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SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI

Project Discovery.

The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project in response to the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the attention of Agency management. As a result of the information provided by him and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project, it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order. The

three identified the project at Fort Detrick as having involved the development of BW and possibly CW agents and associated dissemination systems that were suitable for clandestine use against human targets. They moreover identified lethal agents as among those involved in the project.

Concern about these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted in a recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD) that approximately \$90,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at Fort Detrick "for the maintenance of a BW capability". This statement appeared so important that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD -- now the Office of Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a small effort had been carried on at Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW

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estimated to have been somewhat more than \$3 million. These funds were apparently used to generally augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD. Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way, but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SOD as part of its program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use. Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined. Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories of project activity:

- a. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal agents in readiness for operational use;
- b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated balance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for operational readiness;
- c. Adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbioinoculator (a dart device suitable for the clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with BW/CW agents) to determine compatibility with various materials and to assure that the microbioinoculator cannot be identified structurally or easily detected upon a detailed autopsy; and
- d. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BW/CW.

In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.

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of SOD. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions which will be discussed below.

Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest.

Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years, available records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of lethal materials and delivery systems. The evidence indicates that the Agency relied upon the use of specific BW agents and toxins being investigated as a normal part of the Army's BW program. However, directions were given to investigate such matters as agent stability over varying periods of time, the suitability of specific agents for preparation in dry form, the development of dart coatings, and the preparation of materials in a form suitable for dusting of clothes, pillows, etc.

Primary Agency interest seemed to relate to the development of dissemination equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of such dissemination devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandestine use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of SOD: attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the air, a cigarette

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case rigged to disseminate an agent when lighted, a fountain pen dart launcher, an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent light starter to activate the light and then release an agent, etc. Available records do not indicate whether or not all these were developed specifically for the CIA, though the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as falling into such a category. The easy association of this equipment with specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading, however. At a meeting in June 1952, at the very outset of the Agency's association with SOD when CIA representatives stated they as yet had no specific requirements, a list of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was provided. This dissemination list included such things as cigarettes, chewing gum, cigarette lighters, wrist watches, fountain pens, rings, etc. Presumably work on these devices was already underway in response to Army Special Forces requirements. Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices and levied requirements for the special preparation of some.

One development peculiarly associated with the CIA was the "microbiolojector" which was an extremely small dart device which could be fired through clothing to penetrate the skin so as to inoculate him with an agent of some sort without the target's perception of being hit. An added fillip to this development was the requirement that no indications of the use of such a device be discernable in the course of autopsy. A large amount of Agency attention was given to the problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Much of the equipment delivered to the Agency and some of the testing undertaken by it involved a dart delivery system carrying dog incapacitants, and an antidote used subsequently to restore the dog

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to normal activity. Though most of the dart launchers used in these developments were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the development of a small hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs.

Clearly a lot of work was done on human incapacitation. OTS apparently received continuing requests for safe, effective and rapidly acting, incapacitating devices. Much work was done in trying to use the dart system for such purposes, but real success was never actually achieved. Since larger amounts of appropriate agent are required to incapacitate a human than to kill him, no scheme was developed for introducing sufficient amounts through the use of darts. Attempts were made to solve this problem increasing the area of the darts available for coating and for making a dart which would dissolve in tissue which could thereby introduce more material into the system. Work on this project was underway when the association with SOD ended and Edgewood Arsenal endeavored to complete the project using unexpended Fort Detrick funds. Success was not achieved, however. One reason for the preoccupation of those involved in the project with the incapacitant problem may well have been the substantially greater difficulty of solving it when compared to developing lethal mechanisms.

Substantial work was also done for the Agency in the development of spoilants for agricultural products, biological materials for the contamination of petroleum stores, and agents for use in the destruction of electronics, optical systems, structural materials, etc. At times in the history of the project, requirements for such materials as these were apparently very high on the Agency's list.

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misinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Boston was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material for the CIA, it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not consistent with the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposal of the material have taken place, and it remains under guard in the OTS vault.

Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material.

There is no record associating the project with actual operations. Discussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with darts loaded with dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use in S.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or crop-spoilants may have been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning have been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitating or assassinating Castro.

For example, botulinum pills were reportedly provided in February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pills were made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery of some in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960 involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatment of cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files. Consideration was given to the administration of shellfish toxin with a pin device in late 1960. Both the toxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick. The diving suit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus which would produce madura foot, a serious, non-specific, skin disease. Work

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on fungal agents generally compatible with such an approach was underway at Fort Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent was prepared at Agency direction in a form suitable for application to clothing, pillow cases, and so on. Tuberculosis germs with which the breathing apparatus of the suit were to be contaminated were available at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency stocks. Finally, the general presence of BW agents or toxins in all of these plans suggests the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick.

None of the interviews undertaken in the course of this investigation provide information about specific support to operations which may have involved assassination. Roosevelt, who was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the details and was skeptical as to the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler, Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during its investigation of assassination attempts. Treichler may constitute a connection between the MKNAOMI project and the assassination plots involving Castro. He was the officer responsible for MKNAOMI during this period. The records show his giving direction in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those mentioned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG's report indicates that he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro schemes, no suggestion can be found that any of these materials or devices was ever considered for use for lethal purposes.

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