


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Moscow. Also that VASLOUCH/1 had recently been back to **Finland**. One thing that stayed in V/2's mind was that in conversation with LOGUINOV he referred on three occasions to the possibility that their daughter might very well marry a Russian, a point that might relate to any operational approach LOGUINOV may make to the VASLOUCHES. V/2 stated that LOGUINOV was the only one that had ever come to the Brazilian Embassy regarding visas. She also stated that over the past years she has called his office four or five times regarding visas and has never been able to reach him. V/2 also recalled that during their outing at the Capri Restaurant LOGUINOV stated that he was planning to rent a beach house and was looking forward to the VASLOUCHES spending time with him and his wife there during the summer months. V/1 inquired as to the whereabouts of the former PRAVDA correspondent, Borovsky, and was told he was in Moscow.

2. The **Finnish** Ambassador in Washington has been kept informed on LOGUINOV's advances toward the SLOUCHES. His only comment at this point was that "they are after something." V/2 has advised CARROA whose reaction has been to encourage the relationship in hopes of acquiring some political information from LOGUINOV. The **Finnish** Ambassador also ~~stated that during~~ ~~that calling/42/~~ stated in his telephone conversation with V/2 in Miami that he had requested that the SLOUCHES installation be elevated and given diplomatic status. He expressed surprise that copy of his letter to the Cuban Foreign Ministry had not

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
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been received by V/1 and promised a special delivery copy of it to V/2 in Miami. Relating to this, V/2 stated to the C/O that in one of V/1's meetings with CORONA of the Foreign Office, CORONA stated that he was requesting **Melinkhi** to raise the status of its representation in Havana and to post a charge there. V/2 was told by the C/O that after checking with Headquarters concerning LOGUNOV's background, specific guidance on how to handle the relationship would be forthcoming.

3. From SANCHEZ, V/1 elicited road building information which he had put on an overlay which was passed by V/2 (sent to SAS Reports). SANCHEZ had invited V/1 to Oriente Province with him in the near future to see some of his projects. Reluctantly we instructed V/2 to tell V/1 to turn down the invitation on grounds of ill health but to leave the way open for a similar invitation in the future. It was thought that this was best until we could assess LOGUNOV's interest in the VASLOUCHES. V/2 also passed the war names V/1 had assigned to his principal contacts and a diagram of the Brazilian Embassy including measurements of the out building which DI USALDO had discussed with V/2 in Mexico City relating to its possible use as a dead drop. A pamphlet entitled, List of Exports and Imports of Cuban Foreign Trade Enterprises, also was passed. (Sent to SAS/Reports.) A list of names passed showed numbers and some other data on those passengers which had departed Cuba in two Cubana flights to Brazil for the purpose of picking up the Cuban sports team in Brazil (sent to SAS/RE).


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4. On 19 May DI LEBALDO returned to Washington. DORENOSE met with V/2 on 20 May, from 0700 - 0900 hours. At this meeting, V/2 was given the KEYWAY sterile phone number and told that all future contact should be made to Cline using this number. She was also given our initial assessment of the significance of LOGUINOV's approach (the traces from Headquarters had still not been received). In our opinion there were three possibilities and two of them were unlikely. First, LOGUINOV's approach could be an innocent one and be merely for the purpose of establishing a friendship, an extension of this thought would be the possibility of his interesting in defecting. Given the age difference in the two couples and weighing other factors, this was considered unlikely. The second possibility is that the Soviets have been alerted, possibly by V/1's open code cable to **Finland**, to the SLOUCHES possible involvement with the Americans. This also is unlikely for had this been the case the last thing the Soviets would wish to do would be to alert the SLOUCHES to the fact that they were under suspicion and therefore bring about a cut ^{back} in their activities. (COMMENT: LOGUINOV's sudden and fairly intensive cultivation effort has had just this effect.) The third and most likely possibility is that the Soviets are cultivating V/2 for use as a penetration of the Brazilian Embassy. V/2 accepted the case officer's

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
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assessment as valid and in keeping with her own thoughts. She was told that final guidance on this matter would be given her at a subsequent meeting to be held in the afternoon after DOREMOSE had received the Headquarters traces. The discussion then went to the communications.

6. When the Subject stated that her husband was unable to bring out either the pads or his instructions on how to use the pads which had been given him in New York, it was decided to issue two reduced size OTP's concealed in a shaving kit. S/W instructions on the use of the OTP would be passed by BARKER in Mexico City. She was told that BARKER would be in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Mexico City at 0730 on 23 May. When they have recognized each other she should follow him from the Hotel. If BARKER is unable to make the contact he is to telephone her later in the day using the name BETO. Subject was told that we were unable to come up, as yet, with an extended dual-airphone set which she had requested, but this would be available for the next contact later in the summer.

7. Toward the end of the meeting, Subject passed translations she had made of notes given her by V/1 which he believed to be of intelligence interest. (They are included as Attachment A). Unfortunately, DOREMOSE was unable to review these reports with her but she was persuaded to turn over **Finnish** language notes and the carbon copy of V/1's letter to his ambassador (a translation of which is Attachment B). The C/O requested the name of a person in **Helsinki** who would have reason to write to V/1 but who is not doing so at the present time. She gave

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the name of V/1's aunt, **Kaisa RAIKKONEN**. She was told that some of the incoming S/W in the future would be written in **Finnish**, mailed in **Helsinki**, and ostensibly come from this person. Subject stated that she would depart Miami by Guest Airlines on 22 May 1963. The meeting was conducted hurriedly and necessarily ~~and~~ concluded at 0900 hours. Plans were made for the Subject to return for a brief contact with DORENOSE between 1430 and 1600 hours after finding some excuse to get away from her companion.

8. Subject was unable to break away from her companion in time to make the scheduled meeting and when she telephoned to so notify DORENOSE she was erroneously informed by the hotel desk that DORENOSE had checked out. After some difficulty, DORENOSE was able to contact her and a brief meeting was held at 2100 hours. It was at this meeting that instructions were given V/2 to tighten up on their security citing the dangers of audio-surveillance and the necessity for great care when mailing the letters out. For her benefit, KUBARK security in dealing with her case was emphasized. She was also instructed to react with disbelief combined with indignation if a recruitment pitch was made to either of them. She was also urged not to encourage further social contact with the LOGUNOV's in hopes that LOGUNOV would lose interest. She was advised that her daughter should be encouraged to leave Moscow if the

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