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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrates will make their way to ~~AVANCE~~ ~~father's~~ farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.
2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangement, as yet, is not definite.
3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaissance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.
4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by ~~AVANCE~~ ~~father and~~ ~~Santos SUAREZ~~, located ~~35-40~~ kilometers from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named ~~Pedro CRUZ~~. ~~CRUZ~~ is ~~35-40~~ years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon ~~CRUZ~~ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:
 - a. ~~Roman HERNANDEZ~~, who lives a few kilometers away in ~~Santa Cruz del Norte~~. ~~HERNANDEZ~~ owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is ~~37-40~~ years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.
 - b. If ~~CRUZ~~ is unsuccessful in getting ~~HERNANDEZ~~ truck he will contact ~~Augusto MACHON~~ who operates a farm next to ~~AVANCE~~ ~~father's~~ farm. He is ~~45-50~~ years old, married, no children, wife's name is ~~Alfonsa~~. He was the ~~mayor of~~ ~~Santa Cruz del Norte~~ in 1954. He owns a jeep.

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c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramón Calzadilla, age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo 28, Cerro de la Habana. He owns a butcher shop in the Corojo section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. Elsa María Negrín, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. Pedro Iglesias Betancourt, age 35, born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. Iglesias has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. Iglesias is also a close friend of Elsa Negrín.

c. Serafín Méndez, age about 30, born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Auténtico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. Méndez has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with Méndez.

d. Isabel Menocob, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private autoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. Menocob lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

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e. Gloria BANCALAN, age 23-24, born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALES, age late 30s/early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALES has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALES primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALES is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALES and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALES in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the US Army during World War II. According to A/2, DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilo Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

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c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

Cesar RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s/early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

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to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his ~~father's farm~~ with maritime reception capabilities.

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen ~~WAS~~ and ~~QUARTS~~ for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on ~~QUARTS~~ conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that ~~QUARTS~~ is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims ~~QUARTS~~ is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that ~~QUARTS~~ has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of ~~QUARTS~~ which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his ~~father's farm~~ and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named ~~QUARTS~~ would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

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