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EYES ONLY

8 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatrick, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,
and Mr. FitzGerald1. Agent Operations in Cuba

Mr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of 6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.

He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means. In the latter connection, the point was made that information obtained by agents of this type can contribute to the targeting of aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process of photo interpretation more meaningful.

Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have been weeded out.

The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of these five should be recommended.

(These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February 1963)

2. Subsidy to Venezuelan Newspaper

Mr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been made in connection with subsidy of the Venezuelan newspaper, which

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[was approved at the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency funds on deposit with the **Morgan Guaranty**, which will serve as collateral against the bank's loan **to the new entrepreneur of this newspaper**, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay the commercial rate of 6%. The Chairman expressed satisfaction with this arrangement.]

T. Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatrick
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY**

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~~EYES ONLY~~

28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatrick, and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3

1. Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly Forecast ⁹⁸

The Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned. Mr. McCone alluded, however, to the unexplained military activity that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of BOW TIE to check on this. It was pointed out that the BOW TIE program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind. Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer with COMOR to find out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area, and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special Group.

In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from **Lord Home** to the Secretary of State. **Home** said that while the **RAF** and the **Air Ministry** will be glad to have the advantage of the intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area. Additionally, the flight will, according to **Home**, go closer to the coast than the **RAF** is allowed to go. He was willing to agree to the mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk entailed. Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept this risk.

The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date of 19 March. Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by higher authority.)

In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system. The Group agreed that this is a high-priority requirement, in order to]

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[provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful low-level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have a USIB paper prepared on this subject.

The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now include a courtesy call at Djakarta.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile restriction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of 31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real need for this type of coastal intelligence, there would be adequate time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; and further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated before operations could be mounted based on it.

The revised RED DOG missions, to be flown in C-47's, and the proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were approved.

Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos (ABLE MABEL) until after the results of the Agency effort explained below.

The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not now propitious for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant review by operating elements.]

2. [Reconnaissance - CIA Monthly Forecast] 98

Mr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened up over North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the discussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK mission.

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EYES ONLY

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3. Removal of Soviet Troops

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Mr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Mr. Bundy stated that the official government position is that available information is insufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets on the island. He added that no change can be made in these figures, without specific approval by higher authority.]

4. Testimony on Cuba

Mr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by officials who are required to testify before Congressional committees on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr. Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together. These include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the DCI's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in the hemisphere. He added that the basic responsibility for co-ordinating public statements rests with the Secretary of State.

5. Italy - Status Report on Election Operation

The Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still in its early stages.]

6. Chile - Proposed Political Action

98

The Group approved the proposal dated 25 February, subject to approval by higher authority. (This was later granted.)]

7. Agency Operations in Latin America

98

Mr. Gilpatrick inquired as to the feasibility of mounting intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel in Latin America. Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done but that he will have it studied further.]

8. Progress on Cuban Operations

Mr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful. He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,

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Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe that there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be inadvisable now.

The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept under weekly review.]

2. Reconnaissance, Indonesia 98

The Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later disapproved by higher authority.)

3. Peripheral Reconnaissance Operations 98

a. Colonel Steakley gave the following brief reports on a number of peripheral missions:

(1) The ELINT coverage of the **Sea of Okhotsk** produced good results. He said that this area is now so well covered with radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be relaxed.

(2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now arises as to whether these weapons are in fact SA-3's or perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.

(3) A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their radars when the ship approached.

b. The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment. This includes two in the Baltic area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from **England** to the Black Sea.]

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All members of the Group expressed their interest in getting on with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view of obtaining a standby agreement with the **Indian Government** to permit staging in and out of that country. Dr. Scoville said that a message had gone out to the field on this point last night. The Chairman asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest in this proposition does exist in Washington.

3. Status Report on Italian Elections

CIA's paper of 1 April was noted.]

4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

The Group took no action on this subject.]

5. Covert Subsidy for Kong Le

At Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look into the possibilities of a covert payment **to Kong Le.**

6. Cuban Operations

The Group recommended approval of the following papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

a. Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.

b. Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.

c. Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. Fitzgerald will obtain final approval from higher authority.

Thomas A. Farrott
Thomas A. Farrott

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. Fitzgerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.

5. Annexes to Internal Defense Plans

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The **Colombia** annex was noted. In view of the fact that the basic IDP for **Bolivia** had earlier been remanded for revision by the Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group.]

6. North Vietnam Operations

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The monthly report was noted and approved.]

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He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this proposition because of the possibility that the explosions would be attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr. Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatrick felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to the proposals as follows:

- a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be more carefully defined.
- b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further technical studies.
- c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.
- d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with other resistance activities.
- e. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in conjunction with related operations.

6. Covert Action, Congo

The CIA paper of 19 April was approved with little discussion. The Chairman said that his only concern was whether we are committed to spending money at this rate forever. Mr. Tweedy said first that if the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in the U.S. interest to support a successor government in a somewhat similar way and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitments made, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.

Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority. qf8

7. Final Status Report, Italian Election Project

Mr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication for the Italian elections, as summarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd of April. He noted that virtually all the allocated money will have been passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast is generally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.

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8. British Guiana

Mr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They will consider: an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed British operational plan; alternative proposals if this plan proves not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and an inventory of operational assets.

The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current strike would require expenditures on the order of \$10,000 a day. The Group felt that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision. He said he might see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to coordinate views.

T. A. Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatrick
Mr. McCone

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the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than directly with the U.S. representative of the NTS. With these understandings, the proposal was approved.

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5. Political Action, Bolivia

The CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved.


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6. Air Proprietary, East Africa

The CIA paper of 3 May 1963 on the above subject was approved.

7. Intelligence on Cuba

Mr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelligence on Cuba. He said that this leads him to favor resumption of low-level reconnaissance. The other members of the Group felt that under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.


Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY**

9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2.

Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.

Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.

1. Peripheral Reconnaissance

98

The Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.]

2. Reconnaissance of the Sino-India Border

98

With particular reference to an incoming message from Ambassador Galbraith, the Group noted that the Indians had refused to grant staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country. In light of this, all members of the Group felt that plans for these missions should be shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that the aircraft now at Takhli will, therefore, depart before the 17th of May, the date on which SEATO exercises begin.

The Group specified that in conveying the decision to the Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due to their own view of the urgency of such coverage, not to any reluctance on our part.

(The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in Laos, had been mentioned. The CI Group had felt that harder intelligence should be obtained on this network. Dr. Scoville undertook to make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional high-performance coverage of Laos.)

3. Cuba - Proposed Agent Operations

Mr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage

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4. Reconnaissance of the Middle East

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Mr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve the request to use an RAF base on Cyprus for high-performance coverage of Middle East areas. He said that the feasibility of using Wheelus is being explored and that a new recommendation will be forthcoming to the Group.]

5. ELINT Collection

98

Mr. Miller briefed the Group on ELINT projects GARAGE (Cuba) and MOONBEAM (Japan). No objection was voiced to either proposal.]

6. Channels to Castro

The Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the Group agreed that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any official U.S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret so far as the public is concerned. It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed with the Special Group in advance.

7. Cuba Operations

Mr. Fitzgerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming month. The latter were approved.

8. Italy, Assessment of Results of Election Operation

98

Mr. Karamessines discussed with the Group the results of the recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on the CIA paper of 4 June.]

9. Italy, Proposed Aid to PSI Autonomists

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Mr. Karamessines briefed the Group further on the proposal to give aid to Nenni and his autonomist group of the PSI, as outlined in the CIA paper of 1 June.]

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[The Group agreed to recommend approval of this project to higher authority. Mr. Bundy will take this up on Monday, June 10th. He suggested that in the meantime all necessary preliminary alerting be accomplished, so that **Senni** can be informed in the event of favorable action, before the meeting of the **PSI Central Committee** on June 12th.]

Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

Hmc

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20 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatrick, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.

Colonel King was present for Item 3.

Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.

Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6.

1. Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia

Mr. McCone reported that all high-performance missions scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week, due to bad weather.]

2. Sabotage Program, Cuba

In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special Group every two weeks. The Group agreed with this procedure. They felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate, and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.

3. Haiti - Political Action 98

The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for **Duvalier**, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King, in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with **Bosch** in attempting to unseat **Duvalier**, and that if this is not done we are likely to end up with a far worse situation.

Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes the necessity of taking some action. He said the Department is principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any such operation might be revealed.]

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Colonel King cautioned that we will not be in a position to know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a try. Mr. McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most promising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is eventually to accomplish the defection of significant elements of the Army, the Palace Guard, etc.]

4. Monthly Report on North Vietnam Operations

Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past month, and those planned for the immediate future.

5. Congo - Training of Special Army Unit 98

The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in abeyance.]

6. Iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems 99

The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper of the 19th of June.

Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. The Group agreed that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of commitment to additional actions.]

7. Plans for Immediate Future 96

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened.]

Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commitments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.

It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the **Pakistan** government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.]

Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

Vmc

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EYES ONLY

27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.
Mr. Fitzgerald was present for Item 5.

1. British Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance Flights

The Group reviewed the message received from the British Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply presented by Mr. Johnson. The Group approved the language of the reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK suggestion, we do not find it possible to agree to suspend all such flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However, we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a minimum those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.

In the course of the discussion of these messages, the members of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent to the Soviets. From this point of view, the pattern of DOD peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that:
(a) Particularly sensitive flights are scheduled sporadically. Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified. (b) A worldwide stand-down during the period of the visit could accomplish this purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr. Johnson's draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept by fighters. However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels of]

See special minutes
for additional items.

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the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk, However, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic flights will be very carefully reviewed. Black Sea flights should not require cancellation. In general, all flights around the Soviet periphery will be subject to special review during this period.

2. NRO Forecast

98

The NRO monthly forecast for July was approved.]

3. Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia

98

The NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos. The latter country is considered particularly sensitive in this respect.

In light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.]

4. Spain - Labor Program

98

The CIA paper of 21 June was approved as presented.]

5. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous month's operations.

Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods of delivery of agents and supplies against the eventuality that the patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possibility of such means of delivery as submarines.

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(RE)

11 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, ~~xxxxxidpoxixxxand~~
Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Item 1.
Mr. R. Jack Smith was present for Item 2.
Mr. Fitzgerald was present for Items 2 and 3.
Mr. Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.

1. Peripheral Reconnaissance 96

The Group approved the agreement reached last week between State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive operations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved with the understanding that the nearest point to the Kuriles would be 15 miles instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans will be filed.

It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of the Harriman mission.

Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG/HAWKEYE and the special photographic operation in **European Turkey** were approved as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipulation that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles rather than 10.

The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed. Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been unable to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the British note, are more stringent than this. He told the Group that U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below 2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety, in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level). The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vessels under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for their own aircraft.]

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[State will inform the **British Minister** that we propose to proceed in this manner.]

2. Cuba - Status of Soviet Personnel and Materiel

Mr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day period, so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge. He said this review is just now being completed, it having involved examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft to be available to him by Monday or Tuesday. This will probably take the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.

The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations; accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal paper is fully completed.

Mr. Smith then summarized CIA's latest views on the status of Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba, since last fall.

Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on 6 July appears on close examination by photo interpreters to be communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance equipment.

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Mr. McCone said that the **Japanese** Ambassador to Cuba has expressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still remain in Cuba. CIA and State will debrief the Ambassador on this point today.

3. Cuba - Agent Operations

Mr. Fitzgerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals for the next month. These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's paper of 9 July, were approved.

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Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities should be subject to review.

In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th, in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the operations until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much advance notice as possible should be given the agents, in order not to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by the time of next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks, and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to postpone these particular operations.

4. Vietnam - Monthly Status Report

Mr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations. In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.

5. Tibet - Status Report

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Mr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of July, on the status of projected Tibetan agent operations. He emphasized that the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for air drops of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence can be built up to permit reasonable decisions.]

6. Guatemala - Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense Plan

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This annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists.]

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Thomas A. Parrott

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatrick
Mr. McCone

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18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatrick, and Mr. McCone

Colonel King was present for Item 2.

Mr. Fitzgerald was present for Item 3.

Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.

1. Reconnaissance

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Mr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather.

2. Haiti - Political Action

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Mr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican Republic. The developments are:

a. It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or of adequate leadership, etc.

b. President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base for military operations against Duvalier.

c. Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the elimination of the Barbot brothers.

Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However, in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have concluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to switch to a different kind of operation. This would include in the first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection, in communications, and in cross-border operations. Such training

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could be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico; support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with, and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive role in a future Haitian government; to encourage and support individuals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti-Communist; and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to subvert some of them.

Colonel King emphasized that the \$200,000 already approved would cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable opportunities should be identified.

The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher authority.

(There was no objection by higher authority to the program as presented, in the light of the changed conditions.)

3. Cuba - Sabotage Operations

Mr. FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July, in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negotiating process might have gone into another phase which would make it necessary to cancel the operation once more.

4. Technical Installations - Pakistan

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The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments, which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community.

After some discussion the Group agreed that the best method of approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three-year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and expansion of U.S. Intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Avub at that time

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Mr. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that the British who had been reluctant to support the position of the U.S. and the French, now concurred that a refusal to the Soviets should be made. This concerted action, it was believed by the Group, would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a consolidated headquarters.

C. Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally. Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his operational commitments in Nicaragua and increase his security.]


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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatrick
Mr. McCone



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much encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Artime as possible without showing his activities.

General Carter mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley to implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to create a situation which might ultimately require U.S. intervention. The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation organized by Pawley, would not be desirable. Efforts should be made to bring him into CIA's current operational thinking.

Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sent Mr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turned out to be a series of 4.2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mounted from Guatemala. It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to being impractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the "Somoza plan" and therefore should be discouraged.

2. Bolivia - Covert Action 98

The CIA paper of 2 August was approved.]

3. CIA Training Activities 98

Mr. Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, made an oral report on CIA's counterinsurgency training and courses. Mr. Baird emphasized that ever since the establishment of the Office of Training in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspects of training. It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by the Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities. During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166 government and educational institutions. In addition, during the same year, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses, all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency.

Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed on resistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities. The method of instruction in CIA is based on case studies of current operations. CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (with a drop out of less than four per cent) and gave instruction to 174 foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields.

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected. General Carter replied by pointing out that these courses are continuously inspected by the Inspector General, the President's Board of Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine services.]

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[Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain information on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this. Mr. Johnson then concurred.]

Colonel Steakley briefed the Group on certain sensitive reconnaissance operations.

Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of MIG fighters in the China coastal areas. He said that as of now there are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE missions because of these fighters.]

2. Negotiations for Indian Base

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The Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the Prime Minister about the security of personnel on the projected temporary base at Char Batia, and that approval for use of this base has, therefore, been withheld.

Mr. Gilpatrick and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to bring it up.

The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week. They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case for the priority of the requirement, it would be inadvisable to attempt to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance. They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base available in December.]

3. Cuba

a. The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups." In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but not essential. He felt that the economic damage which this group might inflict would probably be comparatively minor. On the other hand there would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.

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In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.

b. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.

c. Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two sabotage operations conducted the middle of August. Mr. Johnson commented on the amount of materiel that had been left behind at the site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner their first time under fire.

The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage. He also asked Mr. Cheever to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the operations.

4. Costa Rica - Re-establishment of Institute for Political Education

The CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented.]

5. GROSBEAK Armament

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
General Carter

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decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority, noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson. In the event of favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to Mr. Johnson.

Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence. In this connection, he noted that the Artime group should be ready to go in November.

3. Interdiction Operations Along Route 7

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Mr. Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful interdiction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed to adequate operational intelligence, security, size of the group, and the support of the **Parus**.]

4. North Vietnam Status Report Number 7

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Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the coming month.]

5. Operations in Denied Areas of the Far East

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Mr. Colby said that a review has been made of experience with agent operations in the denied areas of the Far East, including North Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that as a result of this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be expected from small teams, either in intelligence or in action. He said that he proposes to discuss with the DCI in the near future, certain changes in the method of operation in such areas. This might take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out minor sabotage. It might also involve much larger groups of people. In this connection, he pointed to the success of the thousand-man operation against Route 7.]

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4. Cuba - Reappraisal of Previous Proposals for Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. FitzGerald informed the Group that CIA is dropping its earlier proposal to support Commandos L, due to the crackdown on exile raids by various U. S. and British government agencies. He recommended that a plan of "selective relaxation" be adopted, designed to relax current stringent controls on selected anti-Castro groups in order to avoid all raids being charged to CIA.

The suggestion is that the "selective relaxation" be accomplished by authorizing CIA to tell appropriate U.S. enforcement agents that certain activities are of interest to CIA and should not be molested. CIA would not actually get involved but would simply screen these groups to permit some freedom of movement on the part of the better ones. This would be without the knowledge of the groups.

Mr. Johnson raised the question of difficulties of controlling exile groups should any group succeed in engaging in activities not to the liking of the U.S. Government. This possibility was admitted.

Mr. FitzGerald cited the Manole Bay group as one group which a "selective relaxation" would assist. This autonomous group is receiving financial and limited logistic assistance from CIA, and desires to mount an infiltration operation from Florida. He has good connections in Cuba and should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy stated he was not enthusiastic about Bay operating from U.S. territory. Mr. Bundy stated he would discuss this proposal with higher authority.

5. Cuba - Infiltration Operation

Mr. FitzGerald reported that one of the small boats used in the 21 October infiltration operation reached Mexico and is in the hands of local authorities, friendly to us. There were three persons on board, one dead, one injured, and the other all right.

The fate of the second small boat is unknown. The mother ship which escorted the two small boats was attacked, but evaded its attackers and escaped. There is a possibility that some team or boat crew members may have been captured and if so, a "show trial" may be expected.

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6. Proposal to Form and Support a Political Action Committee on Religious Freedom in the USSR

This project was not approved as proposed. It was agreed that the concept was sound but there should be further exploration as to

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whether private capital could not be used instead of government funds. The project was referred back to CIA with the suggestion to explore whether the World Council of Churches or the National Council of Protestants and Jews might be interested in obtaining and contributing funds for carrying out the aims set forth in the paper.

7. **Cyprus - Political Action**

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This operation was approved although the Special Group members agreed that until after the elections there should be no new effort to initiate operational activity among the Greek veterans.

8. **Vietnam - Coup Plotting**

Mr. McCone expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General Don and Cousin. Such involvement could destroy Cousin's usefulness and involve Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins in operations difficult to deny.

The Special Group authorized the sending of a coordinated message to Lodge and Harkins emphasizing (a) the setting up of a more secure system of contacts with General Don and other Vietnamese military; (b) the preparation of an Embassy assessment of General Don's status, the group he represents and future plans; (c) the tightening of control over the Don/Cousin meetings.

Special Group members agreed that they should firm up their policy thinking with respect to Vietnam before Ambassador Lodge returns to Washington, and then hear what Mr. Lodge has to say on what courses of action should be taken.

(Signed)

Paul Eckel

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Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatrick
Mr. McCone

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15 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 14 November 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatrick, and Mr. McCone.

General Taylor and Dr. MacMillan were present for Item 1.
Mr. Fitzgerald was present for Items 2 and 3.

1. U.S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces

General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc group be formed consisting of a representative from CIA, Department of State, and Department of Defense to review U.S. programs involving support of foreign paramilitary forces. The countries given in the following list have internal security problems and all have received U.S. support for paramilitary organizations:

Bolivia	Iran
Brazil	Iraq
Colombia	Cambodia
Ecuador	Thailand
Venezuela	Laos
Peru	Indonesia
Guatemala	Pakistan

The Special Group approved General Taylor's recommendation. Mr. Bundy suggested that the agencies concerned make recommendations for membership on the ad hoc committee to the Secretary of the Special Group. This committee will arrange for reviewing programs in the above-mentioned countries and prepare briefings, reports, and recommendations for Special Group action.

2. Cuba - Modification of Revised Schedule of Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations for the Month of November 1963.

Approval was granted by the Special Group for the following:

Operation No. 31111: The exfiltration of a previously-infiltrated agent.

Operation No. 3711: The exfiltration of two members of an existing resistance net.

See special minutes
for additional items

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