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## 5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963.

Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will present several options for discussion, including unleashing of Cuban exiles and the intensification of the covert program.

## 6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1963.

This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Administration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend the meeting on Cuba held this day included: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or Les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy, and Chase.

## 7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963.

For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language regarding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere."

## 8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 December 1963.

This table reveals that the CIA spent **\$106,155,774** on Cuban Operations, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action **(\$47,815,122)**. The total covert action budget (psychological and paramilitary warfare) was approximately **\$81,000,000** in this four-year period.

NSC  
defers to  
PCIA

## 9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.

The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new President on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which included a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans, and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular: one led by Manuel Artiles, the other by Danilo Ray. Bundy recommends that Lyndon B. Johnson take "a more vigorous line toward Cuba than we have in the past."

## 10. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 9 January 1964.

Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not support the program of sabotage, while McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem." Bundy concludes: "...in your position, I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy."

action up to or including invasion."

18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.

Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup in Cuba.

19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964.

This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was "to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections. Thus, the continued exile raids were viewed negatively since they increased the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming completely beyond U.S. control despite CIA financial support to the groups.

20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.

Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed Cubans "but that it is completely deniable."

21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1964. Subject: "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"

The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told the sources, according to Helms, that "the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions." Apparently on 2 March 1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate Castro for \$150,000. The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers were made to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shipping-businessman from Ft. Lauderdale. An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group \$100,000 for killing Castro, plus \$2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York was to pay much of the money, and did pay the \$2,500 on 25 April. Though Cameron's group remained anonymous, it was clear the Mafia was involved. Cameron stated that his contact was a police officer in the St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squad.

22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. Subject: "Assassination of Castro."

Referring to the above memo from DDP to DCI, Chase notes that John Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting.

"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing," notes Chase, "and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special Group.

23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, with attachment (Des FitzGerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations")

FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons.

24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.

Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noise levels and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo (see Item 19).

25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.

In a reference to Helm's memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation." The AG said Justice would look into the matter.

26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.

McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 June (See Item 21). The Bureau interviewed many people allegedly involved, most of whom denied the existence of such a plan. (The Bureau did not interview Cameron, since he was out of the country). The most interesting finding was that Lobo had in fact discussed the matter with CIA.

27. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 November 1964.

The election past, Chase et al. agreed that "we can usefully do some

basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA-directed covert program.

28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE.

A contemptable proposal initiated by the Army to use germ warfare against Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should "remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance' at this stage." I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable than plans for assassination.

29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).

The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of war to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contamination of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating elements into Cuba.

30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.

The Arttime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA (as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere with him at this stage.

31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.

Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Arttime plot to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be "neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Arttime's water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Arttime/Cubela plot."

32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA document.

Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should be authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field.

33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1965.

This memo indicates that not even Arttime had his group in control. The memo also discusses CIA covert activities in British Guiana, such as penetrating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism.

34. Memo, Murat Wilf (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, 23 February 1965.

Recommends immediate termination of Arttime support.

35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965

Discussion of who is for maintaining a covert capability against Cuba (presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA would be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out the Vietnam problem.

36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.

Chase recommends phasing out support to Artime. The CIA is considering diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral bankruptcy of U.S. policy. Also some talk here of backing a new exile group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while DoD and State want the capability maintained.

37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Bundy, 18 June 1965.

This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started."

38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.

Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us," Bundy writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's recommendations said nothing about assassination.

39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.

Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."

40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967.

This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile talking to them about their activities.

41. Memo, W.G. Bowdler to Rostow, 18 December 1967.

The new CIA emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him."