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of the boundless personal ambitions of the respective leaders and the geographic dispersion of the units, <sup>however,</sup> these small groups could never be effectively merged into a centrally directed larger <sup>organization.</sup> ~~unit.~~ To use them effectively we would have to try to siphon off the membership <sup>into</sup> ~~to~~ controlled groups. If this is not possible, they may serve a useful purpose by providing unwitting diversionary harassment while the larger groups work toward the major goals.

2. A unilaterally recruited senior officer of the diplomatic service of a neutralist African country has been briefed and given training in secret writing and communications to assist him in reporting on our objectives in Cuba. He is now in Havana from where he plans to travel to <sup>around Cuba</sup> ~~areas~~ of interest to us.

3. The Chief of the **Danish** Intelligence Service has agreed to cooperate with us on Cuban intelligence operations. He has identified several sources aboard ships transitting Cuban ports and has arranged for their periodic briefing and debriefing.

4. The **Norwegian** Intelligence Service has also agreed to cooperate with us in establish<sup>ing</sup> ~~ing~~ case officer "centers" in **Norway** and **Kiel, Germany**, to handle **Norwegian** Merchant Marine sources who call at Cuban ports.

5. The Madrid Station Cuban refugee debriefing center is now in operation and results of the first interrogations are ~~now~~ being reviewed.

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