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Another of the questions which must be addressed in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of Operations (COPS) for the DDP -- to become more than marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral interviews again provided the best explanations, and, consequently, are entered into this record in rather full detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the following comments:

Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations]. Either on his own volition, which I suspect or on order -- which I doubt -- Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing. I mean absolutely! The one time that I heard from Helms during this entire project was ... I am sitting down there in my chair, as COPS of the project, on a Monday, having spent the entire goddamned weekend working with the guy who is now the head of **MI-6 -- Maurice Oldfield**, who was then the **MI-6** resident in Washington -- trying to get an airplane and some Cubans out of Montego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica came back from their long weekend ... I am sitting there congratulating myself that the plane is out, and the Cubans are out, and the British are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would like to speak to you." Well, fine ... well, the whole thing on his part was so ... to me ... incredibly apologetic ... three times he said to me in different parts of the conversation ... "As you know, I have nothing to do with this project." What he did have to do with, ever since

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King's initial memorandum contained no information about potential locations of transmitters, personnel security, inter-Agency coordination or costs.

Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda directed against the Castro government was introduced to discussions in the Special Group. Following the first such meeting at which the subject came up seriously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide more specifics on such matters as requirements for real estate, recommendations for someone to be in charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment that would be required, and how the broadcasting might be controlled. By mid-November, following additional discussions both within the Agency and by the Special Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts originate from **the Yucatan Peninsula** under the guidance of Manuel Benitez, and from **Costa Rica** under the Monte Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. The presumption was that the **Yucatan** operation would be self-sufficient, but that the **Costa Rican** operation would be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency control. The estimated costs that were mentioned in

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mid-November 1959 were roughly \$80,000 each for the operations in **Costa Rica** and **Yucatan**, plus an additional \$12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would originate within Cuba. 2/

Before the end of November, the plans to utilize **the Yucatan peninsula** had been abandoned because it was feared that the **President of Mexico** would not give his approval for such an activity; and by the early part of December, **President Figueres of Costa Rica** had made it clear that he did not want the propaganda operation to be set up in **Costa Rica**. Consequently, there was considerable discussion about the possibility of getting permission from **President Betancourt of Venezuela** to agree to permit the broadcasts from his country. Some members of the Special Group also suggested the possibility that the anti-Castro broadcasts might be originated from other of the Latin American countries, a project which Mr. Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable broadcast facilities that would be available in countries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Somewhere along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the

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suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be originated from continental United States. How Barnes came by this proposal is not known, for no such activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/

By early February of 1960, however, an equivocal agreement apparently had been reached with **President Betancourt**, for a memorandum from WH Division indicated that:

One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been made and has been played for the benefit of **President Betancourt of Venezuela**. He has agreed not to interfere if we initiate broadcasts from available transmitters in **Venezuela**. 4/

Even though thought had been given to the establishment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would run the anti-Castro broadcasts, **Betancourt** had made it clear that he would not permit the establishment of special new transmitting facilities in his country.

On or about 17 March 1960, the same date that President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its propaganda program which, after outlining various phases of the activity, stated:

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mount radio program operations almost immediately pending receipt of material and guidance from the Agency.* 6/

With reference to King's approach to **Mr. John Loeb, of Loeb, Rhodes & Company,** the businessman stated that he would contribute his personal funds to the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and in addition, he would approach the directors or heads of other companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individuals whom he thought were well enough off to make personal contributions. With reference to contributions of this nature:

It was decided that personal contributions were most advisable because they would not require action and approval by Boards of Directors, and therefore could be most easily concealed. The sum discussed was \$50,000.* 7/

The plan for private funding of WRUL was in trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief

* Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March 1960, were **Mr. John Loeb of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, Mr. Lapham of Banker's Trust Company, and the president of the Freeport Sulphur Company, Mr. Wright.**

** Other companies, including **American and Foreign Power Co. and the Freeport Sulphur Co.,** made donations in the company names and the Agency notified the Commissioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions. 7a/

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operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000 watts and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy was going to purchase scientific signal time from the Gibraltar Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary, which was nominally the operator of a commercial radio station then being established.

The loading of the transmitters, the unloading, the construction of the facilities to house the transmitters, and the installation of the transmitters was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James Burwell, a logistics officer who was thoroughly involved in the JMATE operation, reported that the construction activity at Swan Island required the movement of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the **Washing-**
ton Depot, aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to locating the transmitters and constructing the facilities for housing the transmitters, a crude landing field also was cleared. The total time involved was approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under \$225,000.

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RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PERMISSION WEEKEND WITH ALL THE WORKS IN PARIS, ETC.

4. IN RECRUITMENT, IT SHOULD BE STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS.).

5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME. HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.

6. FOR ANKA, ISTA: APPRECIATE YOUR CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOPERATION **LOCAL SERVICE AND NEWSPAPER ASSETS.** SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FORWARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/

A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above went to Chief, WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum read as follows:

The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms discussed this cable on 24 August [1960] and concluded that since Fidel Castro is definitely identifying himself more and more with the Russians, it is not worth the candle to launch an operation such as that one proposed in subject cable. Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try to find a body for this operation, providing we play it very carefully and do not

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JMATE. It is a story worth recording here, because of the extremely close and continuing relationship between one of the major US oil companies operating a refinery in Cuba, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (SONJ), and WH Division.

As early as 9 March 1960, the minutes of a Special Group meeting reflect conversations that both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the problems being faced by the major petroleum companies operating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- and particularly the need for "discreet means of inter-company consultation" in order to avoid possible anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned para-military operations against Cuba, it was reported that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division was approached "by the Standard Oil Company". He [Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that Standard will be willing to cooperate, perhaps even carry the ball on certain selected [sabotage] targets. DD/P gave authority to push this contact immediately."* 36/

* Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among the specific sabotage targets to be considered for attack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960, were petroleum targets. 37/

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a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage of tanker bottoms in the world market) to transport its own crude to Cuba and to "provide technicians and make modifications in existing refineries to process their crude." This, in turn, was supposed to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among Cuba's crude suppliers.* 39/

In addition to petroleum refineries as targets for sabotage, plans were also made to disrupt the Cuban microwave system. Unlike the plans to disrupt the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly involve properties of the international oil companies -- the sabotage program for the microwave networks, as late as February of 1961, specifically stated that attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net with "hands off RCA and Dumont systems, which are to remain intact for later consideration." 40/ Also

* In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the **Standard Oil** refinery commented to this effect after reviewing the all source intelligence materials available on the plant. He was pleased -- at least in one sense -- to note that **Standard's** training program has apparently been quite successful!

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prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C. King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets by resistance forces not controlled by the Agency were far less efficient than such attacks would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/

In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Division's anti-Castro activity also included extensive plans for the formation of goon squads throughout much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This goon squad program also was of considerable interest to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Because of its areawide nature, the activities of the goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit for were the following: The disruption in Mexico City of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use of stink bombs set off in the meeting place; in Lima, Peru a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro sympathizers also gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement; and in San Jose, Costa Rica, "A meeting

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of the *Amigos de Cuba* was broken up by an **agent at the Station**, who sprayed the two principal speakers, prominent Costa Rican leftists with 'Who, Me?'.** 42/

Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to mention in the same context with the goon squads were the **Secretary to the President** of one Latin American country:

Who can promote action of any of the National Security Forces.

In another country, an:

Agency member integrated into the **Public Safety Program** serving as an Advisor to the President on **Security** matters is in a position to recommend police action to the President.** 43/

In what may have been a ploy intended principally to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations,

* "Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent.

** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's, it is interesting that the reference to the "Action Squads" described above also included with reference to the Dominican Republic an agent:

In contact with a group of dissidents capable of violent action, including assassination. This group has killed a number of agents of the *Servicio de Inteligencia Militar* (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/

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Castro, but it was the heart's desire of many exile groups.* 8/

In another instance, it appeared possible that an agent named Rivero, a Cuban exile, might have been in training to make an assassination attempt because it was reported that he

was taken to the Warrington [sic], Virginia firing range where he was checked out in the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol, single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer; carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm British Welrod with silencer. He is to be also checked out this week in the use of a sporting rifle with telescopic lens attachment.

It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration into Havana, Rivero had two principal sabotage missions -- one against the Esso refinery and the other aimed at the Havana Electric Company. 9/

In mid-July 1960, there reportedly was an internal Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago de Cuba reported:

* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status of his recommendation he was told that it was "in the hands of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery (Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any such report.

Tab B

EYES ONLY
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1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i. e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). **Presidents Betancourt** and **Ydigoras** have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from **Caracas** and **Guatemala City**. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S. -controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

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- 7a. MR from J. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: **Freeport Sulphur Co.** Contribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio Program.

Memo for Mr. Lawrence R. Houston from J. C. King, 9 May 60, sub: **Freeport Sulphur Co.**

MR from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Contribution to Cuban Broadcasting Program.

Ltr to Hon. Dana Latham, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 10 Aug 60 from John S. Warner.

Memo for Col. King from R. E. Gomez, 19 Aug 60, sub: Telecon with Henry Holland, 19 Aug 60.

- 7b. Memo for Chief, WHD from J. D. Esterline, 25 Oct 60, sub: WRUL Radio Effort.

Cable to Director from MASH, 19 Nov 60, MASH 1744 (IN 45083).

Cable to JMASH from Director, 23 Nov 60, DIR 13132 (OUT 95725).

Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to JMARC/Finance from D. Phillips, 21 Nov 60.

Memo for JMARC/Finance from C/WH/4/Prop, 23 Nov 60, sub: WRUL Monthly Payments.

Cable to JMWAVE from BELL, 27 Dec 60, BELL 0022 (OUT 5074).

Memo for Chief, WHD from David A. Phillips, 25 Jan 61, sub: Approval for Continuing Payments from JMATE Funds for WRUL Radio Program.

- 7c. Memo for Chief, Ops Branch, DPD/DDP from Chester H. Vincent, 29 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report (DPD 3505-60).

Memo for DPD/AS from D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub: Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60).

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Phillips, David A., *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 90-91. U.

MR from **Richard R. Bennett**, 22 Apr 60, sub: Proposed Implementation Plan for Cover Plan for JMARC/4.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report 22, 23, 24, 28 Apr 60.

R and R Sheet for E. Stanulis from David A. Phillips, 5 May 60, sub: Annex A, Operational Plan for JMARC/4.

Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 28 Apr 60, sub: Cover for JMARC.

Burwell, James, *Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960-October 1961*, DDS/HS OL-7, Apr 71.

15. [Memo from] WH/Security for Cuban History [May 61], sub: [Security of Swan Island].

16. Memo for Mr. David Phillips from J. D. Esterline, 29 Mar 60, sub: Random Notes of 29 Mar [60] which Require Attention.

17. Cable to Director from Havana, 30 Mar 60, MSGNR 3940 (CKNR 208).

Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Mar 60, MSGNR 18435 (CKNR 098).

18. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview with David A. Phillips.

Memos for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., sub: U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: 20 Jul and 5 Aug 60. OOU. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder "Cuba.")

[Dept. of State, ARA], Progress Report on Cuba, 22 Jul 60. C. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder "Cuba.")