLY  
MARCH, JACKSON SAID KING MIGHT NOT MARCH. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.  
WHEN ASKED IF SCLC GROUP WOULD VIOLATE A POSSIBLE INJUNCTION  
AGAINST THEIR MARCHING, JACKSON SAID "THE WHITE MAN HAS ALREADY  
ENJOINED THE BLACK MAN TO THE GHETTO AND THE WHITE MAN DOESN'T  
NEED TO VALIDATE IT, BY SENDING US A PIECE OF PAPER." KYLES SAID THE  
PROBLEM FACING MEMPHIS IS NOT MILITANT BLACK YOUTH BUT IS  
"WHITE RACISM." JACKSON DESCRIBED OPERATION BREAD BASKET AS MASSIVE  
END PAGE TWO

DRIVE TO FORCE ALL GROCERS IN NEGRO AREA TO CEASE SELLING MART'S  
BREAD, WONDER BREAD, COCA COLA, AND SEALTEST DAIRY PRODUCTS  
AS THESE FIRMS DO NOT HIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF NEGROES.

**POSITION PAPER**

ON APRIL TWO LT. ARKIN ADVISED THAT MEMPHIS CITY OFFICIALS ARE  
CONSIDERING SEEKING A COURT INJUNCTION PROHIBITING ANY MASS MARCH  
LED BY KING OR AN INJUNCTION SPECIFYING CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MARCH  
COULD TAKE PLACE AND ALSO CONSIDERING RESUMPTION OF A CURFEW AND  
PLACING STRIKE SUPPORT LEADERS UNDER A PEACE AND FINANCIAL  
~~INVESTIGATIONS OR PROSECUTION~~  
RESPONSIBILITY BOND.

ARKIN ADVISED THAT REMAINDER OF TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD,  
WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE BATTERY CONSISTING OF TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY  
THREE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE MEMPHIS GUARD UNIT, HAVE LEFT MEMPHIS.  
May 19, 1972

AT THREE ZERO FIVE PM, SIXTY SANITATION WORKERS AND SYMPATHIZERS  
DEPARTED CLAYBORN TEMPLE CARRYING PLACARDS FOLLOWING THEIR USUAL  
PARADE MARCH TO BEALE STREET NORTH ON MAIN TO CITY HALL. NO  
INCIDENTS REPORTED.

*memo*

**OVERTIME**

~~END~~

CIA: This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of  
intelligence-type investigations supervised by the Domestic  
Intelligence Division. Authority for these investigations  
is documented and outlined, including situations where there  
is no direct violation of law. Criteria and controls and  
dissemination policies implementing this authority are  
detailed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2/HM/MTG

62-116345-83  
ENCLOSURE

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/30/00 BY SP4/JMP

Date April 8, 1968

*Ralph B.* *M*  
 Reverend RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, 630 La Verne Drive, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia, was interviewed at the Memphis Police Department at 10:55 p.m., April 4, 1968. Reverend ABERNATHY was advised of the Agent's identity and of the nature of the matter under investigation.

~~INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS~~  
 Reverend ABERNATHY, who described himself as Vice President at Large and Treasurer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, stated he was Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'s closest associate and stated that he and Dr. KING always shared a room whenever they travelled together. He stated that at about 10:30 a.m. on April 3, 1968, he and Dr. KING registered at the Lorraine Motel, Memphis, Tennessee.

~~National Security Council Directives~~

13

~~Intelligence Assessments~~  
 Reverend ABERNATHY stated that on April 4, 1968, he and Dr. KING did not leave the motel and spent most of the day in their room, 2306, which is located on the second floor of the motel. He stated that he and Dr. KING had been gone from their room for approximately one hour or less when they returned to the room at about 5:30 p.m. He said they got dressed as they were going to dinner at the home of Reverend BILLY KYLE and that at almost exactly 6 p.m. they started to leave the room. Reverend ABERNATHY stopped for a moment and Dr. KING walked out onto the balcony just outside the door to his room. Reverend ABERNATHY was still inside the motel room but could hear Dr. KING discussing the dinner engagement with other associates who Reverend ABERNATHY believes were standing in the parking area of the motel underneath and to the front of the balcony on which Dr. KING was standing.

Reverend ABERNATHY stated he heard what sounded like a fire-cracker and then heard the screams of persons to whom Dr. KING had been talking. Reverend ABERNATHY went then to the balcony and discovered Dr. KING lying there wounded in the right side of the face and neck. He said he believed Dr. KING attempted to speak to him but was unable to do so. Reverend ABERNATHY said he instructed someone to call an ambulance and then accompanied Dr. KING in the ambulance to the hospital where Dr. KING subsequently died.

*ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3/30/00 BY SP4/JMP*  
 This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for distribution outside your Committee. It is not to be used in official proceedings by your Committee and the content ~~48~~ may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

On 4/4/68 at Memphis, Tennessee File # Memphis 44-1987

by SA JOE C. HESTER; b:

Date dictated 4/8/68

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

8/10/68  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HB

Reverend ABERNATHY stated that judging from the sound of the noise it appeared that the shot came from directly in front of the door and not from any great distance. He stated he did not observe anything that would indicate who fired the shot. Reverend ABERNATHY also stated that while they were in the motel room Dr. KING did not, to his knowledge, receive any telephone calls of a threatening nature or calls from persons who would not identify themselves. Reverend ABERNATHY said Dr. KING had not feared that any particular persons might harm him and Reverend ABERNATHY was unable to suggest any suspects or to provide any other information which might assist in identifying Dr. KING's killer. It has been charged that our intelligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on personal idiosyncrasies without there being any security interest involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to convey the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding the privacy of citizens, have been published.

The FBI does not conduct security investigations of individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls.

Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to their attention and built them up into what is represented as the end product of security investigations with political overtones. In these instances, the items upon which such importance was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Bishop  
Mr. Tamm  
Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Conrad  
Mr. Felt  
Mr. Gale  
Mr. Rosen  
S. J. Rosen  
Mr. Tavel  
Mr. Trotter  
Tele. Room  
Tele. Room  
Miss Gandy

investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case.

URGENT 6-28-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR (100-186670) PARADE MY PHMISL, MEMPHIS  
FROM ATLANTA (100-5586) necessary part of his current investigations

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP/SP/SP

Intelligence is information and the collection of it is

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SMC, investigative operations. In fact the two--investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.

SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. It is vital that the Federal

Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on

possible violations of law related to the disruption or destruction of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals

INFORMANT'S INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM DISCUSSION SHORTLY BEFORE WITH NOSEA WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR OF VOTER REGISTRATION AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, SCLC, CURRENTLY IN ATLANTA, WHO DURING LATE AFTERNOON MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, CONFERRED TELEPHONICALLY WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., PRESIDENT, SCLC; RALPH D. ABERNATHY, VICE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER, SCLC; AND BERNARD LEE, SPECIAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT, SCLC.

NO constitutional provisions, statutory enactments or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement

HOLIDAY INN, MEMPHIS.

WITH ITS INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION, ALTHOUGH VARIOUS ATTEMPTS HAVE

WITH REFERENCE TO RACIAL DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, KING IS EXTREMELY DEJECTED. HE AND ABERNATHY STRONGLY FEEL DISTURBANCE ON THIS DATE DELIBERATELY PLANNED

EX-115 - 2 REC-9

106-100-3278

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APR 15 1968

been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by intelligence and particularly the techniques of collection.

It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the ~~PAGE TWO~~ exercise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore,

~~BY NEGROES WHO ARE NEITHER SYNPATETIC TO KING OR SCLC. IDENTITY~~  
~~a balance between the requirements of the Government and the~~  
~~OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS NOT KNOWN.~~

~~The intelligence function of investigation, must be~~  
~~WELFARE OF KING, PARTICULARLY ON NIGHT OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT,~~  
~~SIXTYEIGHT, WHEN HE EXPECTS TO PARTICIPATE IN MARCH OR DEMONSTRATION~~  
~~WITH SANITATION WORKERS. AT PRESENT TIME KING DOES NOT FEEL HE SHOULD~~  
~~IT IS neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive~~  
~~LEAVE MEMPHIS. DURATION OF STAY AND FURTHER DETAILS IN THIS~~  
~~intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those~~  
~~CONNECTION NOT KNOWN.~~  
~~who might potentially violate a local antilittering ordinance.~~

~~ACCORDING TO WILLIAMS, HE, ABERHATHY, AND LEE STRONGLY FEEL~~  
~~Detection of a conspiracy to bomb the White House, on the~~  
~~SAME ELEMENTS WHICH CAUSED DISTURBANCE IN MEMPHIS EARLIER MARCH~~  
~~other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive~~  
~~TWENTYEIGHT MAY CAUSE PERSONAL HARM TO KING EVENING OF MARCH~~  
~~intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain~~  
~~TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.~~

~~knowledge of any specific plans.~~ ~~100-24837~~  
INFORMATION FROM AI   JFK Act 6 (4)   MUST BE CLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL. MEMPHIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF  
NOT ALREADY KNOWN THAT KING CONTEMPLATES PARTICIPATING IN MARCH OR  
DEMONSTRATION EVENING OF MARCH TWENTYEIGHT AND THAT IN VIEW OF EARLIER  
DISTURBANCES IN MEMPHIS ON THIS DATE, SEVERAL RANKING SCLC OFFICIALS  
APPREHENSIVE FOR PERSONAL WELFARE OF KING.

It is mandatory that a Government protect its integrity and this has been recognized by judicial authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or groups; crimes against the existence of the government victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction of that society.

It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate **PAGE THREE**. They are, however, quite capable of eroding

~~FOREGOING INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED MEMPHIS MARCH TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT.~~  
not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of RECEIVED: 11:39PM RM the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently, continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.

The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided information concerning hostile actions directed against the U. S.

FBI WASH DC

1242-31533

by foreign governments, their intelligence services and others

FBI MEMPHIS acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has

1242AM REPORT 3-29-68 DUE ~~intelligence concerning~~ changing from the communist underground

TO DIRECTOR ~~about~~ hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our

FROM MEMPHIS (157-1094) in the 1960's ~~when~~ ~~when~~ changes occurred

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-20-00 BY SP/ALW

Casper  
Dr. Collier  
Dr. Conrad  
Dr. Felt  
Dr. Gale  
Dr. Glavin  
Dr. Gandy  
Dr. Glavin  
Dr. Trotter  
Dale Baumer  
Dr. Holmes  
Miss Gandy

In the internal security problems faced by the country. These  
SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, ~~etc.~~ Racial MATTER  
~~changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the~~  
FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied  
upon MEMPHIS by L. B. Clegg, Executive Branch, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT.

FOLLOWING THE SUMMARY OF MARCH TWENTY EIGHT ACTIVITIES,  
added ON MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, L. B. Clegg, INSPECTIONAL BUREAU  
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPT advised that the mass march to be led by

REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IN SUPPORT OF SANITATION WORKERS,  
SHOURED AT APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN AM CST WITH ESTIMATED FIVE TO SIX

THOUSANDS WORKERS, MANY OF WHOM WERE NEGRO TEENAGERS. MARCH  
STARTED AT A CLAYBORN TEMPLE, LOCATED HEART OF NEGRO AREA, AND  
NEGROES JOINED MARCH AFTER IT PROGRESSSED ONE BLOCK. HE WALKED WITH

MARCHERS IN VICINITY BEALE AND MAIN STREETS, MADE NO SPEECHES

PRIOR TO MARCH, MADE NO KNOWN UTTERANCES DURING MARCH, AND BY

TIME HE REACHED ABOVE POINT RAMPANT BREAKING OF STORE WINDOWS  
AND LOOTING WAS BEING PERPETRATED BY MARCHERS, WHEREUPON KING

AND A FEW ASSOCIATES RAN TO A NEARBY CAR AND LEFT MARCH, PROCEEDED  
TO RIVERMONT MOTEL WHERE THEY REMAINED THROUGH AFTERNOON AND

EVENING. BY NOON, POLICE HAD BROKEN UP CROWD, BEING FORCED TO USE

TEARGAS, BUT SPORADIC LOOTING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH AFTERNOON

1cc 11/14 (excluded in letter to White House)  
and Attorney General. Date 3-29-68

NOT RECORDED

1cc 11/6/72 162-APR-4 1968

PCQ APP 12 4068

Page 76

as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in 1969 during their "Days of Rage."

As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it brought with it new and pressing problems on the domestic security scene. FBI domestic security investigations increased ~~PAGE TWO~~. There was also an immediate increase in FBI ~~AND BUREAU, PRIMARILY CONCERNED TO SOUTHERN CIVIL AREA MEMPHIS,~~ ~~TO A FREEDOMMANTLY NEGRO AREA, PRIMARY TARGET OF LOOTERS BEING~~ ~~Lique STORES AND SMALL GROCERIES.~~ was essential in contending with ~~TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE PTOBLY PASSED A CURFEW BILL, WHICH~~ ~~was ENFORCED BY MEMPHIS MAYOR HENRY LEE, EFFECTIVE AT SEVEN PM,~~ ~~AND THIRTY FIVE HUNDRED TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARDSMEN FROM MEMPHIS~~ ~~AND WEST TENNESSEE, AND CURRENTLY DOWNTOWN MEMPHIS OPERATING AS~~ ~~ACTUAL UNITS, BEING ACCOMPANIED ON THEIR PATROLS BY REPRESENTATIVES~~ ~~OF MEMPHIS PD.~~ emphasized that law enforcement organizations must ~~SCHEDULED MASS RALLY TO FEATURE UNCTION OF MARCH TWENTY~~ ~~EIGHT CANCELED AT TWELVE MIDNIGHT, MARCH TWENTY EIGHT, THREE~~ ~~HUNDRED ARRESTS, PRIMARILY RELATING TO LOOTING AND CURFEW VIOLATIONS~~ ~~HAD BEEN MADE BY POLICE DEPT. FOUR INDIVIDUALS~~ ~~HAVE BEEN SHOT, ONE OF THESE, A SIXTEEN YEAR OLD BOY, WAS KILLED~~ ~~IN ACT OF LOOTING A STORE. THREE OTHERS WERE SHOT, TWO BY~~ ~~POLICE OFFICERS AND ONE BY A STOREKEEPER WHILE LOOTING, NONE~~ ~~SERIOUSLY INJURED.~~

Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its AGE THREE report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there

EASTERN AIRLINES ADVISED THAT KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, AND are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to

BERNARD LEE, FAILED TO LEAVE MEMPHIS ON EASTERN FLIGHT THREE bush and bomb, and sometimes to maim and kill." The report

NINE EIGHT, NINE ZERO FIVE CST, DUE TO ARRIVE ATLANTA ELEVEN concluded that the best, ~~AND~~ sometimes the only, means

ZERO THREE PM EST. THIS ALSO CANCELS KING'S AND LEE'S FLIGHT Law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is

FROM ATLANTA SIX TWENTY AM MARCH TWENTY NINE DUE TO through "clandestine intelligence work."

ARRIVE BALTIMORE SEVEN FORTY TWO AM. INSPECTOR G. P. TIMES,

Prevention is the very essence of the proper use MEMPHIS PD, ADVISED KING PLANNING TO STAY IN MEMPHIS AT intelligence. To be forewarned is to be placed in a

RIVERMONT MOTEL TONIGHT, FUTURE PLANS UNKNOWN AT PRESENT position to carry out countermeasures to meet a threat. During TIME. P.

the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's,

CORE PAGE TWO, PARA ONE, LINE ONE WORDS EIGHT, NINE, AND TEN FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination

SHLD BE "AREA OF MEMPHIS" AND LINE TWO, PARA ONE, WORD FIVE of information to other government agencies. This intelligence SHLD BE "PRIMARY"

provided them with an essential working tool to contend with

PAGE TWO PARA THREE, LINE ONE WORD SIX SHLD BE "KING" AND LINE THREE public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.

WORD THREE SHLD BE "PRIMARY" AND A PERIOD SHLD BE BETWEEN

In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67,

"DEPT. AND FOUR OBXXXX ON LINE FOUR"

Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence.

PAGE TWO PARA ONE LINE THREE WORD ONE SHLD BE "LIQUOR". The Attorney General asserted, "It is most important that

END.

HFL

FBI WASH DC

P

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

you use the maximum available resources

to tell Mr. W. C. Sullivan to collect and report all facts bearing upon

(riot activity)." Elaborating on this point, he said, "In  
these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is

SUBJECT DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. bearing ~~intelligence problems;~~

to take every step possible to determine whether ~~intelligence problems;~~

During a conference on 7/16/75 between the Assistant Attorney General, J. Stanley Pottinger, and his staff and the Director of the FBI and his staff, a question arose concerning Martin Luther King's alleged moving from one hotel or motel to another hotel or motel in Memphis, Tennessee, prior to his murder on 4/4/68 by prompt and vigorous legal action." The

Attorney General's evaluation of the substance of LEM setting forth an inquiry including a review of all appropriate Bureau files regarding a proposal made in memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 3/29/68 in connection with the counterintelligence other program wherein it was recommended that information be made available to a cooperative news media source showing King to be a hypocrite. This was to be based on the fact that when violence broke out during a march led by King in Memphis, Tennessee, on 4/28/68, he disappeared. There was a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out in disreputable white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel (also known as the Rivermont Motel). The LEM will reflect and document the fact that although a notation appears on the memorandum that it was "handled" there is no information available to reflect that it was ever actually given to a cooperative news source. Mr. Harold P. Leinbaugh (retired), who placed the notation "handled" on the document, absolutely has no recollection of this matter nor can he state whether or not the information was disseminated.

"relating to black power and black national organizations" REC#8  
The time elements as documented in this LEM would preclude the proposal contained in the 3/29/68 memorandum of having any affect upon King's choice of a motel in which to reside.

## RECOMMENDATION:

12 JUL 29 1975

That the attached LEM along with attachments be disseminated to the Department.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Submittal. It is designed to official proceedings by your Committee and its content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

cah  
HAN:cah (6)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD ASST. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dir. AD SEC. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Sec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
FBI & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. \_\_\_\_\_  
Investigative \_\_\_\_\_  
Intelligence \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

7/18/75

new 7/22/75  
Delivered 7/22/75  
by [initials]  
to [initials]  
cc'd

officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout the country, and any specific demonstrations which are being planned and are of such nature as to render them subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval  
ITEM 7C  
of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.

Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for the guidance of the White House and other departments of the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney General stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of the highest quality intelligence available, but also for an expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product itself."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/29/00 BY SP/AMW

Ritter

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

AUTHORITY

DATE: March 26, 1968

FROM : G. C. Moore

ALL FBI INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING

FUNCTIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD ARE BASED ON

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

ANTI-INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL ENCL. REFERENCED

BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTIVE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVES AND INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS

PURPOSE: set forth below.

~~Congressional Encl. 1~~ To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Attorney General's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project, Section 533

BACKGROUND: Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381

(U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.", for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

~~Rebellion and Insurrection - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2385~~ At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION: Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S. -

18 U. S. Code, Section 2389

That the above facts be given as cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be after hearings by Subversive Activities Control

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach Board - 50 U. S. Code, Sections 780d-9b as amended or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subcha
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan i, curiou Subversive Activities Control Act of 195
- 1 - Mr. Bishop and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954)
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore also Executive Order 11605 below
- 1 - Mr. D. M. Wells
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin

EX-106  
- 10 -

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request made on for information outside your Committee. Its use is limited to your Committee and the subject may not be disclosed to any other person without the express approval of the FBI.

55 Enclosure 334  
TJD:df/dsm (7) ✓ -

5-1

Espionage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.

Sabotage - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan  
RE: ~~Private Correspondence~~ COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -  
~~18 U. S. Code, Section 953. (Logan Act)~~

Registration of Foreign Agents - 22 U. S. Code, given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation, in order to reach all the potential contributor's and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives  
ACTION: for illicit purposes - 18 U. S. Code, Section 844

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division. - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 231-233, 245, 2101-2102

Neutralities - 18 U. S. Code, Sections 956, 958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401 (Munitions Control Act)

Intelligence exchange with CIA - 50 U. S. Code, Section 403 (National Security Act)

*Handled 4/6/68*  
Presidential Directives

Directive of the President - 6/26/39  
directing that investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled by FBI.

Directive of the President - 9/6/39  
requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI to take charge of investigative matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

**Presidential Directive - 1/8/48**

reiterated instructions of previous directive of  
Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern  
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself  
in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at  
least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a  
huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the  
Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on  
Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support  
the march financially in order to feed and house the demon-  
strators. But the churches in the Washington, D. C., area  
have offered to house and feed the demonstrators to espionage,  
subversion, sabotage, and related matters.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from  
the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment  
of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for  
other purposes. The churches had better come through with  
all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because  
there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the  
time the march rolls around. 4/27/53

established programs to insure that the employment  
and retention of my Government employees is clearly  
consistent with the interests of national security.  
Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in  
cases where derogatory information develops, FBI  
conducts a full-field investigation.

**Executive Order 11605 7/2/71**

calls for Subversive Activities Control Board,  
when petitioned by the Attorney General, to  
determine after hearings if any organization is  
totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or  
whether it has adopted a policy advocating the  
commission of acts of force against any  
others their Constitutional or statutory rights.  
By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of  
the Attorney General, would develop evidence for  
hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would  
develop evidence of membership in such organiza-  
tions, which may be basis for denial of Government  
employment.

Policy Instructions of Attorney General

September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney  
General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility  
of conspiracy to plan, promote, or aggravate riot activity.

100-44806-8  
-12

February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that underlying subversive groups were giving illegal directions or guidance ~~SSC REQUEST~~ numerous campus disorders.

11-25-78

(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and Department have been received, amplifying points set forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)

#### National Security Council Directives

Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949, establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC) responsible to coordinate investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation with foreign intelligence.

#### Interagency Agreements

Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in investigations by members of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide for exchange of information on above matters.

FBI-Secret Service Agreement ~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~ ~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~DATE 10/20/2014 BY SP2224/JM~~ signed September 26, 1971, to provide for transmission of information from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals and organizations who, because of their propensities, represent or may represent a danger to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

*Retain*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

## IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY

Tableau \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Dunn \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Motels \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. Sullivan DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : G. C. Moore *her*  
are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions,"subject: SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE  
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE  
in Charge. In addition, instructions and guidance are given  
RACIAL MATTERSALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/29/00 BY SPAM

DATE 10/29/00 BY SPAM

to the field in Headquarters communications on specific cases.

Compliance with criteria and guidelines obtained by supervision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters. In Memphis for some time, Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting. Actions are being followed.

This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called nonviolence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience *in the security field, the basic responsibility of the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated for Washington in April.*

RE: 19 to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States

## ACTION:

EX-105

APR 2 1968  
Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example,

Attached is a blind memorandum pointing out the above, which if you approve, should be made available by Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources. Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weathermen.

In the investigation of subversive individuals a determination is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable

law. Mr. DeLoach

is under investigation of the individual and efforts are made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable law.

1 - Mr. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore  
1 - Mr. Deskin

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and its contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons or without the prior approval of the FBI.

Federal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting, and riot.

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting "black power" and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out, provided for emergency detention of subversive Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much-heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be "nonviolent." He says he has persuaded militant black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our Nation's Capital. However, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and responsibility to record, file and index information secured" in this field and concurred in the establishment of an administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations into subversive activities."

ZEROX  
APR 4 1968

157-9146-38

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/00 BY SPANWED

United States Senate

For this end, such an ~~SECRET COMMITTEE~~ (called Adex) was

STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(Appointed by S. Select Comm. on Intelligence)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Instituted for making quickly referable information on  
four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:

November 25, 1975

I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist

groups who have exhibited a propensity for violence,  
Michael E. Shabean, Esq.

Special Counsel for Intelligence  
members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla

Coordination

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

Warfare, ~~unaffiliated~~ revolutionaries with a propensity

U. S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.

Dear Mike:

II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and

I would appreciate your making available to the  
~~extremist groups, active members of these groups, and~~  
Committee the following items in connection with our  
~~revolutionaries, revolutionaries of extremists with a propensity~~

~~for violence against property rather than persons~~  
1. All memoranda and any other materials which  
pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between  
one Val Colzman and Special Agent Harold Linebaugh or  
any other FBI Headquarters officials concerning Martin  
Luther King, Jr., during November or December of 1964.  
~~within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolu-~~

~~tionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies~~  
2. All memoranda and any other materials which  
pertain to contacts, conversations or meetings between  
any FBI Headquarters officials and any representatives of  
the news media concerning Martin Luther King, Jr., during  
November or December of 1964.

~~likely in national emergency to commit acts of espionage,~~  
3. All memoranda and any other materials which  
pertain to a meeting between Ralph Abernathy and either  
FBI Director Hoover or Cartha DeLoach during December  
1964 or January 1965 (other than the December 1, 1964  
meeting which was attended by Dr. King and the January 11,  
1965 meeting which was attended by Andrew Young).

~~determining whether or not he should be listed on the Index, as~~  
4. Investigation of an individual is conducted to  
determine whether or not he should be listed on the Index, as  
pertaining to the following statement which appears in the  
second paragraph of the September 11, 1964 memorandum  
from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned  
"Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist":

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-20-00 BY SP2/MAP

- 16 -

62-116375-1210X

445-141

Michael E. Shaheen  
Page 2

November 25, 1975

the result of the investigation, it is determined he does not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in

5. The 7/16/64 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan which is noted in handwriting at the bottom of the second page of the July 15, 1964 memorandum from Mr. ~~press~~ Category I ~~case continues under investigation for~~ ~~as long as the individual continues to warrant that Category~~ Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, captioned "Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security - Communist."

listing. When an individual is listed in Categories II, III and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine

his activities and to ascertain whether he still qualifies for and its enclosure. Provision is made for upgrading,

b. Access to all extant "tickler" and/or other copies of this memorandum and its attachment in their original form; activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.

c. All memoranda and any other materials which pertain to, bear upon, or indicate any actions taken pursuant to or in connection with the recommendation contained in this memorandum. (This should include any and all information of whatever nature and/or date pertaining to the individual or individuals involved in this recommendation addressed, collected, and/or prepared in connection with Mr. James Adams' testimony on this subject before the Senate Select Committee on November 18, 1975.)

extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic d. All memoranda and any other materials received from FBI field offices or written at provide FBI Headquarters prior to and pertaining to the recommendation contained in the March 29, 1968 memorandum.

President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;

7. With respect to the memorandum with enclosure, from W. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated March 26, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence (Washington Spring Project); please provide the access and/or materials requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.

17

November 25, 1975

8. With respect to a memorandum with enclosure,  
~~(2) dated November 20, 1975, reprinted from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, dated 3/28/68, reprinted from "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee, Racial Matters," please provide the accessions and/or materials visable to requested in a, b, c, and d of Item 6 above.~~  
prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and

9. Responses to Items 6, 7, and 8 should include  
~~(3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.~~

Sincerely,

*John T. Elliff*  
John T. Elliff  
Director  
investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:

Domestic Intelligence Task Force  
Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information indicating that organization advocates overthrow of Government or engages in activity to deny others their Constitutional or statutory rights.

Investigation is conducted to establish aims and objectives, location and size, domination and control by hostile foreign power, identities of all leaders and members.

In regard to their front groups and organizations which they have infiltrated:

Investigation is initiated upon receipt of information that organization is dominated, controlled or influenced to substantial degree by revolutionary organization.

Investigation is conducted to determine degree of infiltration, aims and objectives, location and size and identities of all leaders.



## OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Extremist Groups

December 1, 1975

The purpose of investigations of white hate and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities; and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investigations of white hate groups are confined to those which have

actually or allegedly committed or have adopted a policy of advocating or acts of violence or have adopted a policy of advocating or an appropriate response to this request.

inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist organizations concern those groups which take extremist, anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose activities have involved them or may involve them in civil unrest and/or subversive activity.

cc: Paul Daly

Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals

Individuals referred to as subversives are generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new left types; and ~~extremists are fundamentally~~ *(B)*

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as follows:

Membership in a basic revolutionary organization

Date of Mail 11/28/75

Espousing the ~~IDEAS~~ revolutionary movements

Special training ~~IDEAS~~; or leadership training, in a revolutionary group

Individuals having access to key facilities  
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section  
of a revolutionary group at any time

Persons with revolutionary, terrorist, anarchistic or extremist beliefs who are likely to seize upon a national emergency to endanger public safety

Individuals who have actually or allegedly committed, conspired to commit, or adopted policy to commit acts of violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Extremists and revolutionaries who have demonstrated a propensity for violence, have involved or may involve themselves in civil unrest, or who ~~ARE REASONABLY CONTAINED~~  
~~ARE UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~DATED 10/10/76 BY~~  
overthrow of the Government

Persons who influence others to engage in acts injurious to the national defense or who are likely to furnish financial or other assistance to revolutionary or extremist elements because of their sympathies  
Subject JUNE MAIL SENSITIVE 79 JAN 1 1976  
Removed By

File Number 62-116395-1210

Unaffiliated Individuals

I - Mr. J. R. Adams

I - Mr. J. A. Mintz

I - Mr. D. W. Moore

The Attorney General

December 9, 1975

extremist activities, some investigation More W. conduct Marshall Director, FBI 1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar of individuals who are not affiliated Mr. Organ F. Z. Phillips

Investigation of an individual is undertaken when information is received that the person:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/10/00 BY SP/ALW/P

Is a revolutionary or extremist and Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of former FBI Assistant Director Robert E. Wick by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Is a revolutionary or extremist and Your specific attention is invited to certain information relating to the interview of Wick suggestive of improprieties on the part of an SSC Staff Member. The facts, as known to this Bureau, are as follows:

ideology and is likely to seize opportunity Wick first contacted this Bureau concerning the interview by telephone on November 5, 1975, to advise that he had been called on October 31, 1975, by an individual identifying himself as Mike Epstein representing the SSC. Epstein requested Wick to come to Washington, D. C., for a two to three hour interview concerning a matter relating to his "employment." Epstein did not further describe the subject matter of the interview and an appointment was arranged for November 7, 1975. Wick said that he was uncertain as to the probable subject matter of the interview because other matters coming within his responsibilities as Vice President of Pan American World Airways which were unrelated to the FBI, have been of recent interest to the SSC. Wick asked for advice of the FBI concerning this matter.

Thereupon, the Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau contacted Epstein and determined that the subject matter of the interview of Wick would be Martin Luther King, Jr. A return call was made to Wick on November 3, 1975, to advise him that this Bureau had learned that the subject matter of the

interview would be Martin Luther King, Jr. Various statements

and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed as follows:  
1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director Robert E. Wick) (1) the detection and

SFP:mjg/jb  
(11)

21  
10

John G. Webster  
JUL 5 1975  
- 21 -  
FBI - BOSTON  
400-3975

identification of intelligence operations and agents;

(2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose of control and the development of intelligence information;

(3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through

disruption and disruption, whatever the assigned priority, the Bureau's objective is to deny access to information sought by whatever practical means are available.

For our intelligence investigations and conducted from this Bureau's representative who had descended from Epstein on November 5, 1975, the subject matter of the interview has advised that when he made the inquiry of Epstein, he asked Epstein why he had not told Wick the subject matter. Epstein's reply was that Wick had not asked him, a statement directly contradictory to Wick's advice to this Bureau, initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connection.

The second suggested impropriety is that Epstein contacted Wick prior to advising this Bureau of his intention to interview Wick, an action which is contrary to procedures which have been agreed upon between the SSC and this Bureau.

Enclosures (4) investigations emanate from various sensitive sources and

involve special considerations, extensive criteria and

1. The Deputy Attorney General limitations are reflected in current instructions.

Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for

Intelligence Coordination

In general terms, the governing criteria are designed to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which are not justified. The limitations are designed to control the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our interests through close supervisory scrutiny.

Restrictions on Investigations

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. D. W. Moore

FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening,  
62-116395

December 9, 1975

investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

to make certain that we do not violate the constitution. Gregar

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS rights of any individual with respect to intelligence activities (SSC)

becoming "fishing expeditions." In the security field these

are some of the restrictions.

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (AD) ROBERT WICK

BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Security cases are evaluated continually  
to determine if we are fulfilling our

This memorandum concerns an interview of former FBI  
AD Robert Wick by SSC Staff Members.

warranting further investigation are

closed promptly.

On November 5, 1975, Wick advised this Bureau that  
on October 31, 1975, he had been contacted by an individual  
identifying himself as Mike Epstein of the SSC who requested  
Wick to come to Washington for a two to three hour interview  
concerning a matter relating to his employment. Epstein did  
not further describe the subject matter although Wick attempted  
to obtain such information from Epstein.  
and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.

Upon receipt of the above information from Wick,  
this Bureau determined from Epstein that the subject matter  
was to be Martin Luther King, Jr., and that fact was relayed  
to Wick on November 5, 1975. Wick was also told that he was  
being released from his secrecy agreement with the FBI for the  
purpose of the interview, confined to the indicated subject  
matter. Wick was also advised by this Bureau that he was not  
required to answer questions falling within four privileged  
areas: matters pertaining to pending investigations; information  
from third agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies;  
information concerning sensitive methods and techniques; and  
information which might divulge the identities of FBI sources.

When it is determined that a security subject

is attached hereto is a copy of a MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE  
dated November 12, 1975, which Wick voluntarily furnished this  
Bureau and which represents his report pertaining to the interview.

Enclosure: Civil rights organizations are not investigated.

1 - 67- (Personnel file former Assistant Director  
Robert Wick)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

SFP:mjsn (10)

- 23 -

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mem. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intel. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Disaster Soc'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

DO NOT CIRCULATE

Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions to the United Nations are not investigated.

U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of Former FBI Assistant Director (AD) Robert WICK by SSC Staff Members  
No telephone or microphone surveillances are operated without prior written approval of the Attorney General.

NOTE: Bureau authority is required for:

Information relating to contacts between WICK and this Bureau are reported in memorandum 11/5/73 from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," and 11/7/73 from J. O. Gregor to M. R. Womall "Senstudy 75." In WICK's statement, MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE, was mailed to Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The matter of inappropriateness was addressed specifically in the above 11/7/73 communication and it is believed that the Department should be made aware of this matter.

Developing sources connected with an institution of learning.

Interviews of subjects of active, current security investigations.

Investigations of faculty members. If approval is granted, only established sources functioning in an administrative capacity may be contacted on the campus. Other established sources and informants must be contacted away from the campus. Contacts with students, graduate students and faculty members must also have Bureau authority.

Interviews of labor leaders and persons in educational, mass media or publishing fields.

These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposition of them.

### Information Storage and Retrieval

The storage and retrieval of information is a basic operational necessity of any investigative or intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI for these functions provide for written records of information received from a variety of sources--confidential informants, confidential ~~INVESTIGATIVE~~ techniques, and open sources--and the storage of this information in different types of files. These include active investigative files on organizations and individuals and some general files. These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Government and in the various field offices. Information in the files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.

In the intelligence field, when an allegation within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information that is received on an individual or organization is placed in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a general file if the organization or individual is not the subject of a specific file.

These files are an integral part of the intelligence-gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary that a system for retrieving this information be used.

Because those files ~~or items~~ contain derogatory information that may not be substantiated by further investigation (the derogatory information received may not be germane to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys General have long taken the position that these files should not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage to individual reputations could result from the disclosure of single items of information without knowing the full background concerning the receipt of a particular item and the context within which it was recorded.

The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:

Disclosure of information contained in the reports (FBI files) might also be the grossest kind of injustice to innocent individuals. Investigative reports include leads and suspicions, and sometimes even the statements of malicious or misinformed people. Even though later and more complete reports exonerate the individuals, the use of particular or selected reports might constitute the grossest injustice, and we all know a correction never catches up with an accusation.

### Dissemination

The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is that information developed by or coming to the attention of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a potential interest in it or responsibility for taking action concerning it, whenever their interest or responsibility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance with numerous formal agreements entered into between the Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in accordance with Presidential directives obligating the Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting the internal security of the U. S.

Despite this general liberal policy of dissemination, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive information a determination must be made on an individual basis as to what information should be disseminated and how it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or the security classification will determine level of dissemination to any interested agency and the method of transmittal. In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished to a high-level official with a request that dissemination in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype, courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone. Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.

v7

The Attorney General  
Director, FBI

August 7, 1973

~~SCOPE OF FBI JURISDICTION  
AND AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC  
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS~~

AMDF6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JLG

During our meeting on July 26, 1973, you referred to a discussion you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your confirmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was being performed on this subject at the present time and that we would be in touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.

Actually, a study has been <sup>JK Law 10/6/11</sup> going on in the FBI for more than two years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority in domestic intelligence investigations. When Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even though we may have publicly relied heavily on Presidential directives as the basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The following is a summary of that report.

Over a period of several months there were a number of public statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by Professor John T. Elliott at a two-day conference at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public Justice.

62-116-15-83

ENCLOSURE

The Attorney General

A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1939 directive, which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type investigations.

Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the nature and extent of FBI intelligence-type investigations. Senator Ervin had even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest in FBI investigative activities.

Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field are authorized under legislative enactments, ~~and~~ Presidential directives, and instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously the 1) directive dated September 6, 1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950, and December 15, 1953, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605 dated July 2, 1971).

In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FBI to handle espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments. It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.

The Attorney General

As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August, 1936, did request former Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism. This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential mandate, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the FBI could conduct such investigations if the Secretary of State should so request.

The study revealed that while the 1939 et seq. directives did not grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FBI, we were responsible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens and to sift and coordinate all such information for indications of subversive activity covered by Federal statutes.

The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to conduct whatever investigations are necessary to determine if statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious conspiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we note that in a letter dated September 14, 1967, the Department of Justice advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots and is submitting intelligence reports to the Department of Justice concerning such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and stated those could be applicable in using maximum available resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.

In other words, the Department was requesting all possible intelligence-type investigative activity based on the existence of certain statutes. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow, destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of national, state, and local governments.

The Attorney General

Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelligence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date. We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepticism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that an up-to-date Executive order should be issued clearly establishing a need for intelligence-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.

The study concluded with two basic recommendations.

- 1) That the Department of Justice be requested to sponsor comprehensive legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of intelligence information relating to the national security and; 2) that the Department of Justice be requested to seek a comprehensive Executive order which would cover any possible gap between statutory authority and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.

At first glance these recommendations may appear to contradict our position that we already have statutory authority to conduct security-type investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs. Title 15 U.S.C. Sections 2383, 2384, and 2385 relate to the national security, but the legislative history of 2383 and 2384 indicates that they were designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unquestionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced as H.R. 6046 and S. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

~~The Attorney General~~

1. KEY WORDS (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

6. DATE PROVIDED

12/9/75

 DOCUMENT BRIEFING MEETINGS INTERVIEWS TESTIMONY OTHER

As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a definitive requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires. The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority. The Executive order would define our national security objectives.

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifying and subject). Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C.

- Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff  
- Memorandum regarding proposed requirement to specify our jurisdiction and  
- Members of former Assistant Director Robert Wick  
- rathor spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number of response to formal request, memo, wire, note, verbal comment, telephone initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter S, C, SC or Codeword)

The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from disclosures coming out of the Watergate hearings could present an obstacle to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However, in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have been set forth in the ~~Information handling~~ nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines which have been set forth in the ~~Information handling~~ It is my belief that we should go forward with this. ~~Intelligence collection~~

7. SUMMARY (see reverse side) We therefore propose and recommend that an Executive order along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong Interviewed regarding his knowledge of the FBI's investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr. An order which we think would be appropriate and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should be submitted to the White House.

62-116395

FMK:fmk

EXECUTIVE ORDER

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE STUDY 75  
The United States was established to insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States;  
~~and information contained~~  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/20/00 BY SP2A/MK

TREAT AS YELLOW

5/11

76/0019

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

The Attorney General

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the Government thereunder; and

- If additions (as where a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to FBI) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful activities perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the common defense, and undermining the general welfare of the people of the United States;

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - Enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally imposed responsibilities;

"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;

"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and other such activity affecting the national security, domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."

The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;

F B I

The Attorney General

Date: 12/9/73

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via **AIRTEL** **AIR MAIL** killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic

declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts

which have been committed by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were

once confined to far flung places and related to problems of no immediate concern of our are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in

collusion with domestic elements have laid plans for an airport massacre of

the type which recently occurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements

have laid plans to assassinate an American official. All information contained

in this report is accurate and reliable. An American official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.

RE: **SENATE, TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS****ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS, AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. RAYMOND WANNALL**

12/2/75

DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DIVISION

ASSISTANT TO THE

DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/20/01 BY SP2A/MW

It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on the concept of ~~no investigation unless there is reason to believe a crime~~  
**Re Los Angeles phone call to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS, 12/9/75.**

involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must obviously anticipate contemplated violence. We believe that in

On 12/3/75, the attached article appeared in the Los Angeles Times under the byline of reporter JACK NELSON.

As indicated, the headline and lead paragraph which supposedly is based on ADAMS' testimony clearly reflects that the FBI did nothing to prevent Klan violence although we knew of normally associated with Klan violence minutes. In other words we

the contemplated violence. After discussing this matter with Mr. ADAMS and reviewing the actual testimony received in

the Los Angeles Division on 12/8/75, SAC ELMER P. LINBERG and I met with Editor BILL THOMAS and National Editor ED GUTHMAN at the Los Angeles Times, the Government. However, we

also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an Executive order that this incorporation is responsive to the Attorney General's expressed interest in trying more to conform our guidelines to our work

in areas where definitely is not included.

I advised these gentlemen that I was aghast when I read the headlines and the lead paragraph of this article

and could not believe that JIM ADAMS did not reute informant RONE's testimony that we took no action relative to con-

templated violence since I knew that this was contrary to the rules, regulations, policy, and philosophy of the FBI

in 1960. In then called Mrs. ADAMS in Washington, D.C., and she likewise was upset over the headline and lead paragraph.

priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General

under Title 28, Section 28, United States Code, to be equally important.

ENCLOSURE EX-112  
 1 - Bureau (1 Encl)  
 1 - Los Angeles  
 REG:nmb  
 (4)

12-1137-1269  
 12-1137-1269  
 12-1137-1269

12 DEC 12 1975

-7-

Approved: 7 1976

Special Agent in Charge

Sent: **PRESIDENT** M. Per \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 483-874

because, according to ADAMS, he completely refuted these statements in that we did disseminate the contemplated investigation plans of violence to the Birmingham Police Department and to the Department of Justice in the form of a letterhead memorandum. These guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating to national security. A copy of the new guidelines was previously furnished to the FBI. I continued that I waited until I received the actual transcript of testimony and told the gentlemen that upon my review of the testimony of Mr. ADAMS and Mr. WANNALL, to the best of my knowledge, I could not reconcile the headline and lead paragraph with such testimony. I then proceeded to read several excerpts from the testimony. The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.

I advised Mr. THOMAS and Mr. GUTHMAN that my immediate reaction was to prepare a "Letter to the Editor" but felt after a re-analysis of the situation that this is not a judgment question on the part of the newspaper, but one of a slanted, inaccurate story either by design or through misunderstanding. I therefore felt that the Los Angeles Times, if it so desired, should be in a position to correct the situation itself based on the facts.

Mr. THOMAS expressed appreciation for my approach and stated that at the time he read the article, already printed, a question came to his mind as to why the FBI did not advise someone or take some action relative to contemplated violence. He, however, took no further action. He said in view of what I had read from excerpts of Mr. ADAMS' testimony and the now available complete transcript of the testimony, he intends to pursue this matter further and would prefer not to have a "letter to the Editor", but rather correct any inaccuracies on the part of the Los Angeles Times through their own pursuit of further inquiring concerning this story.

Mr. GUTHMAN concurred with Mr. THOMAS and they indicated that it appears the obvious question is based on Mr. ADAMS' testimony of who in the Department of Justice received this information relative to contemplated violence and what did such a responsible Department of Justice official do with the information. He agreed that based on the information furnished to them, the FBI has been done an injustice but that they, the Los Angeles Times, desired to pursue this matter further.

1 - Mr. W. R. Hannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
2 - Legal Counsel Division

LA 66-6243  
The Attorney General

April 22, 1975

(1-Mr. Farrington)

~~Director, FBI~~ It should be noted the article of JACK NELSON is based on one specific situation, namely the testimony of former informant GARY ROWE that he had furnished advance information to the FBI to the effect that members of the Ku Klux Klan would be given the opportunity to beat members of the Freedom Riders without interference by law enforcement authorities for approximately 15 minutes after which the local law enforcement authorities would take action, and that the FBI was advised of this ~~in advance~~ Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ENL:ekw (1)  
(8)

4/24 Approved by D.G. (Inch:4, Her.)  
4/25 Delivered to Major Epstabin  
of SSC

POD

REC'D

62-116395-82

NOTE: The Senate Select Committee has made a request for titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage of manpower assigned in these areas. The Administrative Division has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this data should be furnished formally in a written response to the Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classification a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures since should they be made public or otherwise fall into the

- 3 -

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5 APR 29, 1975

J ENCLURE

307  
7/14  
WILLIE / OLY  
100

Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Int. Div. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Oper. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Int. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Int. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Phone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Select Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

AMERICAN DOCUMENTS Doc ID: 32889622 Page 107  
GPO 2014-200948/2009628 Page 107

GPO 2014-200948/2009628

The Attorney General

NOTE CONTINUED:

## Took No Action to Prevent Klan Violence, FBI Admits

BY JACK NELSON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—An FBI official conceded Tuesday that the bureau had failed to use its undercover work's information to head off Ku Klux Klan violence in Alabama in the 1970s.

But, the official, James R. Adams, assistant to the director, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the FBI was "just as frustrated as anyone else" at "rank lawlessness" that existed in Alabama at that time. Also, he said, the FBI is an investigative agency and has no enforcement power.

Adams' defense of the FBI came immediately after Gary Thomas Rowe Jr., wearing a hood to conceal his features, testified that on many occasions he had warned the bureau of the Klan's plans for violence, but that the violence occurred without official interference.

Rowe served six years as an FBI undercover agent before testifying in 1976 as the star witness against three



WITNESS—Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. wears hood while testifying.  
AP Wirephoto

Klanmen accused of killing a white civil rights worker in Lowndes County, Ala. Since then he has been living

Please Turn to Page 6, Col. 1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/00 BY SPOM/HW

Los Angeles Times

12/3/75

- 2 -

62-1-375-1209

EXCLUSIVE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

FROM : T. J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNL. OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
SUBJECT: GARY T. ROWE TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE, RE: ORGANIZATION

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
2 - Legal Counsel Division  
DATE: (12-3-75) Harrington

April 21, 1975

Attn: Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Sys. \_\_\_\_\_  
Other Info. \_\_\_\_\_

On 12-3-75 an individual who identified himself as Garland Reeves of the Birmingham, Alabama News, called and he advised that he understood I was the Special Agent in Charge of the Birmingham Office at the time the bus was burned with the Freedom Riders in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1961. He stated that he would like to know if Rowe had furnished us information that the Birmingham Police were going to wait 15 or 30 minutes to go to the bus station in order to give the Klan an opportunity to work over the Freedom Riders. I informed Reeves that I recall no such information being furnished to us at that time. I told him that all information we received concerning possible violence was furnished to the Birmingham Police Department. He wanted to know, if there had been such an agreement what action would I take. I told him that if I determined that the police department would not take any action for 15 or 30 minutes I would advise the Mayor of the city and the Police Commissioner and if they felt the same as the police department, I would then advise the Governor of the State.

Since this information is considered to be highly confidential, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee in order that the committee may have full protection in the intelligence Division of FBI and is available for review by our Office. Since this information is considered to be highly confidential, it is not being furnished directly to the Committee in order that the committee may have full protection in the intelligence Division of FBI and is available for review by our Office.

He wanted to know what would be the FBI's position at that time if the police department refused to take any action. I told him that we did not have jurisdiction in matters of this nature, that they were purely local and it was the responsibility of the local authorities to handle such matters. He desired to know if I would call out the Federal Marshals. I informed him that the FBI did not have any authority to call upon the Federal Marshals in a situation of this nature but if such a situation arose, I would have immediately notified our headquarters in Washington, who would have notified the Department of Justice, who would have such authority.

62-116395  
I told him that while I was in Birmingham as Special Agent in Charge we kept the Bureau headquarters in Washington completely informed of all developments and they in turn, kept the Department of Justice informed.

ACTION: Submitted for information.

TJJ:pmd (5)

1 - Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Moore  
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-29-00 BY SP2 ALM/jmg

ENCLOSURE

F B I

Date: 12/4/75

www/FAC

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)Via AIRTEL *Geffe*  
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)  
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR

FROM: SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-1714)

*LC*  
SENSTUDY 75

Re San Diego telephone call to Bureau, 12/4/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of a letter-head memorandum reflecting information received in the San Diego Office concerning GARY THOMAS ROWE, Jr.

Deputy SCOTT BOIES of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was contacted and advised that if he felt he recognized ROWE that he should not discuss the matter openly with anyone in that ROWE was obviously attempting to protect his identity. Deputy BOIES was not advised that ROWE was identical with THOMAS NEIL MOORE.

(2) - Bureau (Enclosed)  
1 - San Diego

DCS:pgh  
(3)

1 - The Attorney General

2 - Bureau (Enclosed)

NOT SPC  
AP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/2014 BY SP/SP/AN/SP

REC-100

62-116395-1206X

CH 2-6  
12/4/75

Wolfe  
SP/SP

Approved: R.L.M/C

Special Agent in Charge

67-16395-80

FBI - LOS ANGELES - COMMUNICATED THROUGH TELETYPE SERVICE - 1960 Q-340-00 (1-6)



3010-194

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.San Diego, California 4/3/75  
December 4, 1975FROM : L. C. GROOVER  
*LCG/MC*SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

*Reopened*  
*JK*

Asstn. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Assst. Dir.	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Reference Congressman Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., Adams memorandum dated 3/20/75-captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church dated 3/19/75.

At 11:30 p.m. on December 2, 1975, Deputy Sheriff Scott Boies of the San Diego County Sheriff's Office, Lemon Grove, California Sub-Station, telephonically contacted the San Diego FBI Office and advised as follows:

*Helet requested among other things, the titles and number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities, together with the names of the individuals identified as the sources of the information identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Earl Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 19, 1933, and an address of 580 1/2 Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles, and worked as security, security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.*

*The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal Counsel Division through the Intelligence Division, the response attached herewith, to the above request.*

Deputy Boies stated that he recognized the individual as the man identified as Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., who is testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Ku Klux Klan. He stated he heard Mr. Rowe talk on a news broadcast and recognized him as being an individual he knows as Thomas Earl Moore. Deputy Boies furnished Moore's date of birth as August 19, 1933, and an address of 580 1/2 Street, Chula Vista, California, where Moore resided in 1971. Deputy Boies stated that Moore worked for Western Bureau of Investigation, headquartered in Los Angeles, and worked as security, security guard for the White Front Department Store, Chula Vista, California.

This memorandum is to be forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-10-2003 BY SP2 ALM/JBG

That this memorandum will be forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter, forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to the Senate Select Committee.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

**SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION**

**ADDENDUM PAGE TWO**

**SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION**  
**ADDENDUM PAGE THREE**

JJC:jmb  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/JBG

Memorandum to Mr. Walsh  
Re: Senate Select Committee on  
Intelligence Activities  
The Attorney General

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

December 12, 1975

REC-103  
Director, FBI

*WOB*  
~~ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WO 1206, 12/14/75~~

1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan  
1 - Mr. S. Klein

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE has reviewed the attached figures prepared by the INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). Under the criteria of the current Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability of the FBI employees in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign threat. In view of the above, the INTELLIGENCE DIVISION strongly recommends that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request mentioned as H.C.

Reference is made to my November 26, 1975, letter to you enclosing among other material, a memorandum concerning former FBI informant Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is a copy of a memorandum dated December 4, 1975, regarding Gary Thomas Rowe, Jr., received by FBI Headquarters from our San Diego field office.

*WOB*  
Rowe, is a former informant who testified before the SSC on December 2, 1975, regarding his role in supplying information to the FBI regarding Ku Klux Klan activities in Alabama. He has been utilizing the cover name, Thomas Neil Moore.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the December 4, 1975, memorandum.

Enclosures - 2

62-I16395

1 - Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

Assign. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. AS Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. AS Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
1 - 137-6295

Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Coop. Sys. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Feds & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inv. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Testing \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone En. \_\_\_\_\_

SK:klm:jaw  
(11)

*WOB/Tel*  
SEE NOTE PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/14/2010 BY SP/AM/SP/AM/JV/ER

Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:

(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be classified confidential under Executive order 11652.

Above being furnished to the Attorney General and the SSC in order to apprise them of information reflecting that Rove, who testified with a mask over his face, was identified by a San Diego Deputy Sheriff after hearing Rove's voice on a news broadcast. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum consistent in this area. In this regard SA Rich V. Day has contacted Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.

(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast position that this information not be made available to the Committee or that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.

- 3 -

- 2 -

# model  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/ERG

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Adam B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES  
TESTIMONY BY THE DIRECTOR  
DECEMBER 9, 1975110216  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/4/75 BY SP2 AM/118/16

DATE: 4-10-75 DATE: 12/4/75

Actions:  Audit    
Day     
Down     
Email     
Fax     
Phone     
Print     
Report     
Scan     
Send     
Text     
Teleconference     
Video

In connection with our investigations of staff members for captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller, Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Betty LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society. In connection with the Director's appearance on December 9, 1975, to testify before captioned committee, it is possible that he may be asked concerning recent proposals in the Congress to change the name of the building. Three bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives on December 1, 1975, for that purpose. H. R. 10903, introduced by Congressman Gude of Maryland and H. R. 10918, introduced by Congresswoman Schroeder of Colorado, would change the name of the building to FBI Building. H. R. 10916, introduced by Congressman Rangel of New York, would change the name to Federal Bureau of Investigation Building. All three of the bills were referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House, the chairman of which is Congressman Jones of Alabama. It also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees. Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.

RECOMMENDATION:  
For information of the Director in connection with his preparation for testimony. On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman, and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.

- 1 - Mr. Walsh
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mrs. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland
- 1 - Mr. Moore
- 1 - Mr. W. Myall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Mintz

REC 100 12-16-81  
1 - Mr. Cregar DEC 16 1975  
1 - Mr. Steel \_\_\_\_\_  
1 - Mr. Farrington \_\_\_\_\_  
1 - Mr. Bowers DEC 22 1975

110216 REC 100 12-16-81  
CONTINUED - OVER  
DEC 29 1975 LE 12-16-81

JAM:mfd

(6)

b7c

3.0 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo  
94<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS  
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
1st Session  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

H.R. 10905

Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff. Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard. This request was conveyed to ~~Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA~~ Chief William Cregar of the Intelligence Division who subsequently advised that ~~Charles~~ Director of Security, CIA, had reviewed the file. Colby and ~~Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA~~ agreed there was sufficient cause to question her suitability for assignment to the Select Committee staff. Kane stated CIA Director Colby concurred in this observation.

These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.

To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bicentennial

RECOMMENDATION:      Civic Center Act.

- 1      ~~Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-~~
- 2      ~~tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,~~
- 3      That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bi-
- 4      centennial Civic Center Act (86 Stat. 1022) is amended
- 5      by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" wherever
- 6      it appears in such section and inserting in lieu thereof "F.B.I.
- 7      Building".

I

K  
H  
ML INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/02 BY SP/ALW/P

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams  
FROM : Legal Counsel  
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 3-21-75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 HCR/HM

H.R. 10905

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Cas. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal \_\_\_\_\_  
Oper. \_\_\_\_\_  
Procurement \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Trans. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telecomm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Beavers, <sup>To amend the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial</sup> and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director; <sup>and Michael T. Ervine of</sup> Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; <sup>the Senate Select Committee on Public Works and Transportation.</sup> During the meeting Mr. Schwarz requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.

Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Intelligence Division review and where possible make available training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer.

(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.

NW 88613 DocId:32989632 Page 116

- 1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Farrington  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly <sup>72</sup>  
PYD:kis/Alb 1975

REQ 44

62-11637-8011

17 APR 22 1975

J-EWS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/17/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

Max CONGRESS

1st Session

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE

# MOB16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 100-1162

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adviser \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Cen. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Trans. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

H. R. 10918

At 11:00 a.m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis  
Special Agent Paul H. O'Dwyer met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler  
and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request  
of the Deputy Attorney General.

Mrs. Scammans introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation. It was advised that he had been requested by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee to meet with him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine whether the new Federal building in the District of Columbia, which is expected to house the Federal Bureau's responsibilities of investigation, would be suitable for the meeting. REC 44

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

2 That section 8 of the Public Law 92-520 is amended to

3 The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure  
4 currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests  
5 and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the  
6 "BIA" or the Federal building in the block bounded  
7 by Ninth Street Northwest, Tenth Street Northeast, K Street  
8 Northwest and Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest, in the District of Columbia,  
9 in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James  
10 Wildenauer, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the  
11 - 116395

1 Building. Any reference in law, map, regulation, docu-

1 - Mr. Cregar 1 - Mr. Hotis

10 ment, record, or other paper of the United States to such

JAM:mfd (7)

Memorandum to Mr. Adams  
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

2

## A BILL

Department's representative on the ~~Committee, but he was now being reassigned to responsibilities at the White House.~~ I told him that Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's representative.

By Mrs. Scammon

December 1, 1978

Referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be willing to undertake that responsibility.

It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as possible with the Deputy Attorney General.

### RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*Dir. was advised 8/7  
not clarity on H.R.  
JGD per*

*JGD*

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

94th CONGRESS

1st Session

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: WILLIAM G. MILLER IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
IS - R

H. R. 10916

1 - Mr. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. V. H. Weimar

Asses. Dir. ✓  
Dep. AD Adm. ✓  
Dep. AD Proj. ✓  
Adm. Proj. ✓  
Adm. ✓  
Com. Syst. ✓  
Ext. Affairs ✓  
Files & Com. ✓  
Gen. Inv. ✓  
Int. Inv. ✓  
Inspection ✓  
Laboratory ✓  
Plan. & Eval. ✓  
Spec. Inv. ✓  
Testing ✓  
Legal Coun. ✓  
Telephone Rm. ✓  
Director Sec'y ✓

December 1, 1973

Mr. Rosen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director

for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73, representatives of our Washington Field Office, (WFO) interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, relative to contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. At that time Mr. Miller was the Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the National Emergency. On that occasion he was most cooperative, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in

(S) Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities rather than Soviet policies per se, Mr. Miller agreed to be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.

3. To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building,

3. That section 8 of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Bill, Senator Jacob Javits of New York, (relative to his past contacts with Grigory R. Rapota, a former Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota

5. by striking out "J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building" both (KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on Capitol Hill) times it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G. Miller was Bureau of Investigation Building" contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel, although he was not able to state with certainty that Mr. Miller had been in contact with Rapota. (S)

62-116395 21 APR 26 1975

WFO has now requested ~~NOT RECORDED~~ Bureau through the Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the Chairman of the aforementioned committee for the permission granted to again interview Mr. Miller concerning his ~~past association with~~ (S) Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~ by ~~SP-2 RUM 1/25~~

[105-213145] (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

VHW:dan

(7)

Classified by 5683 WPS/VAN

Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

Enc.

- sent 4-17-75

RECORDS

Place refiled 4-17-75

(RENSTUDY-1)

8 APR 25 1975

WFO 105-213145 Page 118

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: William G. Miller

105-213145 (S)

SEN. CONGRESS  
1st Session

H. R. 10916

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S) To change the name of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI. BY MR. RANGER It is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact.] While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same. (S)

WFO WRW/FSR  
EG WRW/FSR

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denies authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

WFO WRW/FSR  
EG

WRW/FSR

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

PLM

QPA

SECRET

Mr. Jenkins  
The Attorney General

1 - Mr. Cochran  
1 - Legal Counsel Division  
1 - Mr. Sneed  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. McWright  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
11/28/75

April 10, 1975

J. Cochran, Jr.  
Director, FBI

REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON OVERSIGHT AND PROCEDURE  
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS  
FOR INTERROGATION

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated November 13, 1975, to the Director of Central Intelligence and other selected officials dated 11/21/75, advising the representatives of the Senate Subcommittee desire to review any Bureau documents relating to the Bureau's interest in or use of drugs during interrogation. Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is

the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13,

1975 past pointed out in referenced memo that captioned Subcommittee staff members James P. Fesmire and Thomas M. Susman had obtained information from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning a program coordinated between DOD, CIA, and FBI to develop a truth serum. The program apparently began in early 1950 and ended. Persons of the FBI Laboratory had knowledge of this activity and the exhibits will be forwarded as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to

prThe information that Fesmire and Susman have obtained apparently relates to a Navy drug experimentation project from 1947 to 1954. Navy files indicated that the FBI was aware of this program and Mr. C. D. DeLoach and D. J. Parsons were mentioned. One copy for the Committee and one copy for your records.

A review of Bureau files disclosed only one reference (62-2030-75) to the Navy drug project. This was a memorandum, 8/4/58, recording that Mr. Alberti, OMI, had informed Linssen that the Navy had been developing a new drug which

(6)

62-2639

Enclosure

Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Adm. Rev. \_\_\_\_\_

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Sec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Info. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mosc. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
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Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Other Spec. \_\_\_\_\_

CC: Williams  
Plen. & Exec. \_\_\_\_\_  
(10)

84 FEB 9 1976

REC-106

62-116395-118

All information contained  
herein is UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP2/MH

Jan/00 wld  
CONTINUED - OVER

NOT RECORDED

46 FEB 5 1976

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins

I - Legal Counsel Division

RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

2 - Mr. O. Cregar

FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS

April 10, 1975

FOR INTERROGATION

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

might be used to great advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 3/11/75.

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of the Select Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

A review of Bureau files for information relating to drugs deemed to modify behavior indicates an interest dating back to 1922. However, this interest has not extended to the point where the Bureau has conducted research on behavior modifying drugs nor has it funded such research. We have maintained liaison with other agencies, primarily the U. S. Army, and industrial organizations in order to be aware of developments in this area.

On 1/30/74, Laboratory and Training Division representatives met with representatives of the Biomedical and Chemical Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, to discuss the potential use of incapacitating chemical agents in hostage situations. Although we have developed an awareness of various agents which may be used in these situations, we have not conducted any research with these agents. Memorandum on this matter are located in File # 30-807, as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

A single instance occurred where "truth serum" was administered in a Bureau case. Truth serum was administered to Thurman Stevens Wilkins at his own request while being interviewed in the Los Angeles Office, April 26, 1947. Wilkins was allegedly involved with one Lemley Samuel Witezoff, the subject of a Soviet espionage case (100-34307). The actual drug used was sodium amytal and the actual administration was done by a physician. Prior Bureau authority was not obtained by the Los Angeles Office in connection with this incident. SAC Hood submitted a letter of explanation to the Bureau on July 3, 1947. This incident resulted in the following information being set forth in SAC Letter 84-47 dated July 3, 1947:

(6)

This document is prepared in response to your

request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee.

Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee

and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED

personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. System. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Secy. \_\_\_\_\_  
MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT   
Dir. Secy. Doc. No. 32288602 Page 122  
62-11631-78  
ENCLOSURE

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins  
RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE  
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS  
FOR INTERROGATION

"The Bureau will not tolerate any experiments or participation on the part of its personnel in the utilization of the so called truth serums or other chemicals alleged to have a similar effect, ---- consequently, in the event any Bureau agent violates ~~these instructions~~, <sup>April 16, 1975</sup> drastic administrative action will be taken."

*This is to acknowledge receipt of*  
~~Classified material by letterhead memorandum dated April 16, 1975, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.~~  
There was nothing found in Bureau files that would indicate that we have received any documents from CIA concerning their drug research programs. The files do reflect that we were aware that CIA was conducting research with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and that British Intelligence had successfully utilized LSD on several Russian espionage agents. The information concerning CIA and British activities is set out for the benefit of the Director only and cannot be released outside the Bureau.

*See Marshall*  
There are two Bureau files which contain most of the information relating to the immediate area of interest of the captioned Senate Subcommittee. These files are 62-2698 (Truth Serum) and 80-645 (Chemical Munitions and Gases). Pertinent serials may also be found in 80-807 and 100-343077 as previously noted in this memorandum.

I see no reason why Mr. Michie and Mr. Sasman should not be afforded an oral briefing regarding these matters, and if necessary make pertinent serials of Bufiles 62-2698, 80-645, 80-807, and 100-343077 available to them for review.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That Mr. Michie and Mr. Sasman be advised by Legal Counsel that available Bureau records and interview with current knowledgeable employee indicate the FBI has never engaged in nor funded anyone's efforts in research and/or development programs in the use or effect of drugs on human behavior. They should be advised our efforts in this regard as far as can be established from the available records consists of following through liaison contacts with other government agencies and the private sector sources the current developments in behavior modifying drugs.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. T. Jenkins

DATE: April 15, 1975

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum J. Cochran, Jr. to Mr. Jenkins, Each Assistant Director

RE: REQUEST BY SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE

FROM : MCW ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF DRUGS. Cregar  
FOR INTERROGATION Phillips

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

(2) That if they desire to pursue this matter further, SA McWright and myself be permitted to meet with Michele and Susman to (a) reaffirm the information in recommendation #1 and (b) if necessary, to produce for their inspection pertinent serials from 62-6290, 60-615, 60-807, and 100-343877.

From time to time, requests will be made of various Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.

In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information: (1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting, which will be month just ended; (3) Main days devoted to Project assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by 5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3)(a) one-half day @ GS-16; one day @ GS-15; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b) two days @ GS-7; two days @ GS-5.

This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.

If a Division has not participated during the preceding month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.

The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most practical and will suffice.

ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director,

62-116395

15 APR 22 1975

SFP:ekw (18)

WPWT

ekw  
82

XEROX  
JUN 11 1975

5 APR 28 1975

pm jas  
5-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Mr. C. Gregar

PROM : W/wo Gregar

SENSTUDY 75

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/01 BY SP2 ALMTZG

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. P. Gallimore  
1 - Mr. U. Uebelmann  
1 - Each Assistant Director  
11/6/75
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. Soncregor  
1 - Mr. C. Gremright  
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Ctr. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Lab. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Secy. \_\_\_\_\_

This is to inform you that on 11/7/75 Defense Department will release to the Senate Select Committee (SSC), the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures (Senator Edward M. Kennedy's committee), and to the press, information concerning Navy projects from 1947 to 1954 involving drug experimentation; a Navy file indicates FBI was aware of programs but laboratory has no knowledge of any active participation by Bureau personnel. We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to meet the requirements of the Select Committee with the exception of the research that will have to be done in the substantive Divisions.

On 11/4/75, Clark McRuder, Assistant to Admiral Bobby L. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, informed me that on 11/7/75 the Navy was going to release to aforementioned committees and the press information on drug experimentation and that the FBI was mentioned in the pertinent files. Those files were reviewed at the Pentagon on 11/6/75 by supervisor J. P. Thomas of INIS. They had been classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" but now have been completely declassified. FBI was mentioned in connection with three projects. There are no FBI documents in the files. A memorandum dated 9/21/75 informed Mr. Alberti to a proposed request from the Committee to receive one copy of "drugs stated to have been used by Russians and Germans in interrogation techniques". Alberti is identified elsewhere in the file as Jack H. Alberti, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), who apparently coordinated the project mentioned in the file. The purpose of one project was to develop a speech-inducing drug to obtain intelligence from interrogates and the project began in 1947. The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O. Credar, D-2 Section, Intelligence Division. His duties will encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select Committee in an effort to identify policy questions;

WOC:lmh (9)  
(18)

RECORDED - 11 APR 1975  
ENCLOSURE  
CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-  
5 W/wo

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Sanstudy 75  
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
62-116395  
Re: Sanstudy 75

50

ambiguities. An memorandum dated 8/15/75 on letterhead of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations concerned "Top Secret" Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) Project on Speech-Inducing Drugs, reported a meeting on 8/11/50 attended by personnel of NMRI, CIA, Office of Naval Research (ONR), a drug agency representative and Mr. Deloach and Mr. P. J. Parsons of the FBI Laboratory. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the FBI on a CIA project on narco-hypnosis and on the NMRI project. Parsons reportedly said the FBI had no such project, but had information on the experiences of various police departments in the United States with speech-inducing drugs. He agreed to make the FBI information available to NMRI and CIA. ONR agreed to give FBI, NMRI and CIA a study by ONR on projected research to improve polygraph reliability. Recipients were to give their comments and recommendations on the study to ONR. At the meeting NMRI gave Deloach an 8/11/50 NMRI progress report on its project. Parsons agreed to look into the possibility of getting volunteers from prisoners in Federal institutions and to supply NMRI with cannabis (marijuana) and heroin to the extent they might be available to the FBI. It is noted that no FBI representatives were listed in the memorandum reporting a 9/27/50 meeting of this group and there is no further record in the file of FBI participation. Neither is there any record that the FBI supplied any drugs for the project. White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism for the entire intelligence community.

Material regarding project "CHATTER" included a carbon copy of a rough draft memorandum (no letterhead) bearing the penciled date "11/50" which contained the following, clearly off information under the third agency rule carried on a project in cooperation with the Department of the Air Force and Army, CIA and ONR for the development of speech-inducing drugs... The Directors of Intelligence Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community of the three services, of CIA and FBI consider this project

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

62-116395 to Mr. W. R. Wannall

Re: Senstudy 75

of utmost importance and urgency to... fulfillment of their  
missions for the security of the United States." The  
memorandum says that a project submitted to OMB by Professor  
Richard Wendt of the University of Rochester (NY) had been  
approved by all the agencies involved and recommended  
funding the project. The file indicates subsequently that  
this project did go forward and involve human experimentation.  
~~Because of the White House insistence that all requests  
be made through the Select Committees, the Project  
had no permanent records facility available to the Project  
Committee. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI  
documents furnished to the Select Committee must be sanitized  
(excised), it is imperative that records facility not only contain  
copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original  
text. For this reason, we have included in this file~~  
~~related to formation of a Pseudo Management Project to  
impose will or control." FBI was not mentioned.~~

In addition to the above, there will be stenographic  
and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the  
work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more  
personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the  
present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees  
require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be  
submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel  
assigned to the Project.

Although the physical space for the Project is  
limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75  
will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This  
space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.

As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter,  
Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should  
~~any member of the intelligence community get requests from other  
Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence  
community, he would be of interest to advise me, or if of such  
subject by U.S. and foreign researchers, copies of both the  
requests and an abstract of the responses should be made  
available to the Intelligence Bureau files by the Laboratory~~  
~~A review of logical Bureau files by the Laboratory~~

ACTION: Division disclosed only one reference (62-2599-75) to the  
above. This was a memorandum, 8/4/50, recording that  
Mr. Alberti, OMB, had informed liaison that the Navy had  
been developing a new drug which might be used to great

CONFIDENTIAL - OVER

- 3 -  
JW

MBC PLM  
w/w

2 - Legal Counsel Division  
(1-Mr. Farrington)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
**The Attorney General**  
Re: Sunstudy 75  
62-116395

April 9, 1975

H-105  
Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**  
advantage on espionage suspects. Navy offered to inform us about this. A notation by Mr. DeLoach indicated that Mr. Parsons would meet with Navy on 3/11/75. (Navy memorandum on this meeting set out above.) from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents. We have received a memorandum dated 3/11/75 from Defense describing the proposed release of Navy information to the committees and to the press. Copy of that memorandum and of the press release are attached. The release says that "Liaison was maintained with the FBI" concerning the drug releases. ACTION: SCI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

REC-106

Enclosures - 13

62-116395-75

12 APR 23 1975

EWL:jvl.  
(7)

ENCL BEHIND FILE

3-ENCLOSURE

pm

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Con. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Most. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Re. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Secy. \_\_\_\_\_  
MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

84-1070-31464-2 Date 12-02-95 George Page 128

GPO 95-386

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HB

2 - Legal Counsel Division  
(1-Mr. Farrington)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

PRESS RELEASE NOVEMBER 9, 1975  
NOVEMBER 7, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

relating to its drug research on human subjects for the period 1947 through 1954 indicates liaison concerning this project was maintained by the Navy with other Governmental and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation agencies (FBI).

A thorough review of FBI files has disclosed one of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain documents relating to this Navy research; in short, in response to this request the following material is enclosed:

memorandum, dated August 4, 1950. This memorandum, prepared by members of the liaison staff at FBI Headquarters, recorded "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86, that Navy officials had invited FBI representatives to a conference in the Washington area to discuss the usage of 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

truth serum in Intelligence circles," and that the Navy had

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, made advances in developing a new drug which "could be utilized once), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal to great advantage in the questioning of espionage agents."

Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, A handwritten notation on this memorandum directed that it to contain extremely sensitive information and for that representative of the FBI Laboratory was to attend this available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the conference on August 11, 1950, quarters.

No further identifiable references to Navy drug Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of development research is contained in FBI files. No record the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations can be located that liaison was being maintained with the

Navy regarding this program, or that the FBI had knowledge of this program prior to the date of the above memorandum.

(7) **SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED** *Eur?*

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-25

The FBI was not involved in any way in this Navy  
~~UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE~~  
drug research, and the FBI has never participated in research  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

with drugs designed to modify human behavior, nor has it

~~been a party to~~ from the table of contents of this Manual it can  
be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains  
to administrative rather than investigative operations of  
the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to  
select portions of this Manual which pertain directly to  
internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-  
intelligence matters, operations, or activities responsive  
to the Committee's request. The various other requests  
contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1975, are  
receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming  
at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures - 11

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and  
Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections  
of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to  
the Select Committee, have already been made available to the  
General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of  
Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II. Sections  
105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being  
furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed  
to examine these Sections at FBIHQ. Section 36, dealing with  
espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive  
material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the  
requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.

As a matter of interest, all of the material with  
respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made  
available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.

The Attorney General

SI 115  
Director, FBI  
WOC:SL

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Motis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
December 24, 1975

- 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan  
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford  
1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar

This is in response to the SSC letter dated December 18, 1975, wherein Senators Mondale and Baker requested rather detailed information to be made available during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

April 16, 1975  
8-pm PVD/B

This is to acknowledge receipt of ~~classifications~~ ~~most of the requests in this letter are somewhat ambiguous, they require clarification from the SSC before the FBI can logically respond. In one instance, there is no way this Bureau could respond short of obtaining the recollections of Bureau Supervisors who worked in the Intelligence Division extending back almost 20 years. Because of this, we are attaching for your approval and forwarding to the SSC the original of a memorandum which delineates the problems attendant to the request of December 18, 1975, and, in most instances, requests a meeting between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, SSC, and representatives of this Bureau in the hope that some alternatives or clarifications can be developed. A copy of the memorandum is furnished for your records.~~ *See Memo*

Enclosures (2) *SL*

62-116395

Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ass't. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Int. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Filing & Cns. \_\_\_\_\_  
Rec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mod. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Phot. & Encl. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Testing \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rec. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

WOC:lhb/llb

(12) *edw*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/30/00 BY SP25/MW

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

202-354-2100-202-354-22369802 Page 131

202-354-2100-202-354-2289628 Page 131

62-116395-575  
ENCLOSURE

202-354-2100-202-354-22369802

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams  
The Attorney General  
FROM : Legal Counsel  
SUBJECT: ~~RE: STUDY 75~~

DATE: 4-8-75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD-Mktg. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. \_\_\_\_\_  
Supervision \_\_\_\_\_  
Travel \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Counsel \_\_\_\_\_  
Public Rel. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS

### BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

The request of 12/18/75 was received in the Intelligence Division in the midafternoon of 12/22/75. A conference was held on the morning of 12/23/75 of pertinent

Division personnel in an effort to identify the problems connected with responding to this request. It is believed that the only way the Bureau can logically respond to the request is by obtaining clarifications and, in some instances, alternatives to the requests set out.

As you were previously advised, William Miller, then Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad overview of our investigative responsibilities.

We have already determined that both John Elliff and the SSC Counsel, F. A. O. Schwartz, are out of the city beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. The Legal Counsel Division has left ward with Mr. Schwartz and/or Mr. Elliff to call SA Paul Daly upon their return to the city. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour of the Files and Communications Division.

Copy of 12/18/75 request attached.

Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.

REC-106

It is expected that those attending the briefing will include: Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present, we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director.

### RECOMMENDATION:

That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications Division on 4-11-75.

- 1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Jenkins  
1 - Mr. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Farrington  
1 - Mr. Hotis

JBH:dkg (10)  
84 APR 23 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

62-116395

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. ID \_\_\_\_\_  
Assist. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Mem. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Re. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

December 24, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY 601

Mr. F. J. Cassidy  
Mr. W. O. Cregar

## U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

"The Washington Post," Thursday, Dec. 10, 1975, edition

on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is entitled to make public eventually any documents it gets and is very familiar with "strings attached."

Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's statement must be obtained and in the interview we should furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975, and the first week of January, 1976.

On December 22, 1975, this Bureau received a copy of a letter dated December 18, 1975, which Senators Mondale and Baker sent to the Attorney General levying certain requirements on the FBI with a request that the responses be provided the SSC during the last week of December, 1975,

and the first week of January, 1976. Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that the CIA Director William F. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that this statement would be a topic of discussion at the Executive Committee meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of 4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position

that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared to send a letter with his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.

Upon receipt of referenced letter, the Intelligence Division initiated efforts to isolate the files documenting these preventive actions. The Bureau's response of December 10, 1975, was predicated on a review of the pertinent inspection reports of the Intelligence Division.

These reports do not document by file number the individual all FBI personnel to whom preventive actions were taken. In these reports, it will be necessary to have knowledgeable Intelligence Division personnel queried in an effort to try to match the preventive action with a particular investigative file. In some instances, this matter

Enc.

WOC:lbh/bb

(11)

Mr. Wainall

Mr. Mintz

Mr. W. O. Cregar

PVD:dkg (0)

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-1204X

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG  
1 - Mr. Farrington  
1 - Mr. Hotis

1 - Mr. Daly

RECOMMENDATION  
CONSIDERED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RECOMMENDATION:

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

~~No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.~~

~~there will be no investigative file but merely a communication from a field office reporting information furnished by a source of the FBI on which some preventive action was predicated. It is possible that the acts of violence reported by the source could involve a violation over which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction. In such cases, the local field office would have merely furnished the information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and no investigative file would exist.~~

We are continuing our efforts to attempt to isolate those files which document preventive actions. However, because of the problems attendant thereto, as well as those problems raised in the subparagraphs of Item 1, it is recommended that a meeting be arranged between Mr. John Elliff, Domestic Task Force Director, and representatives of this Bureau to discuss possible alternatives to some of these requests.

Items 2 and 3 concern the September 24, 1975, report to the House Judiciary Committee by the General Accounting Office. The FBI is in the process of preparing a response and it will be made available to the Committee as soon as possible. However, it is noted that the FBI prepared no analysis at all on the findings of the General Accounting Office contained in their report of September 24, 1975.

Item 4 requests the annual reports from the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968, and the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that organization was under investigation. Item 4 also requests annual reports available on the investigations "about which materials were supplied pursuant to John Elliff's request of October 26."

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

## Senate CIA Committee Says

RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

## White House Stalls on Data

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Committee on Intelligence Operations division indicated they consider the query, but its committee chair, Sen. Birch Bayh, Indiana, said he had no time to answer it. The committee's staff director, John Colby, told reporters after the hearing that the committee had received "pertinent reports from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies and other parts of the government." He had been authorized to write another letter to President Ford to expedite the request.

**There were no annual reports submitted by the office of origin to FBI Headquarters for the investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1963 through 1968. With regard to the Women's Liberation Movement, the SSC has been provided copies of all pertinent reports for the years the organization was under investigation. In an effort to clarify what is meant by the annual reports available on the investigations about which materials were supplied pursuant to Mrs. John Elliff's request of October 26, 1975, it is again proposed that a meeting with Mr. Elliff be arranged to clarify this ambiguity.**

The committee asked Mr. Ford on March 14 to furnish the executive orders and Jan. 26 Executive Order of the Secret National Security Council, which would be authorized by Section IV of the Department of Justice's guidelines draft on "Domestic Security Investigations."

**The indices of this Bureau are not organized to enable retrieval of information of a "preventive action" character or examples of FBI actions taken to prevent violence. The retrieval of such information from FBI files, other than that described in the response to Item 5, would require extensive review and/or dependence on the recollection of individuals of occurrences extending back almost 20 years. It is suggested that, during the proposed meeting with Mr. John Elliff, this request be discussed.**

Item 6 requests access to all FBI materials pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from January 1, through April 4, 1968.

"The Washington Post"  
April 10, 1975

62-116395-93  
INCLUSIONS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Mr. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

FROM : W. J. O' Cregor  
RE: DECEMBER 18, 1975, LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
FROM SENATORS MONDALE AND BAKER

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Walsh  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Cregar

It is this Bureau's belief that all pertinent material pertaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., for the period January 1, through April 4, 1968, has been made available to the SSC responsive to previous requests. With regard to the Poor Peoples' Campaign and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, it is not clear whether the letter is requesting access to the entire FBI file on these two activities from the period January 1, 1968, through April 4, 1968. It is recommended that a classification of this request can be accomplished during the previously proposed meeting between Mr. John Clancy as well as senior officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

Item 7 requests all materials pertaining to "Project Oversehoe." Items of interest were discussed:

Mr. Padwick Hills reported that he had a meeting with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members of any particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff personnel. Without additional information regarding "Project Oversehoe," this Bureau cannot be responsive to this specific request again, but it is suggested that, during the forthcoming meeting with John Clancy, clarification of "Project Oversehoe" will be obtained. Hills also discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of this individual's testimony and then ~~REHAG~~ advise the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice as to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and Staff Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present during the

Enclosures

WOC:ebc

(9)

SI-106

CONTINUED - OVER

1 ENCLOSURE  
5 APR 21 1975

Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Compt. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Meet. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Info. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Counsel \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## Intelligence Division

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DATE 12/30/02 BY SP-3000 ST

Memorandum for Mr. Wannah

INFORMATIVE NOTE  
SENSTUDY 75 Date 1/5/76

RE: SENSTUDY 75

testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony attached is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/28/75. It is anticipated more definitive (SSC) impact on the final decisions regarding this aspect will be forthcoming from the White House. Director has requested he be advised regarding the status of this request.

The question was raised by the Bureau representative attached to a copy of a letter to the interagency registry AG and DDCI for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, members of the Intelligence Community received from the Congressional committees. Mr. Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question; however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community, involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White House, such requests should be provided to the interagency a result of this meeting, and a date for the response. understanding was developed regarding the

Mondale-Baker attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff who have been certified for access to compartmented information.

Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow by the Bureau possibly in addition to the ones listed. The pencil notation in D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in the agencies of the Intelligence Community responding to item 1 concerning a paper which addresses these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised Items 2 and 3 are in signature process on this very subject and agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline for completion of the study is 4/28/75.

reports on some 31 organizations. This

will be time-consuming and we can only hope of the survey of the SSC facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building covering all aspects of physical and technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.

Attached also for information is a draft of an employee notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.

CONTINUED - OVER

12/18/75  
Bureau, DDCI  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.;  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. **RE:** \_\_\_\_\_  
Maint. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspections \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. **ACTION** \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE  
~~Memorandum for Mr. Wannall 1/5/76~~  
SENSTUDY 75

RE: SENSTUDY 75

ched is a request from Senators Mondale and Baker of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) dated 12/18/75. The AG has requested he be advised of the status of this request.

ched is a copy of a letter to the AG for the SSC, dated 12/24/75, advising the AG that the request of Senators Mondale and Baker require clarification. On 12/30/75, Cregar and Daly met with SSC Staff Members Gitenstein and Epstein to obtain this clarification. As a result of this meeting, the following understanding was developed regarding the Mondale-Baker request:

Item 1 was reworded to make recovery by the Bureau possible. In addition, C and D under Item 1 were temporarily placed in abeyance. (A partial response to Item 1 is currently being walked through signature process.)

Items 2 and 3 are in signature process.

Item 4 was restricted to the annual reports on some 31 organizations. This will be time-consuming and we cannot

WOC:lhb

CONTINUED - OVER *wsu/fm*

estimate when we will complete Item 4.

Item 5 has been reduced to the recollection of Bureau Supervisor David Ryan who handled the COINTELPRO matter and will not require research beyond what SA Ryan can recall. (Ryan is currently developing material and a response to this request.)

~~have read the Resolution establishing the Senate~~  
Item 6 has been reduced to all materials relating to the Poor People's Environmental Operations Campaign, the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and Martin Luther King, Jr., contained in Headquarters files between the period 1/1-4/4/68. (We are currently working on this request.)

~~I understand that to qualify as an employee of~~  
Item 7 - Epstein has agreed to obtain more identifying data regarding Project  
~~the Select Committee on Small Business~~ and I hereby  
Overshoe and we are awaiting this information. ~~agree to, abide by those Rules. I further understand~~

~~that~~ and agree that the obligations hereby placed upon me continue after my employment with the Committee has terminated. *Wet [Signature]*

SIGNATURE

NW 55013 DocId:32989628 Page 139

SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY

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DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 AM/HG  
HMDE16

NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 139

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
OFFICE OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
GENERAL

JOHN H. KENNEDY, SENATE, CHAIRMAN  
ARTHUR B. TAYLOR, TREASURER, VICE CHAIRMAN  
ROBERT A. KELLY, SECRETARY  
WALTER P. MCGOWAN, CLERK  
WALTER S. WADDELL, JR., STAFF ATTACHE  
ROBERT H. COOPER, JR.  
ROBERT H. COOPER, JR.  
ROBERT H. COOPER, JR.

WILLIAM G. WILSON, STAFF COMMITTEE  
FRANCIS A. G. DETHMERS, JR., COUNSEL  
CARTER H. CROWDER, STAFF COUNSEL

"7.5 Testimony taken in executive session by the staff, and other materials received by the staff shall not be made public or disclosed to any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, December 16, 1975 as determined by a vote of the Senate.

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WHICH PERTAIN TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SPONSORED BY ARTHUR B. KELLY, JR.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

F.B.I.

"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any inquiry, Attorney General Edward H. Levi, his successor, or other members of the Department of Justice presented to it, the Committee members shall have a opportunity to examine all relevant testimony, papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the Washington, D.C. papers that have been obtained by the inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testimony or those papers or other materials to the public or any person outside the Committee without authorization by a majority vote, except as may be provided in the rules of the Select Committee on Intelligence which will concentrate on matters relating to domestic intelligence

"7.5 The staff of the Committee shall not disclose to either the substance or contents of the report of the Committee with regard to the conduct of the Committee by the FBI or other domestic intelligence agencies, the causes of such alleged abuses or excesses and recommendations which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we have uncovered. *Senate Select for 1-5-76*

We are aware of the fine work in which your staff has been engaged in these areas and hope that they will be available to work with the Committee staff on these matters. However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs to be supplemented in several important respects and therefore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to the FBI for further information which we hope will be created on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These future requests which will be handled between the two committee counsel or Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Force Leader, and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, will pertain to information necessary for us to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue matters on certain specific alleged abuses which remain unsettled. Among the future requests will be questions pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security-Investigations" and on manpower and budget statistics for the FBI's domestic intelligence program. *12/11/75*

REVIEWED

For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee, it is essential that the information requested below be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
SENATE OF THE  
UNITED STATES

Resolution, the Committee Rules include

United States Senate

BY SENATOR

FRANK STENZEL, IOWA, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TAYLOR, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HORN, MASS.  
WALTER P. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. RODNEY, DEL.  
ROBERT MCGOWAN, ILL.  
GARRET HARDY, COLOR.

CHARLES H. KENNEDY, JR., TEXAS  
ROBERT REEDERSON, KANS.  
CHARLES WOOD, MICHIGAN, JR.  
ROBERT B. CANTRELL, FLA.

WILLIAM D. MILLIKIN, ILLINOIS DIRECTOR  
PAUL L. MURPHY, ILLINOIS, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN  
CHARLES E. COOPER, SECURITY COUNSEL

SENATE COMMITTEE  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMITTEE)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

get 19 1975

provisions of the Senate Rules which provide for the confidential treatment of material received by the Committee. These provisions are contained in Rules 6.11; 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which provide the following:

"6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No testimony shall be made public, in whole or in part or by any Department of Justice authorized by a majority vote of the Washington, D.C. office 20530, prior to the Chairman the name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee shall be General Lewis prior to his testimony."

"RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC SECURITY

"ARTICLE VI. PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL  
Office Building shall operate under strict security  
precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times  
by the FBI and other domestic intelligence agencies; the  
entrance to control room. All persons before entering  
the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard  
which the Committee might make to remedy the problems we  
have uncovered.

"7.2 Sensitive documents and other materials shall  
be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be  
available to work with the Committee staff on these matters.  
However, the Subcommittee finds the Committee record needs  
to be supplemented in several important respects and there-  
fore finds it necessary to direct a number of requests to  
the FBI for further information which we hope will be  
treated on a priority basis so that the Subcommittee can  
meet the deadlines set by the full committee. These and  
future requests which will be handled between the two  
have committee counsel Mr. Frank Ellings Domestic Task Force Leader,  
and Mr. Shaheen, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coor-  
dination, with pertinent information necessary for  
securing to formulate meaningful recommendations and to pursue  
in the person of a specific individual who will be available  
among the future requests will be questions  
pertaining to your guidelines on "Domestic Security-Intelli-  
gence" and on manpower and budgetary statistical for the  
the Committee domestic intelligence program staff director, the  
chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to

"For us to meet the deadline set by the full committee.  
It is essential that the information requested below be

~~SECRET~~

Draft 3/28/75

~~SECRET~~

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attorney General Edward H. Levi

Page Two

December 18, 1975

Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of Confidential Material  
provided during the last week of December and the first week of January;

NOTICE

1. With respect to each of the examples of effective prevention of violence provided the Committee pursuant to John Eillif's letter of November 26 to Mr. Shahsen, please provide access to materials in the investigative file for the 6-month period preceding the act of violence been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.

(a) All materials relating to the legal and factual predicate for each investigation;

Committee requires the Committee to (b) The first investigative report disseminated outside the FBI in each such case, and a list of recipients of that report;

(c) The total number of individuals whose names were referred to the FBI's general name index in the course of each investigation;

(d) The total number of individuals about whom information was obtained through informants, confidential sources, physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and other sensitive techniques; and information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Government engaged

(e) The annual report from the office of origin for each such investigation to FBI headquarters for the last five years during which the case in question was an open investigation during the course of its study

2. Please provide any information which you have refuting the suggestion made on page 34 of the General Accounting Office's September 24 report (to the House Judiciary Committee, that cases in which violence can be predicted probably represents less than 2% of all FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

which would adversely affect the intelligence.

3. Please provide all memoranda or analyses prepared for the Justice Department Director Kelley nor Assistant Director Wannall on the findings of the General Accounting Office as presented to the House Judiciary Committee on September 24.

in foreign countries of any department or agency

4. Please provide the annual report from the office of origin to FBI headquarters for the investigation of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DD/A 75-1549

Attorney General Edward H. Levi

Page three

December 18, 1975

Dr. Martin Luther King in 1963 through 1968, and for the investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement for the years that that organization was under investigation, and the annual reports available on the investigations about ~~MEMPHIS MATERIALS ASKED~~ <sup>1 APR 1975</sup> ~~AS SUPPLIED PURSUANT TO JOHN ELLIFF'S REQUEST OF OCTOBER 28~~ the Intelligence Community

VIA ~~Memorandum for Chairman, Security Committee, dated 1 APR 1975~~  
~~SUBJECT: Security Committee, "Preventive Action"~~  
~~of the draft Department of Justice's, guidelines on domestic~~  
~~security investigations.~~ Hill

6. Access to all FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Poor People's Campaign, and the Sanitation Workers Strike in Memphis, Tennessee, from Mr. January through April 4, 1968.

7. All materials pertaining to "Project Oversight" facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by ~~Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee, was requested on 10 March 1975.~~ <sup>Thank you for your prompt consideration of this.</sup> We look forward to continuing cooperation on this area of joint concern.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and those planned for implementation, <sup>Sincerely,</sup> the facility will provide adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA documents of all levels of classification. Also attached for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Walter F. Mondale  
Chairman

Charles W. Kane  
Vice-Chairman  
Director of Security

Att:

cc: DD/A  
Chairman, SECOM

Refer  
CTA

Regrated Unclassified when separated  
from Classified Attachment(s)

NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 143

OS 5 1284

E-2 IMPDET  
CL BY 063417

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility  
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.  
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.

8-140 (Rev. 1-26-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of its operation.

Addressed to: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures at the Senate Select Committee Facility:

Copy 1 of Document: (12/18/75 Letter to the Attorney

A. Type of Facility: General from Senators Mondale & Baker)

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Street, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is via a staircase in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The staircase has a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

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DATE 10/20/2017 BY SP2/MW/JW

62-116395-1204X

S-25-131

DATE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE  
BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATIN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. NEW INFORMATION (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

X ~~DOCUMENT~~ ~~INTERVIEW~~ ~~TESTIMONY~~ ~~REPORT~~ ~~OTHER~~ 12/24/75  
A ~~document~~ passed from the auditorium to the rear handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor.

4. ~~RELEVANT INFORMATION~~ (provide description data for document item 1 above, name or subject matter, possibly briefest, information, testifies and subject)  
exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor.

Memorandum

5. ~~THE EAST CORRIDOR~~ ~~HAS BEEN CONVERED~~ ~~INTO A COMPARTMENTED~~ ~~information storage room and a compartmented document reading room.~~ ~~RELEVANT INFORMATION~~ (see item 1 above, name or subject matter, possibly briefest, information, testifies and subject)  
SSC letter 12/18/75 Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

6. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed use word closest to meaning)  
The auditorium has SIX wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (West and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the rear while the second door leads to the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west sides of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently "overshoot" projection equipment, all INFORMATION CONTAINED private film viewing rooms.

7. ~~RELEVANT INFORMATION~~ (see item 1 above, name or subject matter, possibly briefest, information, testifies and subject)  
The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west sides of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently "overshoot" projection equipment, all INFORMATION CONTAINED private film viewing rooms.  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/26/00 BY SPANWELL

62-116395 TREAT AS YELLOW  
The rear rooms will be connected with glass interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX  
IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE STUDY 75

62-116395-P284X

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. H. W. Walsh  
(Mr. G. S. McRachael)

B. Access Controls  
Mr. W. R. Mansall

12/17/76

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by J. Coohren the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground floor, or the (Mr. F. M. Loviso) Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Main entrance are checked for ID, however, air boxes are not checked.

This informative memorandum to record unsuccessful efforts to pinpoint the typewriter on which was typed an anonymous letter apparently directed to subject, the original of which was located in papers left behind on the retirement of former Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan. auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday, everyone must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and accepted at all times while in the auditorium. Examination of the questioned document by the Laboratory established that the typing was done on a Royal typewriter with pica style type. We checked available Mr. Marsden's inventory records maintained by the Administrative Division as well as our own in IINIB to locate all Royal typewriters which were in the then Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) around 1964. This search was based on the suspicion that the note was typed by Sullivan on a typewriter accessible to him in 1964 when he was Assistant Director of the DID. Building has two 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee on Small Business occupies the building. Our check-out revealed that there are available only four typewriters of the type sought which were likely inside the DID in 1964. All four are presently in IINID and three of them were readily eliminated as not identical to that which produced the questioned document on the basis that all three have closed "4", whereas the questioned document has an open ended "4". The fourth typewriter, serial number IINB 10-433913, is secured, and the section is normally quiet during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were a shift and was examined by Supervisor F. N. Devine of the Document Section of the Laboratory who advised that it is not identical to the typewriter which produced the questioned document. 200-206670 stationery post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to this post.

SFP:bblb  
(10)

CONTINUED - OVER

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DATE 12/20/01 BY SP/AMW

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 DEC 29 1975

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Marshall  
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.  
100-103670

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. A fire protection & smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will be enumerated at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. ~~The ADT Company will install and maintain~~ None. For information and record purposes.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

~~SECRET~~

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A pre-fabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder


The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations

The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.


~~SECRET~~

Capitol Park Police  
Garage



SECOND FLOOR

Second



NOTES FOR SESSION

# MDW/K  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-20-01 BY SP2 ALM/JMK

In previous sessions we discussed the importance of highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select a few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons, etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in the issue and identify options. For example, the question of Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being worked on.

There are others we feel it would be useful for the group to address and assign responsibility for further work. For example:

- |   | <u>Suggested Action</u>                   |
|---|---|
| 1. Economic Intelligence and National Security--new discussion  | Treasury                                  |
| 2. Covert action and the law  | CIA                                       |
| 3. The Intelligence Budget--open, black, or closed--rational and procedures for handling past, present and future | OMB                                       |
| 4. Joint Congressional oversight committee for Intelligence   | CIA                                       |
| 5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies  | CIA-DOJ<br><i>legislative<br/>counsel</i> |
| 6. Confidential funds authorities, contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses                             | CIA-DOJ                                   |
| 7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions legal and administrative issues   | CIA-SAC                                   |
| 8. Intelligence files and privacy   | FBI <i>select</i>                         |
| 9. The "fact of" question--international, legal and political considerations                                      | State                                     |
| 10. "Sources and methods" legislation   | ONI/DOJ                                   |

What human being responsible by next Friday  
Topics at Executive Session

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 31, 1975


Mr. John Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975  
you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee  
staff designated to receive compartmented information.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



William G. Miller  
Staff Director

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/tjt  
#M0816

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID t/44 <sup>W/H</sup>

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE &amp; PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
William G. Miller	8-15-31 N.Y.	109-26-4349
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35 N.Y.	084-30-2047
William Bader	9-8-31 N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41 N.J.	139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46 N.Y.	133-34-4225
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42 Ill.	239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43 D.C.	042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48 N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46 N.Y.	053-38-7410
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19 Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40 Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23 Md.	216-14-8691

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG  
#MOR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 REINHOLD MDR IS UNCLASSIFIED  
ENVELOPE

ENCLOSURE

102-116395-10

**ENVELOPE**

**EMPTY**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

FROM : W.O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4/10/75

#MDP/6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/8/01 BY SP-2 ALM/313

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. Svcs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Copies of the list are attached to tickler copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE

62-116395

LFS:tdp (8) *tp* VPS PLM  
1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. J.B. Hotis  
1 - Mr. J.C. Farrington  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Schwartz

ST-106

REC-40

62-116395-*jde*

15 APR 16 1975

51APR211975

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
LITER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
BERT MORGAN, N.C.  
ARY HART, COLO.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.  
DARRYL GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510


March 23, 1975

Mr. John Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Sincerely,



William Miller  
Staff Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/ATG

62-116395-78  
ENCLOSURE

ATTACHMENT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE &amp; PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
David Aaron	8-21-38 IL	550-44-7971
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40 KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Chesnik	4-18-46 WI	390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47 OH	287-42-6258
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52 MA	023-44-8792
Peter Fenn	12-12-47 MA	213-50-1123
Edward Greissing	11-27-50 Germany	296-50-4113
Mark Inderfurth	9-29-46 NC	245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25 OR New Zealand	540-20-6413
Loch Johnson	2-21-42 IN	566-62-0478
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42 IN	307-44-9707
Naldeena MacDonald	10-19-51 Brazil	225-78-8708
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19 NE	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31 NY	109-26-4349
Susan Pitts	10-24-53 Canada	020-40-7638
Alan Romberg	12-1-38 NY	107-30-8583
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35 NY	084-30-2047
Patrick Shea	2-28-48 UT	528-64-1965
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54 OH	282-58-6476
Mary Towell	4-25-44 TN	566-64-7628

62-116395-71  
ENCLOSURE

2 - Legal Counsel Division  
(1 - Mr. Farrington)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar  
April 14, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/jmg

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC-106 62-11653-70

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

APR 21 1975

ALL:vb

(7)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ass't. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. \_\_\_\_\_  
FBI \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

1 - Legal Counsel Division  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Director, FBI

April 9, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-24EM/KG

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (3)

DRD:mjg/mjg  
(6)

NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

1 - Legal Counsel Division  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975 to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

In response to the Committee's request for a detailed current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart."

This chart was prepared January 14, 1975, and since that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and Communications Division is John J. McDermott. The Assistant Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Moore Jr. The Assistant Director of the Training Division is William L. Mooney.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 162

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

62-16375-69

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DATE 1/10/01 BY SP-2 RLM/JTG

ENCLOSURE

6-2-04 1039 6-69


# FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG

FIELD OFFICES		
ALBANY	CHARLOTTE	HOUSTON
ALBUQUERQUE	CHICAGO	INDIANAPOLIS
ALEXANDRIA	CINCINNATI	JACKSON
ANCHORAGE	CLEVELAND	JACKSONVILLE
ATLANTA	COLUMBIA	KANSAS CITY
BALTIMORE	DALLAS	KNOXVILLE
BIRMINGHAM	DENVER	LAS VEGAS
BOSTON	DETROIT	LITTLE ROCK
BUFFALO	EL PASO	LOS ANGELES
BUTTE	HONOLULU	LOUISVILLE

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR  
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR  
(ADMINISTRATION)  
THOMAS J. JENKINS

DIRECTOR  
CLARENCE M. K.

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR  
NICHOLAS P. C.



# ANIZATION CHART

FF MDL16  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM JTG

## FIELD OFFICES

MEMPHIS	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN ANTONIO
MIAMI	OMAHA	SAN DIEGO
MILWAUKEE	PHILADELPHIA	SAN FRANCISCO
MINNEAPOLIS	PHOENIX	SAN JUAN
MOBILE	PITTSBURGH	SAVANNAH
NEWARK	PORTLAND	SEATTLE
NEW HAVEN	RICHMOND	SPRINGFIELD
NEW ORLEANS	SACRAMENTO	TAMPA
NEW YORK	ST. LOUIS	WASHINGTON, D.C.
NORFOLK	SALT LAKE CITY	<b>TOTAL 59</b>

**ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-**  
**DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR**  
**(INVESTIGATION)**  
**JAMES B. ADAMS**

## OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER

## STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

OPERATIONS  
PLANNING  
POLICIES  
PROGRAMS

## INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

### COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:

#### CI-1 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE  
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT  
INTERNAL SECURITY

#### CI-2 SECTION:

ESPIONAGE  
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT  
INTERNAL SECURITY

#### CI-3 SECTION:

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - VIOLATIONS  
ESPIONAGE  
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT  
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS  
FOREIGN FUNDS  
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS  
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS  
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY - NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY  
NEUTRALITY MATTERS  
SEEDLING MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY  
BOATING MATTERS  
ANTI-PILOT  
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS  
AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U.S.

#### CI-4 SECTION:

DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON  
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS  
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

### INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:

#### IS-1 SECTION:

EXTREMISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS  
EXTREMISTS  
ACTIVITIES  
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE  
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS

#### IS-2 SECTION:

SEDITION  
SABOTAGE  
COMMUNIST  
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS  
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS  
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)

#### IS-3 SECTION:

CENTRAL RESEARCH  
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH  
TRAINING  
SPECIAL RECORDS  
DEFENSE PLANS

## LEGAL COUNSEL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
LEGAL COUNSEL  
JOHN A. MINTZ

LEGAL ANALYST  
LEGAL INSTRUCTION  
LEGAL LIASON  
LEGAL RESEARCH  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

## GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT

### CRIMINAL SECTION:

ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER  
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL  
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE  
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES  
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT  
BANK ROBBERY  
BILLS OF LADING ACT  
CRIME ABOARD AIRCRAFT  
CRIME ON LAND AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS  
CRIME ON OCEAN AND SEAS  
DESCRIPTION OF THE FLAG  
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES  
EXTORTION  
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY  
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS  
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT  
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT  
FEDERAL TRAIN WRECK STATUTE  
FIREARMS ACT (NATIONAL (B) STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ACT)  
(C) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS  
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES  
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF FIREARMS  
EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA  
ILLEGAL USE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS  
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS  
ILLEGAL WEARING OF UNIFORM  
IMPORSONATION  
INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASING TELEPHONE CALLS  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE REFRIGERATORS  
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS  
KIDNAPING  
MAY ACT  
POLICE KILLINGS  
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - CRIMINAL  
SWITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT  
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY  
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT  
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT

### CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:

CIVIL RIGHTS  
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964  
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS  
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION  
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES  
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT  
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING  
ELECTION LAWS  
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY

### NAME CHECK SECTION:

NAME CHECKS  
SPECIAL MEMORANDA

## SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
WILLIAM Y. CLEVELAND

### CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE--ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:

ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)  
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS  
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS  
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS - OBSTRUCTION  
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING DEVICES  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY TICKETS  
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING  
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING PARAPHERNALIA  
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS  
SPORTS BRIBERY  
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS

### FUGITIVE SECTION:

BOND DEFAULT  
CONTINUOUS RELEASE VIOLATORS  
CRIMINAL ARREST MATTERS  
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING  
ESCAPE AND RESCUE  
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS  
FUGITIVES  
HARBORING  
PAROLE VIOLATORS  
PROBATION VIOLATORS  
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND RE-EMPLOYMENT  
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY  
OR CONFINEMENT  
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY  
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION

### EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION OF SENTENCE  
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS)  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION)  
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS  
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION  
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES  
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION  
PEACE CORPS  
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES  
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
U.S. COURTS APPLICANTS  
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 4/7/75

1 - Mr. Bassett  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Walsh  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.

The study prepared for the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intelligence," has come to the attention of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and for that reason any requests from any committees of the Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the White House. At the present time, the consensus of those persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release of information to the committees of Congress is that this report will not be provided Congressional committees at this time.

The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled "The Third Agency Rule," copy attached, which they have requested be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's General Counsel.

REC-106

62-116395-69

Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for documents provided Congressional Select Committees. The Group 1975 asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence or

Enclosures

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(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration. A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review. Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative, Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.

Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to use in abstracting information that agency has provided one of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained in an interagency registry to be available for review by any members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have available in one location all information in abstract form that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the SSC.

Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that these persons will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated with the House Select Committee.

Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Tul

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GJM

GJM

The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

AMERICAN INFORMATION CONTROLLER  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 AT MEDEVAC

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-68

contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community *and* then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response  
to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

"D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

"(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

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DATE 1-20-01 BY SP2 2 pm (CFC)

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ENCLOSURE

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.


6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency, Bureau, District  
2. Designating agency

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.



John M. Clarke  
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Sanitization Guidelines for Documents  
Provided Congressional Select  
Committees

1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees" prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been discussed with House Staff as well.

2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines. Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.

3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He considers it essential that the written record provided to the Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

  
John M. Clarke  
AD/DCI/IC

Attachment: As Stated

#MDP/6  
ATTACHMENT CONTAINED  
DATE 1-18-27 BY SSF  
1/24/75 1/24/75

RECORDED

62-116 375-68

28 MARCH '75

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS  
PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need. Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources, the material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals.

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2. One form of this special consideration may include use of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of the community's activities.

3. What May Be Sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

4. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with

names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees

for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

#### 5. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

#### 6. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing chart<sup>s</sup> with occupants identified. Sanitization of individual identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future be considered for a covert assignment.

#### 7. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of

deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

- (a) Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.
- (b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.
- (c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.
- (d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.
- (e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
- (f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
- (g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(l) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(m) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors or furnished in confidence.

#### 8. What Should Not Be Sanitized

There are general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

There is an increasing body of information which has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy.

#### 9. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual

content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

The integrity of official records must be maintained. The following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information

as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committees but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

#### 10. Management of Sanitization

The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed upon during coordination.

This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization.

FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO  
THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE  
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. SUBJECT:
2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. TITLE:
5. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (A brief narrative statement which describes content of the material provided, problems addressed, and any conclusions or recommendations. Summary should be of sufficient length clearly to convey the basic thrust of whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
6. REQUESTOR:
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8. DATE OF SUBMISSION:
9. LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES
10. DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY  
PROBLEM? IF SO, IDENTIFY:

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/27/01 BY SP-8 PHM/KG  
#MDE/b

62-116 395-68

IC-75-1951  
28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : SECURITY - House Select Committee -  
Cleared Personnel

1. The following information has been obtained from the Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee who have been approved for access to classified material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near future with the House Select Committee.

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek  
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff  
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building  
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.  
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff  
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building  
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

Mr. John L. Boos  
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence  
Matters  
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building  
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of classified material at the levels indicated:

Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)  
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building  
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B

62-116395-68

Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)  
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building  
Cleared: TS, SI

Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)  
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building  
Cleared: TS, SI, TK

3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.

*Don*  
Donald E. Moore

Dist: R Taylor:mm/28Mar75  
O-Adse  
1 - IC Reg  
1 - SECOM

MR. JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HORNIG, MICH.  
WALTER R. MONROE, ILLINOIS  
SAM E. MOSELEY, KENTUCKY  
FREDERIC MURKIN, N.C.  
CATHERINE NANCE, COLORADO  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 91ST CONGRESS)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 12, 1975

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some of the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion to our inquiry.

At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation. As we discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,


Frank Church

62-116395-68

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DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HG

ATTACHMENT

1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19
2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDD's) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House\* directives pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.
3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure, functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington Special Action Group (and their predecessor organizations, e.g., the Operations Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).
4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and, to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.



\* "White House" as used in this listing is meant to include the President, the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4-3-75

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DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 AM/DM/ZB/6

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions of the Committee's request.

Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest to foreign intelligence sources.

On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee; John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to review in Bureau space.

REC 17

- 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Farrington - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Walsh - Enc.  
1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.

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Legal Counsel to Adams Memo  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee, a copy of which is attached.

Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to be made at one time.

It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with GAO auditors concerning the FBI.

By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response to their various requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response to the Senate Select Committee.

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WDP

RECOMMENDATIONS  
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(2) That we furnish all information which has previously been furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.

*Material furnished to GAO received, all isование within  
ambit of SJC has been furnished to SJC 4/8/75  
WPS*

(3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the Senate Select Committee.

*Done  
4/8/75  
WPS*

(4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

*JAC PWD  
jst jpa*

*PM*

*WPS*

*JAC*

*OK*

*Attelene indicated, Decononion  
reviewing material, Decononion  
with the House Ethics Bureau  
directed to GAO 4/8/75  
WPS*

examples of the types of materials requested under part I:

1. Studies on Subversion and FBI Jurisdiction which were prepared for Director Gray. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session) on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 7 and 15.

2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23 and 24, 1970. Id. at p. 151.

3. Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence operations. See the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (1974), pp. 31-32.


4. An Intelligence Division study which was furnished to the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, by Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on S. 2106, Ten-Year Term for FBI Director (1974), pp. 12-13.

5. Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director Hoover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part I (1974), pp. 3404-3405.

6. The two FBI memoranda which record instructions from President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities, and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1935. Id. at pp. 3372-3373.

7. Memorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director Tamm, dated September 10, 1936. Id. at p. 3577.

8. Presidential directives dated September 6, 1933; January 6, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953. Id. at pp. 3561 et seq.



ENCLOSURE

62-116395-61

Examples of the types of materials requested under Part III:

1. See Delimitation Agreement in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. II72-II79.

2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), Part I, pp. 3309-3303.

For references to items requested in Part IV, see:

1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arizona, to be Attorney General (1972), pp. 63-64.

2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. (1974), pp. 3509-3570.

3. Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973), pp. 150-151.

An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Item A, is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), pursuant to H. Res 803 (Impeachment), Book VII, Part I, pp. 384-431.

The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part V, Item B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session), FBI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.

Memorandum from the Attorney General to the  
Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone  
Surveillance." See hearings before the Subcommittee on  
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on  
the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress  
(Second Session), Warrantless Wiretapping (1972), p. 178.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-3 ALM/HGG

DATE: 4-3-75

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES  
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access.

With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau, be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity to review and approve documents being made available to Congress.

In connection with our preparation of responses to requests of Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum.

In those instances where documents are of a nature that we are not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise, having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should read as follows:

REC-16 62-116395-66 APR 11 1975

"This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI."

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Jenkins  
1 - All Assistant Directors

1 - Mr. Farrington  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

LEGAL COUNSEL

PVD:kjs (21)

JUN 11 1975 RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo  
RE: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES  
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's office by Legal Counsel Division.
- (2) That in instances where access to a particular document should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp in line with the above be affixed thereto.

WD JAT JAT PWS JAM  
JAT DIV 5 is appropriate  
claiming JAT 8/19  
X  
JWA  
MPC JWA

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DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 AMT/MG

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam  
(6) mabm

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC. 106

RLM:mam  
(6)nsm

PLW

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DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/jgs

62-114-7-65

7 APR 17 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
DRAFT SORRY APR 1 1975

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4. Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11, 1973.

The various other requests contained in the Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

Enclosures (4)

1 - The Attorney General

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29 VJS

ENCLOSURE

February 23, 1949

VI

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Division of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30, 1947. In addition, cognizance has been taken of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other provisions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated herein-after. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with the other subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders. When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is a mutually recognized necessity.

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**III. FBI will be responsible for:**

1. All investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of Hawaii\*\*, and the State of Alaska\* except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.

2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on this provision.

3. The coordination of the investigative activities of civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide information regarding subversive movements and activities in these categories.

4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of important developments in these categories within its cognizance, particularly:

- a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed service, including the National Guard.
- b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed forces contracts.
- c. Developments concerning the strength, composition, and intentions of civilian groups within its cognizance which are classed as subversive and whose activities are a potential danger to the security of the United States.
- d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and vital utilities which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.
- e. Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communications systems which have been designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)

- 2 -

\*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.

\*\*Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the IIC on September 9, 1959.

III. ID, Army will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.
6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described in Section 5, below.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the Aleutian Chain.\*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.

V. The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Air Force.

2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.

5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay

\*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to the Kvichak Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula excluding Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in the Aleutian Islands excluding Adak Island which is the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof Islands.\*

6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Air Force contracts.

VI. 1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial coverage, responsibility for such coverage will pass from one element of the armed forces to another automatically when a change of command responsibility ensues. This provision is subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested elements of the armed forces.

2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian populace in former enemy territories occupied by the armed forces has been provided for in Sections III, IV, and V above, those provisions are subject to direct adjustment with the Department of State if and when that Department assumes governmental direction in such areas of occupation.

VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this Delimitations Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already provided for above, general amendments or modifications involving all of the four subscribing organizations shall be issued in the form of a revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate instructions.

VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant armed forces interest not involving martial law, when agreed upon by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A or B, hereto attached, will additionally apply.

IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two or more of the subscribing agencies to the Delimitations Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are

\*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.

now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.

(Signed)

S. Leroy Irwin

Director of Intelligence,  
Department of the Army

(Signed)

Thomas B. Inglis

Chief of Naval Intelligence

(Signed)

J. Edgar Hoover

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

(Signed)

Joseph F. Carroll

Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force

APPROVED

## APPENDIX A

### PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories. His authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsibility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed forces commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.

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APPENDIX B

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY  
INTERESTS; NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army; and the OSI, IG, U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.

2. In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other agencies.

3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the other three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies, the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority from the Secretary of Defense.

III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended.

Supplemental Agreement No. I  
to the Delimitations Agreement

Cooperation and Coordination Between  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation  
The Intelligence Division of the Army  
The Office of Naval Intelligence and  
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the following recommendations will be transmitted to their field installations:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper co-ordination of their investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the four agencies at all times should insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

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(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. III  
to the Delimitations Agreement  
(As Amended June 8, 1950)

Investigative Jurisdiction on  
Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service

1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service is as follows:

a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

b. Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

c. Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

2. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port, if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation. If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility upon arrival of the vessel at the port.

3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.

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Supplemental Agreement No. IV  
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Private Contractors  
of the Armed Forces

It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants and facilities, working or bidding on contracts important to the Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual agreement between the subscribers concerned.

a. The Armed Forces will conduct background investigations of such persons unless there is a particular reason for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has notified the Armed Forces of such interest.

b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no further need for an investigation requested, but not completed, prompt notification will be made to the FBI.

c. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces under a above will be terminated and all information passed to the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.

d. When one of the subscribers is aware that another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm identical or closely connected with a person or firm it contemplates investigating, no investigation will be undertaken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investigation in progress. The investigating agency will make available to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the investigation made.

e. Normally, identity of confidential informants will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however, when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.

f. A subscriber who receives a report of investigation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.

g. A report of complete investigation received by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background information. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all information obtained. Other information required by the Armed Forces will be requested of the FBI.

h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation as provided under g above, and if for any reason the FBI declines or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investigation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investigation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers the results to be of FBI interest.

i. Nothing above is to be construed as altering the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements concerning subversive organizations.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

Supplemental Agreement No. V  
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation of Reserve and Civilian  
Components of the Armed Services

It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct background investigations on members of the inactive reserve and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled from his military status, or to determine whether the individual may be granted access to classified military information. The following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above circumstances:

- (1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or Air Force before undertaking such background investigation will consult the FBI to determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation in progress; if so, no investigation will be undertaken by the intelligence agencies except as may be mutually agreeable to the Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if the FBI already has made an investigation; if so, the results will be made available to the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has information on the individual, even though it may not have conducted an investigation.
- (2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is undertaken by the other agencies, it will be pursued no further than is necessary to make the determination required by the other agencies, and all information developed pertinent to the four categories will be furnished promptly to the FBI.

(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)

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
Supplemental Agreement No. VI  
to the Delimitations Agreement

Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned

It is agreed by the military subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted as referring to areas where the Department of the Army (Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established by the Secretary of Defense.

(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)

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DATE 11/8/01 BY SP2 AEM/JAS



In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

- (1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)
- (2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)
- (3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)
- (4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)
- (5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AM 016 1-7-0  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/196  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency  
Operations in the United States

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES  
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970  
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES

1. General

Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841 through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdiction as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.

Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI have jurisdiction.

2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General

(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter 65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.

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(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections 844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e) through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal Service buildings or functions.

(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted

(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and information is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will unduly impair further investigative efforts.

(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged violations involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be limited initially to the development of background information as prescribed in paragraph 6 below.

(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.

(4) All other alleged violations of subsection 844(f) -- offenses involving use of explosives against United States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) -- offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used, etc., by the United States - The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g) over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., a military facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

3. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdiction in General

---

(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section 842 of Title XI.

(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) - interstate transportation of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(i) - offenses against property used in or affecting commerce - Subject to paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.

(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or functions - The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such violations.

#### 4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction

The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.

#### 5. Special Considerations

##### (a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e)) -

The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection 844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available information to determine whether the identity of the offender is known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence suggests a pattern or plan of such offenses by a particular offender or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated as indicated in paragraph 6 below.

(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony (section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense. The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).

##### (c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) -

In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

6. Development of Background Information

Some incidents such as those directed against Federal property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach and will result in full Federal investigation only after consideration of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having jurisdiction will develop background information which includes (a) facts bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative and prosecutive actions; and (c) any other available facts indicating whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecution. Such background information will be submitted telephonically (202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other Division or Section.

7. Full Investigation

A full investigation will be initiated immediately in those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direction of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division having cognizance over the matter of the background information developed under paragraph 6 above.

8. Reports

Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies

shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting investigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein. Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.

Additionally, each such agency will exchange information on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations. Information regarding significant developments in investigations being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelligence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.

#### 9. Review of Guidelines

These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their administration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law enforcement.

#### 10. Summary

<u>Section</u>	<u>Type Violation</u>	<u>Primary Jurisdiction</u>
842	Regulatory provision violations	ATF
844(d)	Interstate transportation (except by mail) of explosives with unlawful intent	ATF

<u>Section</u>	<u>Type Violation</u>	<u>Primary Jurisdiction</u>
844(e)	Bomb threats - false information - Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
844(f)	Offenses against property of the United States or federally financed organizations --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
	U.S. Postal Service buildings	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
844(g)	Other (including colleges and universities)	FBI
	Possession of explosives in buildings owned, leased, used by the United States --	
	Treasury buildings or functions	ATF
844(h)	U.S. Postal Service buildings or functions	U.S. Postal Inspection Service
	Other	FBI
	Use/carrying explosives in commission of a felony	Agency having jurisdiction over underlying felony

<u>Section</u>	<u>Type Violation</u>	<u>Primary Jurisdiction</u>
844(i)	Offenses against property used in or affecting commerce	ATF
All Sections	All offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals	FBI - Unless another agency has started investigation before receipt of information indicating terrorist/ revolutionary involvement. In this event see para- graph 2c(1) above.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES  
SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES  
SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

[ "I. Purpose of Agreement

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from other sources, large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations. One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective responsibilities.

"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.) The authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or certain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault, killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President and other designated individuals.

"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request or information which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons.

"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective protection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplication of effort.

[ "II. General Responsibilities

"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect; protecting the person of a former President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined; protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).

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"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director, USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis, may direct.

"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investigative jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States and other designated individuals.

"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests in the United States.'

"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.

### III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities

"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information (other than public source information or information originating with other U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.

"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Government of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President and certain other persons.

"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for

consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carrying out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as possible.

"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indication of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.

"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investigation is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and thereafter to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, has been or is being committed.

"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.

"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 and thus does not limit or interfere with the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities. This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security including terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of the FBI.

"IV. Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS, the following information will be furnished to the extent available:

"Individual - Identification data including name or names, addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment, and marital status.

"Organization - Name or names, address or addresses, officers, size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support, background data and such other relevant information as may be available.

"Reason for Referral - Statement of the class or classes of information described in Section IV B under which the individual or organization belongs.

"Information in FBI Files - A summary, as appropriate, of pertinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization referred.

"FBI Identification Records - The USSS will make specific requests in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records is desired.

"B. Types of information to be referred:

- "1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.
- "2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for that purpose.
- "3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign officials.
- "4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments.
- "5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.
- "6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate one or more of the following characteristics:
  - a. Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional instability.
  - b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.
  - c. A propensity toward violence.

"7. Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS because of their background or activities, including evidence of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States.

"V. Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect the President and Other Protected Persons

"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be addressed to the Director of the FBI.

"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other protective function.

"VI. Implementation of Agreement

"In order to effect the best possible security of the President and certain other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS, the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and coordination of information.

"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director of the USSS.

"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the USSS.

July 16, 1973  
Date

BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 30, 1973  
Date

BY /s/ James J. Rowley  
Director  
United States Secret Service"

#106/6  
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DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/MIG

April 9, 1975

REC-106

1.2-116395-66 BY LIAISON

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

1-Mr. Mintz  
1-Mr. Wannall  
1-Mr. Cregar  
1-Mr. Flemister  
1-Mr. Rachner

Dear Mrs. Davis:

In connection with a request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that the following documents, which were originated or received by representatives of the National Security Council, be cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, from J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

DELIVERED BY LIAISON Letter dated November 8, 1950, from ON 4/17/75 LIAISON Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council, which encloses a report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the National Security Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence by Puerto Rican Nationalists"

Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Secy. \_\_\_\_\_

84 APP 1 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT  
NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 232

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary  
National Security Council

to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs,  
which encloses a memorandum concerning  
United States internal security programs  
under the control of the Interdepartmental  
Intelligence Committee

Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested  
the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975,  
your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

NOTE:

In view of the urgency of the Senate Select  
Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to  
the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner.  
This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past  
has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.

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April 7, 1975

Mr. Wannall

S-1 Study - '75

The statement in the attached of the ~~Third Agency~~ rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.

As an observation paragraph number 7 of the document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to Congressional Select Committee" dated March 28, 1975, (attached) appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive without first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined. Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.

REC-106

62-116375-64

Legal Counsel Division

6 APR 15 1975

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

4/9/75

ABOVE WAS BROUGHT TO  
THE ATT'D OF JOHN WANNER,  
GENERAL COUNSEL, CIA, WHO  
ADVISED THAT HE DISCUSSED WITH  
BELL'S OBSERVATIONS AND WOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM  
IN NEW PAPER BEING PREPARED.

PVD:dkg (4)

HPS

J-LFS

62-116395

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

#mop16

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

ALL FIELD INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-3 ALM/131G

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response  
to Congressional Select Committees

1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will be hearing from Senator Church.

2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.

3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," the President directed the following:

"D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department."

4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following quotes 102 (e) in full:

"(3) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,

ENCLOSURE

63-1163 - 64

shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security."

\* 5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.


6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence community. Clearing each and every such reference with every agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time and manpower.

\* 7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure. Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and

1. Agency decision, initials 2  
3. Discretion applied initials

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.



John M. Clarke  
AD/DCI/IC

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group

SUBJECT: Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response  
to Congressional Select Committees

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#moe16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 ALM/HJG

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-64

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
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1. Agency discloses material  
2. U. S. Government checks  
3. Dissemination cleared

all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and telephone number of the releasing party.

8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.



John M. Clarke  
AD/DCI/IC

### The Third Agency Rule

1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency". The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".

2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.

4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:

A. (2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or

ENCLOSURE

62-116375-64

Contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.

D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any other Department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating Department.

E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information. Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of the originating Department and an assessment by the senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department as to the potential risk to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.

F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establishment of special rules limiting access to, distribution and protection of classified information and material under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head of a Department or his designee.

5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:

(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are received from all members of the Intelligence Community *and* then disseminated to members of the community under the authority of the DCI;

(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State Department may not be sent by the State Department to the Department of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;

(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to the Congress without the concurrence of CIA. Thus, a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA information should be referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection of the information can be insured.

(4) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: 4-3-75

FROM : G. R. Steel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)  
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Compt. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress. The Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investigation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.

In addition it is expected that similar requests will be forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be hired." It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of actual receipts.

Since there is no charge for these full field investigations they will have to be considered in the budget. It is noted the current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is \$2028.

EX-104

MCT

PC REG# 62-116395-63

ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be contacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and their replacements.

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Walsh

1 - Mr. Mintz - (Legal Analysis Office)  
1 - Mr. Cleveland  
1 - Mr. Steel

GRS:dc

-6-

JUN 11 1975

XEROX

APR 17 1975  
Discussed with Wm. Mill.  
4-4-75. He agreed to  
30-day deadline on  
future investigations except  
areas which he will indicate still need  
2 weeks. RGS

62-116395- 62X  
62X1

**CHANGED TO**

62-116464 - 2  
3

JUN 12 1975

Hmk/cg

#MDE/6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18-01 BY SP2 ALM/HMS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/3/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75.

- 1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun.  \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum recommends that the attached draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," was distributed to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authorities, the limitations and missions of various member agencies or departments of the Intelligence Community.

In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives of each agency or department of USIB review the document and submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or proposals for new legislation.

Enclosure  
62-116395

WOC:dln/ebc

(5)

ENCLOSURE

REC-10 62-116395-62  
APR 11 1975  
SEE ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL  
DIVISION, PAGE 3

CONTINUED OVER

3/21/1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75  
62-116395

The Department of Justice is represented on the Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participation in this matter.

ACTION:

(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence Division.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for their consideration.

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75  
Re: SENSTUDY 75  
62-116395

ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl

In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division regarding proposals and legislative language.

jcf

jma


jk

gwm

AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW

CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse of power easily thrives. In reality, however, in the implementation of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.

The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are suggested, below.



**ENCLOSURE**

62-116395-162

- 1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by amending the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect:
  - that included in the proper functions of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign intelligence information; (b) conduct of activities to carry out CIA's counter-intelligence responsibilities overseas; and (c) conduct of covert action operations overseas when authorized by the President;
  - that CIA's responsibility to produce intelligence relates only to foreign intelligence;
  - that it is a duty of the Agency to develop advanced technical equipment to improve the collection and processing of foreign intelligence information; and

--that the conduct of any counterintelligence operation or other activity overseas directed specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA employees) will be undertaken in coordination with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.

2) Establish the authority for those agencies engaged in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to carry on certain specified activities within the United States, such as:

--protection of classified information and their own installations against penetration and compromise;

--investigation of employees, applicants, and those persons who could assist the U.S. foreign intelligence effort;

--investigation of employees and other individuals to be granted access to sensitive information;

--collection of foreign intelligence information from foreign nationals and from cooperating U.S. citizens;

--establishment of mechanisms in support of foreign intelligence activities; and

--cooperation with the FBI in investigations relating to the unauthorized disclosure of foreign intelligence.

3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to establish clearly:

--that the collection of counterintelligence information in the United States and the collection of information related to internal security are functions of the FBI;

--that the responsibility for the production of intelligence related to internal security rests with the FBI; and

--that with due regard to assessed reliability of the information and responsibilities for protecting sources and methods, those agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities will make available to the FBI and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, the security and counterintelligence information relating to foreign nationals in the United States and to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities.

- 4) Recognize international terrorism and international illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, as well as for internal security operations.

- 5) Provide protection against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:
  - providing for the protection of intelligence sources and methods on a statutory basis independent of Executive Order 11652;
  - clarifying that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods related to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence;
  - assigning to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting intelligence sources and methods related to internal security and to counterintelligence within the United States;
  - imposing specific burdens, upon officers and employees of all branches of the government and others granted official access, not to disclose such information without authorization,

and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures;

--establishing effective injunctive recourse, through the Attorney General, for protection of all intelligence sources and methods;

--providing for in camera judicial review of material revealing intelligence sources and methods when relevant and necessary to criminal and civil proceedings;

--delineating authorities and responsibilities for investigating suspected or discovered unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens overseas and (b) all persons within the United States.

- 6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are desirable, for example:

--cooperation in research and development  
of technical collection and information pro-  
cessing equipment, methods and techniques;

--loan or supply of equipment, methods and  
techniques;

--provision of training in special skills and  
techniques;

--passage of information derived as a by-  
product of foreign intelligence activities to  
those agencies responsible for the matters  
involved.

A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence  
activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of  
paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits  
the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely,  
efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of  
Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of sub-  
stantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying  
degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be

"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review would provide better insight and understanding.

The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence community deserve careful attention.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Legal Counsel Division

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL;  
AUTORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN  
"INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER  
ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75

1 - Legal Counsel Division  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
DATE: 4/7/75  
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone/Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75, Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper for release to the Select Committee:

- 1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.
- 2) Exhibit B - Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36; 8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.
- 3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43; 7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.
- 4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.
- 5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIC and the ICIS.
- 6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
- 7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64, setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the Attorney General.
- 8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.
- 9) Exhibit I - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.

REC-23

EX-110 62-116372-6

5 APR 10 1975

ALL:vb

(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Legal Counsel Division

Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee Material; Authorization to Release Exhibits  
in "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75

- 10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
- 11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated 5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.
- 12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.
- 13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning instructions on campus disorders.
- 14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.
- 15) Section of paper on "Statutes."

It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council with which there are Third Agency Rule problems. As soon as cleared, it was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these exhibits prior to forwarding.

ACTION:

Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.

*AW* *CF* *wlw*  
*WSP*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *JW*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. J. McDermott  
(Attention: Mr. J. W. Awe  
Room 5644, JEH)  
DATE: 4/11/75

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Project Senstudy 75, established within the Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress. Bureau file 62-116395 has been opened for this Project.

Because of the unusual factors relating to this entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having the file very readily available to the working staff at all times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the file be maintained in the work area of the Project which, effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual manner.

There has already been much publicity about the Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as the standardized repository for newspaper articles. As a first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already in the main file be extracted and placed in the new Sub A file in the usual chronological order.

The foregoing matters have been already discussed with Mr. J. W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications Division.

## RECOMMENDATION:

6 APR 15 1975

This memorandum to be referred to the Files and Communications Division for appropriate action as above.

62-116395

SFP:jvl  
(6)

*WRC*  
*APR 25 1975*

84 APR 25 1975

Handled by Special File Room  
4/25/75

NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 260

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRC*

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt  
1 - Mr. H. E. Helgeson

DATE: 4/9/75

- 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton  
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan  
1 - Mr. H. C. Flemister  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

*#note 6*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/8/75 BY SP-2 APR 10 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum provides for the record the temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division.

Project Senstudy 75 has been established within the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is to develop a capability of implementing requests received from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.

Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75, certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:

Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75, has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.

Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date, will function as Cregar's Number One Man.

Liaison Supervisor <sup>REC'D</sup> Leon M. Schwartz has been relieved of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison Officer in contact with the intelligence community for Project Senstudy 75.

APR 10 1975

Unit Chief Seymour F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75, was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review Coordinator.

- 1 - Personnel file of W. O. Cregar  
1 - Personnel file of E. W. Larson  
1 - Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz  
1 - Personnel file of S. F. Phillips

*WOC:lmh l mh*

(12)

*54 APR 16 1975*

*SJMH*  
CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75

At this time the length of the temporary assignment is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75, the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum for the record will be prepared.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

*wfw*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 3-12-75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions receiving requests for information in connection with testimony before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expeditious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this information should generally be as follows:

1 - Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of contents;

2 - White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";

3 - At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since material will be inserted into a folder;

4 - Double spaced;

5 - Do not number pages;

6 - Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;

EX-104 REC-23 43-11632-58  
7 - Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier ball); identifying caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the caption, card folder should also have the name of the originating Division.

8 - Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up. Enc.

1 - Mr. Callahan - Enc.

1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.

1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.

1 - Each Assistant Director - Enc.

56 APR 18 1975/1  
JCF Law (1)

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo  
Re: Senstudy 75

All mail should be routed through and coordinated with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division, and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office, Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.

Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters Section the identity of individual who will be the contact and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along with his phone extension.

The Intelligence Division will be responsible for representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and the identity of such individual should be made known to the Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs 1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and submit this in the form suggested above.

The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum, also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

JCF

dw

mm

gma

gma

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 3/6/75

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Spec. *W.O.C.*

This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated 3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947.

Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all agencies can be expected.

The Intelligence Division believes considerable time and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this information together. It is believed we should begin now to assemble the data in anticipation of a request.

**ACTION:** If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate the SSC will request from the FBI.

Enclosures

WOC:ebc

(16) *bc*

TUL  
EX 104  
REC-23 62-116385-58  
LEGAL COUNSEL TO  
MR. ADAMS MEMO  
3/12/75 JCF:LAW

APR 10 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

4 March 1975

Mr. William G. Miller  
Staff Director  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator Church on these matters.

By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies are desired.

Sincerely,

  
John M. Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the DCI  
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment:

Memo to Ad Hoc Group

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

#MDR16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP2 am JTG

4 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review

SUBJECT: Information Requested by Senate Select Committee Staff Director

1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organization charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he wants similar authorities and charts for all USIS entities from their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.

2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsibilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be provided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties involved in tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding accordingly.


3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow data on all U. S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions. The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supplemental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-58

as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.

4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel, and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr. Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.



John M. Clarke

Associate Deputy to the DCI  
for the Intelligence Community

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1-Mr. Callahan  
1-Mr. Adams  
1-Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 3/21/75  
1-Each Assistant Director  
1-Mr. Cregar  
1-Mr. Farrington  
1-Mr. Fulton

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Mail \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Evgt. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75.

The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has indicated an interest in.

In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data. In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from the specific data to be collected which is extensive in nature.

ACTION:

EX 104

APR 10 1975

For information.

ABF:enm  
(19)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/mmg

70 APR 15 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Groover *[Signature]*

DATE: 4/8/75

FROM : J. J. Clynick *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel Division by memo dated 4/3.

Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be filed as one item as an EBF. *[Handwritten mark]*

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached be filed as an EBF.

Enclosure

*Field Office Survey 7-10-75*

*ENCLOSURE*

*JJC:jmb*

REC-11

IST-112

APR 10 1975

63 *ENCLOSURE* #MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP-3 AEM 1786

3 - JC

70 APR 16 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/AGS  
IS UNCLASSIFIED

02-116395-50

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR004 AL CODE

4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: SAC, ALBANY

DATE 117101 BY SP-2 ALM/JEG

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED  
BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS  
AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED  
ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE  
OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT  
15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1  
AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT;  
1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT  
85 PERCENT.

1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS  
ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND  
THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget & Accts  
608 JEG

PAGE 2

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT;  
4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS  
AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT;  
1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.

END.

2

Assoc. Mr.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-Int'l. Inv.
Att. Inv.
Int'l. Inv.
C. Inv.
Int'l. Inv.
Int'l. Inv.
C. Inv.
J. Inv.
T. Inv.
R. Inv.
L. Inv.
Mktg. Inv.
S. Inv.
Tr. Inv.
Legal Coun.
Telephone Inv.
Director Sec'y

NR001 AQ CODE

10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO: DIRECTOR  
FROM: ALBUQUERQUE

MAR 26 1975

*J. P.*  
TELETYPE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS  
25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL  
SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS  
ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40  
PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.

ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF  
HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK  
APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL  
SECURITY MATTERS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION #M0816  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EX-1 11761 E1 SP-2 7-20-1978

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

3  
*D.C.*  
R-4028  
TELETYPE

NR006 AX CODE

6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VAN

TO: BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)  
FROM: ALEXANDRIA (80-131)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.  
APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.

ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

3 SPECIAL AGENTS	NINETY PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
4 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIFTEEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS	TEN PERCENT

ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS FOLLOWS:

1 SPECIAL AGENT	TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS	FIVE PERCENT

END.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'l.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Im.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP/FA/M/116

3/CR

4

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR001 AN CODE

MAR 25 1975

5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB

*Dan*  
**TELETYPE**

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)  
FROM: SAC, ANCHORAGE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Innovation	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.

THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5 PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME, RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 22W/ZK/12/95

3/PJZ

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Couns. Sect.	
Int. Affairs	
Gen. Sec.	
Eval.	
Com.	
Tele. Rm.	
Sec'y	

NR008 AT CODED

5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

5

MAR 26 1975

*Dan*  
TELETYPE

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:

POSITION	PER CENT OF TIME
1 SAC WORKING	5
1 AS AC "	3
1 SUPERVISOR "	75
1 SUPERVISOR "	3
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS WORKING	100
4 " " " "	90
2 " " " "	80
1 " " " "	50
1 " " " "	40
2 " " " "	20

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-241-MPL/PC

*3/10*  
*Note: Supervisor Charlie Hayes, Atlanta, telephonically,  
contacted 3<sup>rd</sup>, 3/27/75. He will send initial briefings  
above out by IS & CI matters separately.*

*DJ*

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION	WORKING	PER CENT OF TIME
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS	"	10
3 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	10
4 RESIDENT AGENTS	"	6
1 " "	"	3
1 " "	"	2

THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE  
ABOVE COMPUTATION:

2, 3, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111,  
112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.

E N D

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION5 Revised

NR 007 AT CODE

MAR 27 1975

9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSP

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.

UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY  
AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm.:	
Com. & Pub. Rel.	
Ext. Affairs:	
Int. & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Int. Sec.	
Int. Sec. Inv.	
Int. Sec. Inv. Inv.	
Int. Sec. Inv. Inv. Inv.	
Planned Inv.	
Sp. Inv.	
Tr. Inv.	
Legal Inv.	
Telephone Inv.	
Dir. Sec'y	

POSITION	WORKING	PER CENT OF TIME	
		IS	CI
1 SAC	"	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
1 ASAC	"	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
1 SUPERVISOR	"	<u>45</u>	<u>30</u>
1 SUPERVISOR	"	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT	"	<u>100</u>	<u>0</u>
1 "	"	<u>85</u>	<u>15</u>
1 "	"	<u>80</u>	<u>20</u>
1 "	"	<u>90</u>	<u>0</u>
1 "	"	<u>0</u>	<u>90</u>
1 "	"	<u>85</u>	<u>5</u>
1 "	"	<u>75</u>	<u>25</u>
1 "	"	<u>60</u>	<u>20</u>

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/ATG

3/1/01

PAGE TWO AT 100-0

POSITION	PER CENT OF TIME	IS	CI
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT WORKING	80	0	
1 " " " "	20	40	
1 " " " "	0	40	
1 " " " "	5	15	
1 " " " "	20	0	
1 " " " "	10	0	
1 " " " "	5	5	
1 " " " "	5	5	
1 RESIDENT AGENT "	10	X0	
1 " "	10	0	
1 " "	10	X0	
1 " "	3	3	
1 " "	6	X0	
1 " "	0	6	
1 " "	6	X0	
1 " "	3	X0	
1 " "	0	X2	

PAGE THREE AT 100-0

IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING: 3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134 (ASSETS).

E N D

HOLD FOR 5 MORE

MR 41 9 53 PM '75

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT

602-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 014 BA CODE

10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN

MAR 25 1975

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM BALTIMORE 66-NEW

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FULL TIME  
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS  
DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS  
DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS.  
THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI  
MATTERS.

END

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep. Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep. Dir. CIO	_____
Asst. Dir. CIO	_____
Admin.	_____
Com.	_____
Encl.	_____
Fin.	_____
G	_____
I.C.	_____
I	_____
Y	_____
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P.	KL
S.	_____
T.	_____
Lee L.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/jtg  
#MDR/6  
3/17/2014

CONFIDENTIAL  
REF ID: A6749

Re: 48248

THE CLEVELAND AIRPORT

3987348

COMM-FBI-CLEVELAND TO WASHDC

1971-20 10 JUL 1971 1857

RECEIVED BY TELETYPE UNIT 10 JULY 1971 FROM THE FBI - CLEVELAND

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1971-20 10 JULY 1971

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RELETYPE UNIT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

~~TELETYPE~~

NR 002 BH CODE

241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS

TO: DIRECTOR  
FROM: BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Acst. Dir.:	_____
Adm.	_____
C-e-p. Svst.	_____
Evt. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Legal Cun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

✓pm 6/23/76  
FBI - BIRMINGHAM  
3/25/75

REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.

BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:

AGENT	IS PERCENTAGE	CI PERCENTAGE
A	95	0
B	50	40
C	80	0
D	40	10
E	60	0
F	35	15
G	5	10
H	0	25
I	30	30
J	25	0
K (SUPERVISOR)	40	20

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/26/2016 BY SP/2RZM/M/AT/16

MAP 25 GEGPI 75  
C. REED REED PUBLISHER

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR017 BS CODE

MAR 25 1975

6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MCC

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM BOSTON (66-82)

ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION, TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Corp. Crt.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. L.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JAK

3/24/75  
JAK

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR001 BU CODE

4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUFFALO KYYXXX(66- NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS  
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT  
NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED  
TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:

INTERNAL

SECURITY

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

SAC	0	0
ASAC	0	0
SUPERVISORS	0	0
SPECIAL AGENTS	6	0

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
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Legal Ctr. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

✓ Budget Act.  
Good P/H

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2 AEM/JW/KS

3/6  
M

PAGE TWO BU 66-NEW

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME PERSONNEL:

	INTERNAL	
	SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	7 1/2	5
GRAND TOTALS:		
SUPERVISORS	1	1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS	13 1/2	5
END		

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17-24 USPH-75

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

QNR 006 BT PLAIN

9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BUTTE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SECURITY MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME.  
ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE  
RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE  
DIVISION.

END 1

V

FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.

10  
Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

AMG CERTIFICATION # MDR/6  
DATE 1/17/01  
MESSAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED  
BY SP 2 ALM/JGS

3/00

REF ID: A65121  
RELETYPE UNIT  
Mar 25 11:14 PM '75

100-116395-56  
FBI - MEMPHIS  
REPORT OF INTERVIEW  
WITH GENEVA COOPER, 54 YRS., 5' 5",  
BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES.  
INTERVIEWED BY AGENT R. W. TAYLOR.  
COOPER ADVISED THAT SHE WAS  
NOT IN THE AREA ON MARCH 25TH.  
SHE STATED THAT SHE WAS HOME ALL DAY.  
SHE STATED THAT SHE WAS HOME ALL DAY.  
SHE STATED THAT SHE WAS HOME ALL DAY.  
SHE STATED THAT SHE WAS HOME ALL DAY.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
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Cmp. Syst.	_____
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Director Sec'y	_____

NR 009 CE CODED

5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.

Budget Request  
6000

CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY. THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED 75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.

END

Note: Charlotte security supervisor telephonically contacted 2pm, 3/27/75 and the difference between counterintelligence program and C.I. matters explained to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.

#M0216  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM

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Revised  
11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

NR 005 CE CODE

5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KQ

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.

CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND A SECOND HEADQUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE SINCE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/1976

3/18

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TELETYPE UNIT  
MAY 21 1975

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR026 CG CODE

610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CHICAGO

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

MAR 15 1975  
*Ocn*

*✓ R-6923*

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.

ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY, 20 PERCENT.

SUPERVISORS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME; INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT. (THE OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.)

AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10 AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 3-17-01 BY SP2 ALAN JATG

*3/17*

PAGE TWO

INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

END.

PLS ACK FOR TWELVE

NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTS HAVE AN OVERLINE

PAGE TWO

INTERIOR SECURITY. 3d. NOT LINE.

IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, I REQUEST ARE VARIOUS FILTERS  
LINE TO EXTRACTIVE MATTES.

THIS REPRESENTS A TOTAL OF 114 2d. CLASSIFIED SECURITY  
ITEMS EXCEPTIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.

FILE SEC 603  
MAY 25 7 1974 75

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 CI CODE

13  
MAR 25 1975

748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN  
CINCINNATI DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
MATTERS (CIM):

SAC AND ASAC - NONE

	IS	CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR	65 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR	<u>53 PERCENT</u>	36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	100 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	80 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	60 PERCENT	40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	27 PERCENT	73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	45 PERCENT	55 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	50 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	50 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	73 PERCENT	27 PERCENT

Asst. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Inv.
Admin.
Corps. Svcs.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
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Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Tr. In. g
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Rm. 1088  
JCH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/16 BY SP-2 ALM/JCH  
# MOC 16

3/18

PAGE TWO CI 105-7038

	IS	CIM
ONE AGENT	30 PERCENT	50 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	40 PERCENT	20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	25 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS	10 PERCENT	0 PERCENT
ONE AGENT	10 PERCENT	25 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS	5 PERCENT	5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS	2 PERCENT	8 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS	5 PERCENT	0 PERCENT.

END

REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR

SECRET IN COM

IC	SI	
T-5279-1	T-5279-2	T-5279-3
T-5279-2	T-5279-3	T-5279-4
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MAR 15 1975

7 23 PM '75

NR 005 CV CODE

8:25PM NITEL 3/25/75 RJB

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO: DIRECTOR

MAR 25 1975

FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)

~~TELETYPE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED  
TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS  
TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-  
INTELLIGENCE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE,  
AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE  
MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.

CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT  
IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE  
RESIDENT AGENCIES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2, INDEFINITE.~~

END

HOLD FOR ONE

TJT FBI WASH D

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
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Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
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Director Serv.	_____

Budget Planning  
RCA/RCB/JCH

AMDELS  
REC'D ACCEPTED BY SP-7 ALM 1/16  
GM 1-17-01

3  
AJ

62-116395-56  
NW 88608 DocId:32989628 Page 305

CLASSIFIED BY SOURCE, MODE, CATEGORY & ACTIVITY.  
IN THESE CATEGORIES OTHER APPROPRIATE, SPECIALLY IN THE  
FIRST RECOMMENDED.

END

NOTE FOR ONE

JUL 1961, FROM D

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

15

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR005 CO CODE

7:00PM EDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:

AGENTS 1 - 75, 1 - 30, 3 - 20, 1 - 10,

3 - 5 OR LESS

SUPERVISORS 1 - 20

END.

DBS FBIHQ

CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comm. Syst.	_____
Nat. Affairs	_____
Funct. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Intell.	_____
Int. Rel.	_____
Inventory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget c 105-1101  
602-1101

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 #EMT/JTG

3/0/A

00000000000000000000000000000000

55555555555555555555555555555555

55555555555555555555555555555555

ATTENTION: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

DO NOT USE THIS NUMBER

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

RECEIVED AC 10000000000000000000000000000000

SOURCE: PREMIER CO. 10000000000000000000000000000000

INTELLIGENCE UNIT. IS INVOLVED IN AN ASSAULT ON THE

AGENT. THE AGENT WAS ASSAULTED BY A MEMBER OF THE SPARTAN

ASSASSINATION GROUP.

AGENT 75

3 - 3 00 1000

SUPERVISOR

DO NOT USE

CR

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR008 DL CODE

MAR 26 1975

5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)

ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS), COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS. FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:

<u>16</u>	Assoc Dir. _____
	Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
	Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
	Asst Dir. _____
	Admin. _____
	Comp Syst. _____
	Ext. Affairs _____
	Files & Com. _____
	Gen. Inv. _____
	Ident. _____
	Inspection _____
	Int'l. _____
	Laboratory _____
	Plan. & Eval. _____
	Spec. Inv. _____
	Training _____
	Legal Coun. _____
	Telephone Rm. _____
	Director Sec'y _____

#M2e16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-272 NC/BTS

3/10

PAGE TWO DL 105-NEW

SAS	3X	IX	IX	IX	IX	IX	IX	2	2
IS PERCENT	100		34	63	62	24	30	16	5
CI PERCENT		100	66	11	38	76	16		

SAS	1	1	1	1
IS PERCENT	13	6		2
CI PERCENT		8		

X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.

END.

TELETYPE UNIT  
CIVIL

Mar 26 6 48 PM '75

X 70 VIO HAMMERSMITH WILTON ROAD TELETYPE TO THE CIVIC GOVERNMENT.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 DN PLAIN

17

535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JSG MAR 26 1975

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

TELETYPE

(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):

SAC - 0

ASAC-0

SUPERVISOR - ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI

AGENTS - 12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.

IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT HAVE NO IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR, THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Rec.	_____
Gen. Serv.	_____
Id.	_____
Int.	_____
Int.	_____
L.	_____
Pla.	el
Sp.	_____
T.	_____
Legis.	_____
Teleph. Secy.	_____
Direct. Secy.	_____

#MDE16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALME/JTG  
3/11/02

PAGE TWO (DN 66-DEAD)

(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS.  
TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TIME HANDLE CI MATTERS,  
REMAINDER HANDLE IS.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:

ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT  
SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA  
ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE  
IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 0/0  
AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA  
ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER  
RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO  
IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE  
SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON  
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON  
CI MATTERS.

END

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR

WA CLR

POLAROID REC'D 10-06-74

1000 FT. HIGH POSITION ARE CONSIDERED A HAZARD TO TRAVELERS.  
HUMANS CAN SEE IT HALF AN HOUR FROM THE TIME IT IS SEEN.

1000 FT. HIGH POSITION ARE CONSIDERED A HAZARD TO TRAVELERS.

POSITIONS HIGHLIGHTING EXISTING CONDITIONS ON THE FIELD IN  
THEIR FAVORABLE SENSE ARE USEFUL AS LEADS FOR APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS OF THE  
AREAS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO SPONTANEOUS CHANGES IN THESE AREAS.  
A POSITION WHICH IS GOOD AND STABLE IN ONE DIRECTION IS  
NOT NECESSARILY GOOD AND STABLE IN ANOTHER DIRECTION.  
ONE POSITION WHICH IS GOOD AND STABLE IN ONE DIRECTION IS  
NOT NECESSARILY GOOD AND STABLE IN ANOTHER DIRECTION.  
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NOT NECESSARILY GOOD AND STABLE IN ANOTHER DIRECTION.

RECEIVED  
TELEEXPERIMENT

PM  
75

AMM 9 1974 100-4643

NY CPT

62-116395-56

NR032 DE CODE

5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO: DIRECTOR  
FROM: DETROIT

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAs FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.

DETROIT DIVISION ALSO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND ELEVEN SAs SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE SAs 75 PERCENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE SA TEN PERCENT. ONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

HOLD PLS

18

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

# more 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 11/20/01 BY SP2 AMW/STG

7000 7- SEP 19

RECORDED  
RECORDED  
RECORDED

בנוסף למסמך הנקודות המבוקשין משלוחה  
הנוסף בפתקן יתאפשר לשלוחו  
לשלוחו בפתקן. לא ניתן לשלוחו  
בפתקן. לא ניתן לשלוחו בפתקן.

בנוסף למסמך הנקודות המבוקשין משלוחה  
הנוסף בפתקן יתאפשר לשלוחו  
לשלוחו בפתקן. לא ניתן לשלוחו  
בפתקן. לא ניתן לשלוחו בפתקן.

בנוסף למסמך הנקודות המבוקשין משלוחה  
הנוסף בפתקן יתאפשר לשלוחו  
לשלוחו בפתקן. לא ניתן לשלוחו  
בפתקן. לא ניתן לשלוחו בפתקן.

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT

21 PM

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.  
Dir. A.D. 4 dm.  
A.D. Jay.

19

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 002 EP CODE

6:28 PM NITEL 3-25-75 MJT

TO: DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW) //1P///

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ASAC HANDLES NO SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMBER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, 0 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2 ALM/tjg

3/DR

INFORMATION SECURITY  
INTERIM SECURITY

REBUTTER

DEFENSE

NSA

DDC

DOE

TLM

S-20-5

NITL

ATLANTA: END-24 AT AGENCY-DIVISION SECDEF

WFO: 0249 0249 0249 (481-22) 0249 0249 0249

STATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTTER NUMBER 000-132.

SECURITY INFORMATION SECURITY ASSESSMENT IS THE SUBJECT OF TIME CONVERSATIONS  
INTERNAL SECURITY IS PERCENT COMPARISON MADE WITH HANDBOOK TO  
SECURITY INFORMATION SECURITY ASSESSMENT IS RELATED TO COMMUNICATIVE  
SECURITY ASSESSMENT IS RELATED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.  
SECURITY ASSESSMENT IS RELATED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE EXCEPT  
CONVERSATION IS RELATED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 30 PER CENT OF TIME TO  
COMMUNICATIVE INFORMATION; 30 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY  
SECURITY MATTERS, 30 PER CENT OF COMMUNICATIVE INFORMATION; 30 PER  
CENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY. IS 30 PER CENT COMMUNICATIVE INFORMATION;  
ONE, WHO IS RELATED SECURITY INFORMATION IS RELATED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.  
INTERNAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT IS RELATED TO COMMUNICATIVE INFORMATION.

END

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

20  
**TELETYPE**

NR 001 HN CODE

5:08 PM HST NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HONOLULU (66- ) 1P

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.


END.

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Int'l.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director See'y	_____

Budget JEH

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP&ADM/JTG  
3/D/J



7. 1. 1968

7. 1. 1968

7. 1. 1968

7. 1. 1968

POLICE DIRECTORATE, NEW DELHI, 1968

TO : DIRECTOR

RE : HONOURABLE MEMBER OF THE

LEGISLATION COMMITTEE WITH REGARD TO THE ACCORDINGLY.

GENERAL SECRET COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

THE SURVEY METER TO MR. DAVIES, MARCH 24, 1968.

HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE HAS BEEN SPECIAL USE IN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

COUNTRY MATTERS BROADBAND POLICY AND PRACTICAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AS

GENERAL SECURITY AS FACTORS; 8 PERCENT OF THIS IS DEDICATED TO COUNTRY INFORMATION.

GENERAL AND 15 PERCENT EACH OTHER MATTER; 1967-1968 IS 25

GENERAL INFORMATION; 1967-1968 IS 3 PERCENT OF COUNTRY INFORMATION; 1967-1968 IS 3 PER

CENTRAL INFORMATION; 1967-1968 IS 3 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1967-1968 IS 3 PER

CENTRAL INFORMATION; 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS ARE DEDICATED TO COUNTRY INFORMATION AS

ONE OUT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

ACCORDINGLY, GENERAL SECURITY MATTER, 1967-1968 IS 3 PER CENT OF

THE 1967-1968 BUDGET DRAFTS THAT CONCERN SECURITY.

GENERAL AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

END

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR008 HO CODE

5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: HOUSTON

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY  
WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS  
REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AGENTS	2.05	2.70
SUPERVISOR	.30	.40
SAC	.02	.04

END

HOLD

Assoc. Dir.	—
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	—
Dep.-A.I.-C.R.	—
Asst. Dir.	—
Adm'n.	—
Com. & Gov't	—
Ext. Affairs	—
Fin. & M. m.	—
Gen. Inv.	—
Ident.	—
Inspection	—
Int. R.	—
Laboratory	—
Plan. & Eval.	—
Spec. Inv.	—
Training	—
Legal Coun.	—
Telephone Rm.	—
Director Sec'y	—

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP 2 RTM 146

3/1/01  
F.V.

END

NRG

NRG NO CODE

2005 PM MELT MARCH 25, 1963 210

TO: DIRECTOR

BROWN HUSTON

ATTENTION: BUREAU AND ACCOMPLISHMENT.

APPROXIMATE EFFECT COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE DRAFTED ATT TO ALL 2005, MARCH 24, 1963.

DET TORONTO REPORTS ARE SELF, SUBPARTIZAN AND VENDETTA CHARTERED

ORGANIZATION SECURITY AND COMMUNIST TIEBOND LETTERS AS

SPECIALLY IN PREEMPTED LETTERS

INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMATION UNIT

SAC

SUPERVISOR

VEENTS

32

32

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR005 IP CODE

MAR 25 1975

5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH-  
*THURSTON*

TO DIRECTOR

FROM INDIANAPOLIS

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING  
FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO  
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

SAC : NONE

ASAC : NONE

SUPERVISORS .30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40  
INTERNAL SECURITY

SPECIAL AGENTS 6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND  
9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD FOR FIVE MORE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Inv.	_____
Coo. p. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Int. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Lab. Inv.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

22

MDR/6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 FAC/TTAG

62-116395-56

23

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

*Doc*  
**TELETYPE**

NR003 CODE JN

4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD

TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
FROM JACKSON (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.A D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Cmp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Fin. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Intell.	_____
Int. Sec.	_____
Intl.	_____
Lab. Rv. Ry	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Tr. Inv.	_____
Legal Cns.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION #M016  
CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ADM/116

3/20

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

NRO03 JK CODE

TELETYPE

7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
FROM JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL  
FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY  
AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME  
TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS  
ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.;	_____
Admira.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP-2 ALM JTG

B/PD

RECORDED AND INDEXED BY THE TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 25 1975 7:24 PM PH 75

TELETYPE UNIT

RECORDED AND INDEXED BY THE TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 25 1975 7:24 PM PH 75

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MAR 25 1975 7:24 PM PH 75

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MAR 25 1975 7:24 PM PH 75

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RECORDED AND INDEXED BY THE TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 25 1975 7:24 PM PH 75

TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

NR 003 KC CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW

TO: DIRECTOR

(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM: KANSAS CITY (100-0)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL 3/24/75.

KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.

TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENT, 90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH; FOUR AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

HOLD

25

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2/AM/16

2/14

RECEIVED ON 20 SEP 1968

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2 JAMES R. COOPER

REF ID: A6520

RECORDED IN THE COMPUTER BY SP2 JAMES R. COOPER

ON 10/10/00 AT 10:00 AM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/10/00 BY SP2 JAMES R. COOPER

REF ID: A6520

RECORDED IN THE COMPUTER BY SP2 JAMES R. COOPER

ON 10/10/00 AT 10:00 AM

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RECORDED IN THE COMPUTER BY SP2 JAMES R. COOPER

ON 10/10/00 AT 10:00 AM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE  
UNITED STATES  
ARMED FORCES  
TELECOM

123PM  
10/10/00

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NRO04 KX CODE

MAR 25 1975

DCW

8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN: BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION)  
FROM: SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAP-  
TIONED AS ABOVE.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS. TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D. Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D. Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Serv.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Ctr.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
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Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/BSR #mDe16

3/12/88

PAGE TWO        KX 100-00

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION  
OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH  
CATEGORY.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR

6627 TEL

EX 153-36

GOVT, TELETYPE UNIT

CONFIDENTIALITY ITEM: DETERMINING THE PREDATOR ATTITUDE  
OF THE TWO DIFFERENT MONTHS & PERIODS OF THE RAINY SEASONS  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE READER WILL FOR ONE WEDGWOOD

TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 25 7 47 PM '75

62-116395-S6

27

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 011 LV CODE

838 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ①

LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.

LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.

END

TJT FBI WASH DC CLR

① Supervisor Don Smith contacted and advises Counterintelligence matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.

3/27/75  
5<sup>45</sup> pm / J

#MDRIS  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/TB/SP

2 agents involved, one about 3%  
of his time & one about 2%

D.J.

3/D.A.

2. 211 LA CODE

3. BY MISTER WAGCH 65, 1935 MFB

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM LAE VEGAS CIO-CIO

ATT: SUPERIOR AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

STATE DIRECT COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE FURNISH TEL TYPE, MARCH 21, 1935.

LAE VEGAS SAV AND ASA DO LOT SUB-LIBRARY, INTERNAL SECURITY

MATTERS. LAE VEGAS HAS NO COMMUNICABILITY OF MATTERS.

LAE VEGAS HAS ONE RING CHIEF WHO IS THE CHIEF INTERNAL

SECURITY DIRECTOR WHO IS UNCOOPERATIVE. IT IS ESTIMATE

THIS INFORMATION COULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE CHIEF OF THE

INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR.

LAE VEGAS LINE POLICE OFFICES WHO ARE COOPERATIVE WITH

INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR. IT IS ESTIMATE THAT THE CHIEF

INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR IS PART OF THE UNIT WHICH IS THE

ONE DIA, WHICH IS THE INTERNAL SECURITY DIRECTOR, AND THE

CHIEF TEL. 1935/14721 COULD BE USED.

TEL 211 MARCH 26 CIO

62-116395-56

28

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 LR PLAIN

3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

*Cudahy/RK +  
3/26/75*

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
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Ident.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED

TELETYPE:

TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME  
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH  
BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:

ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME  
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT  
OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTER-  
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY  
8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT  
ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/KHG

3/26/75

**REFUGEE**

300 PM REPORT FROM CO 133 ON

01 MAY 1953

1000 LIQUOR HOOCH (99-155)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

SEVERAL PEOPLE CONSIDERED AS INTELLIGENCE VULNERABLE.

ONE LUGAAN TROOPER TO ALL 5405, MARCH 31, 1953.

REFUGEE SET DOWN IN RESPONSE TO THIS MESSAGE:

15 MAY 1953

TO THE 1000 LIQUOR HOOCH DIVISION, EAST-TRI-

ON INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION WITH

THE FOLLOWING:

REFUGEE SET DOWN IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

1. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

2. INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS

3. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

4. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

5. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

6. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

7. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

8. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

9. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

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11. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

12. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

13. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

14. ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL.

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 009 LA CODE

12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOS ANGELES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUTEL, MARCH 24 LAST.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER. DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF PERTINENT. THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER. TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTG

Asst. Dir.	_____
Asst. A.D.-Adm.	_____
Asst. A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Secy.	_____
Int. Sec.	_____
Int. Affairs	_____
Int. Com.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

29

✓ Budget JCH  
602 JCH

3/10/01

PAGE TWO

ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS  
PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER,  
THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS  
EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE  
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56  
AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE  
INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR  
ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT  
CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED  
FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION  
MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION,  
BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY  
CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL  
OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN  
FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS,  
LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO  
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.

END

JTG FBIHQ CLR

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30

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR013 LS CODE

9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH

TO DI

RECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

MAR 25 1975

*Dew*  
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
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Int.	_____
Pla. & Eval.	_____
Sec.	_____
Tr.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA  
PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED  
INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI;  
AGENT (1) 25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1)  
25 IS, 0 CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS,  
10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, 0 CI.  
END.

#MOR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP 222017836

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

31

NR 005 ME PLAIN

**TELETYPE**

9:12 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JL C

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
FROM MEMPHIS

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS FIELD:

AGENT	TIME ON SECURITY	TIME ON INTERNAL	TIME ON COUNTER- INTELLIGENCE
	CASES	SECURITY	INTELLIGENCE
A	100	100	0
B	75	50	25
C	50	50	0
D	50	25	25
E	25	25	0
F	25	0	25

IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Int'l. & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ideas	_____
Intra. Intra.	_____
Int'l.	_____
Lab. Dev.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2-AZM/JMK

3/DA

PAGE TWO

FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE  
EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

E N D

PLS ACK FOR FOUR TES

ACK FOR 4 AND HOLD

TJT FBI WASH DC

MAR 25 10 AM '75

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TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

32

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR002 MM CODE

925AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MIAMI 1P

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

✓ Budget + Accounting Section  
MARCH 27 1975 JEB

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:

SACS - 0; ASACS - 0.

SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.

SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED 75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.

END.

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/MS  
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RECEIVED  
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MAR 27 9:29 AM '75

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TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 004 MI CODE

7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK MAR 25 1975

O: DIRECTOR

~~2023~~  
TELETYPE

FROM: MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK. 23 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER<sup>ARE</sup> ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:

	INTERNAL SECURITY	COINTEL	OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR	70	5	25
#6 SUPERVISOR	30	55	15
#5 SQUAD 12 agents*	59	8	33
#6 SQUAD 11 agents*	44	44	12
RA'S 15 agents *	2.5	4.5	93

END

ACJ FOR FOUR \$\$\$

\* Per phone call 4<sup>55</sup>pm, 3/27/75 with George Whoptic,  
Supervisor of #6 squad in Milwaukee.

#M0816  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-FAIR/PATG

3/28

Ass'te. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Div.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget & Account.  
Rm 623

60% DIRECTORS

100% MILWAUKEE (CG-MIL)

ATTENTION: EUGENE AND VICKI TIGHE ADDRESSES

PEANUTS SERVICE CORPORATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REPUTABLE SOURCE MARCH 24, 1953.

MILWAUKEE HAS A SECURITY COUNCIL, AS AND AS, DIRECTOR OF

WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TIME TO SECURITY WORK. AS ACTUALLY ARE

ASSOCIATION OF THESE IS SECURITY COUNCIL, SECURITY INFORMATION, AND

EXTERIOR SECURITY COMMITTEE FULL TIME IN

ASSOCIATION WITH SECURITY COUNCIL, SECURITY INFORMATION, AND

EXTERIOR SECURITY COMMITTEE FULL TIME IN

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EXTERIOR SECURITY COMMITTEE FULL TIME IN

ASSOCIATION WITH SECURITY COUNCIL, SECURITY INFORMATION, AND

EXTERIOR SECURITY COMMITTEE FULL TIME IN

34

Asstoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975 116

Bud Butel  
68350174

NR001 MP COD ED

7:13 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DSC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

#MOR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

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3/16

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RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT  
15 APR 1975

602-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

35

TELETYPE

NR005 MOBILE PLAIN

11-12 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VFP

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)  
FROM MOBILE (66-1145)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

END

TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM 1226

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JULY 27 1975

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62-116395-56

36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 NK CODE

6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JOG

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
FROM NEWARK

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

Budget Acct  
G&A JFH

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL  
NEWARK SUBMIT S FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED  
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND  
PER CENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE  
CATEGORIES:

INTERNAL SECURITY:

1 ASAC - 15 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

7 SA'S - 70 PER CENT

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 2011-126

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NK

PAGE TWO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 50 PER CENT

1 SUPERVISOR - 100 PER CENT

23 SA'S - 100 PER CENT

6 SA'S - 50 PER CENT

3 SA'S - 10 PER CENT

END

MAR 26 6 04 PM '75

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TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

37

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR002 NH CODE

MAR 25 1975

1038PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LM

*Don*  
TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) 1P

ATTN; BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int'l.	_____
Law Enf.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

S E N A T E   S E L E C T   C O M M I T T E E   O N   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A C T I V I T I E S

✓ RE (6028)

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.

END

FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-27ADM/JTG

3/10/

100-10000000  
The following

W. T. C.

G. T. C.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

38

NR001 NO CODE

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DCB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU NTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE; PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT; COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE...

MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE

WA CLR

Assoc. Dir.	.....
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	.....
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	.....
Asst Dir:	.....
Admin.	.....
Comm. Syst.	.....
Ext. Affairs	.....
Files & Com.	.....
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Plan. & Eval.	.....
Spec. Inv.	.....
Training	.....
Legal Coun.	.....
Telephone Rm.	.....
Director Sec'y	.....

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/20/01 BY SP2 ALM/JES

Note: Security supervisor contacted 5<sup>20</sup>P, 3/27/75 re counterintelligence matters. He will check & act the obvious errors corrected, either through call back or corrected Ntel. PD

2/1/84

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MAR 26 1975 3:47 PM '75  
TELETYPE UNIT  
REVIEWED

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

38 Revised

MAR 27 1975

TELETYPE

NR015 NO CODE

7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JMF

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE  
MARCH 26, 1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS  
TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY  
(IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS  
ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO  
ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT  
TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT  
TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE  
OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35  
PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END MESSAGE.

DBS FBIHQ CLR

44

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2 ALW/HB

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W3300 - 01

RECEIVED BY TELETYPE 1948-06-19 10:15

1948-06-19 10:15

(25-1) SALTINA, JOHN RICHARD

ACT. 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. WIRE.

REVIEWED 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. FOR

IT IS A TELETYPE FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1948-06-19 10:

00:00:00 PM. FOR THE SUBJECT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,

WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS: RECEIVED BY TELETYPE 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. WIRE.

REVIEWED 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. FOR

IT IS A TELETYPE FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1948-06-19 10:

00:00:00 PM. FOR THE SUBJECT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,

WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS: RECEIVED BY TELETYPE 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. WIRE.

REVIEWED 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. FOR

IT IS A TELETYPE FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1948-06-19 10:

00:00:00 PM. FOR THE SUBJECT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,

WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS: RECEIVED BY TELETYPE 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. WIRE.

REVIEWED 1948-06-19 10:15:00 PM. FOR

IT IS A TELETYPE FROM THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO, 1948-06-19 10:

00:00:00 PM. FOR THE SUBJECT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,

62-116395-56

39

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR003 NY CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NITEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25 AM 3/26/75 GMD

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK  
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.

NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK OFFICE.

SAC, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PER CENT IS SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.

SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/20 BY SP2 2021/M/316

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AMERICAN AIRLINES  
COMMERCIAL AIRLINES

AMERICAN AIRLINES

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AMERICAN AIRLINES COMMERCIAL AIRLINES  
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 002 NF PLAIN

MAR 26 1975

444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB

*D.C.*

TELETYPE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NORFOLK (66-981)

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:

POSITION	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ONE SUPERVISOR	50 PER CENT OF TIME	10 PER CENT OF TIME
THREE SAs	50 PER CENT OF TIME	20 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAs	75 PER CENT OF TIME	0
THREE SAs	50 PER CENT OF TIME	0

TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/1216

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MAR 16 4:48 PM '75

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

EDWARD R. GOREY

JOHN D. HANNAH

NR008 OC PLAIN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

9:30PM MARCH 25, 1975 NITEL DSM MAR 25 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM OKLAHOMA CITY (105-2398)

Dew  
TELETYPE

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

	NUMBER	INTERNAL SECURITY	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR	1	75	5
SA'S	31	615	65

OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENTS, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 55% PERCENT OF THE 615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OF THE 65 PERCENT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TIME.

END PAGE 1

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALW/ETG

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PAGE 2

OC 105-2398

IN SUMMARY, THERE IS .75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY. THERE ARE 6.15 AND .65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.

END

ACK FOR 1 TJT FBI WASH DC CL

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TELETYPE UNIT

10-37 PM '75

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10-37 PM '75

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

1000  
**TELETYPE**

NR 004 OM CODE

4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: OMAHA

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.

OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.

TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

END

MSE FBIHQ

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

✓ Budget - M.A. Unit  
6000 JEH

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DATE 11/7/01 BY SP/SP/SP/SP

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MAR 25 5 43 PM '75  
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

43

MAR 26 1975

~~TELETYPE~~

NR 002 PH CODE

245 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 DMS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: /PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

PHILA. DIVISION UTILIZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:

	IS	CI
1 SAC	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
1 ASAC	<u>50</u>	
1 SUPERVISOR	<u>100</u>	
1 SUPERVISOR		<u>100</u>
13 SAs AT HEADQUARTERS	100	
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS	50	
9 SAs AT HEADQUARTERS		100
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS		75
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS		85

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/00 BY SP-2 11/17/00

3/10/8

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dir.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Analyst	_____
Cmp. Svst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
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Sys. Dev.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

PH 66-NEW PAGE TWO

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:

	IS	CI
1 SA	5	
1 SA	45	45
1 SA	2	2
1 SA	50	25
1 SA	30	10
1 SA	75	20
1 SA	5	70
1 SA	2	5
1 SA	70	30
1 SA		10
1 SA	5	10
1 SA	55	15
1 SA	5	1
1 SA	1	5
1 SA	35	50
1 SA	5	3

IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS, AND 19 CI.

END

KAC FBIHQ CLR

Mar 28 2:58 PM '75

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

44  
MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR 003 PX PCODE

12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)

FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.

PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

A. INTERNAL SECURITY

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS - 75 PER CENT

THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. DOMESTIC - NONE

2. FOREIGN-

ONE SUPERVISOR - 30 PER CENT

ONE AGENT - 100 PER CENT

TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT

END

MPM FBIHQ CLR

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM 1816

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CDR 3-10 100511Z MAR 26

GETTING PERTINENT INFORMATION AND

MAKING IT USEFUL

RECEIVED 39270347 0000000000000000 MAR 26 3-30 AM '75

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100511Z MAR 26 3-30 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

45  
MAR 25 1975

TELETYPE

NR 09 PG PLAIN

7:35 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RGM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNTEL MARCH 24, 1975.

THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).

ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME.  
ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.

11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.

RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

6 RAS 2 PERCENT CI	5 RAS 2 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 3 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 3 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 5 PERCENT CI	1 RA 4 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 6 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 5 PERCENT IS
3 RAS 7 PERCENT CI	1 RA 7 PERCENT IS
2 RAS 8 PERCENT CI	2 RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI	1 RA 12 PERCENT IS

END PAGE ONE

#MOR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JEGS

3/DA

PAGE TWO, PG 62-NEW

1 RA 16 PERCENT IS

1 RA 24 PERCENT IS

1 RA 28 PERCENT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING  
THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR -

PAGE TWO, PG. GS-GEN

I - 50 1G PERGE IT IS

I - 50 2A PERGE IT IS

I - 50 3A PERGE IT IS

THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES MUST BE USED AS AN APPROXIMATION.

THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS COINCIDES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD FOR EACH STATE.

DBS REPORT OF  
MAR 25 7 12 PM '75  
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 007 PD CODE

46  
MAR 26 1975

8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD

TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PORTLAND

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

PORLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.

ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS, SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI AND IS MATTERS.

ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:

SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.

ASAC (ONE), NONE.

SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.

AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Ins. & Fin.	_____
Intell.	_____
Law. Serv.	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Tr. & Eng.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

#MOR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/KTG

3/10/R

PAGE TWO

CI: 90 PERCENT - TWO

80 PERCENT - TWO

70 PERCENT - TWO

IS: 90 PERCENT - FOUR

80 PERCENT - SIX

50 PERCENT - TWO

40 PERCENT - TWO

20 PERCENT - ONE

10 PERCENT - FOUR.

LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT  
BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO  
DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.  
END.

TJT FBI WASH DCC LR

11 - 1.2544 10 :10  
11 - 1.2544 10 :10  
01T - 1.2544 10 :10  
11004 - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10  
X1 - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10  
01T - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10  
01T - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10  
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11 - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10  
11 - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10  
01T - TELTYPE UNIT 10 :10

RECEIVED 12/01/75 10:10 AM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975

REBUTEL

NR004 RH PLAIN

3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.

FROM RICHMOND 1P

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.

RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.

END

DBS FBIHQ CLR

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep. A.D.	_____
Dep. A.D.-Int.	_____
Anal. Div.	_____
Adm. Div.	_____
Cust. Sec.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
FBI & Comm.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
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Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

Budget & Accounting  
Room 6A-8-16

# moe/b  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 Attn: JHG

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12 PM  
7/25/75

MR 25 5 CPH 75  
RECD - APPROVAL  
RECD - APPROVAL

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

NR002 SC PLAIN

9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM SACRAMENTO (66-511)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS 75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL SECURITY.

IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 AGENTS HANDLE VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).

END

FBIHQ CLR SMD

#MOR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/KTG

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Action	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

MAR 27 1988 PM '75

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TELETYPE UNIT

602-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 27 1975

NR001 SL PLAIN  
TELETYPE

✓ Budget & Accounting  
SECTION  
RHI 1-17-75 JCH

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

8:30AM URGENT 3/27/75 TJO

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JOB

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL  
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS  
IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.

NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO  
INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONLY ONE  
SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY  
55 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME  
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
MATTERS.

THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL  
SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT;  
ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2  
PERCENT.

3/27/75

PAGE TWO      S. 94-297

ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEADQUARTERS CITY AND  
RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.

END

JDR

FBIHQ CLR

TELETYPE UNIT

MAR 27 9 34 AM '75

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

NR006 SU PLAIN

8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)  
FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 Amm/HG

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI).  
ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT  
(15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS,  
10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS).  
TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.  
END. M

3/27/87

MAIL ROOM NUMBER 333  
PACIFIC TELEGRAPH CO.

344-92887

MAR 26 10:51 AM '75

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62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR006 SU PLAIN

MAR 26 1975

846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD  
TO: DRAFT TO BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
FROM: SALT LAKE CITY

*Re*  
**TELETYPE**

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
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Ident.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

*✓ Budget & Rm. 602 & 604*

RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:

SAC: NONE.

ASAC: TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).

SUPERVISORS: NONE.

SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI).

ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS). TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.

END.

JTG FBIHQ CLR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP-24EM/HG  
#MOB16

3/DAT

2000 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
2000 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

RECEIVED - 10:00 AM 26 MAR 1975  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS - AIRPORT POLICE

RECEIVED - 10:00 AM 26 MAR 1975  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS - AIRPORT POLICE

MAR 26 10:57 AM '75

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TELETYPE UNIT

602-116395-56

MR005 SA CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975

MAR 25 1975  
LPP (Dw)

TO DIRECTOR

TELETYPE

FROM SAN ANTONIO

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.

REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS.

FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.

E N D.....

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Sect	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Lat. II	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/ZES

3/6/75

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TELETYPE UNIT

Mar 25 7 PM '75  
BIAV DOCUMENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNIT  
THREE AGENT DESIGNATES APPROXIMATELY 26 PER CENT OF THE TIME  
ON COUNTERRIGHT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.  
THESE MATTERS.  
SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY CATERS AND TEN PER CENT OF THE  
INTERNAL SECURITY. ASVG VIO SUPERVISOR HAVE TO SUPERVISION OF  
MANAGEMENT OFFICE. ASVG SPECIAL APPROXIMATELY 10 PER CENT OF TIME  
OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERRIGHT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE  
SAC CIVIL SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION  
RESULTS JAPCH 9A. 125.

INTERNAL SECURITY COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
ATTN: SUPERVISORY ACCOUNTING SECTION.

TOP

CASE 1 METER MARCH 25, 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN ANTONIO

TOP

TOP

62-116395-56

NR 02 SD CODED

12:11AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL GDF

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED  
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN  
DIEGO DIVISION:

SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST  
MATTERS; TWO PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ASAC - SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS;  
TWO PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS;  
40 PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

ONE SUPERVISOR - 20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

SEVEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TEN AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY  
MATTERS.

FOUR AGENTS - EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.

END

THAT IS ALL

SSSSSSS

MPM FBIHQ CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 26 1975

TELETYPE

52

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Acting	_____
C. Sec. Sys.	_____
Int. Affairs	_____
Mike C. Comm.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Prop. & T.	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Off.	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

3/22

RECEIVED IN RECORDING ROOM  
1125 AM, APRIL 1945

RECORDED BY [unclear]

AMERICAN AIRLINES

AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPORT

AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPORT

AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPORT

REFELAGE

AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPORT

62-116395-56

53

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
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Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR 004 SF CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC

MAR 26 1975

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO

ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS  
MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL  
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.

SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED  
FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS  
FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED  
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH  
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END

IEWTZ

JTG FBIHQ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/jgs

3/26

MAR 26

9:26 PM '75

RE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 25 1975  
~~TELETYPE~~

NR003 SJ CODE

10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
FROM SAN JUAN

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE  
DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT  
PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY  
MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR - FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR - TWENTY PER  
CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS - FULL TIME; THREE  
SPECIAL AGENTS - FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.

AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLI-  
GENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL  
ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

END.

DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA

Asst. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep. A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst Dir:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. & W.	_____
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Director Sec'y	_____

Budget & Accounting  
6008-1445

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 MEM/1445

3/14

MARCH 27 1962

WHITE HELMETS S-22-25 XKC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DIRECTOR AND ACCOMPLISHING SECTION

RECORDED MAIL

EXAMINER'S REPORT CONCERNING ACTIVITIES  
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA  
IN COUNTRY  
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL  
DATE: MAR 27 1962  
SUBJ: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN COUNTRY  
ACTIVITIES  
REPORTER: DIAO YUAN  
REASON: CALLING AS A ONE  
AGENT  
THE CALLING IS A REVAKTION OF DISCUSSION  
RECORDED IN THE SAME PLACE DIVISION WHICH IS  
DIRECTOR: DIAO YUAN

ONE SUPERVISOR - UNIT TIME: ONE SUPERVISOR - UNIT PER  
UNIT OF TIME; HONEST SPECIAL AGENTS - UNIT TIME  
SPECIAL AGENTS - UNIT PER CENT OF THE TIME.  
AT THIS TIME, THE MAIN DIVISION HAS NO COMMUNIST  
MEMBER IN A POSITION; THEREFORE, IT IS  
NOT APPLICABLE TO COMMUNIST DIVISION.

END  
SAC SHIHE, AGC 305 ONE GA

62-116395-56

55

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR002 SV CODE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR

MAR 25 1975

V.C.  
P-100000

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAVANNAH

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

✓ REK/22

REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING SET FORTH:

INTERNAL SECURITY		COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1 SAC	0	0
1 ASAC	0	0
1 SUPERVISOR	40 PERCENT	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	90 "	0
1 AGENT	50 "	10 PERCENT
1 AGENT	10 "	0
1 AGENT	0	30 PERCENT

ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PERCENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND 0 FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE AGENT.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/MAG  
3/14

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TIME 24 PM 75  
DATE 20 NOV 75  
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" 14

1.30 1

0450 7 01

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

56

NR002 SE CODED

3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 CSC

TO DIRECTOR  
FROM SEATTLE

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS - FULLTIME; THREE AGENTS - 85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.

SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:

ONE SUPERVISOR: 80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS - FULLTIME.

END

HOLD FOR ONE MORE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ert. Affairs	_____
File & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
I. & I.	_____
Intelligence	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-2 AMN/VIG

3/P/A

RECORDED AND INDEXED

AND CERTIFIED RELIABLE WITH THE RECORD

BY TELETYPE UNIT NO. 1

ON APRIL 25, 1969

AT THE REQUEST OF THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE,

WILLIAM D. GIBSON, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. HOGAN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

MURRAY M. GOODMAN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

ROBERT S. HARRIS, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN W. KELLY, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN L. MCNAUL, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN P. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN R. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

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JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

JOHN T. O'BRIEN, JR., AND THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT,

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT  
APR 25 1969 PM '75

RECORDED AND INDEXED

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 013 SI CODE

MAR 26 1975

10:22 PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK

*DJK*

TO DIRECTOR

TELETYPE

(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)

FROM SPRINGFIELD (66 )

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.

AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:

THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAS SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.

57

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-AD-Adm	_____
Dep.-AD-Inv	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Asst. Dir.	_____
Com. Secy.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Int. & Com.	_____
Inv.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int. Secy.	_____
Planned Eval	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Train. Inv.	_____
Legal Cm.	_____
Telephone Pm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-1-2011 BY SP2 ALM/JES

31  
P

SI 66-

PAGE TWO

THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.

E N D

DBS FBIHQ CLR

MAR 26 11 33 PM '75

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

58

MAR 26 1970

TELETYPE

NR010 TP CODE

6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD

TO DIRECTOR

FROM TAMPA (105-0)

ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS, SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.

NONE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.

INTERNAL SECURITY - SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5  
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS, 1.5.

END

#moe16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

Assoc Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp Svst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Lab. at. ry	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Train. g	_____
Legal C. on.	_____
Telephone Rec.	_____
Dir. Sec'y	_____

3/16

59

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
A.D. Adm.	_____
C.D. Syst.	_____
Int'l. Affairs	_____
Int'l. Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Int. Inv.	_____
Int'l.	_____
Liaison	_____
M.A. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR004 WF CODED

MAR 26 1975

2:57PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS

*PA*  
TELETYPE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM: SAC, WFO

ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

REGARDING BUREAU NTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING  
12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT  
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CD MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10  
PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.

IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6  
SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL  
AGENTS AND 1 SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS.  
ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME  
TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.

END.

JRM FBIHQ

CLR

# moe/b  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP2 ALM/JTG

MAR 26 3 02 PM '75

RECEIVED  
TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395-56

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 4/4/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

(60324 UC BAW/SAB/mL)  
1/12/2011

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;  
RODNEY HILLS, ASSOCIATE  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

AM 016 1-17-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/176  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

Assoc. Dir.  
Dep. AD Adm.  
Dep. AD Inv.  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the ORCHID and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman.

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to this; that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

WRW:dsh  
(5)

REC-11 62-116395-55

CONTINUED - OVER

8 APR 11 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by 12 WRW  
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

34 APR 16 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams  
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;  
~~RODERICK HILLS ASSOCIATE~~  
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified "Top Secret" to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 4/4/75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations Mr. Hoover had with the President.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

WOC:aso (3)

1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. A. L. Lacey

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP/AFM/HG

REC-5 62-116395-54

APR 8 1975

SWB

54 APR 1 1975

2 - Legal Counsel Division  
(1-Mr. Farrington)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

The Attorney General

April 8, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to a request set forth in referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures - 2

EWL:jvl  
(7)


#MDR16  
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DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 RZM/ZTG

REC-38

62-116375-53

EX-110 REC-38  
APR 10 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_



APR 16 1975

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 954-545

2 - Legal Counsel Division  
(1-Mr. Farrington)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the requests contained in referenced letter was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on April 1, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee. It was agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included, which would be made available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

This is to advise that the list has been prepared and is available for review under the above conditions.

1 - The Attorney General

EWL:jvl  
(7)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

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DATE 11/7/01 BY SP2 ALM/jlg

Enclosure

62-116375-53

GPO 954-546

Access only

check 7/28

#moe/16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 1/17/04 BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG

#MPC16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS  
~~IS UNCLASSIFIED~~ ENVELOPE  
DATE 11/7/01 BY SP-2 ALM/TG

62-111375-53  
ENCLOSURE

AMWLB 1-17-61  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/FIG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25XK6

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/25/2011 BY SP-2 ALM/FIG

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

II

W. Raymond Wannall  
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt  
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director  
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson  
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director  
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor  
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor  
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan

Section Chief

Eugene C. Peterson

Number 1 Man

Special Cases Unit

Unit Chief

James P. Lee

Five Special Agents

New York Unit

Unit Chief

Alfred E. Smith

Five Special Agents

Washington Unit Chief

Unit Chief

Wilfred R. Schlarman

Four Special Agents

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar

Section Chief

James W. Redfield

Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response  
to your request and is not for dissemination  
outside your Committee. Its use is limited  
to official proceedings by your Committee and  
the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized  
personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(S)

Chinese Unit

Herbert J. Morgan  
Five Special Agents

Unit Chief

Satellite Unit

Howard H. Wallace  
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Coordination Unit

John P. Thomas  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

### Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.

Section Chief

Sebastian S. Mignosa

Number 1 Man

Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit

Richard J. Daily  
Four Special Agents

Unit Chief

(S)  
Middle East Unit

Carl F. Freeman  
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

(S)  
Far East Unit

William W. Hamilton  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

(S)  
Cuban Unit

Charles H. McCarthy  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Nationality Unit

Vinicio Henry Nasca  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

### Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.

Section Chief

H. C. Flemister, Jr.

Number 1 Man

Liaison Supervisors

Six

~~SECRET~~

Foreign Liaison Unit  
Robert A. Birmingham  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan Section Chief

William H. Atkinson Number 1 Man

Black Nationalist and White  
Hate - Central Unit  
William D. Neumann  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White  
Hate - East Unit  
Paul E. Nugent  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White  
Hate - West Unit  
Garnett T. Tunstall  
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist - South,  
Klan and Informant Unit  
Homer A. Newman, Jr.  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Civil Disorders Reporting Unit  
Seymor F. Phillips  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford Section Chief

Conrad W. Thompson Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit		
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Communist Party Unit		
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Security Informant Unit		
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief	
Two Special Agents		
Extremist-West Unit		
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Extremist-East Unit		
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief	
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man	
Training Unit		
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Central Research Unit		
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief	
Four Special Agents		
Special Records and Related		
Research Unit		
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief	
Two Special Agents		
Analytical Research Unit		
David Ryan	Unit Chief	
Seven Special Agents		

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

#MO216 1-17-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 AM 1/26  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25K6

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

W. Raymond Wannall  
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt  
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director  
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson  
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director  
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor  
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor  
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan

Section Chief

Eugene C. Peterson

Number 1 Man

Special Cases Unit

Unit Chief

James P. Lee

Five Special Agents

New York Unit

Unit Chief

Alfred E. Smith

Five Special Agents

Washington Unit Chief

Unit Chief

Wilfred R. Schlarman

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One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar

Section Chief

James W. Redfield

Number 1 Man

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to official proceedings by your Committee and  
the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized  
personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(S)

Chinese Unit

Herbert J. Morgan  
Five Special Agents

Unit Chief

Satellite Unit

Howard H. Wallace  
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Coordination Unit

John P. Thomas  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr. Section Chief

Sebastian S. Mignosa Number 1 Man

Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit

Richard J. Daily  
Four Special Agents

Unit Chief

Middle East Unit

Carl F. Freeman  
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Unit Chief

Far East Unit

William W. Hamilton  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Cuban Unit

Charles H. McCarthy  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Nationality Unit

Vinicio Henry Nasca  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr. Section Chief

H. C. Flemister, Jr. Number 1 Man

Liaison Supervisors

Six

Foreign Liaison Unit  
Robert A. Birmingham  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan Section Chief

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Black Nationalist and White  
Hate - Central Unit  
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Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

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Paul E. Nugent  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White  
Hate - West Unit  
Garnett T. Tunstall  
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist - South,  
Klan and Informant Unit  
Homer A. Newman, Jr.  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Civil Disorders Reporting Unit  
Seymor F. Phillips  
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

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Conrad W. Thompson Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit		
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Communist Party Unit		
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Three Special Agents		
Security Informant Unit		
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief	
Two Special Agents		
Extremist-West Unit		
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Extremist-East Unit		
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		

### Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief	
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man	
Training Unit		
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief	
Three Special Agents		
Central Research Unit		
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief	
Four Special Agents		
Special Records and Related		
Research Unit		
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief	
Two Special Agents		
Analytical Research Unit		
David Ryan	Unit Chief	
Seven Special Agents		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO  
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Total Equivalent Full- Year Agent Employees
Internal Security	2.80	1.75	47.06	671.07	722.68
Counterintelligence	2.34	2.16	46.18	904.29	954.97

These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:

	Special Agents In Charge	Assistant Special Agents In Charge	Special Agent Supervisors	Special Agents	Percent of Total Agent Personnel
Internal Security	4.2%	2.9%	11.9%	9.5%	9.5%
Counterintelligence	3.5%	3.6%	11.7%	12.8%	12.6%

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LZC  
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by \_\_\_\_\_  
Exempt from CDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinito

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

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#MOR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM  
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by 9  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

4/2/75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 10M 12/15  
ON 1-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
9  
Classified by \_\_\_\_\_ 2 & 3  
Exempt from ADS, Category \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/75

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

\*moe16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/jms  
ON 1-17-01

9  
Classified by \_\_\_\_\_  
Exempt from SDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3-21-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF  
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS  
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY  
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

#MOR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 112310 BY SP-2 ATM/JES

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B. Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and Command and Control.

Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress. He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.

If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course, suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done.

REC-10 62-116395-52

NOT RECORDED  
02 APR 10 1975

RC MAR 28 1975

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Reed
- 1 - Mr. Farrington
- 1 - Mr. Hotis 14 APR 1975

JBH:dkg (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo  
RE: JOHN T. ELLIFF

*b6*

It should be noted that the Select Committee considered offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions. In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the <sup>Committee</sup> legislation concerns of law enforcement.

It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar. Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.

Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to the Senate Committee until he hears from us.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment offered by the Senate Select Committee.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *W.R.W.*

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan  
1 - Mr. Adams

DATE: 3/31/75

1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75. *[Signature]*

This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development Administration. *[Signature]*

The following items of interest were discussed:

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O. Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business. Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is the identification of several key issues that the Committee could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could select one or two for an in-depth study. *[Signature]*

The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement. Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community had some protection against unauthorized disclosures by staff members of the SSC. *[Signature]*

Enclosures

WOC:ebc

(7) *[Signature]*

CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE  
APR 14 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified information or material originating in one department shall not be disseminated outside any other department to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating department.

The Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to the Select Committees.

The question of Intelligence Community personnel being represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills Associate Counsel to the President."

It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or department employing the persons to be interviewed.

Attached also for the record are the following:

A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G. Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;

A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75 advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to classified information up to and including "Top Secret";

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Wannall  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing how such documents should be delivered.

ACTION:

For information and record purposes.

Wannall/Twh

PLM

grm

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.  
HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.  
BARRY GOLDWATER  
CHARLES MCC. MAUL, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510


March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated Compartmentation Officer.

Sincerely,



William G. Miller

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/17/01 BY SP2 ALM/jcs  
#m0816

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
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DARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
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(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 17, 1975

Mr. John Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IG  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20505

#MPC16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/176

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a consideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman. As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send additional persons to be granted clearances.

As to access to compartmentalized information, those members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated to you in subsequent communications.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



William G. Miller

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE &amp; PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
Charity Benz	7-23-46 N.Y.	053-38-7410
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37 Mass.	026-28-6318
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46 Ala.	420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23 Md.	216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48 N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43 D.C.	042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46 N.Y.	133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40 Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42 Ill.	239-62-8495
Jan Orloff	11-14-47 Cal.	558-74-8394
John F. Peterson	6-15-41 Cal.	565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45 N.C.	246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41 N.J.	139-30-1936

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
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WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
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BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCC. MORRIS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWAB, PA.  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

Ad Hoc Staff

75-181

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 20, 1975

Mr. John Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear John:

The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number has received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Benjamin Marshall, May 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)  
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530

Sincerely,

*William G. Miller*

William G. Miller

AMDR16  
S-2 ALM/ZTG  
1-17-91

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-49  
21 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on  
Congressional Review

SUBJECT : Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified  
Material by Senate Select Committee

1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C. Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975 such documents could be delivered as follows:

The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308, advise the guard there that material is being delivered and have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom are authorized to receive classified documents up to and including TOP SECRET\*.

2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents for members of the Committee and staff.

3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation

\*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive documents but the certification for this access to classified material has not as yet been received by your office.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-51

Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented material can begin, you will be advised.

*Donald E. Moore*  
Donald E. Moore  
Chairman