

TOP SECRET

625.

2. Remarks by CIA Handlersa. Introduction

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and interrogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since then. he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experience, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20 other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place, as well as defectors. Three other officers, who began to work with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations, have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence operations; among them, they command an extensive knowledge of the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances:

- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none of which could be covered in detail.
- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the knowledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection.
- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection, first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in the Washington area, where a special effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his statements.
- Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially April 1964 and January-March 1965).
- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, July-August 1965, and October 1966).

Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reactions under varied degrees of stress and control.

The features of NOSENKO's conduct, manner, and techniques discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and consistently observed by all of the officers involved.

TOP SECRET

631.

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.)

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence collection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO thereupon said: "It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he refused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washington area.

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA officers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA officer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation.

#### (ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources

Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSOLAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent.

#### (e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his performance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were largely useless. Out of the 150 or so he said he had provided, he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, however, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.

TOP SECRET



642.

SECRET

VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONSA. Introduction

It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is required in assessing sources of information relevant to the security of the United States.

One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known: Except where independent information is available, it is risky to say and impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the KGB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent information, voluminous in quantity although never comprehensive and entirely current, nevertheless has been assimilated from the reports of the several KGB staff officers who have defected, from the KGB agents who have confessed, and from the Western services which have investigated KGB activities. There is, therefore, a base of reliable knowledge upon which to predicate an assessment of a source reporting on the KGB, even one who principally covers a KGB component (in this instance the Second Chief Directorate) upon which there previously had been relatively little inside information. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from other sources, it would be arbitrarily confining if an assumption were not made that certain KGB standards are at least comparable to those of Western services. Such prior knowledge and, to a limited extent, such an assumption are factors in the assessment of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted here.

A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however, is NOSENKO's own testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information was studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides was thus assembled. These details, as well as direct evidence from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with CIA, have been presented in Part III. through Part VII. of this paper.

The basic questions with regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO are the following:

- Is there reason to question the general accuracy and completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting, his personal life, military service, positions in the KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, knowledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?

- If there are grounds for doubting the general accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the nature of the information he has provided, and for other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from each, are reviewed below. The discussion continues with a survey of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

TOP SECRET

643.

B. Evaluation of Production1. Introduction

What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine and conscientious source may be poorly informed or misinformed; he may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not available long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous, and accurate information.

There are several standards which may be applied to the assessment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment of bona fides. The standards are:

First, how does the information equate, in terms of completeness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven position and access to information? (In this, one judges the internal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it with information from other sources and from investigations.)

Second, does the information harm the opposition? (This point is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know anything harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harmful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for example, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still unexposed.)

Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This point may in some cases be irrelevant, for information useful to us may not harm the opposition, and the apparent usefulness of information may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.)

These standards have been applied in evaluating the production of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counter-intelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NOSENKO claims to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer. From a comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who defected to Western services has produced significant military, economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few have supplied political information (usually concerned with the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence consequence is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death. The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnaires along positive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.



must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the information is useless to Western services and is no loss to the Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this evaluation, since these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate in agent operations. Although KGB Second Chief Directorate personnel have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate, this is not a predictable event and cannot be considered in discussion of current damage.

NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.e., were identifiable by name); the remaining 16 names from NOSENKO were valueless as they were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 who were not known or suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO's information. Of 37, there were 24 who either resided abroad at the time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since that time.\* Assuming that NOSENKO was correct in his identifications of all 24 members of the KGB who were accessible,\*\* it cannot be said that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent operations was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU identifications were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. At the same time, his inability to do further measurable harm to the KGB in this regard cannot be held against him, either, for he has claimed service only in the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate complement. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or against his bona fides.

NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case, BELITSKIY, is a subject of separate

#### sensitive sources

\* Of these 24, ten were identified by [redacted] as KGB [redacted] and thereafter, and two became prominently active in insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.

\*\*Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete knowledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which he said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB officers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets stationed there (a proportion which is consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of NOSENKO's original identifications, positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question.

SECRET

648.

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961.

- GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruitment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the presence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGB agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female secretary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evidence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see below.)

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tourists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages 145-150).<sup>\*</sup> He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forthcoming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of the KGB operation with BLAKE. That the Tourist Department was aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to the Soviet Union in the years when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of 1958 and 1959 cited in a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the document had been passed to CIA by GOLITSYN and that it had been written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete.

\* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who nevertheless had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARGHOORN, arrested in the USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S. military intelligence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.



650.

he had known in Moscow. He has not been interviewed directly on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a recruitment approach.

[REDACTED] French [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NOSENKO reported that [REDACTED] is either an agent or a "solid contact" of the KGB. [REDACTED] Indian [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NOSENKO has identified him as a KGB agent, with no further information. Stationed at the Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1957 to 1961. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there is no derogatory information on him in CIA files.

[REDACTED] Indonesian [REDACTED] in Moscow. In 1961 NOSENKO reported that prior to 1960 or 1961 the KGB recruited the Indonesian [REDACTED]. Although NOSENKO had spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no such case but thought this must have been a mistake for the case of [REDACTED] who had been the [REDACTED] at that time.

Aside from the fact that conditions in Indonesia precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service for investigation, Indonesia's position until 1966 was that of a semi-satellite of the Communist Bloc, and revelation of such a recruitment in the prevailing situation would have been of no value to the United States nor harm to the Soviet Union.

Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important because of their position in government. In two cases [REDACTED] he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSENKO's part) cannot be considered an important lead because of the Communist bias of the Indonesian Government. [REDACTED] position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The possible importance of the [REDACTED] lead cannot be assessed without investigation results.

The William VASSALL case (Pages 503-507) was the one third-national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead when talking about the importance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-

658.

the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955. Of these three examples given by an officer who said he culled all the microphone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office) already reported by a previous defector, and the third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSENKO should have planned and helped conduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).\*

In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251). This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively

\* A comparison between NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message from a sensitive source **who is believed to have been compromised to the KGB after that message (but before 1962)** reveals similarities which may not be coincidental.

- NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them... Some of the things they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms are being monitored by the KGB... The 'flap' involving the American direction - finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American Intelligence officers..."

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call into question NOSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of the microphone product.

TOP SECRET



## IN EXHIBIT FOR ORAL USE

## A. Introduction

sensitive sources

The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by two categories of Soviet intelligence sources: (1) the defector GOLITSYN (p. 2) and These sources, all of whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with American Intelligence, stated or implied that NOSENKO held senior positions in the KGB Second Chief Directorate.\*\* If the conclusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none of the sources can be correct, and they must therefore be either misinformed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.

sources

In assessing whether and how sources could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KGB might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB officer-defector like NOSENKO. The KGB might have accomplished this by the following means:

- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CIA. The KGB would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organizational structure and procedures,\*\* and KGB officers prominent in his story (e.g., GUK, KOVSEK, TSYMBAL, GRIENOV) so that he could not only recognize their photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KGB installations and other areas which appeared in his legend.

\* Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who have not been members of the Soviet Intelligence Services are eliminated from detailed consideration here because their connections with NOSENKO are less direct than the sources with service in the KGB and GRU. Source has never been a Soviet Intelligence officer, and his support for NOSENKO has been relatively limited. However, he reported on repercussions in Geneva caused by NOSENKO's defection and like NOSENKO, he said that the KGB suspected the U.S. State Department official David MARK of belonging to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK and V.V. VAKRUSHEV.

\*\* Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference between GOLITSYN's opinion about him and the statements by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was a genuine defector.

\*\*\*That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his performance under interrogation.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

797.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY(i) Introduction

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial compromise to KGB surveillance. Although ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ report agrees with NOSENKO that the KGB learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ subsequent reports contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop site. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ story of the events stemming from the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with the facts of the case and with all other reporting by

Soviet sources of CIA and the FBI.

(ii) Discussion

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ report of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ 1962--the month after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Americans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This statement is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally participated in the operation. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ statements otherwise agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case.

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ report on the case, however, is contradictory to his first report and to the other sources: He said in ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evidence besides the statements by ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ that PENKOVSKIY ever went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel.

In ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ 1963 ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ reported at greater length about the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice; surveillance had observed him on both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who entered the building reported that the American appeared to be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ continued, the fact that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was observed checking it (see preceding paragraph); an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

823.

by NOSENKO); and she described the documents which he turned over to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that "these were such important documents, important enough that...he was shot."

During her second account of the GIEREPANOV affair, she sourced her information differently and added first-hand details which she had previously disclaimed having. She said that "In two days this man was arrested...in two months he was shot." This is also at variance with NOSENKO's account of a KGB investigation of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit to GIEREPANOV on 8 December 1963, GIEREPANOV's flight, and a seven-day search for him before his arrest.

#### b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Closely conforming in this respect to NOSENKO's account of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, she placed the date of initial suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961. Her statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ completely from the reasons advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources).

Her account is vague, in consonance with her claimed lack of any first-hand contemporary knowledge of the investigation leading to his arrest, and is colored by her expressed personal dislike for PENKOVSKIY the man and by the professional misfortune of her husband which resulted from PENKOVSKIY's arrest. She cited her KGB friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information, as the source of the indirect warning to her husband to stay away from PENKOVSKIY, and as someone who knew about PENKOVSKIY's trial and had been somehow associated with the investigation - thus confirming NOSENKO on SVIRIN's participation in the PENKOVSKIY investigation.

#### c. Reports on KGB Personnel

She has named relatively few KGB officers who have figured in her career as a KGB agent or about whom she could report any substance. Of her KGB handlers:

- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedorovich, whose last name she did not know, her handler while she worked at the Embassy of Nepal in 1964. NOSENKO has not referred to operations against this Embassy.

- Two KGB handlers were assigned to she in Leningrad - V. I. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PCHELIN. Both of these officers had previously been identified by NOSENKO as officers of the Leningrad KGB and have not been identified by any other source. They were two of the total of four Leningrad KGB officers named by NOSENKO.

- Her KGB handler while she was employed by a Canadian correspondent in Moscow was VLADIMIR IVANOVICH KOSTYRYA. Only NOSENKO has identified KOSTYRYA as the KGB officer who had been in the United States under the name Vladimir Viktorovich VLADIMIROV; NOSENKO considered this, as he said in 1965, his most important identification among KGB personnel.

KOSTYRYA was in the U.S. under her cover; her relationship with him was not related to her earlier her work, however, but her connection with a foreign correspondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his return to Moscow.

TOP SECRET

824.

Of the four other KGB officers on whom [REDACTED] has reported in any depth, three were previously identified by NOSENKO and only by NOSENKO:

- V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is an ubiquitous figure in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a Western recruitment approach. SVIRIN had previously been identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments [REDACTED] has confirmed).

- In connection with SVIRIN, [REDACTED] recounted an incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in derogatory terms, Valentin MUZEYNIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and subordinate, SVIRIN. NOSENKO said MUZEYNIK was an officer of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

- Vadim BERYUKOV was identified by [REDACTED] as the KGB officer under Novosti cover assigned to report on the interview in August 1966 of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NOSENKO had previously given information concerning BERYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, targeted against foreign correspondents.

### 5. Remarks

There is confusion in [REDACTED]'s sub-sourcing for her information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that, on one hand, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she was briefed by the KGB to report to American Intelligence on NOSENKO, [REDACTED] was inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however, [REDACTED] has personally supported the bona fides of NOSENKO by offering direct confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV, by corroborating NOSENKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Directorate personalities.

**Note:** Aside from her support of NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, there are many aspects of the [REDACTED] case which independently led CIA and other Western services to conclude that she is a KGB-dispatched agent. Some of these aspects are as follows:

- The circumstances of her claimed relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.

- [REDACTED] description of her husband's recall from Stockholm and his punishment for having previously worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GORR fit neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOVSKIY also identified nor the logic of the situation: Her husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKOVSKIY was uncovered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

825.

assignment in Stockholm may have been a KGB-organized prelude to the defection of [REDACTED] is also suggested by the fact that the one operational contact her husband is known to have had there was a Western double agent, and [REDACTED] was able to provide identifying data on this agent.)

- Nearly all of [REDACTED]'s identifications of Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.

- She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel.

- Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems unlikely that [REDACTED] would have been permitted to leave the USSR.

- There are oddities in her relationship with the Canadian correspondent who employed her in the USSR and who was her alleged KGB target, as well as in her conduct in the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since the defection.

TOP SECRET