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3. The Director then described in some detail Agency covert financial support in the recent <sup>11</sup>[Peru] elections, the last <sup>8</sup>[Greek] elections, and the <sup>8</sup>[Finnish] election. He also described our activities in connection with the Italian political parties. Following this, he covered our plans for the upcoming <sup>8</sup>[Brazilian] elections. He touched on our thoughts with regard to the political situation in <sup>11</sup>[British Guiana].

4. At this juncture, the Director discussed Agency labor operations. He read to the group a short paper which outlined our support to anti-Communist labor unions in <sup>11</sup>[France] and <sup>11</sup>[Italy], our work through the <sup>29</sup>[ICFTU], and our relationships with <sup>8</sup>[American] labor and the assistance <sup>24</sup>[United States unions] have given us.

5. Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by Dr. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current status of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the International Commission of Jurists. He touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the services of Mr. Livingston Merchant to head it.

6. In the time remaining to him, the Director went over with the Panel country by country an extended list of political parties and leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Plans) finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon session.

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EXP 2-5767

11/9/62

Executive Document  
62-8090

2 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's  
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 1 November, the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to present a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since the one held on 20 July 1962. The meeting lasted from 2:30 to 4:45.
2. There was little discussion on Cuba. In response to Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good intelligence job had been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having prepared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured Mr. Coyne would be submitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to review it.
3. The <sup>8</sup> Braslian election program was covered in considerable detail. Points covered were: (a) the reason for the program, (b) the manner in which candidates were chosen, (c) the amount of money involved, (d) the methods of funding, and (e) the coordination of State and the Agency on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of the factual elements, there was considerable discussion of the political situation in <sup>11</sup> Brasil and the direction in which that Government seemed to be tending.

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4. CIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival was the next item presented. A full report was given which followed carefully the post-mortem written by the CA Staff.

5. As for CA activities in the remainder of Latin America, the following countries were covered: Dominican Republic, Chile, <sup>11</sup>[Peru] and <sup>11</sup>[Venezuela]. <sup>11</sup>[Haiti] and <sup>11</sup>[British Guiana] were then touched on, with particular reference to the sensitivity of the <sup>24</sup>[US-UK] cooperation on the latter.

6. In Southeast Asia, an up-to-date report was presented on operations in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Problems in connection with North Vietnamese operations were specifically identified.

7. On the <sup>24</sup>[Sino-Indian] conflict, the Panel was made aware of pending and current requests from the <sup>29</sup>[Indian CIB] for assistance in the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also identified. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy, I said that I did not see any requirement at this time for an increase of our permanent establishment in <sup>11</sup>[India], expressing the opinion that any trainers and paramilitary experts which we might send could be covered for us by the <sup>8</sup>[Indians].

8. In Europe, CA programs in the following areas were updated: Berlin, France and Italy, <sup>11</sup>[Spain], <sup>11</sup>[Finland], and <sup>11</sup>[Cyprus].

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DDP 3-1911

17 April 1963

Executive Registry

63-249

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. On 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major covert action developments since their previous briefing on 2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.

2. At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our electoral operations as approved by the Special Group in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Guatemala. Mr. Murphy was particularly concerned with the situation in Brazil and both he and Mr. Gray found it difficult to understand why the State Department continued to provide large-scale economic assistance when Coulart had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow travelers both within the government and the labor movement. They were interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the military leaders who are opposed to Coulart and they seemed to feel that a military coup at some point might be preferable to allowing a country as large and powerful as Brazil to drift into the hands of the opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the results. They did not question either the need for intervention or the size of our effort; although in the Chilean case Mr. Murphy wanted to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through Italian hands actually reached the Chilean Christian Democrats.

3. Mr. Murphy then raised the Argentine problem and said that he had been informed in New York that the State Department was putting considerable pressure on the Argentine regime to persuade it to hold the elections scheduled for June 1963. He questioned the wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there was a real danger of the Peronistas returning to power if the elections were held. He asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was still considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.

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I added that the more responsible military were trying to work out with the Guido government and the non-Peronist political parties a formula which would prevent the Peronistas from making large gains on the national level.

4. On the subject of Haiti, Mr. Murphy felt that in so small a country action should be possible to remove Duvalier and wondered why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no policy approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and making contact with opposition elements both within Haiti and in exile. I described some of the difficulties, such as Duvalier's control of the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by Haitian army officers.

5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report of our recent decision to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russian to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear to be provocative to the Soviets. I informed him that there had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval.

6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC operates and believed it to be highly useful.

7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the north of India. I told them that Nehru was aware of these actions and they wanted to be certain Mr. Bowles was clearly instructed prior to his departure as ambassador.

8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration officials believed the Soviets to be exerting a helpful and restraining influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain such a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao, and I described the existing policy limits on our relations with Phoumi and Kong Le. I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese

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split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions. Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the outstanding Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would make sure that a report on this did get to them.

9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we had taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current issue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade at the recent art exhibition.

10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the Cuban subversive training effort.)

11. I described the covert support to the <sup>8</sup> [Italian] political parties for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend some selective support to the <sup>8</sup> [Neani autonomists] and described this decision with some surprise "as quite a switch." <sup>8</sup>

12. Finally, when informed of the policy limitations on our relations with the [Angolan Nationalists] and [Holden Roberto], Mr. Murphy expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and <sup>8</sup> seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the [Portuguese] Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had met recently for the first time with [Roberto Holden] in New York last week and was not impressed by the man. <sup>6</sup>

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of DOD in doing this. He said he would like the support of the President's Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership, including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Board had apparently felt in a previous matter.]

Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future potentiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the U. S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Clifford asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No." Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and Mr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not full out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted. Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the engineering of missiles.

Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask Dr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land replied that he might be able to do it.

7. [Mr. Pace asked whether there had been one or two U-2 flights over China. Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had produced some interesting results. These included progress on a possible gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed out the paucity of the information available. However, they had put together]

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a whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive overflights. Dr. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12 over China, and Mr. McCone said that he didn't and, furthermore, that he personally didn't see any problem in using it over the USSR.]

8. Mr. McCone advised that he had taken some additional steps to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the membership.

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Dr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others. Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply compromise the instrument.

Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting, and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1,040 reports looked impressive, but it was quite true that this was not a true indication. He said that some of the reporting was very good, and there were two Cuban ambassadors on the payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone in what Castro was thinking. Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's immediate entourage penetrated and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out that the 665 reports from resident agents were primarily on military targets, and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supplement to overhead reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal team was <sup>two</sup>men and Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes". Mr. Murphy asked whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts "Legal Resident Agents in Cuba" and "Illegal Agent Development".

(At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came in.)

Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort, but because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved. He went over the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in. He noted that it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month. Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-wide resistance networks last summer. He then produced the chart entitled "Illegal Infiltration -- Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this. Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted "subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire and throwing it across high tension lines.

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capability to do so. Mr. McCone said he was inclined to believe that the second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.

5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort to penetrate the Cuban government. The DCI said yes, that every effort should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure and that more and more agents should be put in. He noted that only this week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy asked how many there were in a team and the Director replied <sup>24</sup> [three to five]

6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned the <sup>8</sup> [British] <sup>8</sup> [Canadians], <sup>8</sup> [French] <sup>8</sup> [Germans] and one or two Latin countries. He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced by discussions with Donovan and Nolan. We already know that Castro had a fight with Che Guevara. Castro also spent three hours with the captain of the <sup>24</sup> [African Pilot] and the captain had indicated that he wanted to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities. He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concentrated on intelligence collection.

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11. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case. Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if <sup>24</sup>Guantanamo was used for **SIGINT** purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from <sup>29</sup>the NSA memorandum on their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions were activated in June and the fact that there some <sup>24</sup>floating positions established near Santiago de Cuba.

12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties. He mentioned that there were 100,000 informers organized on a block and community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four different levels of activity. "A" was the most violent, directed toward precipitating a revolution. "B" involved extensive sabotage. "B plus" was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem

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16. Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been 72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of time there had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have discovered the missiles.

17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive research program <sup>24</sup> ~~on~~ **on sensors to break through camouflage**

18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban

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crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2 and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitulation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from covering <sup>11</sup>[China] North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that a second U-2 had been sent to <sup>10</sup>[Formosa] and that the wraps had been taken off <sup>10</sup>[Far Eastern] reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone calls.

19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters, there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.

20. This session was completed at 10:40.

LBK:rm

Orig - DCI  
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cy 3 - DD/P  
cy 4 - DD/R  
cy 5 - DD/I  
cy 6 - IG  
~~cy 7 - Exec Dir (PFIAB files)~~

(PFIAB file)  
(PFIAB file)

*Lyman B. Kirkpatrick*  
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
Executive Director

destroyed 10 Jan 63  
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