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3

This could lead to a symposium in which he would be invited to participate and respond to adversary views. His reaction to such a proposal is unknown. He has always resisted control in the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he does make demands for classified information and position papers including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches were obtained from him using only unclassified information.

6. His production has run into several thousands of pages of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had with other foreign intelligence and security services. The range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet events. We have learned from experience that if we give him a problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and rearrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting his thesis, he often reveals new information of value.

7. Attachment C is a sensitive report received from our Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding the activities, role, modus operandi and reason for Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated); and Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM - A SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are partly drawn from a draft manuscript which he has in his possession. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique interest because of the classified information (based on documents) which he read in Moscow.

8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth below of Source's theme.

9. The major reorganization (which produced the KGB Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN succeeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV, who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a

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