

diff-jfk: record 104-10217-10225 - Page 1 - (diff between 2025 and 2023)

Highlighted changes between 2025/104-10217-10225.pdf and 2023/104-10217-10225.pdf - fresh pages only

DISPATCH		SUBJ:	ROUTINE
Chief of Station, London for LCPIPIT		NO DOING REQUIRED	
INFO	Chief of Station, London	DID NOT QUALIFIED DESK CAN READ MEETING	
FROM	Chief, WOLMER	REFORM	
RELEASER	0 RYBAT/DTDORIC/PLQRPHONE/MHPROBE/STFLIMFLAM Training		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 294821			

1. Being forwarded USC are copies of the QRPHONE/1 training report, the **JBMINIMUM** evaluation, contact reports of meetings with QRPHONE/1, a WOGEAR review of QRPHONE/1's book and some notes made by the STFLIMFLAM Headquarters officer, Harvey B. DAITCHMAN (IDEM), after his meetings with QRPHONE/1. These are for the information of both LCPIPIT and London Station and, taken together, should give you both the flavor of the variety of measures taken to assess the operational potential of QRPHONE/1.

2. During PAUPEROS' TDY at Headquarters we discussed the necessity of having QRPHONE/1 undergo an intensive seven day STFLIMFLAM training program to be conducted by DAITCHMAN. It is our opinion that in order for this training to be of maximum benefit, QRPHONE/1 and DAITCHMAN ought to be ensconced in a safehouse facility which provides security, comfort and an atmosphere conducive to learning. It is important that the training be conducted in a locale which will allow QRPHONE to give his full attention without being disturbed by his multitude of business and social contacts. Therefore, we recommend that LCPIPIT rent a cottage or beach house away from London for the duration of the training cycle. In discussing this with QRPHONE, he readily agreed and indicated that there would be no difficulty in getting away from his family for as long as we thought necessary. He

Attachments:

- A. As Stated (u/s/c)
- B. Iden Sheet (u/s/c)

Distribution:

2A71 Orig. & 1 - COS, London for LCPIPIT (w/att)
 1 - COS, London (w/att)

RECORDED IN FILE
 1 AUG 1972
 BY [initials]
 APPROVAL OF ORIG.
 APPROVAL OF REC.

CLASSIFIED BY _____

SENSITIVE INFORMATION
SENSITIVE INFORMATION SOURCE

CA/B3

CS COPY

OFFICE SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
OEPW-1814	4 AUG 1972	
CASE NUMBER	NOV FILE NUMBER 100-124-156// V200-124-156/3	
ORIGINATING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	TYPE	
DDP/CA/B3/Ken Rosen:ckj	(31 July 1972)	
COORDINATING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/CA/B3	2 Aug 72	[Signature]
E/BC	2 Aug 72	[Signature]
E/CA	2 Aug 72	[Signature]
CI/SO	26 Aug 72	[Signature]
RELEASING		OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
ADC/CA	2 Aug 72	Dino J. Pionzio

PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

17 June 1972

REMEMBERING HORN Chief, WOLINE

PURPOSE: Completion of Training Report for QARHAK/1,
Training Program "SILAY"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of WOMOLD, From Chief,
WOLINE, dated 23 May 1972,
Subject: "Covert Training for QARHAK/1"

1. QARHAK/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to
13 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty seven
training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than
two years ago, PHOM was given three days of reports training (Please
see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then,
WOLINE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment
of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the
instructor does not eat lunch, PHOM brought a sandwich with him daily
and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every
minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for **TRANSMISSION**, and on the
several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover
office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his
office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls
took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion,
everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any
thing to speak of for subsequent preparation of come plans for exercises.
For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop come plans, he
was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then
with only one written one and one that he received orally. As a result
he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of
his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental
exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time
out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight
I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother.
He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

SIC ATT: 1 to OEPW-1814 CS COPY

200-124-156/1
See 124-156/3

- 5 -

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PIKE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safeasite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safeasite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own come exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop come plan) so he was given come plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PIKE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PIKE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of traincraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WASHCOM/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

SER THE DIRECTOR OF NOFOLD

SECRET//RELAY

2

c. He will depart New York the night of 26 July on the 8:00 p.m. TWA flight to London.

d. This will get him in London in time for a previously scheduled ops meeting with PAUPEROS on 27 July. He leaves on 1 August for a one-month vacation touring most of Europe with his family and spending one week in Malta.

4. Before the arrival of DALTCHMAN we discussed other operational matters as follows:

a. His friend in New York City, Richard Ward, (Apt. 11K, 372 Central Park West) recently returned from Hanoi and Paris with the manuscript of a new book written by Cambodian Prince Nordin Sihanouk titled "My War with CIA." Sihanouk gave the manuscript to Wilfred Burchett who gave it to a North Vietnamese friend to give to Ward. Ward was asked to find an American publisher and he, in turn, asked for QRPHONE/1's help. Burchett is an old friend of Ward's and stays at his apartment whenever he visits New York. The manuscript has already been given to a publisher in Europe. QRPHONE/1 asked if we would be interested in a copy. I told him to get one if he could do so without straining his cover.

b. His friend, Lyle Stuart, the publisher, has been trying to buy the Americas branch of the Oxford University Press, and apparently is about to consummate the deal. He offered QRPHONE a job as his European representative if the deal goes through.

c. Per DALTCHMAN's request I asked QRPHONE to give his instructor a copy of the long list of names and organizations given to him by Sibecho. Also per Ken's request, and in answer to my question, QRPHONE said he received the magazine published by the Turkish party in Collards Book Shop in London.

5. From 8:00 p.m. until a little after midnight on 13 July, DALTCHMAN of FE Division briefed QRPHONE/1 in substance on the STFLIMPLAM program, our interest in having QRPHONE/1 pursue such a role, and explained the great amount of dreary work that would be involved in learning the communist dialectic thoroughly if the whole venture were to be successful. I will make no effort to condense these seven hours

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7. I asked QRPHONE to call [redacted] on the sterile line using the "Mr. Stanley" indicator on Monday afternoon, 21 July. This is simply to check in and let us know he is on the way and how things have come thus far. He calculated that he needed another \$500.00 for the U.S. portion of his overall trip since LCPIPIT apparently had not anticipated this when he was given his original advance. I arranged through the good offices of [redacted] in New York to get \$500.00 to QRPHONE today.

8. QRPHONE asked if we had any intelligence requirements for him to pursue while he is in Malta. I said Ken would brief him on those requirements on the 24th of July if we had any. Incidentally, QRPHONE mentioned that Libol Bergman comes to New York City every Thursday and told QRPHONE that he could be reached on telephone number **265-2500**. QRPHONE said if we cared to we might want to track that number and see where Bergman hangs out.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

SECRET/RYBAT

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JEMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JEMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Page 2
ORPHONE/1

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rct+c Uoo)L+

phr 201

TSD/BAB MEMO # 275-72
20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rod Sweet, Chief CA-3
ATTENTION : Mr. Ken Rosen, Rm 3D18
SUBJECT : ORPHONE/1

1. Attached is the psychological assessment of ORPHONE/1. A preliminary verbal read-out was given on 7 July in which it was stated that Subject was an emotionally stable individual. We still support this statement, but a more in-depth analysis revealed there are certain aspects of his personality that are susceptible. These are discussed in the report. If any part of the report is unclear or requires further discussion, please contact us. Meanwhile, we would appreciate receiving follow-up information on Subject's performance in order to help us refine and improve our methods of assessment.

James M. Keehner
TSD/BAB

Attachment:
Report

**Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1**

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JEMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JEMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Page 2
ORPHONE/1

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PAS Formula: 14(E+ut+R+ct+Uoo)L+

S-01-2

05 0257-72

17 JULY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff
ATTENTION: Mr. Jim Anthony

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRFONE/1,
Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Training, From Chief,
Covert Action Staff, dated 23 May 1972;
Subject: "Covert Training for QRFONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.
 2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 10 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.
 3. The only time lost was three hours for **JERMINIMUM** and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.
 4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any casing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he reviewed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.
 5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

DEPT OF THE GENERAL INSPECTORATE
OF E. S. POLICE, E. P. D. C. C.
59(1), (1)(c) & (2) (which are in parentheses)
EXCLUSIVELY RELEASED BY GPO

by authority recd

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- 5 -

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomatic target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

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22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:



CHARLES L. BATTIN

DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

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
7 MAR 19/2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Project QEPHONE

1. A review in some depth of Project QEPHONE was conducted in January 1972 by DC/CA and me with Branch 3 personnel, with the participation of Richard Berkey (now of Branch 4, formerly QEPHONE Case Officer at LCP/PIT). Attached at Tab A are the questions which formed the basis for the review. A full record of the responses to these questions and the review discussion is not practical so I have attempted below to summarize the general conclusions which emerged. Attached at Tab B are two charts prepared by Branch 3 for the review plus a rough draft "CI Assessment" which they also prepared.

2. PI and CA/ Excluding FBI Sensitive Reports, QEPHONE dropped from 157 reports in FY 1968 to 6 reports in FY 1971. His PI reports have evidently not been used as a basis for CA activities since 1967. This situation is apparently due to a variety of factors: the character of the man himself, restrictions placed upon him, a changing political context which compounded targeting difficulties, the complications of his own security situation, and the method by which he was handled. It was agreed that QEPHONE does have inherent skills which should have an application to either PI or CA work. He is politically attuned; he writes well; he can handle contacts in several languages; he knows how to move internationally; he has an engaging social personality; he has an established (if controversial) reputation as a left-oriented journalist/writer with some scholastic credentials. The problem remains one of focussing his talents and determining the platform from which he should operate.



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3. Morality. QEPHONE can be viewed as essentially possessive here are, however, qualifications on this. He move small children and an unwitting, anti-US, white, haughty wife, who would only be willing to leave her England if the overt job to which QEPHONE was going was clearly a step upward in his career.

4. Handling. The method by which QEPHONE has been handled, i.e. mainly through Rodigast (although there has been direct LCPIPIT contact recently), is unnecessarily cumbersome and not suited to the close consultation needed to explore QEPHONE's future directions. Having been declared **to the British Services** the most secure place to meet QEPHONE is in the UK and he should be handled directly by an LCPIPIT officer.

5. Security. QEPHONE cannot escape the record of allegations that he is Agency-connected. What he can do, however, is face-up to these charges, challenge them and deny them. There may thus always be some element of suspicion attached to him, but, as time passes without definite proof of such a connection, its impact on his activities may be minimized and he may be able to engage in effective work inspite of it.

6. Sub-agents. It was felt that QEPHONE may possibly have a flair for recruiting and handling sub-agents. It was believed that this should be explored and that he should be given relevant training, based in New York. This would also provide the opportunity for Headquarters exploration with him of his future development.

7. Future Focus. What QEPHONE's own thoughts might be on his most natural course of development are not clear. He may have an inclination toward African Liberation Movements—the subject of his most recent major writing—but it could be questioned whether on this or on anti-fedayeen work, there is sufficient Agency interest to merit such focus. He has no significant base in the American black community (rather the contrary) which would make him of interest to others on this basis. His overt political orientation is described

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SECRET**AGENT EVALUATION**NAME: QRPHONE/1DATE: 18 January 1971PROJECT: QRPHONESTATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANC: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANC RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

- A. His basic image of JKLANC is positive.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:


 Ray Sweet
 CA/B3

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE
5 January 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED FORWARD

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DC/CA/B3	5 Jan	A	- I'm all for the long-range objective itself - attached An encumbrance of 211 by Andy Newell, which is probably to become a permanent directive, will be of value.
2.			
3. C/CA/B3	6 Jan	D	
4. DC/CA/B3	6 Jan	E	
5. Not D.			3-4 PYI - attached background info on OR Plan alternatives may be useful to you prior our 17 Jan. meeting this subject.
6.			
7.			
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15.			

FORM
5-62610 VM-PREVIOUS
MONTHS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL
USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

17 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff


SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
Dated 29 November 1971

- 1. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on QRPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks. Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring illness--I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.

2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that QRPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell in either Paris or Rome. The purpose of this would be twofold--namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance QRPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that QRPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, Miss Chatelan, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him in the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminating

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his services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposal arose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of proved capabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunity to become useful once more.

3. CI Type Review/QRPHONE Personal Security: Your memo makes out there have been frequent security reviews of QRPHONE's security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assessment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general summary of the alleged security breaches involving QRPHONE and their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and that assessments of his security status were made following each alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other leftist colleagues (who do not have any Agency association) by their rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship--that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent country--this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational inefficiency.)

4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood Paris should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due to the location of the Wright clan. Rome, however, might do very well. If not Rome, perhaps you or EUR Division might suggest another locale. As for the question as to whether or not the Rome station would want him permanently, only time and his own operational success could determine this. One hazards that if QRPHONE were able to make his way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station might come to regard him as a capital asset.

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the conditions which would confront ORPHONE in say **Rome**. But if we are not to channel his energies in this direction, it is incumbent upon us to think of something else for him to do before we begin thinking about writing him off. And so when you suggest that . . . "the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. . ." I agree. And to this end, we should like a couple of weeks more before coming to you with some general conclusions of ours about the current viability of thi. case and some future alternative course of action.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

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UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL USE CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

AS

FROM: Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION
7767

NO.

DATE
17 December 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

RECEIVED FORWARD

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/CA/B3
2. DC/CO/3
3. Don
4. Poors.

*13/17**D**D**G*

5. *Jesse*
6. *WV*
7. *PMR 201*
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

1-4. Ted has always taken a big interest in this case, and so we will have to be brought into the planning. This of course a good idea — and your analyses of past files is excellent. Providing AF is first, we should give it major consideration. Let us not, however, wholly discard the

Some play just yet.

MJ

4 to 3 -
Returned per
your request

FORM 610 VM PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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17 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT: Operational Redirection of QRPHONE/1

1. In response to your request that I examine the QRPHONE/1 project to determine how it might best be redirected in order to gain greater value for the time and money involved, I have talked at some length with appropriate officers in CI/SO and Africa Division. I have been advised that the primary reasons for QRPHONE/1's dwindling productivity are as follows:


A. Key centers of activity of the radical left in Europe are London, Paris, and Stockholm. For different reasons QRPHONE/1's access in these three capitals is either circumscribed or off target. The British have asked that he not operate in London ~~in Paris and Stockholm~~ against African targets. His reputation among target groups of interest to us in Paris and Stockholm has been so tarnished that he has not taken into their confidence significantly enough to be of value.

B. Although he has a multitude of contacts among the left, virtually all are shallow, periodic, and then very brief when they do occur. Even his correspondence to the more important radical leaders, which used to be quite informative, has fallen to almost nothing.

C. Because his contacts are so cursory, he has been unable to develop a close and continuing personal relationship with any one of them in order to develop the intimate confidence so necessary for operational exploitation.

D. His cover has always been thin and thus has circumstantially at least lent credence to the periodic allegations of his being a JKLANC agent.

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E. Close case officer direction has been made very difficult because of the echelons existing between QRPHONE/1 and LCPIPIT, coupled with relative infrequency of field case officer meetings.

F. What contacts he has within the African target, for example, are rendered virtually useless because his case officers are unfamiliar on a timely basis with Africa Division requirements and also miss valuable operational leads simply because they do not recognize them. (This is no fault of the case officers because they obviously have little opportunity to keep abreast of such requirements.)

G. The somewhat artificial nature of his trying to portray a pro-Mao stance may help him a bit with targets similarly inclined but renders him ineffective with other political shadings among the left.

2. With all of the above in mind and without belaboring the history of this project, the following recommendation is offered and has been concurred in informally by CI/SO and Africa Division officers with whom I have talked.

A. Accepting the fact that QRPHONE/1's operational utility in Europe is minimal, I propose LCPIPIT be directed to begin making arrangements for his transfer PCS to Africa and, hence, his operational control transferred to Africa Division as soon as feasible.

B. From the point of view of MHCHAOS requirements and Africa Division's own requirements, both elements felt QRPHONE/1 could best be exploited **in Tanzania**. It is one of the two most active cities in Africa for the radical left, it is a hot-bed of both Soviet and Chicom shenanigans, and it is politically vital to East African stability.

C. However, because of QRPHONE/1's well-known association with two exiled **Tanzanian** opposition politicians **in London** and current reports that these oppositionists are plotting the overthrow of **President Nyere** (perhaps with Soviet assistance), it would be very imprudent for QRPHONE/1 to arrive bag and baggage **in Dar es Salaam** in the near future. **Nyere** and his police might well conclude that QRPHONE represents the advance probe of the coup plotters and promptly throw him into jail.

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D. Both to give QRPHONE/1 time to cleanse his tattered image and because there are almost as important operational tasks in West Africa, the idea is to move him (1) to Nigeria or (2) to Ghana for perhaps a year. This is to be done in concert with a suitable strengthening of his cover (i.e. two or three more stringencies) and a concurrent mutation of his political posture to that of a plain old anti-imperialist rather than the more confining pro-Mao stance. He would be run directly by Lagos or Accra Station against local targets but with periodic trips to other parts of Africa for cover as well as operational purposes. Meantime, in the intervening months the dust may settle a bit in Tanzania, the close association with opposition elements would be allowed to fade and QRPHONE/1's writings and pronouncements concerning Tanzania would be calculatedly designed to support the Nyere government.

E. At the appropriate time, a year or so perhaps, he then moves PCS to Tanzania.

3. If you concur with the above, I will proceed to staff this out more formally here at Headquarters and to advise LCPIPIT.



Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RSweet:ckj

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

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militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968

published Photo and Biog Data on # Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection
American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote
him a long letter and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance
of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1
advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.

Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAL is pro-Cuban, and [redacted] Q/1's loyalty
to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-
Cuban stance.

May 1969: X Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected
widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969* Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse
Don Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized
as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

1970
Feb. 1969 SYNTHIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/l by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent.

(Two of the four persons listed as contributors to SYNTHIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/l attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine Mass Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/l sat. This is Q/l believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/l and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/l believes KANAFANI picked suspicion of Q/l due to accusations against Q/l spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/l in SYNTHIC.)

QRP/MONIA REPORTING

	<u>Cuban</u>	<u>AMSO AAJA</u>	<u>African Liberation</u>	<u>War Crimes Tribunal</u>	<u>Anti-US</u>	<u>European Communism</u>	<u>FBI</u>	<u>FBI SR*</u>	<u>Total Dismissals</u>
FY67	3	5	13	27	12	24	22	-	106
FY68	1	3	24	32	27	27	43	30	187
FY69	1	-	12	-	17	10	2	43	85
FY70	-	-	13	-	-	9	-	9	31
FY71	1	-	1	-	1	3	-	31	37
	6	8	63	59	57	73	67	113	446

Alternative Reports

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29 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/B-3

SUBJECT: QRPHONE


REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Subject: QRPHONE
Operations in Europe, Dated 24 November
1971

1. I made some notes in the margin of referent memorandum upon first reading it. However, since these are too brief, I thought it best to let you have my thoughts on this matter in fuller form.

2. As you may know, we had tried for years to give QRPHONE more meaningful assignments, but there are certain facts about him and the operation today which simply cannot be ignored. It seems to me that your memorandum takes inadequate account of these factors.

a. Security: RODIGAST's and QRPHONE's personal security cannot be faulted, in my judgment. However, that has not protected QRPHONE from accusations of being CIA, which have haunted him throughout the years. This is such an endemic charge in the milieu in which he operates that I feel certain he would have had the same charges leveled at him whether or not the Ollie Harrington incident had happened in Paris.

b. Location: Apart from the efficiency of the French police, there are a number of good reasons arguing against the desirability of QRPHONE's even going to Paris for a meeting, let alone being stationed there (e. g., protection of RODIGAST's identity, the Harrington incident, and the location there of the Wright clan). I cannot imagine why he would consider it, or why we should advocate it.



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A different cover for a move to **Rome** might be developed, but not that of a Maoist developing new cells. **Rome** Station is glad to have him come there and give them "grass roots" reports whenever he visits, but would they want him permanently??

c. Substance: More generally, QRPHONE cannot just simply show up and start forming nuclei -- there are already Maoist nuclei -- the various Marxist-Leninist parties (minuscule though they may be) that existed, and they continue to exist with or without Chinese help. If he were to have something to offer them -- money, preferably -- they might welcome him with open arms. Otherwise he will encounter built-in jealousy, animosity, rivalry, and a source of accusation all over again.

d. Credentials: As a Maoist intellectual (or an intellectual Maoist??), QRPHONE can travel all over. As a Maoist activist, he has only minimal credentials. The only group he is actively involved with is Manchanda's insignificant group -- and even with that he has never carried a placard, and I doubt if he has even helped them with making up a placard. He has helped them with their press releases, leaflets, etc. In short, with the written word, not the deed. By nature -- which we must also take into consideration -- QRPHONE is no longer a "doer" -- if he ever was one. And I doubt very much that he can at this stage in his life become a "doing" radical. We would be misusing his natural talents, which could still serve us well, in favor of dubious undertaking.

In effect, the proposal (if I read it correctly) is to have QRPHONE develop a group which would serve to distribute anti-Soviet material. I cannot judge if that would be worth the cost (\$40,000??) **to Rome**, but I doubt it. I also do not know enough about the "Andy Ness" operation to comment on that aspect, particularly as to its feasibility in a sophisticated European community.

e. Book Dispatch Sale: Shopping him around to the European Stations is the wrong approach, in my judgment. In the first place, any Station likely to have a use for him is already extremely well up on QRPHONE's background. There are only **three** Stations really

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heavily involved in anti-CP ops (in which field I suppose this would fall), and those **three** have former CI/ICG men who know QRPHONE well:

Breckenridge, Hornstein and Friend. QRPHONE has talents and abilities and weaknesses which can best be explained/sold in person, not through dispatch. I think, that the way to do it, if at all, is by Spence during a visit to these Stations.

f. **"CI-Type"** Review: A review of the file will show how often this has been done, and how thoroughly. (I can understand Horvath asking for a security review -- he had no background knowledge of the operation that would have given him this information.) I do not know what you now expect to find. In all frankness, and unless CI Staff feels the need for yet another review and is willing to undertake it, I would consider a Staff-internal review pretty much a waste of time.

3. Having gone around this problem several times in the past several years with CI Staff and the pertinent area divisions (as the files will clearly show), I am most doubtful that any of them will consider QRPHONE of sufficient interest (current or potential) to pay what it costs to maintain him. We may be able to justify it since we attempt (as no one area division would) -- and to some extent succeed -- to target him on a multi-divisional basis. In light of these considerations, and since I have developed serious reservations on the long range viability of this operation (in terms of the cost-effectiveness factor), I believe that the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. After some internal discussions, this will also, of course, entail consultations with the CI Staff and at least **three** area divisions.

4. I will appreciate receiving your comments by mid-December.


Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

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24 November 1971

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING


SUBJECT: QRPHONE Operations in Europe

1. Mr. Leo Horvath, EUR/CA, and myself briefly discussed prospective QRPHONE operations on 8 November. During the discussion I outlined to him a general proposal which had been bruited about during my recent TDY at LCPIPIT in mid-October. In substance, this proposal was that following QRPHONE's forthcoming trips through Scandinavia and Africa, he then repair to either Rome or Paris for an extended period of time. In either of these locations he would then attempt to identify and to enlist the cooperation of various unwitting contacts in the left sector of the student and youth population, who could assume in time the trappings of a Maoist study group. QRPHONE would have excellent cover for doing so inasmuch as he is an established writer of the Maoist stripe. His relationship with these contacts or followers would not be set in the routine JKLANCE operational context. Rather, he would guide and motivate such contacts as would an alleged covert representative of a Maoist group, and would claim to have been a member of a larger such group say, in Britain. He would, of course, imply to his followers that he is attempting to develop a similar nucleus in (France) (Italy) or whenever, as good Communists should.

2.. Operational activity would be of a twofold nature. First, exploitation of the prospective group of Maoists would follow along lines of a typical black Communist cell, emulating the kind of notional movement which Mr. Andy Ness developed in the Middle East some seven or eight years ago. Hopefully, these unwitting followers, in turn, would each recruit two or three other sympathizers who over time could distribute anti-Soviet literature and perform other low-key CA operations, as directed by the Station, and which could be attributed to the PRC. Presumably their actions would result in some local embarrassment to the USSR and the PCI. Second, QRPHONE, himself, would no doubt enhance his own Maoist credentials-- already strong--to the point where he might well become

*to the party
of the future!*

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of focal interest to the PRC. This could lead to invitations to Peking (as it did in Ness's case) and possibly an FI operation of consequence vis-a-vis the China target.

3. The efficacy of the aforementioned scheme seemed to pose some doubts to Mr. Horvath. On the one hand, he did not feel that either **Rome or Paris** Stations had sufficient case officer strength on hand to direct and support a tricky operation of this type which might have only marginal utility, in their view. As for **Paris**, the **French** police, being as efficient as they are, would probably come upon QRPHONE's "black net" in time, and could conceivably pose security problems for him. As an alternative, Mr. Horvath proposed that CA Staff write a general dispatch to all EUR Stations describing the asset and indicating that the Staff would like to see greater use made of QRPHONE's capabilities on the Continent. The dispatch should ask the Stations to comment on the service that QRPHONE might provide them and suggest the means for accomplishing it. Mr. Horvath also asked that, prior to forwarding the dispatch, a security review be conducted of this case. He did comment that, if the security review indicated no severe compromises of QRPHONE's cover or personal security, it would be a pity not to make greater use of this agent's notable contacts in the European leftist community.

*I believe that
the above info
is to be included
in the dispatch
already*

4. Accordingly, I agreed with Mr. Horvath's two recommendations; namely, to conduct a security review of the case and, subsequently, to forward a blanket dispatch to the Field, if appropriate. I mentioned that we would still like to raise the possibility of a black operation **in Paris and Rome** in that dispatch and to this, Mr. Horvath posed no objections.


Donald W. Huntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

Addendum: Following the above conversation, Miss Jane Long has initiated a CI type of review of the Subject's security status.

You are opposed to another CI-type review but, frankly, am under the impression that this has been done quite satisfactorily several prior times.

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4. The charge is made that QRPHONE is too thinly spread and there is a recurring urge that his targetting be better focussed. Can he in fact be better focussed on a multi-divisional basis or would focussing, in practice, result in his being narrowed down to a primarily divisional target?

5. Granting that the CIA label is somewhat indiscriminately used for character assassination in the conspiratorial fringe in which QRPHONE has been operating, isn't he in fact stuck with this label and in view of the international character of this conspiratorial fringe, won't it turn up wherever he goes? In this milieu is there really much chance he will be given any significant information (and not deception information) by anyone who will do so because he wants the information passed to CIA?

6. When he was looked into in April 1968 by a Chicom official, what do we suppose to be meant by the officials finding that it was not clear if he was completely reliable in a Marxist-Lenist sense?

7. How eagerly sought-after are travelers to China now-a-days? What is the forecast as to demand for such travelers by next summer?

8. With a reportedly anti-US, white, British wife and 3 small children, how really mobile is QRPHONE in a PCS sense? If we should move QRPHONE and family to a new location for a trial period and it didn't work out, wouldn't resettling him have considerable complications?

9. In how many languages does QRPHONE have verbal and written fluency?

10. What are the current clearance limitations upon our use of QRPHONE?

11. One gathers from the project renewals that QRPHONE's CIA status is known to MI-5, MI-6 and Scotland Yard. A French service penetration (UNDERBID/39) indicated

that Rodigast was under some suspicion. QRPHONE has been refused entrance at the border by the Swiss authorities. Does anyone doubt that in view of the groups and individuals he contacts on his travels he has a dossier in each of these countries? Does anyone doubt that in many of these dossiers the alleged CIA connection is recorded? In view of this, isn't it a fact that probably the safest place for him to be contacted is London, in spite of whatever tradecraft he and Rodigast may practice? In spite of a rapport and background knowledge elements which he undoubtedly benefits from with Rodigast, are these factors worth the extra handling complications? Doesn't this handling method essentially double the cost of the operation?

12. What were the reasons for the break with "Fair Play for Cuba?" the break with Verges? Does QRPHONE have a power base at all among American negroes (SNCC doesn't like him and it is recorded in the renewals that blacks and revolutionaries sense that he is not "sincere")?

13. Can't we determine right here at Headquarters the degree of interest in the Italian branch in having a rather low-level propaganda operation involving anti-Soviet propaganda ostensibly emanating from pro-Chicom sources? Now that the PRC has decided to go "legit," what is our best estimate as to the likelihood that they will lose interest in previous and current pro-Chicom fringe groups?

14. Other than on the above, if we asked QRPHONE to become involved in depth with one of the groups he is in touch with, wouldn't he have to act "more Royalist than the King," and wouldn't he be the first to come under suspicion in case action against the group pointed to a leak?

15. If he could not take covert action himself through such a group to what extent are we now or potentially likely to become involved with covert action by other groups against:

- anti-Vietnam action
- African liberation movements
- New Left groups
- pro-Chicom groups
- Fedayeen groups

ATTACHMENT TO DISPATCH NO. OIL4-26059

ZIBET would appreciate receiving from JAGUA any current material on the activities and contacts of the following Africans who either reside in London or who visit there frequently. These targets have been selected according to the criteria outlined in paragraph 6 of the referenced dispatch.

China

William B E D O E-A N S A H - Sensitive Headquarters' sources have indicated that John K. T E T T E G A H is planning to return to West Africa. Since B E D O E-A N S A H is known to maintain contact with T E T T E G A H and was in fact responsible for T E T T E G A H's employment with a Japanese business firm in Cairo, we feel he may be involved in any new subversive moves undertaken by T E T T E G A H.

Kojo B O T S I O - There has been some indication through sensitive sources that B O T S I O has recently been travelling in Africa and that he too may be involved in T E T T E G A H's current activities.



(In addition we are still interested in the other targets mentioned in Reference C.)

Nigeria

L. B A L O G U N - He is the purported author of the recently published Manifesto of Nigerian Young Revolutionaries Organization.

Alex C H I M A - He is an Ibo resident in London who is not only a self-described Marxist but is also a regular contributor to Advance the organ of the Marxist Nigerian Trade Union Confederation.

Sam I K O K U - Although I K O K U is the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction of the Nigerian East Central State and is resident in Europe, we understand that he occasionally visits London. He would appreciate being alerted to these visits and receiving information on his London contacts.



3/1/77 A1 FAE LW 26059

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION



DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

S E C R E T / R * P A T

DELM-26059

ITEM: The Home Secretary

112



SECRET**AGENT EVALUATION**NAME: QRPHONE/1DATE: 18 January 1971PROJECT: QRPHONESTATUS: Contract Agent (Under
a Memorandum of Oral
Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANC: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANC RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

- A. His basic image of JKLANC is positive.

SECRET

[REDACTED]

- 2 -

5. In organizing a report exercise, he did extremely well. In exercises separating fact from inference, he did only fairly well, considering his background and compared to trainees with no where near his experience or education. He has a slight tendency toward jumping to conclusions and reading meanings into words. He realized this and from then on he overcame this weakness to a considerable degree. However, even on the last day, writing reports based on New York Times newspaper articles, he twice (out of five reports) substituted his own word for a word in the article for no valid reason and which new word in fact changed the meaning of the sentence, though only slightly.

6. This small weakness is not unique to QRFMCE/1. It is also true of other equally highly literate trainees, who, like QRFMCE/1, unconsciously substitute their own language for that which has been directly given to them, not realizing that they thereby sometimes change the meaning of that which they are reporting. Happily, QRFMCE/1 realized this during the exercises, recognized the changed meaning, and earnestly stated that he will watch it in the future.

7. In observation and description exercises, he did well after a rocky start. Here, he at first concentrated on individuals, almost completely ignoring the actions they were engaged in. He soon saw that he has a mental capacity to watch both at once and there was no problem thereafter.

8. He was excellent in his ability to separate hard facts and put those in the body of his reports while listing as comments those items which legitimately were comments and which had no place in the report itself.

9. For the final session, he had been asked to do assessment reports on two people. He was mortified when he came in on the last morning, happily handed in his five intel reports and suddenly realized that he had completely forgotten to do the other reports. However, in discussing spotting and assessment reports, it appears that he now understands them.

10. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in November 1971 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WCHOLD/QRFMCE/1/PERSHING. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

Calvo L. Satten
Calvo L. Satten
DC/OS/ALZ/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

SECRET

<input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/> INTERNAL E ONLY	<input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL	<input type="checkbox"/> SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET			
SUBJECT: (Optional) QRPHONE/1			
FROM: U/DA		EXTENSION	TO:
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
		RECEIVED FORWARDED	
1. CA/CF 3-P-0002			<p>GLORIA - I WILL CALL YOU ON THIS BY MID-AFTERNOON, BUT AM SENDING THIS ADVANCE COPY SO THAT YOU WILL HAVE SOME THE INFO IN IF DIANE CALLS BEFORE 1PM. THE TRAINING MEMO WILL BE CARRIED ON TO THE P/P/T/TRAINING OFFICE THIS AFTERNOON.</p> <p>CAL GATTEN, CHIEF, COVERT TRAINING, WILL BE INFORMED EARLY (BY ME) AS TO U/DA'S RESERVATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN THE STIPULATION ATTACHED TO THE FOR AGREEMENT.</p> <p>PICK RUPPNER</p> <p>YOU WILL NOTE THAT THIS IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE FOR AND NOT AN OR WHICH DIANE IS INTERESTED IN OB- TAINTING.</p> <p>THE DA, WHICH I BELIEVE, WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN DIANE AND U/DA.</p> <p><i>al</i></p> <p><i>201-fel</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">12 OCT 70</p>
2. ATTIN - GLORIA BENNETT			
3. TUBE EW-7			
4.			
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SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

28 SEP 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training /OS/TR
SUBJECT: Covert Training for ORPHONE /I

1. This is to confirm telephone conversation between Mr. Caleb L. Batten and Miss Diane L. Chatelan, Chief, Counter Front Branch, requesting covert training for subject contract agent.

2. We would like to have this training begin 14 October 1970, and can make the agent available full time for three days only. We are planning to have the training take place in New York City, and Mr. Lazarus has already indicated orally to Miss Chatelan that he will be available.

3. Our main objective is to provide ORPHONE /I with a firm understanding of what is required for good intelligence reporting and also the skills needed for spotting and assessments. ORPHONE /I has been an Agent for over five years and has absorbed a good deal of tradecraft in the process. He has not, however, had any formally organised training.

4. We would like to have ORPHONE /I's outside case officer (handler) present during this training.

5. Subject and his operational background represent a highly sensitive area and we would appreciate the selection of a training site with this in mind. Biographic background as needed by your instructor will be provided by Chief, CA /CF with whom all further arrangements for this training should be made.

FRED W. VALTIN
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-70-933

ORPHONE /I
3064050

SECRET

SENSITIVE

SECRET

TO : ID/1

23 September 1970

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

**SUBJECT: Richard Thomas GIBSON
201-306052**

IRD# 54454

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a 39-year-old, married, male U.S. citizen who has been utilized by this organization since 1966 as a covert action asset. He was granted a POA on 23 May 1966. His previous polygraph examination was on 13 June 1965.

PROCEDURE:

On 21 September 1970, Subject was interrogated and given a polygraph examination **in a Commodore Hotel suite in New York City** which was used as a covert site. Subject's interrogation and examination were conducted in the English language.

PURPOSE:

The examination was requested through Miss Diana Chatelin of the CA Staff. ADDP approval was granted for the examination.

The examination was conducted in order to determine if Subject had revealed his covert relationship with this organization, whether or not Subject had been approached by any other intelligence organization seeking his cooperation, whether or not Subject was maintaining a secret relationship with any other organization, whether or not Subject was deliberately withholding any contacts which he has developed from this organization, and whether or not Subject is currently subject to blackmail or other direct forms of coercion.

SECRET

**REF ID: A65297
EXCERPT
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification**

201-306052

23 Sept 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:**SECRET**

ROUTINE MAIL - AIR MAIL - AIR MAIL

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEMINATION INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO _____ BRANCH FILE RD
 PER _____ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _____
 FILE, VR.

(initials) (place)
 (classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)**C R E T****PAGE 2**

CITE DIRECTOR

Q13P59

ER, REQUEST Q/1 ALLOCATE TIME FOR DEBRIEFINGS/ANALYSIS
 A/PHOMBEAH POSSIBILITIES BY ZIBET OFFICER, CONGREVE
 THERE IS STILL AS
 ALSO STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR
 POSSIBLY
 RL, WHICH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED SAME TIME. UNLESS YOU
 4
 OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST Q/1 BE PREPARED SPEND WEEK **IN NEW YORK**
 THESE MEETINGS.

SINCE CONGREVE HAS MET Q/1 AND ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEMS
 VISE ABOVE, NO NEED RODIGAST PRESENCE UNLESS HE TAKING
 LEAVE SAME TIME.

FILE: 200-124-156/3.

GP-1
END OF MESSAGE

CA/B&F

CJ/ON

CI/SO

EUR/BC
COORDINATING OFFICER**SECRET**G-2/GP-1
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downgrading and
declassificationDC/CA
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OFFICER

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S/CA
ISSUING OFFICER

militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968

published Photo and Bio Data on # Q/l in conjunction with story recent defection

American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/l responsible in part Jones defection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/l's wrote

him a long instant and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance

of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/l and give Q/l

advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/l.

Bo Hammar editor of TIDSSIGNAL is pro-Cuban, and ~~but~~ Q/l is loyal to

to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/l for his pro-Chinese and anti-

Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/l is now suspected

widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969: Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse

Don Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/l whom Cleaver characterized

as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

1970

Feb. 1970: SINIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article

mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an

CIA agent.

(Two of the four persons listed as contributors to SINIC were

at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969.

They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine ~~EEG~~

Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A.

Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. This is Q/1 believes this story was printed

in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition

with the PSC.)

6 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his

conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of

being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI picked suspicion of Q/1 due to accusa-

tions against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly

in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1

in SINIC.)

SECRETQUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE :	LCP1P1T (London)	PROJECT :	UNIDENTIFIED
AGENT'S CRYPT :	QRPHONE/1	DATE OF FOR/ON:	22 Aug 1970
PERIOD COVERED :	1 October-31 December 1969	COSTS :	UNIDENTIFIED
CASE OFFICER TIME:	12 working days per month (average)		(W-1000 costs only)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING 4 QMDS: During the quarter an effort has been made to target QRPHONE/1 on the activities of the Palestinian liberation groups and their European supporters. A good start has been made in this effort. QRPHONE/1 undertook a "reconnaissance" of those European leftist groups active on this issue. (See COMINT - 2227) This in turn led to his being invited to attend the Congress of Palestinian Solidarity Committees which was held in Algiers in late December. (See LCP1P1T 7667).

In early November QRPHONE/1 made a brief visit to Paris to re-contact certain of his radical contacts there. (See COMINT - 2229, he likewise made a visit to The Netherlands in mid-December.

In October QRPHONE/1 made another extended visit to Italy in order to "take the temperature" of the radical left. The reporting from this visit was forwarded to Headquarters and Rome in COMINT - 2145 and COMINT - 2171. This visit was deemed to have been useful by some Station which asked that another such visit be scheduled for February 1970.

A visit to Nairobi by QRPRANK in late December may offer an opportunity for an added assessment of her - something which has been sought for some time.

QRPHONE/1 continues his cultivation of various Afghan personalities in London who are of operational interest. See COMINT - 2041 for a discussion of QRPHONE/1's relations with Dennis Phoenix; and COMINT - 2167 for a discussion of his relations with **General [REDACTED]**.

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF ORGANIZATIONAL IMPORTANCE: It is recommended that QRPHONE/1 be suspended by the Station by the end of January in connection with the Palestine issue - the nature of which is now security problems. The decision was taken to advise the Headquarters of the Special Branch in order to end the police in London immediately. See LONDON 6062, DIRECTOR 000343 and HQ.DIST 401, 1000 latest estimates.

The suspension of activity by QRUNIT has been recommended for a day period to be followed for QRPHONE/1. Although the QR is likely still continuing to be used for one or two more months, a new cover identity must be adopted with all deliberate speed. One suggestion is that QR take an assumed Tokyo. It is our understanding that Headquarters is favoring this and possibly others. Meanwhile QRPHONE/1 has been instructed to project a "business as usual" image. He should be able to do so with no difficulty unless in full cover.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO PALESTINIANS: UNIDENTIFIED access remains substantially unchanged - with a possible improvement in access to the Palestinian cause due to his attendance at the Algiers meeting.

SECRET

2.

ASSESSMENT OF WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAKE THE MOST USEFUL CONTRIBUTION: QRPHONE/1 has begun his assignment with energy and enthusiasm. He has facilitated and is continuing to do maximum damage feasible - given the limitations imposed by the unwilling informant-type relationship. This is a difficult task, despite every effort by QRPHONE/1 to avoid being seen as a source. It must be recognized as a factor in this operation.

During the quarter QRPHONE/1 was the source of information concerning

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT BY THE SOURCE: QRPHONE/1 will follow-up on his access to the Arab/Palestinian leaders in order to attempt to cultivate leaders in this cause - both Barak and Arafat - with the objective of taking a trip to the **Middle East (Clive, Azam, Shmeissani, Beirut).**

QRPHONE/1's postponed trip to **the U.S.** has been rescheduled for April (in the next quarter).

QRPHONE/1 will re-visit **Italy**, per **Rome** instructions, for another look at the activities and attitudes of the various **PCI groups**.

QRPHONE/1 will continue his development of various personalities of operational interest in London.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE PROVIDED FOR PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to intelligence, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and intelligent. The comments made in previous quarterly (and other reports), namely that **ROBERT** and **RODIGAST** are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very good ability to analyze and relate easily to others. This is a positive factor in his intelligence gathering from his many contacts and also in his ability to plan the uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 does not have violent handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, INCLUDING PROMOTION: QRPHONE/1's new method of funding the bulk of QRPHONE/1's salary so far seems valid and has been approved and will be put into operation in January. This will not militate in the problems of **BURNEO** - which were cited in your last report.

An increase in salary of \$100 per month has been approved for QRPHONE/1. This will be effective 1 January and will be just into an increase-type arrangement in order that it not increase QRPHONE/1's standard of living.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1 is an excellent asset. He has performed well and effectively against his targets.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS: QRPHONE/1's initial effort to gain useful access to the Palestinian leaders has so far been progressing well. In subsequent quarters we will see whether or not this progress can be maintained.

The progress toward operationally useful contacts with Tony Bennet in London (Kambona and Kambona) is painfully slow. In this - as in all other situations - the problem is mainly the nature of QRPHONE/1's access to his

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
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.3.

contacts (that of an unwitting informant). We feel that given this situation ORPHONE/1 is doing as well as might reasonably be expected.

OUPW - 858 was a much appreciated analysis of ORPHONE/1's recent reporting on the **Italian** target and explained why much of this has not been judged disseminable. Having reflected on this we realize that this is actually not surprising. It should be recalled that Rome Station specifically requested that ORPHONE/1 get away from rigid formal CS-type reporting and render more opinionated journalistic type reports. This type of reporting has been judged quite useful by Rome Station - but it is useful in an operational manner and for general appreciation of the situation. Thus it was not surprising that an analysis of this particular group of reports turned out as it did. Rome Station has orally noted to LCPIS/P that ORPHONE/1's visits will continue to be welcome and his reporting of definite use - even if this utility is outside the CS framework.

In general we feel that this operation is progressing well. In the past there may have been a tendency on the part of certain "customers" to exaggerate ORPHONE/1's potential - with a consequent let-down when the realities of ORPHONE/1 the man and his access to targets was brought home. We now feel that this is behind us. Judged against the realities of his situation, his access and the nature of his targets, we think that ORPHONE/1 makes excellent progress against those targets assigned him.


Aaron C. LAGINESTRA**SECRET**

ATLANTIC INVESTMENT CORPORATION
ESCAPE ACCOUNT
Statement of Account
LARRY A. CIR

June 17, 1959 - September 30, 1959

Date	Receive	Disbursements	Interest Payable	Principal Balance	Account Balance
6/17/59	\$ 3,200.00			\$ 3,200.00	\$ 3,200.00
6/30/59			\$ 6.22	3,200.00	3,206.22
9/30/59			\$ 40.00	3,200.00	3,246.22

* 5% interest from day of deposit to day of withdrawal compounded annually on value date (6/17).

DISPATCH		CATEGORIZATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WOLIME		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. COS, London; C/EUR; COS, Paris		MICROFILMED	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, LCPIPIT/London <i>(A371)</i>		DFF. 9 - 1969	MICROFILM
SUBJ/DIST/Operational/ <u>MHPROBE</u> QRPHONE/Passport		DOC. MICRO. SER.	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			

201-306052.

1. At their most recent meeting QRPHONE/1 reported to RODIGAST that he had lost his passport in **Paris** during his recent visit to **France**. The loss occurred on 8 November in the departure lounge at **Orly** Airport as QRPHONE/1 was waiting to board AF 822 for London (leaving at 1755 hours). QRPHONE/1 had shown his passport to the immigration officials when he entered the lounge. He then went to the duty free shop to purchase a bottle of Scotch and a carton of cigarettes for his wife (she smokes Galoises). He presumes that his passport slipped from his pocket during the process of producing his wallet to pay for these items. At any rate he did not discover the loss until the flight was airborne.

2. QRPHONE/1 had no difficulty re-entering Britain using his Home Office Certificate of Registration. He reported the loss to Air France immediately but as of his meeting with RODIGAST on 13 November it had not been located.

3. On 10 November QRPHONE/1 went to the U.S. Embassy in London and obtained a new passport (the number of this passport is IDENTITY - u/s/c).

4. We advised CHALEMSKY, of Paris Station, of this loss during his visit to LCPIPIT on 14 November.

Attachment: u/s/c
Passport Number

NO ATT'D BY RID/SD
Dated 9 Dec 69

ACL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:

- ✓ 3 - C/WOLIME w/att
- 1 - COS, London w/o att
- 1 - COS, Paris w/att
- 1 - C/EUR w/o att

1ATT

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DOC REFERENCE ID	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA - 2223	DATE 21 November 1969 201-306-052 201-306-052-56/3
	CATEGORIZATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	DOC REF NUMBER

S E C R E T

IP

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO: OEPA - 2223

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IDENTITY

Z 1057628

S E C R E T

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2223 ES COPY

201-306052
200-124-156/3

degree feasible - given his cover and the unwitting informant-type nature of his relationship with his many contacts. QRPHONE/1 makes every effort to overcome this limitation and in this regard a plentiful supply of background information greatly facilitates his elicitation of added details from his informants. However, this limitation is one which will always be with us in the case of QRPHONE/1 and it is one which can sometimes be particularly frustrating. During the past quarter QRPHONE/1 has been the source of 11 intelligence reports prepared by LCPIPIT/Reports.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT FOR ENSUING PERIOD: QRPHONE/1 will make a trip to Italy in late September and early October in order to survey the situation within the Italian new left/radical sector. This trip is one which has been requested by Rome Station. (The trip will have been completed by the time this report is received by Headquarters.)

QRPHONE/1's contact with an official of the Eritrean Liberation Front led to a TDY by AF Division officer Geoffrey B. DRANSTON to brief LCPIPIT on the ELF and to discuss possible operational exploitation of this contact.

QRPHONE/1's trip to the United States has been deferred until spring 1970 by which time any possible repercussions from QRPEONY's return will be relatively unlikely.

An effort will be made to explore the operational possibilities posed by QRPHONE/1's existing (or potential) contacts within the Arab liberation movements. Headquarters views on this matter were requested in OEPB-2044.

A re-scheduling of QRPHONE/1's trip to Germany has been proposed and Headquarters and Bonn have been asked for guidance/requirements.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS LEVIED INCLUDING MOTIVATION, PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly reporting regarding his security and motivation remain valid insofar as RODIGAST and LCPIPIT are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING OR CRITIQUE OF HIS REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in his elicitation of information from his many contacts and also makes dealing with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting. Please see previous reporting on this subject for added details.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, INCLUDING PROMOTIONS, TRAINING: A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is now being devised. This has been the subject of several items of correspondence between Headquarters and LCPIPIT. We plan to consult with the SGFLAG representative in Bern on this matter.

QRPHONE/1 has had some purely overt problems with his Chicago bank (an apparent error in his statement, etc.) He is also being charged very high service charges for the performance of routine transfers. If he is not able to resolve his problems with this bank it may be necessary for him to change banks.

At LCPIPIT's insistence QRPHONE/1 has begun to invest a portion of his monthly salary in a reputable Mutual Fund of his choice. This modest investment program will enhance his financial security in the event of termination and/or a rainy day".

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DISPATCHCLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

TO: Chief, WOLIME	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO: Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT/London	<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN INDEX
FROM: Chief of Station, London	<input type="checkbox"/> MICROFILM
SUBJECT: <u>QRPREY/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/JAGUAR</u>	

COMM CHANNEL - REFERENCES

1. As previously reported, we related to JAGUAR the incident in which Lionel Morrison is believed to have searched QRPHONE's papers while the latter was out of town. As you know, there have been some indications in the past which might be taken to suggest that Morrison was a JAGUAR contact - he works for the Daily Telegraph and seems to be in touch with **David Floyd**, and on one occasion provided QRPHONE with a report (on QRPEONY) which came almost simultaneously from JAGUAR. Clearly, this does not add up to much of a case, and we could hardly conceive that JAGUAR would be involved in the harrassment of QRPHONE. Even if there was no JAGUAR contact with Morrison, however, we felt it might be possible that JAGUAR could add to our understanding of this peculiar development from sources available to their own net. JAGUAR's reply is as follows (**CORONET is the agreed** crypt for QRPHONE):

"With reference to your letter of 24th April 1969, we have been informed by a secret and delicate source that **David M. SIBEXO**, the newly appointed **P.A.C. representative in London**, has recently been told by **Elias NTLOEDIBE**, the **P.A.C. representative in Nairobi**, of the incident of MORRISON's search of **CORONET's** papers. According to **Elias**, MORRISON had written him a letter in an attempt to blackmail him. **Elias** told **SIBEXO** that what annoyed him was that MORRISON had sent photostat copies of **Elias's** own correspondence with **CORONET**.

"Elias went on to say he was satisfied that MORRISON must have had covert access to **CORONET's** personal effects. **Elias**' was surprised that **CORONET** had not replied to letters

/Continued/

Distribution:

- ② - C/WOLIME
- 3 - C/EUR
- 1 - C/LCPIPIT/London

1 COPY

COMM REFERENCE NO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA-50928	DATE 26 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	REC FILE NUMBER 201-306052

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

SECRET/RYBAT

OELA-50928

he had written to him about the A.N.C. and enclosing press cuttings. He has asked SIBEKO to find out if CORONET got those letters, and to warn CORONET that MORRISON or someone acting for him has been stealing mail from his (CORONET's) house.

"Elias speculates that the spy, whoever he is, may be working for Black Power or Marxist/Leninists or The Telegraph or even M.I.5., and wants CORONET told of this.


"Elias has written to MORRISON telling him to go to hell and that he (Elias) and his friends will stand by SIBEKO.

"Elias has said that he held no brief for CORONET, but he notes that CORONET was introduced to the party by MORRISON and that in June 1968, MORRISON wrote an article in the Zambian Mail describing CORONET as a great Afro/American and a great revolutionary.

"According to Elias, CORONET was then living in London and he recalls that there was correspondence between CORONET and MORRISON at that time; and that CORONET used to supply MORRISON with pocket money. SIBEKO wonders when MORRISON began to work for CIA and infers that he and his friends should no longer be taken in by the 'coloureds.'

"In view of the delicacy of the source I should be grateful if the above information is not passed on to CORONET."

2. This reply does not of course answer all our questions, but it does seem to be in accord with what we know of the incident from QRPHONE. It seems reasonable to attribute Morrison's actions to factional fencing with PAC - a crossfire in which QRPHONE happened to be caught.



Nowell D. KAMMERMAYER

201-306052

FORM 53a 5-64 1-601	USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2
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SECRET 021205Z MAY 69 CITE
OCL
DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

PRETORIA 6916
PRET

2 MAY 69 IN 49487

SECRET//~~NOFORN~~

1. **SELEVER/17** PROVIDED/FOLLOWING MEMO ON 2 XAY:

SUBJECT: RICHARD GIBSON 201-306052

SUBJECT IS BELIEVED TO BE AN AFRO-AMERICAN JOURNALIST

RESIDING IN LONDON. HE TAKES A KEEN INTEREST IN AFRICAN
POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

IT HAS COME TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THAT SUBJECT, WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN IN TOUCH WITH **SOUTH AFRICAN** POLITICAL EXPATRIATES, IS NOW SUSPECTED WIDELY OF BEING BOTH A CWC/FIRK AGENT AND A **SOUTH AFRICAN** INTELLIGENCE CONTACT. THE **TANZANIAN** ASSISTANT HIGH COMMISSIONER **IN LONDON** HAS APPARENTLY ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF THE SUSPICIONS AGAINST SUBJECT AND HAS PROMISED TO ALERT HIS GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO HAVING SUBJECT DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA IN A
ABOVE MERELY FYI."

2. IN PASSING THE ABOVE, SELEVER/17 COMMENTED GIBSON PUTS OUT SOMETHING CALLED "THE GIBSON LETTER" ON ABOUT A WEEKLY BASIS AND SELEVER HAS FOUND THAT HIS INFO RE

July 2010

CIT:45A

acc. : Journalist

MICROFILMED

MAY 19 1969

PGC-MICRO-100

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN _____ PAGE _____

MAY 6 3 20 PM '69

PAGE 2: **PIAGRIA 6916 SECRET**

MAY 9 3 59 PM '69

PACIFIC ETC. IS FAIRLY ACCURATE. ALSO STATED MAY 6 201
RPT NOT ONE OF **SELEVER** CONTACTS.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON GIBSON, WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT
BE FOR PASSAGE TO **SELEVER**.

4. INDEX.

5. FILE: 72-2-2/3.

SECRET

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/R Y B A T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CEPA-1708
<p>as MANCHANDA, which are obviously known to the security authorities. Furthermore QRPHONE/1 himself might think it odd that he was being treated in that fashion and suspect that the Home Office was aware of his role which would not help your relationship with him. Alternatively (a) would obviously be a nuisance to say the least, so we felt that the obvious answer was (b) i.e. an extension of another year on present conditions."</p> <p>3. We have attached QRPHONE/1's brief report of his visit to the Home Office to obtain this visa renewal.</p> <p><i>ACL</i> Aaron C. LAGINESTRA</p> <p><i>I think JACAR was absolutely right!</i></p>		
FORM 53a 1401	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/R Y B A T	PAGE NO. <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED 2 of 2

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
KINGSTON 5E8

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
Riverside 3441

Jan 20th, 1969.

Liver Function Tests, Jan. 14th, 1969.

Plasma total bilirubin	less than 0.5 mg./100ml.
alkaline phosphatase	3 K-A. units.
alanine aminotransferase	9 i.u./l.
Serum total protein	7.4 g./100ml.
albumin	3.8 g./100ml.
globulin	3.6 g./100ml.

Electrophoresis of serum protein showed a normal pattern.

Comment : All parameters of liver function tested appear to have returned to normal.


John D.
Chemical Pathologist.

287

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

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PROCESSING

NAME	RECD	ACTION	DATE RECD
			MAILED FOR RELEASE
Chief, AF	IP	NO RELEASE FLGGED	
		DELTA QUALITY TRANSMITTER FROM ONE MORE FLGGED	
Chief of Station, Algiers		ABSTRACT	
Monthly Report/Errol S. KULPA,		REFFILE	

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

1. Attached find contact and subject reports covering activities of KULPA during the month of January 1963. The two outstanding characteristics of this project remain a helter-skelter operational pattern and the usual difficulties in administration.

2. We can not really blame KULPA for the former. His forte is moving around and being able to convince. These two qualities are rare enough not to demand in too loud a voice for the third--serious concentration on a long range target. It is not that KULPA lacks the professionalism, rather it is the tempo of his personal and professional life that inclines him to speed rather than accuracy. As last month was marked by the stop and go of **SCIMITAR/6**, so this month was hampered by the upcoming Congo voyage. It is not that these ventures are unimportant, it simply remains difficult to judge KULPA's performance on events occurring outside our area of competence.

3. We can say nothing new or nothing untrue on the administrative aspects of the project. The cry is the same from all small stations--why must so much valuable time be spent on tiny administrative detail. In KULPA's case the matter is perhaps compounded by his transfer from **Casablanca** but his complete file is living evidence of the imbalance of the outside staffer. In the regular four way breakdown, the file reflects almost no paper in Plans and Development, Production is not fat, Operations is fuller but transitory, Support is a swollen, blistering monster. We see no end to it. Our present agenda for the next KULPA meeting calls for a discussion of eleven separate administrative items. One more chestnut and we are finished. The KULPAS of the world take precise careful case officering with sufficient time prior and post the meeting to bring order from chaos. It is just this time that a small station lacks. So far we are glad to state, KULPA seems to be worth the price paid.

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - C/AF (w/att h/w)

Attachments:

a.s.a (1 copy
of each)

S-607

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INDEX

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
17 Feb 1963	FEB. 19 1963
CARTON NUMBER AND NAME	
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3 - 6 - 25/4	

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22 January 1964

CONTACT REPORT II - PROJECT LOG-FILE

1. Roberts **Halden** the record of KULVU's dealings with **Serge Michel** and **Robert** appear to be as follows.

a. Four (4) initial meetings with Michel on 17 and 18 Jan.
b. Two (2) meetings with **Edouard** on 19th and 20th Jan. It
was evidently at these meetings that the trip to the
Congo was arranged.

c. KULVU contacted Bemore during the afternoon of 19 January.
Saturday. **Bemore** explained that he could not participate in the meeting of the
plan discussed that day between KULVU and **Halden**. He should still however
at 0900 the following day, Sunday and discuss the matter with him.

d. **Bemore** indicated **Linton** that same evening and via telephone
between the two showed that it would be difficult to set the meeting up
as the minimum info Linton had given Bemore over the phone was to
wait for the next day's contact and to advise KULVU to hold one more meeting
with **Halden**, the latter was leaving for Tunis at 1000 on Sunday.

e. KULVU telephoned Bemore at 1000 instead of 0900 after which
his watch was wrong. Edouard clearly overreacted. Bemore asked him
to put **Halden** off and KULVU gave no indication of any difficulty in this
respect. A meeting was set up for 1000 on Sunday, 20 January.

f. It was at this meeting that it became apparent that KULVU
had indeed committed himself and that **Halden** was making firm plans to have
join him the following week in Leopoldville.

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LISTEN & REPORT 228, Lima

19 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts with **Serge Michel**

Father Galletti Hotel, two meetings 17 Jan and two meetings 18 Jan

1. **Michel** is starting a new publication to be called **ATLAS**, much on the order of **Part-Faction**, which will be aimed at French-speaking North Africa, Middle East, and Africans in France. An Algerian trained at **France-Tireur in Paris** will be editor (he was untrained) and **Michel** will be the publishing genius. Color will be used for the cover and odds inside, the plates being made in West Germany. An Arabic edition will be issued later.

2. **Michel** plans to use three photographers for the magazine, **Jean Lachay aka Dymal (trained in Czech)**, **Daval Tchad-r-ri** (if he consents to use a camera instead of a movie camera), or me. (**Michel** said he had to use Algerians even though we're not "photographers", but that he needed me to back them up technically.) He has already taken twenty-nine photos from me and has given me a long list of others he wants. He has promised to pay 15¢ francs each to start, with raises in pay as the magazine progresses. I said my present work earns my living, and a question of prestige was more important than pay for the moment. (Comment: I'm not sure how serious **Michel** is, nor if he has the authority to use me. At least he takes a good sample, and he has taken some photos to show the editor for use in the first few issues.)

3. Before **Michel** offered employment on the magazine, he asked if I would be free to spend three or four weeks in Angola and the Congo with **Roberto Holden** to take "several thousand" photos which could be used for the next several years in a continuing campaign for the liberation of Angola, with me retaining selling rights in the negatives and the entire trip being paid by **Holden**. I said I was willing if I could arrange it with my employer. That was at noon 18 Jan. At six p.m. 18 January, **Michel** announced to me that **Holden** had agreed to sponsor a trip for me to Angola. As a first step, **Holden** wanted me present at 1000 Jan 19 to take photos of his interview with **Ben Bella**. I will be there.

4. **Michel** then said the **Atlas** once underway would not be his responsibility, just as he had loosed the reins of **Al Shaab** once it was started. Then he will publish an entire series of slick, one-ti publications on the various phases of the Algerian government and its efforts, a photo book on Algeria, photo books on the various regions and problems of Algeria. Concurrently, he will be doing publications on Black African subjects, taking many, long swings through Africa to gather the information and photos. He said, "You will be working more with me and traveling through Africa at that time than working on **Atlas**, which should have a good backlog of Algerian photos by then." He added, "of course, I'll have to get permission to take you on these trips--maybe they'll want an African photo-reporter instead."

5. After the **Holden/Ben Bella** interview today, I am to get **Holden and Michel** to make further plans.

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BOSTON 36 MART 224, Paris

26 Jan 63

Subject Contacts 17-18 Jan

1. Serge Michel saw twice daily. He responded very rapidly to the offered trip to Algeria, including arrangements with Holden, Holden to pay for the trip, only other interesting subject discussed was Attaouia's chance of finding new location. He said the 17th will be better with Attaouia than this year.

2. Josie Piron met her twice with Serge Michel, ~~except~~ same subject. She seems to be quite in the heart of Attaouia, is very efficient, treated as equal by Serge.

✓ 3. ~~✓~~ Huberto Lopera saw him twice, on 17th and 20th, on 10th after Ben Bella interview, Josie Piron presented me to him, and he mentioned that "Mr. Berger had a ticket of \$1,000.00 and \$100.00 for visa, to avoid any publicity for myself. The 20th with Michel & Piron, before I could say anything, Holden told me he was applying for a visa in Paris that afternoon, and that he would read my ticket to Lopera in the daytime or referred to it. He is staying at Gare du Nord, but "I didn't say where he was staying", he said. I explained that I was willing when I had told ~~✓~~ ~~✓~~ ~~✓~~ that I was in contact with my right not let go in this case how many in Africa. (Holden is going to know in the very near future, according to Dalleau about who was Holden told him.)

4. Gérard Jullien saw him twice, once at 9 AM on 17th and at my office on the night of 20th. Said he was going to come from 10 AM to 10 PM at maximum, would do anything possible for Algeria. Said Americans prepared

5. Taleb Jaâdou saw him several times, including once at home. Said never saw anything like the example of the CIA's connection to the FLN and Politburo. Said never saw Irving Polk, while his assistant (allied to the "Strat") are both CIA agents.

6. Kabbouch Ben Djellil, a CIA Analyst, of Algiers. Metankhane and dinner up here yesterday. 20 hr. Kabbouch declined talk about CIA contacts or anything faintly resembling

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26 Jan 1968 37
Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON2R Jyo. 30105418 LC
OSPA- 211

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is running for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara while he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHAUDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

26 Jan 1968 38
A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

26 Jan 1968 39
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

2R

REF ID: A6415613
TOP SECRET CARD, APPROBATION

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

DEPA-2115

LIONEL MORRISON said Richard GIBSON is planning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

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24-108746

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S/C ATT.1 to DEPA-2115.

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INFORMATION REPORT COVER SHEET

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England, London/LCPI/PIT

OEP-797

CASE OFFICER:

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA *AC*

23 January 70

JAN 26 1970

REPORTS OFFICER:

Mosse C. BULSTAD/DE *NCG*

RELEASING OFFICER:

Adrian R. VASLOTT/*AC*

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DTDRIC/QRPHONE

SUPDATA:

Subject: First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

Source: QRPHONE/1

Note: Request Headquarters verify and correct names. INDEX participants.

Congress documents gave several English translations for this Congress. We have chosen the one which we believe is the most accurate translation of the French.

File: 200-124-156/4

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ZR 10-71587
Lionel MORRISON and22 Jol-3010534181c
Richard GIBSON
OEPA- 211

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara whom he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

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ZR 26) A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

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204-15613

Lionel ROBINSON and

Richard GIBSON

OEPA-2115

1. **MORRISON** says **GIBSON** is running for his because he is too involved with **GIBSON**'s wife **Sara**. **MORRISON** had had an affair with **Sara** when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. **GIBSON** had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told **MORRISON**, and he told **Sara**. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

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2A-10874b
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S/C ATT.1 to OEPA-2115. 8 copy 200-124-156/3

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LISTENING REPORT #220, 1/20/64

1 Jan Jan 64

Subj: PRESIDENT BEN BELLA'S VIEW

PABAR Ben Bella's apartment, Villa Joly, 20-220, Jan 8

M.R. BEN BELLA REQUESTED ANY OF THESE VIEWS BE KEPT PRIVATE.

1. The moment of crisis in Algeria is over, and relatively speaking a breathing spell is here. Opposition is nil, with the student and labor unions won over, the Federation disbanded, other opposition dispersed or too disorganized to be effective, and the people persuaded to give Ben Bella's government a lengthy and sincere support to overcome Algeria's problems. For the first time since emerging from prison, Ben Bella is getting six or seven hours sleep per night. He is relaxed, calm, confident.

2. Algeria's greatest problem now is reconstruction of the economy, including housing, agricultural reform, dams and irrigation, and new roads. In this respect, foreign aid is essential. He wishes that talks with the U.S. could start as soon as possible, and feels the best method to do this is to have an economic delegation visit Algeria to see on the spot the needs and special conditions. (He remarked several times that he wished the talks could start as soon as possible.) As for aid, he does not wish aid "which will help us eat better or have a higher standard of living" but rather aid "which will be of a developmental, constructional type" to permit the Algerian economy to help itself. In reply to the question whether he hoped more aid would come from the U.S. than from Russia, he said "I hope so, I hope so." (He gave the slight impression he felt the U.S. was much better equipped to aid. The preliminary estimate of the government committee for the reconstruction of Algeria is one hundred billion francs. This figure might go higher, but the final figure will be what Algeria will ask from France in additional help over the next two years." He stressed his appreciation for the American Ambassador, Mr. Porter, saying one of his most valuable qualities is that he actually loves the Algerian people, a trait extremely appreciated by him and the Algerian people.

3. The above figure is in addition to the regular administrative budget and the operational budget. The administrative budget of 280 billion francs is a balanced budget, with receipts—especially because of the new taxes—exceeded without fail to equal expenditures. He mentioned several times that Algeria is too proud to ask anyone else to pay its administrative budget, i.e., pay its running expenses.

4. On the question of the economy, there will be a code established soon which will delimit the private and public sections of the economy. He was asked that some people do not believe there will be a private section, and said "People will someday learn to take me at my word. If I didn't say it, I didn't have to say it. And if I change my mind, I will say that too, and I will give the reasons. But, there will be a private section of economy, and we do want foreign private investment."

5. Land reform in Algeria is and will be an experiment never tried anywhere. There will be both collective and state farms—Ben Bella does not believe in giving land to individual peasants because small plots are economically un-productive. And in any case, the question of communal lands has been a tribal custom in Algeria for thousands of years, which even the French could never wholly erase, and the new arrangements are but a slight change from this ancient custom. To buttress this argument, he pointed to the fact that the peasants were

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already accepted with no difficulties the several arrangements for the one million hectares of Bien Yacouta (abandoned French lands) now being put into production. He contrasted this with the resistance of the Russian peasant "which caused the slaughter of 11 millions of Russians from which Russian agriculture has not yet recovered". He feels even if production on these million hectares is lower than it would be French control, it is definitely worth it, since the profits won't go to one rich class which spends the money on the Riviera but will greatly boost the peasants' standard of living. In this respect, he was definitely not in agreement with Prof. Denevi's major criticisms of Algeria given on 9 January, and on told a professor in private.

6. With respect to Cuba, he was disappointed to return home to find that the missile bases did exist. His main hope in visiting Cuba—as he told President Kennedy quite frankly but discreetly—was to help lower temperatures. He had advised President Kennedy not to invade, and he had advised Castro to be more discreet in acceptance of arms. The end result was not disappointment, however, since "no man can be disappointed if a nuclear war has been avoided."

7. The U.S. reaction to the Yemen revolution disappointed him also, and he felt U.S. early actions were mistakes. It had appeared relations between Cairo and Washington were going to well prior to the Yemen crisis, and it had been a shame to ruin good relations. U.S. recognition of the Republic of Yemen however was highly welcome to him, and he feels this will do much to return U.S./Cairo relations to the previous high plane.

8. With respect to a United North Africa, he feels the time to act is now on a cultural and economic level. He feels identical textbooks, exchange of teachers, cultural exchanges, lowering of frontier customs and administrative barriers, etc. will start a movement which in the end will force constantly greater unity, even if the politicians don't really feel the time is ripe. He feels this is especially true in education and the exchange of economic advantages, such as producing electricity from Oujda for Maroc or Tlemcen instead of from Oran.

9. "Upon his honor as a man" he swore he nor any Algerian had anything to do with the attempted assassination of Bourguiba. He also felt sure the two Toussefists in Algeria, who are good friends of his, had nothing to do with it. He felt his friendship with these two persons might have led to groundless suspicions that Algeria was involved. He said "that is not my way, and I have too many problems of my own to meddle in Tunisian affairs. It was a plot mounted and supported in Tunisia itself."

10. Personal information gained: DUB 25 Dec 1916, Maroc, of parents born in Marrakesh, Morocco, secondary studies at Tlemcen college, French army in France 1937-40, then demobilized, then French army 1943-45 in Italy where he received military medal and two others (highest medal possible), and he was first of three so decorated), then back to Algeria. In 1945 he was in 5th Moroccan regiment in Setif when 45,000 people were slaughtered, which marked his entry into politics. That action branded him for life, and he realized that force was the only answer to Algeria's cry for liberty. He does not hate the French in any way, however. That is in the past.

5

*** Both at the beginning and the end of the evening, Ben Bella remarked how each time we met, he was reminded of the "fine" times at Tlemcen and how much he appreciated the help those broadcasts were to him. I delivered the tea set he had requested in Dr

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LUSTREL REPORT #222, 1 Jan

9 Jan 63

Subject: Americans / Yves Schleifer / Richard Gibson / Afrique Revolution

PARIS Home of Jean Marie Boaglin (Johnson Network), 7 January 63

1. Boaglin scheduled an informal discussion between himself, Schleifer, an exile leader from the Union of South Africa, and Yves Mathieu (phonetic) at the Boaglin/Johnson apartment. I was invited to participate, and to translate for Schleifer who speaks no French. The South African didn't appear, but we were joined later in the evening by a French lawyer Maurice Lai who works in Blous Verts and by Francois Lai, another Johnson network character.

2. Boaglin has accepted me as being very leftist, "objective", and perhaps even communist—an impression I have nurtured with him. Thus, his acceptance of me as a like-minded person gave confidence to the others.

3. The evening was a discussion of the Cuban and Algerian revolutions. Schleifer was more or less the oracle, having been in Cuba twice, once for two months Dec 60/Jan 61 and recently for nine months. Personally, I felt Schleifer is so entirely left that he is a communist in everything except perhaps the card and the party membership. He is intelligent, reasons well, and is obviously well-read, being able to give quotes from books by title of the principal communist authors, especially Lenin. He is also funny in that he seems to trumpet U.S. positions as being propaganda positions and does not assume the same case for Russian positions. At the same time, he gave no impression of sincerity, quite a bit of criticism for Russia, and an obvious search for the truth. He didn't blink an eye when Mathieu assumed that we were all "Marxist, Socialist, and hoped for the eventual implantation of socialism even in the U.S." If he is not a communist, he is an extreme left fellow traveler.

4. The principal conclusions of the evening were that the Algerian revolution has proceeded along the path of socialism much faster than the Cuban revolution did, but that the Cuban revolution will reach true socialism before the Algerian revolution because of the limiting factor of the Evian agreements; the Cuban army was the spearhead of the revolutionary reforms in Cuba, but the Algerian army has not been due to the political crisis, a defect which is being corrected at the moment as plans are now being made for the Algerian army to assume the same position here; Spain and the U.S. after the Cuban break have implicitly or explicitly made an agreement to keep out of Algeria in particular and Africa in general in favor of French and other European domination in order to keep from having a further stand-off as in Cuba; Spain is not ready for nor does it want further revolutions in Latin America or Africa—as opposed to Asia—since it is not ready to back such revolutions in the face of American or European opposition to the limit, and thus she can only face and the position of monopoly of communist leadership which she wishes to retain. Schleifer made one interesting statement that Morgan had been killed by Castro because he took funds from the CIA to finance a counter revolution.

I caused a flurry of dropped jaws during the evening, especially Mathieu—which was later forgiven because of my "objective" objectivity—when I described the lower middle-class farm of my family with its 50 hectares, tractor, combine, etc., and declared communism couldn't work in such a wealthy atmosphere. Mathieu agreed that perhaps in the U.S. no more effective organization and distribution of land could be envisaged.

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5. Later I took Schleifer to his room, the home of Richard Gibson. He was due to leave for Morocco on 9 January, but stayed over to get an interview with Ben Bella which was to be arranged, or "guaranteed" as he put it, by Doeglin. From there he is to go to the States. I asked him what he was doing here, and he replied just traveling. Doeglin hadn't as he was a socialist with a study grant, but Schleifer decided he was a sociologist, volunteering nothing about a grant. He told me Gibson was staying in Algiers to put out a newspaper called "Arrivée Révolution" which was to be a big slick publication with many photos and a selling price which would enable it to replace *Jours Africains* throughout Africa. When I asked about financing, he said the Algerian government was financing it heavily. He suggested we meet again 8 January so he could present me to Gibson who was looking for a photographer, and suggested I could be that photographer at a nominal salary. I replied I would be interested more from the point of prestige and publication rather than salary since I was doing well in my present journalistic endeavor as far as salary went. I was kept from making the meeting, but I talked by phone with Gibson (who speaks French so badly he couldn't complete a sentence on the phone) and the meeting is to be set up on 10 January.

6. Doeglin requested Mathieu, who is a high official in the Bens Yaâma section dealing with agriculture problems to set up a series of photos for me. Mathieu met me at the G5 office 8 January and sent me on a visit to communal lands in Zerarda with an assistant, Mohamed Ouerif Bourghamid (a real "pure" militant) on 9 January. Mathieu also presented me to the Director of the program, Nahjeb (phototic) whom I had known since his days in the Ben Khedda exhibit. Nahjeb has given me carte blanche for a report in depth of the entire program, to be made over the next few weeks. At Zerarda, the regional monitor turned out to be an acquaintance from El Aouana PAM office, and I was permitted to photograph anything and everything I desired. To finish this report, I will be furnished with complete figures, etc., as well as further trips in the field, especially in the Constantine area.

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LISTKIN-R ME UNF #220, Tulupe

9 Jan 63

Subj: Requested list of continual contacts, for which requirements are to be tailored.

1. President Ben Bella; seems to answer quite frankly whatever question I pose.
2. Commandant Aliouane; airforce in questionairre, but has evidenced desire to make recorded interview which will "shock" America on whatever subject I choose; Also has suggested a report on the army of the post with him as guide; has also agreed to explain army system to me; also has agreed to interest with Duxedilex to permit me to photograph Ingolani trainees.
3. Brahim Boumari has never up Gendarmerie and Army oil contracts for Shell and sees army leaders frequently, worked on budget with me attorney is married to sister of Minister of Finance Finance; step-daughter married to Bedjaoui of Ben Bella's office.
4. Drs Hadj Mezou and brother of same name who works in Finance ministry; has suggested I arrange informal meeting with him and Am... under Porter at my house.
5. Mohamed Maghribi; former Director of Security, now to work in Ministry Foreign Affairs to present me to his successor Yousseffli.
6. Jamal Kert, Director of Tourism; good friend Sec. to the Director Yousseffli, Maghribi, other important government members.
7. Jean Marie Dauglin, former Jeannin Network now assistant Ministry of Information.
8. Yves Mathieu & Melgoueb (phonetic) of Siens Vacant.
9. MIL MI/4, now Algerian Radio.
10. Marc Schleifer/ Richard Gibson, American "leftist"; connected with Afrique Revolution.
11. Louis Alatti, Hotel Alatti; good friend of Chinese Ambassador, agrees/and produces generally any information I request of him. I know most blue people.
12. Mrs Nabi (in spite of lack of first name, we are quite good friends & exchange visits frequently), formerly with Shell, now in Government office dealing with all oil questions.
13. Noha ed Yaqid, deputy; a bit anxious deepen our old but rather light friendship.

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of the Secretary of State

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LUSTIGER REPORT #201, Kufra

30 Jan 68

Subj: Contacts, Jan 25-29 Jan.

1. Serge Michal: Saw him Allett hotel, his house, and three times my house. He says Yassid is de facto Minister of Information now, and will become Minister of Information over the next few weeks or month. Michal stayed with El Chaab long enough to get it on its feet, then moved on to plans for Atlas. When Atlas is established, he will move on again to look on Algeria and one-shot publications. He is going to the Congo in early April for a week to gather material for articles on Angola and the Congo. He is taking the line that Kennedy and Kruschev are "allies", with De Gaulle and Mao as enemies; thus Algeria should not support nor attack either one too much. He feels the Afrique Revolution is making political mistakes in this respect by attacking the United States (presumably with an article on Meredith & Mississippi) and can be termed the extreme left in Algeria. He feels Afrique Revolution will be taken over by Atlas staff in six months or less, and run on a less violent basis. Serge talked of his ancestors, saying they were all from Georgia, and that a translator was used when he talked with his grand parents who only spoke Georgian not Russian. He is an apatride with a Moroccan passport (which I saw but couldn't get the number) which contains his nationality as Moroccan, as opposed to other Moroccan passports for Algerians which have the nationality lined through. His father was apatride also, and Serge claims he feels more for Algeria than any other country. He arrived here the first time when he was 20 years old, and from that time lived with Algerian rebels. He is 41 years old now. He has three boys, about one year, four and six, all with Russian first names, and occupies a villa in Ryfva. His wife speaks French with an accent, Russian I believe. His infant is very sick with asthma.

2. Richard Gibson & wife: Saw them in his office as result of his request for photos for Dave Watts in New York for the latter's "Liberator" publication, which is a slick, leftist publication with a format something like a cross between Newsweek and The New Yorker. I gave him fourphotos without my name, but he insisted on putting my name on the back for credit. He said Watts would pay me directly, since he had my address already. He also said I would probably get photo requests from London from a person whose name he didn't remember. This person and Watts are also correspondents for Afrique Revolution in their cities. Mrs. Gibson is white, and appeared to me to be Jewish, probably from Brooklyn, judging from her accent. However, she could be foreign since the accent is difficult to place. Eduardo dos Santos was in the office, but wasn't very friendly. Gibson knew of my trip to Angola, probably from dos Santos via the Congo embassy in Tunis, and wanted some photos when I returned.

3. Jean Marie Boeglin: Boeglin phoned me, after having missed a luncheon with me last week. He has acted on my request to speak to Jacques Verges about using me when possible for Afrique Revolution. Verges is to meet me tomorrow to discuss photos. I am to bring one—violent action if possible—which is to be used as the first cover of Rev-Afrique, if it is a suitable photo. Boeglin will be there, and we are to meet today to plan the conversation with Verges to make sure I benefit.

4. Djmal Tchanderli: (brother of U.N. Tchanderli, although name spelled differently). He came to my home with Michal. He is going to the Congo to film Angolans in March, and wanted my agreement not to film for my cover company while there. I finally agreed, extracting a promise from him that he would not take anyphotos, thus leaving me that monopoly in exchange for the film monopoly. He & Michal feel they are related, both families coming from Georgia, & Michal having an uncle named Tchanderli.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT #201, Paris

25 Jan 62

Subj: Contacts PI-PL January.

1. Serge Michel: Saw him four times at Hotel Aletti, discussed mostly "Atlas". As far as to procure six color covers in advance, first one to illustrate ancient Corbusier plan for face-lifting of Algeria which is now planned by Algerian Government. Claims Africa Revolution will be "absorbed" by Atlas (probably both under same editorship). Robert Goldie phoned Josie Falon from Tunis; he will be in Rome Saturday, will send w/ ticket and visa for Congo from there. I am to leave soon as possible.
2. Louis Aletti, about sixty years, 220 pounds, 4' 2", white hair, blue eyes, French, worked in States several years in 1920's, speaks English well, friend of most diplomats in city. Individ w/ Calvoco, is regarded by Algerians as being anti-OAS in spirit. He claims the last German cover went was full recognition by the Algerians, cited Ben Bella's adherence at national holiday of East Germans, though Scharfenberg is only Charge d'affaires. Have no Chinese or soap address as 35 Rue Lucien, El Biar, phone 54-44-44. Will have w/ me w/ East Germans whenever I wish.
3. Talib Jarai, Hotel Aletti & the city. Jarai had difficulty with reporters of Republique Algérienne and was in rare over "stupid communists". Again claimed Irving Brown was CIA agent in front of a French radio speakerine.
4. Dr. Saïd Jarras, Janati Alari, Brahim Bouzar, at my home and at their homes. Nothing of interest or concerned.
5. Pms Ben-Dah, police ~~member~~ officer, plus two of his friends, at Rome. Nothing of interest except the three of them very idealistic, insisting everyone must work to maximum for minimum pay in order build Algeria. Seems to be typical attitude among young Algerians.
6. Zerati, police ~~member~~ commissioner, Les Prairies for lunch. Extremely pro-American, talked of all his OAS friends from Morocco at Ben Guerir while he worked in Marrakesch. He should be contacted by someone under official cover as being "sent by his old OAS friends" or some such play. He can be developed.
7. Abdellah Kavery (phonetic), Secretary General of the Assembly, my home. Nothing of interest, but he is quite likeable and certainly of importance. Will see him again rather frequently.

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Secret**LISTENING REPORT #332, Pulse****31 Jan 63****Subj: Contacts, 30 Jan—31 Jan.**

1. Jean Marie Boaglin: Saw him three times, his home, office of Revolution Africaine, and Brasserie du Berry. 30-31 January. He arranged meeting with Jacques Verges, Director of Revolution Africaine, having told Verges that I was "practically a militant" who would work well for the cause instead of the salary. He also offered me the "executive" job as photographer for the Information Bureau of Black Vacants, with all expenses for trips etc paid for by the ministry, but with very little extra salary. I accepted, saying that was a good method to study the reforms abroad deeply for an article. Yves Mathieu will be my boss in that job. Boaglin then took me to the Opera where he has an office in capacity as Technical Director of the National Theatre. He requested me to furnish him with photos he could use for the Theatre posters and for the programs for the first production scheduled in mid-March. I agreed.

2. Jacques Verges: Saw him 1100 31 Jan in the office of Revolution Africaine, of which he is director. Edouard Lhote's intent is to be the editor in chief of this publication. Verges immediately offered me a job as a regular salaried photographer of Revolution or as a piece-mail photographer. I indicated I thought payment by the job was better, since my cover outfit is not "liberal" as I am. Popular salary for everyone on the paper, from the lowest secretary to Verges himself, as decided by Verges, is to be 100,000 francs per month. My job payment will amount to about that much. I will take a trip once a week with Georges Aymo (phonetic) to do photos on the feature articles on Algeria for each week's publication. Verges also ordered six photos from me from my contact prints, and took one photo on the spot for the cover of the second issue due out 9 February. The cover of the first issue of 2 February is to be a photo of Lumumba. Verges took me around to introduce me to the rest of the staff—all odd characters who hardly said hello with the exception of Cinet, the ex-Express cartoonist—and showed me the physical layout. He invited me to the opening cocktail party for Saturday night also. Boaglin later said he was quite impressed with my photo collection.

3. Serge Michel: Came to my home 31 Jan when I wasn't home, but I talked with him from Botras' house. Michel had with him "an FLN responsible" who wanted to commission me to produce the photos for an FLN publication, slick style one-shot but presented as a "mosaic", on Algerian women. We set up a meeting for Saturday morning to discuss it. We will take a trip into the Kabylie area to start these shots of women.

4. Bijan Tahandari: Saw him down town, said he wanted to discuss something important with me, made date for tonight, but he didn't show. Will see him tomorrow.

5. Talked by phone with Tony Pali and Frank Kearns (directing CBS Paris since Kleinman is in New York since Christmas with rumored sick wife—he may be getting fired) in Paris. They are extremely interested in the Congo trip, approve it fully in spite of leaving radio uncovered tops, want both radio broadcasts and actuality tapes. Also want me to shoot movies, and insist I make a deal with Tahandari to permit me to shoot movies. In to phone them tomorrow for latest word from New York on actual requirements and possible premium payments for Congo/Angloless movies!

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6. Abdalkader Bel Hacene, two Deputies, at Hotel Alletti. Nothing of interest.

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some time he was in trouble at the hands of the political groups opposed to Algerian independence. He was provided a guard outside his house and for a little while had even to leave France to live in Geneva because of fear for his life. Even in the legal defence that he conducted, the basis was entirely political. He was all this period subscribing to an extremist view which may be called ultra-revolutionary. For example, in his legal defence his theory was always to justify an act of killing by an accused on the ground that it was part of a war of independence.

Almost from the very beginning and in any case from 1951 Vergez had serious difference with the French C.P. He considered them to be reformists and accused them of being cowardly in their support to the Algerian revolution. He was never a member thereof in this period and often worked against them.

In 1962 he shifted to Rabat as Political Adviser to the King. He was very friendly with a Senior Minister, "Ahmed", and his post in Rabat was brought about by the Minister. However, it appears he did not continue long in this post and was back in Paris in 1963. Now he is the Chief Editor of a political monthly journal called "Revolution". He is also reported to be the head of the China Lobby in Paris.

Acquaintance

The writer met Vergez in 1951 when he visited Delhi. In 1955 the writer stayed with Vergez in Paris twice and twice again in 1958. The last time the writer saw Vergez was in Paris in 1961. (In 1951 Vergez was in Delhi in connection with an I.U.S. meeting. In 1955 the writer was in Paris on the way to and from Prague in connection with I.U.S. matters. In 1958 he visited Paris going to and from Stockholm for the Youth Festival Preparatory Committee meeting. And in 1961 the writer was in Paris to attend an I.A.D.L. Commission on Algeria.) Vergez has always been very friendly and cordial with the writer and openly discusses his problems, views, activities, etc.

SECRET//COMINT//REF ID: A65124

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APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUALS PROMINENTLY CONCERNED WITH THE PRODUCTIVE OF
"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"201
Baraa ALAVI

- was born on 10th April 1921. He is a Pakistani resident in the U.K. and has strong Communist sympathies. Member of Editorial Board

201
Freddy Miles ANDERSON

- was born on 11th February 1933 at [redacted] Lausanne. He is a Swiss and the business manager of "Revolution". He has been a Communist for a number of years.

201-339225
Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU

- was born on 22nd September 1921 at Zanzibar and is at present Minister for External Affairs and Trade in the Zanzibar Government. His sympathy towards Communism is well known. Member of Editorial Board

201-36452
Richard Thomas GIBSON 201-36452
Latin America, Africa Revolution, Paris
was born on 13th May 1931 in the U.S.A. He is the Editor-in-Chief of "Africa, Latin America, Africa Revolution" and works in the Editorial Office in Paris. An American negro, he was Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" in the U.S.A. until September 1962. →201
Bernard Arthur LARDER

- was born on 25th September 1926 at [redacted] Manchester. He is a Communist and has taken a close interest in African affairs. Reported to be Legal Adviser

201-180164
Jacques Camille Raymond VERGERS
alias Jacques Mansour VERGERS

- was born on 5th March 1925 or 5th March 1929 at Oubone, Thailand. He was a member of the French Communist Party in 1951 and subsequently was employed by the I.U.S. as Secretary of its International Relief Organisation. More recently he was Defence Counsel in the trial of a number of members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (P.L.N.). Director and key figure of the publication, "AFRICA, LATAM AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" →