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T 602263		EIA422		PAGE 01		IN 794546	
TORI1500522 JAN 76						CNBR 21033	

S E C R E T 142302Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 21033

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE 12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION BRIEFING AT 0830/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0930). CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN GIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.

2. CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY AT 0830. WITH **CUNNEELY** PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN **AUSTRALIA**, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HQS IN MANAGEMENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF **LIAISON**, STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO

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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SPECIFIC DETAILS OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT WITH TARGETS AND USE OF **LIAISON** - STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS! THE "LIVE WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY

COS RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND HQS MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE **WELCH** INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD.

3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

**S E C R E T**

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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T 682263 EIA422		PAGE 83	IN 794546	
		TDR150052Z JAN 76	ON BR	21033

SNOODGRASS HAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND IT  
 IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE (CANBERRA 21027). AT (IN 793209)

SNOODGRASS REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING  
 WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GDB OFFICIALS. THE DETAILS OF THAT  
 MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF  
 THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029. ON  
 BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THOSE  
 MEETINGS, SUGGEST CEA AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED  
 CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION  
 BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT.

4. THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRESSMEN  
 INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD  
 BEEN COVERED. COS STRESSED THAT HE WERE AVAILABLE TO  
 CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY  
 WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN  
 ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT  
 WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS  
 DEPARTED ON THEIR "V IS IT" IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE,  
 AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH,  
 ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300. E2, IMPDET.

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S E C R E T

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IN 791659

TOR:122154Z JAN 76.

CNBR 21007

S E C R E T 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CANBERRA 21007

TO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO

REFS: A. JAKARTA 35606 (u787635)  
B. JAKARTA 35661 (u790579)

CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING

ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE  
WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

13-00000

diff-jfk: record 104-10400-10311 - Page 7 - (diff between 2025 and 2023) - fresh pages only

FORM 3020B  
7-71 MFG. 2/78

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			TOR:121111Z JAN 76		JKRT	35674

S E C R E T 120939Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **JAKARTA** 35674

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO

REF: **JAKARTA** 35661 ( 190579 )

1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY, REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.
2. MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR. SNODGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK OF ONE STATION WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL

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7-71 MFG. 2/76

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RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE <sup>A</sup> RELISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNODGRASS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS OPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN **JAKARTA** WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS.

3. MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.

4. THUS IT SEEKS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC ABOUT IT.

5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF CODEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET

\*\* S E C R E T \*\*

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER SOP 112TOTAL COPIES 10

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EIA152

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IN 790651

TOR:112233Z JAN 76

CNBR 21000

S E C R E T 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 21000TO: IMMEDIATE **WELLINGTON** INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: WELLINGTON 15837 (in 787572)

1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800

AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL.

2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.

3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO **BRIGADIER GILBERT**.

4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

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FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 2/75

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		IN 790652	
		TOR:112313Z JAN 76	
		<b>CNBR 21001</b>	

S E C R E T 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 21001

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)

SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT

1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH

**SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, D/JIO AND SOTERN/44,** EACH FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.

2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON, DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET.

3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.

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FORM 3620  
J-77 MFG. 2/75

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IN 798579

TOR:111013Z JAN 76

JKRT 35661

S E C R E T 110937Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE JAKARTA 35661.

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.

NIACT CANBERRA

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO

1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF **COVER WORK**

**PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY, INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES, DIA ROLE IN INDONESIA,** AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING.

2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP **CU** SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE

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TOR:111013Z JAN 76				JKRT	35661

- CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).

3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.

NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR OUTLOOK.

4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP.  
E2, IMPDET.

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IN 789314

TOR:091229Z JAN 76

CNBR 20992

S E C R E T 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **CANBERRA** 20992TO: **WELLINGTON** INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: **WELLINGTON** 15837 787572)

1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.
2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-2

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TO: PRIORITY **JAKARTA** INFO **CANBERRA, WELLINGTON-Y**

RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y

REF: **JAKARTA** 35600 [IN 787573\*] Y

1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN  
 MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP  
 DISCUSSIONS HERE-Y

2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS.  
 OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF  
 IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT, <sup>IF PUBLISHED</sup> WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT  
 WITH **INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT** PLUS  
 CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES  
 IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION  
 IN **INDONESIA** WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN **INDONESIA**.  
 ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL  
 PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF  
 PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH-Y

3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED"  
 VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS

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*Mr. Waller*

RELEASING OFFICER

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## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED.

4. FOR **CANBERRA, WELLINGTON:** IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/ BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION **AS JAKARTA MATERIAL.** E2, IMPDET.

H

OLC MR. WHITE (DRAFT)  
 SA/DDO MR. WALLER (TELECOORD)  
 CEA/PMI *UNFO* *R.P. Krebs*

DATE: 8 JAN 76  
 ORIG: B.J-HOUSTON  
 UNIT: DCEA  
 EXT: 9373

*William E. Nelson*

WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA  
AUTHENTICATION OFFICER
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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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S E C R E T 080352Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **JAKARTA** 35606TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE **CANBERRA** ROUTINE **WELLINGTON**.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: **JAKARTA** 035600 (P) 787573\*

1. CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN **INDONESIA**, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF **INDONESIAN** MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD SAID. COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL **INDONESIAN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE"** PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES

*JKRT 35606*

*file in  
Senate /  
Congress  
travel*

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7-71 MFG. 2/78

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TOR:W80559Z JAN 76

JKRT 35606

RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS.

2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN **INDONESIA**. THEY APPEARED HIGHLY INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH MADE MENTION OF **INDONESIA'S** CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE HE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR **INDONESIAN** COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT HE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF **PRESIDENT SUHARTO**, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING THE **INDONESIAN** U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM **JAKARTA**

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BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT  
**PRESIDENT SUHARTO** HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE **INDONESIAN** UN.  
 DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS displeasure KNOWN  
 TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT MARCOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S., AND NATURALLY Affected CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO. HE ASKED FOR COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO

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7-71 MFG. 2/76

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DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT.

COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS **INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS** THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.

4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS. GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY. CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN **SUKARNO** ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED, "LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!" THEY EXPRESSED VERY LITTLE OF THEIR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CUNDOF OF MR. COLBY.

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7-71 MFG. 2/75

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5. GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR CONVERSATION WITH COS. ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT UP TO THAT TIME, SINCE THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FROM THE **INDONESIANS** THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADQUARTERS ADVICE TO TREAT WITH THESE GENTLEMEN SEPARATELY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, WHOSE INTERESTS SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS'. E2, IMPDET.

\*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on 7 January.

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FURIN JAKARTA  
7-73 MFG. 12/75

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S E C R E T 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE **JAKARTA** 35600TO: DIRECTOR INFO **CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.**

RYBAT PLMMCONGA

REF: A. DIRECTOR 788143

B. DIRECTOR 788139

C. DIRECTOR 788390

D. DIRECTOR 785722

1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO CONTACTED CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON AND LATER MR. TED LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY.

2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REFD. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WEREVER CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES.

3. MILFORD WAS SERIOUS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL, OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED

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7-71 MFG. 2/76

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IN STATION'S **LIAISON** PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE **INDONESIAN** GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIEVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WERE LARGEY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DOG. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. COS OUTLINED A FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE HIM.

PAGHS2 JAKARTA 35620 SECRET

4. OFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND

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THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED  
<sup>COULD NOT BE</sup> BASIS AND MCWD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND OQ SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE <sup>KE</sup> PRESENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOED THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMITTEE <sup>YI</sup> SEEING THAT IT WOULD HAVE <sup>NO</sup> MHQ LEGISLATION <sup>NO</sup> AUTORITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.

5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS' VIEWS ON THIS LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES<sup>S</sup>, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST HAVE <sup>some</sup> <sup>A</sup> SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD BE OUT OF BUSINESS. COS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT

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TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.

6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATION ACTIVITIES. COS POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE **RIVES** AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED **GENERAL YOGA** IF **MYOGA** FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN **INDONESIAN** AFFAIRS. **GENERAL YOGA** REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP **BAKIN** SOMEWHAT FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF **BAKIN** ARE CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. **YOGA** CONTINUED THAT **BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATE** IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC GOAL. **YOGA** ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON

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RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH, THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JAPANESE,

WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED MARY WHO WAS ~~HAS~~ BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT. SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE; HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.

9. MILFORD ASKED FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PASSED ON TO HIM; THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.

10. OVERALL BELIEVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILFORD EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED THAT IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO WOULD BE IMPRESSED.

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11. WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING  
 WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE **CANBERRA** 20980

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMMCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 787555

1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH **SOTERN REP**  
**(PROBABLY SOTERN/44, D/JIO AND SQUASH/D-Q.**

2. COS **AND BONHAM** DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR 0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET.

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CITE **WELLINGTON** 15837TO: **CANBERRA** INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959

B. DIRECTOR 787555

PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS **WELLINGTON** CAN ARRANGE  
 15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING **WITH NZ SECURITY INTELLI-**

**GENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H. E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN****MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY **WELLINGTON** BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION****DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY****PREFER TO MEET WITH COS **AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN******CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR****FLIGHT TO **MT. COOK** WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH****GILBERT. PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN****CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT **WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT.****

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TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON-4

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 4

REF: DIRECTOR 787555 1\*

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH LIAISON. E2, IMPDET-H

\*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.

OLC *rech*  
CEA/PMI *b Great teleconed*

DATE: 2 JAN 76  
ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON  
UNIT: DCEA  
EXT: 9373

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BILL J. HOUSTON DCEA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET  
CL BY 058913

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TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO.4

RYBAT PLMHCONGAY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} |\*|

B. DIRECTOR 787555 {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} |\*\*|4

1. BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDDEES AS FOLLOWS:4

JAKARTA - MORNING 7 JANUARY

CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY

WELLINGTON - EVENING 14 JANUARY 4

2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE {PIKE COMMITTEE}, HAS BEEN MOST INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HQS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES

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CL BY: 058055

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AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE LIAISON CONTACTS.

3. FOR **JAKARTA**: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CONTACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.

*Mr. Lou Bonham*

4. FOR **CANBERRA**: MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET AND DISCUSS HIS **(BONHAM'S)** ACTIVITY WITH **MR. BONHAM** IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF 30 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT **FACILITY AT TIPENBILLO**. IF SO, SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE PRIORITY.

5. FOR **WELLINGTON**: MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY **WELLINGTON** SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION.

6. FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS REST STOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO

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7. REQUEST ACTION ADDDEES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HQS HAS PROVIDED MILFORD NAMES COS'S IN **JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON.** REQUEST STATIONES CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATIONOFFICER ASSIST MRS. MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET.H

\*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.  
\*\*CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.

DEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT {DRAFT}  
OLC - R. CHIN {DRAFT},

DATE: 3 JANUARY 76  
ORIG: R. CHIN  
UNIT: OLC  
EXT: 7030

*Theodore G. Shackley*  
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

*Bill J. Houston*  
BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CITE **JAKARTA 35549 (SHIMA ACTING)**

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMMCONGA CONGRESSMAN

REFS: A4 DIRECTOR 787555

B4 DIRECTOR 785722

1. **CHARGE MIKE RIVES** HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A, WILL ARRANGE BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL.

2. ON 2 JANUARY **HAFAWN/1** TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY **BAKIN** FROM **HACLAUSE/1**. WE PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **INDONESIAN** PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON **PRESIDENT SUHARTO**. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT **GENERAL MURDANI** BRIEF THE GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. **BAKIN** HAS SENT CABLE TO **MURDANI** TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT **BAKIN** HQS ON 7 JANUARY. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS BRIEFING. STATION ARRANGED **BAKIN** BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHARGE.

*E2 IMPDET*

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TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REF: DIRECTOR 785722 |\*|

## 1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE:

ETD	JAKARTA	1200	8 JAN FOR BALI
ETD	BALI	0800	9 JAN FOR CANBERRA
ETA	CANBERRA	1740	9 JAN
ETA	WELLINGTON	1515	14 JAN
ETD	WELLINGTON	1000	15 JAN FOR MT. COOK
ETD	MT. COOK	1400	15 JAN FOR CHRIST CHURCH
ETA	CHRIST CHURCH	1500	15 JAN
ETD	CHRIST CHURCH	09 16 2330	16 JAN FOR HAWAII

NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY  
 MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574.

2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH  
 COS, JAKARTA 10 JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS,  
 WELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES  
 THIS CASE. MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW

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SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME.

3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC {MR. ROBERT CHIN}

BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975.

A. NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS **IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND INDONESIA** WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.

B. **AUSTRALIA:** THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA, MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT

SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN **AUSTRALIA**. IT WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH UNILATERALLY **AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS** WITH THE **AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICE**.

THERE WERE **53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, 66 CHINESE, 8 HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS, 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS AND 17 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS.** IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT

BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL **AND JOINT OPERATIONS** WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST

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EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY IN **AUSTRALIA** BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN **AUSTRALIA**. HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTON OF KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN **AUSTRALIA** BUT WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDERSCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON **AUSTRALIA** ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S **LIAISON WITH ASIO, ASIS AND JIO**.

C. **NEW ZEALAND**: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD **THREE** PEOPLE IN **WELLINGTON** WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING **JOINT OPERATIONS** WITH **THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE** AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC

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AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON AUSTRALIA.

D. INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA, MEDAN AND SURABAYA. CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA. THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PERSPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO INDONESIA. THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA. THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF

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STATION'S EFFORTS IN **INDONESIA** WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN **INDONESIA**. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN **INDONESIA**.

E. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS.

F. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN **AUSTRALIA**, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF **AUSTRALIAN** LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES' REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.

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PARTICULARLY IN **AUSTRALIA**, WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSONALITIES.

4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2, IMPDET.H

\* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.

DATE: 31 DEC 75  
 ORIG: B-HOUSTON  
 UNIT: DCEA  
 EXT: 9373

OLC Rchm  
 DDS&T  
 SA/DDO  
 EA/PMI

*Theodore G. Shackley, CEA*  
**THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA**  
 RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

*BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA*  
**BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA**

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TO: PRIORITY CANBERRA, JAKARTA, WELLINGTON.

RYBAT PLMHCONGA 4

- REFS: A. CANBERRA 20866 [IN 774560\*] {RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON}
- B. DIRECTOR 784159 \*\* {RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON} 4
- LARGE NUMBER
1. THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,

ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA, CANBERRA,

SYDNEY, AND WELLINGTON. GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND

the only WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WHO HOME ARE GOING AT THIS TIME. NONE FRANK SLATINSHEK OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. LATER REQUESTED CHIEF COUNSEL OF COMMITTEE FULLY CLEAR AND TRAVELLING BY HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH WITH SYDNEY AND EXPECT YOU MAY CONTACT YOU IF COMMITTEE STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO TRAVELLING WITH GROUP. INTEREST DEVELOPS.

2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (DEMOCRAT, TEXAS) WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE (HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE) WILL ACCOMPANY THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN

DATE: 24 DEC 75.  
ORIG: B-J-HOUSTON  
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FOR **CANBERRA** AND **WELLINGTON**: SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION FROM **LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS.** (FYI: OBJECTIVE K HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM **CANBERRA** OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.) THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING **LIAISON AS**

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EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. POINT OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED.

E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS. WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON.

F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO underscore ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS.

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4. WHERE APPLICABLE (SUCH AS **JAKARTA**) BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS. 4

5. FOR **CANBERRA** AND **WELLINGTON**: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN **AUSTRALIA** AND **NEW ZEALAND**. HE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES. 4

6. FOR **JAKARTA**: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF **SUHARTO** REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. 4

7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS, CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574. 4

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. 4

9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF VISIT. ~~888 8888888~~ ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: 4

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CANBERRA 9 JAN, ETD 11 JAN Y

SYDNEY 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN Y

WELLINGTON 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN E2, IMPDET-H

\* INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.

\*\* HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.

DDS&amp;T/OEL

OLC

SA/DDO

~~RECD~~

EA/PMI - J. Walpert

DATE: 24 DEC 75  
ORIG: B.J.HOUSTON  
UNIT: ACEA  
EXT: 9373DAVID BLEE, A/DDO  
RELEASING OFFICERBILL J. HOUSTON, ACEA  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF INFORMATION.

THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE **TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ.** THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF

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7-71 MOD. 2/75

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**DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS** BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.

IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED **A HIGH**

**ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS**

TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S

**ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT.** THE REQUESTED **SYSTEM** INCLUDES A **DOWN LINK**

CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A **NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA**

**COLLECTED.** OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND

NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE **DOWN**

**LINK ACCESS** TO NATIONALLY MANAGED **OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS,**

WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.

WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION

SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONTHELESS, GENERAL

HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR

PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE

YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE,

AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES

IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP

TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT

NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

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TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.

15. ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES. LANG ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION.

THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD. COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER

S E C R E T

13-00000

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## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

STAFF

CONF: C/0A 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF,  
D00, D00/00, S/000

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 759842

INDEX DISSEM BY: J  
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U/P FILES # 112

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KODE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,

SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. \*

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA \*

REF: DIRECTOR 759843 \*

1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM 8888888888 PLMHCONGA. \*
2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS {PLMPTACT} PRIVACY CHANNEL. \*
3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET-H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}  
EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975  
ORIG: CEA/ESEC  
UNIT: S.M. LABAR  
EXT: 1709

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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CL BY: 005088

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759843

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CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF CS/RF,  
 DDD, DDD/DD, SAT/DDD

IN FILE # 112

TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAE, KOBÉ, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,

SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. 4

RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA 4

REF: DIRECTOR 759842 4

1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.

2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.H

CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}

EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975  
 ORIG: CEA/ESEC  
 UNIT: S.M. LABAR  
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THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA  
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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CL BY: 005088

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DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

759641

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PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS

AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. 4

2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE  
 UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS.  
 ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE  
 ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY  
 AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT  
 WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS  
 OR FAILURES. 4

3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS  
 UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC  
 GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY  
 PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. 4

4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH  
 BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTI-  
 GATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET.H

AC/EA/JK

*Melvin*

DC/EA

*G. Melvin*

C/EA/COPS

*TJ*

DATE: 24 OCT 75

A/DDO

ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM

C/REVIEW STAFF

*SG*

UNIT: C/EA

C/OLC

EXT: 1428

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 061991

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DATE-TIME GROUP

231741Z DIRECTOR

CITY

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

758926

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ADMIN Y

- ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.Y
- IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET-H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975  
 ORIG: **SAMUEL H. RICKARD**  
 UNIT: **NE/COPS**  
 EXT: **R-1562**

C/N/E  
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TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-4

ADMIN Y.

REF: DIRECTOR 758926

IDEN: PLMHCONGA E2 IMPDET-H

DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975  
 ORIG: **SAMUEL H. RICKARD**  
 UNIT: NE/COPS  
 EXT: R-1562

*DARRE*  
**CNE**  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

*S. Rickard*  
**NE/COPS**  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COLLECTION OPERATION. AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY **COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS** TAKING PLACE IN **THE U.K.**

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US. AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIALE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE **COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH** REPRESENTATIVES SERVICING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM.

C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 161726Z OCT 75 STAFF

IN-716059

CITE BONN 43387

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 752556

1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY STIGGINS [HIBBERT] AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15 OCTOBER. AARON HAD LUNCH WITH [HIBBERT] AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE COLONEL OLIVER RAY. HE MET FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR HILLENBAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.

2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY. AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED. HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS, AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPTABLE. IN PRACTICE, WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS IN RECENT YEARS;

3. MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLLECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED MILITARY ODS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL

PAGE 3 BONN 43387 S E C O D E T

7. MR. AARON ASKED ABOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMBASSADOR INFORMED ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAN FIELD. WE REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE SOURCES LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS, MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS" PROVISION OF OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED OUT THAT EACH CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY CONSULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON OTHER HAND HE CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN.

8. MR. AARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER STRENGTH AND GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REPORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED HQS BY TM DATED 25 SEPT 74.) WE EXPLAINED THAT BREAKDOWN SOMEWHAT ARBITRARY AND SAID THAT FOR NUMBER OFFICERS (THOSE ENGAGED IN LIAISON, SUPPORT, ANALYSIS, FOR INSTANCE) IT NOT ALWAYS EASY TO CATEGORIZE THEIR EFFORTS.

9. HE PROBED IN SOME DETAIL ON OUR NOC STRENGTH AND WE ANSWERED CANDIDLY. MR. AARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS NOC OFFICERS IN STATION AND SAID HAD HEARD OPINION FROM SOME CIA OFFICERS THAT NOC PREFERABLE TO OFFICIAL COVER. WE SAID FELT THIS DEPENDENT ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE IN GERMANY ARMY COVER READILY AVAILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY AND COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN NOC COVER. AARON ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER NOC. WE EXPLAINED NOC PRIMARILY USED FOR PERSONNEL WE PLANNED KEEP ASSIGNED GERMANY SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE NOC PROBABLY MORE SECURE AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. WHEN HE PUSHED FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTLY CONSIDERED PUTTING OFFICER UNDER STUDENT COVER IN HEIDELBERG WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE STUDENTS SIGNIFICANT TARGET REPRESENTED BUT THAT THIS PLAN DROPPED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. WE MADE NO MENTION USE JOURNALIST COVER AND DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY COVER FIRMS BY NAME.

10. AARON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT AARON'S ENVISAGED AS THREE PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME. AARON OUTLINED HIS DUTIES AS MANAGEMENT OF STATION, EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SAID MANAGEMENT OF

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- THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.

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C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH

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FREDERICK A. O. SCHWABE, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 2, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten  
Assistant to the Director  
Room 6D0120  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, **Embassy Station** officers and military commanders... As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

Sincerely,

*Bob*

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department

*SL:HJSO L E 100*

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## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 91st CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1975

REVIEW STAFF

75-3150

Mr. William G. Hyland  
Director  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA

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CITE **MONTEVIDEO** 21403 SECTION 1 <sup>7-2</sup> OF 2

# 1

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

INFO BUENOS AIRES

INFO PLVWCADET

1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER. GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW **MONTEVIDEO** STATION IS FUNCTIONING IN **URUGUAY**. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL. MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".

2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM.

3. THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID

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AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN **URUGUAY** WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING **PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS.** COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULLY AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.

4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADOR'S WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?

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COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT HOW TO HANDLE HIS OVERT CONTACT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO DISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER: THE SAME.

5. THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER. HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART SAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND THEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECRUITING THEM. COS POINTED OUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT HERE IS PROSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS SOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SURCE REGISTER. COS ADDED THAT MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.

6. TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO DO SO, WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES, PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE **LIAISON** TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS

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BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.

7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT HE WORK WITH LIAISON ON THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE HAS ADVISED LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCE OF A SOVIET OFFICIAL, HE SAID PROBABLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO FLAP POTENTIAL. AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT.

8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OF NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS OF INFLUENCE. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON THEIR REQUEST, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO OR

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THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS ENOUGH. AARON ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE HE COULD DO. WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON. WHILE THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE. ANSWER: NO. DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: NO. ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES. THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY. WE ANSWERED THAT URUGUAY IS

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CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN  
 INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FRIEND OF THE U.S.  
 AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF  
 OTHER STATIONS IN **LATIN AMERICA**, I.E., TO COUNTER SOVIET  
 INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT  
 KNOW, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART  
 POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF  
 A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER. WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS  
 THROUGH AN EBA? YOU AND WE PLANNED TO MEET WITH THE  
 STATION STAFF TO DISCUSS THIS.

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CITE **MONTEVIDEO** 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.

NIACT BUENOS AIRES

RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO. TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES. TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE AMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.

9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET. HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER

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OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET PROVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUT MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE.

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OF OTHER THINGS TO DO.

11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON **NOCS** WE ADVISED WE H  
NONE IN **URUGUAY**, E2, IMPDET.

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CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, **MONTEVIDEO** ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G., LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

SAIDDO  
J. WALLER

# 2

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UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE **NOC** PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR **COVER COMPANIES**, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR **NOCS** (**SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND**) IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING **NOCS** (NO, DIRECT **INSIDE C/O CONTACT** UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND **NOCS** WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (**CONTACT REPORTS**) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT **(PENETRATION OF**

**LIAISON** AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELSTAPS,

SURVEILLANCE, ETC,--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON

COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HQS

BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A **MEDIA OP** AND A **COVERT POL** ACTION OP.

MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR

**POLITICAL ACTION** OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO

THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN

**POL ACTION** IN **BRAZIL** FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS

SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION,

THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723 6 E O E~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS

EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL **MEDIA CAPABILITY** AS WELL AS

AN **AGENT OF INFLUENCE** PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY

RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE

CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO

KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

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CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TOP IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS  
CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE  
AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL  
ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE  
CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF  
THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE  
POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL  
OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE  
PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS  
PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A  
CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY  
SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER  
SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED  
ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

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COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL **PENETRATION EFFORTS** FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIDS AND THE GIRLS AND TAILED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT **SPORLON ACTIVITIES** IN **RIO** EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT **NSA** WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE **SPORLON PRODUCTS** (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE **INTERCEPT** PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO **AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION** ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF **AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,** ETC.

14. **AARON** EVINCED GREAT INTEREST **IN THE COVER** PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT **COVER** COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS **WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,** THAT THEY GAVE **ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME** ON THE ACTUAL **WORK OF THAT SECTION**, THEN SPENT **THE REST OF THE WORK** DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE **ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK** FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EquALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (at) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS

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S E C R E T 291547Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

REF BUENOS AIRES 34511

(n 64826S)\*

1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT

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WAS NONTHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)

3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN **ARGENTINA**. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF **COMMUNICATIONS**: AMB BELIEVES STATE DEPT **SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS**; HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO BKHERALD **HAVING ITS OWN COMMO**. ALSO, REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW. VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST

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CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT **SPORCON**  
 EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST **NORTH AFRICA**. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF  
 HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT  
 BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF  
 BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING  
 26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE  
 DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE  
 FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:

(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE  
 IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THE  
 FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.

(B) HE SAID HE THOUGHT BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.

(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL VISIT OF PECKING ORDER.

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO **MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.**

RYBAT PLVHCADET

REF DIRECTOR 745626

1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING THE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.

2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)

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4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF **GOVT OFFICIAL** PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUNCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE-HEART.)

5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATION'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.

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ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORTING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO.

6. IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION **CL**  
**OFFICERS DECLARED TO LIAISON**, ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH INTEL REP. ANSWER: YES; BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-

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SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE **SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES.** ANSWER: WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS AND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.

7. SUBJECT OF **NOCS** NOT RAISED.

8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER: NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS **UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM.** WE STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL SCENE.

9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTIONING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE OFFICERS. WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO **MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,**

RYBAT PLVWCADET

10. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS **(MONTONEROS AND ERP)** AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT. ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.

11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING

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CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, **MONTEVIDEO** ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.

2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.

3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G., LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET

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UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.

4. THE **NOCS** PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR **COVER COMPANIES**, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR **NOCS** (**SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND** IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER **CUTOUTS** WERE USED IN CONTACTING **NOCS** (NO, DIRECT **INSIDE C/O CONTACT** UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND **NOCS** WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).

5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS

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DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT [PENETRATION OF  
 LIAISON] AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELESTAPS,  
 SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON  
 COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS  
 BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE  
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A [MEDIA OP] AND A [COVERT POL ACTION] OP.  
 MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR  
 [POLITICAL ACTION] OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO  
 THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN  
 [POL ACTION] IN [BRAZIL] FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS  
 SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE F N SUCH ACTION,  
 THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO

~~PAGE 3-BRASILIA 24723 6 E O E~~

UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS  
 EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL [MEDIA CAPABILITY] AS WELL AS  
 AN [AGENT OF INFLUENCE] PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY  
 RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE  
 CHILEAN VARIETY.

6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO  
 KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY

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S E C R E T 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF

CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLVWCADET

BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS  
 CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE  
 AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL  
 ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE  
 CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.

8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF  
 THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE  
 POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD HE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL  
 OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE  
 PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS  
 PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A  
 CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY  
 SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER  
 SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED  
 ACCORDINGLY).

9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE

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COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES.

10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL **PENETRATION EFFORTS** FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.

11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIDS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE.

12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT **SPORLON ACTIVITIES** IN **RIO** EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT **NSA** WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE **SPORLON PRODUCTS** (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE **INTERCEPT PROGRAM** WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)

13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO **AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT, ETC.**

14. AARON **EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY,** HE WAS TOLD THAT **COVER COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,** THAT THEY GAVE **ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL WORK OF THAT SECTION,** THEN SPENT **THE REST OF THE WORK DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.**

15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EquALLY GOOD WORK IN THE DSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)

16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (at) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.

17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS. IS

S E C R E T


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J. M. MINN.  
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W. H. COLE,  
  
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARTZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL.

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 9TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975



*Re: C/LR + 3 LA/Han  
Completed by [unclear]  
17 Sept 1975  
[Signature]*

Mr. Seymour Bolten  
Assistant to the Director  
Room 6D0120  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Langley, Virginia

*Seymour*  
Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.

The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.

Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.

Sincerely yours,

*Bell*

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department



**SECRET  
SENSITIVE**

28 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten  
Review Staff

VIA: Mr. John Waller  
Special Assistant to the DDC

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at  
Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our **past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway.** With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist **the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela,** which was provided to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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SENSITIVE**

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Review Staff

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**SENSITIVE**Covert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing RegimesCATEGORY I

1. **ETHIOPIA:** A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the **labor movement** as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in **Ethiopia**. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was **\$291,006.** Covert support to the **Ethiopian labor movement** was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.

2. **SOUTH VIETNAM:** From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly democratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers.

3. **GUATEMALA:** In 1972-73, **the Guatemala City Station** with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against **Belize**.

4. **HAITI:** As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana."

5. **Dominican Republic:** In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.

6. **GERMANY:** From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its **European** counterparts.

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**SECRET****SENSITIVE****CATEGORY II**

1. **SOUTH AFRICA:** In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of \$165,000 to a leading South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The activity was terminated in 1962.
2. **SOUTH AFRICA:** A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization. State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of \$311,705 was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.
3. **KOREA:** In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members.
4. **KOREA:** The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a newsletter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.
5. **ARGENTINA:** Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.
6. **BRAZIL:** From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to 1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.

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7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors.

8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train **15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders** a year outside of **Spain** to build an effective cadre of **Spanish labor leadership**. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the **Christian Democratic movement in Spain** through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements.

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22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller  
Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations  
Against Right-Wing Governments

REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,  
Same Subject

We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the  
following comments on those paragraphs which concern  
**European Division.**

13. **GERMANY.** While this case is somewhat  
bizarre and does not represent a productive operation,  
we pose no objection to its being presented to the  
Senate Select Committee.

14. **SPAIN.** We have no objection to the  
presentation of these programs to the Senate Select  
Committee for review although we share concern expressed  
by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detri-  
mental to the base negotiations.

Sighted/William W. Wells

William W. Wells  
Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75)

## Distribution:

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25 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff  
SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right  
Wing Regimes

1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations **in Africa**, cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.

2. In the case of **Ethiopia**, we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the **labor project** has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the **new Ethiopian regime**.

3. **The Ethiopian labor program** was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing **\$20,000 or less**, it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.

4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of **two Ethiopian labor leaders** who are former assets under this project, and accusations in

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the **Ethiopian** press that the **trade union organization** received support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the **labor organization** potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets nor the **labor organization** have been accused of CIA involvement. An admission now of CIA support to **Ethiopian labor** or to the two **Ethiopian labor leaders** in jail could be a sentence of death for them.

5. In the case of **South Africa**, CIA support to a leading **South African** political figure to encourage the creation of a **new political party** remains a very sensitive matter. The principal agent is still a **leading and respected spokesman** for the **opposition party in South Africa** and is a **leading member** of the **South African parliament**. Exposure of the operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our government's relations in **South Africa**. For these reasons, we believe it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee only.

6. The **European philanthropic organization** which was used to fund the development of a **multiracial trade union organization** in **South Africa** was the **Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)**, located in **Germany**. The **South African labor officials** and organizations which received funds from **FES** were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, **FES** was used to support a number of other covert action operations in **Africa** and elsewhere and exposure of the **foundation** would have ramifications other than in **South Africa**. The Director should be briefed on **FES** and its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed.

*Clifton R. Strathern*  
Clifton R. Strathern  
Deputy Chief, Africa Division

Attachments:  
As Stated Above

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21 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. John Waller  
Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against  
Right Wing Governments

REFERENCE : Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated  
18 July 1975  
Subject: "Summary of Covert Action  
Operations Against Right Wing Governments"

1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments". None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in **Korea**) and TUMIX (which took place in **Vietnam**) -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U. S. Government hand was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking participation in the governmental process.

2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in **South Korea**. As noted above, the purpose of this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in **South Korea**. The Agency today


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maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in **South Korea** and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in **Korea** as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.

3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.



Robert D. Brown, Jr.  
Acting Chief, East Asia Division

cc: DC/Operations Staff  
C/SS/CAG

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TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

FROM GRAVER

REF DIRECTOR 708791

1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF

**BERLIN**, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE **BERLIN AND MUNICH** PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.

2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH **THE BND**" SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, **THE BND** IS LOCATED IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUIALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE **WESTPORT** FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT **WESTPORT** IS A

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PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS, THERE  
 IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS  
 IN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT  
 ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR  
 PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN  
 ADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.

3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST  
 ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,  
 REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING  
 PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK  
 IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,  
 IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS  
 OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN  
 AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED, E2 IMPDET,

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DIRECTOR

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TO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS **INFO OSLO, HELSINKI.**

RYBATY

REF: DIRECTOR 707518 {NOT NEEDED **OSLO, HELSINKI**} *Y**WF-A  
O/R  
R*

1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.} *Y*

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {1 DAY} AND BONN {2 DAYS}. NO DECISION *DIRECTLY FROM* YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ~~VIENNA~~ VIENNA. *Y*

3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. *Y*

4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

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AIRCRAFT-Y

5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR-Y

6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT *(GERMAN EMBASSY AND THE BND)* WITH THE *(BND)*

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE **WESTPORT** FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. Y

8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET-H

DATE: 17 JUNE 1975  
 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS E.H. KNOCHE *Ethnische*  
 UNIT: C/EUR *Wells*  
 EXT: 1012

*W. W. Wells*  
 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR  
 RELEASING OFFICER

*John Waller*  
 JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO  
 AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100  
Room 2E-45SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with  
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's  
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed  
Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

- a. 30 June - 1 July: London
- b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day
- c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the Paris stop, one day.

In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need **Station contact.**

2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control". It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.

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**SECRET 168853Z JUN 75 STAFF**

CITE VIENNA 26877

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 787518

D  
OAB Z  
JW

1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION **WITHIN EMBASSY**, PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAME NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

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**SECRET**

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

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4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER **CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL.**

LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. 4

5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY - VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON; 9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S. 4

6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. 4

7. FOR BONN. SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT **TO WESTPORT.** 4

8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETH  
 9. MORE specific guidance on operational discussions to follow. E.H. KNOCHE *E.H. Knobche*

LC *Ross Chen*

SA/DDO

*William W. Wells*

DATE: 13 JUNE 1975

ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS

UNIT: C/EUR

EXT: 1032

*W.W. Wells*  
DCI  
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