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DRAFT

2 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Edward G. Tichborn(P)

1. Edward G. Tichborn(P) arrived in Washington from his trip to Cuba during the night of 31 January 1960/. He was debriefed at the Hotel Statler from about 1000 to 1530 hours on 1 February. Those present at the debriefing were Messrs. 03 (Phil Tenny) and Charles Penney from WH Division, Mr. (Alexander Hunter) PP/EAD, and the Undersigned. This debriefing was very interesting and resulted in a good deal of pertinent information. The three and a half reels of tape derived from therefrom are now being transcribed by this office. Some of the more salient points are noted below.

II

2. Some of the operational information and suggestions offered by Tichborn are the following:

a. There appears to be little chance of a coalition of the opposition groups at this time or in the near future since they are not well organized and each group ~~xxxx~~ would want to be the leader of such an effort. Also, according to the members of the opposition to whom Tichborn talked, it is the general consensus of opinion that Fidel Castro is in no danger of losing his grip or the devotion of his followers for some time to come.

b. Fidel Castro seems to become most ~~xt~~ upset and almost panicked by defections. Possessing a "Messiah-type complex" he cannot bear the thought of someone leaving the fold. Rather than to let such defections pass on unnoticed, he feels compelled to give reasons and make excuses. This then blows the matter up perhaps out of proportion and quickly becomes a matter of public knowledge. Tichborn feels that the inducement of defections could perhaps have more effect on Castro than any other single, rational action we might undertake.

c. There appears to be a relatively long-standing schism between the brothers Fidel and Raoul Castro. Raoul is the more cold individual. As an example, Fidel once ordered some 400 prisoners to be returned safely to their homes, but Raoul had a number of them killed. The general feeling in Cuba is that Fidel is not a Communist, but that Raoul is undoubtedly at least a fellow-traveller. Developing or exploiting this schism could therefore, be operationally advantageous. (The fact that they are brothers would probably have little effect on Fidel who has already reduced ~~xxxxxx~~ the land holdings of his mother and another brother in conformity with the agrarian reform program and who jailed his sister, and fired a Minister, over a shake-down on an insurance deal.)

3. Of special operational interest were several individuals Tichborn mentioned who might have some influence on Fidel Castro and hence might be of

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