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S. Corbat  
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 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL  
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Security Information

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans  
SUBJECT: Background Material for Dr. Tyson's visit on Wednesday,  
January 7th.

1. I would like the attached papers to call to your attention the very good work that Dr. Tyson has done which is generally not known here. His successful use of emigres in making a calm and factual presentation to the American public of conditions behind the Iron Curtain is, in my opinion, the basis on which the Crusade for Freedom can be run by the Heritage Foundation in the future.

2. Dr. Tyson shares our doubts about the Free University in Exile. He agrees that the two principles upon which the University was founded:

A. that there were sufficient qualified Iron Curtain escapees to justify institutionalizing their education; and

B. that by creating such an institution for escapees an esprit de corps is created, together with a determination on the part of the escapees to serve their homelands at some future date

have not been proved.

3. All of the evidence to prove the validity of these principles is certainly not in. The evidence at hand raises serious doubts, and is as follows:

A. Of the current 208 students of the Free University, 37 are Yugoslavs, and 12 were born in Western European countries. (The high total ratio — almost 25% of the student body — of Yugoslav students, which is not a target country, together with the non-satellite born students indicates an inability to recruit the kinds of students the University was intended to train.) It should also be noted that from the information available to us it is not possible to determine what proportion of those listed as born in target countries actually left them before Soviet domination. I have the impression, which is substantiated by the recruiting missions of Mr. Royal Tyler throughout Europe and even Turkey, that suitable candidates are already extremely difficult to find. It should be noted also that of the 64 outside scholarships given to exiles in various European Universities, 16 are for Yugoslavs.

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Security

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Security Information

- 2 -

B. We have had various reports which indicate that the morale of a number of students at Strasbourg is not good. These morale problems arise from a variety of reasons, among which are:

- (1) They are not entirely certain why they are there and just what the American sponsors intend for them;
- (2) They fear that after they finish their education they will be without jobs;
- (3) There has been a steady and systematic campaign carried on by French Communist students at the University of Strasbourg to demoralize and disorganize the FEUE student body. In addition, several students are suspected of being espionage agents.

4. Dr. Tyson is leaving for Europe on the 21st of January to make a thorough investigation and evaluation of the Free University in order to answer these questions. We are aiding him by having the officials of the President's Escapees Program make available a complete inventory of escapees who might be potential candidates for the University.

5. Dr. Tyson was not the instigator of the proposals for a gymnasium for the Free University. The proposals were made and pushed by Royal Tyler and Spencer Phenix. The handling of this matter as far as Tyler was concerned was another example of his difficulties in dealing with Phenix for, as financial officer of NCFE, and having no position in the separate corporation, that is, the Free University, Phenix has and is dealing with matters of policy.

THOMAS W. BRADEN,  
Chief,  
International Organizations Division

Attachments: a/s

IO/TONIC:WFD/cmm

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SECURITY INFORMATION

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (+LINS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: NCFE Cooperation with CIA

The cooperation of NCFE in certain matters should be brought to your attention.

1. In aiding the Agency to take advantage of the Slansky trials, NCFE: (a) has made available complete monitoring of the trial; (b) is translating into Hungarian, Polish, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Albanian, transcripts of the trial; and, (c) is sending us complete extracts of the Iron Curtain press dealing with the trial. All of this has been, or is being done with great speed. NCFE is making a major project out of the Slansky trials and will distribute a pamphlet on the subject in the satellite languages to its extensive overseas mailing lists.

2. NCFE is releasing to the press and carrying on its broadcast the substance of incoming cable 2140 dated 17 December from Vienna, on Vienna Peace Conference.

3. In addition, NCFE has done some specific research for us with skill and great speed.

THOMAS A. BRAZEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

IO/TOMIC: WPD/aka

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SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

Chief, Cover Division, Plans/PI

19 December 1952

Chief, Contact Division, CO

HII-591

Crusade for Freedom

The attached extract from the 12 December 1952 issue of  
Fifth Army's Domestic Intelligence Report is forwarded as being  
of possible interest to your office.

Encl. 1

E. M. ASHCRAFT

14-00000

"An S M. CHEN approached the Head of the Notre Dame University Security Section, and requested a list of all Chinese nationals attending the University. Chen represented himself as a member of the STUDENTS RELATIONS SECTION, COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA, INC., 105 Market Street, San Francisco, California. CHEN stated that his reason for requesting such a list was that his organization was active in promoting better relations between Chinese nationals attending colleges and universities in the United States and the American people. Notre Dame received for a second time a pamphlet from the COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA entitled, "Asia in the World Today". Officials at Notre Dame have also been contacted by the NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, 110 West 57th Street, New York 19, New York. This organization requested a list of all foreign instructors and students presently instructing or attending courses at the University. A business card attached to a pamphlet revealed the following information: Miss Ellen M. STUDELY, 1223 East 57th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Chinese Student and Alumni Service, Chicago Area, COMMITTEE ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS, 29 Broadway, New York 7, New York. There is no information in O-2 files this Headquarters relative to STUDELY or CHEN."

CONFIDENTIAL  
CUNNINGHAM

SECURITY INFORMATION  
SECRET

22071689

16 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: Edward W. Barrett and NCFE  
REFERENCE: Your Note Lated 11 December 1952

I'm informed by Admiral Miller that the matter of Edward W. Barrett joining NCFE as a director, was discussed at an Executive Committee meeting a month ago.

No formal decision was made because of considerable opposition so the matter has been tabled.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

SECRET

C  
O  
P  
Y

15 December 1952

Dear Archie:

I much enjoyed our chance for a talk, and Bill Durkee, who assists me in the subject we discussed, is tremendously enthusiastic, as I am, about the possibility that you will consider favorably the appointment Frank mentioned.

Let me state again what seems to me most important in the facts under discussion. The job is of national and world-wide importance. It can help achieve greatness. It can endanger us all. It requires a man of imagination and ideas but also a man of deep and thoughtful responsibility to discharge it well.

I should like you to consider that I am at your service at any time to give you any facts you would like to have or any opinions for that matter. All of us here consider that we would be greatly privileged to be able to help you if you undertook the job.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Mr. Archibald Alexander  
1430 - 33rd Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:				NO.	3-5808
C/IO				DATE	11 December 1952
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
REC'D	FROM				
1. DDCI		12/11		W.P.D.	EYES ONLY
2. CIO	Mr. Braden			T.W.S.	Mr. Braden
3. DURKEE					How much more does he want?
4.					I agree that we should do everything possible to get a <u>strict accounting</u> .
5. Che for file					This is a serious matter <u>Ally</u>
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

July 8, 1952

Note: Nelson please deliver this to Allen.

To: Allen Dulles

You recently asked me for our views on Yugoslavia. The enclosed memorandum is a consensus formed from all of our key staff members. It also meets with the approval of John Hughes. I think this is a fair statement of what we are doing to date and what our views are. I hope this will be of some use to you.

*Leonard*

Enclosure

Copy 2,

All work.

## MEMORANDUM

The National Committee for a Free Europe's policy in respect to Yugoslavs and Yugoslav exile activities may be summarized in the following statements.

1. The Committee does not now, nor does it plan to interfere, by radio or otherwise, with the domestic affairs of the Yugoslav people or of the Titoist regime.

2. In so far as our anti-Stalinist aims and activities coincide, we see no reason to obstruct such functional and mutually beneficial arrangements as may from time to time present themselves. Specifically, we have no objection to exchanging with Radio Belgrade certain types of radio materials in respect to the countries under Soviet domination which might enhance the effectiveness of our radio programs or otherwise aid the work of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. As an anti-Communist organization dedicated to the concepts of democracy and of individual freedom we feel it is entirely consistent and proper to extend aid to democratic Yugoslavs exiled from their homelands, within the budgetary and other limitations under which we operate. To this end a total of some 69 Yugoslavs are retained by the Committee and engaged in five types of work.

a) In Radio Free Europe, which has no Yugoslav desk, 13 Yugoslavs have been engaged as information analysts, program advisors and translators because of their technical abilities.

b) In the Mid-European Studies Center 31 Yugoslavs are engaged in research projects connected with the East European Inquiry, the Law Project and the East European Accessions List, and include 7 scholarship students.

c) In the Research & Publications Service 9 Yugoslavs are engaged in analysis of the Yugoslav press and other sources of information and in the publication of factual, non-propagandistic studies and bulletins designed to keep the emigration and interested Americans informed on domestic events.

d) The Free Europe University in Exile has selected 13 Yugoslav students on the same basis of individual merit as students from the other European Communist nations have been granted scholarships to study at Strasbourg.

e) Finally, the National Council Division gives financial aid to three formerly prominent Yugoslavs in recognition of their past services to the cause of democracy.

In conclusion, the number of Yugoslavs thus supported by the Committee's various divisions represents 6.6% of the total exile staff.

SSW/bvb

*Sent to State Dept. 28 July 1952*

*b7c* *SECRET*  
Security Information

*Dec 27/671*

11 December, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I would like to call DD/P's attention to this unsolicited memorandum. It is additional evidence for my own observation made to him orally that the work of backstopping NCFE is being carried forward in a manner which at least attempts to meet the challenge of servicing the entire Agency in those aspects of NCFE work which can be useful to the various Divisions of the Agency.
2. As he is aware, NCFE conducts an enormous amount of research and other activity. I believe we can now say with some certainty that this record is being put to use by Washington.

*Tom Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment  
Memo from DC/O, SI dtd 26 Nov. 52

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Security Information

**SECRET**

Security Information

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**TO :** Chief, PP/IOD  
**FROM :** Deputy Chief, Operations Staff, O/SI  
**SUBJECT:** Fulfillment of Requirement RDA-3345

DATE: 26 November 1952

1. This office wishes to express its appreciation for the excellent cooperation provided by your TOMIC Branch in connection with our requirement RDA-3345 concerning higher education in Poland.

2. The material which we received met our need precisely and enabled us to close out this requirement.

  
HAYDEN CHANNING

CSI/JBQuigley:bm

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3-5294

SECURITY INFORMATION

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: University of the Saar

1. The University of the Saar was created on 8 March 1947. It has four facilities -- two in Saarbrucken (Letters and Law) and two in Hombourg (Medicine and Science). Faculty members are French, German, Swiss, British and Saarois.

2. A number of "institutes" exist with undefined relations to the University though financed, as is the rest of the University, by the French Government, and include a special institute for interpreters, an institute for economic science, and a European Institute. The support of the French Government of this University, aside from its merits, is part of the French attempt to Europeanize the Saar.

3. The European Institute, devoted to European unity, is a recent creation and is largely the result of the promotions of former Deputy, Andre Philip. It was the European Institute to which the Herald Tribune article specifically refers.

4. The University participated extensively, especially the European Institute, in the European Youth Campaign. Some of the specific activities were as follows:

March 1952: The Campaign cooperated with the International Institute of the University of Sarrebruck in arranging a meeting of young professors in the Saar and another meeting of youth leaders, both to discuss European problems. Films were supplied by the Campaign for both these meetings.

By the end of April, 25 youth organizations (practically all) in the Saar were associated with the Campaign. During April, May, and June an extensive program of discussion groups was arranged in the secondary schools throughout the Saar. These groups were sponsored jointly by the Campaign and the youth groups of the Saar. The groups discussed all phases of the unity question but concentrated particularly on the Schuman

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Plan due to the economic position of the Saar in this matter. Films and publications of the Campaign were used in the discussions. 7000 students participated.

During June 1952, in cooperation with the Campaign, students and professors of the International Institute formed a committee along with youth leaders to discuss the particular problems of the Saar in a United Europe.

On March 27, 1952 the Campaign held a large study group in cooperation with the European Institute of the University of the Saar. Students attended from Aix, Hambourg, Oxford, Tübingen, Leyden, Nancy, Berlin and Paris. Lecturers were provided by the Campaign.

*Thomas W. Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

SECRET

Security Information

DD/P 12-35

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division  
SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one, it seems to me that we should (a) know more about this and (b) give consideration to providing some support for it if it is good. It might even prove to be the case that this is a better and more deserving show than some of the activities which we are currently supporting having similar objectives. I think we are generally agreed that it is better to get in behind and give support and encouragement to a movement which has demonstrated the ability to stand on its own feet than to try to create and sustain an activity which would not exist but for our own contributions.
2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

fsw

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr. Dulin)  
C/EE

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

DD/P 12-35

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division  
SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one, it seems to me that we should (a) know more about this and (b) give consideration to providing some support for it if it is good. It might even prove to be the case that this is a better and more deserving show than some of the activities which we are currently supporting having similar objectives. I think we are generally agreed that it is better to get in behind and give support and encouragement to a movement which has demonstrated the ability to stand on its own feet than to try to create and sustain an activity which would not exist but for our own contributions.

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f82

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WB (Attention: Mr. Dulin)  
C/EE

SECRET

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3-5-2022

**SECRET**  
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10 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
 DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Call by Spencer Phenix on DDCI

1. Spencer Phenix will call upon the DDCI Friday for the purpose of taking up with him certain questions among which are the following:

a. A gymnasium for the Strasbourg University. The history of the gymnasium request is as follows:

On 8 August 1952, at a meeting of the PRC, NCFE proposed capital expenditures of \$377,500 for the Free University in Exile. This amount was placed in a reserve fund along with other requested budget items. It was agreed that funds held in this reserve could be released to NCFE by the DD/P in conjunction with the DD/A if in their judgment the submission of further data justified such expenditures.

On 17 September 1952, Spencer Phenix, for NCFE, made a request for \$47,000 to be released from the CIA-held reserve for the construction of a gymnasium at the Free University.

This request was rejected by the DD/P. He said he would reconsider the request if further data supported it.

On 8 October 1952, Mr. Phenix made another request supplying further data. This time the request was reduced to \$43,500. This request was also rejected by the DD/P.

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Security Information

*In view of PRC action  
or initiation of proceeding by Phenix  
it would appear to be the opinion  
of Mr. Phenix that it is  
not in conflict with our understanding  
that is reflected in our memorandum  
to the Board of Directors of NCFE.  
I feel that it is important to have  
a clear understanding of what is  
meant by "in conflict".*

By memorandum of 5 December 1952, Mr. Phenix refers to the fact that the trustees have given formal approval to the establishment of a gymnasium and that his understanding of the reserve fund is that when the Board of Directors of NCFE ask for the money, they receive it at once. He says that there appears to be some misunderstanding of this procedure, pointing out that the locus of misunderstanding "is in and around Frank W's office."

*Certainly  
not in the field  
of public finance.*

*Yester  
yesterday  
today  
yesterday  
yesterday*

b. The Turkish Broadcasting Station. Mr. Phenix intends to raise this question as a basic policy matter, he having been informed by us that while there is great enthusiasm for the project and while the State Department has set January 15th as the date by which VOA must either secure agreement from the Turkish Government or withdraw itself from consideration, the basic policy question of whether RFE then moves in has not been definitively settled. Mr. Phenix would like to know definitely now whether, contingent upon the failure of the Voice to gain entry to Turkey, NCFE can proceed with the building of a Turkish station. This item, which will probably be in the neighborhood of five million dollars, was presented at the PRC meeting, at which time it was agreed it would be considered as a separate project at a later date.

*Mr. Phenix is worried about the  
statements in the Slansky trial indicating use of RFE by the United  
States Government to send operational messages. We have told him  
that this secret arrangement was made with RFE by CIA men in the  
field. No approval of Headquarters was ever requested. Corrective  
steps have been taken in the EE Division to insure that action which  
may compromise operational facilities does not occur again without  
prior consultation with and approval of top authority of NCFE and  
CIA.*

d. Barbara Bowen. Mr. Phenix is concerned about a little girl who works in the Munich office, who through some mischance of several years standing is still on the roles of this Agency and draws retirement pay, although her salary is paid by NCFE. Phenix regards this as a penetration though in fact Miss Bowen is a valued employee of NCFE and has no contact with anyone from CIA. We are trying to regularize the situation by affording her the opportunity of resigning from the Agency or resigning from NCFE.

e. Second Installation for Strasbourg University. The trustees of the Free University in Exile have voted to create a German-speaking free university in exile, probably to be located in the Saar. Phenix reports in his memorandum of December 5th that the DDCI has given Royal Tyler assurance regarding this extension.

*N.B.*

*There is  
already a  
free university  
in the Saar.  
It is not  
necessarily  
something we  
want to do.  
Having all  
along with  
this, and  
whether we  
might be  
able to visit the existing  
university  
to make something  
new.*

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Mr. Phenix requests assurance that if Mr. Royal Tyler approaches French authorities at the ~~ear~~ to create such a university and is granted permission, the Agency will supply the funds. No formal request has been made and this project of course has not been budgeted.

f. Names of pensioned Army and Navy Officers. In compliance with DD/P Notice No. 20-6 issued on 27 October, we have asked Mr. Phenix to furnish the names of pensioned Army and Navy officers employed by NCFE. Mr. Phenix is concerned about the legal ramifications of this step, stating his fear that what this order implies for him is that the monies he dispenses as Treasurer are government funds. He has been assured by us that the purpose of the Agency-wide request is to inventory those who are receiving Navy and Army pensions and serving in proprietary organizations. He has also been assured that Army and Navy pensioners in his organization will be exempt from any action taken by the Agency on the problem of double pay. He is quite naturally worried about it.

2. The Philosophy of Spencer Phenix. In arguing his case on the above questions, and others, Phenix brings to his support the argument that he is not dispensing government funds. He says that once government funds reach the 1848 Foundation they become private funds. This is no mere self-delusion for the sake of maintaining a position before his conscience. Because from this conviction he proceeds to argue:

- a. that the Agency cannot ask him to furnish such names as suggested above, or lists and records of any kind.
- b. that the Agency has no right to query the decisions of the staff and directors as to the expenditure of funds once released by the Agency,
- c. that the Agency has no right to intervene in NCFE affairs or to issue guidance or instructions after funds have been passed. Phenix modifies this point by volunteering that the Directors are always glad to receive advice from friends such as DECI.

3. Spencer Phenix is a good man at his job and I understand the futility of arguing principle rather than cases. Nevertheless, the Phenix philosophy, argued as it is to the staff and directors of NCFE, and stated to us whenever possible -- frequently without relation to the facts under discussion -- often untempered by good humor, is beginning to try the souls of other good men.

THOMAS W. BRALEY  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Proately  
3-327.5

DeWitt Warner


December 2, 1952

Dear Allen,

When we were talking on the telephone last week you suggested that Alexander might possibly be interested in the N.C.P.M. and that he might be worth considering as President to succeed Min Miller. As you requested, I have not mentioned his name to anyone as yet and will not do so until I hear further from you. As I understand it, you are going to be talking to him some time this week and hope to ascertain then whether he himself would have some interest in this job. Whenever you do get any further information on this please let me know.

Meantime, a number of other names have been suggested and we will give them careful consideration. Naturally we will discuss them with you before taking any definite action.

Very truly yours,



14-00000  
RWB  
  
December 1, 1952

Dear Mr. Hedwood,

The enclosed documents may be of interest to you and  
are sent to you for information.

Sincerely yours,

*Whitney Stetson*

C. S. : V

October 31, 1952

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew  
2840 Rockland Drive, N.W.  
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Grew:

Attached herewith you will find a most interesting summary of the methods that have been adopted by the USSR to attract the minds of youth in the satellite states.

It has long been known that some such program was being followed, but it is only recently that detail has become available.

In contrast to these methods, efforts expended in this country to teach our young people the real meaning of freedom as represented by western democracy are feeble. It is almost safe to state that we have been relying solely on an innate, sentimental aversion to "communism", because no intelligent or systematic means have as yet been organized that will capture the minds of the young people of the United States in the same fervent manner that the communist ideology has taken hold of Russian youth.

For a little more than a year, in connection with the reorganization of the research activities of the Division of Intellectual Cooperation we have been attempting to enlist the help of American intellectuals — not the intelligentsia. There is a difference.

From the very beginning I have been amazed to discover the dearth of people who are familiar with that section of Europe which engages NCCE interest — the belt of countries extending from the Baltic to the Aegean. I was curious to find out why there were so few upon whom we could draw for help, so I started an inquiry. The results are now being compiled.

We must remember that the teaching of history or of government in America has never been emphasized to the same degree that it has in Europe. The curricula of the secondary schools in that part of the world cover those subjects much more comprehensively than is the case with us. It was difficult for me to appreciate this at first, but our inquiry has verified it without any doubt. In practically all European countries now on either side of the Iron Curtain it has long been traditional to emphasize instruction in history, because the tides of war and change have ebbed and flowed across their lands for many centuries. We have been isolated and in most respects free from foreign influences as we have developed our democratic processes. Today American foreign policy faces grave

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew

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October 31, 1952

issues, and in one part of the world it is deeply concerned with the very section of Europe about which all NCIE activities revolve. Yet the American public is practically illiterate respecting this area, both its past and its present. I know whereof I speak as a result of the inquiry above referred to. When it is completed I am inclined to think the results will be startling, particularly if we bear in mind that the issues at stake must be settled; that they are a concern to this country; and that our people are practically uninformed. They know little if anything about the historical significance behind what has occurred or will occur in the next few decades unfold because they have had no opportunity to learn the historic significance of it all.

In this country today there are approximately 800 colleges and universities offering four year courses of study leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree. This figure does not include the 575 junior colleges which usually conduct non-degree-granting programs two years in length — approximately the first two years of the traditional four year program. As far as our inquiry has gone it is already apparent that there are only several dozen institutions in the former group which offer instruction in this area, and very few in the latter. Most of those which do cover this area are the larger universities where the courses are really graduate in character and thus elective. In many instances brief coverage is supplied in survey courses, but even these can not and do not develop the attention that historically this part of the world now deserves. When this survey is completed a comprehensive report of the findings will be made. It will refer to colleges included in a list compiled by the American Council on Education which is the overall representative organization in this country for higher education.

I am calling the attention of the Directors to this situation because it seems to me we must realize that the American public not only does not know what we are doing, but actually can not understand the significance of why we are trying to do it. Generation after generation has grown up in America illiterate about the outside world. What we are discovering concerning the lack of knowledge of this area will of course prove true of other parts of the globe such as the Far East or South Africa.

In our Division we feel this particularly strongly because we are dependent on help from the academic world. The plain fact is more and more evident that we can not rely on American higher education as a prolific source of assistance. The relatively few individuals who have studied this region, and who are therefore qualified to aid us in our efforts, are either too overburdened with demands made on their time because they are qualified, or they are too young and inexperienced to be relied on in an enterprise as delicate as the one which we are conducting.

There are signs that in some academic localities interest in this field is developing. However, we can not wait for another generation to emerge even though, under whatever auspices, a program of training could be implemented to

The Honorable Joseph H. Gray

- 3 -

October 31, 1952

correct the situation. The important question is what can we do about it and what shall we do.

As already stated, the inquiry above mentioned grew out of our attempts to discover people in American higher education who are qualified to help us. We suspected they were not numerous, but we are amazed at the small number. We shall continue to try to persuade them to help us, but that well has begun to run dry already.

Can those associated with us do anything to emphasize this situation strongly enough in some quarters so that something will be attempted to correct it? Obviously this is not a problem that falls within the scope of NCFE; the problem concerns all colleges, universities, secondary schools, and the enormous field designated as adult education. Responsibility may even rest with the government itself.

I shall appreciate your suggestions, and will send you the final report of this survey when completed.

Sincerely yours,

Levering Tyson

Enclosure:

"Youth in the Soviet Satellite States"

14-00000

10 July 1952

1. At the last Project Review Committee meeting on NCFE, you asked that the State Department be consulted on policy in respect to National Councils. A review by State has begun. Meantime, however, for your information and in order to enable you to answer questions which may be raised by Messrs. Dolbear or Miller, I want to explain to you how the IO Division is presently handling exile affairs.

2. The difficulty in this matter arises largely from the fact that three organizations are doing the job. State has apparently found it necessary to deal directly with exiles. CIA area divisions, FE and SE, also deal directly with exiles for area purposes. NCFE hands out the money and tries to keep them together in National Councils. Out of this triple play a large degree of bad feeling and mistrust has arisen between CIA and State on the one hand and NCFE on the other. State, including Wally Barbour, and the area divisions of CIA accuse NCFE of playing personal petty favorites and of not keeping us informed. On the other hand, cooperation of State and CIA with NCFE in giving positive continuing guidance in their efforts has not been forthcoming. In the past no coordinated attempt has been made to give NCFE high-level over-all policy direction. Relations have been personal, casual, uncoordinated, and sometimes confusing.

3. We have taken the following action to try to insure orderly efforts to fuse or coordinate the various exile activities conducted by the three organizations:

a. This division has asked the concerned area divisions to initiate plans for reorganization and unification of each national council. The resultant paper is then coordinated with the proper authorities in State and a final line is agreed upon.

b. This plan is then communicated to NCFE and the organization is asked for comments, criticisms and suggestions.

c. After such are made or agreed upon, the paper becomes the policy directive which charts NCFE's course of action.

14-00000

d. NCFE then informs this division of progress being made and supposedly requests authority to depart from such completed policy papers.

To date two such policy directives have been written. The first was a plan for the reorganization of the Romanian National Council. It was submitted to NCFE, and their criticisms and suggestions have been incorporated. The plan is now being executed.

The second was a similar State Department-CIA paper on the reorganization of the Bulgarian National Committee. This will be submitted to NCFE on Thursday, 10 July, and a similar course of action will be followed.

4. I realize that this will seem to you as a somewhat simple and obvious way of insuring coordination, but the fact is that it had never been done before. I hope that it results in as few flaps as possible and as few occasions when people are running off in all directions.

5. A current case where people are running off in all directions is the Polish situation. This broke at the very time we were beginning work on a coordinated CIA-State-NCFE paper. NCFE has been operating upon the assumption that if a Polish National Council is to be formed, all groups are to be represented. Unknown to NCFE, and in fact to me, EE Division has been making attempts to unify two of the three main groups by holding conversations with representatives in London. There are a good many charges and counter-charges flying about at present on this situation. The man abroad is saying he had informed NCFE of what he intended to do, and people in NCFE say he hadn't. We are trying to straighten it out, but the situation is illustrative of how the plan above outlined can prevent such flaps.

## CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit by Robert Lang with officials of CIA

REFERENCE: EYES ONLY Memorandum to C-P from Richard Helms,  
Acting Chief, Operations, D/P/F, dated 25 Nov. 1952

1. After consultation with Mr. Durkee, I would like to make the following comments on Mr. Helms' memorandum. Mr. Helms is correct that Mr. Lang has had difficulty in dealing with CIA. Mr. Helms is also correct if he understood that this state of affairs is the responsibility of Admiral Miller. (To Admiral Miller's responsibility must be added that of Spencer Phoenix, Vice-President and Treasurer.)

2. Within and outside NC&F, Admiral Miller's dealings with Mr. Lang are based on two attitudes:

a. Miller's desire to have control of his organization by having everything channeled through him; and

b. Miller's desire to maintain an autonomous organization which will accept over-all policy guidance from the highest levels of the government, but which will not allow either domination by, or close contact with, CIA in order to discuss that organization's problems or to be informed of its vehemently disordered activities.

In this connection, a statement by Admiral Miller in a letter to Mr. Alan Valentine, until recently President of the Committee for Free Asia, is of interest:

1 August 1952

"It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

"For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape."

REPORT  
PROBLEMS  
IN THE FIELD



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This letter was written at a time when the IO Division had achieved for CIA its first detailed budget from NCPE and was further adding a mutuality of relations between NCPE and CIA, ultimately defined in Memorandum of Understanding, dated 24 September, signed by H. B. Miller and Allen W. Dulles. It proves what at the time we only suspected, that Miller was calling on support from Valentino against CIA.

3. Mr. Phoenix and Lang resent Admiral Miller's tendency for tight administration. Both have carried on a campaign within NCPE to discredit Miller. However, Mr. Phoenix, perhaps Lang, and almost all of the responsible officials of NCPE back Miller in his attitude towards CIA. For example, despite repeated requests by RFE and as recently as three weeks ago by DCI personally, Miller has refused to turn over to CIA a list of NCPE employees. Even a request by DCI to John Hughes has failed to produce this list.

In addition, Mr. Phoenix acts as the German expert in RFE, cutting out Lang. Phoenix alone has negotiated and dealt with German high officials on RFE's position in Germany. Mr. Lang and Mr. Phoenix have fundamental disputes about how RFE's German problems should be handled. Part of Mr. Lang's desire for personal talks with officials of the Department of State grows out of his wish to get backing for his position.

4. In a sense, RFE is the last NCPE bastion to be sealed. Mr. Lang's statement that he has received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise from this organization is largely a play on words. Mr. Lang has not sought the guidance of members of his own organization, much less the guidance of CIA. Even the IO Division took over responsibility for NCPE, the CIA intelligence support unit, which supplied RFE information and guidance, was abolished on Mr. Lang's advice that such information and guidance were no longer necessary. RFE broadcasting policy is set down in a handbook which has been thoroughly examined and accepted by CIA and from time to time specific guidance has been given to RFE. RFE accepts any materials and guidance as suggestions, not orders. We believe Lang is getting all the guidance there is to give, and that he is looking for the kind of risk policy forecasting which does not exist.

5. These are the political facts of life for the IO Division, and indeed for CIA. The IO Division has attempted to deal with this situation by: (1) winning the confidence of the Directors and Division heads of NCPE, and (2) maintaining friendly personal relationship with both Admiral Miller and Mr. Spencer Phoenix. Much progress has been made in gaining knowledge of, and control over, the activities of NCPE.

Aside from friendly dealings, our specific concept of gaining control over NCPE as a whole, has been to push and encourage the thought that NCPE should be operated as a whole. The present separation and uncoordinated activities of divisions, especially RFE, while perhaps

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SPECIAL INFORMATION

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necessary in the past, is not satisfactory at present. Added to this has been the theme that there must be a re-thinking of what NCCE has done, is doing, and should do in the future. Our efforts are beginning to bear fruit. We have found that these lines have struck a responsive chord among the working personnel of NCCE. In many ways, the current RFE difficulties in Germany -- unfortunate as they are -- have been helpful, for they have made it clear to everybody concerned, including Mr. Lang, that re-thinking of objectives and techniques based on cooperative effort by NCCE and CIA as a whole is vital if the organization is to do its job effectively.

6. To reformulate our own and NCCE's ideas, the IO Division has been and is carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCCE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department has been a direct participant. The IO Division has also been exploring these matters with officials of CIA and the Department of State.

7. These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

- a. What is NCCE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations; what is American policy; what modifications are likely?
- b. How can NCCE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain but in the Free World? For example: How can NCCE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?
- c. Should NCCE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?
- d. How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?
- e. Is NCCE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc.?
- f. How the formidable research and information resources of NCCE can securely be used by CIA?
- g. How can NCCE be geared more closely to the activities and needs of CIA?

- 4 -

b. Analysis of Radio Free Europe's effectiveness, programming, political position in Germany, how RFE can be used to support CIA operations specifically, alternate broadcasting sites for RFE etc.

i. How can CIA give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

7. These are some of the topics being discussed. In a few weeks the time will come in my opinion when the main outlines of this common thought will be sufficiently clear so that the working officials of NCFE, including Mr. Lang, should meet with officials of CIA and the Department of State for two main purposes:

a. A briefing on U.S. policy toward CIA operations behind the Iron Curtain so that these officials will see clearly the way in which they are expected to fit into total U.S. efforts, and the manner in which they should operate.

b. Analyze and contribute, in some detail, to the main lines of thought developed in order to arrive at comprehensive working policy for NCFE, and detailed methods of its cooperation with CIA.

8. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that Mr. Lang does not, at this time, come down to meet the CIA officials as suggested by Mr. Helme but that Mr. Lang's visit be a part of the IO Division's over-all effort to gain working control over NCFE as briefly outlined above.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

IO:TONIC:WPD/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)

1 cc - AC/OP/DD/P

~~1 cc - CPP~~

1 cc - IO/TOMIC

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - HI

Bill will be forwarded  
Security Information

Bring from Ellerster  
1 Dec

There are writing memo  
Bill

NOV 26 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Formation of a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to IO, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization, dated 12 September 1952

1. The NCFE negotiations for a united Rumanian refugee organization appear to be culminating successfully. Although a number of differences have been resolved, a few controversial matters remain. These points have been discussed several times, both with the NCFE and the refugees, but are of such importance as to warrant special attention and emphasis at this moment.

2. The most urgent problem, the one most likely to nullify the recent efforts and cause further difficulties, is that of General Edescu. The problem is to find a position which the General will consider sufficiently important for him and which we will consider sufficiently innocuous to ensure that he cannot interfere with the Committee. A majority of the refugees are in accord on the necessity for placing limitations of activity on the General. For operational reasons, we require such limitations. The existing good relations between the NCFE and the General should be utilized to persuade the General that a passive, honorary position is the only way to guard his health for, by implication, later action. He must be made to realize that he is not being shelved but is being saved. If he cannot be prevailed on to adopt this attitude, he will have to be told with complete frankness that his obstructionism cannot be tolerated, that he will have to remain passive outside, rather than within, the new organization or risk losing the assistance he now receives. The first method is the more desirable, and it is suggested that the General's secretary, Barbu Niculescu, be informed of the NCFE's intention and warned of the latter step if his cooperation is not obtained in expediting the General's acceptance of a passive role. Niculescu should be dealt with quite frankly and informed of the consequences, to him as well as to the General, if he does not cooperate.

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3. In regard to paragraph 4 of reference memorandum, the matter of the Council apparently has not been discussed thoroughly with the refugees. The importance of an organization for the masses of refugees, controlled by the Executive Committee of 16-17, should not be underestimated. The working commissions proposed by Visoianu (European Federation Movement, PW, ruckusations, etc.) should be drawn from the Council rather than from the refugees at large. Further, there are many refugees for whom the Committee has no need, nor we at present, who desire to participate in a refugee organization. That the desire to belong to something is particularly strong among the younger refugees, i.e. those of potential operational value, is evidenced by the number who have affiliated with the Iron Guard, other fanatic organizations, student, and professional groups. Membership should be open to large numbers of refugees (exclusive of hard-core Iron Guards, Communists, criminals, etc.), and should be manifested by membership cards. To strengthen the sense of participation small annual dues could be required or subscription to the Committee newspaper (which would be subsidized so that subscription cost would not be excessive). The formation of this Council is considered particularly worthwhile since it offers a way to draw worthy refugees from less desirable organizations and to develop their usefulness for the future.

4. With respect to the secret fund in the possession of Mr. Cretzianu of the Romanian National Committee, we do not consider that an issue should be made of the disbursing and control of this money. Both Visoianu and Cretzianu have agreed to account for the funds and to auditing of the books. It is possible that a finance committee, consisting of Cretzianu and one or two others, will be appointed in the new organization to handle the subsidies and to audit the secret fund.

5. Reports that Gafencu has developed an intransigent attitude toward the new committee have been received from several sources. As Mr. Folbeare is in Europe and is a friend of Gafencu's, it is suggested that he attempt to obtain again Gafencu's cooperation with the current negotiations.

6. It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the NCCE so that the information may be of immediate assistance in the negotiations planned for this week.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

26 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE  
 SUBJECT: Results of debriefing of Czech Defector  
 REFERENCE: Memo from Bob Joyce 17 Nov. 52, attaching State Cable  
 from Frankfort #813

1. I am sure Bob Joyce will upon reflection not allow himself to be troubled by the remarks of one Czech defector to the State Department Mission in Germany.
2. These are the facts:
  - a. Radio Free Europe has been most careful in its handling of the subject of liberation. They have not in the past nor do they now allow anyone to speak on the air of "liberation now".
  - b. Attached for your information is a detailed guidance on this subject issued by Radio Free Europe -- policy which governs all of their broadcasts.
  - c. As an example of how careful Radio Free Europe is on this subject, RFE did not use Mr. John Foster Dulles' recent controversial campaign speech on the subject of liberation because they believed that even though it was news and a statement made by a responsible American, it might be misinterpreted behind the Curtain.
3. I think that Radio Free Europe has maintained excellent discipline on this subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Curtain emigration to take the line of early hope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed force.
4. I would be glad to have you show this memorandum to Mr. Joyce if you care to do so. He should know that everyone is constantly on the alert and carefully watching the problems he raises.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
 Chief  
 International Organizations Division

Attachment  
 Social Guidance  
 dtd 2 Sept. 52

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CIO:WPD-TWB/sh 1 cc - IO/TOMIC  
 Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

25 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, P & P  
SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Robert Lang

1. I spent an hour and a quarter in New York on Friday, 14 November, with Mr. Robert Lang of Radio Free Europe. The major portion of this time was devoted to a briefing by Lang of the NCFE structure and the position which RFE occupies in it, including the philosophy of RFE operations. Lang gave an impressive performance and struck me on such short acquaintance as an individual of ability, judgment, and energy.

2. Mr. Lang made quite a point of the fact that his operation inside NCFE is virtually independent. He intimated that he receives no guidance from the President or other officers and has expended considerable effort in the past seeing to it that an iron curtain is kept between RFE and the top command of NCFE. He said that if RFE had not developed and expanded according to a philosophy which it itself had originated, it would have got nowhere and would still be frustrated by what he kept referring to as the "old State Department line" as exemplified by the views of DeWitt Poole, Fred Dolbear, and others. He then pointed out that he had received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise, from this organization. Also he claimed to suffer from lack of contact with us. He stated that when he saw Mr. Dulles a week or so ago, it was the first time he had talked to anyone in authority here in many a moon. As far as Mr. Braden and company are concerned, he said that they dealt largely with Admiral Miller and his immediate staff. It was clear that he would prefer to deal directly with Washington. He also feels inhibited by the fact that he has to cajole Admiral Miller into permission to come to Washington. He cited as evidence an incident recently when he felt obliged to ask a friend in the State Department to intercede with Admiral Miller to permit him to come down here for consultation.

3. There was nothing bitter or frustrated in Mr. Lang's remarks. Rather he struck me as an individual who was discussing the facts of life, be what they may.

4. I told him that I would discuss with you the wisdom of having him come down here for a day some time in the next week or so

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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- 2 -

in order to spend a couple of hours around a table with Tracy Barnes, Al Ulmer, Eric Tista, and other appropriate individuals, at which session he would have an opportunity to set forth his problems and invite whatever assistance we as an organization can provide.

5. After you have read the foregoing, I would like to talk with you and Mr. Braden for the purpose of passing on DDP/P's reactions to my suggestion.

✓  
Richard Helms  
Acting Chief, Operations, DDP

cc: Chief, IO

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Security Information

DDAP 1387

24 November 1952

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division**  
**SUBJECT : Dr. J. H. Retinger**

1. Please note and return to Mr. Dulles the attached letter from Dr. J. H. Retinger who has asked Mr. Dulles for an appointment during his visit in Washington between November 25 and 28. You will also note that Mr. Dulles does not propose to answer the letter nor (presumably) to grant the appointment. I am not sure whether you are familiar with the background on Retinger including our past difficulties with him. If you are not, I think it is important for you to have a look at the files which include numerous items of derogatory information concerning Retinger and his declared hostility toward the National Committee for Free Europe. We went to the mat with our British friends in what I believe proved to be a successful effort to have Retinger removed from the key position which he held on the so-called McMillan Committee. (You are aware of the fact that the British Service is now working with the McMillan Committee and in support of it.)
2. Retinger's position as Secretary General of the European Movement -- as evidenced by the letterhead -- is probably known to you. Because of our interest in this activity, it is important for you and the appropriate members of your staff to be fully on notice of Retinger's connection and past performance. I could not be very enthusiastic about or too hopeful for the production of genuinely constructive results -- in keeping with policies of the United States Government -- of any organization of which Retinger would be the Secretary General. To the extent that his loyalties can be determined, it is clear that they do not run toward the United States.

(Signed) FRANK O. WISMER

FRANK O. WISMER  
 Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)

Letter to DDCI from Dr. Retinger  
 dated 15 November 1952.

cc: DDCI  
 C/PP

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Security Information

DR 1321

21 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : Leland Stowe; I&S Approval of NCFE Request.

1. This memorandum will record the understanding arrived at in a conversation today with Colonel Edwards, Chief of I&S, and reported orally to Mr. Durkee by me. Admiral Miller telephoned me today with an urgent request that we give our authorization and approval to the use of Mr. Stowe for a further period of six months in the capacity of a consultant to NFE and not as a regular employee. This was the same basis as was finally approved for the first period of six months which is about to expire.

2. In discussing this matter with Colonel Edwards I refreshed his recollection as to certain features of the original arrangement, including the fact that Stowe is an extremely capable individual who has attracted other good people, notably Russell Hill, into the effort, and who has no serious security <sup>now</sup> risks against him. (He is not regarded as a loyalty or security risk but rather as a source of possible embarrassment in view of certain earlier writings of his.) Admiral Miller informed me and I passed on to Colonel Edwards the fact that there have been no questions or flurries of any kind concerning Stowe and the further fact that he has been doing a very effective job. Colonel Edwards approved from a security standpoint the continuation of Mr. Stowe as a consultant to NFE for a further period of six months.

3. I requested Mr. Durkee to so advise Admiral Miller at the earliest possible moment. I assume he has done so.

*FJW*  
FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/PP

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Security Information

**SECRET**  
(When Filled In)

**DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE**

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
NCFE		2. RI FILE NO.					
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE		5. EVALUATION		
		BRITISH	Nov. 1952				
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION			
10. ANALYST	11. DATE PROCESSED	12. DISSEMINATED IN	13. DATE				
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION		14. PERTINENT INFORMATION					
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14. PERTINENT INFORMATION							
THIS PERTAINS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT FILED IN THE <del>TOP SECRET</del> SECTION SECTION BY <del>T5 8 1191</del>							
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 							

NO. 311952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division  
Thru: PI Plans

SUBJECT: NCFE Employment of Mr. Brutus Conte

1. This is to advise you that, due to delay in our operations, the NCFE has been requested to provide interim employment for Mr. Brutus Conte.
2. We have been informed that the NCFE/MSEC has offered Mr. Conte a contract for the preparation of a study on integration of the Rumanian with the Soviet economy. However, in view of Subject's knowledge of the refugee political situation and interest in propaganda measures, a position utilizing this background would be more advantageous to the NCFE and this Division than the proposed economic study.
3. It is requested that the proposed employment of Subject be discussed with the NCFE and that we be informed of the action taken. This Division is prepared to reimburse the NCFE for Subject's salary if such is desired. It is understood that Subject will continue, during the period of NCFE employment, to perform for this Division certain assignments which will not interfere with his NCFE work.
4. Your approval of the proposal for such employment is requested.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

SE-5/MCNewsom/kp (19 Nov. 1952)

Distributions:  
Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
1 - RI  
2 - SE-5  
1 - IO

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Executive Registry
3 - 4257

13 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Jan Nowak

1. At your request, I had a conversation today with Mr. Jan Nowak, head of the Polish radio desk of RFE in Munich. I am sorry that you did not get to see him. Our conversation reminded me that our work is terribly important, which is a nice reminder on a busy afternoon.

2. I say "important" because Nowak reviewed with me the letters he had received from listeners in Poland and these, together with his own enormous enthusiasm for the work he is doing, reminded me that our long days in Washington have an effect on the lives and hopes of people far away. Nowak, who was in the Polish resistance during the war and who on one of his three escapes from Poland at one time spent several weeks in Switzerland where he had made contact with your representatives, later worked for the BBC and he pointed out that at no time during the war was he given to feel by the BBC the sense of responsibility and mission which he feels in his job in RFE. He said he was told when he was brought to RFE that the responsibility for the programs was his and that if at any time programs went on the air which were irresponsible, then he would lose his job. He says that when he has questions which he thinks might influence United States policy, he confers beforehand with Griffith and the Americans in Munich, and sometimes arguments ensue, but he feels, and I am certain he feels sincerely, that he has an equal share with Americans in a great effort to carry the truth back home.

3. I say "terribly" important because Nowak, like other exiles, wonders out loud how long our work can continue to have an impact. He is himself convinced that every Polish soldier is a potential ally of the West but he wonders, and makes his listener wonder, how long we can expect this sympathy among a rising generation for which the past is inexorably fading.

4. Nowak made one point which I am sure he intended for your ears, that he was afraid that "certain people in Germany" who had contacts into Poland might lead his friends behind the Certain to

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

betray themselves unnecessarily and tragically. He said that he had heard that these people had promoted behind the Curtain a whispering campaign among the Poles at the time of the recent elections to the effect that the elections were to be postponed. He seemed to think this an unnecessary risk for those who took part in it. He also said that he had been approached by these same people who asked him to urge the Poles by broadcast to cross out the names of the Communist candidates when they voted. He learned only later, he said, that the system of voting at the last election was such that in order to cross out candidates it was necessary to step out of the ballot box and do it in the open before witnesses. He had in any event refused such suggestions. I got the impression that he feels some of our people are a little immature.

5. I liked him. As I say, seeing him made me proud of what we are doing.



THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

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NOV 4 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: DDP/P's Memorandum to you 30 October 1952 entitled,  
"National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and Related  
Matters"

1. You will be interested to know, I am sure, that Mr. Wisner's friend, Mr. Georgescu, has recently been most helpful. Through his efforts and the cooperation of Jim Pekich of SE European Division, I believe that NCFE is on the threshold of a unified Romanian National Council.

2. I'm in entire agreement also with Mr. Georgescu's observation on the personnel set-up within NCFE. As you know, Mr. Dolbear is concerned about his role. He is the first to admit that his strength is ebbing, and that he should retire. I think it must be agreed also that Mr. Dolbear has done a splendid job, a job that would have been, and will still be, difficult for a man in the prime of life.

I have discussed this problem in confidence with Francis B. Stevens. As a result of my inquiries about a possible successor to Mr. Dolbear, Mr. Stevens suggests that Mr. Nathaniel Penistone Davis is a person eminently qualified to do this job. I would be interested in knowing whether Mr. Wisner knows this man.

3. I believe also, Mr. Georgescu's misgivings about Mr. Yarrow are well-founded. In the last two months, Mr. Yarrow has taken an increasingly prominent position in Mr. Dolbear's Division, as a result of Mr. Dolbear's physical inability to do a full time job. Mr. Yarrow is blunt, and inclined to be dictatorial. He has a predilection for direct action in situations that rightly call for finesse and careful development. For these reasons, in addition to the fact that he is of Russian extraction and speaks with a heavy accent, I am convinced that he should not replace Mr. Dolbear. In my opinion, under the right leadership, Mr. Yarrow could continue to make a valuable contribution to NCFE's dealings with emigres as an administrator.

I believe that such a solution is politically possible, for NCFE in this phase of its activities is going through a period of groping and painful reorientation. I hope that the start we have made in working out a re-statement and a re-direction of activities within Division of Emigre Relations will provide a program of positive projects which will supply ammunition for psychological warfare, both behind the Iron Curtain and in the Free World. Such a program will call for an efficient administrator versed in exile affairs -- a position for which Mr. Davis is well qualified. Under the political leadership of a person of Mr. Davis' caliber, for direct dealings with emigres, I feel that the Division of Emigre Relations will be able to clear up present inefficiencies and contribute effectively to NCFE's over-all mission.

**SECRET**WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
Chief, IO/TOMIC

SECRET

Security Information

DD/P - 1111-

30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Operations Division.

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe, NCFE, and related matters.

1. This memorandum is to inform you of a number of items which have recently come to my attention and to which I think you should give consideration and take necessary action. V. C. (Nica) Georgescu, who is an old friend and a very helpful consultant of the Agency, came to see me the other evening and discussed certain aspects of NCFE. Nica has been working on both factions of the Rumanians in an effort to bring them together, and I think that his criticism is, on the whole, constructive. He states that entirely apart from the question of factionalism among the Rumanian groups and other national groups, there is the greatest amount of inefficiency at the desk level of NCFE. This results from having too many politicians and diplomats in positions of authority and too few persons of any practical experience; too much time is consumed and too much of the general effort goes completely to waste as the result of endless political discussions, much of it entirely theoretical. It would be desirable to review the entire personnel set-up within NCFE at an early date and place in charge of the various desks individuals who are capable of administering their people and running a race. Such persons could be advised and assisted by the politicians and the diplomats, but they would have the responsibility for getting things done. Finally, Nica told me very confidentially that he thought Delbore, who has never been strong, was getting weaker and weaker, and he voiced some misgivings about Bernie Yarrow. He said that he does not know Yarrow at all well, but has the impression from others that Yarrow is high-handed and dictatorial in his dealings and that his background is not particularly suitable for a person who is to hold a position of so much responsibility in dealing with Southeastern European nationals.

2. I think I have already told you that Victor Kiesel, the writer of the hostile pieces which you brought to my attention, complained about the treatment that he received from Finis Farr, who he said had led him to believe that he was going to be called upon for advice and assistance to the Agency. There were no follow-ups and Kiesel was miffed. Kiesel also singled out for sharp attack Captain Ginder, who he said he believed was in a high place in CIA and who was a thoroughly incompetent and undesirable

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individual. He referred to Ginder as a "no, too kick" -- whatever that means in Brooklynese. He also said that Ginder is a "pseudo-intellectual" and a "coddle-headed liberal". Lionel expressed himself as being annoyed that a person like Ginder should be used by the Agency while a person like himself should be ignored.

3. I hear that Howard Chapin is back at work but that his physical condition is not at all good and that the cause of the paralytic effect was not determined by the doctors.

4. At the Director's staff meeting this morning, he again raised the matter of our using the American Heritage Foundation for cover and possibly fund-raising purposes in connection with HCUF, CFA and the Freedom Crusade. He explained for the benefit of Mr. Dulles that the directors of the American Heritage Foundation have met recently and agreed to provide assistance to us and to make available to us their sponsorship, good name, etc. According to the Director, Mr. Sam Pryor has been primarily responsible for this decision although Winthrop Aldrich and D'Arcy Brophy were to some extent instrumental. The Executive Secretary of the Foundation, who was scheduled to visit Washington on 15 October, will be coming down sometime shortly after November 1st. At that time we should be ready with concrete proposals as to the manner in which we would like to make use of the Foundation and its various assets. He would, of course, want to coordinate whatever is developed in this connection with the work that Henry Ford has undertaken to do for the Crusade this year. After some discussion it was agreed at the meeting that the American Heritage Foundation might be brought in either during the forthcoming crusade campaign or immediately thereafter, depending upon what should appear to be most desirable. At the very least we should use the Foundation for cover purposes, since by advertising the support of this well-known organization, we would gain a very solid and substantial point of attribution as the source of funds. We might also wish to channel funds into the Crusade or directly into one or both of the two committees through the American Heritage Foundation. (This would require some straightening-out with the Treasury Department authorities to guarantee against any subsequent investigation.) Finally, the Crusade might be conducted in future years under the bannerhead of and in the name of the American Heritage Foundation. The LI, shorts in the Foundation would not want to work at fund-raising themselves, and they have been assured that we would not ask them to do so. It would be up to us to provide the nuts and bolts of the effort.

cc: C/PB

FRANK G. VINEY  
Deputy Director (Plans)**SECRET**

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN  
International Organizations Division  
SUBJECT: Change of name of Baltic Panels

With reference to your memorandum of October 15, 1952 concerning the desire of the Baltic Panels to change their names to the Committee for Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively, I wish to inform you that the Department perceives no reason to oppose such a change.

It is suggested however, that NCFC insist that the new names for the Baltic Panels be precisely those mentioned in your memorandum of October 15. It is our feeling that if the panels were to be called National Committees, for example, confusion might arise with respect to other organizations from these countries already in existence and the impression might be created that the committees are of greater political significance than we wish them to be.

ROBERT P. JOYCE  
Policy Planning Staff  
Department of State

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET****ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/I0				NO. <i>10/2379</i>	
				DATE <i>29 Oct 52</i>	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	PWD'D		
1. CPP		8 NOV	10/2 now	CACB	as a matter of incidental info, Drew Pearson gave a big plug for contributions to the Crusade on his TV program last night (num. 9) a.c.u
2. DD/P			13 now	JWB	
3. C-I0				JWB	
4.					
5.					
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15.					

## SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. While in Detroit yesterday, I talked with Charles Moore, who is the Director of Public Relations for Ford Motor Company, and also with Henry Ford. I was merely paying a friendly call on Moore but he raised the matter of the Crusade and asked Mr. Ford to come in and talk about it. They are both very unhappy with Mr. Walsh, who is Admiral Miller's man on the Crusade and whom Miller secured from the State Department, and I also gathered the general impression of dissatisfaction with Miller and his whole effort -- "If we had known what kind of an outfit we were working with, we wouldn't have taken it over." On the other hand, both Mr. Ford and Moore said that they were "going ahead full steam and intended to see the job through to the best of their ability".

2. I think there is no action to be taken here and merely pass this on for your information, but it does bring to mind again what I think is growing evidence that the Crusade is more trouble than it is worth.

3. I think this ought to be the last Crusade for Freedom and that we ought to give thought to alternatives. We are now taking steps to take the Crusade for Free Asia out of the Crusade next year, substituting a permanent fund-raising office in San Francisco, token donations from three Agency foundations, and making a serious attempt to obtain some money from Asian groups and contacts. Some other cover is obviously needed and we are thinking in terms of the American Heritage Foundation or other possibilities that may occur. We should take similar steps for the National Committee for a Free Europe.

*Thomas Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE DIVISION  
CHIEF, SE DIVISION  
CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of persons outside the Agency to influence  
Agency and State Department policy with respect to  
National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I have had reports from several sources that persons outside the Agency and outside the State Department have attempted to influence Agency operations and State Department policy in respect to the National Committee for a Free Europe. Two of these persons, it is reported, are Carmel Offie and Maynard Barnes.

2. To the extent that Messrs. Offie and Barnes are aware of our continuing relations with NCFE, their awareness constitutes a danger to our successful conduct of the operation. I therefore ask you and members of your Division to refrain from any contact with these gentlemen or with others who, by virtue of their suspicions or knowledge but without any official capacity whatever, are attempting to grind their personal axes through the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. I have also had reports from several sources that members of this Agency who happen to hold strong personal views on the conduct of exile activities by NCFE have, in their direct relations with the exiles, encouraged the exiles to oppose NCFE decisions and policies. Please transmit to your respective staffs my strong aversion to this kind of in-fighting. I call your attention to the agreement signed by myself and Mr. George Kennan of the State Department on 18 February 1949, which reads in part:

"Exiles and refugees will be referred to the New York Committee for all matters of an operational nature, including the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities."

The same memorandum states that "Certain operational activities will not properly fall within the province of the New York Committee" and reserves these activities to this Agency, but these reserved operational activities were clearly not intended to embrace the encouragement of the exiles to fight off decisions made by the Committee as to "the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities".

4. Please also convey to members of your staff that I shall not tolerate further violations of the established policy set forth above.

5. If there is any basis whatever for these reports, I am sure that you will all agree that we should review our differences inside the agency.

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

*see covering memo  
+ page 2 in  
Chrono 21 Oct*

Analysis of Memorandum by Mr. [redacted] **Craigton Scott**

The following memorandum, I believe, discusses most of the points raised by Mr. **Scott**.

1. Scripts prepared in Munich are almost never read by Americans before broadcast although the general content of each broadcast is agreed upon in programming conferences between the American and exile staffs. The reasons why the broadcasts are not read by Americans before they go on the air are as follows:

a. Because the natural inclination of Americans is to change the broadcasts, and such changes, RFE officials feel, are likely to lessen the "genuine" quality of exile broadcasts for the listeners.

b. Because the exiles feel themselves to be patriots working for their countries, and the submission of scripts to Americans before they are broadcast would be regarded by the exiles as casting doubt upon their allegiance and fervor.

The American staff believes that it can exercise policy control by suggestions during program discussions rather than by making deletions and corrections in the scripts themselves.

2. During my trip to Europe in June, I asked Mr. W. E. Griffith, Political Advisor for RFE, to institute the service of regularly translating the most sensitive RFE broadcasts after the fact. He has complied with this request and CIA now receives English translations of Munich scripts within a month after broadcast. CIA also receives an immediate teletype summary of all Munich broadcasts, as well as a weekly consolidated summary of all broadcasts. To provide for immediate English translation of all RFE programs after the fact would require an enormous staff of translators.

3. No doubt RFE has made the mistakes Mr. **Scott** mentions in connection with the items about the weakness of the Iron Curtain and the ease of crossing it, and the Czechoslovakian currency devaluation. On the first point, Mr. **Scott's** dates are in error, for RFE did not go on the air until July 1, 1950. Assuming that he means that such broadcasts were made from that date until April 1951, it should be noted that this was the very beginning of RFE when all of its broadcasts originated in New York. Such broadcasts certainly are not being continued. I assume they were the result of inexperience. The

will be discontinued when NCDC was out of existence, and they should not be reestablished. You will remember that at the hearings which considered NCDC's 1953 budget, the officials of NCDC asked for \$500,000 to cover the expected loss of such privileges and because we felt that this was unjustified, we asked and were granted the right to retain this money in the CIA reserve pending further justification.

5. Mr. Scott's complaint that the Information Service of RFE has been too expensive and naive is probably correct. In part this is the result of CIA's inability, for justifiable security reasons, to make information on a large scale available to RFE. However, the Information Service is being reorganized. There is reason to believe that excellent professional newsmen, such as Russell Hill and Ed Chamberlyne will provide the competence necessary for an increase in efficiency.

6. In sum, Mr. Scott's criticisms and complaints seem a mixture of fact and fiction animated by a personal antagonism. His is but one of a number of such attacks by former employees. Our own approach to Radio Free Europe should be not so much an assessment of past success and failures, as an examination of future opportunities. A powerful instrument has been created, in the main successfully, in an incredibly short time. Where it goes from here, giving due consideration to criticism such as Scott's, seems to me to be our priority task.

## SECURITY INFORMATION

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27 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division  
SUBJECT: President's Committee on Immigration and Naturalization

1. The attached memorandum, greatly modified in form by the General Counsel of NCFE, is to be presented tomorrow afternoon at an open hearing of the President's Committee which is conducting hearings on the McCarran Bill.

2. I was informed of this proposed presentation on Friday afternoon, October 17. I obtained the attached from Mr. Greenleaf, NCFE General Counsel, today. NCFE does not know that Mr. Greenleaf has been in touch with us and should not know.

3. I suggest that you review, with Mr. Wisner, whether NCFE should make such a presentation. In essence, the presentation is an attack on the McCarran Bill. I suggest that, perhaps, NCFE should not testify for two reasons:

- a. This is close to a clear example of a tax exempt charitable organization, attempting to influence legislation and;
- b. The political implications are liable to be an embarrassment for CIA.

4. Apparently, NCFE is making this presentation in the hopes of receiving wide publicity so they will be in a position to say to the emigrees with whom they deal, "look what we are trying to do for you."

5. I urge your rapid concern, for the presentation is due to be made tomorrow afternoon.



WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
Chief, IO/TONIC

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14-00000

The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., was formed in 1949 when a group of private citizens joined together for positive action against Soviet enslavement. It concentrates its efforts on the 100 million Central and Eastern Europeans today living under inhuman conditions of force and fear. This tyranny, imposed by Soviet Russia in flagrant violation of her solemn guarantees, precludes the enduring world peace desired by free men everywhere. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the American peoples' answer to the Kremlin's despotic rule.

The Committee seeks:

- (1) To pierce the Iron Curtain with messages of moral and practical value through the facilities of [Radio Free Europe], thus taking the fight to the enemies' camp;
- (2) To build for the future by educating young refugees from Communism through the [Mid-European Studies Center] here in the United States, and the [Free European University in Exile] in Strasbourg, France. In this manner we attempt to preserve the cultural heritage of the past which the enemy seeks to destroy;
- (3) To develop political unity and a dynamic platform of aims and principles among the exile groups through the [Division of Exile Relations];
- (4) To assemble, analyze and distribute knowledge about current conditions in the captive areas;
- (5) To create active public support, both moral and material, for these activities.

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Vital to the work and well being of the National Committee for a Free Europe are its approximately two thousand alien associates. 60 percent of these aliens are in Europe, with the rest residing either temporarily or permanently in the United States. At the present time over one hundred of those aliens residing here face imminent deportation.

~~It might be inserted parenthetically at this point that all of these aliens presently facing deportation have attempted to remain within the spirit and the letter of the law, but because of the absurdities of the law have been forced into the position of being wilful violators of it. We do not speak, either now or at any point in this discussion, about evaders of, or fugitives from, justice, but shall only refer to individuals of good faith, attempting to the best of their ability to conform to the rules and regulations of the country which they believe, often mistakenly, to be the refuge of the afflicted.~~

At various times during the history of our organization it has been necessary for the National Committee or its subsidiaries to ask certain aliens with particular talents to come to the United States <sup>Then</sup> on extremely short notice. They were, of course, admitted as visitors. After these aliens had arrived in the United States, they were immediately faced with the problem of attempting in some manner to regularize <sup>the alien</sup> ~~from the placement~~ <sup>their</sup> status here so that trips back and forth from Europe for visa renewal purposes would not be necessitated. Under the present immigration law the only possibility of obtaining such regularization was by having

change

- 3 -

the alien apply at an American Consulate in Canada, await the issuance of a visa number, and then having the alien personally pick up the visa at the appropriate consulate. This procedure usually took from a year to 18 months. But ~~this mode of regularization will cease under the new law, since aliens will not be admitted into the United States from Canada without having first completed certain residential requirements there.~~

*While the present  
law it is impossible  
to safe guard  
the residence  
in the U.S.  
of an alien  
here or in  
countries elsewhere  
are inevitable*

[The only manner of safeguarding the residence of an alien visitor in the United States at present is to attempt to get unlimited extensions of his visitor's visa. This is of course impossible.] The alien finds himself, therefore, in the position of being deportable to the country from which he came, and in most cases after having stayed in the United States for over a year, the respective governments will refuse him permission to return. In the end the alien finds himself in a position worse than the one which he enjoyed while residing in a Displaced Persons camp in Germany.

Students supported by our Mid-European Studies Center find themselves in an even more embarrassing position. They are allowed to come to the United States as students providing their re-entry permits to the countries from which they come are still valid. Any student who comes to take advantage of our scholarships comes for at least a period of from two to four years and is therefore unable to maintain his residence abroad and keep his scholarship at the same time. They soon arrive at the point where they cannot return to Europe, cannot continue their studies here, and are constantly harassed by officers of the Immigration Service.

Those students studying at our Free Europe University in Exile in Strasbourg

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cannot come to the United States to continue their studies at graduate schools here, because most of them are chargeable to heavily oversubscribed quotas.

Our work here in the National Committee for a Free Europe is essentially psychological. Our associates in Radio Free Europe, the Division of Exile Relations, etc., cannot do efficient, effective or productive work when they are constantly being harassed by officials of the Immigration Service. When their stay in the United States is on a day to day basis they cannot devote their full energies to the work for which they came to this country. While it is true that most of them intend to return to the country of their origin when Communist domination is overthrown there, they must have some assurance that they can remain peacefully here until that moment. Therefore, it would seem appropriate that some provision be made in the immigration laws that students and temporary visitors in the United States be allowed to adjust their status to that of temporary, if not permanent, residence in the United States.

Another aspect of the law which should be considered is the fact that many of the exile leaders of various Iron Curtain countries were admissible to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 as amended. However, when asked by the Immigration authorities whether they intended to remain in the United States temporarily or permanently, they answered in all honesty that they intended to remain here only until their own countries had been liberated from the yoke of Communist tyranny. Because, by their own admission they were therefore automatically barred from adjusting their status from that of temporary visitor to permanent resident. In the case of our student associates,

they are obliged by the Committee as a requisite to receiving a scholarship, to sign a statement agreeing to return to the country of their origin when liberation comes so that their training will be of direct help in the cause of building a free world. It is indeed unfortunate that both the present law and the forthcoming one makes no provision for political refugees except in the case of those individuals who are admitted to the United States under diplomatic standing and subsequently leave the service of their government.

At the present moment individuals awaiting adjustment under this particular section of the P.R.C. law are in an extremely precarious position. All of them have a lifetime of political activity behind them, and therefore the administrative delay in processing their applications, completing investigations, etc., has been interminable. Now, most of them are receiving notices from the Department of Justice stating that since their applications have not been processed within the time limit, they are now eligible for deportation proceedings which will be effected forthwith.

Both the present and the future immigration laws make no provision for administrative discretion in the enforcement of the deportation laws. Should the local commissioner be allowed to use his discretionary powers in the matter of deporting individuals such as those discussed, the problem in great part would be cleared up.

The national quota system is completely out of accord with present worldwide conditions. Almost all of the Iron Curtain countries, with the possible exceptions of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have annual

D.O.T. & G.W. to [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear]

- 6 -

quotas of only 100, and these quotas are almost all oversubscribed to the year 2000. Should the mortgages laid on these quotas by the Displaced Persons Act be removed, or if Hungarians, for example, were able to borrow from the British quota, so should be able to bring to the United States many aliens possessing particular skills whose services are urgently needed by this organization. Many of our aliens are highly skilled technical, professional, medical or scientific men whose training, experience and ability would most certainly be prospectively beneficial to the United States.

It is because of the heavily oversubscribed condition of the quotas of Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., that most of the applications for visas, made as long as two years ago in American Consulates in Canada, are being returned unprocessed, with the notation that no action can be taken on their application due to the imminent approach of the effective date of the new law.

Neither the present law, nor the new law makes proper provision for Displaced Persons who are bona fide visitors to the United States. None of these people have passports from their own countries, since all of them have rejected the political party presently holding sway there. As a result they are traveling on French, German, or other free country affidavits of identity or travel documents. Before a visa can be extended under the law, the travel documents and re-entry permits must be valid for a period of sixty days beyond the date of application. These countries will not extend these documents since the bearers are not nationals of the issuing country. This, in effect, means that these visitors can only

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remain for a period of from six to nine months, and then must return to Europe, oftentimes without being able to complete the work for which they came.

Finally, it would seem that some provision could be made for the rapid processing of the visas of both prospective immigrants and prospective visitors so that in case of necessity an alien can be brought quickly to the United States without the usual two year delay.

Generally speaking, if some drastic changes are not made in the Immigration laws at the earliest possible moment, we can foresee the virtual disbanding the National Councils Division of this organization, and a serious curtailment of the quality of the broadcasts from Radio Free Europe, and, although it is not a propos to the present matter, we should like to point out that these broadcasts are making a terrific impact behind the Iron Curtain. One has only to read the virulent attacks against our organization printed in the Communist press all over the world to be assured of their effectiveness. The propaganda value to the Communist cause of the mass deportations now being planned of these well-known exiles is of course immeasurable.

When Public Law 414 was being debated in the Congress, it was submitted that the present Immigration and Nationality Act was one riddled with inconsistencies and completely engulfed in "red tape." We respectfully submit that the forthcoming law is full of even more inconsistencies, is completely unaware of present world conditions, will in effect stop all immigration except from those countries which are socially acceptable, and will create an impossible labyrinth of restrictive red tape.

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SPECIAL INFORMATION

*10/23/52*  
23 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie

1. In conversation the other day you asked me through what channel Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie were stating their opinions on the matter of NCFE's request to move the administrative headquarters of the exile countries from Washington to New York, and who was listening to Barnes and Offie.

2. The channel seems to be the Southeastern European Division and in particular Colonel Yatsevitch, SE/OP. The Southeastern European Division maintains an extremely skeptical view of NCFE activities in the exile field and has gone to considerable trouble, through exiles as well as through Barnes and Offie, to create the greatest possible objection not only to the recent move of the exiles but to NCFE in general. I am attaching an article by Edgar A. Mowrer which was written at the behest of Mr. Offie and was originally intended to be the first of a series. We have been successful in having the series idea dropped.

3. While I believe that there is some justification in the points the SE Division continually makes about the exile record of the New York Committee, I think the inter-governmental squabble which is aroused by the Division's repeated attempts to use exiles, members of the State Department, and others as a sounding board for its own lack of sympathy with NCFE makes it difficult for the National Committee to fulfill its charter and for CIA to control day-to-day operations without interference from the State Department and others from outside the Agency.

4. I suggest that you send the attached memorandum to the Chiefs of EE, SE and IO. It is worded in such a manner that it will not reveal this reference.

*Thomas Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

1. Mowrer article.
2. Suggested memo.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

*sing to  
Burke*

13 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO  
FROM : Chief, ROM/OIS  
SUBJECT : Exchange of Intelligence Information between the  
NCFE and the DD/P Offices

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the reservoir of a great wealth of intelligence information, particularly in the field of psychological warfare. A four-day survey of the NCFE conducted by an OIS case officer indicated that three NCFE components - the Research and Publications Service, the Mid-European Studies Center, and the Radio Free Europe - can make a very valuable contribution to the operational intelligence required by the DD/P offices.

2. It is the purpose of this memorandum to suggest a procedure for the most effective use of the NCFE intelligence potential. The most practical approach seems to be as follows:

a. At this time it does not appear necessary to establish a continuous flow of raw and finished intelligence from the NCFE to the DD/P offices. Rather, we would like to use NCFE facilities whenever individual cases indicate that such action is advisable.

b. We would like to maintain a direct relationship with the NCFE for the purpose of enlisting its support in the work on our individual cases. When the nature of the case indicates that the NCFE can make a valuable contribution to it, we could make arrangements through the Chief of IO/TOMIC, to make direct contact with one of the security-cleared NCFE officers. A permanently-designated OIS case officer (A. Shatto and/or H. Knoepfmacher) would then proceed to New York to discuss the substantive research problems in the NCFE and reach an agreement on the scope of NCFE support.

3. It is recognized that the final authority on all contacts with the NCFE rests with the Chief of IO/TOMIC, and that the latter may direct and limit such contacts whenever he desires.

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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

4. We suggest that, for the purpose of meeting security requirements, the two OIS case officers assigned to NCPS liaison be given permanent cover which would be arranged by the NCPS Personnel Officer and the Chief of IO/TOMIC.

5. It is recognized that the relationship between RWM/GIS and the NCPS must be based on mutual exchange of information. We are, therefore, prepared to provide such intelligence research support to the NCPS as may be given within security limits and our manhour capabilities. The requests for intelligence support from the NCPS would be channeled to RWM/OIS through the Chief of IO/TOMIC.

6. Our proposals contained in this memorandum have been discussed with the Chief of IO/TOMIC and an understanding has been reached on all points covered. It is requested that the suggested procedure be approved.

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Security Information

DD/P 807

OCT 10 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/ATI

FROM : C/RQM/FI

SUBJECT : Survey of the National Committee for a Free Europe

1. This memorandum serves to inform you of a four-day survey made of the National Committee for a Free Europe by Alexander Shatton of RQM/GIS. The survey has uncovered a great wealth of information, contained both in raw files and finished reports, which is of operational intelligence interest. We are now making arrangements, through the IO Division, for continuing access to the NCFE files and for direct liaison with the NCFE Staff.

2. In the course of his conversation with Shatton, the President of the NCFE (Admiral Harold Miller) expressed concern over the fact that he had not been notified of Shatton's arrival and stated that he does not look with favor at CIA individuals working in the NCFE without his knowledge. Although Shatton informed him that his visit had been cleared with the IO Division, Admiral Miller remained somewhat unconvinced that the arrangements had properly been made. I suggest that this misunderstanding be brought to the attention of the DD/P, so that he may be informed of the facts in the event the matter is brought up by Admiral Miller in his contacts with the DCI and the DDCI.

3. Mr. Shatton's visit to the NCFE headquarters took place on 16, 17, 18 and 19 September.

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4 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division,  
P & P Staff

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe's Request for  
Funds to Build a Gymnasium at the Free University-  
in-Exile; Reclamer of Admiral Miller.

1. I believe that I told Mr. Fraden last evening of the telephone call which I had received from Admiral Miller and of what I had said in response to his request for funds to build the gymnasium. I want to make it clear that I offered him no specific encouragement, and confined my remarks to a statement that if he wished to draw up a proper application we would study it very carefully. I told him that this seemed to us an unnecessary expense and one which I would find difficult to defend with the Director in light of our present economy drive.

2. I should greatly appreciate a thorough staff job being done on this matter to relieve me of the necessity of thinking up all of the arguments pro and con, especially the latter. Will someone please dig up in the Congressional Records the speeches made during the last session of Congress in condemnation of the State Department's lavish approach to the educational and cultural exchange program? If we were ever forced to defend this Free University program, I think we would be extremely vulnerable on the score of having spent \$50,000 for a gymnasium or anything like it. This is the icing on the cake and has the sound of being definitely in the luxury category. There is also the very questionable wisdom of our spending additional money on "permanent plant", when we cannot be sure how long we will be able to continue our support of this enterprise, nor for that matter how long the present flow of students material will continue.

3. Please -- let us sharpen up our thinking and our pencils as well. In the final analysis I shall probably have to veto this proposition, and will certainly do so unless it is much more convincingly supported than heretofore. However, I would like some help on this.

(Signed) FRANK O. WISNER

FRANK O. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

*1 Oct rec'd*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: NCFE-SE Division Conference on Romanian Refugee Situation

REFERENCE: Memo to Chief, IOD, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Romanian Refugee Organisation, dated 12 September 1952.

1. It is requested that the referenced memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE for study prior to the conference (ref, para. 8) between NCFE representatives and personnel of this Division.

2. Due to the importance of the negotiations with the Romanians, no action should be taken on the plan outlined in the memorandum until after the conference is held. The Division representative to be assigned on TDY in New York (ref, para. 7) will be designated prior to the conference.

3. We have been informed that Mr. Visoiannu has not received an acknowledgment of his letter and proposal. It is suggested that the NCFE write Mr. Visoiannu, expressing appreciation for his communication, and inform him that the NCFE has been studying various proposals and hopes that within the next few weeks further discussions can be arranged.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

25 Sept. 52

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANE)

SUBJECT: Request for Budget Revision for NCFE

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/A and DC/P from Comptroller 13 Sept. 52

1. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the subject memorandum requesting a budget revision for NCFE are explained in the supporting data attached to that memorandum. Items totaling \$78,343 to be released from the reserve held by CIA, summarized in those paragraphs, are for material support of substantive operations already approved. Release of these items to NCFE is concurred in by International Organizations Division. It is recommended that the sum of \$78,343 be released to NCFE.

2. The item in paragraph 3, i.e. \$60,000 for nine months' operating expenses from July 1952 through March 1953 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris, is concurred in by the IO Division. The reason for its occurrence is as follows:

a. Support in the amount of \$71,000 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile through NCFE was undertaken by a memorandum for the DCI/P dated 1 September 1951, Louis S. Thompson, Chief, Special Projects, OPC.

b. In early June 1952, the matter of continuing support for the ICFIU in Exile was reviewed by the DCI, Admiral Miller and Mr. Braden. It was decided that the ICFIU in Exile would continue to be subsidised in the amount of \$60,000 for a nine months' period, running from July 1952 through March 1953.

3. A cable, IN-34233, from Mr. Braden indicates the Chief of the Paris Station and Mr. Braden have discussed the possibility of ending relations with the ICFIU in Exile. Mr. Braden indicates he wishes to take up this matter with the DCI on his return.

b. It is therefore recommended that the sum of \$60,000 be released to NCFE to enable them to continue payments as already agreed. If the support for the ICFIU in Exile should be terminated, funds remaining in NCFE's hands can be applied to other proposed activities now held for justification by CIA.

GERALD E. MILLER  
Chief  
Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachments  
Reference memo with  
attachments.

IO/TONIC:WPD:jp/eh  
(24 Sept 52)  
Distribution  
Org & 1 - Addressee  
IO/TONIC - 2 cc  
CIO - 1 cc  
RI - 1 cc

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division  
SUSJECT: Library of Congress Eastern European Accessions  
REFERENCE: Fund Memorandum No. 513, 2 September 1952

1. SE Division has noted with interest that effective August 20, 1952, the Washington research staff of the NCFE will begin processing books and publications received from the Iron Curtain countries by the Library of Congress. These acquisitions represent a very valuable source of information which this Division is presently unable to exploit, since we have no personnel with the language qualifications required to review all that is received for our specific interests.
2. Referenced memorandum indicates that the NCFE has arranged to microfilm portions of given books containing items of propaganda or informational value. One copy of the print will be mailed to the New York research desks, while the original microfilm will be sent by pouch to Munich, presumably for RFE. This Division requests that an additional copy of the print be obtained on a continuing basis by IO for further analysis by the interested Area Divisions and for pouching to our field stations which have indicated a specific interest in this material. It is suggested that the copy be broken down into sections corresponding to the Area Divisions interested in order that this material may receive immediate attention by the appropriate Area Division.
3. SE Division would appreciate receiving your comments regarding this request since we are anxious to utilize this material as soon as possible and wish to make other arrangements if these suggestions are found impractical.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

Copy to EE

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Security

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SECURITY INFORMATION

24 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Assignment of Mobile Radio Facility (MB-50)

1. According to Messrs. Rowland and Emmons arrangements have been made to utilize the MB-50 in Germany.
2. The completion of the transaction is awaiting a test that is being undertaken by outside engineers through General McClelland. This test, I am told, is necessitated by the fact that there is not available a complete specification of the equipment.
3. It is estimated by Mr. Brown that the test will be completed in a few weeks.

/S/

D. LLOYD RIGNER  
Acting Chief  
Psychological Staff Division

PP/COPY:CLE:tms

Distribution:

Addressee	- original & 1
Mr. Rowland	- 1
✓Mr. Brown, IO	- 1
<u>CC: [unclear]</u>	
COPY	- 1
PY/ZPD	- 1
<i>clipper file</i>	- 1
RI	- 1

SECRET

*May file*

17 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. W. P. Burkeo, Chief, IO/TOMIC

SUBJECT: Refugee Stipendiaries of NCPE

REFERENCE: Secret Memo dtd 12 August 1952 from Chief, IO/TOMIC,  
to Chief, SE; Subject: List of Stipendiaries of NCPE.

1. In compliance with your request of 12 August, the referenced memorandum was circulated to the various interested branches of SE Division. Of the thirteen Romanians listed as stipendiaries of NCPE, only one, Mr. Brutus Coste, is on the payroll of SE Division. However, it has been our understanding that Mr. Coste has received no stipend since December, 1951. We would appreciate a further check on the status of Mr. Coste with respect to his reported stipend. No other duplications were reported.

2. It is requested that in addition to the referenced list of stipendiaries, IO Division obtain from the NCPE and RPD a list of all refugee employees from within the SE area (Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia) who may be employed in any capacity, with their salaries and job titles. Such information has not been available to the interested branches in the past, but experience has shown that the availability of this data on a current basis would be most helpful to the responsible case officers.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

PP:CACRANE:bar

Distributions:  
Addressee - Orig & 1  
SE/PF - 2  
RI - 2

SECRET

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF DIVISION  
ATTENTION: Mr. E. J. Harrison, PY Evaluation  
SUBJECT: TDMIC Use of PY Guidance Papers

1. In discussing this subject, the following facts of TDMIC operations should be kept in view:

a. TDMIC prepares its own daily guidance papers, written by a special staff which has at its disposal a European-wide news-gathering apparatus.

b. State Department overnight policy guidances are regularly delivered to TDMIC on the day of issue.

2. Guidance papers from PY are dispatched as soon as they are received. For instance, Special Guidance on Bacteriological Warfare, dated August 7, 1952, and Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 9, dated August 8, 1952, were sent on August 11.

3. The value of PY guidance papers for TDMIC was taken up with TDMIC officials last May. Their observations are contained in the following quotations from their letters to this Division:

a. The Chief Programming Official wrote:

"We have received several of these papers in the past couple of months. They are extremely useful for the following reasons:

- a. They set forth clearly U. S. policy on one issue or another;
- b. They occasionally report thinking in quarters from which we hear nothing directly;
- c. They usually contain pertinent quotations of expression of views by the enemy which we can make use of (both published and other sources, such as interrogatories);

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**SECRET**

a. They permit us to know what lines are being laid down for propaganda addressed to other audiences than ours (other than central and eastern Europe).

"On the other hand, when these papers deal with our targets, they sometimes reveal a change of view from our thinking and our points of view. Where this is owing to the fact that they have to mind black, while we deal in white, the difference can be legitimate. But even so, we find proposals that seem to us illogical, and now and then extremely unwise."

b. The President of the organization wrote:

"You enclosed a paper giving additional guidance material for propaganda countering Communist EW charges. All the lines therein suggested have been successively used by us since February 25 or thereabouts when the topic first arose.

"Papers of this kind are of great use, provided they arrive promptly. By promptly is meant, either in anticipation of an event, or an expression of views on the day the event occurs."

c. The Deputy Director, Radio, wrote:

"With regard to the paper (Prop-103, dated 28 March 1952) that you enclosed, I checked Bob's department and they advise that from the beginning we have made the points specified in 6(a)3 and 5, 6(b)2, 9(a)1 and 2, 9(d), 9(e), 10.

"As a matter of information, to our particular audiences we may, instead of 6(b)1, that the Soviet Union is trying to persuade the leaders of German heavy industry, militarists, and ex-Nazis to go into partnership with it; and instead of 6(c) that the prohibition of alliances is fraudulent, Moscow intending, as in August 1939, to ally itself with a reactionary Germany against our peoples. Again to our audiences, we say instead of 9(a)2 that the German problem can be solved, and that the Western powers are attempting to solve it in the interest of the security of our audiences. We are glad to see that our line parallels that laid down in 9(d) and (e)."

d. A fair summary of the use of PY guidance papers for RFE is as follows:

**SECRET**

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- 3 -

a. They are useful insofar as they contain ideas that have not occurred to TONIC's own people or in reference to events that are not a matter of public knowledge.

b. In most cases the guidance papers arrive so late that TONIC is already engaged in treating the next stage in the development of the propaganda theme suggested.

c. As PY guidance papers, therefore, are at the moment another contribution to the thinking of TONIC officials, it is not possible to point to specific uses of the material suggested.

d. To be most useful, propaganda guidance from PY should treat the development of special themes that have a specific relation to precise U. S. Government operations and objectives aside from general U. S. foreign policy goals. To be most useful to RFE, such guidance should be developed over a period of time in anticipation of the actual facts or operations making up such programs.

EMMONS BROWN  
Acting Chief  
International Organizations Division

10/TOM C:WPD/vch

Orly - Addressee  
1 cc - 10/TOMC  
1 cc - CIO  
2 cc - PI

SECRET

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: SE Division Plan for Rumanian Emigre Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In view of the considerable length of time since NCSE opened negotiations for Rumanian refugee unity and subsequent developments, a reappraisal of the situation and a delineation of final action are required.

2. It is evident that expression of NCSE interest in the Council of Political Parties (actually it has been directed primarily toward the National Peasant Party) had had the desired effect on the two refugee groups in the United States, by raising the specter of a third force developing and being recognized by the Americans. It has also made the King aware of the seriousness with which the Americans regard the division between the two groups. Further, it has incited the Iron Guard to adopt a "democratic" facade in the hope, perhaps, of fitting eventually into the resulting organization. However, in spite of the success of the maneuver, further encouragement of the CoPP and the RFI could well prove dangerous to our overall objective of unifying the refugees, by adding fuel to their differences.

3. Careful consideration has been given to the various worthwhile proposals and counter proposals which were advanced in the course of the recent discussions. It is hoped, in this connection, that the NCSE has made it entirely clear to all the participants that this series of discussions was undertaken purely to explore the possibilities for agreement in concert with the refugees themselves, and that after hearing all sides of the question, the NCSE will present for their consideration a "package" proposal, on the basis of which final agreement should be reached. It is believed that the revision of the original plan, set forth below and embodying certain features which have developed in the course of the last three months, can provide a solution acceptable both to this organization and to the refugees. Operational considerations, the desirability of maintaining a reasonable degree of control, the necessity for taking into account the refugee concept of democratic procedures, as well as the firm stand on size taken by the Rumanian National Committee, these are all important factors affecting the problem. The final organization should be small enough to control, sufficiently selective to attract prominent exiles, inclusive enough to contain the rank and file, and of an optimum size to carry out its functions effectively.

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4. An organizational form of a large passive Council, to which all Romanians who meet certain qualifications could belong, but with all action vested in a small Executive Committee, offers a practical way to satisfy both U. S. and refugee requirements. The name of this overall organization should be the "Romanian National Committee" since this would provide a sense of continuity and would facilitate acceptance of the proposal by Viscolanu and the King. It would be formed by an expansion of the present Romanian National Committee into the Executive Committee of approximately twenty persons. Membership in the Council would be extended to the rank and file by means of letters announcing the new organization and inviting participation. The "Council" of the Romanian National Committee would include members from all countries and would not meet in session. Radescu should be designated honorary president of the Council. The Executive Committee would be the functional unit of the organization. It would appoint sub-commissions and groups to perform the work of the Committee and designate representatives of the Romanian National Committee at various refugee centers in Europe, South America, and the Near East. A membership card would be issued to all who affiliate with the Council. Members of extremist groups would be excluded in principle from membership in the Romanian National Committee, except in certain cases passed upon by the Committee and accepted by us. A newspaper would be published and distributed in liberal quantities.

5. The Executive Committee headquarters would be in New York City and work in conjunction with the NCRC and representatives of CIA. It is recommended that the position of chairman of the Executive Committee be held for a term of one year, elective by members of this committee only. Its members should be:

Constantin Viscolanu, Chairman

Gheorghe Ascan  
Cornel Manu  
Vintila Bratianu  
Nicolae Caranfil  
Edmond Ciuntu  
Brutus Coste  
Alexandru Cretzianu  
Anton Crihan  
Carlos Davila  
Mihail Tarcasanu  
Grigore Gafencu  
Emil Chilezan  
Mircea Ionițiu  
Augustin Popa  
Iancu Zissu

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6. As the first step in achieving the organization outlined above, it is suggested that the NCFE reply to Visoianu's memo expressing appreciation and inviting him to a discussion of his proposal. At this meeting, the NCFE should present the ideas outlined in paragraph 4 as the American view of the compromise which, after careful study, appears to offer the best possible solution. In the discussion, the NCFE should indicate that this plan is the result of much thought by interested groups after discussions with many refugees, that it has attempted to aid the refugees because of its interest in them and their country's welfare, and that it is prepared to support a Romanian refugee organization in a number of ways. Visoianu should be invited to recommend the people whom he considers desirable for the Executive Committee. He will have been briefed by CIA prior to the meeting and will propose the same list generally as that in paragraph 5. The NCFE should then request Visoianu's cooperation and active participation in forming an organization along the lines suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5. It will suggest that Visoianu, Pone and Crihan work with Gafencu, Chilesan and Coate for this purpose. Each of these gentlemen should be approached by CIA and NCFE prior to the opening contact meeting of the group. If any substitutions are made in the participants, CIA should be consulted prior to the time arrangements are completed. After this group has worked out details of the organization and consulted with the others suggested for the Executive Committee, the NCFE will issue invitations to a general meeting of this Committee and will assist in getting the other organizational details underway. Sub-commissions should be established immediately, using the refugees who have been participating in the recent NCFE discussions. Arrangements will be made for Visoianu and Gafencu and an additional delegation to be named later, to go to England to inform the King of the agreements reached and the details of the new organization.

7. During this phase of activity, it is recommended that someone from this Division be assigned on TDU in New York to work closely with the NCFE and advise on any necessary changes. CIA will contact certain refugees to ensure their cooperation prior to the initiation of this phase of activity.

8. This plan has been coordinated with the Department of State. It is requested that the details be forwarded to the NCFE and a meeting arranged to discuss the implementation.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

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Security Information

11 September 1952.

*the Record*  
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on Wednesday,  
the 10th of September.

The following is a memorandum of my conversation with  
Admiral Miller in New York on Wednesday, September 10th. I would  
like to preface this account with the observation that Admiral Miller  
seems to be in a highly emotional state and generally suspicious of  
those around him.

(1) Larry deNeufville

Admiral Miller reported his meetings with Larry deNeufville  
in Paris and indicated a difference in his projected use of Larry  
deNeufville and that envisaged by deNeufville, which Admiral Miller  
presumed represented CIA's interests. Miller proposes to use  
deNeufville as one of a three man brain trust, one of whom is Louis  
Gallantier and the other is still unnamed. He mentioned that he had  
originally considered deNeufville as an aide in administrative matters  
but had been informed that deNeufville was not equipped for such duties.

(2) VOA

Admiral Miller indicated that RFE was having difficulties with  
VOA, especially with the new Information Intelligence Unit created by  
the State Department, under the direction of Donald Shea, to provide  
information for VOA's broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries. These  
difficulties included the preventing of RFE's information people from  
interviewing escapees.

(3) Information Service — Leland Stowe

Admiral Miller indicated that he was more than satisfied with  
Leland Stowe's activities, and that with the exception of RFE corre-  
spondents in London and Paris, they were satisfied with present personnel.  
He also stated that Russell Hill had become RFE correspondent in Germany.  
He further indicated that he will make every effort to keep Leland Stowe  
on after the expiration of the present six-month consultative contract.

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Security Information

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Security Information

- 2 -

(4) Father Morlion

Admiral Miller stated that he had conferences with Monsignor Cardini who stated that Father Morlion's information was not reliable. Admiral Miller reported that McDonald, the RFE correspondent in Rome, held the same view. Admiral Miller exhibited some suspicion of the actions of Mr. Dulles in trying to sell him the matter of Father Morlion and Anna Brady, but stated if that was what Mr. Dulles wanted, that was all right with him.

(5) Crusade for Freedom

Admiral Miller indicated he was going to give two days a week to the Crusade for Freedom.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
Acting Chief,  
International Organizations Division

AC/IO:MPD/cmm

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee (via C/PP, and DD/P)  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - IO/Tonic  
2 cc - RI

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

# National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 WEST 37TH STREET

NEW YORK 10, N. Y.

TELEPHONE PLAZA 7-7600

CABLE ADDRESS: NAFECOMM

September 9, 1952

Mr. Thomas Braden  
2203 Foxhall Road, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Braden:

At the suggestion of Admiral Miller, I am enclosing six copies of the new Committee brochure "Weapon in the Struggle for Freedom." If you would like to have additional copies, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

*Samuel S. Walker, Jr.*

Samuel S. Walker, Jr.  
Director, Research and  
Publications Service

SSW:bvb

**SECRET**  
Security Information

2 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures in the FEUE

Those present: Captain Sabalov, Dr. Tyson, Thomas Heyers, Francis Hand, Bob Cunningham, John Rooney

1. The purpose of this meeting was to inform the Office of Inspection and Security of the security arrangements made in the selection of students for the Free University in Exile.

2. As a result of the discussions, an outline by Captain Sabalov of his security procedures, it was agreed:

a. That the present security practices were satisfactory and that the nature of the security problem does not call for the kind of security scrutiny necessary in Radio Free Europe.

b. That the FEUE is an excellent source of information for CIA and that in consequence Captain Sabalov will make available to this Agency:

1) A list of all applicants to the Free University with biographical data.

2) A list of all student with biographical data given general scholarship aid in Europe.

3. That no contacts by CIA with the Free University in Exile will be undertaken except by headquarters action or by field stations through Mr. Royal Tyler.

*William P. Durkee*  
WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
IO/TOMIC

**SECRET**  
Security Information

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Security Information

ER-3-2387

8 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans  
Acting Chief, International Organizations  
FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. Mr. Phenix when he was recently here advised me that the Board of NCFE desired to change its name from "National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc." to "Free Europe Committee." The purpose of this was to avoid confusion with the multitude of "national committees" for various purposes, some of them subversive.
2. This proposed change was discussed at the morning meeting with the Director and Deputies and no objection was found if the Committee really wanted to do it. I suggest that C/IO confirm this to Phenix as they want to set the legal steps in motion.

ALLEN W. DULLES

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Security Information

11 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Admiral Miller Letter about NCIE Personnel  
mentioned at the PRC Meeting on Friday, 8 August

1. Attached hereto is Admiral Miller's answer on behalf of NCIE to numerous requests for personnel records of NCIE in order to provide CIA with basic information about this project.
2. In view of NCIE's reticence to provide us with such basic information, Mr. Braden and I have discussed the possibility of whether we could effectively perform a liaison function here for you without such information, and we are agreed that we cannot. As you know, it is not our purpose to use this information to harass people in New York or to quibble about salaries or details of assignments. We do think that the only way CIA can perform its responsibility toward NCIE is to keep itself fully informed in every field of NCIE's activity, and that knowing which employees are doing what is essential information.
3. You suggested at the PRC meeting on 8 August that you might be able to give us a hand in our effort to get this information.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
C/IC/DHIC

Attachment  
As stated.

ID/TMIC/WPD/ah

Orig - Addressees  
1 cc - CIA  
2 cc - TMIC  
2 cc - RI

*see pink for attachment*

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Security Information

7 August 1952

*TWB*

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Request While on Travel Orders

Please contact Larry d'Neufville to obtain debriefing paper of Sperling and to be present at further verbal debriefing of Sperling. Sperling will be available in Paris from the 15th of August to the 2nd of September.

*Durkee*  
WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
C/IO/TONIC

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

6 Aug 52

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9

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO REEVES FOR THOMAS BRADEN FROM LPA--SECURITY INFORMATION --CITE

NY -3124

JOHN C. HUGHES RPT JOHN C. HUGHES SAYS:

"THE BULL-AUGUSTINE REPORT OF JULY 20 WAS PREPARED IN PARIS AND DISTRIBUTED BY ROYALL TYLER FROM THERE. IMMEDIATELY ON READING IT I PROPOSED A MODIFICATION OF THE NAME FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION SO AS TO DEFINE MORE ACCURATELY ITS PURPOSE. I SUGGESTED WE CALL THE PROJECT FREE EUROPE EXILE CENTERS, AND THIS NAME WAS ACCEPTED.

"IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT EVER SINCE NCFE HAS BEEN IN ACTIVE OPERATION, INCREASING ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID BY US TO THE PROBLEM OF THOSE REFUGEES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO ARE NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH NCPE IS CONCERNED, AND SUBSTANTIAL SUMS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE HANDS OF THOSE NATIONAL COUNCILS WHICH SHOWED INITIATIVE IN THIS PARTICULAR FIELD TO ENABLE THEM TO BUILD UP THE MORALE OF THEIR HOMELESS NATIONALS. THE PRESENT REPORT AND ITS PROPOSALS LOOK TO A MORE EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE ON A SOMEWHAT LARGER SCALE OF WHAT IS ALREADY BEING DONE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS RESULT, WE RECOMMEND EMPLOYING A SMALL AMERICAN STAFF (OF ABOUT EIGHT PEOPLE) TO SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

THE NCFE BUDGET FOR 1952-53 FOR WORK OF THIS CHARACTER INCLUDED APPROXIMATELY RPT APPROXIMATELY \$350,000 TO CONTINUE PREVIOUSLY

118,669

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-2-

APPROVED PROGRAMS. THE BULL-AUGUSTINE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOW THAT A MORE EFFICIENT AND SOMEWHAT MORE COMPREHENSIVE OPERATION (FOR EXAMPLE POLISH REFUGEES ARE NOW TO BE COVERED) WILL CL RPT COST ABOUT \$400,000 FOR THE TEN MONTHS—SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE, AN INCREASE OF ONLY \$100,000.

"THIS PROGRAM IS NOT A NEW ONE FOR NCFE AND IT INVOLVES NO RESETTLEMENT HOUSING OR LARGE SCALE SUBSISTENCE EXPENDITURES. IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH OR DUPLICATE ANYTHING THAT IS NOW BEING DONE BY RPT BY OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AGENCIES NOR DOES IT INVOLVE ANY LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS. IT REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NCFE REALLY IS CONCERNED WITH THE MORALE OF REFUGEES REACHING WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. WE SEE NO REASON, THEREFORE, WHY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT NEED BE CONSULTED AT THIS TIME. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH MR. DULLES R/T DULLES."

GR-351

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TITANIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.
2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.
3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

PRESTON L. SMITHEN  
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressees  
3 - CM  
2 - RI/FI

**SECRET**

Security Information

**SECRET**

Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.
2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.
3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

PRESTON L. SUTPHEN  
Chief, Commercial Division

GS/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
3 - CM  
2 - RI/FI

**SECRET**

Security Information

**SECRET**  
Security Information

**TONIC**

August 5, 1952

Dear Dick:

Tom Braden, one of our friends will be coming over in your direction soon.

Please show him every courtesy and everything that we have in the way of operations. It is essential that he know our operations thoroughly, and all wraps are off.

Sincerely yours,

H. R. Miller

Mr. Richard J. Condon  
Radio Free Europe  
APO 407-A  
c/o Postmaster  
New York, New York

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Royall Tyler - Paris ✓  
cc: George Caesar - Lisbon ✓  
cc: Oliver Hadwood - 635-10

AUG 6 1952

**SECRET**  
Security Information

C  
O  
P  
Y~~SECRET~~

R 3-1338(2)

Security Information

4 August 1952

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. It is understood by Sponsor and the Fund that activities of the Fund will be conducted in accordance with the following principles:
  - a. The Fund will present to the Sponsor on or before 1 May of each year a proposed program and financial budget for the fiscal year beginning on 1 July. In general, this presentation will include detail comparable to other Sponsor budget presentations and, of course, must include as a minimum sufficient information to enable the Sponsor to analyze the program from both a budgetary and policy viewpoint.
  - b. After subjecting the program and budget to normal Sponsor review and analysis, the Sponsor will advise the Fund as to the specific activities of the over-all program which the Sponsor desires to support and as to specific amounts approved for expenditure in connection with each Fund division, including a small General Administration Contingency Fund which can be used at the discretion of the Fund for minor unforeseen requirements of any division. Exceptions, limitations, or other special provisions will be stipulated where appropriate. The Fund will undertake major activities other than those approved in its annual program only when mutually agreed by the Sponsor and the Fund. Transfer of funds from one Fund division to another division will not be made except by prior mutual agreement of the Sponsor and the Fund.
  - c. A reasonable reserve fund will be held by Sponsor and provided for in the budget to take care of unforeseen emergencies or contemplated activities which have not been sufficiently developed to permit detailed budgetary planning. Releases will be made from this fund to the Fund as appropriate upon presentation of proper justification to the Sponsor.
  - d. The Fund will furnish the Sponsor with such regular financial reports reflecting its operations as may be necessary to enable the Sponsor to properly account for the Fund expenditures. The Fund will also furnish the Sponsor with copies of audit reports made to the Fund by the firm of Certified Public Accountants employed for that purpose by the Fund with the approval of the Sponsor.

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Security Information

**SECRET**

- 2 - Security Information

e. In order that the Fund may have available at all times sufficient net liquid assets to provide for liabilities which would exist in the event unforeseen liquidation became necessary, Sponsor will provide the Fund with an adequate liquidation reserve which will be held by the Foundation and invested in United States Government obligations of a readily convertible variety mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund. This reserve will be made available to the Fund as required, to be used only for the purposes of liquidation as mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund.

f. In case of liquidation, the assets of the Fund remaining after payment and discharge of all debts and liabilities of the corporation shall, as required by the Fund by-laws, be distributed "to such tax-exempt charitable organizations as shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in its discretion," but it is understood that the Fund will, in fact, designate the tax-exempt charitable corporation known as "The 1848 Foundation" as the recipient of such net assets.

g. The Sponsor will provide the Fund with appropriate guidance and the Fund, to the extent it is apprised thereof, will insure that all Fund activities are conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. Government policy and the Sponsor policy and mission. It is moreover recognized that developments unforeseen at the time of the approval by the Sponsor of any annual program may require the termination thereof, or any portions thereof, at any time by the Fund either at its own instance or at the request of the Sponsor.

h. The Fund will accept restricted gifts from private donors, other than Crusade for Freedom, Inc., only when mutually agreed by the Fund and the Sponsor.

i. The Fund may submit budgetary revisions either quarterly or whenever proposed new activities or unforeseen developments require a significant change in approved budgets.

j. Within the limits of approved budgets, the Fund will requisition funds from the Sponsor quarterly unless unanticipated requirements necessitate interim requisitions.

k. To promote their common security interest, the Sponsor will keep the Fund continuously advised as to desirable security procedures and the Fund will be free to request specific security guidance from the Sponsor at any time. The Fund will not elect or appoint a director, officer, key executive or any other person who will have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship without the prior specific concurrence of the Sponsor. In respect of employees who will

**SECRET**

Security Information

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- 3 - Security

not have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship, the Fund will, nevertheless, obtain appropriate security clearances from the Sponsor prior to employment.

2. Where appropriate, detailed procedures will be cooperatively developed by the Fund and the Sponsor to insure the effective implementation of the principles outlined in this Memorandum of Understanding.

For that purpose a liaison office in Sponsor's organization will be designated by Sponsor. Except on financial and budget matters which will be handled by the Fund with Sponsor's Office of Administration, and on matters which the Fund desires to take up with the Director of Sponsor or his immediate Deputies, relations between the Fund and Sponsor will be coordinated by or through this liaison office and, except as above, any matters which the Fund desires to bring to the attention of Sponsor may be referred to or through such liaison office.

Initialed as of this 4th day of August 1952:

/s/ A.W.D.  
(Mr. Dulles)

/s/ H.H.M.  
(Admiral Miller)

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Security

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION ND BOTTOM) **(SECRET)**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	CPP		
2	DD/P		
3	DDCI		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	C/IO	TWB	8 Dec
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

## REMARKS:

This may interest you as evidence of the good team spirit we have among some of our operating campaigners. It was left behind by Alan Valentine in his personal files.

*Terry Braden*  
TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

STAN. NO. 30-4  
SEP 1947

TOP 1610

**PRIVATE** *3*  
**National Committee AND Free Europe, Inc.** *1/4*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

110 WEST 37TH STREET

NEW YORK 12, N.Y.

TELEPHONE PLAZA 7-2600

CABLE ADDRESS: WATERFALL

August 1, 1952

Mr. Alan Valentine, President  
 Committee for a Free Asia, Inc.  
 245 California Street  
 San Francisco, California

Dear Alan:

It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape.

I checked down there regarding any taboo concerning your help on the Crusade for Freedom campaign. I think there was a misunderstanding here. They have no thought of providing a complete taboo. Their thought was that all other operation should not stop and your time be devoted wholly to the Crusade.

Actually, we will call upon you for very little help. When Dick Walsh comes out to talk with you within the next ten days, he will give you a complete fill-in on what assistance we would like to have. I am sure you will have no trouble in giving us this assistance.

With regard to the wording of the language by which we transmit the money to you -- I am going to try to get a Board Meeting together on Tuesday at which time the necessary action will be taken to clear our forwarding letters to you insofar as capital expenditures go.

My very best regards.

Sincerely,

  
 H. B. Miller

HBM:mlm

**PRIVATE**  
**AND**  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Aug 1 1952  
B&L

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT : List of Rightist Rumanian Refugees.

1. In accordance with a request of Mr. John Leich for information on any questionable members of Gen. Radescu's League of Free Rumanians, transmitted herewith is a list of a number on whom information is available. Information on others will be forwarded to you as received.

2. Most of those listed have been connected with the Iron Guard groups, either as members or as fellow travelers, or with other groups whose ideology is in conflict with U. S. policy. The names preceded by an asterisk are considered unsuitable for employment in any American organization.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE Division

Encl.  
List

SE/5/MCNewson/fe (13 August 1952)

1 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Division  
Chief, SE Division  
Chief, WE Division  
Chief, PY Division  
Chief, Budget and Analysis Division  
Chief, Operations Division

SUBJECT: TPTONIC Budget

1. Attached for your specific comments and evaluation  
is the TPTONIC proposed budget for fiscal year 1953.
2. It will be necessary to have your comments and  
initials on the cover sheet by Tuesday noon, August 5.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

1 - EE  
1 - SE  
1 - WE  
1 - PY  
1 - AL/BD  
1 - OD/CO  
1 - CIO  
2 - IO/TOMIC  
2 - RI

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July 2<sup>nd</sup> Draft  
not sent

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: NCFE-CIA RELATIONS

1. When this Division was delegated the responsibility of conducting CIA relations with NCFE it was immediately apparent that a variety of problems existed which made effective action on the part of IO Division difficult if not impossible. These difficulties may be generally summarized as follows:

(1) Satisfactory mechanical procedures to provide information to CIA and to insure effective cooperation and coordination of activities by CIA and NCFE did not exist. This was true not only in financial matters, such as the orderly submission of budgets and financial reporting, as well as security, but was also true of attempts to give NCFE policy guidance and to insure that NCFE's activities did not compromise CIA operational activities.

(2) The attitude of the responsible officials of NCFE was one largely of non-cooperation in terms of NCFE and CIA efforts being joint to achieve the same objective. Indeed NCFE's attitude was that they are a separate organization with the responsibilities of a corporation in the State of New York, and that the role of CIA's representatives in dealing with them was one of being their salesmen rather than partners, that once their general activities were approved and financed, their responsibilities to CIA were fulfilled.

(3) NCFE has not only failed to provide information about its activities, but had generally expanded its relations with government agencies in an effort to play one agency against another and, indeed, in many cases play the personnel of one agency against other personnel in that agency. A general feeling of suspicion and distrust provoked CIA's relationships with NCFE.

2. In an attempt to properly discharge its responsibilities IO Division has attempted to solve the above problems by (1) preparing an agreement or directive which ~~states~~ sets out the joint responsibilities of CIA and NCFE and (2) which clearly states NCFE's duties and responsibilities to this Agency. To implement this agreement IO Division has, or is in the process of, creating orderly procedures by which this agreement will be put into effect.

3. If IO Division is to succeed in its task, which in our opinion is well begun, two conditions are ~~in our opinion~~ essential:

(1) That there be a single point of liaison between NCFE and CIA and that CIA act as the sole official governmental liaison with NCFE. It should be said that this does not mean that officials of NCFE will not consult with higher authorities in CIA, but that when they do, those responsible in IO Division will be fully informed.

(2) That NCFE clearly understands with whom they are to deal in CIA and that those with whom they deal on a regular basis are responsible officials entitled to respect as such--

- 3 -

officials whose responsibilities are to lend their cooperation and guidance insofar as it is necessary to achieve common objectives.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

## SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: CIA Investigation of Relations

PROBLEM

It is likely that at a meeting you will hold Monday, 5 August, with members of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, these Directors will maintain they do not wish to sign or to accept a directive and/or agreement as to relations between NCFE and CIA, which has been approved by the CIA administrative staff and the International Organizations Division of CIA.

DISCUSSION

At the time responsibility for CIA dealings with NCFE was transferred to the IO Division, a survey was undertaken by this Division with the help of the CIA administrative staff under Mr. Wolf. The following was found to be the status of relations between CIA and NCFE:

1. Budget and Financial Relations.

a. No orderly submission of budgetary requirements on the part of NCFE has ever been established or practiced. For example, the CIA approved budget for the fiscal year 1952 was substantially different than the budget upon which NCFE based its activities. Bad communication has existed.

b. CIA has not exercised any form of control over NCFE expenditures after initial approval. For example, NCFE has been free to switch funds allocated for one project to some new project or to pay for extending an old one without further reference to CIA.

c. Monies raised by NCFE through the Crusade for Freedom or monies advanced by CIA and unspent at the end of the fiscal year have not been considered in the granting of funds for a new fiscal year.

[REDACTED]

SECRET

- 2 -

d. When budgets have been presented by NCFE, they have not been presented with reasonable thoroughness or accuracy nor have they indicated expenditures which are reasonably certain and those which are projections of possible activities for which NCFE has nevertheless asked for funds.

e. In certain instances, i.e. grants to certain national councils, NCFE makes expenditures for which there is no adequate accounting to NCFE and on which the Committee has had little or no information on how the money is spent.

2. Financial Reporting.

a. It is unquestioned that the internal business and accounting procedures of NCFE are excellent. However, adequate financial information has not been presented to CIA.

b. Security.

As the recent case of Leland Stowe indicates, NCFE has disregarded essential security considerations in the hiring of personnel. Neither the Security Officer, CIA, nor any other branch or component of CIA, has anything but extremely inadequate information as to who is on the NCFE payroll.

c. Policy Control.

In its relations with emigres through its National Councils Division and in its radio broadcasts through RFE, NCFE has in many cases not received adequate guidance from CIA and the State Department and in some instances not followed the guidance provided. CIA is seldom informed by NCFE of its proposed activities other than in its over-all budgetary presentation.

d. Coordination of CIA Activities with NCFE.

NCFE's activities in radio broadcasting, which account for three-quarters of its yearly budget, are almost entirely transferred overseas. The action of its 1400 or more overseas personnel often cut across CIA's own field operations. NCFE has not accepted coordination in this field.

3. IO Division and Administrative Staff Proposed Actions to Solve These Difficulties.

The IO Division with the assistance of the CIA Administrative Staff has prepared a memorandum of agreement to serve as a guide in

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- 3 -

the conduct of relations between CIA and NCSE. This agreement provides the following:

- a. Adequate budget information upon which to evaluate the purposes and probable success of proposed NCSE activities as well as an adequate financial reporting system by NCSE so that this Agency can at all times be aware of and insure the approved expenditure of funds by NCSE.
- b. Adequate security arrangements so that every employee of NCSE has been given a security clearance necessary for the proper protection of this operation.
- c. The IO Division is to be the sole channel of liaison by NCSE to CIA and the State Department. The purpose of this provision is to insure adequate preparation and consistent policy guidance for NCSE in all its varied activities and to afford a single point of liaison and coordination with State Department and the area divisions of CIA. It is by no means intended to prevent officials and directors of NCSE from discussing problems with higher authorities and in fact the IO Division cannot give policy guidance without reference to higher authorities. In the past, however, NCSE has conducted liaison with many of the area divisions in CIA, with the State Department and with various officials in CIA, and there has been a resultant confusion.
- d. The agreement provides for the submission of monthly reports by NCSE as to the status of its substantive activities.

4. Attitudes of NCSE.

The basic attitudes of NCSE about themselves is summed up by the comments on the first draft of the above-mentioned agreement by Spencer Phoenix:

- a. "Our friends can refuse to supply funds for disapproved activities but cannot legally or properly be given the 'right to disapprove or modify any activities or require abandonment, modification, or change in emphasis, in any of the existing programs'."
- b. "Again, no agreement between our friends and ourselves can legally diminish our corporate right to spend our corporate funds . . ."

SECRET

- 4 -

c. It is unacceptable that private consent of CIA should be required as to the appointment of new directors and officers.

d. The money given to NCFF by CIA is given first to the LSHG Foundation and this money is then donated to NCFF. CIA therefore has no right to inquire into policies or expenditures although "normally we would consult our friends".

5. Basic Attitude of CIA.

CIA has a duty and responsibility to insure affirmatively the conduct of the NCFF program in accordance with the CIA mission and with the DCI's responsibility to higher authority. A course of action based upon the view that NCFF's autonomy is such that it cannot accept the above-mentioned agreement, or some form thereof, might under conceivable circumstances, i.e., a change in the viewpoint of the German Government where most of NCFF's employees are located, the possibility of high-level changes in NCFF, or the growing insistence on the part of the exiles for armed liberation, lead to action not consistent with the DCI's responsibility. At present a situation exists in which CIA and the Division charged with CIA responsibility cannot exercise that responsibility.

6. Recommendation.

The PRC has reviewed this agreement and has refused to approve the budget of NCFF until this agreement or a modification acceptable to NCFF is adopted. The Director has approved this decision and it is suggested that he stand upon it.

L. K. WHITE  
Acting Deputy Director  
(Administration)

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - ADD/A (for DDGI)

1 cc - "

1 cc - IO/TOMIC

1 cc - CIO

2 cc - HI

CONFIDENTIAL  
Security Information

ER-3-1369

29 July 1952

MENORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations  
FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is a memorandum which was handed me by Spencer Phenix covering a confidential report made by two NCFE people with regard to NCFE's action in connection with refugees. I have not read this in full and would like your recommendation and analysis so as to spare me this if possible.

ALLEN W. DILLERS

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000  
July 15, 1952  
Revised July 20, 1952

## THE NCFE APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

- 1 -

### INTRODUCTION

Reduced to its simplest terms, the European refugee problem can be resolved, saving liberation, only by the assimilation, or at least the integration of the refugees into the countries which receive them or by their emigration to countries better able to do so. National and international programs vast in scope and cost are required for these purposes, and it is obviously not within NCFE's power or interest to engage directly in them. But, in an indirect way, while paying attention only to its direct and fundamental interests, NCFE can contribute to the success of both types of programs, at least so far as they concern refugees from the ten NCFE countries.

The first step is, of course, for NCFE to analyze its position in relation to the European refugee situation and to formulate a policy accordingly. NCFE has been a constantly and rapidly growing organization, fully occupied with the immediate problems of expansion which have confronted it. NCFE has been deprived of the opportunity to pause and consider the consequences of its expansion in a changed situation, much less to deal with these consequences.

Several basic factors have combined to alter NCFE's position in relation to the European refugee situation. While IRO operated, NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees, who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. IRO's several successor organizations have yet to prove their ability effectively and completely to perform its functions. During the early years of NCFE's existence, the frontier countries, Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain, were absorbed in post-war reconstruction or subjected to military occupation and hence were generally not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of most of the exile National Councils were in the U.S. under nominal U.S. control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. As conditions approach the normal in such of these countries, NCFE's grounds for self re-assurance become less solid. Until its May 1, 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting

-2-

the countries whence the refugees flee, NCFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. This, however, is no longer the case.

Fundamentally, any NCFE interest in the European refugee situation is an aspect of the general NCFE relationship with exiles. In the changed European situation in which this interest is and will be manifested NCFE should reconsider its basic instruments for such relationships : the National Councils. Their exceptions, gaps, and shortcomings should be carefully analyzed and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The inadequacy of the National Councils as a basic instrument in the changed situation in Europe will be indicated in this report. Certain adaptations of this instrument and the creation of new ones will be required if NCFE is to carry out its functions and realize its potentialities.

- II -

WHY NCFE IS CONCERNED IN THE EUROPEAN  
REFUGEE PROBLEM AND WHY THIS CONCERN  
SHOULD BE PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY  
MANIFESTED.

A. The Extent of NCFE's Concern to Date :

In the past NCFE has not directly concerned itself with the over-all problem of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. This policy of NCFE has manifested itself in the following ways. NCFE has consistently made it clear that its chief interest lies in what it regarded as the political and intellectual elite of emigrations from the various Iron Curtain countries. Certain elements of this political and intellectual elite, however, realized the necessity and the importance of channeling some of their activities toward the mass of their respective emigrations on a national basis. This realization was dictated either by humanitarian or strictly realistic political principles, or by a combination of the two. Accordingly, these elements of the elite approached NCFE with their proposals for NCFE material and moral support of such activities. These proposals differed widely and were implemented at varying periods over the last three years, with the result that presently NCFE is indirectly supporting refugee activities on a national basis at an annual amount of \$118,168.00, and with the further result that these activities are confused, haphazard, erratic, ill-coordinated and unjustly and inexplicably disproportionate. Some nationality groups, as for instance the Hungarians, have been receiving relatively large amounts for refugee activities, with other groups, as for example the Poles, who have a large emigration, receiving nothing.

The vehicles for the channeling of this support have also differed widely. Originally, NCFE's theory in providing support for such activities was based upon the existence of National

-3-

Councils or Committees, the idea being that the National Councils should themselves undertake such activities in order to gain for themselves the necessary standing in their respective emigrations. This was not altogether inconsistent with NCFE's policy of emphasis upon direct assistance only to the intellectual and political elite, but was a subsequent development thereof.

The most ambitious and long-lived of these National Councils' refugee projects has been the Refugee Service of the Hungarian National Council, which is the best and almost sole surviving example of NCFE's original theory. The record, however, even of this prime example, is an extremely spotty one (details to follow in a descriptive report to be submitted separately). More importantly, the reasons for the spottiness of the HNC's record are not all attributable to the HNC itself; many, indeed, are due to the situation in which the HNC's approach to the refugee problem, which has provided financial support, but little or no guidance or moral support. ~~Refugee Service has had unequal and erratic attention to AT&T~~

In the Rumanian case, NCFE's support for refugee activities was originally channeled through the Rumanian National Council, which ceased to enjoy NCFE recognition in 1950. Since that time, NCFE support for Rumanian refugee activities has been given to Rumanian Welfare, Incorporated, an organization entirely outside the National Council category, and which includes Americans on its Board of Directors.

In the Czechoslovak case, NCFE has channeled its support for refugee activities through the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, a National Council, which was the victim of a political split lasting from January 1951 until July 4, 1952. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in turn, channeled some of this support to an organization which enjoys the status of voluntary agency, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. This organization, like Rumanian Welfare, Inc., includes Americans on its Board of Directors, which is chaired by Professor James Shotwell. Unlike Rumanian Welfare, however, the AFCR in Germany and Austria received from IRO or UNRRA and USCOA facilities and/or financial support as did other larger organizations such as the NCWC, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee, etc. which shared with it the status of voluntary agency. There is no doubt that Czechoslovak refugees have been, to some extent, the victims of the political fluctuations of their leadership in the U.S., and that, in a sense, NCFE must also accept some responsibility for allowing the political situation to have had repercussions of this nature.

A/ In the case of the Albanians, no specific sums in the budget (which has been provided by NCFE) of the National Committee for a Free Albania have been earmarked for aid to Albanian refugees; although despite this the NCFA has, it is reported, due chiefly to close American supervision in Rome, managed to do more for Albanian refugees in Italy than other National Councils, as for instance the HNC and ANC in Italy.

-4-

In the case of the Poles, because of the failure of the Polish emigration to produce a united national council which could be recognized by NCFE, no financial support whatever has been given by NCFE to Polish refugee activities, although the Poles have one of the most sizable emigrations of all the nationality groups with which NCFE cooperates, and although the Poles have an organization, American Polish War Relief, a voluntary agency, which seems to be at least as effective, if not more so than the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees or Hungarian Welfare, Inc., organizations with which it is roughly comparable.

In the case of the Yugoslavs, which is probably the most difficult case of all, from the U.S. and the NCFE point of view as well as from the viewpoint of the individual refugee, NCFE has confined itself to contributing small amounts to the Benevolent Association of Free Citizens of Yugoslavia in London, in order that certain exiled leaders—who rendered signal services to the Allied cause during World War II, through their participation in the revolt of March, 1941, which led Yugoslavia to resist the Nazi Invasion—might receive small stipends. Although this aid is rendered through an organization abroad, to exiles residing abroad, it is in line rather with NCFE's policy of providing assistance to a political and intellectual elite than with the policy of indirect support through National Councils or other organizations of refugee activity. No Yugoslav National Council, enjoying NCFE recognition, has ever emerged due to the delicate situation of Western policy vis-a-vis Tito's government.

In the case of the three Baltic States, although NCFE has been provided, both in the U.S. and abroad, with the instruments which have most nearly proved themselves capable of efficient, just and honest use of funds for refugee activities, no such funds have been placed at the disposal of the three Baltic Consultative Panels or their counterpart committees in Germany and elsewhere abroad.

Originally, also, although the principle was never clearly defined or rigidly adhered to, and, at present, is as much departed from as observed, it was felt that NCFE-supported refugee activities should be restricted, as much as possible, to the type of assistance which a consulate would render to its citizens who found themselves in difficulties in a foreign country. Such assistance would according to this line of thinking only occasionally and in cases of extreme and immediate need, be material; essentially it would consist of advice, translation and verification of documents and direction of the refugee to the appropriate agency capable of furnishing him with the type of further assistance, material or otherwise, which might be required. It has always been recognized, however, that the various National Councils acting as consulates for their anti-Communist compatriots, who could not turn to the legally-recognized Communist embassies, legations or consulates of their countries for help, would have to provide some material assistance for those who turned to them for help, if only a train ticket, to allow them to visit the various international and local social agencies who could help them, or

-5-

the price of a meal or a night's lodging which would carry them over the necessary period of time which it always takes until the machinery of other agencies can be persuaded to start grinding for the assistance of these people. However, as time went on, NCFE assistance was also being given, directly or indirectly, to agencies which gave particular attention to material aid, as for instance the APUR and Hungarian Welfare, neither of which has any clear and responsible relation with a National Council, yet each of which has been the victim, to some extent, of the vagaries of exile politics.

Some of the elements which seem, either consciously or unconsciously to have been operative in the development of this NCFE policy of only limited and indirect concern with the over-all problem of refugees from Eastern Europe were the following:

1. Refugees in the mass were already the direct concern of a large, well-staffed and well-financed international organization, the IRO, which meant that the problems confronting the National Councils and other organizations of the exile élite were limited in scope.
2. Until the initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on May 1, 1951, NCFE (through RFE or any other instrument) was not itself an active factor in the refugee problem. It was not directly associated with the refugee himself, either through indirectly stimulating him to flee or through his increased value for information purposes.
3. The National Councils and Committees were considered to be a suitable instrument qualified to deal with the refugee problem in the limited manner in which it confronted them during the existence of IRO. It was felt that any credit for assistance to refugees could appropriately be given to the national councils, which would in turn reflect to the credit of NCFE, the U.S. and the Free West in general.

-III -

#### THE CHANGED SITUATION U.S. AND EUROPE

While IRO operated NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile élite and the mass of refugees who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. Even before IRO disappeared, care and maintenance of refugees in and out of camps had passed to the various local national authorities. IRO's functions of protection and care for the refugee in both legal and material aspects respectively from arrival to emigration have been divided

among these governments and two international agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and ICOMS, none of which has been provided with the means adequate to the performance of their tasks assigned it, and the latter of which are only just becoming fully operational. In consequence of IRO's closure the various voluntary agencies, such as HCR, IWF and WCC, etc., have been deprived of facilities which were provided by IRO in the past, with the result that they have been compelled to curtail their activities. Neither of IRO's successors has assumed the vast and vital coordinating function performed by IRO, with the result that the present confusion is discouraging. It may develop that the New State Department - NSA program for neo-refugees will clarify this confused situation, but at present it, itself, is as yet an unknown factor and naturally rumors regarding it at the field level have thus far only served to confound the confusion.

The period of IRO's existence coincided with the period of mass emigration, whereas at present emigration possibilities are small and uncertain, with the result that to the hard core remnant, which cannot be moved, is being added to the small but steady flow of new arrivals, most of whom are unable to emigrate and who must also face the appalling employment conditions in the frontier countries of Germany, Austria, Italy and Trieste (in the other frontier countries of Greece and Turkey the situation is probably similar) and the intermediary receiving countries such as France and Britain. Out of the more slowly moving remnants, particularly in the frontier countries, the possibility exists for the formation of more stable national committees, which would hence be more susceptible of control.

During the early years of NCFR's existence the frontier and intermediary receiving countries were either absorbed in post-war reconstruction or were subject to military occupation and hence were not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFR, in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of the exile national councils were in the U.S. under nominal NCFR control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. There are now strong indications that the situation is more rapidly approaching its more normal aspect and that it is still in the process of change in this direction.

In January the British-backed Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement held its first major meeting in London; in April the French Comité National pour l'Europe Libre emerged; and in June the Germans attempted to bring about the emergence of a central organization of refugees, which, in its composition reflected traditional German sympathies with the Separatist movements of Eastern Europe, a policy which is in direct conflict with that of NCFR and RFE. Although the authorities, particularly in the frontier countries, probably lack

special financial means to engage in activity on an NCME-scale, they do possess, by virtue of their control of the legal and welfare framework within which the refugee must exist, the means to extend or withhold benefits so as to influence the refugee political situation to their advantage. It seems reasonable to suppose that as these nations gain in strength and independence this process will continue at an increasing rate.

As a result of the factors described above, the refugee finds himself in an increasingly hostile environment, deprived of an effective international protector and incapable, alone, unaided and unaided legally to see his interests and defend them from exploitation. The Czechoslovaks and Poles in Germany provide striking examples of short-sighted, aimless exile pre-occupation with sterile political maneuvering to the advantage of their German hosts. At the same time, the voluntary agencies in Germany, which, after IRO's demise, were granted certain facilities by Nicosia must, after the ratification of the contractual agreements, look to the German Government for whatever facilities it may choose to grant them.

Until its May 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the west. Since that time, however, the steady expansion of RFE's activity and its increasing need of refugees as informational sources have led to strong accusations that RFE is evading its responsibilities and failing to accept the consequences of its own effectiveness. Although RFE expressly refrains from specifically inciting its audiences to flee, its comparisons of life in the west with life in the East inevitably constitute an indirect encouragement to escape. These accusations and resentment are ill-concealed among the representatives of the various international and voluntary agencies.

RFE's information service men, who, of RFE's personnel, are in closest contact with the refugees, sympathize with this criticism and wish that they could do more for the refugees than they are presently able to do on their own. These RFE information gatherers are in competition with an endless series of rivals seeking this valuable commodity. They usually present the refugees who have been helpful in providing them with information with presents of food, cigarettes or money. Although they would like to be in a position to do more than this for their informants, they cannot, for, as they explain, they are not in the welfare business. One of their special difficulties is to persuade the refugees to come to them in the first place. Almost universally they have reported that if the refugees were made to realize that Free Europe was doing something for them, they would be more willing and even eager, to come to the RFE information offices in the camps to give freely of their information. Furthermore, RFE's propaganda can be dangerously weakened by the boomerang effect of the few disillusioned refugees who return to their homelands.

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In consequence of the closure of IMO and the absence of any authority capable of organizing and controlling the refugee national committees a double vacuum exists. In respect to the first vacuum, the UN High Commission, NCFE, the voluntary agencies and the State Department program have yet to prove their ability to fill it. In respect to the second vacuum, the British, the French, the Italians, the Austrians and the Germans have the possibilities of filling this vacuum. Of these, the German interest is most likely to provide the most direct and immediate conflict with NCFE-RFE interests. The fact that the Germans have demonstrated an interest in these committees and particularly in support of the Separatist elements indicates that these committees are not without political importance; because of the political ambitions or honest desire to serve of their leaders and of the need of the refugee for spokesmen and representatives in their dealings with local authorities, such committees will always exist, whether or not they are controlled or supported. If these committees are to be controlled at all, it is obviously to NCFE's advantage that they be controlled by NCFE. It would be dangerous to assume that this control could be exercised solely through the "leaders" residing in the U.S. as the opportunity exists for these leaders and for those in Europe to play off one Western Power against another. It has already been demonstrated in one case that the branch of a national council, with headquarters in the U.S., due to the exigencies of the local situation may be obliged to follow a policy which is quite contrary to the interests of NCFE.

In addition to the major double vacuum described above, our survey has disclosed the existence of a number of minor vacuums in exile representation which have been filled by unscrupulous self-appointed national representatives whose presence has been largely responsible for the skepticism and mistrust with which exile representatives are frequently regarded by the international and voluntary agencies. This unfortunate factor may be traced to the lack of recognized accreditation for such representatives, to the absence of any responsible and consistent field supervision, control and backing of worthy and qualified representatives. In this regard, representatives of the UN High Commission and the voluntary agencies have expressed a definite interest in efforts to order the chaotic situation of the national representatives.

- IV -

RECONSIDERATION OF NCFE'S BASIC  
INFLUENCE IN ITS RELATIONSHIP  
WITH EXILES AND REFUGEES: THE  
NATIONAL COUNCILS.

As we have shown above, it is to NCFE's interest to attempt to order this confused situation, and if the attempt is to be made, careful consideration must be given to the selection of the tools which are to be used. The Division of NCFE which has hitherto dealt with NCFE's relations with the exiles, and indirectly with the refugees, has been the National Councils Division. This Division

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has used as its basic instrument the National Councils and Committees which have their headquarters in the U.S. NCFE's experience over the past three years has served conclusively to modify the initial view of the National Councils as suitable instruments for the creation not only of an atmosphere of positive and constructive cooperation, but even for the effective implementation of NCFE policy and purpose.

The divisive factors of exile have resulted in:

1. The absence of any Polish National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
2. The absence of any Rumanian National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
3. A prolonged split (a year and a half) in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia;
4. A precariously balanced Hungarian National Council.

Other factors have produced a Bulgarian National Committee which is unsatisfactory from almost every point of view. Genuine and productive reform of the BNC will doubtless prove a prolonged and difficult process. This leaves the NCFE with a National Committee for a Free Albania, which could stand reform and which, nevertheless, has always been closely supervised by Americans and with the three Baltic Consultative Panels which were established entirely by NCFE in the first instance.

No single national council during its existence, with the possible exception of the three Baltic Consultative Panels, has demonstrated itself as being capable of even reasonably efficient and just administration of its own affairs. In each case NCFE has been obliged to step in, at first exercising only cursory supervision, but at present attempting to introduce systems of closer administrative and financial control and supervision, which, unless made sufficiently rigid, will doubtless prove as unsatisfactory as they have been in the past.

Where national councils do exist branches or sections of these councils which have demonstrated their effectiveness can and should be used where practical to implement a secondary level NCFE projects and policies. For the primary implementation of these projects and policies, however, a more permanent, ordered and controllable apparatus must be found, one not liable to the naturally disruptive tensions of exile life. Even where unity in a national council can be produced, experience has proved that its continuity is at best tenuous and unreliable, with the result that the council becomes a delicate and cumbersome apparatus which must subordinate the achievement of practical goals to the maintenance of this temporary and elusive unity.

Further factors disclosed by our survey reinforce the conclusion that if NCFE is, as we believe it must, effective

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develop its interest in the European refugee field, a new instrument must be found. These factors also tend to indicate roughly some of the qualities which this instrument must possess.

1. No single exile organization engaged in refugee activity, including those receiving NCPE support, is consistently good in all of its local branches. This observation applies also to those organizations receiving NCPE supports which do not fall into the national council category (the AFGR and Romanian Welfare).

Conclusions:

In its activity in the European refugee field, NCPE must be completely free to select the organizations and individuals with which it may consider it practical to cooperate on any level. NCPE must therefore not be committed to support or to cooperate with any organization in all its parts and must be free to sever connections at any time with any organization or its parts (individuals or sections) with which it finds it no longer practical to cooperate. NCPE must be completely flexible in this operation.

2. The refugee in Europe is confronted with a situation which is fluid in all its aspects. He faces since the closure of IRO, a multitude of uncoordinated agencies, the continued existence of some (the voluntary agencies) is uncertain; the operations of others (the UN and MICHE) remain to be developed fully; the scope and activity of another (the State Department Program) is in the rumor stage. He is uncertain, suspicious and fearful of the new status and intentions of the local national authorities under whose immediate jurisdiction he must live. He faces the after-effects of mass emigration, which, although it ceased some time ago, has deprived him of the most qualified of his compatriots and hence of stable national leadership. For himself, the limited, uncertain and uncoordinated emigration on an individual basis which still exists offers but faint hope for departure from the frontier countries. He faces almost impossible employment conditions, depending upon local situations and seasonal work which often requires his being shifted from place to place as the employment situation dictates. The majority, however, must stay in the camps or on the coasts. He faces shifting camps which are often moved or dissolved by the local authorities. These factors combine to produce a demoralizing feeling of impermanence and insecurity. They are, in turn, aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the countries in which the refugee finds himself, an attitude which frequently approaches hostility and which is not improved by the presence in these countries of embittered expelled ethnic minorities who were once the citizens of the refugee's homeland. The homelander is a deplorable feeling of apathy, hopelessness, isolation and abandonment and a total lack of any sense of direction or purpose.

Conclusions :

1. NCFE's approach to the refugee and his problems must be broad in order that it may impart a feeling of purpose, direction, continuity and security. This approach must have an attractive national flavor which will appeal to the refugee's desire to belong, without encouraging his chauvinistic tendencies, and, indeed, should provide a positive substitute for them. To implement this approach NCFE's instrument in the field must again be supremely flexible but susceptible of close and rigid control. This instrument must be capable of conveying an impression of seriousness, responsibility and constructive interest, thus inspiring a feeling of confidence on the part of the authorities and agencies as well as the refugees.

2. In general it may be observed that in the frontier countries there is a notable lack of knowledge of NCFE's role in support of the admittedly limited and relatively negligible refugee activities in which it is thus far, indirectly engaged. RFE is, of course, widely known and almost as widely criticized for its failure to accept responsibility for its part in the refugee problem. FEUE is usually known, but only vaguely and secondarily, and in many cases the picture of its scope, activities and goals is distorted. There is a dim awareness of FEUE's connection with RFE, but a general failure to draw any conclusions therefrom.

Conclusion :

To engage in refugee activities of any nature or extent without clearly identifying and labelling RFE as the organization ultimately responsible for these activities is a needless and senseless failure to exploit a possibility in the form of enhanced NCFE prestige and greater sympathy and cooperation with the work of RFE and FEUE on the part of both refugees and other active agencies. Particularly from the point of view of RFE's essential relationship to the refugees it is a serious mistake not to do so. Therefore the instrument which NCFE adopts for its work in this field must be identifiable only as an NCFE operation, clearly related to RFE and FEUE.

3. It has been mentioned previously that the international and voluntary agencies tend to regard the exile representatives with skepticism and tend to hold them at arm's length. This attitude seems partially to result from their ignorance of exile politics and their understandable reluctance to become involved therein. Their ignorance and disinterest has in several cases led them to choose refugee assistants and advisors of unfortunate political background and tendencies from the NCFE point of view. Again, however, as mentioned above, the representatives of several of these agencies have expressed a definite interest in having these insuppressible refugee groups somehow organized and controlled.

Conclusion :

Responsible and direct American control would therefore

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do much to dispel this negative attitude and would pave the way for a more positive and productive cooperation between the national refugee groups and the agencies active in their behalf. This control would also it is reasonable to suppose, help to fill vacuums in exile representation of the kind described above.

5. Another weakness of the organizations surveyed in the frontier countries is their almost universal tendency in greater or lesser degrees to discriminate politically or personally in the distribution of assistance. There is no comparison between the extent of this weakness in the tense and unsettled atmosphere of the frontier countries and the more normal environment of the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain. In addition to the injustice of such discrimination, definite opportunities are lost through failure seriously to attempt to win over, through less narrow assistance, elements (such as the Czech and Slovak Separatists, Hungarian extremists and the Schwabs) which now oppose or in the future might oppose the political and national structures which NCSE recognizes and supports.

#### Conclusion :

Again, close NCSE guidance and control are indicated so that injustices may be reduced and broader NCSE aims implemented, rather than thwarted by narrower interests of short-sighted and unenlightened refugee representatives.

- V -

#### HOW NCSE'S INTEREST IN THE POLITICAL REFUGEE PROBLEM MIGHT AFFECT OR LIMIT NCSE'S ACTIVITIES IN ITS PRE- SENT INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS -- THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE & SERVICE. (P.C.S.).

##### A. NCSE's approach

If NCSE is to modify its present instruments and create new ones to manifest its interest in the problem of refugees in Europe, it should first formulate a broad and comprehensive approach to the refugee as a type of person in whom and in whose problems this interest is to be shown.

This approach will, by the nature of NCSE's interest in the refugee, differ markedly from those of other organizations active in the field.

All these organizations, the intelligence agencies, the local national governments, the UN High Commissioner and the voluntary agencies, are interested in the Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole who crosses the border because, respectively, he might be a Communist agent or have information, he is or might be a political refugee or because he is a human being in need. NCSE is interested in him because he is a Czechoslovak or Rumanian

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or Pole -- a citizen of a country whose people were promised at Yalta certain rights and privileges which they have not received because of the violent interference of a Communist Russia. This is also the fundamental theoretical reason for RFE broadcasts to the Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Poles in Poland, etc. The fundamental practical reason is of course the interest of the United States in these nations and peoples as European political factors.

RFE obviously cannot create a military machine capable of liberating the nations of Eastern Europe. It is interested quite simply in promoting the existence of certain attitudes, interests and activities which will one day contribute to the successful fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta. RFE is interested that mothers should teach their children certain truths to counter Communist lies; that workers should react in certain ways to Communist pressures; that students should understand the fallacies of the system which they are being seduced or forced to serve. In short, RFE wishes to direct Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, Poles in Poland and Hungarians in Hungary to act in the enlightened self-interest of their respective nations. The fact that this enlightened self-interest, as supported by RFE, coincides with our own and other broader interests serves only to underline its importance.

We have tried to point out in this report the extent to which the presence and activities and problems of the refugees from NCFE countries in western Europe cannot but be of interest to NCSE. Again, NCSE need not concern itself directly with the feeding, housing, employment and emigration of these people, any more than RFE should itself undertake to raise an army.

This is not to say that NCSE may not find it advisable to continue to use limited welfare funds in its work with refugees. But its principal tasks will be to protect its interests by attempting to produce some order out of the chaos of refugee activities by giving to the refugee and his representatives a sense of direction and belonging which the other agencies active in the field are admittedly unable adequately to provide. Without it, the refugee in Europe almost inevitably sinks into a state of hopeless and isolated apathy. He belongs to nothing but the tense and quarrelsome fraternity of his fellow abandoned. Sitting unoccupied all day, his only activity soon becomes the endless intrigue of the political parties. With few books and less communication with the outside world, and particularly, without constructive leadership and guidance, the parties become almost the only organizations with a national flavor open to the refugee. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that refugee nationalisms become chauvinistic and ideas, of national interest, subordinated to the narrow and petty goals of the political parties.

The voluntary and other agencies and the local national authorities can hardly provide a constructive substitute since they only approach the refugee as such, reinforcing his apathy by their much needed gifts, unable to offer allegiance to anything other than the Churches, opposed or reluctant to undertake any

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attempt at support or guidance of his national tendencies. In all fairness, it should be noted, however, that the current approach to the refugee on the part of all these agencies is a conscious and considerable improvement on the exaggerated and incentive-killing IRO dole system.

But if NCCE approaches the new escapee, as well as the older DK, not as a needy "refugee" but as a citizen of his country who simply finds himself in a difficult position on this side of the Iron Curtain rather than on the other side, it should be possible to appeal to his desire for national continuity and then to some extent appeal to his ideas of his own enlightened self-interest in much the same way that such appeals are provided for the escapee's compatriots at home by RFE.

This approach would also take into account the significant fact that many of the new arrivals, (estimates run as high as 20%) are not real "political refugees". They leave their countries for economic reasons or because they are fed up or simply want to try out the conditions in the West which are described to them as so much superior to those in their homelands. Among these people there are of course many misfits, incompetent s and undesirables. No one should delude himself with a picture of all refugees as worthy, deserving, honest people persecuted by a Communist regime and fleeing for their very lives.

SCFE interests, however, override this unfortunate reality: no individual who leaves a satellite country for any reason whatever should be allowed to fall into such a condition of disillusionment that he should consider returning or even consider sending word of his discouragement home. One such return or report of personal disillusionment can produce a most unfortunate counter-effect to RFE and other Western propaganda. It is an accepted fact that there have been such cases and they are in fact regarded as one of the factors contributing to the present lower arrival rate of new escapees.

Granted this approach to the escapee and the old refugee and DK as a citizen, and the desire to promote among these people the idea of concern for their real self-interests, the idea which most adequately describes this approach is that of the "consulate".

The functions of a consulate are to protect the interests of the citizen abroad. Material assistance is provided only in cases of emergency -- the consulate's principal task is to take an active interest in guiding the citizen to those local agencies best able to satisfy his wants and to suggest approaches and attitudes most likely to benefit him during his stay abroad. The most glaring and urgent example of the need for such consular guidance may be found in the necessity for protecting the Czechoslovaks in Germany not only from the political opposition of the Germans, but from their own senseless, destructive and short-sighted political maneuverings.

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### B. Modifications of NCFE's present instrument.

As indicated above, it will of course be useful and desirable to incorporate in this approach and in the new instrument, (FECS), designed to implement it, features, (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument which have demonstrated their effectiveness. However, also as mentioned earlier, in order to assure the freedom of action and freedom of choice of the new instrument, certain modifications of these features of the present instrument will be required.

1. It will first of all be necessary that those features (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument considered suitable for incorporation in FECS be separated administratively and financially from their headquarters, since FECS will operate on the basis of the following procedural approach:

Such individuals or organizations will be incorporated in FECS on one primary basis -- their proved effectiveness in the past and/or their promise of effectiveness under NCFE guidance; their retention will be dependent upon their ability successfully to continue this performance. This is of course basically an adaptation of part of the approach which has enabled RFE and RPS to make effective use of qualified exile personnel for the attainment of their own goals.

2. For the undirected and uncoordinated system of almost complete lack of control which has hitherto generally prevailed in NCFE's relationship to refugee activities and exile organizations, will be substituted a system of control which will preserve at least the illusion of freedom through the incorporation of qualified exile organizations and individuals and the selection of others to fill gaps which such organizations and individuals have proved unable to fill. The fact of their ultimate responsibility to NCFE should be made abundantly clear. That this is in no way incompatible with the atmosphere of an illusion of freedom in which FECS's exile employees will be working is amply proved by the success of RFS national desks. It will be made clear to these employees that they should consider themselves to be working as consuls and consular assistants under a civil service program. They should be given the impression that the responsibility for the success of FECS in its attempts to assist the refugees lies in their hands, and that its failure for reasons of favoritism or dishonesty would constitute an evasion of their patriotic responsibility.

### C. Functions and potentialities of FECS.

The underlying purpose of FECS is of course to serve the policies and basic interests of NCFE.. we have tried to indicate the extent to which its work with the refugees would be directly to these interests. Other interests which FECS would have the purpose of serving might be :

- 1) The prevention of misunderstandings on the part of the

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refugees and other agencies active in the field regarding all phases of NCPE work, and particularly that of FECS and RFE.

2) The attempt to keep the NCPE European Representative and the RFE Political Advisor informed of exile political developments in Europe which might affect their operations and to control and guide these developments wherever possible to the advantage of NCPE and RFE. For example, NCPE, designed to wage political warfare on a broad front, was recently almost outflanked in Germany. Some organized means of preventing such occurrences, or at least of reporting their development, should be provided.

1. The primary function of FECS is to approach the refugee as a citizen and by so doing to try and set up conditions and introduce a spirit which will make it possible for the refugee to escape from the apathy which is his traditional lot and become a positive factor in the struggle of the West. FECS will attempt to perform this function in several ways:

a. Normal consular activity. FECS will engage in the normal consular activities of interventions on behalf of refugees with the local authorities, voluntary agencies, international agencies such as the UN High Commission, or wherever else it might effectively and usefully do so. It will provide translations, verify documents, advise refugees on all relevant matters in conjunction with these other agencies and generally interest itself in all aspects of the refugee's life and problems.

b. Material assistance. While material assistance should be kept to a minimum, it must be recognized that FECS will be required to provide more help of this kind than the normal consulates, since the physical condition of the person appealing for assistance will almost invariably be poor. Other organizations are better set up to provide such material needs, and FECS should of course attempt to cooperate with their already extensive efforts to prevent duplication. But FECS must have available emergency welfare funds in order to escape the accusation that it is a featherbed or another operation to "use" the refugee.

c. Refugee morale. The fundamental practical target of all FECS operations should be the improvement of refugee morale. This morale depends on two factors: the refugee's frame of mind and the atmosphere in which he lives.

The refugee's frame of mind should be improved in several ways. The first of these is the citizenship approach which is to govern all FECS operations. It should be manifested as soon as possible after the refugee's arrival and clearance, if only in the form of a greeting and briefing from someone not interested in milking the refugee of information and asking him questions. This briefing might include a description of the voluntary agencies which might assist the refugee, a description in simple terms of his legal status and, of course, of the FECS program, including the names and addresses of its representatives in the camps or

areas to which the refugee might be sent. The refugee might also be saved considerable disillusionment if at this time he were given a carefully worded description of the difficult economic situation in which he will be obliged for some time to remain. For example in Germany, the refugee should be told of the presence of large numbers of refugees from the East Zone and of the German government's natural desire to assist them. A representative of one of the voluntary agencies suggested to us that the refugees are rarely made to understand that they are initially accepted into countries faced with unusually severe economic problems.

Secondly, the refugee's frame of mind might be improved by the installation of reading rooms containing publications in the national languages, some of them geared especially to the refugee and his problems. For example, some of the useful exile-organized refugee aid Committees such as the Anglo-Rumanian in London and the Hungarian Office in Munich produce regular bulletins containing local legal and employment news of interest to the refugee. Such bulletins should receive a wider distribution and others like them should be created. In this connection, it should be noted that RFE publications are not reaching the refugees, among whom our survey has indicated they would be most welcome and are much needed. Also in the reading rooms, radios should be provided in response to the desire, frequently expressed to us, of hearing RFE and other broadcasts in the national languages.

The organization of constructive meetings, discussions and national celebrations would provide an outlet for refugee enthusiasm if they were supervised by competent leadership. Similarly, FECS should stimulate and possibly provide the means for self-help work projects, such as the painting of barracks, the planting of gardens and the organization of sewing circles, language courses or discussion groups, etc....

The second factor involved in the question of refugee morale is that of his environment, the atmosphere in which he lives. To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved in which he lives. To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved by the organization, as noted above, of constructive outlets for the energies now dissipated in chauvinistic and petty political internal and international strife, both of which have at times led to murder in the camps.

FECS major effort in this direction, however, should be directed toward bridging the gap in a constructive manner between, on the one hand, the voluntary and international agencies and the local authorities; and, on the other, the essential national interests of the refugee. Occasionally representatives of the voluntary agencies have mentioned the fact that refugees sometimes cooperate with them best when the situation has been explained by one of their national representatives. For the reasons of suspicion on the part of these agencies cited earlier, this is not always done. FECS could provide a responsible instrument for so doing.

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The principal gap which exists at present between the various authorities and the refugees is over the question of assimilation, or, as it is usually described, "integration" and "adaptation". There is a natural feeling on the part of these agencies and authorities that in view of the restrictedness of emigration possibilities, the only alternative open to many of the refugees is to adapt themselves to their environment. The refugee, in, however, quite understandably reluctant to do so: He plans to return to his country when it is liberated "next year"; he is sure he will emigrate shortly; particularly in Germany, he may strongly dislike or distrust the local population. There is likewise of course the determining factor of employment possibilities -- one of the aspects of the refugee problem with which FECS cannot and need not directly concern itself.

Indirectly, however, FECS can contribute to its resolution. For example, in Germany, the problem of national schools, which has been a score point, suggests a suitable compromise. The refugees have struggled to maintain full-time national schools for their children, sometimes succeeding with HGFH and other external support, while the local and international authorities have insisted that refugee children attend German schools. The refugee must be made to understand that it is in his children's interest to allow them to adapt as long as the essential elements of national culture can be preserved. This requirement could be met in some instance in already being met by extra-curricular instruction in the national language, history and culture.

In the same way the refugee must also be shown that by refusing to adapt, he may make of his national group an ingrown, despised and distrusted minority. If on the other hand, he shows willingness to adapt to the situation in which he finds himself, he is much more likely to obtain not only physical but psychological benefits in the form of broader practical experience, with the possibility that this experience may one day be of use to him in his own homeland. This is a difficult point which the mass of refugees will be reluctant to grasp. Some of their more intelligent leaders, however, -- the kind which FECS hopes to employ -- might be able to explain its importance. Also, the experience of one camp director in Trieste has proved that it is not impossible to get results through healthy national competitions; if the Romanians paint their barracks, the Hungarians feel more obliged to paint theirs. While probably ineffective among the hardened older refugees, shame might successfully be used among new arrivals, as for example, "If you say you intend to return after liberation, what will you tell your friends that you did for Poland in emigration?" That you helped create friends for Poland by keeping the neatest barracks in Germany --- or that you sat around a pigsty all day doing nothing? That you refused to take a job in a construction company because it was beneath you, or that you helped to build a stronger and more prosperous nest to hasten the day of liberation?" Arguments of this kind were not wholly without effect on strikers, and shirkers, during the war. Doubtless they have been tried by representatives of the voluntary agencies, etc., but FECS representatives should

have additional authority for such arguments by virtue of their membership in one division of an organization actively working in many ways for the liberation of the refugees' homelands.

Also, just as the presence of extracurricular schools, by their guarantee of the preservation of the essentials of national culture, encourage attendance at German schools, so the manifestations of NCFE's similar interest on the local level through FECS might liberate the refugee from the anxiety for maintaining his traditions within his smaller group and so diminish his reluctance to attempt some measure of adaptation. In this connection the citizenship approach applies particularly, since FECS must demonstrate that NCFE is not only generally and broadly interested in keeping satellite culture alive (in the DIO and ~~and~~ at FEUE), but also in keeping the individual refugee living outside a camp, in touch with his compatriots and traditions not only through personal contact but by making available to him publications in his language, etc; In this way the refugee might be encouraged in his slow process of adaptation to strange and in many cases hostile environment.

This is again a vast problem affected by many factors far beyond the scope of FECS or NCFE. It is almost certainly true that if more respectable and worthwhile jobs were available to refugees, much of their apparently nationally based aversion to adaptation would disappear.

But if FECS makes emphasis on adaptation one of its major points of policy, and makes this fact clear to the local national and international authorities, and then actively implements this policy as suggested above, it will almost certainly find itself most sympathetically regarded by these authorities.

2. These are but a few of the functions which FECS should be able to perform; anyone regularly active in the field could probably suggest many more. There are, however, certain broader potentialities for the development of this instrument which might be briefly suggested here.

In the first place, it should be possible to gain some advantage, beyond the fact that they come to us, from the presence of the refugees in the West. FECS might be able to produce such an advantage.

To brand this approach as hopelessly idealistic is to ignore the extraordinary practical results achieved at Camp Valka from July 1951 to January 1952 by the German camp commander at that time, von Homeyer. When von Homeyer, with no previous experience of these problems arrived, Valka was in terrible situation. Knifings and riots were frequent and the Nuremberg police were not only on constant alert, but a force of 28 men was maintained at the camp.

Von Homeyer began by calling the national representatives together, and it took him two weeks to get them into one room

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Finally, when they had assembled, he gave them hell and explained it would be a waste of time for them to try to alter or influence the situation in their own countries from Valka. He told them he believed the cause of many difficulties was the personal interest of many of the leaders in preparing the way for big roles at home after liberation. He then presented his idea of forming the first European community at Valka. He told the national representatives he had no support from Munich — he was on his own and asked for their help and cooperation. One by one they came to him and agreed.

Von Homeyer's technique of making friends with the people, with whom he soon acquired an excellent reputation, was an effective instrument in swaying their national committees to his side, for aware of his popularity, they hesitated not to show active cooperation. As a means of delegating self-administration of the camp to elected representatives, von Homeyer was about to establish a small parliament when he was recalled by reason of a German administrative snafu in which favoritism played a part. Just before his departure, the Nuremberg chief of police approached him and asked that he request the withdrawal of the permanent squad, which the chief felt was no longer required due to the enormous progress in camp behaviour.

After von Homeyer's replacement by an unimaginative bureaucrat, the situation at Valka relapsed into silence. Yet his influence lingered, and delegations from the national groups visited him, urging him to return to the camp. Later, when the situation became even worse, delegates from the German administrative personnel at Valka also came to urge that he return. This was just before our talk with him, and the employees brought with them tales of the latest knifing. Obviously von Homeyer's idealistic and far-sighted approach to the refugee problem had made a profound impression not only upon the refugees themselves but on Germans associated with the problem in a practical way.

Von Homeyer's European community approach might be borne in mind in connection with NCPE's espousal of the policy of Federalism. Similarly the RFE's citizenship approach might have the potentiality of being broadened to provide grass-roots emphasis on this aspect of NCPE's policy. The idea of European citizenship for refugees is not original or new, but it might provide NCPE and RFE with a useful propaganda weapon.

Von Homeyer's realistic and productive idealism perhaps also indicates the necessity for at least trying to uncover and support more positive elements than the usual exile political leaders, even though it is believed likely that the latter will be able to regain control of their political machinery and return to power after liberation. For this reason, not to attempt the production of more constructive leaders and attitudes more amenable to NCPE and US interests is an example of infatuation with "hard-boiled" realism for its own sake.

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Another potential use of FECS might be in conjunction with certain proposals advanced by individual RFE staff members. These call for the use of refugees as sounding boards for group reactions to new broadcast themes and as sample groups for testing basic satellite country attitudes. Refugees helped by FECS might be more interested in contributing to such projects; conversely, FECS efforts to restore their feeling of belonging to the struggle for liberation of their countries would be immeasurable assisted by this opportunity for them to assist in the sharpening of this potent "sister weapon".

-:-:-:-:-:-

NCFE and RFE exile employees who by and large form a privileged class among the refugees as a result of being relatively well paid, should be encouraged to contribute small but regular amounts of their salaries on a voluntary deduction basis to refugee welfare. Some RFE employees have already done this on an informal basis and have expressed a desire to do so on a regular deduction basis but have been discouraged by the information that this would involve a violation of RFE regulations. In view of the success of a similar welfare fund instituted by the Polish Labor Service Companies attached to the U.S. Army in Germany, it is recommended that this possibility be investigated. FECS might prove a sure means of channeling such aid to the refugee.

-:-:-:-:-:-:-

The form for refugees in Turkey established by the Gazi Khan Bessolt Committee which has an international aspect resembling Von Homoyer's approach would qualify for inclusion in the FECS program, although no specific proposal can be made until after a detailed field survey.

#### D. Proposed organizations of FECS.

1. FECS will be a service section of NCFE under the directorship of NCFE's General European Representative. General policy headquarters will therefore be in Paris as well as the operational subsection responsible for the administration of the FECS branches in England and France. This will have the advantages of removing the general policy headquarters from the immediate tensions and pressures of the frontier countries. The Director will have the task of general policy coordination of FECS with other NCFE divisions and of gaining on a high level the acceptance of and cooperation with FECS by the national and international authorities concerned, perhaps by emphasis on the contribution which FECS could make to their efforts to resolve the refugee problem.

2. Operational headquarters under the direction of a FECS Deputy Director will be in Munich, the point closest to the refugees' geographical center; from Munich the German refugee reception center at Volka and the Austrian equivalent at Wels are each within half a day's drive, or less.

3. The Deputy Director will be responsible for the implementation on the operational level in all areas of all the functions of FECS in line with policies established by the Director. The Deputy Director will be responsible for general operational policy coordination with the national and international authorities and voluntary agencies locally active.

4. The Deputy Director will have six Area Assistants :

- 1) North Germany, center Bonn or Hannover.
- 2) South Germany, center Munich and Wurka.
- 3) US and French zones of Austria, center Salzburg and Wels.
- 4) British Zone Austria and Trieste - possibly two assistants
- 5) Italy, center Rome.
- 6) Paris, London and Benelux, center Paris.
- 7) Greece and Turkey; probably will require one area assistant each. However, no field survey of the refugee situation in these two countries has as yet been possible.

The duties of these Assistants will be to provide guidance, inspiration and close administrative and financial supervision of the various national sections of FECS in their respective areas. These Area Assistants must have considerable administrative and financial latitude in order that FECS may possess the high degree of flexibility essential to its effective exploitation of the fluid refugee situation. They must be fully informed of all employment and emigration possibilities, projects of voluntary agencies, etc. Their cooperation and relations with local authorities and active agencies must be close and their relations with them always excellent.

4. FECS will, in each area where it is to operate, form National Sections. These National Sections will be recruited and appointed by FECS. They may or may not include individual representatives of organizations already locally active. In rare cases in the frontier countries, but almost entirely in England and France, proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees will become the local National Sections. In cases where no proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees exist, the FECS Area Assistant will recruit with the help and approval of the Deputy Director a National Section Chief, who will in turn, with the approval of the Area Assistant, recruit his own paid assistant or associate where necessary, and as many as local volunteer section member-representatives as may be required by the amount of work, geographical distribution of the refugees, etc.

5. Possible organization of FECS national sections :

England

- a) Albanians : special case

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- b) Bulgarians : Two Karaboyanova as Section Chief
- c) Czechoslovaks : Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee
- d) Estonians : Association of Estonians in Great Britain
- e) Hungarians : Section Chief to be recruited and appointed  
possibly Father Henkay-Hung
- f) Latvians : Latvian Welfare Association
- g) Lithuanians : Lithuanian Association in Great Britain
- h) Poles : Polish Ex-Combatants Association
- i) Romanians : Anglo-Romanian Refugee Committee
- j) Yugoslavs : Yugoslav Welfare Committee (special case)

#### France

- a) Albanians : special case
- b) Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France
- c) Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques
- d) Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien
- e) Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois
- f) Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France
- g) Association Lituanienne de Bienfaisance
- h) Polish Section Chief and probably two paid assistants  
to be recruited and appointed.
- i) GROMAH
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be  
recruited and appointed (Special case).

#### Germany

- a) special case
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- c) Czechoslovak Section, paid Associate and one paid  
assistant to be recruited and appointed.
- d) Estonian National Committee
- e) Hungarian Office, plus Hungarian Relief Action

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- f) Latvian National Committee plus Latvian Red Cross
- g) Lithuanian National Committee
- h) Polish Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- j) Yugoslav Section <sup>Chief</sup> and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

#### Austria

- a) Special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- c) Czechoslovak Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of AFWR Salzburg representative, Mr. Knilski.
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of Colonel Bojovic (Special case).

#### Trieste

- a) special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- c) Czechoslovaks - none
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief and one paid assistant to be appointed. Possible use of Prof. Ternay as half-time Chief with full time assistant.
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

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- 1) CAROIAN Trieste delegate and staff (Mr. Di Demotrio)
- 2) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Italy

- a) Special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- c) Czechoslovaks - none
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Note : In cases where no national section is provided due to the insignificant numbers of refugees present or probable, it is assumed that the Area Assistant could handle the needs of special arrivals or cases if existent.

E. PROPOSED ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FREE EUROPE CONSULAR SERVICE.

1; Salaries

a; Americans

1) Deputy Director	\$ 12,000.00
2) 5 Area Assistants at \$1,500.00 per year. (the duties of the sixth Area Assistant, covering France, Britain and the Bonelux countries might be performed by a member of the staff of the Paris office).	37,500.00
3) Executive Secretary to Deputy Director	4,000.00

4) Bookkeeper (possibly locally hired)	\$ 3,000.00
5) Quarters and living allowances (35% rough estimate : \$ 19,775.00)	\$ 56,500.00
	19,775.00
Total American Salaries	\$ 76,275.00

b. Exile Salaries

1) 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs and Associates at \$ 250 per month	\$ 3,500.00
2) 10 paid assistants for National Sections at \$ 150 per month	1,500.00
Total salaries Exiles and American	\$ 77,775.00

2. Travel in Europe and Maintenance of cars at \$200 each for 7 American staff members (#4,400.00 per month)	16,800.00
3. Two Annual round trips U.S. - Europe	2,000.00
4. Rent, stationery, telephone, etc. for Deputy Director's office	6,000.00
5. Expenses (travel, stationery, postage, etc. for 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs at \$50 a month per person)	8,820.00
6. Monthly subsidies to Exile-Organized Refugee Aid Committees	
a. Bulgarian Refugee Committee - London (Mrs. Karastoyanova)	3,000.00
b. Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee (London)	3,000.00
c. Estonian Consulate - Welfare Division (London)	2,000.00
d. Latvian Welfare Association (London)	2,000.00
e. Lithuanian Welfare Committee (London)	2,000.00
f. Polish Ex-Combatants Association (London)	10,800.00
g. Anglo-Roumanian Relief (London)	5,400.00
h. Yugoslav Welfare Committee (London) through B.A.F.C.Y.	2,000.00
i. Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France (Paris)	4,800.00

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j. Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques (Paris)	\$ 4,800.00
k. Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien (Paris)	3,000.00
l. Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois (Paris)	10,800.00
m. Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France (Paris)	3,000.00
n. Association Lithuanienne Bienfaisance (Paris)	3,000.00
o. ROMAN (Paris)	4,800.00
p. Estonian National Committee (Germany)	6,000.00
q. Hungarian Office and Hungarian Relief Action (Germany)	20,000.00
r. Latvian National Committee and Latvian Red Cross (Germany)	7,000.00
s. Lithuanian National Committee (Germany)	8,000.00
t. CAROMAN (Trieste)	1,200.00
<b>7. Material costs of implementation of FECS Program (extra-curricular schools, reading rooms, meetings, subscriptions, charts, posters, publicity)</b>	<b>\$50,000.00</b>
<b>8. Welfare Fund</b>	<b>\$50,000.00</b>

Total Annual Budget for FECS \$417,695.00

Capital Outlay in Initial Years of Operation

a. purchase of 5 cars at \$1000 each for use of 5 area assistants in frontier countries	5,000.00
b. 10 one-way trips U.S.-Europe for transportation to job of American personnel (and wives and children where they exist) \$500 each)	5,000.00
c. Furniture and equipment for Deputy Director's office	700.00
Total	\$ 10,700.00

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Mary AugustineRoger L. Bull

Information

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division  
SUBJECT: Report of Ex-King Michael's Interest  
in Rumanian Refugee Unity

1. Transmitted herewith is a report which will be of interest to the NCFE in its current negotiations with the Rumanian refugees.
2. The views of the King with regard to the Iron Guards and others listed, are in agreement with those of this Division.
3. It is requested that arrangements be made for representatives of the NCFE to meet with personnel of this Division to discuss the current negotiations and utilizing this recent information.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH  
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Attachment

bris - Bureau

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24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: G. Popescu-Botosani; J. Radovan;  
J. Aron

1. This office has no objection, with respect to security, to the employment of the three subject Rumanians, who have requested State Department assistance in getting on the ECFE payroll.
2. However, it is recommended that no action be taken on their behalf until the present attempt to settle the refugee situation is completed, in order to avoid any appearance of ECFE's favoring one faction.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH  
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

4 Attachments  
Biographies

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**SECRET**  
Security Info. July 22, 1952

To: George Lofton  
From: Leonard I. Stamm

For your information I enclose a copy of our contract letter with Leland Stewe. I send you this because of the considerable discussion of the case.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate your consideration and help in this whole affair. It really pulled us out of a deep, deep hole. My very best.

Leonard I. Stamm

Attachment in TONIC file (add 17 July)  
Attachment in AFCE file (add 17 July)

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B.

File

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

Attached is a memorandum which it is suggested be shown to the Director of Central Intelligence in time for a scheduled meeting of the Director, members of CIA, and members of the Board of the National Committee for a Free Europe on Monday, 4 August.

L. K. WHITE  
Acting Deputy Director  
(Administration)

Attachment  
As stated.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - ADD/A  
1 cc - IO/TOMIC  
1 cc - CIO  
2 cc - RI

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DRAFT  
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Richard's memo

Security Information

21 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: DCI

SUBJECT: Study of Working Relations Between NCFE and CIA by  
IO and AS/S

1. Following upon its assumption of responsibility for the NCFE project, IO, aided by the AS/S, has undertaken over the past two months an investigation into the NCFE/CIA relations. It ~~is apparent~~ <sup>has concluded</sup> that these relations have deteriorated to a dangerous extent and <sup>that</sup> the Agency has lost control of the NCFE activity to a degree it can no longer ignore.

2. In general, the fundamental defect in the relationship is that the NCFE has refused to recognize the legitimate duties and responsibilities of CIA for the policies, financial administration, and security aspects of the NCFE, and the latter has persisted in regarding itself as virtually autonomous. The secondary weakness in the situation has been the inadequacy and confusion of the procedures which were developed to maintain control over <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ evaluation of NCFE's activities.

3. As examples of the consequences to which these weaknesses have led, the following are cited: (here should be discussed illustrations of specific problems such as those in your para. a.)

4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CIA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitions and procedures have been reduced to a Memorandum of Agreement which has been prepared by CIA and submitted to NCFE for study. A copy of this Agreement is attached as Appendix A. The Senior Vice President of the NCFE has ~~reviewed~~ reviewed this Agreement in detail and has prepared his comments thereon, a copy of

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which is attached as Appendix B. In brief, these comments bear out in instance after instance the assertions set forth above as to the fundamental difficulties with which we are faced in the administration of this project.

5. The PRC already has reviewed this Agreement and the 1953 fiscal year budget submitted by NCFE. The Committee is so convinced of the weakness of the present situation and the need for its improvement along the lines suggested by the Memorandum of Agreement that it has refused to approve the budget of the NCFE until a satisfactory Memorandum of ~~and the budget resubmitted~~ Agreement is concluded in the manner prescribed therein.

6. There is, ~~thus~~, a choice between ~~basically~~ <sup>only</sup> two alternatives, viz., CIA either has a duty and responsibility to ensure, affirmatively, the conduct of the NCFE program in accordance with CIA's own special mission and general responsibilities as a Government agency, or

The NCFE is an autonomous organization operating independently of any Government direction and control, in which event this Agency should formally indicate the responsibilities with which it has been charged in this connection.

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13 July 1952

Dear Mr. Leah:

I would appreciate it if you would deliver  
this envelope to Mr. John C. Hughes, 100 Worth Street,  
New York.

Thanks,

/S/ Tom Braden

2203 Foxhall Road, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.  
17 July, 1952

Dear John:

I was glad of our meeting day before yesterday and I am looking forward to seeing you soon again.

Here is a memorandum I addressed to A. a short time ago which I would like you to read because it may give you some indication of how we are trying to get to work here. It is for your eyes only.

I talked to Min on the telephone this morning and he seemed in an extremely bellicose mood. This bellicosity, replete with references to "little people who get in his hair", "from now on I'm dealing only with the top", and "otherwise there are going to be some resignations here" is difficult for me because I am partly Irish, and as able to resign as the next man. I have succeeded, however, in maintaining my Scotch heritage to the core so far, and since you assure me that none of this is personally directed at myself, or people like Bill Durkee whom I persuaded to come and help me or to the job that I am sincerely and honestly trying to do, I will try to keep it there. It was nevertheless awfully calming to have a chance for such a good talk with you.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

/s/ r

Mr. John Hughes  
McCarran & Company  
40 Worth Street  
New York, New York

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~~EYES ONLY~~

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. Admiral Miller will call upon the DDCI soon to request more funds for the Crusade for Freedom. At the present rate of expenditure, funds will run out on 31 December.
2. \$488,991 was budgeted for the Crusade this year. We have told Admiral Miller that since the Crusade was unable to live within this budget, we were certain that the Agency would appropriate more money to wind it up, although we have explained that his request was embarrassing because the PRC had expressly approved \$488,991 instead of a larger amount in the belief that less money should be expended this year. We have asked Admiral Miller to provide us with a financial statement of the Crusade cost to date as well as a breakdown of the further amount needed.
3. The Crusade this year has so far cost only a quarter of last year's expenditure and half of the amount expended in 1950. Receipts are up, 140% over last year at this date. On the whole, a much better job has been done to date than we anticipated -- and purely in terms of the amount raised the performance has been superior.
4. There is a good deal of gossip about the use of Crusade funds and I think you should be acquainted with it. Because the Crusade is a rather public enterprise, the gossip has occasionally been sounded not only within NCFE and this Agency but also among "semi-witting" private citizens who have been enlisted for short-term fund-raising on an unpaid basis. The gossip is that a good deal of money has found its way into the private hands of local Crusade chairmen and workers. In one instance, it is said, involving a local chairman in Minnesota, the amount which reached private hands was enough to build a new home. Another story I have heard repeated by different people on different occasions is that in the state of Nevada and certain other locales no money received by fund-raising chairmen last year was ever turned in to Headquarters, and no report ever made. Another item which some

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Security Information

~~EYES ONLY~~

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SIXES ONLY

of the people in the New York office talk about is the payment of \$37,500 to Fred C. Smith, who worked for approximately one month in drawing up a Dimes for Freedom campaign which, as you recall, was rejected as a basis for this year's campaign.

5. No accounting of Crusade funds expended in the field has ever been made, and in a fund-raising campaign it is perhaps impossible to do so. Nevertheless, records involving payments for expense money to private citizens engaged for the duration of the campaign are chaotic. You will recall that Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCPE, refuses to have anything to do with expenditures for the Crusade.

6. Since we are winding up the Crusade this year and will attempt to place it on a more reliable basis through the Heritage Foundation, I suggest that you assure Admiral Miller that funds sufficient to wind up the Crusade will be forthcoming and that you instruct the IO Division to expedite a project granting these funds. I further suggest that in view of the allegations above, which I repeat for your private background information, you keep the position of the Agency faultless by requesting from Admiral Miller a budget in as much detail as possible for the amount necessary to liquidate the Crusade.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division



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Security Information

17 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Deputy Director (Administration)  
FROM: Acting Chief, Administrative Staff (Special)  
SUBJECT: Conference with TPTONIC Management re TPTONIC/CIA  
Agreement

1. On 9 July 1952 Mr. Echols and I conferred with the President and the Treasurer of the TPTONIC organization regarding the fiscal portion of the proposed Agreement to be reached between CIA and TPTONIC.
2. The purpose of the conference was to extend to the TPTONIC management an offer of aid in the interpretation and implementation of the fiscal phase of the Agreement in response to TONIC's request for assistance in this connection.
3. Our statement of the Agency's position may be summarized briefly as follows:
  - a. The Agency is insistent upon obtaining the detailed information regarding TONIC's activities which is essential in order to fulfill the Agency's fundamental policy, fiscal, and security responsibilities. The great size to which TONIC has grown makes it necessary for the Agency to take a closer interest in TONIC's activities than it has in the past.
  - b. Although final concurrence in an Agreement has not been reached by TONIC, it is necessary that revision of the financial budget be commenced immediately if PRC budget approval is to be obtained as soon as possible after a final Agreement has been reached. The budget document must be expanded in order to provide reasonably detailed information not only as to proposed changes from the previous year's activities but also regarding the continuing activities as well. Without this additional information there is lacking sufficient data on which to base the approval of any allotment of funds.
4. The President assured us that a revision of the budget would be undertaken immediately to provide not only the information the Agency requires but also to eliminate incompletely planned, vaguely foreseen requirements. He assured us that the revision would be completed in time to permit a review, prior to its presentation to the PRC, for the purpose of determining that the document attains the standards set forth in the Agreement. The Treasurer concluded that he was sufficiently familiar with the terms of the fiscal portion of the Agreement to be able to satisfy its requirements, but promised to call upon us if he should desire further clarification.

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5. In order to avoid later misunderstandings we set forth briefly the concept of financial control contemplated in the budget section of the Agreement. We noted that the Agency must have confidence that the programs of the various TOMIC divisions are carried out to the appropriate extent proposed in the Agency approved budget since other Agency plans must be synchronized harmoniously with TOMIC's approved program. Accordingly, the principle of establishing an expenditure ceiling for each of the TOMIC divisions is regarded by the Agency as fundamental with which inter-division transfers without Agency approval would be incompatible. We assured the President it positively was not the intent of the Agency to lift managerial responsibility from TOMIC's own hands, and that the controls contemplated by the Agreement are aimed not at stifling managerial activity but rather to the attainment of the minimum checks which the Agency feels it must insist upon in view of the scope and importance of the TOMIC program in the fulfillment of the Agency's own responsibilities and mission.

6. The President expressed his appreciation of the Agency's viewpoint in the matter of financial control although he did not expressly commit TOMIC to its adoption. He did, however, promise to undertake a point by point review of the terms of the Agreement immediately so that the specific areas of doubt or disagreement may be localized and disposed of in further negotiations.

7. This Staff feels that there is in reality no misunderstanding of the Agreement on the part of TOMIC nor any lack of technical confidence to carry out its terms. The problem of attaining and understanding, therefore, comes to nothing more than a determination by TOMIC management to accept the minimum of control upon which the Agency is insistent.

Frederick W. Richards  
Acting Chief, Administrative  
Staff (Special)

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Security Information

ER 3-0917

15 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

**SUBJECT:** National Committee for Free Europe; proposed employment of Mr. Leland Stowe.

**REFERENCE:** Memo from Security Officer to DCI dated 12 January, and attachments.

1. As the result of an extensive consideration of the problem created by the NCFE offer of employment to Leland Stowe, and in light of the adverse information concerning Mr. Stowe's past connections and affiliations with certain organizations, it was decided by the Director upon the recommendations of Messrs. Dulles, Hedden and the undersigned that Mr. Stowe should not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the RFE information collection program.

2. When Admiral Miller was informed today of this decision, together with the reasons upon which it was based, he and his staff immediately proceeded to re-examine the entire problem and within an hour-and-one-half communicated to the undersigned an entirely new proposition concerning Mr. Stowe, of which the following were the principal elements:

a. In line with the Director's decision, Mr. Stowe would not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the information collection activity of RFE.

b. In lieu thereof he would be offered a contract as a "consultant and contributor of information" for a six-months term.

c. He would not be offered a salary but would be placed on a fee basis, and paid according to the amount of work and material which he contributes.

d. Thus he will not become an official of RFE or NCFE, and will not be in such a position as to enable anyone to maintain that he guides the policy of or controls the flow of information to Radio Free Europe.

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2. Subject to prior approval from our security office, Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang will endeavor to secure the services of either Mr. Cy Burgin of the Time-Life organization, or Mr. Russell Hill of the New York Herald Tribune as Chief of the information collection activity of Radio Free Europe. They are both regarded as competent and experienced individuals, and Mr. Burgin has already indicated his interest in this position if it were open.

3. The proposal described in the preceding paragraph was submitted to Mr. Dulles and to Mr. Braden by the undersigned, and they both expressed their approval. Mr. Dulles said that, on the basis of our discussion with the Director, he felt certain that this arrangement would be acceptable from the standpoint of CIA. The Admiral was so advised by the undersigned and expressed himself as being entirely satisfied and very pleased. He undertook to check through Mr. Braden on the acceptability from a security standpoint of Messrs. Burgin and Hill.

4. One other aspect of this matter is worth recording for future reference: Mr. Hedden has stated that he has been well acquainted with Mr. Stowe for many years, having known him in college and having followed his career rather closely. On the basis of everything he knows about Mr. Stowe, Mr. Hedden is convinced that Mr. Stowe is a loyal American citizen and that there would be no real risk in his case on the issue of loyalty as such. In the opinion of Mr. Hedden, Mr. Stowe's past proclivity for becoming involved with left-wing movements (some of them presently regarded as subversive) is not a commentary on his loyalty but rather on his judgment. At times before and during the war he was prone to hop onto popular bandwagons and to take a line in his writings and broadcasts that seemed to be popular at the time. In other words, he is an opportunist by nature and prone to take up causes which appeal to him as having wide popular interest and support as of any given moment. This propensity on the part of Mr. Stowe is not without its professional and commercial aspects.

FRANK C. WISNER

Encls  
References.

FRANK C. WISNER

DD/P-FGW/bjm

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Ray dry

12-07-52

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers on NCCE Views on Yugoslavia

1. Here are NCCE's views on Yugoslavia which you asked for.
2. I am worried about item d) in particular. The other items may be justifiable on the grounds that we have to take care of people in this country, but item d) may seem to be taking unnecessary forward steps.
3. As you suggested, we have asked the State Department for a review of the entire national council policy, and I am sure we will get State's views on Yugoslavia at this time.

*Thomas W. Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

1. Ltr to Allen Dulles from Leonard Stern dtd 7 July 52.
2. Memo dtd 2 July 52 re NCCE views on Yugoslavia.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru DD/P)  
1 cc - CIO  
2 cc - IO/TOMIC  
2 cc - RI

SECRET

DD/P-1752

3-5643

16 December 1952

Jan 53 - 40

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Briefing of Secretary of the Army on 17 December  
on NCFZ and CFA

1. On 17 December, I briefed Secretary of the Army Pace on the subjects of the National Committee for a Free Europe and the Committee for a Free Asia.

2. The briefing covered both physical assets and concepts. Secretary Pace asked many questions, for example:

- a. How did NCFZ handle the problem of Yugoslav exiles and at the same time use the Yugoslavian defection as an argument in its broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries?
- b. How much did the State Department have to say about the day-to-day operations?
- c. The duties of the President?

In addition, he expressed great enthusiasm over the concept of the two Committees and in general for the concept of covert psychological warfare. He interrupted at one point to talk at some length about his belief that while it was essential to continue to draft boys as soldiers and produce rifles, it was just as essential, and in the long run more conducive to ultimate peace, to wage the argument for democracy to a questioning world in a covert manner. He indicated that he thought very little of the government's overt propaganda program and that from what he knew about the government's covert program as conducted by CIA, it was the effective means to the end.

Thomas W. Braden  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

TMW

Dr. 172.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
<b>TO:</b>		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
<b>REMARKS</b>		
Sent to N.Y. 20 July 1952		
<p>To Durkee: I think      the content of      WCCW memo, <del>is</del>      ought to be referred to  <u>Miller, Walsh et al.</u></p>		
<p>Return to E Hill for file</p>		
<b>FROM:</b>		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
14-00000-1 600		
FORM NO. 36-8 SEP 1946		

14-00000-1 600

SECRET

Security Information

14 July 1952

Dr. Miller

## MEMORANDUM

I would certainly be inclined to agree with F.W. on the importance of a dignified "worthy cause" sort of campaign. Moreover I would scrupulously avoid any activity which might cast doubt on the good faith of the Crusade (e.g., "We gave our money for balloons at Christmas — where are they?")

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REL

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**SECRET**

Security Information

ER 3-0732

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom  
(ER 3-0686).

1. Please note the attached inquiry from Tom Braden, in which he raises two questions with respect to balloons. The following are my recommendations on the two questions, respectively:

a. I see no objection to reference by the Freedom Crusade campaign to the use of balloons, provided this is handled with care. By this I mean that it would be all right for the Crusade to refer to its former use of balloons and the effectiveness of this use, and also to say that the National Committee for a Free Europe will, on an appropriate occasion and at the right time, make further use of balloons. It would be wrong and unwise for many reasons to make a flat statement as to the exact time and content of further balloon operations. There is no point in thus telegraphing our punch to the opposition, and it would get us into trouble if we were to be too specific about the timing and subject matter of any new messages.

b. I would be very much opposed to the stunts such as dropping Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums. This is the kind of flamboyant publicity which we have agreed not to undertake this year, and incidentally which makes us look as though we were in the class with commercial advertisers or irresponsible and playful student ~~underground~~, or both. I thought Abbott Westburn had gone to help Ike!

*F.H.W.*

SAMUEL S. WISNER

Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)

ER 3-0686, dtd 7 July

DD/P-528/bjm

Distribution:

Cdr. - addressee w/att

1 cc - ER

1 cc - DD/P et rono

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Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry  
3-0686**SECRET**

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Request for Decision as to whether Crusade for Freedom Campaign Beginning 15 November may use a Dropping of Leaflets Theme in its Propaganda.

1. Admiral Miller of NCFE has appointed a new head for Crusade for Freedom, Mr. Richard Walsh, formerly of the State Department. Mr. Walsh has submitted a new plan for the Crusade for Freedom campaign to begin November 15. The campaign will be based upon the idea of sending Christmas message leaflets behind the iron curtain with publicity that the Crusade for Freedom will use balloons among other methods for this purpose. It was originally contemplated that the Crusade would in fact send balloons as it did last year. Bearing in mind, however, the DCI's warning about using any propaganda device which might give the Soviet a weapon in its bacteriological warfare campaign, we have instructed the Crusade that there will be no actual transmission of balloons.

2. Will it be permissible for the Crusade to publicize the use of balloons, to employ such stunts as dropping the Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums in the United States and to give the general impression that balloons will be one of the ways to carry messages from the American people behind the iron curtain, even though they will in fact not be employed?

3. You will appreciate that an immediate decision is essential.

  
THOMAS W. BRADENChief  
International Organizations Division

## Distribution:

Original - DDCI through DD/P  
cc: ADPC - 1  
CIO - 1  
IO/TONIC - 2  
RI - 2

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RALPH FURKELDNER  
Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT: Follow-up on your report of 26 June 1952 re: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka.

1. The following report of 2 July 1952, is a reply to our presentation to the Admiral of the subject report:

"I have questioned Tom about the matter cited in your letter of 30 June 1952, File Number 4-3039. Tom states that the facts are as follows:

1. By letter dated March 20, 1952, Congressman Robert T. Ross requested consideration for the employment of Captain Oskierka. The latter was interviewed on several occasions, and prospects of his employment were fully examined. After careful consideration, it developed that Oskierka was not useful in any division of our operation, and there was no job for him. He was personally so informed by Tom in a subsequent interview on May 6, 1952, in which Oskierka expressed his understanding of the situation.

2. Under date of May 23, 1952, Congressman Ross again wrote us stating that Oskierka had contacted him again about the possibilities of a job with us. I wrote the Congressman under date of June 5, 1952, telling him that, although we had made every effort to place him, we were unable to offer Oskierka a position.

3. On or about June 25, 1952, Congressman Ross' local secretary telephoned my office inquiring about Oskierka. My secretary referred her to Tom who then talked at some length with Congressman Ross' secretary. He told the latter that we had no position for Oskierka and that we had so informed the Congressman by letter above cited. In the course of the conversation, the secretary inquired as to what suggestions we could offer relative to such a position for Oskierka as would be useful in procuring an extension of his visitor's visa. Tom stated that he might suggest to the Congressman that he might make inquiry in Oskierka's behalf in various government agencies in Washington, stating that Oskierka seemed to have various useful talents which might interest someone other than us.

**SECRET**

-2-

**SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION

4. Tom has never talked with Congressman Ross. Tom did not state to his secretary or to anyone else that Congress an Ross' candidate might be able to get a position with you. Tom states that he knows better for obvious reasons than to make any such suggestion to anyone.

For your more complete information in this matter, a copy of an internal memorandum is enclosed.

Sincerely

/s/ H. B. Miller \*

2. We should like to know if the information you obtained from CIA personnel agrees with this report.

Encls:-1 copy

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

IO/TOMIC : NRV/hka  
Distribution:  
Orig:- Addressee  
2 cc - C/IO✓  
2 cc - IO/TOMIC  
2 cc - RI

Stop

SECRET.

C O P Y

SECURITY INFORMATION

May 27, 1952

Memorandum

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka

There are no prospects for utilizing  
Captain Oskierka's services by the Fund.

I must say that I do not like the behavior of  
Oskierka in again trying to pressure us via Congressman  
Ross. As the attached file shows, he has been most  
courteously treated here; every effort has been made to  
place him; and he has expressed himself as being pleased  
with the treatment and attention accorded him. I personally  
informed him and explained in great detail that his  
background made it impossible for us to use him here.  
He stated to me that he thoroughly understood this and  
that he was quite satisfied that we had examined the pro-  
position thoroughly.

I don't suppose that it can be told to Congressman Ross, but Bernie Marrow has taken his whole story to  
certain of our friends to explore the possibilities of their  
possible interest in him since he stated to me that he is  
single and willing to go anywhere in the world to get into  
the fight.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION/OPC

FROM: AC/RDD/OTS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of New Type of Air Leaflet

REFERENCE: (a) Memorandum for RDD/TSS Subj: Request for Appraisal of Weiss proposal to NCYE of new type of air leaflet dtd 21 June 1952  
(b) Telephone discussion between C/IOD/OPC and AC/RDD/OTS on 3 July 1952

1. Subject proposal has been received and will be established as RDD Ad Hoc Project No. 23.

2. This project will be carried out along the lines discussed in Reference (b), which will require a number of field experiments; therefore, some additional time will be needed for the complete evaluation. Information will be forwarded to you on these trials as it becomes available.

3. It is noted that the samples attached to Reference (a) are approximately 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ " by 8". It is requested that you advise whether or not this leaflet is large enough for applications you have in mind. In the event that it is not, trials will be conducted with larger size leaflets of the same pattern.

L. R. DAILY  
Acting Chief  
Research & Development

LRD:hmg

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

# "CS" RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~6590~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. 6A-50
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4578.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 1790 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

1421

3.	2D24	2000130001
4.	S. Corlett OG/CFK	
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		
11.		
12.		
13.		
14.	RETURN TO 6A-50	
15.	IP/ARD Rm <del>6590</del>	

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129  
432393

~~432393-718~~  
~~6A-50-134590~~

FILE NO. Wash CIA AD 37

DOCUMENT: \_\_\_\_\_

FOLDER: 12 ~~2~~

PAGE: \_\_\_\_\_

BOX: 2

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED



January 1953-December 1953

ICFE

~~CLASSIFIED~~~~RESTRICTED~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (checkmark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/I0/1				NO. I 0 - 4 - 7	
				DATE 31 Dec 53	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CIO				TWB	POW:
2.					
3.					
DD/P		31 Dec 53	18 Jan	CJ 7	I am sorry that through an oversight the 10 Dec 53 memo to DCI attached was neither routed through nor a copy sent to you.
4. C-I O					TWB
5.					DD/P noted
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
6.					

SECRET

5-1126

31 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Gregeoire Gafencu

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI dtd 10 Dec'53, same subject

1. Both Whitney Shepardson and Bernie Yarrow were unable to persuade Gafencu to remain in the United States. He left for Paris 12 December 1953.

2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed it would not be possible for NCFS to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFS policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. All the meetings between Mr. Shepardson and Gafencu were entirely cordial.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief,

International Organizations Division

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**SECRET**

Security Information

12 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Acting Chief, International Organizations  
Divisions

SUBJECT: Grigoire Gafenou

1. I have just spoken to Whitney Shepardson and he reports that he and Berndt Yarrow have been unable to persuade Gafenou to stay in the United States. Gafenou gave many reasons for wishing to live in Europe. He is leaving for Paris this Saturday.
2. As a result of his own decision, Gafenou was informed that it would not be possible for NCPE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCPE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafenou will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.
3. Mr. Shepardson stated that all of the meetings with Gafenou were entirely cordial.

WILLIAM P. TURKEE  
Chief  
IO/Branch 1IO/Branch 1:WMD:jb  
Distribution:  
Addressee - orig & 1  
IO/Branch 1 - 2cc  
CIO - lcc  
RI - lcc

Gafenou (tr. 12 Dec 4 attachment  
(tr. from 8 Jan 25 Nov 53 to  
Gafenou) returned to DCI

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Security Information

204N  
54

UNCLASSIFIED	RESTRICTED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)			
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
<b>TO</b>		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief/IO Division		
2			
3			
4			
5			
<b>FROM</b>		INITIALS	DATE
1	Exec. Asst. to DCI	JSE/dr	12 Jan 54
2			
3			
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL		<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION		<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT		<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE		<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE
<p><b>Remarks:</b> The Director has noted the attached memorandum. He indicated to me that he had seen "something else on this". Do you know what he refers to?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JSE JSKarmen</p> 			
SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

8079

Executive Hospital
5-0728

30 December 1953

Noted by FBI
"Jan 54"

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report that Sensitive Files covering Emigre Activities may have been made Available to Senator McCarthy

1. The following report was made available to us by Eugene Lyons, former President of the American Committee, who still actively participates in Committee activities as a policy advisor. Mr. Lyons is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends for Russian Freedom, and he obtained this report from an unnamed source in the American Friends' organization.

2. A man named Verbitsky (fau), living in Munich, has somehow managed to obtain the personal files of Georgi Mueller, the KTS safe-house keeper who was arrested as a Soviet agent last fall. These files contain, among other things, a number of letters to Mueller from Gregori Klimov, an influential emigre who is head of the emigre group known as the League of Post War Defectors. These letters involve Klimov in Mueller's activities, and implicate many other emigres. Verbitsky attempted to turn these documents over to unnamed authorities in the field; when he was ignored by these authorities, he mailed the entire parcel to Senator Joseph McCarthy.

3. The American Committee naturally considers that this correspondence, which, if it exists, no doubt contains a great deal of that unfounded denunciation and allegation which is so typical of emigre expression, may involve the American Committee as well as other matters of particular concern to the Agency.

4. The Chief, SR Division, has been made aware of this report.

*Thomas W. Budde*  
Thomas W. Budde  
Chief/IO

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<del>CLASSIFIED</del>	<del>RESTRICTED</del>	<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	<del>SECRET</del>
(LEADER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)			
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
<b>TO</b>		<b>INITIALS</b>	<b>DATE</b>
1	<i>Refugee</i>	<i>JKR JAN 1</i>	
2	<i>Mr. Thomas Braden</i>	<i>1028 K</i>	<i>2/26</i>
3	<i>Bunche</i>	<i>Res.</i>	
4	<i>Desires with me</i>		
5	<i>Braden 1028 K</i>		<i>2/26</i>
<b>FROM</b>		<b>INITIALS</b>	<b>DATE</b>
1	<i>CG/ME</i>	<i>St/S</i>	<i>31 Dec.</i>
2			
3			
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL		<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION		<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT		<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE		<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE
<b>Remarks:</b>			
<i>3 - 5. Have a phone call about this. Will put on agenda. We are about to engage Bunche in major research project Relates to major liaison units in cooperation with Agency units which will include Hart What will do or what they</i>			
<b>SECRET</b>		<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	<b>RESTRICTED</b>
		<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>	

SUBJ:

30 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRADEN

1. Professor Richard V. Burks of Wayne University is chairman of a small team of scholars engaged in a study of the European satellites.
2. The findings of this team are being given as the content of a course on the mid-European area. They are also, I believe, being broadcast.
3. The time of Professor Burks and his group is being purchased by the Mid-European Study Center which is, as you may know, under Mr. Stetson Holmes.
4. As yet Burks has no definite plan for the publication of his findings. Manifestly, the kind of book which would emerge from his research would have to receive some sort of subsidy. As you know, books of this sort, if they are considered important enough, are published as loss leaders by university presses. Also, as you doubtless know, university presses are in pretty straitened circumstances these days. If the Wayne University Press -- the normal place for the publication of Burks' book -- were to consider publishing the book, it might be able to publish it only with outside assistance. The figure would run probably between \$1500 and \$2000.\*
5. In my opinion Burks is one of the most competent, if not the most competent man in the United States in this general field of investigation. Anything he turns out will be about as good as it comes. Although I have not seen any of this most recent work, my hunch is that it will be enormously valuable to the policy-maker and us estimators when the time comes for some deep thinking and critical decisions about the European satellites.
6. I thought you might be interested in the above, and with a little poking around yourself might feel inclined to give the venture whatever kind of boost seems appropriate.

*Sherman Kent*

SHERMAN KENT  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates

\* P.S. The proven way to get the best work out of a scholar is to have him know that it will be published in normal course of events submitted to the critical judgment of his peers.

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PD/P 7643

1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Current activities and behavior of Grigoire Gafencu.

REFERENCE: Paris 0615 (IN 37959) dated 28 November 1953

1. The reference telegram from Paris contains a recommendation that NCFE do what it can to prevail upon Gafencu to come back to the United States and engage himself in certain activities which may be of some use and value to NCFE. The following information was obtained yesterday from Mr. Tyler who is familiar with the background of the reference message.

2. Mr. Tyler stated that Mr. John Hughes has become somewhat concerned about the activities and behavior of Gafencu in Europe, and more especially in and around Paris, and although he does not believe that a major issue needs to be made of this matter, he is firmly of the opinion that Gafencu is not doing anything useful for the NCFE in Europe and that the net effect of his activities is somewhat to the disadvantage of the interests of the United States. Gafencu is believed to be maintaining a rather close association with Guy de la Tournelle (sp?) and his wife, who are described as "very sour apples and bitter opponents of EDC." Gafencu is also reported to have been involving himself with certain businessmen in France in a series of questionable oil promotion schemes. He is also reported to have been engaged in organizing a kind of information center in emigre circles and to be selling this information to Agence France Presse. Moreover, Gafencu has been selling himself and "throwing his weight around" on the basis of representations and strong intimations that he is a close and intimate friend of Mr. Allen Dulles. His utterances in this regard are regarded by Mr. Hughes as highly indiscreet, the more so since he appears to be living and entertaining on a scale sufficiently lavish to suggest that he is being provided with substantial funds -- well above the allowance granted to him by NCFE.

3. Mr. Hughes, as well as the Paris Station, fully appreciates that NCFE is not in a position to force the return of Gafencu to the United States. At the same time, he believes that NCFE should do

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- 2 -

all that it can to get him out of Paris and he recommends that a strong invitation be extended by NCFE to Gafencu to return to the United States, and that this invitation be coupled with a statement to the effect that in view of budgetary considerations and the very marginal value of Gafencu's activities in Europe, it will not be possible for NCFE to continue his stipend unless he returns to the United States and engages himself in activities more useful to the program of NCFE.

*FW*

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Original: C/IO

cc: DCI

C/AE

C/SE

P. S. Since dictating this memorandum, I have received a report from a well-informed Rumanian source to the effect that Gafencu has returned to the United States within the past few days for the purpose of remaining here indefinitely. (The fact of Gafencu's return to the US has been positively established, and it is possible that within the next day or so confirmation will be obtained concerning his longer-range future intentions.) My Rumanian informant has told me that the real reason for Gafencu's return was an urgent request from Malaxa, who feels that he requires Gafencu's present in the United States to assist him (Malaxa) in government circles, etc. My Rumanian source is prejudiced against Malaxa, but has maintained contact with Gafencu notwithstanding this, and is convinced that Gafencu is still on Malaxa's pay roll and subject to Malaxa's demands for this reason.

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29 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: The League of Free Rumanians

1. Correct title: The League of Free Rumanians.
2. The League has no offices but Barbu Niculescu is using the late General Radescu's address at 47 East 61st Street, New York; telephone Plaza 9-5540.
3. Its officers and executive committee are attached under Tab A.
4. Barbu Niculescu is Secretary General.
5. The League now has no offices and insofar as we know has discontinued publication of its bulletin. It is generally rumored that the organization is supported by Malaxa and it is presumed by knowledgeable people that in particular Malaxa supports Niculescu and Mihail Farcasanu, the two most active League officers, as well as Malaxa's nephew George Palade, who is a doctor in scientific research with Rockefeller Institute in New York.
6. Attached is a letter from Panuch to yourself dated 2 November 1953, your memo to Chief, SE Division and his reply, which you requested, as Tab B.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organisations Division

Attachments  
Tabs A and B

CIO:TWB/eh  
Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/1  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

SECRET

Lang's file on this  
has been in A/E for  
3 weeks. Do you  
want to go ahead with  
Pardele?

14 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLAIN)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Edward W. Barrett

1. I had a conversation with Ed Barrett on Friday, 11 December, who called to tell me about recent developments in respect to an Inter-European Radio Press Committee. He described the history of Hans Colressen's participation, with which you are familiar, and he went on to say that the two-fold objective at present is to get some sort of cooperation among European nations for broadcasting a frank discussion of foreign affairs in each other's countries, and secondly, to enlist the same sort of cooperation for a column which would appear in various countries, perhaps including this one, written by different people and discussing each week some aspect of foreign policy differences which might exist between and among countries.
2. The idea seems to me a pretty good one. Its principal asset is that it will allow the airing and discussion of issues among nations other than by diplomatic means.
3. Barrett pointed out that he is now putting Colressen definitely in a back seat, that he will soon come to us as a good responsible board of directors and officials. He said that he had enlisted Bob Lang's support and Bob had suggested to him that NCIO give the Institute a grant. Barrett said the Institute needs \$25,000 to keep it going while it finds suitable leadership. I said that I would discuss the above with you and I would look forward to hearing from Mr. Lang.

Signed: EDWARD W. BARRETT

EDWARD W. BARRETT

Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO/TB/ah

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
 1 cc - DCIO, C/Io/1  
 1 cc - CIO  
 1 cc - RI

11 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

VIA: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (CIO/C)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Lee Pennington

1. On Friday, 11 December, I had a conversation with Lee Pennington, formerly of the CIO and recently appointed Director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion.

2. Pennington was most cordial. He showed me a letter which he had written to the members of the Americanism Commission of the Legion in which he dismissed charges against CIO based principally on an attack by Kurt Glaser. The arguments he used in his letter he had drawn from briefings by this Agency. He thinks that this will be the end of the matter and that members of his Commission will no longer press for investigation of NCAC and CIO.

3. I took this opportunity to brief Pennington thoroughly on the World Veterans Federation which the Director had previously mentioned to him and about which he had had a little information, most of it false. He had been under the impression that we had something to do with it but that it was a left-wing outfit which we were investigating. At the end of our conversation he told me that he was thoroughly satisfied with the information I gave him and that he would take two steps in accordance with my request:

a. He would notify the Ford Foundation that the Legion looked upon the World Veterans Federation as a worthwhile outfit and would certainly not criticize the foundation if it were to make a grant to the organization.

b. He said he would prevent any attacks on the organization coming from Legion members in being given serious consideration. He said that this could be taken care of by referring all such attacks to the Americanism Commission for study.

THOMAS W. MCGINNIS

Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TMK/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressees

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - CIO/1

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

~~SECRET~~

11 OCT 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: RIC Summary Reports

REFERENCE: Memorandum from C/10, dated 17 November 1953,  
Subject as above.

The appropriate SE Branches and Staffs have read the RIC Summary report for October 1953, which you forwarded to this Division as an attachment to referenced memorandum. We have found the report well prepared and useful, both for SE Headquarters and for our field personnel working on propaganda projects. We would therefore appreciate your sending this Division two copies of subsequent RIC monthly reports, one of which will be retained by SE, while the other will be sent to our Athens Station.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON  
Chief, SE

Addressee: 2

~~SECRET~~

SECRET  
Soviet Information

4 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO DIVISION  
SUBJECT: "News from Behind the Iron Curtain" - Mail Subscription for Mr. Arvo Tuominen  
REFERENCE:  
a. OSSA-1632, 20 Nov 1953  
b. Memorandum to WE/PP-1 from IO/Branch I, 8 Oct 53  
c. Memorandum to IO/TOMIC from WE/PP-1, 28 Sept 53  
d. Memorandum to IO/TOMIC from WE/PP-1, 6 June 53

1. A recent dispatch from the Stockholm Station (reference a) reports that Mr. Tuominen is not receiving Subject publication. In light of reference memorandum b, which states that he has been on the mailing list since June 1952, it is apparent that there has been some slip-up in the distribution channels of this publication. A check of address indicates that Mr. Tuominen's address is the same as given in reference d.
2. It is requested that appropriate measures be taken to insure that Mr. Tuominen will receive this publication in the future. Please inform WE/PP-1 of the action taken regarding this matter.

PAUL BIRDSEALE  
C/AE

discussed orally! (not sent)  
sent sterile version to  
Whitney.

River End, n. Roberts Lane  
Arlington, Virginia  
4 December 1953

Dear D'Arcy:

This is in reference to your telephone call of this afternoon. I have just had a full report on the matter of the seven visitors.

I am afraid you have got yourself on the hook on this one and nothing can be done about it except to go through with the bargain you made. This bargain, the documents indicate, was to bring the seven Czechs over here and take the responsibility you assumed when you signed the seven declarations of support affidavits.

Now having gotten that bad news off my chest, I hasten to add that I do not think this is going to be burdensome to you. You are doing a real public service, as I shall explain in a moment, and all of us will do our level best to help you.

I realize that you did not think you were assuming the responsibility for seven people. It is clear, however, that everyone else thought you were, and I think it is simply too late to change it now. The Czech regime is attacking the United States for its handling of emigres; it is attacking the camps which you have seen; it is pointing up the general hopelessness of an emigre's lot and the dullness and dreariness which you have noted at first hand. This little trip of our seven friends has set all the refugee circles in Germany gossiping. It is exciting news. It is undoubtedly known behind the Curtain. To call it off now would make a real difference -- not just in terms of the Crusade, but in terms of what refugees think about the United States and United States citizens.

The procedure from now on seems to lay itself out as follows: The seven refugees will arrive sometime during the month of December. This arrival date is important. WICG has made every effort to expedite it so that they can come in December, and only overwhelming reasons ought to dictate a postponement. They will go to work and do whatever you, Clyde and Bob want them to do on behalf of the Crusade. After their work for the Crusade is over, all seven doubtless will wish to remain in the United States. We will all then jointly try to find jobs and places for them. The visas are good until next April, but if they can find jobs here it will probably be possible for us to secure special legislation for them to stay on indefinitely.

- 2 -

Now as to the questions you raise in your letter of November 24th. The National Committee for a Free Europe should certainly look after these people when they arrive and while they are here except insofar as they are directed by you to take up certain activities on behalf of the Crusade. The National Committee should also cooperate in trying to help you in your effort to find jobs for them when their tour is over, and I am sure the people there will do their best. I am sending a copy of this note to Whitney and I know that he will cooperate to the fullest.

As to your second question, I think the expenses of all seven ought to be paid for out of Crusade funds. They are over here on behalf of the Crusade and you are the one who asked them to come.

On the third question, as I indicated above, I think it would be a great blow to United States policies in this field if they were to turn around after their duties were over and limp back to a dusty refugee camp.

I think this is the way the whole thing ought to rest now and I do most earnestly urge you not to be too concerned about your personal responsibilities. We will all be lucky if we have to tackle no tougher problems.

Sincerely,

Mr. D'Arcy Brophy  
American Heritage Foundation  
245 E. 46th Street  
New York 17, New York

cc: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

CIO:TWB/eh  
Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - Mr. Shepardson  
1 cc - IO/Brl  
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

SECRET  
SOLICITORS' OFFICE  
11/15/1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Romanian Emigre Organization

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, SE from Deputy Director (Plans), dated 5 November 1953 - Subject: Romanian National Council

1. In agreement with Mr. William Durkee of International Organizations Division, I share your view, as stated in paragraph 3 of the referenced memorandum, that Mr. Anthony Panuch should discuss the problem of the organization of Romanian refugees with the ECPE rather than with this Agency. We were informed by Mr. Durkee that Mr. Panuch is fully aware of the ECPE position that the refugees should resolve their own differences before presenting a solution for the consideration of the ECPE. Mr. Durkee also informed the Romanian Branch on 13 November that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Whitney Shepardson who concurred in the view stated above.
2. With reference to Mr. Panuch's statement that "the League in its present state is a useful operational vehicle," memo traces reveal that fourteen members are Iron Guardists, five are suspected communist agents and four admit that they are on Nicolae Malaxa's payroll. Because of this unsavory composition, it appears unlikely that the League as presently composed would be useful operationally.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON  
Chief, SE

cc: C/PP  
C/IO/PP  
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)  
General Counsel

SECRET

Security Information

7267

5 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern European Division

SUBJECT : Romanian National Council

1. The attention of the ES Division and Messrs. Braden and Durkee is invited to the attached copy of a letter which I have just received from J. Anthony (Joe) Panuch concerning certain recent developments in the Romanian emigre situation and with particular reference to the "League." You will note that Mr. Panuch has indicated that if we are interested in the League and its possibilities, he would be glad to talk to us about it.
2. I believe that the addressees of this memorandum will recall the significance of Mr. Panuch and the role which he has played recently, including his visit to me of about two or three months ago. (I was annoyed by and considered as a minor breach of confidence the reference which was made to my name in the material which was published concerning a communication addressed to King Michael, although I did note that this contained no representation that I had taken a position one way or another concerning the League or the proposed formula for resolving differences between the two principal Romanian emigre factions.)
3. As regards the proposal of further conversations between Mr. Panuch and either myself or some other spokesman or representative of this Agency, I continue to be inclined to the view that these are matters which should be taken up by Mr. Panuch with Mr. Shepardson and not ourselves. If after consultation between the ES Division and IS Division it is agreed that this is the correct position, I should appreciate it if Mr. Braden or Mr. Durkee could talk with Mr. Shepardson about this letter and obtain his views for my benefit. I would then be in a better position to reply to Mr. Panuch's letter — presumably telling him that in line with my earlier advice to him, I still would recommend that he raise these matters with NCRA and not CIA. I could also add that I had been troubled by the appearance of my name in the published material referred

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET  
SAC-117

- 2 -

to above and cite this as an example of why I would prefer to stay out of the matter directly.

b. A copy of this memorandum is furnished to Mr. Houston because of his knowledge of the background of the old Malaya allegations, and the difficulties which Malaya is capable of creating for the Agency in the future. It will be recalled that Malaya has charged that CIA has injected itself into the matter of his immigration status; that I have wrongfully involved myself in his affairs -- including some ridiculous charge that I kept him from getting a lucrative contract with the California Steel Company, etc., etc. -- none of which had any foundation in truth whatsoever.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)  
Letter to Mr. Wisner from  
Mr. Panush dated 2 November 1953.

cc: C/PP /  
C/IO/PP  
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)  
General Counsel

SECRET

Ref ID: A6568

C

G

P

Y

Law Offices of  
J. ANTHONY PANUCH  
60 East 42nd Street  
New York 17, N.Y.

November 2, 1953

Hon. Frank Wisner  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Confidential

Dear Frank:

Re: Romanian National Council

This is to bring you up to date on the aftermath of our conference of June 17th with respect to the above. On my return to New York I took the following steps:

1. Personally submitted the settlement formula to Nico Georgeescu for mediation with Visoiu and Cretzianu, and to Larry DeNeufville for the information of the NCUR. Nico, in my opinion unwisely, took the position that the formula was not negotiable.
2. Directed the League to transmit the formula to King Mihail for his information and action and, pending final acceptance or rejection to "lay off" visavis Cretzianu, Visoiu et al. This was done.
3. Summoned Malaxa and the officials of the League to (a) inform them of the false charges made to the White House by Malaxa against you in 1951 and to demand their formal retraction; and (b) insist that Malaxa immediately make good on his commitment to General Radescu that he set up an independent "no strings attached" budget for the League -- an undertaking then six months in default. Malaxa agreed to comply with both demands and asked for time to the beginning of September when he hoped he would be released of the strain and mental anguish incident to his chronic immigration proceeding. Malaxa defaulted on both promises.
4. I issued an ultimatum to the leaders of the League to the effect that irrespective of my friendship with General Radescu, unless they disassociated themselves completely from Malaxa and any semblance of his influence -- direct or indirect -- I would resign as the League counsel. This severance of their relationship with Malaxa has been accomplished after a stormy showdown session between Farcescu and Niculescu and Malaxa.

- 2 -

Mr. Frank Wiener

The League in its present state is in my opinion a useful operational vehicle in any Romanian situation in which the utilization of skilled and experienced personnel (notably Parcemenu and Niculescu) of conservative and non-Marxist political orientation is indicated. If you are at all interested in it as such, I should be glad to talk to you about it.

With best regards,

Faithfully,

/s/ Joe Farnoch

Honorary President  
PHILIP A. HROBAK  
President  
P. O. Box 100  
Middletown, Pa.

Vice-President  
MICHAEL RINCIAK  
333 Schuylkill Ave.  
Monessen, Pa.

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Pittsburgh 10, Pa.

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National President  
Slovak Catholic  
Cadet Union

## The Slovak League of America

A Cultural and Civic Federation of Americans of Slovak Descent

Organized 1927 in Cleveland, Ohio.

## OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PHILIP A. HROBAK  
P. O. Box 100  
MIDDLETOWN, PA.

October 31, 1952

Mr. Kurt Glaser  
1717 - 30th St., N.W.  
Washington 9, D.C.

Dear Mr. Glaser:

I have read your article on Radio Free Europe - THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO "FREE EUROPE" - and I must say that it agrees with the facts as I know them. It is regrettable that such knowledge or information cannot get to the masses of the American public. I have visited the State Department and the National Committee for a Free Europe several times during the past two years to upgrade them of the situation, but it seems they do not choose to do much about it. I had my information directly and indirectly from Slovak refugees in Germany and Austria....and London.

In December, 1951, the ASSOCIATION OF SLOVAKS IN GREAT BRITAIN, sent a "Memorandum" to the Nat'l Committee for a Free Europe in New York stating, in effect, the very things your article contains. The personnel of RFE in Munich was given in toto. At that time 31 program editors were employed by RFE - 29 Czechs and 2 Slovaks (renegades). Of the 29 Czechs employed - 27 were SOCIALISTS of one brand or another! The memo mentions who they were....and I still have that list. Should you want to use it, you are welcome to it.

I have long been convinced that it is not in the ~~interests~~ interests of America or other free countries to employ pseudo-agents and left-wingers in the RFE, the Voice of America or in other governmental agencies. I simply would not trust them. Your article reflects the charlatans in RFE or used by the RFE and I certainly would recommend its publication. I, for one, certainly would!

Sincerely,

*Philip A. Hroba*  
P. A. Hroba

S t r i c t e n t .

I read with attention and interest the article "The 'Russia First' boys in radio 'Free Europe'", by Mr. Kurt Glaser.

Having no documentation on hand in order to verify all particular affirmations contained in this article, I can express my entire adhesion as to its general line. I lived in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1946 and I knew the policy of the "National Front" Government in Prague at that time from my personal experience.

In order to understand the Marxist tendency of some present politicians grouped in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", it is necessary to point out that the Czech National Socialist Party of Mr. Beneš, Mr. Zenkl, Mr. Ripka, Mr. Stran-sky, etc. formed, on June 25<sup>th</sup>, 1945, the "Front of Working People" with the pro-Communist Social Democratic Party of Mr. Pierlinger, Mr. Lauschman and Mr. Major and with the Communist Party of Mr. Gottwald. That "Front" constituted the closest ring of socialist solidarity and common action within the "National Front" Government composed of two more parties: the Czech Catholics and the Slovak Democrats./See the article "Let us say the truth!", by Dr. Michal Zibrin, former Deputy of Slovak Democratic Party in Prague Parliament, published in "Jednota", on October 29<sup>th</sup>, 1952, Middletown, Pa./This ring of the three Czech socialist parties is responsible for the evolution in the policy of Czechoslovakia until February 1948.

The Government of the "National Front", of which Mr. Zenkl was then Vice-Premier, Mr. Ripka Minister of Foreign

Correspondence; Mr. Stepanek; Minister of Justice; Mr. Pernick; Delaporte  
to M. O. on mixed brigades in labor camps in Czechoslovakia.  
April 1948, Mr. Comptroller of the Presidency of the Slovenské  
Národného rada in Bratislava: I visited a great deal that was  
being erected in North-Slovakia, in Bratislava. I met two of  
my friends who were working there as political prisoners and  
I managed to speak with them.

At about that time, Mr. Jan Pernick published in America  
his book "Czechoslovakia"/International University Press, New York/.  
On page 120 he says: "The so-called Bolshevik danger, a bogey for  
many nations, was taken easily in Czechoslovakia, because the  
latter was free of very vestige of feudalism and its democracy  
was too all-embracing and successful, that there remained no class  
whose dissatisfaction could lead to the acceptance of Communism  
as a possible remedy for it."

...as in the very time, when the "National Front" Govern-  
ment was eliminating Slovaks and Czech patriots by mostly Communist  
People's Courts and was imprisoning them in "Labor camps", i.e.  
Pernick was playing in the USA the role white washer of Communism.

For all these Gentlemen would like to change their tone.  
But the testimony of Czech Communists themselves are convincing  
them of double dealing. At the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia"  
is infected even now by "fellow-traitors", it has been proved  
by the "hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the  
administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal  
Security laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States  
Senate, 80th Congress, First and Second Session on Economic

activities of personnel attached to Embassies and Consulates under Soviet domination in the United States.July 9,1951-February 5 and 7,1952.United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952.No.57249.

On page 7 one can read the testimony of Mr.Joseph Ignac Lohnir,agent of F.B.I.Speaking of Mr.Ervin Hunk,former organizer of Czech Red Espionage network in USA,Mr.Lohnir said:

"Mr./Mr.Hunk/told me that we had a very-well-organized underground movement which was giving them a lot of headaches, more than the National Council for Free Czechoslovakia,with its political prestige and its chairman,Peter Zenkl.

"We are not afraid,"he said,"of Zenkl and his organization because we have there our men who even hold higher positions and we can render them harmless whenever we wish."

The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia",against a strong opposition of anti-Communist Czechs and Slovaks,has been recognized by the National Committee for a Free Europe as a representative body of Czech and Slovak refugees.In this quality,it is a recruiting office for the personnel of the Radio "Free Europe".

Washington D.C.November,1952

*Jozef A. Mikus*

Former diplomat of the Czech-Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague /1935-1939/,  
Former Charge d'Affaires of Slovakia in Madrid /1940-1944/.  
Former Counsellor of the Presidency of the Slovak National Council in Bratislava 1946-1948/.

16-A Sunday World-Herald

Omaha November 2, 1952

## Radio Europe 'Houses Reds'

### Station Got Millions From Americans

By Dr. John B. Crane

Frankfurt, Germany. "You would do well to make an investigation of Radio Free Europe," a prominent Washington lawmaker advised me a few weeks ago as we were having tea together near Heidelberg. "I have just returned from Munich," he continued, "where I inspected both the facilities of the Voice of America and of Radio Free Europe. I was much impressed with the Voice of America set-up and find they are doing a very good job.

"But when I called at the plant of Radio Free Europe I got such frosty reception I could hardly believe it. They tried to be polite but were obviously delighted when I left. I figured maybe they had heard of my vigorous anti-Communist campaign when I ran for re-election."

**Makes Headlines**  
Within the past month at least three other visiting American officials have tipped me off that I ought to investigate Radio Free Europe. The climax was reached today when a Washington investigator suddenly appeared at my apartment for a chat and casually announced he was headed for Munich. When I inquired why, he replied:

"I want to inspect Radio Free Europe."

During the past week Radio Free Europe has twice made headlines in leading German periodicals. One important weekly paper, the *Rheinischer Merkur*, devoted an entire page to the problem of Radio Free Europe.

**70 Millions from Americans**  
American readers will doubtless remember with what high hopes this radio broadcasting station was started two years ago under the sponsorship of outstanding private American citizens such as Gen. Lucius D. Clay, former American Military Governor in Germany.

The purpose of the new broadcasting station was to send programs behind the Iron Curtain to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries to encourage them to hold out against their Communist Governments.

Millions of Americans welcomed this new weapon in the cold war against communism and contributed 70 million dollars for its support, according to the German press.

#### Anti-German Propaganda

The money was to be spent not only for building and equipping a broadcast station, but also for financing the escape of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain and giving them jobs at the new station in Munich.

Now come leading articles in the German press charging that Radio Free Europe is heavily infiltrated with Communists and that pro-Communist, anti-German propaganda is being fed to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The well-known German weekly, *Christ in Welt*, states that seven members of the Czech Department of Radio Free Europe have recently been arrested on suspicion of espionage, while one member, after working for several months, was found to be a Communist agent and fled over the border into Czechoslovakia with important personal records of Czech emigrants' families.

#### 'Saw the Light'

The German paper names names and places. For example, it charges that the executive editor of the Czech Division of Radio Free Europe, Pavel Tigrid, was editor of an illegal Communist paper in 1932, known as *Haló Noviny*.

It charges, further, that during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Tigrid co-operated closely with an important Communist leader, Fucik, who had become editor of the Communist paper *Rude Pravo*. Tigrid was a contributor to the Communist Central Party organ when the war ended in 1945.

Shortly thereafter, however, he "saw the light" and fled to Germany as a refugee. Soon he was executive editor of the Munich radio station fighting communism.

#### Demand Shake-Up

The German paper further mentions we name five other prominent employees of Radio Free Europe who were, earlier, Communist Party members or who today have close relatives in important Communist Party posts in Czechoslovakia.

The Germans are demanding a drastic reorganization of Radio Free Europe. This seems to be on the point of being realized. It is reported that 25 employees of the organization have already resigned, and that Executive Editor Tigrid (alias Paul Dietrich) has submitted his resignation.

It is to be hoped that the "housecleaning" now in progress will put an end to the many ugly rumors that have been floating around about Radio Free Europe for the last several months.





23 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Monseigneur John C. Kirk

1. You asked me by telephone for a report on subject, who is domestic prelate on leave from the Savannah-Atlanta diocese in Georgia.

2. Monseigneur Kirk was formerly secretary to Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, Bishop of the Savannah-Atlanta diocese, and also his secretary while Bishop O'Hara was Apostolic Nuncio to Rumania from 1946 until O'Hara's official expulsion in July of 1950. (NCIS has been reliably informed that Kirk remained behind in Rumania disguised as a Swiss tourist. He visited many of the imprisoned hierarchy but eventually escaped. This report is without objective verification.)

3. Because no single member of the Rumanian hierarchy escaped, Kirk was appointed as president of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe. The headquarters of the Mission is now Passeggiata del Gianicolo 5, Rome. Monseigneur Kirk resides at Via Panama 110, Rome.

4. While in the United States in 1952 as personal delegate of Cardinal Tisserant to the convention of the association of Rumanian Catholics in America, Kirk visited the office of NCIS. Members of the staff met with him on five occasions and made the following estimate:

As a prelate on leave in a southern diocese, Kirk can be classified as a religious liberal interested in the betterment of various classes and, particularly the Negro. In Rumanian politics, he vigorously resisted the influence of the iron guard. Evidence of this is that in 1952 Kirk moved the headquarters of the Mission from Madrid, where it was located at Calle de Serrano 30, because of continuing attempts of the iron guardists to use him for political purposes.

5. A detailed account of the principal purposes and scope of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe which Kirk heads is available

- 2 -

here. Highlights are:

- a. Roughly 150,000 people under his jurisdiction.
- b. Mission centers have been established in Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Trieste, Spain and France.
- c. Kirk is assisted by thirty priests located in the above areas.
6. Kirk is now in the United States and intends to return early in November. He is visiting NCFE in New York next week. His former chief, Archbishop O'Hara is now Nuncio for Ireland with headquarters in Dublin.
7. Statements made by Monseigneur Kirk in visits to NCFE together with extracts from correspondence are available if you should wish me to scan those and form an estimate of my own.

Very truly yours,

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

IO/BRI:WPD-TwB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressees  
1 cc - IO/BRI  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

19 October 1953

Jamming of western broadcasts to Russia began sporadically in 1948 and was well established by early 1949, first against VOA then also against BBC. Satellite language program jamming began first from Russian stations and then from jamming stations located in the Satellites proper. When RFE transmissions began in 1950, the organization and equipment were available for the new target.

At the present time, the organization for jamming - including the transmitters, the monitoring stations to watch for the undesired programs, and the control network to direct the jammers to the target - is apparently integrated throughout the Bloc, with a certain amount of cooperation between countries. That is, programs directed to one Satellite country may be jammed not only from within the country but from Russia and from neighboring Satellites.

At least some of the jammers are closely controlled so that efforts to evade them by changes in frequency or schedules are frequently met by a prompt reaction on the part of the jammer -- within a minute or less.

The extent of integration of the total Bloc jamming system makes it very difficult to separate the effort contributed within the Satellites. However, it is presently estimated that about 900 transmitters are in the jamming effort within the Bloc, and these appear to be fairly well distributed throughout the total of the frequencies that are being used at any given time. Therefore, at times when RFE is broadcasting to the Satellite countries with a considerable number of frequencies, there are undoubtedly hundreds of transmitters jamming these frequencies.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT

19 October 1953

The effectiveness of the jamming is difficult to assess quantitatively from the few available observation locations within the Orbit and from the fan mail received. However, in general, it is apparent that jamming is most effective in large cities: approaching 100%. In rural areas, the picture varies from time to time and from place to place, but it appears that a considerable proportion of the programs to the Satellites can be received. For example, the RFE monitor in Vienna reported that, at that location, the medium frequency Czech broadcast from Holzkirchen on 719 kc was practically 100% jammed while only about 50% of the shortwave Czech programs were not intelligible. The Embassy in Warsaw reported in May that while VOA programs were unintelligible, RFE programs were "often intelligible."

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL  
SUBJECT: Salary Information on NCFE People

1. Subsequent to Mr. Durkee's memorandum to you of 1 September 1953, which we discussed this morning, I learned that Mr. Jullies discussed with Mr. Shepardson the need for the information as to the salaries of NCFE people. Very likely this conversation was held pursuant to your own talk with the Director.
2. In any event, we have received precisely the information requested by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 6 October, and I have forwarded it to Win Scott.
3. I think your effort has been successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/SrI  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Dr. Francois Kase  
REFERENCE: Letter from Dr. Karel Kase to Mrs. Dulles

1. Dr. Francis Kase has had the following relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Committee for a Free Europe:

He has never been an agent of CIA, but has been used from time to time by CO/Contacts for translations etc., and is now being paid between \$150 and \$200 per month for subsistence by CO/C.

In December 1952, IO Division referred this man to the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Unfortunately, he did not fit into their research pattern, but they think he is an extremely capable man.

2. Unless the Director wishes to instruct NCFE to hire Dr. Kase, I suggest Mrs. Dulles send the attached reply.

Signed, THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment

Suggested reply  
to reference. *See Chrono.*

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee

2 cc - IO/BrI

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Security Information

004/4

14 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Vienna Conference with Ambassador Joseph Flack

1. On 2 September, representatives of RFE and VOA met with Ambassador Joseph Flack and solicited his comments on reported unrest in Poland, and the utility of RFE and VOA Polish broadcasts.

2. With reference to internal disturbances and partisan activities, Flack stated that there have been "absolutely none" in recent weeks, and added that earlier reports of unrest following the June uprisings in East Germany were proved to have been without foundation as a result of relatively unrestricted survey action then taken by numerous representatives of U. S., British and French diplomatic missions in Poland. He expressed his conviction that there is no significant underground organization in Poland which might be considered as an immediate asset by the West, and emphasized his belief that serious disturbances would not occur as long as the present Soviet control mechanism retains its power and the Soviet armies in Poland and East Germany go unchallenged. The bitter lessons of World War II, particularly the abortive Warsaw uprisings, and lack of confidence in the Polish emigration definitely discourage active resistance. The Poles increasingly tend to resent the action of the emigre leaders, regarding them essentially as symbols of failure, and, Flack feels, will undoubtedly develop new leaders from within the country when the time comes for action.

3. Flack carefully distinguished resistance as an immediate asset from resistance as a potential asset. He expressed the belief that the Catholic Church still offers the strongest and the best organised base of resistance in Poland as it is looked upon as the only symbol of continuity and solidarity with the past. To this he added his own appreciation for traditional Polish spirit of independence and Christian orientation, and emphasized his belief that Polish hatred of Russians and communism continues to mount. Unfortunately, similar sentiment persists with reference to Germany. Fear of German occupation or seizure of Polish territory continues to play a prominent part in Polish thought and is cleverly utilized by the Communist government in its propaganda effort.

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Security Information

4. Fleck expressed certain misgivings with reference to the character of RFE and VOA broadcasts, emphasizing his conviction that Western radio broadcasts should do nothing to compromise the position of the Catholic Church in Poland, always taking as guidance the attitude and statements of the Polish clerical leaders themselves. He strongly urged that all possible steps be taken to maintain the present volume of broadcasts into Poland as a means of preserving hope and belief in the inevitability of Soviet communism's collapse.

15/

Sherman D. Lash  
Executive Secretariat, DC/P

Attachment

**SECRET**

Security Information

25 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT TO DCI  
SUBJECT: Attached Letter from William H. Smyth

With reference to the second paragraph of the attached letter, the following information will answer the question:

Mr. Smyth's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Relations was reprinted by the National Committee for a Free Europe. It appeared in "Progled", a monthly mimeographed newsheet, which is published in Serb, Croat and Slovane, and contains statements etc. made regarding Yugoslavia by prominent leaders, reprints from articles on Yugoslavia etc. It has a limited distribution (2-300) to Yugoslav emigres in this country, and its purpose is to keep the Yugoslav emigration in this country informed. It is indicated in the newsheet that the statements reprinted therein do not reflect the views or opinions of NCFE.

Attn: THOMAS W. BRADEN  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (Mr. Long)  
1 cc - IO/BrI  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED   RESTRICTED   CONFIDENTIAL   TOP SECRET  
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION)   (TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DD/P 5288  
**OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO	INITIALS	DATE
1 DD/P		
2		
3 CIO - 1028-K		
4		
5		
FROM	INITIALS	DATE
1 CIO	TWB	25 Sept
2		
3		

APPROVAL    INFORMATION    SIGNATURE  
 ACTION    DIRECT REPLY    RETURN  
 COMMENT    PREPARATION OF REPLY    DISPATCH  
 CONCURRENCE    RECOMMENDATION    FILE

**Remarks:** The attached reply was received from Mr. Shepardson in response to my request for them to study prospects for broadcasts to the Baltics. Reference your letter of 30 July to C.D. Jackson.

SECRET   CONFIDENTIAL   RESTRICTED   UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4  
 SEP 1947

16-CAB48-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

5788

September 14, 1953

917-1

Dear Mr. Hadwood:

A short time ago the question was asked of us whether RCFE would recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the Baltic states. The question was made the subject of several papers which were prepared for, and circulated to, and thereafter discussed at three meetings of the RCFE policy committee.

Following these discussions, the RCFE position is as follows:

Broadcasts of the RFE type (i.e. the type to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), directed at the three Baltic countries, would be mainly advantageous to the United States in terms of RCFE's objectives. There are even stronger arguments for starting such broadcasts at once than there were for starting them two years ago. However, now, as during the 1951 discussions, the problem arises whether such broadcasts (Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) cannot -- without damage to diplomatic usage -- be handled by the Voice of America. The fact that Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations has never been recognized by the Government of the United States would appear to remove the restraints under which the Voice of America must operate where the local government has an American diplomatic mission accredited to it.

If the Voice of America can transmit Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we would not want to compete with them and would consider it preferable that they should do the job with the whole prestige of the non-recognition policy of the United States Government behind them. If we knew for certain that the Voice was not going to handle the task (which would be a different one and in addition to what we believe to be their present transmissions in the Baltic languages) then we would add the Baltic nations to the list of unfinished business to which RFE must direct its attention whenever sufficient resources become available.

However, sufficient resources are far from being available at the present time, and, urgent as are the needs of the Baltic listening audience in the present period of fermentation of freedom throughout the Satellite area, our first task must necessarily be to hold the audiences we already have in the face of the electronic war that is being waged against our transmissions by enemy jamming. RFE's original budget for 1953-54 was based on an orderly program to maintain present gains in the three main targets (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary).

**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

## SECURITY INFORMATION

Part 2  
Mr. Redwood  
917-1

and to develop our present scanty capabilities in Bulgaria, and the lesser targets of Romania, and Albania. The original budget cut of about \$1,500,000, not followed by a second cut of \$1,000,000, make it doubtful if RFE can even maintain full audience-reaching capabilities to all of its main target areas, let alone maintaining the scanty capabilities to the other targets mentioned above. Indeed, the RCFE Board of Trustees will probably vote on September 15th (i) not to expand Bulgarian broadcasts, (ii) to shorten Romanian broadcasts, and (iii) to eliminate broadcasts to Albania.

To enter the Baltic area, as a real and not a token target, would (I am informed by RFE) cost additional sums of money several times greater than the cuts that have recently been made. Much as we would like to see this new area opened up in what is generally regarded as "RFE style", either by VOA or ourselves, I see no hope of RFE's being able to undertake the task until their budget allocations can not only reach, but substantially exceed, the amount needed to preserve existing programs (against enemy interference) at their existing audience-reaching level. And certainly if such budget additions were in sight, it would be necessary for us to consider, alongside the Baltic plan, the relative desirability of:

- (a) Strengthening still further the signal to the three principal targets,
- (b) Initiating the often discussed plan for installing transmitters in Turkey or Greece for reaching Romania and Bulgaria more effectively,
- (c) Broadcasting to Albania as a more important target than the Baltic states.

## Conclusion:

Unless it is regarded as of paramount national interest that RFE type broadcasts be made to the Baltic states; and

Unless it is clear that VOA is not in a position to provide such programs; and

Unless it is clear that such development by RFE is more important than

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Page 3  
Mr. H. D. Wood  
217-1

SECURITY INFORMATION

(1) Additional signal strength to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary,

(11) Additional signal strength and programs to Bulgaria and Romania, preferably from a new transmitter installation, and

Unless an adequate sum of money for one or all of these operations is in sight, -

NCRE does not recommend the extension of PTE broadcasting to the three Baltic states.

Sincerely yours,

*Daniel G. Wood*

SECURITY INFORMATION

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September 18, 1953

Memorandum for Messrs. Joseph B. Phillips  
William Durkee  
Thomas Braden ✓  
George Morgan  
Abbott Washburn

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory and  
was written to me by Mr. Jackson while he was  
away on vacation.

Could someone--perhaps Mr. Phillips--let us know  
when it has been decided how David will be handled?

Many thanks.

*Marie McCrum*  
Marie McCrum  
Secretary to C. D. Jackson

Attachments

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SECURITY INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1953.

Miss McCrum:

I have a feeling that no one on our side is prepared to keep a firm hand on the Jean Paul David trip.

David is himself a king-size free wheeler. Although he is unquestionably one of the French "doers," as opposed to "talkers," in this field, he is also quite a big-mouth and inclined to over-talk, over-promise and over-indulge in cloak-and-dagger stage setting. If he hasn't got a guard, armed to the teeth, with a beret and a half-burned cigarette glued to his underlip, lurking outside the dining-room, he can't enjoy his meal.

The plot is complicated by the fact that as far as the U. S. is concerned he has always been strictly covert. This time he arrives as strictly "overt" so no one on our side will really know how to behave since everyone will have to do and be the exact opposite of what they did and were during David's last trip.

I would suggest that you show the attached to Abbott Washburn, George Morgan, Tom Braden and/or Bill Durkee, and Joe Phillips (also this note) and suggest that they work out who should consider himself responsible. I personally hope Joe Phillips will be willing to take it on.

Incidentally, the American who handles David best is Helen Kirkpatrick. She might conceivably be drafted as chaperone for this trip.

C.D.J.

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The following is from a dispatch written by Mr. William Tyler, dated 22 June 1953.

1. After a recent conversation with Jean Paul David, at which time he outlined his activities and ideas in connection with the mission with which he is charged by Georges Bidault, I received a letter from him.
2. It will be seen from this letter that David is most anxious that the report which he will make on his survey should represent, without committing any one country, a synthesis of the views and the resources of the Western powers allied under NATO, in the broad field of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to build support for Western defense policy and to promote the achievement of the objectives of these policies.
3. It occurs to me that a difficulty which we have to face, and which we are probably unique in having to face, is due to the organizational structure within which we operate officially in the general field under discussion. In a country like Italy, for example, it is possible for David to have exchanges of views with high officials of the government and to feel reasonably sure that even though such views are not to be taken as a commitment, they do in fact represent the disposition of the government in question, or any government likely to succeed it, toward these problems. In our case, however, it seems to me that it will require careful preparation to determine with whom David should consult and to work out a constructive position which will influence his report and his recommendations in a direction which we approve.
4. It is particularly difficult for me to make specific recommendations, since developments in Washington in the last few months are difficult to keep up with from overseas. It would, therefore, be particularly helpful to have headquarters' views at this stage on the following points, assuming that David will go to the States in late September on the last leg of his survey:
  - a. With whom should he meet for basic discussions. (It occurs to me that a suitable body, if still in existence, would be the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.)
  - b. Within what limits at this time are we prepared to discuss the problem of concerted action for the psychological strength of the North Atlantic Community.
5. As headquarters is aware, C. D. Jackson knows David personally, and it would perhaps be useful to arrange for conversations with him and any group he might have in mind. It is true that the position of David with regard to this Agency is anomalous, since the survey on which he is engaged, far from relating to covert operations, is of the most official

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kind possible. As headquarters has pointed out, his interests in his present mission in reality pertain more to the State Department and NATO than to us, and it seems to me that we should not be in the direct line of fire except in the capacity of individual observers or participants in the conversations he will have. It would, therefore, seem to be all the more important that we arrive at a clear understanding among ourselves as to how David's trip to the States will be organized and what is to be the respective role of the component elements in the psychological effort with regard to his survey.

/S/ WILLIAM TYLER

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ATTACHMENT #1

(TRANSLATION)

Translation of Letter from Jean-Paul David

June 19, 1953

My dear Bill,

You know that - probably toward the end of September - I am to leave for the United States on a mission entrusted to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Bidault is concerned - and justly so, about the problems connected with the objectives of my survey; and my desire is to produce a realistic report since I wish to avoid (you know my way of thinking) the traditional phraseology which generally takes the place of action.

To date, in Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway ... I have successively conferred with the Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, of the Interior, of Education. I have also sometimes met with the Chiefs of Staff, and specialists of information and of psychological warfare.

To all of them, I have said:

"Mr. Bidault has requested me to make this survey and you have before you the text of the French note which speaks for itself and seems to require no further comment. I want to ask you to state, in writing and without in any way committing your Government or your particular services, what solutions seem reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall make a synthesis of the reports so assembled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in this respect. And, at the (NATO) 'Conference of the 14' at the end of October, we shall have available a program on the basis of which constructive action can be taken."

There, in telegraphic style, is my argument. I should add that everywhere I found an excellent welcome, everyone accepted this method and promised me substantial reports.

But, if in small or medium-size countries, I have encountered no major difficulties, I have no idea of the way of thinking of your compatriots on such matters. And this note is for no other reason than to ask you to express your thoughts, in view of the excellent advice you can give me.

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I want to emphasize that, in my mind, the reports and suggestions gathered from all the specialists of all the ministries of any particular country will not commit any country in any way. I will name no one, compromise no one. I want to gather the sum of the ideas and resources of the Atlantic Community in this domain and add a few personal ideas which seem workable.

That is why, my dear Bill, I ask for your contribution as I would like to carefully prepare this trip across the Atlantic. Please forgive this long letter. Tell me what you think of all this.

s/ Jean Paul David

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16 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Whitney Shepardson Phone Call to You of Yesterday,  
15 September, Concerning Forced Labor.

1. The central facts in this business are as follows:

a. NCFE had a letter sent to the President of the United States signed by various individual exiles expressing their gratification to the United States Government for its "initiative in placing as an item for the agenda of the 8th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the matter of 'Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor', . . ."

b. At this Division's direction the Department of State was asked to prepare an answer to this letter for the President's signature which NCFE could publicly exploit in cooperation with the United States Mission to the United Nations.

c. Late Friday afternoon this Division was informed by the Department that no answer could be forthcoming as the U.N. Delegation had decided not to push the forced labor matter at this time. NCFE was informed to this effect the same afternoon and again on Monday by this Division.

d. Because its letter was not being answered, NCFE erroneously assumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperation with the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that it was the decided policy of the United States Government not to force this issue at this or any other time.

e. The net effect of this matter is as follows:

(1) The Department of State will draft an answer for the President's signature which will be transmitted to Secretary of State, Dulles for his personal approval after consultation with Ambassador Lodge. The approved answer will then be transmitted to President Eisenhower for his signature. Public exploitation

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

of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.N. but the timing and use of the materials developed by NCFE is to be determined by the United States Delegation.

*Thomas W. Braden*

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief,  
International Organizations Division

SECRET



**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The Director of Central Intelligence  
**SUBJECT:** British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning  
                  the tone and content of EME broadcasting to  
                  the European satellites, and related matters.

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum of conversation prepared by Tracy Barnes, who sat in on a conversation which took place on 4 September in my office with Messrs Rob Scott and Adam Watson of the British Embassy. Tracy's memorandum covers the conversation quite fully, but I should like to point out certain impressions and conclusions of my own which I believe to be worthy of your consideration.

2. It was quite evident that Rob Scott, who, as you know, is the new Minister, and Watson had received some fairly strong prodding from Sir William Strong; and it was equally apparent that they were not particularly well prepared as they were somewhat embarrassed when called upon for specifications -- unable as they were to produce these. Three other features of the conversation which struck me rather forcibly were the following:

a. The fact that they placed primary emphasis on the absolute necessity at the present time of keeping the US-UK copybook completely smirchless until such time as there shall (may?) have been a high-level four-power meeting, including the Soviets, and until such time as it shall have appeared clearly that the Soviet Government is not prepared to make concessions and otherwise adopt a conciliatory approach. This is a fairly evident British line which they have been peddling for some time and I do not doubt that you heard something of it while in London. If followed in the letter and permitted to order our conduct, the result would be that we would, ourselves, adopt a total "sweetness and light" program for an indefinite period of time.

b. The fact that the Embassy representatives said that they had no intention of speaking with the State Department about any of this aroused some slight suspicion on my part that they may have been deliberately bypassing

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the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This is the more my impression, since if the British "sweetness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit -- then the State Department had better be get into line as well. Obviously the utterances of top State Department officials, both here and abroad, and State Department actions are much more important for the purposes of this particular British approach than are the actions and utterances of our unofficial gray and black media. I reported the substance of the conversation to General Cabell who authorized me to bring it to the attention of Doc Matthews, which I have done, and at the same time requested him to advise us if the Department hears anything about this from the British Embassy.

c. Finally, Adam Watson dragged in by the tail some questions about the so-called "Freedom Corps", and asked me whether I could confirm that there had been a substantial "heating up" of this old proposal within the past month or six weeks. I replied that if this idea -- which was a very old one indeed in US Government circles -- had reached any particular climax within the past month, I was not aware of it. I said that I had heard that the State Department was considering asking the Foreign Office what it thought about such a program. Mr. Watson then replied that the State Department had, in fact, submitted this question to the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Office had replied that it recommended most strongly against any broaching of this subject at least until after the German elections. I thanked Mr. Watson for bringing me up to date, and the point was not further pursued.

*J. S. Wisner*

FRANK S. WISNER  
(Deputy Director (Plans))

Encel (1)

Memo for Record dtd 3 September, sigd by C/PP: Conv. betw. Messrs Wisner, Scott, Watson and Barnes.

cc: C/PP

*detached 9/11 and filed in C/PP's files*

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5589

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent conversation with members of the FO staff of the British Embassy re RFE broadcasts, etc.

REFERENCES: a. Memo dtd Sept 8 from DD/P to DCI; Subject: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning tone and content of RFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.  
b. Memo for Record dtd 8 September from C/PP: Subject: Conv. betw. Messrs Wisner, Scott, Watson and Barnes.

1. I am returning to you the original of the Reference a. memorandum for the file. Mr. Wisner asked whether you had shown your copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden -- he thinks that both Mr. Braden and Mr. Durkee should see it.

2. Mr. Wisner asked me to tell you that his suspicions of Mr. Watson's sheepishness were rather fully confirmed by a subsequent conversation in which Mr. Watson admitted to Mr. Wisner quite frankly that neither he nor Mr. Rob Scott had had very much stomach for their mission that day. Mr. Watson rather doubted that we would hear any more about this.

BPM  
BJW

Attached:  
Ref. a. memorandum.

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25 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU Developments

The attached extracts from RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletin are evidence of the day to day coverage that RFE is giving to ICFTU decisions. In addition we are setting up an arrangement whereby RFE will have continuing liaison with a member of the special committee appointed by the ICFTU. Through this channel we hope to supply RFE with documentary material on workers' conditions in the satellites and to insure also that the line taken by RFE toward labor issues is not in conflict with the ICFTU position.

CORD MEYER, JR.  
Deputy Chief  
International Organizations Division

DCIO:CM/mf

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee via Jacobs  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - DCIO  
1 cc - RI

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SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU

The following extracts of RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletins indicate the general guidance around which more complete coverages are prepared for broadcasting:

Daily Guidance 554, June 30, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph d:

Concerning forthcoming conference of ICFTU, attention is called to Christian Science Monitor of June 24, reprinted in today's Information Bulletin, and to Report on America #13. "American Labor's Wide Horizons" as published on June 26.

Daily Guidance 560, July 2, 1953, Page 4, Last two lines:

Remarks by George Meany, president of American Federation of Labor, before Stockholm meeting at International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; in addition to expressing the philosophy of free workers toward less developed areas, should have a special significance to our listeners at this stage of their struggle against Soviet colonialism. Meany declared that freedom to colonial peoples and inhabitants of protectorates was something democracies must take steps to insure as soon as possible. The Federation (ICFTU) should see to it that workers in such territories enjoyed trade-union organization liberty.

Daily Guidance 573, July 28, 1953, Page 3, Paragraph c:

As far as East Germany is concerned, most significant news is vote by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to set up a fund "to support insurgent unions in East Germany and other satellite countries in their efforts to undermine communist control". George Meany, President of AF of L, predicted that substantial sums would be made available but "declined for obvious reasons" to say how they would be spent.

Meany's announcement would seem to be an event of major significance in which all target areas should be equally interested.

Latest reports on East German purge receive most of their meaning from fact that a faction presently losing out is said to be composed of communists who -- while not at all disloyal to the Kremlin -- are not Muscovites in the sense in which the victors are Muscovites. Chances are that all communist functionaries who did not spend the last war inside Russia are in danger of their jobs or, as the case may be, of their lives.

Human interest stories on recipients of food aid speak for themselves. However, emphasis might well be on fact that recipients are either primarily or exclusively unemployed workers -- and that communists deny the existence of unemployment.

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Daily Guidance 590, August 20, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph f:

Note that ICFTU followed up on its promises reported here and created special fund for support of Soviet Zone workers.

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19 August 1953

RECORDED FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Food Program for Eastern Europe

1. This proposed program supports a plan for limited food distribution to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is generally agreed that it is highly desirable honesty to attempt food distribution through regular open channels, before utilizing any unusual method such as balloons, even though it is highly advised the offers to distribute food will be accepted. It is further felt that no food program of any kind should be commenced unless it is certain to culminate in actual deliveries.

2. Formal Offer: A group such as a Committee to Assist the Peoples of Eastern Europe would be formed, which would in turn make an offer of a definite amount of food to representatives of the satellite governments of Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the Department of State would be requested to take up the food offer officially with representatives of the governments concerned. CIA will arrange for the composition and sponsorship of the proposed committee. The food offer of the committee, taking note of the official statements indicating that a food shortage exists in each of those countries, would propose the establishment of an international commission to supervise the distribution of food to the needy children of the areas involved. This food would come from U.S. surplus stocks and through contributions made by the sponsoring organizations.

3. Delivery of Balloons: In event of refusal by the satellite regimes of the food offer, the committee might turn to the American Heritage Foundation for help. The latter would be asked to utilize its primary project, the Crusade for Freedom, both in raising public funds and delivering food by balloons.

Crusade for Freedom (NCF)

A. Capabilities:

1. The Crusade can deliver 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 lbs. of food by way of 200,000 to 400,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia,

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Hungary and Poland over a period of two to three weeks;

2. The Crusade can deliver 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 lbs. of food in 400,000 to 600,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland over a period of five to six weeks;

Capabilities (1) and (2) above, are possible within the time periods indicated only if U.S. military facilities and equipment for the necessary procurement and stand-by storage of the hydrogen gas for the balloons is available. (20,000,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas will fill 200,000 balloons sufficient to lift 1,000,000 lbs.) If such storage facilities, etc. are not available, the time periods must be revised for (1) and (2) above to two months and three months respectively;

3. First balloon launching could commence within sixty days of project authorization;

4. Each food package, suspended to one balloon, would contain five lbs. of staples. (sugar, fat, flour, coffee, chocolate) Packages will be sealed and/or wrapped with polyethylene.

B. Costs:

1. Costs of operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland would be approximately \$1.15 per net pound of food delivered, or a total figure of \$1,160,000.00 for each 1,000,000 lbs. delivered.

2. Costs of operation into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Baltic areas would be greater, due to added technical factors, necessity of shipboard launchings, etc. The unit cost figure would be \$1.55 per net pound delivered.

C. Operational Considerations:

1. If delivery of food into satellite areas is considered feasibly, realistically sound, then entire operational effort must be centered at launching -- delivery of food in the shortest period of time. Counteraction to the impact of food deliveries will be immediate and sustained to include "tampering" with food packages, wholesale arrest, EW charges bolstered by staged photography.

2. Launching sites previously used by the Crusade for Freedom for balloon operations into Czechoslovakia were located along the Czech frontier between Cham and Hof. For launchings into Poland and Hungary, sites in Berlin and in and around Graz, Austria, respectively, would be the most operationally satisfactory.

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Concurrence of the proper Austrian, West German and British representatives as to use of launching sites in their jurisdiction areas must be secured well in advance through the appropriate channels.

3. There is no guarantee that the Adenauer government will be favorably disposed towards this food delivery program, even if it wins the September 6 elections.

4. For an operation which envisions the launching of 200,000 balloons (1,000,000 lbs. of food) over as short a period as two to three weeks, a relatively large group of indigenous personnel must be hired, trained (four or five days) and supervised over a minimum five week period.

D. Psychological Considerations:

1. Most recent estimates indicates that the harvest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland will be fair to average this year. Consequently, it would be a mistake to send food into these areas simply to alleviate a "desperate shortage" which might not in fact exist for workers in good standing. Rather, as a part of RFE's accompanying program exploitation, the population would be urged to conserve the packages as "iron rations" or "strike rations" against the day when they might not otherwise be able to afford absenteeism or loss of wages for other reasons.

2. One of the gravest risks to any food delivery program of this kind, especially should its launching interval be in excess of two weeks, is the systematic poisoning of food parcels by the communists. The only really effective way of safe guarding against this is by anticipating it and pre-conditioning the people, via RFE, against contaminated efforts.

3. During the time when, and at the places where the food is packaged, the Crusade should arrange for supervision of such packaging by acceptable humanitarian/religious international groups, such as the Quakers or the Red Cross, in order to neutralise EK charges and augment the bona fides of the committees and Crusade for Freedom.

4. The initial private and official offers of food to the satellite areas must be accompanied with certain conditions ensuring guarantees of delivery, in order to avoid communist acceptance of a ~~new~~ food offer as such, which would place us in the awkward position of having to subsequently request guarantees for proper distribution and delivery.

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Securit:

5. Type of MFE "running attack" during balloon operation is well illustrated by the following - 'Czech workers would have to work 6.6 hours to earn enough money to buy one average pound of food parcels contents, whereas the American worker could earn the \$1.15 per net lb. delivered in 1.2 hours.'

D. Conclusions:

1. The operation is large and the resultant psychological gains and losses, depending on many variables, could be extensive. Needless to say, the operation should not be undertaken, even in part, as a 'gesture' or on a 'fumble'.

2. Balloons are not the most economical means of delivering food, in point of fact, the movement of items by balloon is at least twice as expensive as any regular means. However, to date, balloons are by far the most feasible way of diffusing a relatively large amount of food containers into an otherwise denied area.

3. Planning of the operation in all its phases should include the Director of PWZ, in order to ensure a well coordinated political warfare program.

E. Recommendations:

It is requested that should authority be given to proceed on this balloon-borne food program, such authorization be contingent on the following recommendations:

1. That the commencement of the balloon launching be generally planned for the end of this year.

2. That no more than 400,000 balloons be released (2,000,000 lbs. of food) at a cost of approximately \$2,332,000.

3. That the balloon launching phase of the food delivery operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, not exceed ten full consecutive days from its date of commencement.

4. That \$50,000 be made available immediately for preparatory work.

5. That food deliveries into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltics not be considered until after the primary operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland has proved successful.

IO/BRI:NSD/ah  
Orig - DD/P  
2 cc - IO/BRI  
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

SECRET

FO 3-2117

Executive Secret  
4-3-2-

22 July 1953

*Allen Dulles*  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

I had a talk with Spencer Phenix about NCFE matters and the following points were discussed.

(1) A Strategy Board to guide RFE. Spencer feels the need for some higher level political guidance than RFE is getting from their staff people and talked about getting together a board of people like George Kennan, etc. I told Spencer that I thought it unlikely that George would give very much time to this but might be willing to give them an occasional idea or suggestion.

(2) Spencer asked me about the possibility of their finding some job **for Sam Reber.** I told him to wait on this until I had time to discuss it with FW.

(3) Spencer seemed disturbed that the allocation of one million a month until our budget was passed would cramp their operations. I told him that if they had particular difficulties to let me know. He also asked what they should do about the proposed allocation of \$400,000 to help in the refugee situation. I told him I was not familiar with this particular issue.

(4) He suggested that it would be well to have a meeting here with some of the members of the Board and the Executive Committee and suggested a date around the first week in August. I told him I would do it if I had not already left the country by that time.

(5) Spencer is pleased with the better integration and coordination of activities between their shop and this office.

*ALLEN W. DULLES*  
Allen Dulles  
Director

cc: DD/P

SECRET

JAN 1953

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Executive Copy
3-6124

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. Aid for East German Refugees

1. Last year you testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the U.S. "iron curtain escapees" care-resettlement program, and during the course of testimony I understand you stated that the program excluded aid to ethnic groups such as Germans in accordance with PSB recommendations.

2. Mr. George Warren (UNA/Refugees) of the State Department has proposed that \$300,000 be made available from his program for aid to selected East German refugee projects.

3. This proposal is being made as a gesture of aid to East Germans and has the support of HICOG, of James Reber, and of Representative Celler of New York, among other Congressmen. John Bross, CEE, has no objection.

4. Frank Hand in my office is the liaison point; is following this closely, and will keep us thoroughly informed but I thought, in view of your testimony, you would want to know of the projected policy switch.



THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief

International Organizations Division

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRET  
Security Information

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations/Branch 1  
SUBJECT: Coordination of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation

1. As both you and Mr. Slovick agreed in your informal conversation of yesterday, the present explosive situation in the satellite periphery and the Interim Psychological Strategy Board guidance on its exploitation necessitate closer cooperation between our respective facilities and branches. I want to thank you for offering to make it possible for us to gain further access to RFE libraries and open sources and for your offering us further technical assistance. I agree that it would be desirable to exchange a Branch officer so that we may have a better understanding of our respective assets and problems. SR/1 will provide one of your associates with a desk and complete access to our files at any time.

2. It may be well for us to discuss how we can best take advantage of further demonstrations and riots in the satellite areas. Should there be an uprising in Poland, for example, it may be desirable for RFE to place broadcasting time at the disposal of Radio Liberation so that the latter may address concentrated and repeated appeals to the Red Army not to fire on Polish workers and peasants, not to interfere in the Polish struggle for freedom, and to consider the Polish people as the allies of the Soviet people in their common struggle against Communism. It was this line that Radio Liberation followed during the East German uprisings. In the event of riots in Czechoslovakia where the Red Army is not present in force and where the satellite security forces may be unable to keep order, close cooperation will be even more desirable.

3. Consideration could be given to having RFE allot Radio Liberation regular time on its broadcasts to Poland and Bulgaria where there are large concentrations of Soviet troops so that Radio Liberation can further build up the idea of a free, Soviet anti-Communist moral and political authority and to express the solidarity of the Soviet peoples with the oppressed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Radio Liberation could also allot regular time on its transmitters so that spokesmen of free Czechoslovakia and Poland could address the Soviet troops.

4. It will, of course, be necessary to discuss the divergent approaches of the two stations. Because of its sponsorship, its identity and its mission, Radio Liberation cannot treat the Soviet oppression of the Central and East European peoples in terms of nationalist domination and exploitation. Radio Liberation always distinguishes between the people on the one hand and the Party and Police on the other, and it is our policy to identify the Red Army with the people. SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

5. We will maintain close coordination on all matters relating to Radio Liberation broadcasts to the occupation troops and solicit your comments and suggestions on our broadcasts to the USSR proper and on all other matters.

ANDREE YEDIGAROFF  
AC/bR/1

2 - Addressee  
1 - C/10

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

## SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET**

100-221363

MEMORANDUM FROM: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Branch One

SUBJECT: General Pavle Griva Pavlovic (201 - 14578)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE  
to IO, dated 16 July 1952, Subject as above

1. Although not initially responsible for recommending that the NCFN subsidize General Pavle Pavlovic, in referenced memorandum SE Division endorsed the continuation of payments by the NCFN to Subject on the basis of his ability to aid in research work being done for CIA at the Pentagon, as well as of his need as a meritorious exile. We have recently been advised by Miss Stern of your office that the NCFN wishes to discontinue this payment since Subject does not participate directly in the NCFN's activities. We have been further advised that if SE Division wishes General Pavlovic to receive a regular income from the NCFN, SE must provide the necessary funds.

2. It is believed that termination of the subsidy by the NCFN will result in real personal hardship to the General, who, at the age of seventy, has no other known source of income. SE Division, however, is not in a position to provide the necessary funds, since this would necessitate the initiation of what would essentially be a charity project, falling more properly within the purview of IO/Branch One. Neither can this Division justify continuation of payments on the basis of work performed for SE, since he has been working primarily for the Department of the Army during the past year. The arrangements for his work at the Pentagon are such, however, that CIA can place research requirements on General Pavlovic whenever desirable.

3. In reviewing the case this year, we have ascertained from the Department of the Army that Subject has worked diligently and contributed materially to the work of his office. He has been particularly commended for his adaptability and readiness to work, which have shown themselves in his efforts to learn English and typing.

4. It is the opinion

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SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET**

- 2 -

b. It is the opinion of SZ Division that the NOFE decision to terminate payments to General Pavlovic should be consistent with its policies vis-a-vis other Yugoslav emigres, many of whom receive regular stipends solely on the basis of "prestige". General Pavlovic's actual contribution to the efforts of the U.S. Government, if not of CIA or the NOFE directly, should be taken into consideration in addition to his very real need before halting payments to him. We would appreciate your informing us as to the final disposition of this case.

CHRISTIAN W. FRIER  
Acting Chief, SZ

**SECRET**

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**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1953

7/23 F GW saw  
but decided  
to take no  
action.

Bjm

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
 SUBJECT: Message from Whitney Shepardson

1. Whitney Shepardson cabled the following to his office with the request that they immediately give it to C. D. Jackson. This information and message was given to us today by Spencer Phenix.

"Report this morning Mrs. Wilde Benjamin new East German Justice Minister rescinded right to strike granted June 11 by predecessor.

Seems appropriate your boss Thursday press conference or perhaps more formally sum up recent Russian inspired communist actions behind curtain; in Czechoslovakia savings wiped out, future bleak, families, children bankrupt. In east Germany revision of elementary right of labor to strike is again denied and will be ruthlessly crushed by force. Satellite states long deprived of their food and goods by most vicious practices of colonialism known for two centuries. This is no paradise for workers, this is hell. In the United States this capitalist society so often denounced by Soviet propaganda lines, the savings of the workers are protected in law and in fact, and the right to strike is protected in law and in fact also. After almost two hundred years of its national existence there can not be found in the US one trace of the colonial practices which characterize Soviet rule over its satellite colonies.

Condon asks that if such theme is used "give our boys a break so they can prepare and push home with background and variation."

Signed: THOMAS W. BRADIN

THOMAS W. BRADIN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000  
21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Meeting with PSD

1. I understand that two of the matters that have come up before your PSD luncheon are:

a. C. D. Jackson's proposal to send food to East Germany via balloon.

b. C. D. Jackson's proposal for a monument memorial to be put up near the Brandenburg Gate. I would like to comment on these two proposals for what use it may be to you.

2. It seems to me food shipment via balloon is a meaningless gesture. It will not do any positive good because it can't get enough food into East Germany to make any difference. Thus a negative result is fostered; it looks and appears to be psychological warfare of a rather obvious kind. The food offers by the U. S. Government and those by the ICFTU were, as the London Times pointed out last Monday, psychological victories, but the Russians are now moving food into Germany in far greater quantities than we can do via balloon. In addition, there are obvious dangers from the standpoint of a EW play-back as Mr. Wisner suggested. It would be much easier and much more effective for the Russians to use the EW threat on balloon shipments than on any quantities of food that the Government or the ICFTU are actually able to get behind the Iron Curtain. In sum, balloons are a trick and food doesn't lend itself to tricks.

3. I think the monument idea is a respectable one but not on the level that the PSD people seem to want to play it. They have in mind a world campaign to be conducted in all countries, particularly in this one and in South America with a distinguished body of citizens to lead the campaign here. I do not think the memorial idea is big enough for that (the best memorial so far erected was Berlin's own decision to change the name of the Unterlinden to Strasse June 17). I think the memorial idea ought to be left to the Germans. We can delicately suggest it and see that it is followed up with any support necessary in this country through already existing organizations such as NCFE or the Crusade for Freedom if this is necessary. These should play a minor role.

CIO:TWS/ch

Orig - Addressee

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - w.

SECRET

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 21, 1953

"PROSPERO"

Preliminary Report

The purpose of this operation was to exploit the present critical circumstances in the Communist empire and in Czechoslovakia in particular by bringing to the people of that country tangible evidence of the West's interest in and support for their resistance against the regime. There follows a brief summary of the salient facts about the operation:

1. 5402 rubber balloons and 1212 plastic balloons were launched from the primary site in Ellensfeld, a small German village on the Czechoslovak frontier and from the secondary site in Schönsee, some 40 miles to the south.
2. These carried a net total (after wastage) of approximately 10,000,000 messages of three types:
  - a. A likeness of the new 1-crown note issued by the Czechoslovak regime following the recent currency reform. The text of this note is attached as Appendix A.
  - b. A replica of the new 25-heller coin, bearing the words "All our people for freedom - All the free world for our people". The words "Free Europe" and the emblem of the Freedom Full appeared in the center of the coin.
  - c. A leaflet bearing photographs of the East Berlin demonstrations on one side and a text describing recent events in East Germany and the Soviet Union (including the Beria purge) on the other. Copies of this message are attached as Appendix B.
3. The target areas for the operation were:
  - (a) the industrial and mining districts of northwest Bohemia;
  - (b) the capitol of Prague and the heavily populated area north of Prague;
  - (c) the city and environs of Pilsen;
  - (d) the Ostrava region. (See display map.)

- 2
4. The operation took place between 0800 Monday, July 13, 1953 and 2400, Friday, July 17. Balloons were in the air 15 working days after conception of the idea, and 3 working days after final approval. The third (Berlin-Berlin) message was sent to the printer on Saturday; on Monday 2,000,000 copies were at the site and on the way to their destination.
  5. A crew of 22 workmen was transported from Munich to the site. Including guards, drivers, and supervisory personnel, the total payroll for the operation was approximately 40. The crew was billeted in a small hotel in the nearby village of Tirschenreuth and was fed in a Gasthof at the site. Working time totalled approximately 3000 man hours. The operation entailed the use of 7058 cubic meters of hydrogen, representing 17900 lbs. of lift. The weight of the hydrogen cylinders was 102 tons.
  6. The rubber balloons carried an average payload of 2 lbs. and burst at an altitude of from 30,000 to 40,000 ft. They rose in the air at a rate of 100 to 500 ft. per minute. The total elapsed time from the leaflets' point of departure to arrival on the ground ranged from 2 to 5 hours. The plastic balloons carried a payload of from 1/10th to 4/10ths of a pound, travelled at an altitude of 30,000 ft., and penetrated from 60 to 300 miles, depending on the target desired. The plastic balloons do not burst but descend to the ground at a point determined by the amount of gas and weight of payload. At the peak of the operation well over one million messages were in the air at the same time.
  7. The wind speed averaged 40 miles per hour and ranged from 230° (blowing into Northern Bohemia) to 270° (blowing towards Prague and Ostrava). Pilots were bracketed from both launching sites. Meteorological data was obtained from the Neubiberg air base and confirmed by radar facilities located 7 kilometers from the site. These facilities and the personnel necessary to man them were obtained from the U. S. Army. They were able to track target balloons deep into the country. The radar units were also able to detect Czechoslovak air activity and to establish that the other side was also using radar, presumably in connection with the balloons.
  8. Border activity was intensified during the period of operations. During 5 trips to the frontier (which was within sight of the launching location), it was observed that officers had replaced enlisted men on border patrols. On several occasions attempts were made by ground forces to shoot down

3.

the balloons, although only two hits were observed by border police.

On Wednesday, July 15, at 1400 hours, two Migs flew along the frontier over the site and were clearly observed by the working party. Subsequently that afternoon the theodolite was moved to a hilltop point (from which, incidentally, the hills around Pilsen could be discerned) and Migs attempting to shoot down balloons were viewed by members of the party as well as by the German border patrol. As many as 7 Migs were observed at one time. Three hits were witnessed, two of which appeared to cause the balloons to explode and one of which simply caused the balloon to disappear. On Wednesday night additional planes were reported by border police. Searchlights were also seen. On Thursday, 5 Messerschmitts 109Fs replaced the Migs and succeeded in destroying three balloons. No air action was observed on Friday, although at 1000 hours a jet vapor trail materialized directly above the launching site and was headed into Czechoslovakia. However, it was impossible to see the aircraft or to say for certain that this was a border violation.

9. On the last night of operations (Thursday) a procession of 80 plastic balloons with candle-lanterns was launched. Since the night was perfectly clear, the "torchlight parades" could be easily observed - the lights looked like stars marching quietly across the sky. No aircraft were seen.
10. The total cost of both the original operation and the supplementary Berlin-Beria message is estimated at less than \$25,000, or a unit cost of 1/5th of a cent per message sent. A substantial portion of this represents transportation and other non-recurrent expenses which would not be involved in a sustained operation.
11. Note must be made of the invaluable technical and operational assistance provided by the two General Mills personnel, Mr. C. B. Moore and Mr. Fletcher Bartholomew, who were present on the trip. It should also be mentioned that the help of RFE personnel was exceedingly valuable.
12. As of the date of this report, regime reaction includes:
  - a. Rude Pravo editorial read over Radio Prague on July 18 (Appendix C), plus supplementary articles in Svobodno Slovo and Mlade Front.

- b. Commentaries over Radio Moscow in Russian and Polish and over Radio Warsaw.
  - c. Articles in the Romanian and Hungarian press.
  - d. An article in Moscow Pravda.
13. In accordance with previous plans, Western publicity about the operation was discouraged.

#### Conclusions

The limited purpose of "Prospero" has, so far as we know, been substantially achieved. However, it must be acknowledged that an operation of this kind is both strongly provocative and (because of its tangible form) susceptible to dangers not risked by radio. There is the further complication that it is launched from German soil and could conceivably cause injury to RFE's position in Germany. All of these factors must be carefully weighed in considering any future action of this sort.

Further, this must be classified as a "crash action", as evidenced by the time elapsed between conception and termination. Crash actions are good once or twice, but are not to be recommended as a habit either from the point of view of cost or, even more important, in cognizance of the utter necessity of careful and thorough preparation of the best possible message.

On the positive side, this can be stated:

1. The message was timely, worth saying, and closely integrated with RFE policy.
2. Enemy reaction was immediate and sorely hurt.
3. Internal conditions and the world Communist situation suggest that the action was taken at an apt moment.

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4. Technically, with radar help it was proved that balloons could be launched carrying relatively heavy payloads on an assembly line basis with a high degree of target accuracy. This was not previously known.
5. Aside from the impact of the messages, the very fact that the West was interested enough to go to the trouble and expense of penetrating the Iron Curtain by a means which the regime is powerless to prevent - by Migs or bullets - cannot be lost upon the captive peoples.

S. S. Walkor, Jr.

MESSAGE ON LEAFLET

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD!

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER!

THE PEOPLES OF THE CAUTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GROWING STRONGER!

The Soviet Union is getting weaker. The struggle for Stalin's heritage shakes the entire Soviet empire and fear creeps through the Kremlin. Who will fall with Beria and who will fall after Beria? How many millions will fall victims to the new purge which is now going to begin - the biggest purge which the Soviet Union has ever known?

How many victims will fall in the Soviet Union and how many in the occupied countries? Who will fall with Beria in Prague and who will be dragged down by his fall in Bratislava? Who will be the new Slansky and who the new Clementis? And when the purge spreads and broadens, down from the Politbureau to the lands and districts, to the offices and the factories - how many functionaries will safely survive?

Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and help the people's struggle against the oppressors.

The Soviets have trapped themselves in a blind alley. If the Moscow boot weighs even heavier on the necks of the oppressed people and if Moscow's demands upon the frightened puppet governments become more pressing, the resistance of the people will only grow: for the people will not return into submission. If the Communist regimes, in order to appease the wrath of the people, try to bribe their subjects by promising concessions - as in Hungary and in Eastern Germany - they will get nowhere: for the people will no longer be deceived by party concessions.

The people are growing stronger. The first flames of revolt have flared out in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Germany. From Pilzen, from Moravská Ostrava, from Oslavany, from Berlin, Dresden and Magdeburg the echo of this revolt has roared throughout the world and deeply shaken the entire Soviet realm: the people showed their strength.

The Communist regimes recognized the menace and became afraid. They started apologising. They started self-criticising. They started giving promises. In Germany the anti-labor decrees had to be revoked. In Czechoslovakia the frightened government was forced to desist from applying the penal laws concerning absenteeism. In Moscow, under the influence of the news of the peoples' revolt in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the internal struggle became sharper. Beria and his all-powerful police fell as victims. Your resistance has helped

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to alter the course of history: new forces made their appearance on the battlefield, the people won their first major victory in their fight with the regime.

#### CZECHS AND SLOVAKS!

The more your oppressors are shaken by uncertainty, the greater is the certainty of your victory. The regime is afraid of you, it knows that power is fundamentally on your side. This is the time when people's unity, common agreement, and unity of purpose are capable of winning concessions. Your battlefield of labor is in the factories and in the fields. On this battlefield of labor you have the advantage of numbers. On this battlefield you cannot be vanquished. You will not be content with bribes, you will ask more and more from the exploiters. So do not presume to give you orders nor to give you advice. You and your new leaders who are being born in the struggle know best how and where to strike. But we want you to know that you are not alone: Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smouldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows.

FREE EUROPE!

MESSAGE ON BANKNOTE

On one side:

Czechoslovaks, know this:

The regime is weaker than you have dared to think! Power lies with the people and the people stand opposed, With unity and courage, organize your strength! Down with the collective! Insist on workers' rights! Today demand concessions; tomorrow - freedom!

On other side:

Men call this the hunger crown - gift of the Soviet Union. It is the symbol of regime desperation, of five-year failure. It is a challenge to fight, to meet weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

The other captive peoples are uniting and will join you in your struggle.

The free world is with you!

All power to the people!

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RPE LG 7-24-68

CAESAR INFO WALKER PW MICHIE

OUR VIENNA BUREAU YESTERDAY REPORTED FOLLOWING BALLOON REACTION:  
QUOTE SEVEN MEN FROM PARDUBICE SAID THAT ALL LAST WEEK PEOPLE  
WERE JUMPING LIKE FROGS TO CATCH THE LEAFLETS AS THEY CAME DOWN.  
MANY PEOPLE WORE THE COINS AROUND THEIR NECKS. MANY SOLDIERS  
WERE CHECKED OUT FROM THEIR ARMY UNITS TO COLLECT THE LEAFLETS.  
SAME REFUGEES SAID ALSO THAT IN PILSEN BIG PLANES TOOK OFF EVERY  
HOUR FROM THE AIRPORT TO SHOOT DOWN THE BALLOONS. THERE WERE  
NO REPEAT NO LEAFLETS AND NO REPEAT NO BALLOONS IN THE RUDEJOVICE  
AREA IT WAS REPORTED. NEVERTHELESS ALL THE GENDARMERIE INTERVIEWED  
THE POPULATION TO SEE IF THEY HAD SOMEHOW OBTAINED ANY. ALSO THE  
POSTMEN HAD ORDERS FROM THE GENDARMERIE TO ASK EVERYBODY ALONG  
THEIR POSTAL ROUTES IF THEY HAD ANY LEAFLETS. UNQUOTE

TO CAESAR FOR W/ DEN IN MEICHE

RADIO WARSAW JULY 20 0700 HOURS QUOTED BALLOON ACTION. AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS HAVE LATELY LAUNCHED IN WESTERN GERMANY A CAMPAIGN AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA - THE DAILY RUDE PRAVO STATED IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE A CAMPAIGN CONDEMNED TO FIASCO UNQUOTE. FROM AUSTRIA SMALL BALLOONS CONTAINING DENUNCING LEAFLETS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE DIRECTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE ACTION - AS ANNOUNCED BY THE MUNICH SLANDER-STATION FREE EUROPE - WAS LED BY AMERICAN EXPERTS WHO CAME TO WESTERN GERMANY FOR THAT INTENTION. IT IS A FACT SAYS RUDE PRAVO THAT BALLOON EXPERTS HAVE NOT SPARED THE LEAFLETS. DURING TWO DAYS TIME CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS HAVE BROUGHT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LEAFLETS TO SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL COMMITTEES. CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING MASSES ARE DEEPLY INDIGANT AT THIS DISHONEST PROVOCATION OF WARMONGERS UNQUOTE.

RADIO WARSAW JULY 22 0700 HOURS QUOTED THE NOTE SENT BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT SENT A NOTE TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN PRAGUE IN WHICH IT PROTESTS VIOLENTLY AGAINST SPREADING ON CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY SOME LEAFLETS, CALLING FOR ANTI-STATE ACTIVITY. THE NOTE STRESSED THAT THE PROVOCATIONS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO ARE STAYING IN THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION ZONE IN WESTERN GERMANY UNQUOTE

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SEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 1953

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Balloon Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Práce. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Referring to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented from breaking among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Poland the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Sympat Rhee. In Germany sabots were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons while, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflammatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Nork and similar "institutions" speaks boastfully of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committee where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubrovnice, district of Český Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Žatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundred times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens came with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflammatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power which helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine; in Cracow, in Li Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Prave. It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNC and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people

who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laugh at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of pansterism which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this.

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Plzen and which destroyed the Plzen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they know very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brezov in the Plzen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality loots the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

413 7 7-

RFE 7 7-21-53

PHENIX LANG WALKER GRIFFITH FM CGNEOS  
FOLLOWS RADIO PRAGUE ANNOUNCEMENT 0910 TODAY RE NOTE ON BALLOONS.

"THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING NOTE TO THE  
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES ON JULY 20, 1953:

DURING THE PAST DAYS BALLOONS WERE SENT TO CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY  
WITH LEAFLETS OF A NATURE DESIGNED TO INCITE DISCONTENT OF THE  
POPULATION AND TO ENCOURAGE ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THIS NEW ATTEMPT  
TO INFLUENCE THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING PEOPLE WITH PROPAGANDA MEANS OF  
SO PRIMITIVE A LEVEL, UNDERSTANDABLY MET WITH INDIGNANT RESISTANCE,  
THAT THE ENTIRE ACTION

WAS PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS SENT FOR THIS  
PURPOSE TO GERMANY, TO GERMAN TERRITORY UNDER US OCCUPATION ADMINIS-  
TRATION. IT IS THEREFORE A NEW INSTANCE WHERE THE UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT ABUSED ITS POSITION AS AN OCCUPATION POWER TOWARDS ENDS  
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, WHICH BINDS  
THE UNITED STATES TO CARRY OUT THE OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE BASIC  
TENET THAT GERMANY IS NEVER AGAIN TO BECOME A THREAT TO WORLD  
PEACE AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.

4-00000

a  
ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACT WHICH MAKES THIS NEW VULNERATION OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE IS THE FACT THAT IT TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE NATIONS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD ARE INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE AND ASSURE PEACEFUL COOPERATION.

THE AIM OF THIS PROVOCATIVE ACTION, ORGANIZED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF US OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES IS TO INCREASE THE POLICIES OF THE SO-CALLED COLD WAR AND TO PREVENT A LOOSENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

FOR THESE REASONS THE GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA DECISIVELY PROTESTS AGAINST THIS ACTION AND ASKS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO FURNISH INFORMATION ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO PREVENT SIMILAR PROVOCATIONS AIMED AGAINST PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF NATIONS, REPRESENTING CRUDE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS."

END RSC

6-00000  
TOP SECRET INFORMATION July 26, 1944

Counter-espionage

Balloon operation

The "Circumstance of the Week" quoted an article from "Rudo Pravo" dealing with the preparation for "Y-Day". In this broadcast from abroad, no balloon operation can delay the fact that our plan for "X-Day" which had been planned for 5 years failed with the Berlin plot.

The weekly program "Uncle from Slovakia" will be utilized, and underestimates the significance of the balloon operation. This program was broadcast by Radio Bratislava in Slovak dialect. It tells the story of the "cuckoo" who found some of the crowns which had been put into the balloon on the roof and of course immediately recognized that they were only the imitations or the real crowns. Next day he entered the tobacconist shop and when paying; gave the sales girl inadvertent the crown he had found on the roof. She only laughed and told him he could not get anything for that crown but has to pay with real Czechoslovak currency.

**SECRET**

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs' Note to America Legation

REFERENCE: Memo dated 21 July 1953 - Subject: "Czech Reactions to Balloon Operation"

1. The Czech Desk of the Department of State is preparing an answer to the Czech note which will generally disclaim any U.S. Governmental responsibility for the balloon operation. The VOA is being instructed to brush off the Czech note and to cite it as another example of the regime's attempt to prevent the Czech people from getting the truth.

2. RFE will not comment on the note except to report the U.S. reply as a news item, but will comment on the Hude Travo editorial taking the line the Czech Government can't let its people know the truth and also speculating on how many Czechs did not turn in their pamphlets.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief,

International Organizations Division

C-IO/Branch 1/WPD/mhj

Distribution:

Addressee - orig & 1  
C-IO/Branch 1 - 2  
CIO - 1  
RI - 1

**SECRET**

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SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: Czech reactions to balloon operation

1. Attached are Czech reactions to the balloon operation including the text of a note from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered today to the American Embassy in Prague.
2. Radio Free Europe has been instructed not to comment upon this note until directed.

*Thomas W. Borden*  
THOMAS W. BORDEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czechoslovakian territory with leaflets of a nature designed to incite discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignate insistence, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under U.S. occupation administration. It is, therefore, a new instance where the U.S. Government abused its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the U.S. to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peaceful cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of U.S. occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czechoslovakia decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the U.S. to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar provocation aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

SECRET

S O P Y

MUNICH RFE 20 - JULY 20, 1955

PLEASE NOTE THAT TODAY'S PRAVDA CARRIED PAPERPRINT OF  
MAJOR PORTION OF RUDE PRAVO BALLOON EDITORIAL,  
INCLUDING MENTION OF RFE, UNDER TITLE: "A WORD OF  
THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE TO THE PROPAGANDISTS AND  
SLANDERS". UNITED PRESS CARRIED STORY OF RUDE PRAVO  
EDITORIAL UNDER VIENNA DATELINE JULY 18.

END

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 1953

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Religion Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Rudé Pravo. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Thanks to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grew stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany bandits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflammatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks bombastically of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravice, district of Cesky Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Zatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundred times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens come with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflammatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power which helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Cradour, in Li Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Frace. It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people

-3-

who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laught at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of provocation which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this.

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the war; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Pizen and which destroyed the Pizen Skoda Works and the Prague Holben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they know very well that American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence! One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brno in the Pizen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality looks the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their profits full but otherwise the action was decided to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

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Draft Note to Czechoslovak Government

Verbatim Text

Following is text note for transmission PONOFF in reply to its note July 20.

Begin text. The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's Note of July 20, 1953, concerning the release of balloons from the US Zone of Germany has the honor, upon instructions of the US Government, to make the following reply:

The balloons apparently in question were not released by any official agency of this Government but by the Crusade for Freedom, an organization established by private American citizens. The US Government has ascertained that the balloons were released for the purpose of communicating with the people of Czechoslovakia.

It is a fundamental conviction of the American Government and people that free communication between peoples constitutes a principle upon which the very life of the international community should be founded. If any government attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people from contact with the outside world, it is inevitable that ways will be found both by the people inside that country and by the peoples of other countries outside to penetrate that artificial barrier and maintain some line of contact with one another. The use by those outside of such media as balloons confirms that the Czechoslovak Government has created a barrier interfering with free communication. The US believes that the best assurance that this means of communication will not be used is to obviate the need for it by permitting what is natural and necessary in the modern world, namely, free contact between nations and the free exchange of information and ideas.

As for

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- 2 -

As for the content of the messages carried to Czechoslovakia by this medium, it is understood that they contained information on current developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in addition various statements focusing on the idea of "freedom". There would be no reason for a government to be disturbed about the principle of freedom in a message to its people, if conditions of freedom actually existed in that country. One cannot readily believe that the Czechoslovak Government would even raise this issue with the US Government if the fundamental freedoms were observed in Czechoslovakia and if the Czechoslovak Government were not now especially concerned about the attitude of the people toward the absence of those freedoms.

The US Government cannot agree that the transmission of these messages to the people of Czechoslovakia from the territory of the US Zone of Germany by the Crusade for Freedom Committee involved any misuse of the position of the US as an occupying power. Such communication is clearly not contrary to any quadripartite agreements affecting Germany. Nor does such communication violate any other international agreement to which the US Government is a signatory.

With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace the US, as is generally known, has endeavored in every practicable way to work step by step, in accordance with the deep interests of the American people in permanent peace and in cooperation with other countries, toward building an enduring structure of international peace and stability. The US seeks to help bring about a relaxation of international tension wherever there are genuine possibilities of doing so. It is recognized at the same time that true international tranquillity presupposes conditions which assure human rights and fundamental freedoms for the people concerned. End text/

Cable soonest intended date delivery so press release may be issued here.

SECRET INFORMATION

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czech territory with leaflets of a nature designed to incite discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignation in instance, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under US occupation administration. It is therefore a new instance where the US Government abandons its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the US to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and ensure peaceful cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of US occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czech decisively protest against this action and ask the Government of the US to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar persecution aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

UNCLASSIFIED      RESTRICTED      CONFIDENTIAL      SECRET  
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	4 June
2			
3	<i>file NEE</i>		

- |                                      |   |                                    |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL    | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION          | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION      | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY         | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT     | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION       | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE      |

REMARKS:

Attached is Mr. Durkee's recommendation in respect to Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., International Federation of Free Journalists and the Free European Press Service. His recommendation is that we do not support this organisation for PW or intelligence purposes. I concur in it.

*See 2 June Chron*

TWB

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RESTRICTED

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 30-4  
 SEP. 1942

16-38796-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

**SECRET**

Security Information

4237

20 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/AC

SUBJECT: Lyman Harorski; Free Persian Press Service; International Federation of Free Journalists.

REFERENCE: Memo to DDC/P fr C/AC dtd 12 June, same subject.

1. I have read with interest the reference to Harorski which concludes with recommendations against the utilization of Harorski and his "organization" in connection with DDC operations, including dissemination activities. It is my recollection that there had been a previous recommendation against the use of this individual and his colleagues and associates as sources of information. It is my further recollection that in part as the result of a recommendation which we received from C. D. Jackson, we recently granted a very modest (\$3500 per month) subsidy to cover a try-out period of a few months' duration.

2. Will you please advise me if I am wrong on any of my points of recollection as indicated above. If, on the other hand, my recollection is accurate, will you please prepare for my signature a brief communication suitable for transmittal to Mr. C. D. Jackson and stating, in effect, that whereas we did in fact go forward with a modest subsidy for a three (?) month period, we have now had an opportunity to re-examine this entire situation initially, including the identity and character of Harorski's sources and associates, and have reached the conclusion that we have no interest or desire to continue our support and relationship with Harorski beyond the conclusion of the trial period.

(Signature required)

PAUL C. TIGHE  
Deputy Director (Plans)cc: C/AC  
C/IO ✓Attachments:  
Ref. memo and talk.**SECRET**

Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

20 July 1953

TO, Attn: Mr. Burke  
 VIA : Chief, EE  
 EC/EE/P

**Proposed Balloon Campaign in Event President Offers Food to Poland**

1. With reference to our discussion of 17 July, attached hereto is a sample of the coupon which it is recommended that the Crusade for Freedom distribute by balloon from Germany in the event that a Presidential offer of food for Poland is refused by the Polish Government. This coupon reads as follows:

The bearer of this coupon is entitled to receive from the food supplies donated by Americans:

(food listed will be those specifically offered)

Stamped across the coupon are the words, "Invalid due to the rejection of the offer by The Polish 'Peoples' Republic".

2. We are advising the Frankfurt mission of this plan and requesting their estimate of the number of leaflets which they could release by balloon from the Baltic. Please advise us whether or not your printing facilities can supply the German mission with whatever number of leaflets they undertake to distribute. We, on the other hand, will advise you soonest of the number of balloons we will require from your stocks and the address to which they are to be consigned.

3. In the event that the Crusade desires to include a printed message on the reverse of the leaflet, it is requested that the text of the message be cleared either with this desk or with the German mission prior to printing.

**Attachment:**

MALCOLM LAVIS  
 Deputy Chief

*see Duke's  
 reply 29 July  
 chrono*

EE/P:ECnowarwms  
 20 July 1953

2 Addressees  
 1 RI  
 2 EE/P

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/PP

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Mr. Kenneth Dean Koch

1. In January of this year I discussed with your office the retention of Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as RFE representative, due to his extensive usefulness to FI in Berlin, providing FI with cover facilities, leads, general services and working very satisfactorily in supporting the FI mission in Berlin. At that time I was assured by IO that they would do everything possible to retain Mr. Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative. In May of this year I had occasion to visit Bob Lang in New York on another matter and I again touched upon Mr. Koch's assignment in Berlin, at which time Mr. Lang assured me that no changes would be made in Koch's assignment in Berlin without prior clearance with me. He also emphasized that no man would be sent to Berlin who did not meet with our complete approval. In the meantime, Koch was sent to Israel to set up the RFE office but seemingly met with opposition on the part of Israel authorities and has returned to Germany with no definite job envisaged for him. John Elliott has taken over the RFE office in Berlin and there seems to be no attempt to make any concessions to FI wishes in Berlin.

2. We find this solution an extremely unsatisfactory one. Elliott, by background, general character, and ability, is not as useful to FI in Berlin as Koch was and I seriously doubt that RFE would find him as satisfactory as Koch in standard RFE business. I knew Elliott when he was a newspaper man, and I have checked with several of his former colleagues who agree that he does not have any of the hard-hitting qualities so desirable for an RFE representative in Berlin. This is not an attempt to belittle his ability as a journalist but the job in Berlin is very much more than that. In short, I would appreciate your office taking steps with RFE to return Dean Koch to Berlin as RFE representative, since his services to FI are very much desired even on a part-time basis. Our main reason for wanting Koch in Berlin is that the RFE office attracts a large percentage of Satellite refugees and as such it is important for us to have the head of the RFE office in Berlin.

SECURITY

Security Information

- 2 -

cognizant of our intelligence interests in order to be able to channel the right type of refugee to our doorstep. Furthermore, in many cases the RFE representative can perform valuable screening and cutout functions which would preserve his own cover and yet save us valuable time and effort.

3. I would appreciate any action you can take on this subject and refer you to IN 40404 from Berlin which is attached. Please keep me advised on any progress you make in this case.

PETER SICHEL  
Chief, EE/FI

Attachment: IN 40404

Security Information

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Security Information

*Read by Wiesner*  
7/17/53

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: RFE Report on recent Soviet Zone  
Politburo Meeting

1. Attached herewith, I am forwarding you a cable which has just been received in New York from Munich.
2. The information contained therein was transmitted by the RFE correspondent in Hamburg, Major Ramsey, who reportedly got it from a usually reliable British SIS contact.
3. RFE has asked us to treat this information with extreme caution and strictly as speculation.

*(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN*

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachments: a/s

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION****SOVIET ZONE POLITBURO MEETING****Cable dated 7/16/53 from Munich to New York**

"East German ailing President Wilhelm Pieck is definitely on the way out, reliable sources in close contacts with the East German Government said here today. The sources stated that Pieck's ouster was disclosed during an East-West German Communist Politburo meeting which ended in East Germany on July 12. Top German Communist leaders were also told that East German Secret Police Chief, Wilhelm Zaisser, is now suspended or under house arrest. Zaisser was arrested for publication of casualty figures of the June 17 revolt, the source said. His ouster also falls in line with recent Communist policy shifts all over the Red Empire, they said. At the meeting it was disclosed that StD head Walter Ulbricht will remain a potent force in East German politics despite recent rumors of his impending purge. Premier Otto Grotewohl will be given increased power in the new government set-up, the sources said. During a discussion of recent events in the Soviet at the Politburo meeting, the Communist leaders were given information from Moscow reporting that Foreign Minister Molotov will emerge during the next month as the key figure in the Soviet Union. Premier Malenkov will serve as a figurehead for Molotov, the sources revealed. The Red Army is fast becoming a major political force in Russia and several generals have been recalled from outpost areas by order of Molotov, the sources said. The USSR is suffering from acute shortages of raw materials, especially rubber and oil, as well as strategic metals of the rarer varieties; it was disclosed at the meeting. In view of this, the top Communists were told that Russia would continue its "peace offensive" for at least another year. The sources, reported to be "highly reliable", said that the revelations released at the meeting were to be used as "policy directives" by East and West Communist leaders."

**NOTE:**

FYI. "This information was released through our Central News with the warning to treat with extreme caution, adding that Political Advisor's office agreed it is of most explosive nature and should be handled strictly as speculation."

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

43529  
Note 6, 801  
8 Aug 53, 932

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SUBJECT: Purge of Berlin

Attached herewith is a guidance received by  
RFE on the purge of Berlin.

*Carl Meyer Jr.*  
CIA REVIEWED  
Deputy Chief,  
International Organizations Division

Attachment

**SECRET**

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

**I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:**

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.)  
THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEVHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BEING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS REBELLE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, COME DURING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF "PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE—AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD, — FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

- A. THE NATIONALISTIES QUESTION
- B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE SHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

b. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE--BUT WITH NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENUINE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURVIVING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOT TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITES.

## II. GUIDANCE:

CAUTION: AS BEFORE, WE SPECULATE ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ANY ONE PARTICULAR THEORY. THIS IS THE END OF THE FIRST ACT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST ACT; THERE ARE MANY MORE AND BLOODIER ACTS TO COME. THE COALITION WHICH DESTROYED STALIN IS JUST AS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL DISSENSION AS WAS THE MALENKOV-DEBENIA-BULGOTOV COALITION FOLLOWED AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. THE BASIC ANALOGY HERE IS TO STALIN'S TACTICS AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. FIRST HE ELIMINATED TROTSKY AND THE LEFTIST (THE NEW COALITION NOW HUMILIATES BURIA); THEN HE ELIMINATED THE RIGHTISTS (PROBABLY THE NEXT ACT IN THIS PRESENT DRAMA WILL INVOLVE ELIMINATION OF THE REST OF THE COALITION BY THE RISING ELEMENT IN IT).

### A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE BOLSHEVIKS BETRAY EACH OTHER EVEN MORE FEROCIOUSLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON IT IN PLEASURE AND ASSURANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EARLIER RU OPZAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE KREMLINS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE PURGE HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST BIG SHOTS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANTICAL AS BEFORE. THERE COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE: AFTER EASTERN GERMAN REVOLTS AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARSHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL RISE OF CONFUSION WAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THAN NOW. THE REGIMES WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FAÇADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FAÇADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMES, CONFUSED AND RANT WITH INTERNAL DISSENSSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICY. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SHIFT TO EXTERMINISM MAY MEAN (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERES ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE--CONFUSION NOW REIGNS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SECURE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN EVERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE ARE MORE THAN EVER ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIMS TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

SECRET

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

B. TO THE COMMUNISTS:

THE KREMLIN IS RIGHT IN ONE POINT--THIS IS AN EVENT OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. IT PROVES ONCE MORE, AND MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE THIRTIES, THAT NO COMMUNIST CAN EVER BE SAFE. THOSE OF YOU LIKE ZAPOTOCKY WHO TRIED TO HEDGE IN HIS BRATISLAVA SPEECH ON THE NATIONALIST ISSUE; THOSE OF YOU LIKE NAGY, GERO AND BATA WHO BECAME THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTIST COURSE--YOU ARE SUITABLE OFFERINGS FOR THE NEW SLAUGHTER. AND THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME PRETENTIOUS RIGHTIST DEVIATIONISTS WILL NOW UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO BECOME EXTREMISTS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE--NO MATTER HOW MANY OF THEIR COMRADES THEY MUST DRAG DOWN IN A NEW PURGE. AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF TRYING TO BECOME AN EXTREMIST AGAIN? YOU KNOW THAT THE NEW SOVIET DICTATOR (REMEMBER WE CANNOT BE SURE WHO HE WILL BE, HAVING ELIMINATED BERIA) WILL NOW TRY TO ELIMINATE BERIA'S OPPONENTS. AS COMMUNISTS (SEE CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN) YOU HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES. YOU CAN AID THE PEOPLE AND SABOTAGE THE REGIME, THUS CROSSING THE "GOLDEN BRIDGE" TO SAFETY, OR -- YOU CAN FLEE. THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCAL ORGANISATIONS OF THE KVD IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONNETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

NOTE:

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN IS ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

14-00000

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by  
RFE on the purge of Beria.

CC: CORD MEYER, JR.  
CORD MEYER, JR.  
Deputy Chief,  
International Organizations Division

Attachment

**SECRET**

**SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA**

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3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOVS HIMSELF. MALENKOVS NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.
4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MAKES A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE—AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD — FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:
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SECURITY INFORMATION

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A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE BOLSHEVIKS DEVOUR EACH OTHER EVER MORE PROFOUNDLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON WITH PLEASURE AND ASSURANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE KREMLINS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE PURGE HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST BIG SHOTS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANNICAL AS BEFORE. THIS COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE. AFTER EASTERN GERMAN RETROGRADE AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARCHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL DOOM OF COMMUNISM WAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THIS DAY. THE REGIMES WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FAÇADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FAÇADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMES, CONFUSED AND RENT WITH INTERNAL DISSENSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ONE CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICY. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SHIFT TO EXTREMISM MAY MEAN (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERE ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE--CONFUSION NOW RAIDS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SEIZE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE ARE MORE THAN EVERY ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIME TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

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**C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:**

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE KGB IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

**NOTE:**

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN IS ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Branch 1.				NO.:	
				DATE 15 July 1953	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
REC'D	FWD'D				
1. CTP		15 JUL 15		CTB	To me -
2. C/10				TRB	Thanks. This suits are great. What does State think? The messages are stronger than what I thought State would buy. BUT -
3.					Good -
4.					Tracy.
5.					How was your trip - Let's exchange early next week.
6.					Tracy
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET

Security Information

Executive Registry  
43495

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: EFE - Balloon Operation

Attached herewith is the story of the balloon operation  
and an early report of what happened.

*Carl Meyer Jr.*  
CARL MEYER, JR.  
Deputy Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

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Security Information

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Security Information

FOLLOWING RELEASED LOCALLY TODAY: RELEASE FROM RALLY FREE EUROPE:  
DEBARGOED UNTIL 11:30 GMT - JULY 14, 1953

MUNICH, JULY 14, 1953-- THOUSANDS OF HIGH ALTITUDE BALLOONS CARRYING  
MESSAGES OF HOPE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WERE RELEASED ON THE CZECH BORDER  
LAST NIGHT BY THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM.

CARRIED BY STRONG WINDS AT ALTITUDES UP TO 30,000 FEET, THE BALLOONS WERE  
EXPECTED TO REACH AS FAR AS THE INDUSTRIAL CENTER OF OSTRAVA ON THE POLISH  
BORDER, WITH PILSEN, PRAGUE, MOST AND SOKOLOV AS SPECIAL TARGETS.

THE "BALLOON BARRAGE"-- THE SECOND AIMED AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE CRUSADE  
FOR FREEDOM -- WILL CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS. A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 12,000,000  
MESSAGES, OR ONE FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE COUNTRY, WILL BE SENT.

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM LAUNCHED A SIMILAR BARRAGE AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON AUGUST  
23, 1951, AND ANOTHER AT POLAND ON AUGUST 28, 1951. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT  
OPERATION IS FOUR TIMES AS LARGE AND BELIEVED TO BE THE BIGGEST EVER ATTEMPTED.

MESSAGES CARRIED BY THE BALLOONS RELEASED LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WERE OF  
THREE TYPES: A REPRODUCTION OF A NEW ONE-CROWN NOTE, BEARING A PLEA TO OPPOSE  
THE COMMUNIST REGIME; A PAMPHLET EXPLAINING THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN  
EAST GERMANY AND THE FALL OF SOVIET POLICY CHIEF LAZEBKÝ BERIA; AND AN ALUMINUM  
COIN STAMPED WITH THE "FREEDOM BELL" AND THE SLOGAN "ALL CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FOR  
FREEDOM--ALL THE FREE WORLD FOR THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS."

THE BALLOONS USED IN THE OPERATION CALLED "WINDS OF FREEDOM" ARE OF TWO  
TYPES, A RUBBER SPHERE WHICH EXPLODES AT HIGH ALTITUDES, SCATTERING ITS  
MESSAGES OVER A WIDE AREA, AND A PLASTIC BALLOON WHICH DESCENDS ON THE TARGET.  
BOTH TYPES ARE FILLED WITH HYDROGEN.

THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE PRINTED ON THE ONE CROWN NOTE FOLLOWS:  
ON ONE SIDE --  
  
CZECHOSLOVAKS, KNOW THIS; THE REGIME IS WEAKER THAN YOU HAVE DARED TO  
THINK; POWER LIES WITH THE PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE STAND OPPOSED. WITH DUSTY

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- 2 -

AND COURAGE, ORGANIZE YOUR STRENGTH: DOWN WITH THE COLLECTIVE! INSIST ON WORKERS' RIGHTS! TODAY DEMAND CONCESSIONS; TOMORROW - FREEDOM! ON THE OTHER SIDE --

MEN CALL THIS THE HUNGER CROWN - GIFT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS THE SYMBOL OF REGIME DESPERATION, OF FIVE-YEAR FAILURE: IT IS A CHALLENGE TO FIGHT, TO MEET WEAKNESS WITH STRENGTH, TO RESIST AS YOU KNOW BEST. THE OTHER CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE UNITING AND WILL JOIN YOU IN YOUR STRUGGLE. THE FREE WORLD IS WITH YOU! ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

THE FULL TEXT OF THE PAMPHLET ABOUT EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY: CZECHS AND SLOVAKS: HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD: THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER! THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GETTING STRONGER! THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER. THE STRUGGLE FOR STALIN'S HERITAGE SHAKES THE ENTIRE SOVIET EMPIRE AND FEAR HAS CRESTED INTO THE KREMLIN. WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA AND WHO WILL FALL AFTER BERIA? HOW MANY MILLIONS WILL FALL VICTIMS TO THE NEW PURGE WHICH IS NOW GOING TO BEGIN - THE BIGGEST PURGE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS EVER KNOWN?

HOW MANY VICTIMS WILL FALL IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW MANY IN THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES? WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA IN PRAGUE AND WHO WILL BE DRAGGED DOWN BY HIS FALL IN BRATISLAVA? WHO WILL BE THE NEW SLANSKY AND WHO THE NEW CLEMENTIS? AND WHEN THE PURGE SPREADS AND BROADENS, DOWN FROM THE POLITEUREAU TO THE LANDS AND DISTRICTS, TO THE OFFICES AND THE FACTORIES - HOW MANY FUNCTIONARIES WILL SAFELY SURVIVE?

ONLY THOSE WILL SURVIVE WHO WILL DETACH THEMSELVES FROM THE SINKING COMMUNIST BOAT IN TIME. ONLY THOSE WHO JOIN THE PEOPLE AND HELP IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS.

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- 3 -

AT ANY RATE, THE SOVIETS ARE IN A BLIND ALLEY. IF THE MOSCOW BOOT WILL WEIGH EVEN HEAVIER ON THE NECKS OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND IF MOSCOW'S DEMANDS UPON THE FRIGHTENED PUPPET GOVERNMENTS OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES WILL BECOME MORE PRESSING, THE RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE WILL ONLY GROW: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT RETURN INTO SUBMISSION. IF THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, IN ORDER TO APPEASE THE WRATH OF THE PEOPLE, WILL TRY TO BRIBE THEIR SUBJECTS BY PROMISING CONCESSIONS AS WE HAVE SEEN IN HUNGARY AND IN EASTERN GERMANY, THEY WILL NOT GET ANYWHERE: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT BE DECEIVED ANYMORE BY PHONY CONCESSIONS.

THE PEOPLE ARE GROWING STRONGER. THE FIRST FLAMES OF REVOLT FLARED OUT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IN EASTERN GERMANY. FROM PILSEN, FROM MORAVSKA OSTRAVA, FROM BERLIN, DRESDEN AND MAGDEBURG THE ECHO OF THIS REVOLT PEARED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND DEEPLY SHOCK THE ENTIRE SOVIET REALM: THE PEOPLE SHOWED THEIR STRENGTH.

THE COMMUNIST REGIMES RECOGNIZED THE MENACE AND BECAME APPAID. THEY STARTED APOLOGIZING, THEY STARTED SELF-CRITICISING, THEY STARTED GIVING PROMISES. IN GERMANY THE ANTI-LABOR DECREES HAD TO BE REVOKED. IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE FRIGHTENED GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO DESIST FROM APPLYING THE PENAL LAWS CONCERNING ABSENTEEISM. IN MOSCOW, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEWS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GERMANY, THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE BECAME SHARPER. BERIA AND HIS ALL-POWERFUL POLICE FELL AS VICTIMS. YOUR REVOLT HELPED TO ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY: NEW FORCES MADE THEIR APPEARANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THE PEOPLE WON ITS FIRST MAJOR VICTORY IN ITS FIGHT WITH THE REGIMS.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS: THE MORE YOUR OPPRESSORS ARE SHAKEN BY UNCERTAINTY, THE GREATER IS THE CERTAINTY OF YOUR VICTORY. THE REGIME IS APPAID OF YOU, IT KNOWS THAT POWER IS FUNDAMENTALLY ON YOUR SIDE. THIS IS THE TIME WHEN PEOPLES UNITY, A COMMON AGREEMENT AND A UNITED PURPOSE ARE ABLE TO WIN CON-

SECRET  
Security Information

- 4 -

SESSIONS. YOUR BATTLEFIELD IS IN THE FACTORIES AND IN THE FIELDS. ON THIS BATTLEFIELD OF LABOR YOU HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF NUMBERS. ON THIS BATTLEFIELD YOU CANNOT BE VANQUISHED. YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH PROMISES, YOU WILL ASK FOR DEEDS. YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH BRIBES, YOU WILL ASK MORE AND MORE FROM THE EXPLOITERS. WE DO NOT PRESUME TO GIVE YOU ORDERS NOR TO GIVE YOU ADVICES. YOU AND YOUR NEW LEADERS WHO ARE BEING BORN IN THE STRUGGLE KNOW BEST NOW AND WHERE TO STRIKE. BUT WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE NOT ALONE; AMONG THE MASSES OF PEOPLE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN THE FIRE OF REVOLT IS SHOULDERING AND ITS SPARKS ARE FLYING FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE IN THE FREE WORLD. YOUR FRIENDS ARE WITH YOU. THEIR HELP WILL GROW AS YOUR DETERMINATION GROWS.

14-00000

SECRET  
Security Information

The following was received from Conder, Munich

Have report early afternoon that Czech fighter planes attempting shoot down balloons. In only instance so far reported, planes shot down two out of ten that were in air at moment. Also have report that attempts being made shoot balloons down from ground, but no success. This shooting occurred at 1410 local time, which is only report so far. Will inform you of any developments.

SECRET

14-00000  
Secret  
Security Information

The following received from Condon, Munich

Following is full story as of 1700 local time on shooting. At 1400 two possibly three jet aircraft, presumably MIG, which kept well within Czech territory, managed after considerable moving to shoot down two repeat two balloons. Aircraft departed area and have not returned since. Small arms fire during most of afternoon accounted for total of three repeat three balloons. Small arms fire effective only during periods when weather conditions did not permit rapid rise of balloons crossing border at height within range of submarine guns and carbines.

- - - - -  
Walker's report - Temper of residence in launching area calm and unworried.

End of Message

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

8 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO  
FROM: EE/Czechoslovakia  
SUBJECT: Bohumil HOUSER

1. Reference is made to a letter dated 25 June 1953 and addressed to you from Mr. Leo M. Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, forwarding certain proposals sent to the latter by Mr. Bohumil HOUSER of the International Rescue Committee, Camp Valka, Nuernberg, Germany. This memorandum will summarize for you our knowledge of Subject, and our present interest in his activities.

2. Subject was born 1 March 1922 in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. He reportedly fought in the underground in World War II and was taken prisoner. From the end of the war until December 1945 he was employed as interpreter to the U.S. military unit in Falknov, Czechoslovakia, and in 1949 he was head of the personnel department of the Brown Coal Mining Company in Falknov.

3. According to a report from the British Army of the Rhine, he was recruited by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in 1946 in Cheb, Czechoslovakia, and is an ardent Communist. According to the CIC, he travelled to Belgium shortly after the war, and then returned to Germany (sic).

4. We do not know exactly when Subject left Czechoslovakia. He seems to have emigrated to Australia in 1949 or 1950, and to have returned to Germany some time prior to September 1951, when he became associated with the American Fund for Czech Refugees and with the International Rescue Committee. According to one informant, Subject was deported from Australia for Communist Party activities.

5. On 14 April 1953 Subject sent Mr. Cherne an operational proposal of such interest that, in spite of the unfavorable information on Subject, we felt obliged to investigate it further. Upon our instructions, an agent of the Munich Operations Base contacted Subject on or about 25 June, using air force cover, and obtained the identity of Subject's lead. This person turned out to be an individual who has been suspected since 1949 of being an agent of the Czech Intelligence Service, and who has very recently been crossing lines with one or two operations being run by Berlin Operations Base. Under the circumstances it appears very likely that Subject's lead amounts to nothing more than a provocation or fabrication. We are still waiting for an appraisal and recommendations from the field.

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

RICHARD A. FINNEY

**SECRET**

Security Information

Executive Report

4-3-57

7 July 1953

Noted by DSI  
-7/13-6

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Proposed Balloon Operation

1. The following message was received from Whitney Shepardson on the proposed balloon operation.

Shepardson talked at length with Conant yesterday, Monday. Conant did not object to the proposed balloon operation, but on the contrary "endorses" the project, but said he could not "request" acquiescence. Thus Shepardson says we have "improved upon our minimum expectations".

Shepardson says further that Adenauer has been away since last Saturday but that Lentz and Hillestein were to have returned last night and NCCG is trying to arrange an appointment with either or both for today, Tuesday.

Shepardson will send further word after these talks.

*Carl Meyer Jr.*

THOMAS W. MEYER

Chief

International Organizations Division

**SECRET**

Security Information

6010-4559

7 July 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

Security

**Memorandum for the Record****Subject: Conversation with Congressman Kersten**

1. On 6 May Congressman Kersten addressed a letter to the State Department, enclosing a letter dated 6 May 1953, which he had received from Mr. Creighton Scott, a former employee of Radio Free Europe at Munich, Germany. This letter was highly critical of certain personnel in RFE, particularly as regards allegations of pro-communist attitudes. On 6 July I discussed these criticisms with Congressman Kersten in detail, conveying to him orally the material contained in the memorandum of 17 June 1953 from the Director of Security; Subject: Inquiry by Congressman Kersten; which the Director of Security had noted should be utilized in this meeting with Congressman Kersten.

2. The Congressman noted the difficulty in evaluating the type of criticisms which Mr. Scott had made but appeared willing to accept our explanation.

3. Congressman Kersten then turned to certain criticisms which he had heard expressed regarding RFE from several sources, including Scott. One such criticism is that RFE is not doing the best it should on religious programs. He feels that this aspect of the broadcasts could probably be considerably strengthened, particularly among Catholic elements.

4. Mr. Kersten cited the opinion of Count Tarnowski (sp. ?), a well known Pole, who told the Congressman that any fourteen year old Soviet citizen would be so well briefed on Soviet philosophy as to turn up their noses at the RFE material. The Count (and Kersten appears to agree) feels that the Soviet population has more sophisticated philosophical material thrown at them by their own Government, and that it should be an important function of RFE to counter with an attempt to destroy the Soviet philosophical material and shake the Soviet faith in their theoreticians.

5. Congressman Kersten realized that it is difficult to capture a wide audience with philosophical arguments, but he feels that if these arguments reached a segment of important leaders behind the Iron Curtain, it would help to destroy and counter the philosophical teachings of Marx, Lenin, et al. The Congressman feels that many of our broadcasts deal with economic matters, and, while these are important, RFE should go

CONFIDENTIAL

Security

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRET

deeper and hit harder on religion and philosophy.

6. While Congressman Kersten is aware that many of the captive population are not interested in rightest movements, it is his opinion that RFE cannot beat communism with socialism. In particular, he felt (and Scott bore this out in their conversation) that we were making too much use of Czech socialists, and we were using socialists from the Benes Government which had sought to compromise with the communists. While he recognizes the popularity of Benes and Masaryk in Czechia, he feels they are not effective in Slovakia, where there is a heavy Catholic population.

7. Congressman Kersten plans to go to Europe, probably in September. While he did not say so, I believe he would welcome an invitation to visit RFE, Munich. Furthermore, as the author of the Kersten Amendment and of several resolutions on the enslaved peoples, at least one of which may receive Congressional approval at this session, consideration might be given as to whether it would be advisable to request the Congressman to utilize RFE facilities to broadcast while he is abroad.

Walter L. Pforzheimer  
Legislative Counsel

OGC/WLP:jps

Mr. Kirkpatrick gave  
the original of this to the  
ACI, who added it, and  
took a copy for NEFE.

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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

3 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: D'Arcy Brophy and Louis Novins' Trip to Europe

1. Mr. Brophy and Mr. Novins tell me that you have agreed to pay their expenses for their trip to Europe. I told them that since they were traveling on our business they should draw the money from Heritage Foundation funds which have been made available.
2. I think this is the easiest way of handling the transaction. Novins gave me some representations that it would be better to channel funds for the trip through one of his clients, Paramount Pictures. This seems to me complicated and insecure, and I recommend that if this subject is raised with you directly, you again suggest use of Heritage funds.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Colonel  
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/Br I  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

1 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Comments on Arthur Page's letter of 29 June 1953

1. I think a budget presentation before a mixed audience of PRC members and directors or members of the Executive Committee of NCIE plus supposedly members of the NCIE staff would be extremely confusing, whether it were held here or in New York. Not all the members of the PRC have detailed knowledge of NCIE operations and most of the members of the Executive Committee do not have such knowledge. I see a meeting such as Arthur Page suggests going about as follows:

a. IO Division presents the budget with cuts which we plan to recommend.

b. Members of the Executive Committee of NCIE oppose the cuts.

c. PRC is placed in a position of turning down its own staff before the assembled outsiders with whom the staff is working.

2. I should suggest instead that we follow the following procedure:

a. IO Division presents the budget with the suggested cuts in same.

b. PRC considers these cuts carefully.

c. PRC calls in expert members of the staff of NCIE, i.e. Spencer Phanix, Bob Lang, Bernic Yarrow etc., if it desires to do so, and questions them on any matter within their respective responsibilities and in particular about the suggested cuts.

d. The experts leave the room.

e. PRC makes up its mind whether to accept the cut proposed or to make bigger cuts, or to add to the budget, as it may desire to do.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

- 2 -

3. It would be useful to brief the Executive Committee on the reasons why any changes in the budget are made after they are made, and it might be well to have a luncheon with the Executive Committee down here or in New York after the action has been taken and have the Director explain the reasons why PRC did this or that for Agency action.

4. I suggest that you write Arthur Page saying that you think a meeting such as Phenix suggests would confuse our procedures but that you do think a later meeting with the Executive Committee to explain the actions taken and have a meeting of minds for the work ahead after the budget has been passed would be useful.

*luncheon here*

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

14-00000  
JUN 30 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION  
SUBJECT: Funds for Balloon Operation

This will authorize you to inform officials of TPTONIC that the restrictions imposed by the Project Review Committee, at its meeting on 29 May 1953 of \$3,000,000 for operating expenses of TPTONIC for the first quarter of fiscal year 1954, may be exceeded by the funds necessary to prepare and/or execute a balloon operation.

*131 A.W. Dulles*

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

IO/BrI:WPD/ah  
(30 June 1953)

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 cc - Finance  
1 cc - Budget  
1 cc - IO/AD  
1 cc - CIO✓  
1 cc - RI  
1 cc - DCI

**SECRET**  
ALL INFORMATION

14-00000  
JUN 29 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Hungarian Refugee Situation

1. In a verbal report to the Romanian National Committee upon his return from a trip to Europe to secure former King Michael's approval of a proposed refugee committee, Mr. Visoiu stated that the King did not reject the proposal advanced for the reorganization and enlargement of the present Committee, although he indicated no interest in having the plan put into effect immediately. This information on the attitude of the King is contrary to that previously reported by a member of the Romanian National Committee, who stated that the King had finally rejected the proposal upon the recommendation of his ADC, Petru-Lazar.
2. In his last conversation with Mr. Visoiu, the King requested that the members of the present Romanian National Committee should send him, either jointly or individually, their opinions in writing about the following points:
  - a. On what grounds does the Romanian National Committee consider that it cannot continue in its present form?
  - b. What are the criteria for choosing the members of the new committee and who are the persons who should belong to it?
  - c. Who are the Hungarian exiles and Hungarian organizations in exile which could be consulted by the King to advise him in the matter of forming a new National Committee?
3. The Romanian National Committee members plan to send a joint resolution to the King requesting that he entrust Visoiu with the formation of a new committee to be comprised of members whose names were submitted to the King. Should Michael refuse this request, the Committee intends to tender its resignation.
4. Visoiu reported that he had conversations in Paris with Gafencu, Ghorman, Veniamin and Antonescu, to whom he proposed membership in the new committee. At that time, which was before the death of General Radescu, Gafencu refused because of the exclusion of the General in the new organization. Since Visoiu was unable to return to Paris after his conversations with the King, a meeting with Gafencu subsequent to Radescu's death has not been possible. Ghorman did not refuse to

14-00000

become a member of the new committee, but wished to be accepted as a representative of the Socialist Party. This would be difficult because of Gherman's affiliation with the left-wing faction which seceded from Petrescu's Party in 1946, subsequently joining with the Communist Party. Antenrade and Verianain have agreed to become members of the new committee.

5. In a letter to the Fund on 26 May 1953, Gafencu stated that an attempt should be made to give support to a new committee through a large national council in order to establish unity of the leaders and of the Rumanian colony abroad. He said that on the day of General Radescu's death he had received a letter from the General asking him to take over "his task" to assure the unity of the Rumanians abroad. Gafencu also wrote that friends in Paris and abroad had asked him to take over the leadership of a small "ad hoc" committee with the support of all the Associations of Free Rumanians, which he stated he will do if the New York group assures him of their support. After that, he indicated he would see if there would be a possibility of an understanding with the Vlaicu group.

6. Prince Nicholas reports that he has been approached by Gafencu with a request that he join forces with Gafencu to form a new Rumanian refugee committee under Gafencu's leadership and with headquarters in France. A committee embracing such individuals as Nicholas and General Ion Gheorghe, whom Gafencu also reportedly approached, would not be acceptable to segments of the Rumanian refugee colony because Nicholas is not on good terms with the King and has had Iron Guard associations, as does Gheorghe.

7. It would appear that there is little reason to believe that the Rumanian refugees will set aside their factional differences and personal ambitions to form a representative committee at this time.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER  
Acting Chief, SE

1400000  
**SECRET**

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIO/EO, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION  
SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of Stockholm ICFTU Congress

1. At our request RFE is going to give full coverage to the ICFTU Meeting in Stockholm. It has arranged to have the meeting covered by three desks. The Hungarians are using a Stockholm stringer, while the Poles and Czechs are each sending editors. In addition, there will be overall coverage to the central newsroom by RFE's information correspondent, Dreifuss. Messages from the labor leaders of the free world will be broadcast to the Czech people, in line with our recent guidance.
2. A copy of the UN Slave Labor Report was delivered to the board of Col. Mullany's friend yesterday afternoon prior to departure.

*William P. Durkee*  
WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
Chief, IO/Branch 1

**SECRET**

UNCLASSIFIED   RESTRICTED   CONFIDENTIAL   SECRET  
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss Tisthammer	—	—
2	CIO		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO		
2	CIO c/o		6/30
3			

- |                                      |   |                                    |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL    | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION          | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION      | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY         | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT     | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION       | <input type="checkbox"/> FEE       |

Remarks:

Alice:

Please insure that Mr. Dulles sees this before the NCFE people come in, and that they don't get their hands on it. *TWR*

TWB

SECRET   CONFIDENTIAL   RESTRICTED   UNCLASSIFIED  
 FORM NO. 30-4  
 SEP 1947   16-62543-2   U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Recd. File Registry  
11-2856

23 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NCFE with afternoon.

According to my informants (I have not talked to Arthur Page), the Executive Committee of NCFE made two decisions at its meeting yesterday:

1. That the performance of RFE in the recent difficulty was like that of a divisional commander who refuses to obey the corps plan, and
2. That RFE should immediately devise procedures so that future guidances from CIA will be put into effect without the two-week delay caused by Lang's refusal.
3. As I understand it, however, it is a fact that the guidance is not yet fully in effect and that the action part of the guidance, that is to say, paragraph 4, of the instructions of the Executive Committee to Radio Free Europe (you have a copy on your desk), has not yet been put into effect. I am guessing that you will get a lot of talk this evening about how most of this has been done before and is already standard operating procedure etc. etc. etc.
4. If you want to take a firm line this evening, I suggest that you stick to trying to find the answers to two questions:
  - a. Is the guidance initiated by you and passed upon by the Executive Committee fully in effect?
  - b. Have any steps been taken to make sure that in the future guidances will be put into effect?

TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION  
SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Jessie McKnight,  
Department of State

1. Mr. McKnight called to report that Mr. Herbert Pierce from the UN Public Affairs Office is very disturbed about the conduct of "some RFE man" in New York, who is approaching members of the US Mission to the United Nations and asking them all sorts of questions, for example, their views on the recent Doctors' Trial.
2. Mr. McKnight feels that this practice should be discontinued, especially in view of the fact that the new members of the US Mission are not yet fully informed about, or sympathetic, to RFE. He feels that any questions concerning US policy on particular issues should be cleared with Mr. Kretzman, the WOA Policy Chief in New York.
3. I think this matter ought to be discussed with Bob Lang. Would you let me know whether you will take it up with him, or whether you wish me to do so.

*You do so.  
JWS*  
ELLEN STERN  
IO/TOMIC

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

*SECRET*  
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDS

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss State Department Proposals on how to Counter-Check Items on UNCGA Agenda.

1. I attended a meeting on Wednesday, 28 January 1953, to discuss paragraphs 6 and 7 of the attached paper prepared by the Department of State. It calls for the establishment of "a commission of independent members to study the nature and extent of this escapee problem, with the view of determining the reasons and circumstances impelling these people to escape" and suggests that "this inquiry could follow the pattern of the commission on forced labor. The Commission would hear refugees in such places as Western Germany, Geneva, etc., and its eventual report to the assembly would, in fact, be a report on the entire communist system, the denial of basic human right, etc."

2. The questions raised in the meeting centered around the possibility of CIA's intelligence activities being compromised by the investigations of this commission. It was decided that FI, MDCAP and the operating people were the ones competent to make the decision.

3. Mr. Lazarus informed me by telephone on 30 January, that the above-mentioned individuals had presented him negative answers on the subject proposal. Their conclusions are being forwarded to the DDP and subsequently to the Department of State. Mr. Lazarus further stated that any recommendations by IO would be welcome.

IO/TOMIC: ES/hka

ELLEN STERN  
IO/TOMIC

Distributions:  
 Trig. -Addressee  
 2 cc -IO/TOMIC  
 1 cc -C/IO  
 1 cc -RI  
 1 cc - Mr. Braden —  
 1 cc - Mr. Hand

*SECRET*  
SECURITY INFORMATION

1400000  
23 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

SUBJECT: Leland Stowe

1. Pursuant to my conversation with Mr. Namby, I have talked with the Director of PVE and he has agreed to terminate subject's present job.
2. He intends to bring subject to New York and make him his personal consultant in the New York office. He assures me of his full intentions to carry out this plan and further assures me that he has no intention of giving subject administrative or operational authority of any kind.
3. Is this arrangement satisfactory to you?

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
CHIEF  
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/Br I  
1 cc - IO/Security Officer  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

14-00000  
SECURITY INFORMATION

22 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Julius Epstein

In response to our request from the Fund, we are forwarding herewith the general information available concerning Julius Epstein.

(Signed) [Signature]

THOMAS A. BRUDEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachments: (5)

- 1. Ltr. to Nelson dtd 4/29/53
- Personal biography by Epstein
- Excerpt from Congressional Record for 2/9/52
- Booklet by Epstein
- Article by Arthur Elisa Lane

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb

Distribution:

Addressee - orig & 1 via CPP

IO/Tonic - 2cc

CIO - lcc

RI - lcc

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

# Collège de l'Europe Libre

CHATEAU DE FOURLAËS - STRASBOURG-ROBERTSAU (Bas-Rhin)

BOITE POSTALE 61. STRASBOURG R. P.  
TÉLÉPHONE DIRECTION: 832.98 - INTENDANCE: 832.96  
ADRESSE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE: EXILUNIVERS STRASBOURG



Paris  
April 4<sup>th</sup>, 1953.

Dear Dr. ...  
You should have this, as soon  
as send to be copied by the same report.  
This meets with one Ex. Committee on the 9<sup>th</sup>.  
I hope they consider that situation fully.  
Frank has been made aware of what has been up  
against.

Lincerely,

Ty.

COPYCOPY

April 1, 1953

No. 26 Dear Adolf,

A day or two before I sailed for Europe in January, 1953, I received a typed manuscript copy of the "Progress Report on the College de l'Europe Libre", which has now appeared in mimeographed form under date of February 27, 1953, over the signatures of Royall Tyler and Richard Sears.

I admit to considerable curiosity when this document appeared. In the covering letter Royall Tyler merely stated, "It comes from Dick Sears". I rather wondered why this report should be compiled when it was known I was coming to Europe presumably to examine into conditions and it seemed to me immediately that this might be a counter foil to what it was expected I would find. In reply to a direct inquiry from me, Sears now states it was prepared "to reinforce the German language unit project by supplying information that was apparently lacking.

At the risk of indicating an overly suspicious temperament, which is not characteristic of me, I feel that this report over-simplifies a complex situation. It embodies a point of view that the operation at Strasbourg is proceeding smoothly and successfully, which it is not. It assumes that a paper plan (for the National Seminars) is in full and healthy bloom, which is not the case. I have stated so frequently (almost ad nauseam) that you must live in this frustrating atmosphere for a while before you can understand what conditions are. Royall Tyler and Sears have never had that experience and formed their opinions from what they have been told by Davis, Galy, Straka, and Donzelot. The latter in turn was constantly fed information by Galy and Straka, and altogether has spent only three or four days on the ground. He has had numerous talks in Paris with Galy and some of the tutors.

So, while the factual material in this report can not be questioned — I mean the statistics and the historical portions — the interpretation of them does not reflect the disappointing results. This pertains to the work of the Committee on Awards on the one hand and the actual operation at Robertsgau on the other.

When I asked Sears how widely this report had been distributed he told me "to the Trustees of FEUE, to the members of the Association du College

COPY

Dr. Berle

Page 2 of No. 26

April 1, 1953

de l'Europe Libre and to Messrs. Thomas Braden, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson and Whitney H. Shepardson". I assume, therefore, that the members of our Executive Committee, to whom I am sending copies of this letter, have received it.

The sentence (bottom of Page 9 and going over to top of Page 10), "These were men of advanced education, expert in their knowledge of their own countries but also, most of them, having studied in French institutions and so capable of forming a bond for the students between their training at home and in exile.", is not an accurate description of the caliber of the tutors.

On Page 14, second line, I would question definitely the phrase "well organized administration". Also on that page, sixth line, the sentence, "Special French courses were being given to those who still showed weakness.", is misleading. Such courses were announced, but the program for teaching the French language is only now being outlined with the help of the French language staff at Strasbourg University after a conference with them I called for this purpose.

On the same page again, fifth line from the bottom, the phrase "the severity of the action taken in the autumn has had a salutary effect in imposing firmer discipline and setting higher standards" simply is not so. The manner in which the action was taken, and the inaccuracy of some of the judgments, which had to be reversed, called forth protests from staff and students alike and did as much as anything else to cause present low student morale.

On Page 16, the last sentence in the first paragraph reads, "A fresh start in life combined with exposure to Western thought and practice will, we are encouraged to hope, produce a full return." Instead of what the statement implies, the students have witnessed a cleavage between the European staff and the Americans, — and the "exposure to Western thought and practice" has been anything but inspiring or unifying.

The distribution of this document can be and will be very misleading by its implications that success has been achieved to an extent that warrants our proceeding on our present path. That will be unfortunate. We have acquired a fund of valuable experience and we have made mistakes. The net result is the present situation. Fundamental changes must be made, which are bound to be unpleasant, but they are essential, unless we are going to continue a mere charity operation and miss the real purpose of FEUE.

Sincerely yours,

LT:ECK

Dr. A. A. Berle, Jr.  
70 Pine Street  
New York 5, N. Y.

Levering Tyson  
President

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
SUBJECT: Information reported by Bob Lang, RFE

Bob Lang has had reported to him the following:

1. Epstein, an investigator for Senator McCarthy, has just turned into the Senator a 150-page anti-RFE report.
2. Lang has received this report from three former RFE employees. The first two, FAAGO and TATER, reported to Lang they were visited by Epstein. They reported this interview to Lang because Lang has considerable derogatory information on them. They do not wish to be identified with any such report. The third informant is one DeCASTER, about whom Lang has written you. DeCASTER resigned a job in RFE to come to work -- presumably for us -- which collapsed, and has since been trying to get his RFE job back. Bob considers his report for that reason to be quite reliable. DeCASTER wrote a letter to the New York Times, which was published 8 March, in which he referred to himself as a former employee of RFE. Epstein apparently read the letter and immediately came to see DeCASTER. During their conversation, Epstein referred to a 150-page uncomplimentary report he had compiled on RFE.
3. NCIR says that it has some derogatory information on Epstein and it will be forwarded to us.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)

1 cc - IO/BrI

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

(ENCLOSURE WILL CIRCLE CLIP POSITION TOP AND BOTTOM)

10-3-1106

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS DATE
1	<i>Exec Office, DD/P</i>	<i>CMT Page</i>
2		
3	<i>PP - 2042</i>	<i>WACB 14 April</i>
4	<i>I O-CIO</i>	<i>TWB</i>
5	<i>RP</i>	<i>WJD</i>
FROM	<i>(GPO retention or destroy)</i>	INITIALS DATE
1	<i>Op. Division, DD/P</i>	<i>to 4/19/63</i>
2		
3		

APPROVAL       INFORMATION       SIGNATURE  
 ACTION       DIRECT REPLY       RETURN  
 COMMENT       PREPARATION OF REPLY       DISPATCH  
 CONCURRENCE       RECOMMENDATION       FILE

## REMARKS:

*Mr. Wisner suggested  
this be circulated as  
indicated for information.*

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4  
SEP 1947



OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

Executive Register  
3-8728DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1953

My dear Mr. Wisner:

I want you to be informed of the action which I am taking in regard to international broadcasting facilities in this country.

I have sent a letter to the companies concerned along the lines of the enclosed which gives a full explanation.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson  
Administrator

## Enclosure:

Copy of letter to broadcasting companies terminating contracts.

Mr. Frank Wisner,  
Central Intelligence Agency.

4/9/53 CC-EA File

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

**COPY OF LETTER TO THE VICE-CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SIGNALS  
REGARDING CONTRACTS**

**Conditions:**

Particulars of each of the several contracts mentioned above will be given on the back of this letter except those of the administration of which the Vice-Chief of Staff has been informed.

The bulk of this correspondence will be given below, but it is necessary to point out that the administration of existing policy and arrangements are not up to date. Certain of these require the conclusion of additional contracts which will be detailed on the separate document hereto attached.

However, from the standpoint of safety of operations and in view of the recent directive of the Bureau of the Budget regarding fiscal economy, it is mandatory upon us to take prompt and over steps are necessary to prevent the Government from becoming obligated for facilities or services which it will not be needed.

It is my opinion that, in order to protect the Government, to give at this time formal 90 day notices of termination of a number of these contracts to work out possible liability thereunder continuing into the next fiscal year. However, I feel that it is due to your Company and to the others similarly situated to accompany these notices with the reasons for cancellation or the reasons for them.

Last fall there was a reduction of over 100,000 per cent made by the Voice of America in the number of hours of radio programs originating in the United States. This has been done in their transmitter capacity, aside from the compensation, to prevent the condition, consideration is being given to deactivation of points outside the United States area of the program or, alternatively, if this would result in a requirement, to re-establish it in the United States.

In my judgment, protection of the Government's interests requires that a notice of termination be given to each of the contracts above as soon as possible.

**Associated Broadcasters of Carteret:**

Crosley, as to the installation at Marion, Ohio

General Electric, as to the installation at Belmont, California

Westinghouse

World Wide Broadcasting Corporation

Open

Upon the effective day of January 1, 1942, at Wayne, New Jersey, this month, it is my pleasure to advise you that the contract with General Electric for the construction of the proposed will also be terminated.

I personally must take the responsibility for my part in this required decision. I have been asked to make recommendations on the plan to be followed, and I have recommended that installations to be offered by the Voice of America, or the experiences of the International Organization Service, be adopted. I have also taken advantage of the services of a management consulting agency which has made recommendations on all domestic facilities used by the Voice, particularly those purchased by decision primarily thereon. I have selected one architect, and an acting agent, competent persons to whom I have given full authority to engage competent persons in private industry, to come and familiarize with the operations of the Voice.

The decision to terminate these contracts has been taken with full realization of the policy of Public Law 402 relative to private enterprise in the broadcasting field. Very recently I voted to terminate construction contracts for two large Government transmitting stations in this country.

This present action is not intended to prejudice a continuance or increased participation of a private entity in international broadcasting by these licensees. I shall co-operate to this end.

This action is taken with genuine regret particularly because you and your Company have rendered in many ways services of great value to the United States, and because I know what has been done in a highly patriotic spirit.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson  
Administrator

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Agency Channel to NCPE

1. Now that Larry deFererville is working for NCPE, I know that there will be a strong tendency on the part of all of us to deal with NCPE through Larry, this not only because he is an able man but because we all know him so well.
2. If we take this course, however, we shall confuse channels of communications as between the Agency and NCPE by adding to the normal IO/Branch I (William J. Burke, Chief) channel and to such informal channels as necessarily exist still another channel. This would make the job of all of us more difficult and confound our constant efforts at orderly procedure.
3. I hope that higher authority will bear this in mind.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)  
1 cc - IO/BrI  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

CMR 3067

~~SECRET~~

## SECURITY INFORMATION

3-9241
--------

3 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

SUBJECT: Request from the NCPB for the release of £150,000 from  
the CIA held reserve for the NCPB.

1. Mr. Spencer Phoenix, on behalf of the NCPB, upon authorization of  
the Board of Directors, has requested the release of £150,000 from the CIA  
held reserve for FEUC capital construction for the following purposes:

## (a) "Alterations to the main building:

Installation of a refrigerated cold room  
for the storage of food 35,400.

Additional automatic kettles and equip-  
ment in the kitchen and service room 1,700.

Additional office space on the second  
floor 600.

Total £7,900.

The original dining room installation  
provided for service for a student body  
of 100; the increase in enrolment (now  
almost 200) has demonstrated that more  
refrigeration and storage space and equip-  
ment is needed.

Housing the women students in the main  
building with resultant changes in the  
physical lay-out has meant the readjust-  
ment of office space and it has proved  
possible to provide two new offices on the  
second floor for the estimated cost of £600.

(b) Improvements to the furnished house adjoining  
the main building and used as residence by the  
Assistant Dean 6,000.

Necessary additional furniture to replace  
items removed by lessor and improve living  
conditions. 1,200.

Total £7,900.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

The contemplated alteration involves principally the installation of central heat connected with the main heating system. At the present time there is no central heating, the building is constantly damp in winter time, and the attempt to maintain a satisfactory temperature with stoves and portable heaters has proved unsatisfactory. Other improvements consist of additional kitchen equipment, including a gas water heater, a kitchen cabinet, the construction of a closet, repairs to the electrical system and conversion of existing garage space into a small dining room.

- (c) Construction of an auditorium for student meetings, lectures and recreation activities, such as contests, student theatricals, moving pictures and the like with, as a secondary feature, facilities for indoor exercise during the winter months.

Total	\$102,000.
-------	------------

The auditorium will have a reinforced concrete foundation, outside walls of pine clapboards (similar to recently completed dormitory and lecture hall) with compressed fireproof straw material for insulation, a composition roof of the same material used on the new dormitory and lecture hall and with main framing of steel. Satisfactory lighting and heating systems are included and the interior finish will be such as to provide satisfactory acoustic qualities. Also included in this building are offices and living quarters for the "concierge." The architect's estimate shows the estimated cost of the auditorium itself (17 meters x 22 meters in size, including 15,000. for steel costs and \$3,000. for safety glass) as \$55,000., the additional cost of the stage with the "concierge's" accommodations above as \$19,000., connecting passage between auditorium and adjoining building, \$7,300., relocation of library and alteration of study halls, \$1,100., revolvable seats, stage and window curtains, motion picture equipment with screen and window curtains, motion picture equipment with screen and athletic equipment, \$22,400. (All figures approx.)

- (d) Re-surfacing walks between buildings and installation of a few electric lights at strategic points along the walks. Total cost \$3,000.

- (e) Installation and equipment of a central telephone switchboard with necessary wiring and additional telephone instruments so as to permit intercommunication

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

between the various buildings and offices.	\$2,000.
(f) Additional furniture required for the "concierge's" quarters, equipment for the kitchen enlargement and additional furnishings for the women's dormitory.	\$5,500.
(g) Architect's fees.	\$6,000.
Total	<b>\$135,400.</b>

Savings are due to a great simplification in the architect's proposal for the auditorium, the elimination of the new residence for the Assistant Dean, made possible by the recent agreement on the part of the owner to permit the Assistant Dean to occupy his present quarters until the termination of the lease on the entire property instead of requiring him to vacate the quarters this summer; the elimination for the time being of a proposed small apartment building to accommodate visiting professors and officials; postponement of certain landscaping expenses and the elimination of a proposed enlargement of the dining hall now felt to be unnecessary since a limit of 200 has been fixed for next year's enrollment.

In order to complete new construction by August 1, 1953, work should start not later than March 15, 1953, and in view of the time necessary for the preparation of working plans, opening of bids, and signature of contracts, it is of the greatest importance that the necessary funds be made promptly available."

2. The difference between the total of \$135,400 and the \$150,000 asked for is a 10% margin allowance for price increases.

3. We recommend, for release from the CIA held reserve by the D/P and the D/A, all items except (a) and the 10% margin allowance, a total of ~~\$150,000~~ <sup>\$135,400</sup>.

CIA - DEPT. OF STATE - H. BRADEN

IO/Branch 1:WFB:jgb  
Distributions  
Addressee - orig & 1 (DD/P)  
 1 cc (D/A)  
 CONCURRENCE: 1 cc Ccsp.  
 (SAC) signed 1 cc CIO  
 1 cc IO/Br. 1 ✓  
 N. Deputy Director (Plans)

FRANK W. HANLEY  
 Chief  
 International Organizations Division

JOHN J. GAUDENS  
 Comptroller

1/5/22 WRW SECURITY INFORMATION  
 Deputy Director (Administration)

SECRET

Security Information

DD/P 3098

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Good news concerning William Heimlich.

1. I have just received through Mr. Durkee a report from the RFE people in Munich to the following effect.
2. Mr. Heimlich has visited the premises and talked to some of the key personnel of RFE-Munich. He was cordially received and shown around. At the conclusion of his visit, Mr. Heimlich stated that whereas he was not primarily or particularly interested or concerned with NCFE/RFE activities and operations (presumably meaning that he was more concerned with the State Department information project -- and presumably NPA), he had been very much impressed by what he had seen. He was satisfied that this was a hard-hitting operation; that there was no "fat" on it; and that he would so report to the Senate Committee upon his return.

FRANK O. WISNIE  
Acting Deputy Director.

cc: CIO - Information.

SECRET

Security Information

**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

Received by	15
3-28-22	

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Points raised by you in connection with Mr. Burkett's conversation with Leland Stowe on 11 March 1953 and Whitney Shepardson on 16 March 1953.

The following answers to Mr. Wissner's comments on subject above have been prepared by Mr. Burkett:

1. "Mr. Lang does not intend to put Stowe in official charge of Munich operations. My remark was intended to indicate that apparently with Lang's consent, Mr. Stowe is becoming increasingly influential in the Munich operation. Is Stowe's Information Service developing, so that it is writing scripts and programming as he proposes, and if Stowe's suggestions for dealing with the German problem are followed, he will indeed, if given Lang's full support, be the dominant R&D figure in Munich."

2. "The original 'ice-box' statement was indeed passed on by us. By reference was to our approval of an alternative 'ice-box' statement entitled, 'UNWE Policy Statement', which Shepardson proposes to use in place of the original. I have not been able to determine whether this received our approval and, therefore, on 24 March, sent it through channels to the D/P and D/CI for their official approval."

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

UNCLASSIFIED   RESTRICTED   CONFIDENTIAL   SECRET  
 (SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	e 100		
2	<i>Burke</i>		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	PP/c/admin	CRD	26 Mar
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS: CPP asks that you prepare  
 a reply to the two points  
 raised by F.G.W. and send same  
 to F.G.W. via CPP.

SUSPENSE 2 APRIL  
 SECRET   CONFIDENTIAL   RESTRICTED   UNCLASSIFIED  
 FORM NO. 30-6  
 SEP 1947

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2863-

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:				NO.	I O - 3 - 861
<i>10/Branch I</i>				DATE	<i>16 March 1953</i>
TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	PWDU		
1. <i>CVO</i>				<i>TWB</i>	<i>TOM:</i>
2. <i>C/PP</i>			<i>19 Mar</i>	<i>CTB</i>	<i>Frank W should see this at least to report of conversation w/ it continental Libs started with him.</i>
3. <i>D/DP</i>		<i>On 29 Mar</i>		<i>FSC</i>	
4. <i>Mr Barnes</i>			<i>26 Mar</i>	<i>CTB</i>	
5. <i>Mr Braden</i>					<i>WPD</i>
6.					
7.					
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**SECRET**  
Security Information

TRANSMISSION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION  
RECEIVED BY RAY - 2:30 P.M. TO 12:15 P.M.

During the course of our conversation Mr. Stowe stated that he was pleased to have had the opportunity to meet here and to clear up his status. He also stated that:

a. In his opinion Mr. Lang is indispensable to the operation of RFE, but that it was necessary for Mr. Lang to be in Munich more often. He feels that in spite of Mr. Lang's over-all comprehension that developments in Munich have out-run Lang's or anyone's capacity to understand it without closer contact with its day to day operations.

b. He has a high regard for Mr. Richard Condon, whom he feels is doing an excellent job. It is Stowe's opinion that Condon needs a competent administrative assistant and that Alan Lichie, RFE correspondent in London, could fill such a position. Lang agrees with him. Stowe feels it remarkable that during his considerable time with RFE that he has never heard a bad word about Mr. Condon.

c. He has a very high regard for Mr. Griffith and the role he plays in RFE's operations, however, it was his feeling that it is impossible for Mr. Griffith to adequately take care of RFE's outside relations in Germany because: (1) Griffith does not have the time and; (2) He is not particularly effective in dealing with Germans because of his youth and rather pedantic manner. He informed me that there is a possibility of getting Raymond G. Swing for employment with RFE and that he felt Swing could excellently undertake the job of dealing with the German government and German public because of Swing's language facility, his familiarity with Germany and his prestige.

d. He is reorganizing the News and Information Service of RFE because the drying up of escapees has increased the need for top rank correspondents with depth of European experience and political knowledge, so that significant ideas and contributions to RFE propaganda can be developed. He also feels that a reorganized news gathering service will lead to more effective American leadership because of the respect the exiles will have for its American personnel. Such procedures, in his opinion, are necessary in order to properly integrate the various free radio desks, their use of information resources and to professionalize program content. He says he intends to have his News and Information Service prepare scripts to be used by all desks. In addition, Stowe pointed out a news gathering service of top rank correspondents will allow him great operational flexibility, for personnel can be interchanged at will.

**SECRET**  
Security Information

**SECRET**

Security Information

- 2 -

e. Stowe also made a strong plea for Malcolm Davis who is a personal friend.

COMMENTS:

Stowe is a strong person who is taking over PNH Munich, apparently with Lang's consent. I suspect Lang gives his consent because he has been unable to dominate either Griffith or Condon. Lang has presumably heretofore dealt with this problem by insisting upon U.S. policy control and by keeping an inordinately large Czech, Polish and Hungarian program desk in New York.

I am sure there is merit in many of Stowe's observations but suspect that real trouble is brewing between New York and Munich, especially among exile personnel as this becomes more a Stowe "American" operation.

*William P. Derrick*  
WILLIAM P. DERRICK  
Chfr., IC/TOHC

**SECRET**

Security Information

**SECRET**

Security Information

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION - 16 MARCH 1953 AM~~

sub50

1. Mr. Shepardson said that he had gone over Drew Pearson business with his entire staff and that they had all agreed that a policy of silence was clearly indicated — that this was not a time to release the "ice-box" statement which he referred to as "ice-box" statement number 1 and number 2. Shepardson said he would feel out C. P. Jackson in his meeting with him today to determine whether C. P. thought any approach to Pearson should be made and whether he himself would be the one to do it. He agreed that such an approach to Pearson should be made by someone else.

2. When I queried him about the "ice-box" statement number 2, he said he referred to the NSC Policy Statement which states the fact of US Government support. He said that it was his understanding that it had been cleared down here. I replied that to my knowledge this was not so. I told him all we had ever had was a draft statement which had been discussed informally. He agreed that if this was in fact the case, he would immediately send the policy statement for our formal approval.

3. During the course of our conversation he indicated that Abbot Marchburn had arranged for RUE to appear before the Jackson Committee on March 26 and also had arranged for the rest of RUE to make a presentation some time in April. I asked whether Mr. Dulles was informed of this and he said he was not aware that he was. I suggested that some problem existed here for RUE is Mr. Dulles' responsibility and that no-one denied that RUE/DU should make such a presentation, it was still a fact that such a unilateral presentation might lead to some difficulties. I therefore suggested that we make a joint presentation whether written or oral, to which Mr. Shepardson agreed.

4. I discussed the problem of security in RUE, Munich, and our concern that a security man competent to deal with questions other than the mere internal security of RUE be placed in Munich. Shepardson immediately agreed that this should be done and we agreed that I would prepare a paper for him outlining what we thought our problems are. In the meantime, there will not be informed of our discussions on this subject. We also agreed that the matter of working out the placement of such a person in RUE would be a matter of joint study, but that it was largely a problem for him to work out with much assistance as we can give.

5. We discussed the question of construction funds for the TUSA and Shepardson agreed that he would talk with Spencer Phenix in order to arrive at an overall estimate of University affairs before submitting an official request for funds. It was agreed, therefore, at this time we would not take any action on Phenix's request dated 17 February 1953.

6. I stated that I was anxious for a thorough review of Albanian-Rumanian emigre questions and we agreed that after Shepardson had time to give personal attention to details of these matters, we would have a full discussion here.

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Security Information

*William P. O'Durkin*  
110000 P. 07/2/53  
Chief, 10/tonic

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Security Information

1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FROM: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TO: Deputy Director (Plans)  
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare  
SUBJECT: Release of Funds for purchase of apartments to house  
FEUE personnel.

1. Spencer Phoenix, Treasurer of FEUE, has submitted a request for the sum of \$22,300.00 to purchase four apartments in Strasbourg, France, to house some of the tutorial staff of the Free University in Exile (see attached). FEUE can obtain these premises by special arrangement with the city of Strasbourg, to whom these apartments belong. There is an acute housing shortage in Strasbourg so that these apartments are necessary if the teaching staff of the University is to be reasonably accommodated.
2. I recommend that this sum be released to FEUE from the CIA held reserve for FEUE capital construction. The purchase price of these quarters is readily recoverable, if necessary, by resale because of housing shortages in the city of Strasbourg -- a shortage which will not be substantially relieved for sometime.

*Thomas W. Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment: Ltr. fr. Phoenix dtd  
3/23/53

CONCURRENCE:

Deputy Director (Plans)

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

Security Information

23 March 1953

Dear Nelson:

As requested by you this morning, I quote below the text of a letter received today from Paris, regarding the unfurnished apartments which the City of Strasbourg is prepared to sell for use by Robertau personnel.

"This morning I sent you the following cable:

'FOR ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FRANCS CAN HAVE OPTION EXPIRING ONE MAY TO PURCHASE FOUR UNFURNISHED APARTMENTS PRICED AT SIXTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND FRANCS STOP OPTION MUST BE TAKEN UP NOT LATER THAN TWENTY SEVEN MARCH STOP TYSN AND I FAVOR PURCHASE AS REQUESTING MOST SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF HOUSING PROBLEM LETTER FOLLOWING SABOLOT'

As stated in Minet's memorandum of the 9th of March the city of Strasbourg is in control. They are willing to give us an option on these apartments, at a cost of 160,000 francs, said option to expire on 1 May 1953. They give us until the 27th of March to take up this option.

The apartments will be finished on the 1st of August. They have offered us the following apartments:

- a) Southern exposure - ground floor - 3½ rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic. Fr. 4,075,000
- b) Southern exposure - 3rd floor - 4 rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic. Fr. 4,520,000
- c) Northern exposure - 2nd floor - 3 rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic. Fr. 3,555,000
- d) Northern exposure - 2nd floor - 4 rooms plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic. Fr. 3,950,000

TOTAL Fr. 16,100,000

To the above total must be added the costs of:

- a) Registration, transfer and notary fees.
- b) Installing electrical fixtures.
- c) Installing stoves and ice boxes in kitchen.
- d) Furnishing apartments, (I assume men of our staff will have their own furniture, etc.)

SECRET  
Security Information

It is estimated the above would come to Fr. 4,300,000, making a total of 20,400,000 francs or \$50,000.00 at 350 francs to the dollar.

I am aware of your reasons for not wishing to own real estate in Europe. However, the problem of finding suitable quarters for the College staff is a difficult one. Providing the funds are available, Ty and I are in favor of purchase, as these apartments provide an immediate partial solution to a difficult problem.

If you should decide to take up the option, we can discuss the financial details of the purchase when you visit Paris next month."

You will note that for the relatively small payment of 160,000 francs, an option will be granted valid until 1 May 1959, and since it is obvious that a final decision cannot be immediately made, I have cabled Paris, requesting that the option be purchased so that we may have time to consider the problem carefully.

I shall be in Washington next Sunday evening and available for discussion Monday morning. If you have not been able to clear the question before then, I suggest that you set up a meeting with George Lefton at which Daniel Church and I can present our views in the hope of obtaining prompt determination.

Sincerely,

William L. Digby

SECRET  
Security Information

3787

14 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PP  
SUBJECT: Letter from G. M. Dimitrov

The attached letter to Mr. Shepardson with appended Agenda and Procedures of the Plenary Session of the B.N.C. came to me through a reliable source in New York. Mr. Dimitrov is unaware that these papers have fallen into our hands. I am passing them along to you for whatever interest they may have. You may want to send them to Tom Braden for his scrutiny and files. It should be underlined that Mr. Dimitrov must not become aware of our having secured this material.

Richard Helms  
Chief of Operations, DD/P

Attachments

SECURITY INFORMATION

9 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: Bradshaw Project

Attached is an accounting signed by William L. DIGBY  
of the Bradshaw Project for the period August 15, 1952 to  
May 27, 1953. This is for retention in your files.

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment  
As stated.

CIO:TWB/ah

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/TOMIC  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET**

Security Information

2 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Remarks for meeting with Spencer Phenix et al  
on Thursday, 2:30 PM, 4 June 1953

1. At a PDC action on Friday, 29 May, as an interim action pending a full review in August of NCFE's total program and budget the Division recommended:

a. NCFE be given three months operating expenses -- \$3,945,104 - the current rate of expenditures;

b. \$813,590 to be put in the Free Europe University in Exile account -- the proposed NY 1954 operating expenditures -- with authority for NCFE to draw upon this account for three months at the current rate of expenditures. NCFE authorities had requested that the full amount be made available to them at this time to enable them to comply with the legal requirements of the Board of Regents of the State of New York, to which the University is responsible. It was expressly stated that the activities of the FEUE would be subject to the later full review and that the recommended action in no way implied approval of University activities at this time; and

c. Approval for RFE capital expenditures of \$1,299,275 for the completion of RFE's transmitter program in its present locations. The funds for these expenditures were to come out of Crusade funds which, as you know, are specifically raised for capital construction.

2. In its action the PDC:

a. Refused to allow the \$3,945,104 which NCFE requested to cover its current operating expenses by cutting this figure to \$3,000,000 with the statement NCFE can come back for more if necessary, and with the further stipulation that Crusade funds be used for this purpose;

b. Refused to allow RFE to undertake its proposed capital development but authorized this Division to investigate the possibility of using two 100 kw transmitters owned by this Agency and as well as the purchase of the unused 100 kw's from VOA; and

- 2 -

c. Refused to appropriate any money for the FEUE, but directed NCFE to transfer funds from other accounts including that of the Crusade for Freedom to the FEUE, authorizing NCFE to incur expenditures for three months at the current rate.

3. The intent of this Division in its recommendations to the PRC was to provide NCFE and the FEUE with the operating funds necessary to continue its activities in the FY 1954 at the current rate. These funds were to tide NCFE over the first months of FY 1954, pending a thorough budgetary and program review and subsequent presentation and recommendations to proper CIA authorities in the month of August. At that time Whitney Sherardson will have completed his initial tour of inspection, and can be on hand to defend his budget and our recommendations thereto.

The only exception to this procedure was the request for approval of RPN's capital needs. This request was made after a thorough examination of proposals by this Division and General McClelland, Office of Communications, his technical staff and RPE engineers. As a result, General McClelland authorized this Division to state to the PRC that the RPN proposals were technically sound. As far as these capital expenditures are concerned the IO Division had completed its review and recommended their approval in order that there be no delay in getting this additional transmitter equipment in place.

4. I would strongly suggest that the meeting on Thursday not involve a general budgetary review. It should be confined, in my opinion, to a statement to Mr. Spencor Phenix and his budgetary officer, who should be the sole NCFE officers present, that CIA will conduct through the IO Division:

a. A thorough and detailed review of all current activities and new activities proposed by NCFE;

b. A financial review in the sense that all financial information necessary to support the NCFE program and budget is made available. Our study of this financial information will be confined to a general review to ensure accuracy, adequate explanations of uncertain items and a general analysis to ensure proper budgetary procedures. I would like to point out and strongly emphasize that we have already received the utmost cooperation from the officials of NCFE in setting such program and fiscal information.

5. We cannot, in my opinion, having granted NCFE broad authority in the execution of its task, seek to impose our judgment for theirs in the details of their management of this project. Such matters as were raised at the PRC, i.e. whether the request for replacement of 32 trucks is based on Agency standards for truck replacement, have in my opinion no place in such a review. We can review management and fiscal policies in a broad sense to satisfy ourselves that they are

- 3 -

sound. NCFE officials should be present at the budget review to answer such questions. This is their responsibility. If we are dissatisfied with the present management, we should get a new one.

We have, however, the responsibility of making a detailed review of the policies and the activities of NCFE undertaken in pursuance of their mission as given to them by this Agency. NCFE is entitled to know that its programs and policies are approved and that no after the fact question can arise. Equally, NCFE is not entitled to undertake programs or activities which are not approved by this Agency.

At the completion of its review of NCFE's proposed program for FY 1954, a review which involves detailed examination in cooperation with the CIA staffs and area divisions and with the Department of State, IO Division will make its recommendations to the proper Agency officials for their final action. Such an orderly procedure will enable this Agency to have completely reviewed NCFE's activities, to have concurred in each, and will allow NCFE to proceed in the knowledge that its activities are fully authorized and approved.

6. I, therefore, propose that the meeting on Thursday be confined to Phenix and his budget officer during which the above approach can be made. I will leave for your judgment the question whether the actions of the PSC on Friday should be opened for review and modification. Phenix will certainly want to do so for the following reasons:

- a. The operating funds authorized are not adequate;
- b. The directive to use Crusade funds for operational expenses runs counter to established procedures and NCFE's commitments to the public in the use of such funds;
- c. The failure to approve RFE capital items now means a delay into next year of the installation of transmitting equipment, which if approved now, can be in place and operating by October of this year. (This will not be the case if you authorize our use of the Agency owned 100 kw's and a purchase of the VOA transmitters can be arranged, which I believe can);
- d. There are not sufficient surplus funds, (excluding the Crusade, to apply to the Free Europe University). (There are, however, impressed cash funds which are a three months' operating advances in NCFE's possession which can be used - Phenix agrees.)

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

UNCLASSIFIED	RESTRICTED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)			
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
<b>TO</b>		INITIALS	DATE
1	DCI		
2			
3			
4			
5			
<b>FROM</b>		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	8 May
2			
3			
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE		<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH <input type="checkbox"/> FILE
<b>REMARKS:</b>			
This is the letter which Whitney Shepardson sent to Sol Levitas, about which you are aware. <i>TWB</i>			
SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	UNCLASSIFIED

4-1139

May 5, 1953.

May 5, 1953

Mr. E. M. Levitas,  
Executive Editor,  
The New Leader,  
7 East 15th Street,  
New York 3, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Levitas:

In January 1953 an arrangement was made whereby you were to send 1000 copies of The New Leader to England and to Europe during the current year.

We wish to discontinue that arrangement. We do not wish to have our contribution used any longer in that way.

I would like to discuss with you at your early convenience the question of the return to us of some part of that contribution in view of the paper, printing and mailing costs which will be saved by the discontinuance.

Yours sincerely,

President.

WE3:IRH

Orig to SO/BrI

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAY 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: IO/BRANCH ONE

SUBJECT: Utilization of Various Balkan Emigre Groups  
by SE Division for Operational Purposes

In reply to a request made by Miss Stern of your office for detailed information concerning the operational utilization of various Balkan emigre groups by SE Division, there are attached as tabs to this memorandum studies covering our activities among the Albanian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Yugoslav emigration. We understand that this information is required to provide a basis for reviewing the operational plan and budget of the Fund for the coming year. Since the information is considered highly sensitive, it is forwarded for your information only.

Christian H. Freer  
Acting Chief, SE

Tab A - SE Utilization of Albanian Emigre Groups  
Tab B - SE Utilization of Bulgarian Emigre Groups  
Tab C - SE Utilization of Yugoslav Emigre Groups  
Tab D - SE Utilization of Rumanian Emigre Groups

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SECURITY INFORMATION

*Orig given back  
1 Apr*

*Rec'd 31 Mar.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division  
SUBJECT: Reported Financial Support of  
Dr. Dimitrov by Bulgarians in Germany  
REFERENCE: Memorandum (IO-3-682), dated 2 March 1953

1. With regard to reference memorandum, this Division has long suspected that some such arrangement existed. Any money which Dr. Dimitrov managed to extract from the Guard Company members is obtained by him as a result of his own personal sway exercised over this group of Bulgarians.

2. It has also come to our attention that Dr. Dimitrov is receiving money from miscellaneous Bulgarians in Canada and the United States in the name of a trust fund which he has set up. You are no doubt aware of this development.

3. We are most interested in getting from you, your estimate of Dr. Dimitrov's income from all sources as well as a listing of those sources of income about which you know.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER  
ACTING CHIEF, SE

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAP 17  
1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF IO DIVISION

SUBJECT : Proposal for Establishing a Microfilm Library  
of Rumanian Reference Material

1. The attached paper outlines a project which may be of interest to your division. A Rumanian emigre, interested in propaganda and cultural activities, prepared the paper after consulting with a number of refugee scholars.

2. Although the results of such a project would be of great value to our Rumanian operations, implementation is considered beyond the scope of the activities of this Division. Further, it appears more practicable for a project of this type to be undertaken by a research or cultural organization, rather than an intelligence agency, in order that the results may be more widely used.

3. It is suggested that the NCCE, which is concerned with worthwhile employment of refugee intellectuals, may be interested in this project for its Mid-European Studies Center. If the NCCE is not in a position to finance such a project, it is possible that a privately endowed foundation would be interested. The emigre has discussed this project with Dr. Sergius Jacobson of the Library of Congress and with Professor Moseley of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. He has reported that both agencies appear interested.

4. Because of some doubt concerning the reliability of three of the individuals mentioned in section III of the attached report, the following data is submitted for your information:

a. Dr. Mircea Eliade was formerly editor of an Iron Guard (Rumanian fascist group) newspaper and a doctrinaire of the Guard. He is reported to have disassociated himself from the Guard in the last year but this information cannot be confirmed.

b. Dr. Leontin Constantinescu reported as formerly pro-Iron Guardist in his sympathies.

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**SECRET**

c. Dr. Tom Claudian is reportedly engaged at the present time in emigre Iron Guard activities in Europe.

5. If further information is desired, please contact Miss Nowson, extension 495.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SE

Attachment: As stated above

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Security Information

*orig to baker  
Stern  
Recd: 4/2/53*

26 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Bulgarian Guard Company

REFERENCE: Secret Memo from Chief, IO, Subject: Information on Quasi-soldiers located in Frankfurt dated 19 March 1953

1. Sole control of the Bulgarian Guard Company was assumed by USARUW in December 1952. Since there was never a definite period of enlistment, members of the Company were free to leave at will. As a result, there was a considerable turn-over of personnel. The maximum T/O strength was 200. Peak strength, about 30 in excess of T/O, was reached in 1952. However, this number was immediately reduced to 200.

2. The Company was continually plagued by the constant political activism of the adherents of Dr. Georgi K. Dimitrov. It is estimated that a maximum of 40 members were hard-core Dimitrov adherents.

3. The first Bulgarian Commander of the Company was Stefan Boidev. Upon his removal from the Company, Borislav Baichev was appointed in his place.

4. Stoyan Dobrev (Papazov) does not appear on the last roster of Guard Company members (September 1952) available to us. He was one of the early members of the Company.

JOHN E. BAKER  
CHIEF, SE

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 25 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

SUBJECT: The New Leader

Confirming the instructions from DCI which I relayed to you by telephone last week, CIA is not to pay for overseas subscriptions to the New Leader either by direct or indirect channels.

(Signed) ALFRED C. ULMER JR.

ALFRED C. ULMER JR.  
Assistant Chief  
Political and Psychological Warfare Staff

cc: C/IO

CONFIDENTIAL

**SECRET****Security Information**

16 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Memorandum dated 13 March 1953, Subject: "Notes on Paris Trip"

1. C. D. Jackson wrote the Boris Duke Foundation on Cohen's behalf, asking that he be granted \$10,000. He was granted this amount.

2. Zurcher Berle & Co. are meeting in New York today and I have done everything that I can to ensure that Tyson gets full backing. I think this was really already being done as far as possible. When I got back, I suggested that this be done and a telegram was sent to Tyson giving him full authority to act in any manner in which he saw fit, including the firing of Malcom Davis. In my discussion with Shepardson this morning he agreed that the entire subject of the University and its future should be discussed immediately. He will, therefore, examine their position in this matter for our consideration and he agreed to withdraw the request for construction funds until they themselves know what they wish to do.

*pls discuss  
with me*

3. In discussing the FTUC in Exile with Spencer Phenix while you were away, I was informed that you had decided that support would be withdrawn after June 30. If this is so, I wonder how Pacak could be employed unless it has other means of support. Phenix also informed me that Benmen agreed to go back to Paris for at least six months on an expenses paid basis with no salary.

Frankfurt is supposed to make high level defectors available to RFE. I discussed this while in Munich and was assured that this would be done. The difficulty up to now has been Truscott and the Munich station's inability to insist upon anything from Frankfurt.

4. ACUE has a bank account which is used to bank funds passing through the Committee and which show on ACUE books. Another account is impossible for cover reasons as funds passed to it would not show in ACUE accounts in New York but would in Paris. As a result arrangements were made to have Fugitt's account a joint one with some administrative officer in Paris or to have Fugitt sign a blank check to be held in the Paris office. All these matters were gone into in great detail by Knott. Thayer, in my opinion, is using technique through Tom Lester of making business impossible. Knott shares this opinion, as do others. For example, Fugitt was granted a raise about one year ago, he has not yet received it, etc.

5. I know nothing about the Swiss franc matter and moreover my impression is that financial procedures now followed in the unity projects, to which I presume you refer, and which are not in this Division, have been arranged at

**SECRET****Security Information**

**SECRET**  
Security Information

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the direction of administrative and finance people. Jim Knott, who is as scrupulous and thorough as any man can be, made all such arrangements and I would accept his recommendations of what needs to be done, if anything.



WILLIAM P. DOHMAN  
Chief, IO/TOMIC

**SECRET**  
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Dr. Paul A. Fabry

At Clover's suggestion, I saw Paul Fabry, a very impressive and learned young Hungarian who is not a citizen and who wanted a job. I have replied to him negatively in the attachment and do so because there is a long list of allegations in the files about his and his wife's Communist associations. These allegations may or may not be correct but are accepted as correct by John Hughes who advises most strongly against having anything to do with him.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

/attachment

C  
O  
P  
Y

25 March 1953

Dear Dr. Fabry:

I have given a lot of thought within the past few days to the question of your immediate future which you raised with me. I find on checking into our rules and regulations that I simply can't help you here. I am sorry about this because you are an impressive man to talk to.

I wish you good luck elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Dr. Paul A. Fabry  
347 W. 87th Street  
New York, New York

Security Information

bring given  
TONIC 10 March

7 March 1953

what has  
wife done  
about this?

7 wife talked  
Harry been talked  
to SIS on this

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ID/PP

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Mr. Ramsey

1. Reference our conversation sometime ago, I would like to give you the results of our Registry checks on Ramsey, who may or may not be identical with the present British citizen employed by EFE in Hamburg.

PTE-289 19 Aug 48	Subject arrived in Trieste under sponsorship of Charles K. NOFFLY, director of AIS. He speaks fluent Serbian and during war was commander of a Yugoslav camp in Egypt. Has been assigned to planning section of AMG. AIS is cover for SIS.
PTA-291 3 June 49	Individual believed identical with subject signed interrogation report either as or for the Trieste Security Officer.
PI-44033 24 Sept 49	ANTONIJE, suspected EA for British, has for three weeks been under constant SIS interrogation by Italian speaking British sergeant in apartment of Maj. A.I.E. RAMSEY. Surveillance reveals apartments several FBI officers in building. Gold, SIS chief, seen entering and leaving building with subject and several unidentified British women.
PTT-371 5 Oct 48	Subject is the head of five British officers who are in Trieste making a survey of the entire area prior to conducting special mission in Yugoslavia.

Security Information

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NAV-000424 20 June 57	Subject British FSO (Pub. Sec. officer) Graz. Intervened in the case of Josef Meger.
IN-22201 2 Sept 57	Subject is in Graz. Question as to whether in FSS or NI-6.
IN-21803 27 Aug	Subject was named by Mary Allison Nixon, now held in prison in Baden by the Soviets, as FIS officer in Graz.
WEL-593 12 Sept 57	Public Safety Officer in Military Government in Graz. He has been in contact with representatives of British Austrian Station.

2. Ramsey no doubt is an extremely desirable officer for RFE and I see no objection to a man with intelligence background being employed by RFE, since quite obviously the combination of language and background must be invaluable to their program, but I still believe that those RFE posts which could be exploited best by us should be occupied by American citizens, who can be cleared by us and who will have American intelligence interests closest to their hearts. You may or may not know that RFE, especially in such places as Berlin and Vienna, is one of the important screening points for refugees coming from the Satellite areas and as such the RFE representatives act as bin-i-dogs for this Agency's PI program wherever possible.

3. I should appreciate your keeping me advised on the possibility of keeping Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative.

PETER STINSEL  
EE/F1700

SECRET

Security Information

2574

5 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division  
ATTENTION: Mr. Durkee  
VIA: C/PP  
SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe. Miscellaneous matters; conversation with Mr. Lang.

1. This is a brief report for the benefit of Mr. Durkee and for the information of Messrs. Barnes and Braden, concerning certain aspects of my luncheon conversation with Mr. Robert E. Lang of 4 March.

2. I believe that I was successful in covering in one way or another all of the points raised with me by Mr. Durkee prior to my conversation with Mr. Lang. I will not attempt in this memorandum to recapitulate the entire conversation, but I will comment on certain aspects thereof and state that, in general, the conversation seemed to me to be quite satisfactory.

3. I received the impression that there are still "wheels within wheels" and much internal friction within the NCER set-up. This is very regrettable, but it seems to be a fact of life which I think should be brought to the attention of Mr. Shepardson at a very early date, and he should be urged to bring the warring factions together on a more amicable basis. The personalities involved are all important to the success of the operation and it is a great shame that they spend so much of their time and energy trying to out-maneuver and checkmate one another. I would not "give up" Bob Lang on this in talking with Mr. Shepardson -- but simply make this as a general observation of ours.

4. I came down quite hard on Bob with respect to the Leland Stowe brochure which Mr. Durkee handed to me and which I return to you herewith. I pointed out that this thing struck us as quite bad, and for three good and sufficient reasons, to wit:

a. It represents too much concentration of effort on publicity and propaganda within the United States -- our target is the satellites and to some extent the rest of the free world, but we have no charter to operate or propagandise within the United States and this only invites trouble when it is done;

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Security Information

**SECRET**

- 2 -

b. As written, this communication or brochure has every appearance of offering a new international news service to American editors. (It is called "The RFE News and Information Service".) It is not indicated whether this will be charged for or furnished free of charge to the proposed newspaper recipients -- but in either case it would be almost sure to bring down upon the head of RFE the wrath, indignation and hostility of all the major news services who are extremely jealous and sensitive about competition of any kind, but particularly Government competition. The news services and newspapers have played ball pretty well in covering up our dark secret, but I suspect that anything of this kind would make enemies out of friends and set the news services upon a course of deliberate exposure.

c. This move points up and invites attention to Leland Stowe's present position and, as such, opens up unnecessary vulnerabilities to the kind of attack with which we are all too familiar concerning individuals who have "written a book".

Bob Lang had no ready or very satisfactory explanation of this matter -- said that he had not known about it or had not seen it -- and that he could only interpret it as an effort on Stowe's part to personally rehabilitate himself. I said that I had no objection to a program of self-rehabilitation on Stowe's part, but that he simply could not do so at the expense of the organization for which he works. Lang appeared to agree.

5. I told Mr. Lang that as far as we understood it there would be no objection to his going to Turkey to see what he could negotiate for himself. Ambassador McGhee's cable appears to have relieved State Department's objections and the only question seems to be one of operational feasibility and desirability as regards his making the effort with the Turks. I ventured to predict that he would run into difficulties with the Turks, and suggested that if he were to fail in his Turkish mission he might stop by in Greece to look into the situation there, which I said we had reason to believe might be more favorable.

(Signed, FRANK C. WISNER)

FRANK C. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)

Mimeo brochure offering reports via "RFE's News & Information Service."

**SECRET**

Sensitive Information

SECRET

Rec'd 6 March '53  
sent to Stern

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

ATTENTION : Miss Stern

SUBJECT : Material for Transmittal to RFE.

1. Forwarded herewith is a list of persons who are considered to be acceptable script writers for Albanian material to be prepared for use by RFE. It was originally intended to forward a list of persons not considered suitable, but it was later felt that this negative approach might allow some unacceptable persons to slip through. You will note that this approved list consists of only 30 names. If RFE proposes to use any persons not on the list all that they have to do is submit the name of the proposed script writer so that we may check our files for any information on him. Immediately upon receipt of the name of a person we will reply, stating whether the person is: (a) unacceptable now, (b) may be used one time only, or (c) may be used and added to the approved list.

2. Of particular interest to us, and something we consider worthy of RFE's attention, is the recent use of Ernest Koliqi for the preparation of a script. Mr. Koliqi is a member of the HKI, a political organization which has been unacceptable in the past. Mr. Koliqi is further unacceptable as an individual by reason of his past. From the condensed information available on him it appears that he "cooperated with the Italian Minister to Tirana in preparing the Italian occupation . . . returned to Tirana (he had long lived in Italy as he does now) where he held the post of Minister of Education 1939-1943. Member of the Albanian Fascist party."

3. It would seem that the use of Mr. Koliqi for the preparation of scripts is subject to serious question. In this script for February 22, page 2, he states "a much better presentation of the various literary phases . . . is the anthology entitled The Albanian Writers published in 1941 by the Minister of Education." (Note that he was the Minister of Education during this period under the Fascist government.)

4. There are other specific examples of possibly doubtful persons having been used in the preparation of scripts. Dimitar Berati, a Zogist official when Zog was in power, a Fascist official when the Fascists were in power, and now reported to be a Communist stooge, was used on several occasions. Zef Shiro, formerly, and possibly still, editor of the Fascist magazine "Albania" was used for the preparation of a script on January 5.

5. As was agreed in a

14-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

5. As was agreed in a recent discussion between Major Mitchell of this Division and Miss Stern of your office, we hope such embarrassments may be avoided in the future by bringing the facts to the attention of RFE and by asking RFE to limit its list of writers to those specifically approved by this Division.

JOHN K. BAKER  
Chief, SE

Attachment (1)

SECRET

**SECRET**

Security Information

1. Alimehmoti, Kasen (Dr.)
2. Andoni, Alfred
3. Andoni, Vasil
4. Bajraktari, Muhamet
5. Binaku, Ejup
6. Danani, Selim
7. Delvina, Hignet
8. Dibra, Adem (Dr.)
9. Dilo, Jani
10. Dime, Dilaver
11. Dosti, Hasan
12. Ermenji, Abas
13. Farka, Ibrahim
14. Fratari, Kauf
15. Gogh, Georges
16. Kogi, Atlas
17. Kotta, Muci
18. Kryeziu, Said
19. Kupi, Abas
20. Maci, Halil
21. Meniku, Halil
22. Mulleti, Nyaini
23. Pali, Zef
24. Ferpoza, Hysen
25. Paškopija, Nexhat
26. Rushiti, Haki
27. Skendi, Stavro
28. Tafilaj, Tani
29. Toptani, Ishan
30. Zernal-Cenay, Asllan

**SECRET**

Security Information

*Suspense*

*6 Mar 53*

26 February 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Director, Central Intelligence

Agency

SUBJECT : Dr. Lela Boszormenyi-Nagy

1. This is in response to your request for our views regarding the attached letter from Dr. Bela Boszormenyi-Nagy.
2. Our files contain only a limited amount of information regarding Dr. Boszormenyi-Nagy. However, it is unlikely that information regarding Hungary which he acquired prior to September 1948 would add very much to information we have obtained from refugees and defectors who left Hungary more recently and who were better situated to observe at first hand the top government officials there.
3. I would suggest, therefore, that in acknowledging Dr. Boszormenyi-Nagy's letter we advise him not to make a special trip to Washington. Instead, we might suggest that if he is here on other business at some future time he should get in touch with Mr. DuBose at Sterling 3-5520. (DuBose is with the Contact Division, Office of Operations).

JOHN A. BROSS  
Chief, Eastern European Division

5 Mar 53

Note on cover sheet returned to EO/DD/P states:

"IO/TONIC concurs in subject memo - ES per WPD

SECURITY INFORMATION

scd-1 to DD/P (Va. Hill)

5 March 1953

William F. Heinrich

Scheduled to be employed at a salary of \$10,000 on December 1949 as a program adviser until March 1950. Worked under General Clay and under General Frank Howley.

Used to be with RIAS (Radio in American Sector). Told he would not be continued because up to the time (no date) records showed three official investigations on the following subjects:

1. When serving as Intelligence Officer, why instead of putting the Goebbel's diaries as captured documents into official channels known to him, did he turn them over to private persons in a transaction from which he subsequently expected to profit, both in cash and in a future position with Double Bay.
2. When serving as an intelligence officer, how did it happen that another captured document being the German appraisal of USSR Intelligence Service was changed in a foot locker sent by Heinrich to his home.
3. When serving as head of RIAS, entertaining at the expense of the station and ultimately, therefore, of the US government at private American parties, why did he accompany a German female singer during her appearance at a German vaudeville theater? In the latter case, the entire RIAS symphony orchestra appeared without payment at the German theater for a period of one week. There was an investigation into the existence of extensive payroll padding at RIAS when subject was informed that the State Department did not wish to inform him and he thereupon resigned.

KICOG Appraisal:

He is generally dishonest in his day to day dealings and apparently is in the habit of fabricating any story which contributes to his particular objectives at any particular time. The people in KICOG would not look with favor upon his employment by any American organization in Germany.

Private Sources:

He is going abroad to survey installations, etc. Munich people have been warned against him.

114-4

February 25, 1953

Dear George:

Confirming what I have just told you on the phone, our mutual friend wrote Michael a note the exact contents of which are as follows:

"After you left this afternoon, Mr. Robert Voegeler came in to see me, and among other things told me that to his certain knowledge, RFS had been infiltrated.

"I picked up the word and asked him if he would tell me more about it, to which he replied that maybe he had used too strong a word. So then I told him to pick any word he wanted, but to tell me what he meant.

"He then told me that there were people working for RFS who were either ex-Communists or ex-Socialists who were utterly discredited in their own country and who were doing us more harm than good. I asked him if he cared to tell me who some of these people were, to which he replied that he did not come to the office to denounce anybody. I thought I would leave it at that and we went on to another subject.

"However, the purpose of his trip to Washington was to feed information to Senator McCarthy's Committee, and he will be returning in another ten days to give him some more advice.

"I think it would be most important for you or Bob Lang to have a word with this gentleman and see if you can't find out whom he is talking about, as I am sure you would be eager to know and to act if justified."

It was our friend's suggestion, and we will act upon it, that together with Michael and Kenneth Walters I try to see Voegeler. This I will do as soon as I can locate him, and I learn that he is now in New York. We here have information that Voegeler associates socially with an individual who, having failed of employment with the Fund some time ago, has since lost an opportunity to condemn the Fund as being infiltrated. The latter individual's identity is known to Michael as is also the basic situation which gives some color to the allegation.

I will reserve further comment on this until I see you personally, or I will instruct Michael to give you this background when he next goes down to see your colleagues.

Sincerely,

SECRET

Spec

Virgil Popa  
Ellen 13 Pk

REU 12 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of Virgil POPA to Secure Employment  
with RFS Munich

1. The information below was reported by a KUBARK source, and  
was acquired in Munich during October 1952.

a. Virgil POPA has renewed his attempts to secure employment with RFS Munich. Subject is in possession of a letter of recommendation signed by Baron NICULESCU and issued in the name of General Niculescu RADESCU. The letter recommended Subject as a good and capable Rumanian to General Ion GHIBORGHIE and Alexander GREGORIAN, the latter an RFE employee, and requested them to assist Subject in gaining employment with RFS Munich. Subject has taken the letter to GREGORIAN in Munich, and has visited him several times, in each instance pressing him for a job.

b. POPA has explained to GREGORIAN that he wishes to emigrate to the United States, but because he is anti-SIMLA, the Simists have informed U. S. authorities that he is a Legionary. As a result, he was interned at Ellis Island and refused entry into the United States. GREGORIAN is aware that POPA is still an important Legionary leader, and that this explanation is a typical Legionary maneuver.

2. It is requested that RFE be informed of the above information.

JOHN E. BAKER  
Chief, SS

SECRET

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

#764-6

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 February 1953

Dear Oliver,

Would you be kind enough to pass on  
the enclosed memorandum to Ed Greene.

Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Kenneth

Kenneth J. Walters

Enc. 1

sent to 2433 Holmes Run Drive  
Salls Creek, Va.

C  
O  
P  
Y

12 February 1953  
110 W. 57th Street  
New York City

Dear Ed,

I saw your name on a piece of paper today written in recommendation of one Giacca Cantacuzino on 2677th stationery no less.

We are considering him for a job with the Rumanian desk and would be grateful for your comments. He seems, so far as we have been able to determine, to be well equipped but a difficult personality.

Hope to see you sometime soon.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Bob

Robert E. Lang

(For Edward Greene)

REF ID: A6592

12 February 1953

At 1715 I was called to Brad Connor's office and shown a memorandum dated 10 February 1953, "Meeting with Representatives John Taber and Cliff Clevenger on February 6, 1953 - Baker East and Baker West". The memorandum was signed by General Stoner. Present were:

Rep. John Taber	IPO - Mr. Connors
Rep. Cliff Clevenger	I - Mr. Harris
Dr. Wilson Cow顿	IBS/NY - Mr. Morton
General Frank Stoner	S - Mr. Barnard
I/R - Mr. Croeby	- Mr. Lourie

General Stoner had been discussing the need for money for more installations for VOA. At the top of page 3 of his memo, there is found the following:

"Mr. Taber mentioned that we had a large Munich plant. He said that this was the alleged place of employment of Ruby Parsons. He stated that our plant in Munich was not comparable to the large plant built up by RFE, that we felt there should be a closer coordination on a technical level between the various US activities engaged in international broadcasting in Europe and that there wasn't any reason why a single centralized plant should not be able to serve Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Armed Forces Network, and the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.

"When liberation of the Peoples of Russia was mentioned as a potential broadcaster, Mr. Taber made notes and said that he would look into the matter. He was told that the single building in Munich erected by RFE could also house all the feeders located in separate sites and separate buildings pertaining to U.S. activities mentioned above. He was particularly interested in this possibility."

Mr. Connors told me that he had ordered page 3 of this memo rewritten to omit these two paragraphs before the paper got further circulation. However, he wanted us to know what Stoner had said as shown by these two paragraphs, so that we could take any action we see fit with reference to Taber and Clevenger. Connors said he didn't know how far we cut in the Appropriations Committee. He said that he had warned Stoner "twenty times" not to reveal such things. He stated that Stoner had learned these things while in Germany.

ARISTIDES G. LAZARUS

SECURITY INFORMATION

DOD N

**SECRET**

Security Information

20 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

VIA: General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reimbursement of Mr. Francis D. Stevens

1. It is requested that approval be given to reimburse Mr. Francis D. Stevens of the Department of State for a trip to Long Beach, New York. This trip was made at our request and with the approval of the IOP and AD, to approach Mr. Nathaniel P. Davis as a possible replacement for Mr. J. Jolicard, head of the Division for Trade Relations of the National Committee for a Free Europe.
2. Mr. Stevens was asked to do this work because of his close personal friendship with Mr. Davis. Mr. Stevens is also acting in the capacity of a State Department contact with the National Committee for a Free Europe.
3. An accounting of Mr. Stevens' expenditures is attached. The airline stubs, to be attached to my letter, are being kept in this office, pending approval of all in regard.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
THEODORE H. WAGNER  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Approved:

General Counsel

Deputy Director (Administration)

Attachments: 1 (a/s)

**SECRET**  
Security Information

IO/Br.1/M:fb  
Distributions:  
Addressees - orig & 1  
Gen.Counsel - lcc  
IO/Br.1 - lcc  
CIO - lcc  
RI - lcc  
IO/AD - lcc

~~SECRET~~

2/59

Security Information

FEB 6 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SUBJECT: NCFE Support of the New Leader  
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 12 January 1953 (ER #3-6149),  
same subject.

1. On 30 January, Saul Levitas advised our PY Staff by telephone that he had received a call from Spencer Phenix. According to Levitas Mr. Phenix stated that NCFE has decided to provide the New Leader with \$18,000. \$12,000 of this amount will be a direct payment to the magazine for services and the remaining \$6,000 will be used to renew 1,000 subscriptions to the United Kingdom.
2. The PP Staff is preparing for your consideration a project separate from the above which would envisage sending subscriptions to the New Leader to key Socialist and Labor people in certain other priority areas.

*RICHARD HELMS*Richard Helms  
Chief of Operations, DD/P

APP/ACU/gvm  
31 January 1953

## Distribution:

Addressee - Orig & 1  
Chief of Operations, DD/P - 1  
~~Executive Registry - 1~~  
CPY - 1  
CIO - 1✓  
APP - 1  
RI - 1

~~SECRET~~  
Security Information

[From ]  
3-6-1953

(ADP 2042)

3 February 1953

My dear Mr. DeBarcza:

I appreciate your letter and your interest. I recall with pleasure our acquaintance during the war and have noted your desire to serve the "democratic cause".

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ALLEN W. CULLES

Mr. G. DeBarcza  
11, Ranger Road  
Croydon  
N.S.W.  
Sydney, Australia

CIO:TWB/mf (19 January 1953)  
retyped O/DDCI:RML/lab (23 January 1953)  
retyped O/DDCI:AWD/mam (3 February 1953)

Dist:

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - DDCI Chrono  
1 cc - ER  
1 cc - CIO ✓  
1 cc - RI  
1 cc - TONIC

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Recd 2 Feb 53  
Relevant to E. Stern  
what has →  
done?  
This should go to  
Lang.  
Yes went to New York

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division  
FROM : Chief, SE  
SUBJECT : Viorel Virgil TILEA

1. It is our understanding that Viorel TILEA is currently under consideration for the position of head of Romanian broadcasts for RFE. In this connection we call your attention to information in our files indicating (a) the possibility that Subject is a British Intelligence agent; (b) that a close relationship exists between Subject and Nicolae MALAXA, the well-known Rumanian industrialist now in the United States, and (c) that Subject has ties with former King CAROL. MALAXA is currently under scrutiny not only by this Agency but by the FBI, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, the Department of Justice and the House Judiciary Committee, for his alleged collaboration with King CAROL, with the IRON GUARD and later, with the Rumanian Communist Government. CAROL's activities are, of course, a matter of record.

2. Numerous usually reliable sources have indicated their belief that TILEA is an agent of the British Intelligence Service. This opinion appears to be held by many knowledgeable Rumanian emigres.

3. That Subject is definitely linked to Nicolae MALAXA is borne out by the following:

a. A report by the FBI on Nicolae MALAXA dated 20 October 1948 indicates that the following telephone calls were made on MALAXA's own telephone in New York:

"March 20, 1948. Number called: District 3000, Wash. D.C. Person called: V. TILEA, Mayflower Hotel. Viorel TILEA is the former Rumanian Minister to the Court of St. James who has been active in Subject's behalf.

"April 1, 1948. Incoming collect call from V. TILEA, calling from Executive 7300, Wash. D.C.

"April 14, 1948. Telegram sent to London, International 575, signed VIOREL (VIOREL TILEA).

"April 14, 1948. Telegram sent to Paris, International 550, signed TILEA.

**SECRET**

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

From the same report:

"Confidential Informant T-3 advised the Bureau on May 11, 1948 that he had received information that among the members of the Board of Directors of the Rumanian-American Economic Corporation (Note: This was set up by MALAXA) are Viorel TILEA and Grigore GAFENCU . . ."

From TILEA's own statements to the Bureau in the same report: ". . .he (TILEA) could honestly say that MALAXA, in his opinion and in the opinions of many Rumanians, is by far the best Rumanian citizen. Mr. TILEA indicated that there never had been any question about the character of MALAXA and that no one could level any charges against him that would concern his character, morals or patriotism . . . Mr. TILEA stated that he was very sympathetic towards MALAXA at the present time . . ."

b. In the case of a suit brought before the Supreme Court, County of New York, in November 1948, by Mircea A. GROSEN, formerly employed by MALAXA, against the latter for recovery of certain funds, the following was given as "Third Cause of Action":

"That on or about the 10th day of August 1948, at the special instance and request of the defendant, and upon defendant's promise to repay the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (\$3,000.00) dollars, plaintiff paid to one Mr. V. V. TILEA, the sum of three thousand (\$3,000.00) dollars.

"That no part of the said sum of three thousand (\$3,000.00) dollars has been paid to plaintiff by defendant, although demand therefor has been duly made."

c. Another source is quoted as follows in March 1948:

"There is an important consideration which, in the minds of some Rumanian political exiles, necessitates the greatest caution concerning collaboration with TILEA. It is a well-established fact that TILEA has close business connections with MALAXA and is working hand in hand with him. As TILEA's collaboration is of no interest for MALAXA from a business point of view, it is clear that the strong ties which exist between them are of another nature. It is obvious to Rumanians abroad that TILEA should not be included in a Rumanian National Committee."

b. Concerning TILEA's alleged ties with KING CAROL, the following references are taken from our files:

SECRET

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

a. From a report dated 24 August 1954 from the London office of OSS:

"TILIA's Free Rumanians are also satisfied (with the new developments in Rumania) though more moderately. They too are for NICULE and MAFTEI but they suspect Russian intrigue to be responsible for the latest changes. The fact that ex-King CAROL has expressed his satisfaction is also gratifying for them since several of TILIA's men have not given up the hope of bringing CAROL back to Rumania. They have maintained a correspondence with the ex-King, and they would have much to expect from him if he came back to power. TILIA's followers are likewise very pleased with the fact that most of the men forming the new Government are of the same political color as themselves. They are almost all former King CAROL favorites and good friends of some of the members of the Free Rumanian movement . . ."

b. From an OSS report addressed to Mr. Allen W. Dulles from "B.C." dated 5 May 1952:

"Regarding the Romanian diplomat who is expected to arrive in New York (as per my recent memorandum) to take over the leadership of the Rumanian movement here, my informants believe that he is Mr. Viorel TILIA, the man who started the Free Rumanian movement in England. The British are said to have looked upon him with disfavor. He is a friend of King CAROL and of MAFTEI. It is reported that Mr. TILIA is to enter the United States via Mexico and it is believed that he may already be there conferring with GURU."

c. From a report by Emil CHILEANU in 1948:

"DAVILA might be watered down to the point where he is acceptable to the Political Parties, but never TILIA, who is a King CAROL man."

d. From a report dated 1951, evaluated as B-3, from a London source, concerning the activities of Father Vasile LIVIU, the discredited Rumanian emigre priest who has set himself up as a bishop:

"From Iosifbul LIVIU intends to visit King MAFTEI, to request the episcopal crozier. This plan seems to have been worked out by LIVIU and Mrs. Elena LIPESCU. Former King CAROL will apparently finance LIVIU's bishopric . . . Informant gained the impression that LIVIU's plans are supported by Viorel TILIA and Major George TILIESCU . . ."

e. From a report, evaluated as B-3, coming from Paris in November 1952:

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

"Judging from opinions gathered here during the last weeks Source is inclined to believe that General Nicolae RADESCU is ready to repudiate the King. In such an action he would be backed by the pro-CAROL clique Gheorghe RAUT, Prof. Nicolae HIRIASCU, Col. Gheorghe ILIESCU, Viorel TILIA, General Ion Gheorghe."

5. A member of the National Peasant Party and supporter of Iuliu MANIU, TILIA broke away from that group around 1935 to join Alexandru VAIDA-VORVOD who founded the fascist RUMANIAN FRONT. VAIDA-VORVOD, having aided CAROL in becoming dictator, became President of the NATIONAL RENAISSANCE FRONT, the totalitarian party set up by CAROL in 1938. VAIDA-VORVOD was an advocate of the "numerus valahicus", an ultra-nationalist policy aimed at limiting to 5% the number of Jews allowed to practise professions or to attend universities. In 1938, according to this source, who is considered usually reliable, TILIA became one of the mainstays of the CAROL dictatorship. Another source, in referring to this period, states that TILIA who was then Under Secretary of State, acted as liaison between VAIDA-VORVOD and the IRON GUARD.

6. A source evaluated as usually reliable stated that in late 1946 TILIA wrote to Alexander CRETZIANU requesting loan of 30,000 pounds from the "resistance funds" in Switzerland which CRETZIANU controlled. Upon receiving CRETZIANU's refusal, TILIA reportedly wrote to the latter that it would be necessary, since he had not received the treatment to which he believed he was entitled, "to revise his attitude (towards CRETZIANU) in future."

7. In the interests of expediency we have not made an exhaustive search of the files for information on Subject at this time since this would involve a considerable delay in forwarding information. We are, therefore, submitting the above in the form of an interim report for your immediate consideration.

**SECRET**

SECRET

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: TO/TOMIC  
SUBJECT: Call from Admiral Miller

1. Wants to put Paul Weston ~~on~~ Board - has radio experience.  
Please secure Security Clearance on him right away.
2. Re Yugoslav publication which Adm. Miller called Bill Durkee about and has not yet received an answer. What do our friends across the street think of it? Ask Mills if she has any dope on it. They have run 500 copies off and are just holding them.

TWS

TWS:

1. Ellen will start the clearance on Paul Weston. *Cleared back in 1951*
2. Bill Durkee took this up with Stevens at State who asked that we hold off until Mr. Allen returned from Yugoslavia and they got his views. Ellen talked with Stevens a couple days ago on this and rather than say to us agreed on the distribution of these publications, he asked if we wouldn't hold off a couple more days until Amb. Allen returns. Enclosed Sam Walker this. She has also had a letter from Polkman on it so everyone is after her on this.

eh

28 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Agenda for discussion with Messrs. Ford, Brophy et al.

BACKGROUND:

1. For your information, the following are current facts in the American Heritage Foundation take-over of the Crusade for Freedom:
  - a. The American Heritage Foundation will undertake the Crusade for Freedom subject to reconsideration after a period of one year;
  - b. PRC has recommended the sum of \$25,000 be granted the American Heritage Foundation for its preliminary work;
  - c. Two CIA staff agents will be employed on the premises of AHF -- an administrative assistant and a financial man.

AGENDA:

2. In your discussions with Henry Ford and D'A. Brophy Wednesday, I wonder whether you should make the following points:
  - a. The principal objectives of the AHF program are to provide cover for NCPE-PYE and CFA through a multiplicity of ostensibly sources of funds. Fund raising is a distinctly secondary objective.
  - b. For several reasons, cover fund-raising for the Committee for a Free Asia should be carried on outside the Crusade for Freedom activity. We may at some future date wish to transfer the fund-raising for the Committee for a Free Asia to some other organization. In any event, we do not want the Crusade name linked with the Committee for a Free Asia.
  - c. The previous Crusade operations have been inefficiently operated. It has cost a dollar to raise a dollar. We know that AHF will be run on a businesslike basis, as have AHF past operations.

d. We want a dignified operation which will enlist the support of representative groups and individuals. While we are interested in securing real contributions from the public for the Crusade, the Crusade's primary purpose is to serve as a cover. It was and is intended therefore that its tenor be educational -- a dignified presentation to the American public of events behind the Iron Curtain and a request for the public's support of NCFE/RPE efforts to give aid and hope to the satellite peoples.

e. We request that before further funds are authorized, a memorandum of understanding along lines of the attached be signed by both parties. (Your attention is invited to the provision requiring two CIA staff agents assigned to AMF staff).

(signed) [Signature]

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment  
Draft Memo of Understanding

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - DCI (trans oo/p)  
1 cc - IO/Br I  
1 cc - IO/Br II  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI  
1 cc - CPP

Tentative Memorandum of Understanding  
between Fund and the Foundation

Subject to the specific understanding that the Fund shall at all times have authority to veto either in part or as a whole any fund raising or other activities that the Foundation may desire to undertake in its conduct of the Fund's campaign, and equally that the Fund may request that specific action or actions be taken, the Fund agrees:

1. To provide funds for Foundation's overhead and maintenance of a basic staff.
2. That Foundation should continue its normal fund-raising activities, but such activities other than provided for in 1 above and 3 below cannot be financed by the Fund.
3. To approve, by June 1 of each year, a campaign budget for the next fiscal year beginning 1 July, terminating 30 June of the next year.
4. Subject to Fund's budgetary review and policy guidance, to vest in the Foundation management and operational authority over the public fund-raising activities.
5. To designate a competent liaison officer through whom Fund-Foundation relations will be maintained.
6. To provide an administrative assistant and a fiscal officer to work on Foundation premises.
7. To provide thorough fiscal and other procedures.
8. To define and provide a liquidation reserve acceptable to the Fund and Foundation should relations be terminated.

The Foundation agrees:

1. To submit by May 1 each year its budget for the next fiscal year following that date.
2. Not to undertake other fund-raising activities which would conflict with the terms and purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding.
3. To observe procedures as provided by the Fund.
4. To employ Fund-chosen administrative assistant and fiscal officer to work on Foundation premises.

5. To have an annual audit by a firm to be designated by the Fund.
6. To exercise management and operational authority within the framework of policy guidance provided by the Fund. The primary objective of the fund-raising activities is to provide a multiplicity and variety of plausible, attributable sources of funds. The secondary objective is to raise as large a sum of money annually as is feasible and consistent with the above purpose.
7. Provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding will subsequently be more specifically detailed and may be amended by mutual agreement between the Fund and the Foundation.

---

Date

---

FUND

---

Date

---

FOUNDATION

HOURLY BROADCASTING BREAKDOWN

<u>Language</u>	<u>Original Programming Hours</u>		<u>Total Broadcast Time</u>	
	<u>Weekdays</u>	<u>Sundays</u>	<u>Weekdays</u>	<u>Sundays</u>
Czechoslovakia	11	11 3/4	19 7/12	16 7/12
Hungarian	9 1/2	10	16 3/4	16 7/12
Polish	6 5/6	6 5/6	16 5/6	16 3/4
Rumanian	1 1/2	1	3	3
Bulgarian	1 1/2	1	2 3/4	2 3/4
Albanian	<u>1/2</u>	<u>1/2</u>	<u>1 1/4</u>	<u>1 1/4</u>
	30 5/6	31 1/12	60 1/3	56 11/12

Program Dept. Personnel - N.Y. (Total) -111  
 Munich (Total) -468  
 -579

(Free Lance not Included)

FBI - Aug 51.

31 Jan 53

State Dept. consideration

Further inquiries resolved w/L.G.

O'Connell - 2591

Mr. Braden:

Ellen says a clearance has been in since 4 Dec 1952 on Allen Michie. Nothing has been done in Security on it and possibly they can get to it next week. O'Connell on 2591 is the one handling it.

FBI made a check on him in Aug 51 and found some rather derogatory info. State was considering him for employment and dropped it because of FBI check.

Do you want to call Long and tell him clearance has not been secured yet?

SECRET

(When Filled In)

## DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
V.O.A. Reim Project U.S. Assistance in Expansion of Arabic Radio Network		2. RI FILE NO.				
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE		
		'STAZK F - DESP No. 454'				
		5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	6. DATE OF INFO.	7. EVALUATION		
8. ANALYST	9. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE		
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.				
PERTINENT INFORMATION						
14. THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT FILED IN THE T-1 SECTION SECTION BY 15. 853 CO. B						
16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 						

To reply refer to:

26 January 1953

Dear David:

You may be interested in a dispatch which I received here a couple of days ago and which I quote as follows:

"On January 14, Alexander Booker of the German Foreign Office informally brought to our attention a map of Eastern Europe which appeared in the December issue of "News from Behind the Iron Curtain", a monthly periodical published by the "National Committee for a Free Europe". This map which is shown in small scale on page 1 of this periodical, shows all of Eastern Germany, including East Prussia, the Satellite States, and the former Baltic States. In the case of the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, the area is simply shown as belonging to Poland, and its pre-war borders are not set off by a dotted line. With respect to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, however, the territories that were annexed by the Soviet Union during or after World War II are clearly marked by a dotted line. Furthermore, the Eastern Zone of Germany as well as East Prussia are shown in the same colors as the Soviet Union, whereas the Baltic and Satellite States are shown in white.

"Although Booker admitted that the map itself was not of great importance, he nevertheless pointed out that it represents 'a typical example of the one-sided anti-German propaganda' put out not only by the National Committee for a Free Europe but also by Radio Free Europe. Such propaganda, he said, can only increase the misgivings which many Germans, particularly the refugees, already entertain with respect to the activities of the committee and on the operations of Radio Free Europe on German soil. Finally, Booker politely hinted that the German Government would welcome it if the U. S. High Commission would use its influence with the National Committee for a Free Europe to stop dissemination of such anti-German propaganda in the future. A more constructive and objective propaganda policy of the committee and Radio Free Europe along the lines of a larger European Community that would embrace Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as a reunited Germany and the other European nations would not only contribute to a better understanding

- 2 -

between the various refugee elements but would also have the full support of all Germans, Booker added."

Incidentally, I think you are doing an awfully good job on this kind of thing. The other night I actually read through an entire copy.

The article on music for the masses and the general arose of the attack on the arts is particularly significant, I think. Until the recent anti-Semitism, this field of culture is the one field of Soviet activity in which they were vulnerable before neutralists and fellow-travelers everywhere. The tendency of the intellectual to swallow the Soviet line on culture, to fall for the Stalin Prizes, the high status accorded the obedient intellectual in Soviet society, and pseudo-scientific appeal of the Marxian dogma of equality is dangerous. In a free society, the intellectual is the origin of ideas.

Anything we can do to show the fact that every aspect of Soviet culture has been transformed into an instrument of the State, that the intellectual's role is important only so long as he is obedient, that in fact the product of the Soviet artist would not hold a candle to the standards set by fellow-traveling circles in Western Europe, and that the Soviet has corrupted the principles of equality on which it pretenses to stand is terribly important.

I am sure you are aware of all the above but I thought of it when I read the piece in the last issue, and my comment is just another way of telling you what a good job I think you are doing.

Sincerely,

Oliver Hardwood

(Mr. David Powers  
New York, New York)  
CIC:TWB/eh  
Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - Leonard Stamm  
1 cc - TOMIC  
1 cc - GIO  
1 cc - RI

Mr. Dulles & I neglect the  
foreign and domestic issues.

**SECRET**  
Security Information

27 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIO/EP, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Exploitation by RFE of Physicians (Plot)

1. Attached herewith the January 17 Washington Post Editorial on "Communist Antisemitism", which you requested.
2. This editorial has not been previously sent to New York. However, I should like to call your attention to the fact that the material covered in this editorial has already been exploited by RFE, as evidenced in their guidances of 13, 14 and 15 January.

ELLEN STERN  
IO/TOMIC

Attachments:  
As stated above

Mr. Lang 30 Jan 53  
JWP  
Annotate

**SECRET**  
Security Information

**SECRET**  
Security Information

26 January 1953

TO : Deputy Director (Plans)  
 FROM : Comptroller  
 SUBJECT: Additional Funds for Crusade for Freedom

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 15 January 1953 from Chief, PP to the DD/P and to the memorandum of 8 January 1953 for the LD/CI submitted by the Chief, IO Division wherein request is made for additional funds of \$553,109 for the Crusade for Freedom.

2. On 21 January 1953 a representative from this office discussed and reviewed the basis for the request for additional funds with officials of the Crusade for Freedom. The following unaudited amounts were presented for review:

An operating bank account overdraft	\$18,802.67
Unpaid invoices on hand	106,406.03
Unpaid Commitments for the 1952 campaign	<u>123,294.03</u>
Total bank overdraft, unpaid invoices and commitments to 21 January 1953	\$248,502.73

The Crusade officials have estimated that in addition to the above \$248,502.73 a further amount of \$18,000 will be required for expenses to close out the 1952 campaign.

3. It is recommended that the \$253,000 approved by the PRC, 21 January 1953 be made available to the Crusade for Freedom from the allotment to the DD/P area for the fiscal year 1953. The use of unvouchered funds is recommended.

*E. R. Saunders*  
E. R. SAUNDERS

*Funds approved for release*

*Richard D. Brown*  
*Acting SD/P*

**SECRET** 27 January 1953.  
Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED	(RESTRICTED (SEE BACK SIDE))	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
<b>TO</b>		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P	CRT	29 Jan
2	C-I.O.	VWB	
3			
4			
5			
<b>FROM</b>		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, FBI	X	28 Jan
2			
3			
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION <input type="checkbox"/> FILE			
<b>REMARKS:</b> The attached item carries reference to CI and was published in the Restricted INTER Daily Report.			
This distribution is made to DD/P; DD/I; Chief, FBI; Chief, PP; Chief, Intelligence Control Branch, OCI; AD/OC; General Counsel; and Col. Wood, I & S.			
SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	UNCLASSIFIED
FORM NO. 30-6 SEP 1947			

RESTRICTED

- HU 4 -      HUNGARY  
Jan. 26, 1953

'JOINT' ONLY ONE OF U.S. SPY TENTACLES

Budapest, Hungarian Home Service, Jan. 23, 1953, 1900 GMT--L

(Commentary by Pal Lendval)

(Summary with Quotations)

In the report carried by an "American bourgeois weekly" the name of the banker Warburg was included among several philanthropic U.S. businessmen. Warburg was described as one of the most zealous among them. The adjective would have been truly apt if applied not to Warburg's philanthropic activities but to his business activities.

"In the history of American capitalism we have heard of many a shrewd and bold businessman, but few have been more cunning or more ready for any and every wickedness than Warburg. By profession he is a banker--and not just any second-or third-rate speculator, but a member of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, the second largest banking firm in the United States. At the same time, he is also chairman of Joint, the Zionist Jewish, bourgeois-nationalist organization.

"It will be remembered that the Joint has been, to the accompaniment of the eulogies of the bourgeois press, acting for years under a philanthropic disguise and with the alleged purpose of providing financial aid to Jews in Europe and other countries.

"In reality this organization--as revealed by the Flakovsky trial and the case of the group of doctor-wreckers unmasked in the USSR--has served as a forward base of American imperialism and has carried out, under the direction of the U.S. espionage service, spying, terrorist, and sabotage activities against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

Birds of a feather flock together: Joint is given away by the identity of the man heading it. Mr. Warburg, donning the robe of the philanthropist and placing himself in the role of savior of the Jews, has been the bosom friend and business partner of the West German banker Pferdorffgen, one of Hitler's former financiers and advisers, one of the wickedest Nazi war criminals.

"Warburg, the Zionist leader, and Pferdorffgen, the Hitlerite, have jointly founded with vast initial capital a banking firm in Hamburg, the most important investment in West Germany of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company.

RESTRICTED

- HH 5 -

HUNGARY  
Jan. 26, 1953

"This same Farburg who, with one hand, scribbles humanistic and charity appeals has pocketed with the other--as a chief shareholder of I.G. Farbenindustrie--rich dividends resulting from the manufacture of poison gas for the Auschwitz death camp, where several million people, including many hundreds of thousands of Jews, were killed. This same Farburg who preached about helping the victims of the war is one of the main architects of the cold war and, with the golden rain of dollars he helps to set on its feet again the bloodthirsty and money-hungry German imperialism.

"Such is the likeness of philanthropists for whom every life extinguished, every bomb dropped means the clinking of gold. Under the expert direction of Mr. Farburg, the principal task of Joint has been spying and the organization of sabotage for the overthrow of the People's Democratic regimes. This was the organization which directed the base activities of the doctor-wreckers and gave instructions for the extermination of the leading cadres of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it does not look with contempt upon currency deals and black marketeering or smuggling. Spying and sabotage have proved excellent business also. Through the illegal emigration movement in Czechoslovakia, for instance, Joint made a profit of 9 dollars for every dollar invested. The damage which these criminals have caused the Czechoslovak People's Republic would have covered the costs of 20,000 room flats or 177,000 car loads of wheat."

Joint, though important, is by no means the only espionage and terror organization of American imperialism. The U.S. Government long ago made an institutional and an official governmental activity of the organization of assassinations and acts of terror. The Mutual Security Act provides 100 million dollars for the recruitment into armed formations of "war criminal and other criminals who fled from the USSR and the People's Democracies," for action against their countries of origin.

"Since the end of the World War Two the war incendiaries have been tenaciously and systematically building up their interwoven and world-embracing espionage network." The sum total invested for the purpose is far in excess of the amount stipulated in the Mutual Security Act.

"The Swiss paper DIE TAT estimates the annual operating costs of the Central Intelligence Agency, employing 6,500 permanent and tens of thousands of temporary spies, at 300 million dollars.

RESTRICTED

- HU 6 -

HUNGARY

Jan. 26, 1953

"That agency was recently given a new chief, following the resignation of Gen. Pedell Smith, with the appointment a few days ago of Allen Dulles, the brother of the new Secretary of State, the immediate director of the secret war against the USSR and the People's Democracies, the recruiting officer of the Rákosi, Szonyi, Slavinko, and other traitors of the same brand.

"The central espionage organization embraces several bodies active in spying and diversion and camouflaged with impressive names, the espionage organization known as the National Committee for a Free Europe being one of the many maintained with U.S. dollars and directing its own branch organizations all over Europe. That committee, too, has been headed by Allen Dulles, and its members have included President Eisenhower, Gen. Clay, and representatives of the yellow trade unions and of "all Street."

That committee has been the motive force behind the various national committees, including the one led by "proven traitors like Ferenc Nagy, Mikolajczyk, and their associates." In Strasbourg and other places espionage has been given a scientific standing at universities, together with various methods of incendiarism and assassination. The "Green International" is also one of the committee's branches, allied to "the gang of the International crew of landlords deprived of their estates."

"It is but a few months ago that the Czechoslovak State Security organs unmasked a terrorist group belonging to the international espionage organization. The outbursts of fury of the imperialist big manufacturers, their willing, the salvos of rage coming from the bourgeois politicians, are proofs in themselves that the exposure of the undercover Joint agencies, the recent liquidation of American spy and terrorist groups in Bulgaria and Poland has touched the organizers of a new war to the quick.

"According to data not quite complete, in the past year alone 41 American spy groups and terrorist organizations have been liquidated in the USSR and the People's Democracies. We must be prepared for the time when the enemy, precisely because of the new blow suffered by him, will try to harm us by even viler means."

"We must always remember Stalin's wise words to the effect that so long as there is capitalism around us, there will be wreckers, diversionist spies, and terrorists sent by foreign countries to stab the Soviet Union in the back. Let us therefore fight with even greater vigilance, let us fight even more implacably against the enemy's attempts to prevent, by sabotage and subversion, the building of socialism. The frustration of his plans depends upon us and upon our vigilance."

1953 BUDGET

Radio Free Europe (operating expenditures)	\$ 9,526,302.00
" " " (capital )	<u>2,981,120.00</u>
Total RFE	\$12,507,422.00
National Committee for a Free Europe	
Operating Expenditures	3,774,517.00
National Committee for a Free Europe	
Capital expenditures	<u>NONE</u>
Total NCFE	3,774,517.00
Free Europe University in Exile	
Operating Expenditures	628,631.00
Capital "	<u>6,000.00</u>
Total FEUE	<u>634,631.00</u>
GRAND TOTAL	\$16,916,570.00
Reserve for Contingency (to be held by NCFE)	100,000.00
To be held by sponsor	<u>1,783,430.00</u>
TOTAL BUDGET	<u>\$18,800,000.00</u>

**SECRET**

Security Information      26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION  
SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February  
REFERENCE: Memorandum on same subject from CIO to IO/Branch I, dated  
                  23 January 1953

1. NCPE has confirmed that a meeting of ambassadors and diplomats of the Polish Government in Exile is to be held here in the middle of February.

2. The following individuals are scheduled to attend the meetings:

a. Ambassadors

Papie.....Ambassador to the Vatican  
Potocki.....Ambassador to Madrid  
Zenczykowski.....Ambassador to Lebanon

b. Agents

Morawski.....Paris  
Paczynski.....London  
Rabiniski.....Greece  
Lipski.....Washington  
Arciszewski.....Buenos Aires  
Dembinski.....Cuba

c. Others

Rozier.....Montreal  
Librach.....Secretary-General of the Foreign  
                  Office of the Government in Exile,  
                  coming from London  
Ciechanowski.....Former Ambassador to Washington  
                  (until 1945)  
Wszelaki.....Former Consul to the Embassy in  
                  Washington (until 1945)

3. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss and decide matters concerning the foreign policy of the Government in Exile. NCPE has heard rumors, but does not know for a fact, that the Poles intend to pay their respects to the new Administration. If this should be done, General Soemkowski (who is returning from Canada at the end of this week) would be the spokesman, since he knows Eisenhower personally.

4. NCPE is in no way involved in sponsoring or financing this meeting. The Polish Government in Exile has funds of its own which should enable it to send delegates.

**SECRET**

Security Information

WILLIAM P. DURKEE  
Chief, IO/TOMIC

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/BRANCH 1 - Miss Ellen Stern  
SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

1. John Bross telephoned me late today to inquire whether NCFE knows anything about a meeting of a group of Poles in the Polish Government in Exile to be held in February. Sokolowsky'?) was mentioned as a member of this group, and it is their intention to meet with Poles from South America, and pay their respects to the new Administration.
2. The Embassy in London is concerned about visas for these Poles and Bob Joyce has asked John Bross whether we are giving any encouragement to this proposed meeting.
3. Will you find out from NCFE what they know about this?

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

CIO/eh

Onig - addressee  
1 cc - CIO Tonic file

CONFIDENTIAL  
SPECIAL INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL  
SPECIAL EDITION

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO BRANCH I  
SUBJECT: Use of RFE as Playback in event of hostilities

1. I believe you held some conversations with the Communications people about Spencer Phenix's idea, which he expressed to me, that RFE might be used as a playback in the event of hostilities. Will you let me know the results of those conversations, whether our Communications people think it is possible or not possible, and in general what their ideas are.

2. Spencer Phenix has been asking me about this for reasons which you know, and I think we ought to give him some kind of a definite answer.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/ch

Orig - C/Io/Br2  
1 cc - CTO

INW/P/DACM

P: Canto Q10 for file  
P: 6906

great deal  
22 Jan

22 January 1953  
(Haller)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, JO

FROM: Chief, PI/Plans/Cover

SUBJECT: Comments concerning Crusade for Europe

1. In December 1952 Mr. Reichardt discussed with your division contact made by CC/C representatives with Mr. Buckner of General Motors in Detroit in regard to General Motors' contributions to the Crusade of Freedom. Mr. Buckner recently reported to CC/C the following information.

2. Suzanne LaFollette, Managing Editor of the Freeman Magazine, New York, recently wrote a letter to Mr. Jordan of General Carton Company, Battle Creek, Michigan, in which she criticized the Crusade for Freedom. She stated, among other things, that the promoters of the Crusade are a "bunch of micro liberals and do not know anything about reaching iron curtain countries".

3. The letter is reported to have been turned over to the Battle Creek newspaper, Enquirer, but its contents have not yet been published.

4. According to Mr. Buckner, LaFollette's comments have curtailed efforts to solicit funds for the Crusade and he fears that this type of information might reach other city groups.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET**  
Security Information

22 January 1953

sent to DDP  
22 Jan

TO: SECURITY INFORMATION, INFORMATION AND EDUCATION DIVISION

SUBJECT: Statements made by Robert Vogeler.

1. Our friends in New York have informed us that Robert Vogeler gave a talk at the Veterans Athletic Club in Chicago on 13 January 1953 on the subject of psychological warfare.

2. In the course of his address he reportedly referred to as broadcasting nothing but propaganda, baseball scores and "junk." He said that V.A. was an organization originally formed with private capital because of dissatisfaction with A.A. However, it ran out of money because the public failed to support it and a power plant loan was made which has enabled it to exist, in fact. Since then, V.A. has become guilty of the same kind of poor programming that characterizes V.A.

3. Our friends are sending down a complete report of this speech. They feel that some sort of action should be taken to stop Robert Vogeler from continuing to make such remarks.

LAWRENCE,  
Chief, IN/ICAC

BUCKEE MEMO 13 Jan sent to  
TANC, see chrono

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Security Information

S : 17  
Security Information

26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PL/NC)

SUBJECT: Draft NCFF Policy Statement

1. Attached is a draft NCFF Policy Statement which has been reviewed and accepted by the Executive Committee of NCFF, but which was sent to us without the knowledge of Admiral Miller and therefore should probably not be commented on by you to any of our friends in New York unless you have also received a copy from another source. Admiral Miller probably intends to send us this statement after it has been approved by the Board of Directors.

2. You may wish to compare it with the old ice-box statement now in effect, also attached.

3. You may also wish to note Part I, paragraph 2 in which mention is made of government support. It is apparently the intent of NCFF to make this statement not an ice-box statement, but a public document and if so, I think you ought to make particularly certain that you approve this part of it.

4. Finally, I think you will want to note the general tenor of Part III. Perhaps I am quibbling, but it seems to me a trifle full-blown. I realize that NCFF is a separate government agency just under cabinet status, but this reads a little bit as though it were putting on the trappings of national sovereignty.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachments  
is stated.

CIO:TWB/mf

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee (CPP) *Thru*  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - RI  
1 cc - IO Brl

For Bill Durkee

101 7-1 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting

1. Today the PRC approved \$253,000 for the Crusade for Freedom, the money to be held in escrow and to be paid out on Frank Wisner's signature subsequent to an audit by a CIA auditor who will go over the Crusade's books and account to us for the reliability of the Crusade's estimate of \$253,000 to wind up the affair this year.

2. PRC set aside the request for \$300,000 for next year's campaign on the grounds that the Agency should first settle matters with the Heritage Foundation and start clean on a Heritage Foundation estimate.

1951

they had 4750 spent in April  
 & they had 1000 in bank  
 so we will repeat this  
 total.

This year may they need  
 about 61 thousand more.

1951

expences	2,132,478	(7900)
receipts	2,011,221	

1950

expences	1,17000 (40,00)
receipts	1,217000

461  
 121  
 16300

TRANSMITTAL SLI		
21 January 1953		
DATE		
TO: Mr. Braden		
BUILDING	K	ROOM NO 1030
REMARKS:  Mr. Durkee asks "to have you ask Joan to tell Dorkis" Trust you know what this means!		
FROM: JO/Tonic		
BUILDING	K	ROOM NO 1402
EXTENSION 6000		
FORM NO. 38-8 SEP 1948		

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Security Information

21 January 1953

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

Per telephone conversation from Mr. Durkee on 21 January 1953, the following was stated:

"Returns are \$600,000. These are returns in central banks. Other returns reported but not in central banks. This brings the total up close to \$1,000,000. Twenty-one states have yet to report in."

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Security Information

8 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)  
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Additional Funds for the Crusade for Freedom

A. Items requested for termination of 1952 campaign.

1. Admiral Miller has requested a sum of \$261,106.92 for the 1952 Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom.

2. From April 1, 1952, the starting date of the 1952 campaign, the Crusade for Freedom has had available to it \$550,760.81. Of this amount, a total of \$105,239.81 was cash on hand as of April 1, 1952, and returns of cash from the field to headquarters after that date, \$44,528.00 of this amount were CIA contributions to the 1952 Campaign. Actual expenses of the Crusade from April 1 through December 20, 1952, were \$673,439.38. Available cash as of that date was \$69,324.13. Expected additional expenses will be \$329,437.35. Additional funds of \$261,106.92 are thus requested. Not included in the figure of cash on hand as of December 20, 1952, are the funds in a payroll revolving account of \$6,000. These funds can be deducted from the total requested if a decision is made that the present Crusade organization is to be terminated and transferred to the American Heritage Foundation.

3. Total expenditures of the 1952 Campaign will thus total \$803,866.73. It should be noted that of this amount \$35,928.66 was spent to clear up remaining 1951 Campaign expenses, leaving a net of \$767,938.07 expended on the 1952 Campaign.

4. A comparison of the total cost of the 1951 Campaign with that of the Campaign conducted in 1952 clearly shows that the instructions of the PRC that the Crusade be scaled down in amount was complied with. Total expenditures during the 1951 Campaign were \$1,932,478, while total expenditures this year will be \$767,938.07. This year's expenditures are also less than those of the initial Campaign of 1950 when expenditures were \$917,663. Receipts in 1950 were \$1,317,000, while receipts in the 1951 Campaign were \$2,011,221.94.

5. Detailed statements attached. (Tab A) (Note particularly item 3 which compares field expenses between 1951 and 1952 Campaigns)

B. 1953 Campaign.

1. Attached (Tab B) hereto are Admiral Miller's proposals for a 1953 Crusade Campaign. He has requested a sum of \$830,000 for this purpose. This \$830,000 is an addition to the sum requested above for the termination of the 1952 Campaign. In view of the request of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that the American Heritage Foundation take over and run the 1953

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Crusade Campaign, no action should be taken on Admiral Miller's proposals. However, it is recommended that a sum of \$300,000 be made available for the remainder of the fiscal year 1953, to be drawn upon by the DIP, to finance such activities as may be necessary to transfer the direction of the 1953 Crusade Campaign to the American Heritage Foundation and to prepare the beginnings of that Campaign.

2. Should the American Heritage Foundation decide against taking over the Crusade Campaign for 1953, the present Crusade organization will have to again be reexamined with policies and financing decided.

C. Recommendations.

1. It is therefore recommended that the sum of \$253,108.92 be made available to the 1952 Crusade for Freedom for the remainder of fiscal year 1953.

2. That \$300,000 be allotted to be used on the authority of the DIP in the transfer to, and start of a 1953 Campaign by the American Heritage Foundation in the fiscal year 1953.

*Thomas W. Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

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Security Information

## SECURITY INFORMATION

December 23, 1952

SUMMARY OF FUNDS NEEDED

Total Cash Received	8550,767.81	TAB A
Less Payroll Revolving Account	<u>0,000.00</u>	\$542,767.81
Exps: rec April 1, 1952 thru 12/20/52		<u>473,439.38</u>
Available Cash -		\$ 69,328.43
1952 Field Budget	9247,585.00	(See #3 Tab A for breakdown)
Spent .. November	26,203.60	
" .. December	51,394.05	
Advances to Field	<u>24,250.00</u>	
1952 Field Commitment	72,517.65	<del>73,037.35</del>
Ad Council "	25,000.00	
Campaign Printing "	100,000.00	
Payroll last half of December Commitment	10,000.00	
Telephone Charge November "	1,700.00	
" " December "	(estimated)1,700.00	
Airline " November "	3,500.00	
" " December "	3,500.00	
Miscellaneous Hdqs. Exp.	" "	10,000.00
	8330,437.35	<u>\$330,437.35</u>
Funds Needed -		\$261,103.52

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December 29, 1952

## CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM, INC.

## ANALYSIS OF CASH RECEIPTS AND CASH DISBURSEMENTS

RECEIPTS From 4/1/52 to 12/31/52				DISBURSEMENTS from 4/1/52 to 12/20/52					
	1951 Field Refunds <u>Foundation</u>	1951 Field Advances <u>And Advances</u>	Misc.	Total	Total Paid By Month	1951 Field Expenses	Easy Bank	Special Budget	Adval. 222
Balance of cash on hand 4/1/52	-	87,371.55							
		8,000.00 Pay Roll /c		95,371.55					
April	-	1,179.20		1,046.32	2,226.12	24,921.49	2,069.96	2,794.33	437.00
May	177,816.00	506.52		583.05	178,903.57	26,893.84	1,400.29	93.36	
June	-	27.28		858.52	885.30	29,978.70	4,694.99	146.03	
July	-			830.04	830.04	56,797.41	3,337.51	16,143.11	
August	133,362.00	68.79		906.84	134,337.63	39,094.47	105.59	4,406.89	
Sept. Sep.	133,350.00	-		2,560.05	135,910.05	31,314.32	-	-	
Oct.	-	-		746.52	746.52	6,632.89	18.70	-	
November	-	-		814.89	814.89	86,130.18	200.90	-	
December	-	-		739.64	739.64	121,676.03	-	-	
Total	446,528.00	2,782.39		9,085.57	550,767.81	473,439.38	11,907.96	22,583.72	437.00
								437.00	24,452.92
								824,020.72	Munich sub Total
SUMMARY	CASH on hand 4/1/52			95,371.55					
	CASH Received 4/1 - 12/31/52			455,396.26					
	Total			\$ 550,767.71					

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Security Information

December 10, 1952

FIELD EXPENSES

STATE	1951			1952		
	FEES AND SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL	FEES AND SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL
ALABAMA	\$ 562.00	\$ 1,777.08	\$ 2,339.08	\$ 1000.	1000.	1750.
ARIZONA	60.00	3,985.21	4,045.21	1000.	750.	3025.
ARKANSAS	555.00	7,392.55	7,947.55	1275.	1750.	10000.
CALIFORNIA, NO. SO.	11,275.00	12,868.15	24,143.15	4000.	6000.	10000.
COLORADO	21,050.00	16,623.68	37,673.68	4000.	6000.	10000.
CONNECTICUT	6000.00	14,055.87	20,055.87	2000.	4375.	10000.
DELAWARE	6,151.65	7,215.06	13,366.71	1000.	500.	6375.
D.C., WASHINGTON	7,466.00	7,852.52	15,318.52	-	1000.	1500.
FLORIDA	7,605.19	3,762.33	11,368.52	2550.	250.	1000.
GEORGIA	6,600.00	10,353.25	16,953.25	1000.	250.	2800.
IDAHO	6,200.00	6,189.53	12,389.53	600.	1725.	2725.
ILLINOIS	1,050.00	3,440.97	4,490.97	2000.	1700.	2500.
INDIANA	22,016.67	16,570.82	38,587.49	2500.	2000.	4000.
IOWA	14,433.31	6,325.67	20,759.00	1000.	2500.	5000.
KANSAS	2,425.88	7,004.31	9,430.11	750.	1000.	2000.
KENTUCKY	3,500.00	6,364.24	9,864.24	2000.	2000.	2750.
LOUISIANA	1200.00	13,715.88	14,915.88	1000.	1500.	2500.
MARYLAND	12,000.00	4,980.12	6,980.12	1800.	2500.	4680.
MAINE	14,934.00	25,703.04	30,639.04	-	1000.	1000.
MASSACHUSETTS	2,822.78	3,519.73	6,372.51	2000.	1000.	3800.
NEW CANAAN	7,015.98	16,152.26	23,168.24	1000.	1000.	2000.
MINNESOTA	2,100.00	18,509.10	20,609.10	1850.	3200.	5080.
MISSISSIPPI	25,875.00	25,318.20	51,193.20	-	2000.	2000.
MISSOURI	1,000.00	7,052.36	8,052.36	5700.	1600.	2000.
MONTANA	8,000.00	35,000.00	43,000.00	500.	2300.	5300.
NEBRASKA	3,828.00	6,662.59	10,490.59	3300.	700.	2800.
NEVADA	2,000.00	13,208.22	15,208.22	500.	500.	10000.
NEW ENGLAND	2,664.93	4,810.59	7,475.52	1200.	1800.	3000.
NEW HAMPSHIRE	6,419.57	3,374.12	9,793.69	2300.	1300.	3600.
NEW JERSEY	583.00	2,749.94	3,633.24	-	-	-
NEW MEXICO	6,190.97	11,819.74	18,019.71	500.	1000.	1500.
NEW YORK STATE	1,250.00	3,290.44	4,540.44	2000.	2500.	4500.
NEW YORK CITY	5,372.17	28,719.99	34,092.16	5000.	7500.	12,500.
	38,00.00	129,568.08	167,958.08	7500.	10,000.	17,500.

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Security Information

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Security Information

1951

Page 2 - Cont'd.

1952

<u>STATE</u>	<u>FEES &amp; SALARIES</u>	<u>EXPENSES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>FEES &amp; SALARIES</u>	<u>EXPENSES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
NORTH CAROLINA	\$ 4,255.00	\$ 9,250.67	\$ 13,505.67	\$ 800	\$ 1,550	\$ 2,350
NORTH DAKOTA	780.38	2,881.17	3,661.55	-	2,000	2,000
OHIO	11,000.00	13,657.86	25,157.86	2,400	2,400	4,800
OKLAHOMA	3,250.00	3,928.49	7,178.49	2,000	2,000	4,000
OREGON	2,200.00	3,300.00	10,500.00	2,000	2,500	4,500
PENNSYLVANIA, EAST )-	6,375.00	40,601.49	48,976.49	6,000	8,000	14,000
WEST )	-	-	-	4,000	4,000	8,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	4,229.17	6,368.21	10,597.38	2,000	1,400	3,400
SOUTH DAKOTA	860.00	1,123.67	1,933.67	1,000	1,000	2,000
KANSAS	700.00	15,808.09	16,508.09	3,600	4,250	7,850
TEXAS	14,200.00	16,470.76	32,570.76	10,000	26,750	36,750
RHODE ISLAND	2,206.54	7,330.52	9,537.05	500	2,500	3,000
UTAH	525.00	5,499.59	6,024.59	-	-	-
VERMONT	750.00	1,682.74	2,432.74	500	250	750
VIRGINIA	3,633.74	4,185.11	7,819.15	750	1,500	2,250
WASHINGTON	4,312.51	5,076.26	10,188.77	2,000	2,000	4,000
WEST VIRGINIA	2,000.00	2,455.73	4,455.73	1,000	500	1,500
WISCONSIN	5,000.00	7,322.53	12,322.53	1,200	3,800	5,000
WICHITA	1,773.64	2,729.70	4,503.54	-	-	-
WASHINGTON, D. C. (Federal Employees)	816.51	5,627.12	6,443.63	1,500	1,500	1,500
INNICH	10,555.52	1,898.89	12,454.41	-	-	-
LENWOOD PLANT	6,796.73	7,062.48	13,859.21	-	-	-
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$338,077.26</b>	<b>\$648,478.69</b>	<b>\$986,555.95</b>	<b>\$59,605</b>	<b>\$147,980</b>	<b>\$247,585</b>

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SPECIAL ORGANIZATION  
FOR THOUSANDS FOR LIBERTY FOR 1952

On November 19, 1951, General Clay and Campaign Chairman Gandy, wrote to state chairmen for the KKK Crosses regarding their opinion and suggestions on the basis of continuing the Crosses throughout the year. They in general terminus agreed favoring a year-round educational program directed by a fund drive in the Fall. Experience since this confirms this point.

This would require the development of a field organization on a modest scale to bring into the Crosses as many citizens as possible and to set there the initial high leadership which was secured for the 1952 campaign. These objectives may be attained in two ways.

The first way is to secure at the national level the endorsement and cooperation of national groups in all phases of activity, with the wisdom of securing volunteer leadership on the state and local levels.

The second way is to work directly in the state from the city and county level.

We are presently staffed to carry out the method necessary in the first approach on the national level. However the second method requires a more concentrated effort. For organizational purposes the country should be divided into four regions with a national representative in charge of each region. This national representative should at all times be regarded as a member of the national staff delegated to be of service to the states within his region on a year-round basis. His functions generally are:

1. To interpret national policy to the state chairman.
2. To facilitate the flow of material, news releases, etc., from the national office to the units within the working areas.
3. To assist the state chairman in securing from the national office assistance of all kinds.
4. To aid the state chairman in perfecting his organization.

At the time of the campaign the various state chairmen would, with the counsel of the national representative, secure the assistance of individuals or agencies at the state level to carry on the intensive phase of the campaign efforts, within budgetary limitations.

Experience in the field in voluntary organizations over the years indicates that this method of regional representation is effective and economical for the following reasons:

1. The national representative is the full-time employee of the organization, with a knowledge of the broad phases of the work of the organization. He is therefore equipped to interpret policy and exercise judgment as rapidly as required.

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2. As an employee of the national organization he is directly responsible to the national organization, and is by the fact under its control, and subject to its supervision within a general framework of action.
3. Working the year-round with state chairmen and state committees, the national representative is in an excellent position at campaign time to secure the type of temporary personnel and help that the chairman and the state situation require.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

TABLE OF PERSONNEL  
CREDIBLE FOR SPYING

Executive Vice Chairman  
Secretary

Campaign Director

Secretary  
Assistant to Campaign Director  
Clerk-Stenographer

National Representatives — Headquarters in New York  
A. Labor, Veterans, Federal Employees  
B. New York City operation and special assignments  
C. Management Groups, Corporate Appeals and special assignments  
two stenographers

National Representatives -- in Field

Five National representatives will be assigned on a regional basis to work with state chairmen and state committees.

Assistant Treasurer's Office -- Accounting Department

Assistant Treasurer  
Secretary  
Chief Accountant  
Assistant Accountant  
Stenographer

Telephone Operator  
Stock Clerk and Messenger

Publicity and Public Relations Director

Secretary  
Assistant Director -- Features, Magazines, House Organs  
Stenographer  
Director -- Speakers Bureau

Radio and TV Director  
Secretary

Director Women's and School Groups

National Representatives for assignment on a Regional Basis  
New England and Middle Atlantic (Out of New York Office -- 1 man)  
South  
Midwest  
Far East

Munich Operation -- Public Relations

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SECURITY INFORMATION

## SECURITY INFORMATION

## CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

## 1953 Budget

January	855,000		
February	45,000		
March	45,000	1st Quarter	<u>\$245,000</u>
April	45,000		
May	45,000	2nd Quarter	<u>140,000</u>
June	50,000		
July*	60,000	(*Printing \$20,000)	
August	70,000		
September	110,000	3rd Quarter	<u>260,000</u>
October	100,000		
November	60,000	4th Quarter	<u>205,000</u>
December	45,000		
	<u>\$750,000</u>		<u>\$750,000</u>
July printing	<u>- 60,000</u>		<u>- 60,000</u>
TOTAL - 1953	<u>\$690,000</u>		<u>\$690,000</u>

It is requested that the budget be made available on a quarterly basis with a payment on January 1 of \$145,000 to cover the first quarter; another payment on April 1 of \$140,000 to cover the second quarter; a third payment on July 1 of \$260,000 and the fourth on October 1 of \$205,000.

In addition to this, it is requested that, in order to keep all printing well in advance of the campaign \$80,000 be made available on or about July 1.

SECURITY INFORMATION

1951 CONTRIBUTIONS

Alabama	\$ 12,500.60
Arizona	5,399.38
Arkansas	22,161.12
California - North	58,699.21
" - South	75,872.71
Colorado	51,128.91
Connecticut	36,390.43
Delaware	2,464.06
Washington, D.C.	43,401.61
Florida	23,926.88
Georgia	44,874.21
Idaho	11,110.04
Indiana	46,000.13
Illinois - Chicago Area	57,619.81
" - Down State	29,443.26
Iowa	25,716.82
Kansas	27,837.48
Missouri	100,471.49
Kentucky	27,532.48
Louisiana	12,670.40
Maine	9,992.16
Maryland	23,960.69
Massachusetts	49,916.45
Michigan	103,498.47
Minnesota	67,491.44
Mississippi	10,510.27
Montana	15,289.51
Nebraska	8,744.06
Nevada	6,008.32
New Hampshire	9,172.44
New Jersey	57,139.56
New Mexico	21,042.03
North Carolina	38,563.78
North Dakota	8,739.73
Ohio	65,343.44
Oklahoma	37,293.71
Oregon	29,639.08
Pennsylvania	135,052.40
Rhode Island	14,867.15
South Carolina	24,738.02
South Dakota	1,564.89
Tennessee	44,118.99
Texas	75,729.70
Utah	15,227.07
Vermont	5,105.89
Virginia	31,243.18
Washington	17,347.66
West Virginia	8,375.58
Wisconsin	23,996.11
Wyoming	7,233.49
New York State	158,895.98
New York City (Metropolitan)	139,438.14
Alaska	80.09
Canada	15.77
Mexico	14.00
Anonymous	262.65
Misc.	<u>11,938.05</u>
	<u>1,999,144.78</u>
Munich (Contributions in European currency)	5,173.07
N.C.F.E. (Contributions received by N.C.F.E. and credited to Crusade)	<u>6,912.09</u>
TOTAL	\$ 2,011,229.94

*orig returned  
to Tonic*  
**SECRET****SECURITY INFORMATION**

January 20, 1953

Dear Belmont:

The following is submitted for consideration but without recommendation so far as the Fund's Board is concerned, since a question of basic policy is involved which can be determined only by the Corporation.

The Fund now occupies an entire building, except for the ground floor which contains two small stores and a moving picture theatre, under a sub-lease from the operator of the moving picture theatre. The Fund's sub-lease expires November 21, 1956 but the Fund has the option to cancel on November 21, 1954 on payment of an indemnity of \$61,800. During the reconstruction of the building to fit it for Fund occupancy the Fund contributed roughly \$150,000. to the cost of asphalt tile floors, acoustic tile ceilings on certain floors, fluorescent lighting fixtures, partitioning and air conditioning. The Fund's offices take up about 32,760 square feet so that disregarding leasehold improvements rent paid by the Fund of \$123,760 per annum averages \$3.777 per square foot. The Fund has no right of removal at the expiration of the five-year term.

The owner of the fee has recently placed the building on the market. The asking price is \$1,250,000 compared with the assessed valuation of \$1,150,000. The Fund's landlord is seeking a reduction in this assessment and we are informed has been granted a reduction in rent by the owner of the fee, justification therefor being the increased tax burden (the Fund's landlord's lease being a net lease) and the less than anticipated income from his moving picture theatre. The owner of the fee has rejected an offer of \$900,000 in cash for the building.

In the opinion of the Fund's counsel the Fund, if it owned the building, would be exempt from New York City real estate taxes in respect of all the space occupied by the Fund, namely, the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh floors. An appropriate amount of the total valuation attributable to the two stores and moving picture theatre on the ground floor would be subject to taxation. 1952 real estate taxes amounted to \$38,900.

The Fund's current rent of \$3.777 per square foot is very low for air conditioned property in the desirable location where the Fund's offices now are. Should the present owner or an investment or speculative purchaser refuse to renew the Fund's lease in November 1956, without a substantial increase in rent, the Fund would, if it were still in operation on the present scale and if the New York real estate market is not depressed, be faced with either a greatly increased rent cost or

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the expense of moving to other less desirable quarters where the rent would probably also greatly exceed the present \$3,777. Our difficulties in 1951 in this connection demonstrate the possible magnitude of that problem.

If it be true that the building, if owned by the Fund, would be exempt from real estate taxes (except for the commercially leased property which certainly could be leased for more than the tax cost) the operation of the building would cost the Fund considerably less than the present annual rental of \$123,760. In the absence of a more careful study than it is possible to make without disclosing our possible interest in such a purchase the amount of that saving can be little better than guesswork. My guess is it should be between \$50,000. and \$75,000, allowing interest on the capital investment at a two per cent rate.

The question is whether the Fund should or should not attempt to purchase the building either to safeguard the right of continued occupancy or to effect the estimated saving in annual expense, or both. If the answer is in the affirmative, we shall see what can be done toward negotiating a satisfactory price and estimating in detail the probable annual saving and advise you further before any commitment is made so that you can approve or disapprove the entire deal. If there is a reasonable chance that you would approve, I suggest you take immediate steps to earmark the necessary funds so that if a satisfactory price can be agreed upon the transaction can be promptly concluded.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William

William L. Digby

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*(initials)*

*W.P. 1/15/53*

*15 Jan 1953*

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Security Information

DD/P 1/17

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern European Division

SUBJECT : Arthur Maixner; young Czech political refugee recommended by Mr. Ortona of the Italian Embassy.

1. Attached hereto is a letter from Egidio Ortona of the Italian Embassy, who is recommending for our consideration the above-named individual who is said to be the son of Mr. Arthur Maixner, formerly the Minister Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia to the Vatican. Also attached is a brief curriculum vitae of Maixner.

2. It is rather unusual for a foreign diplomat, even though he be on good terms with officials of this Agency, to recommend personnel to us for our use, and under the circumstances I do not suppose that there would be any way in which you could make secure use of this young man even if you were to find him in other respects suitable. In other words, he is "blown" by the very fact of his having been recommended to us by a foreign diplomat. And I am also aware of the fact that this would be a good cheap way of effecting penetrations of the Agency were we to follow the practice of acting favorably on recommendations of this character. Nevertheless, there may be some aspect of this matter which would have significance to you or to Mr. Tamm which I do not readily perceive, and accordingly I am passing this on to you and to Mr. Tamm with this thought in mind. For example, there is a bare possibility that because of the contacts and connections of Maixner and his father, a former Czech diplomat, it might be possible to make use of him (on an arm's-length basis) in a program of defector solicitation.

3. I am also furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden in view of the possibility that Maixner might be of some use to Radio Free Europe, assuming that the objection of his having been introduced to this Agency by Ortona could be overcome.

4. In any case, I should appreciate your suggesting a suitable reply to Mr. Ortona, bearing in mind the fact that he has been helpful to us in the past and does seem to be well disposed.

Enclosures (2)  
As specified.

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/I0  
C/FI  
C/HB

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:				NO.	
CPP				DATE	
TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FILE'D		
1.	C/IO				Tom - I would definitely get this dope to Archie.
2.	Bill - did you show him this?			WD	
3.					
4.					
5.	Return to C/IO file				
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.	attachment				No, it was not written at the time. I however explained verbally, the Crusade & subversive principles of Liberation etc.
11.	FWB gave this to Henry Ford Jr (?)				Bill. Let's send it to him then. It's a good excuse for getting in touch with him again which I want to do. And don't we better?
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					Please send White copy & return this form.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL  
SUBJECT: Briefing Papers on NCFE and CFA

1. Before I send this memorandum to Messrs. Brophy, Ford et al., I want you to have a look at it for reasons we discussed on the telephone today. Please give me a quick reaction.
2. I am also enclosing a memorandum on CFA which is about what they would want to know.
3. These are the only copies I have left of these two memoranda and I must have them back.

TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

2 Attachments  
TS 85308  
TS 85340

ATTACHMENT 1

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1. COPY OF 3 COPIES

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NCFE has, from small beginnings, for purposes only generally defined, grown into a large institution organized as follows:

NCFE is a non-profit membership corporation, organized under the laws of New York State. Intimately associated with it are three separate corporations: the Crusade for Freedom (the fund raising and cover mechanism), the Free Europe University in exile, and the Portuguese radio relay installation, Rarot.

The Committee's major divisions, functions and budget for 1953 are as follows:

a. Division of General Administration - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - \$772,100

This is a headquarters administrative unit in NCFE's New York headquarters. It is not an over-all administrative unit, as each subdivision has its own administrative organization.

b. Division of Emigre Relations - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - \$1,244,272

The Division of Emigre Relations is the political center of NCFE. Through this Division, support is given to the various emigre organizations and to individual emigres.

In the past two years, this Division has attempted -- with conspicuous lack of success -- to create unified refugee groups. It is at present in the process of reviewing and revising its relations with individual emigres and emigre organizations. It is attempting to exercise closer financial control over these organizations and to develop a program using emigre groups and individuals in a way which will contribute more positively to psychological warfare efforts. This Division of NCFE is the most responsive to guidance.

c. Division of Intellectual Cooperation - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - \$1,648,311

The activities of this Division are principally directed to the building of intellectual resources which will ensure continuity with the past and which can be used when the satellite countries are liberated. The Division's activities consist of:

1. The East European Inquiry, an outgrowth and enlargement of the Panubian Inquiry, which was created by Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Its aim is to prepare basic materials in order to meet the minimum needs of those who will be charged with the reorganization of the Panubian area.

2. Other Studies of a miscellaneous nature useful to the other divisions of NCFE and to students of Central Europe.

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3. Scholarships to American universities this year will be \$0-35 to highly qualified exiles who have signed a pledge to return to their homelands after liberation.
4. Textbooks to replace Communist textbooks are being prepared in stockpile and manuscript form.
5. The Mid-European Law Project, which digests and annotates current legislation from the Iron Curtain countries.
6. The East European Accessions List, which publishes a monthly annotated bibliography of current published material from the satellites received in the Library of Congress.
- d. Free Europe University in Exile - Budget for fiscal year 1953 -  
1637731

Two hundred exile students, all escapees, are provided with board and lodging at the University in Strasbourg. Each student attends the University of Strasbourg for his or her formal education. The Free University, in addition to providing board, lodging, and tuition, conducts courses and seminars dealing with the countries of origin of these exile escapees. The University operates on the theory that these young people are being equipped for future leadership after liberation.

- e. Research and Publication Service - Budget for fiscal year 1953 -  
1637732

The Committee for Research and Publications was created in November 1951 to make available in currently useful form information about the satellite countries. It gathers information from four basic sources:

1. The analysis of 270 Communist newspapers and periodicals;
2. RFE's overseas information-gathering network;
3. Monitoring reports from all major satellite radio stations. The analysis of the 10,000 publications from the satellite area received annually by the Library of Congress. The compiled information is used in the following ways:
  - a) Within NCFE - Daily digest of all Iron Curtain information. These are prepared for the use of RFE's New York language desk;
  - b) Weekly trend meetings by RFE -- RPS desk heads to discuss the interpretation and use in radio programming of events in the Iron Curtain countries;

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- c) Research projects on specific targets for RFE's New York and Munich language desks. Daily monitoring highlights summarize major events in all satellite countries;
- d) RFE also makes available its information files to the Divisions of Intellectual Cooperation and Empire Relations;
- e) A "Black Book" prepared every six months, contains communist attacks against RFE/RFE;
- f) To the general public - "News from Behind the Iron Curtain," a monthly magazine of source material about the target area, is issued to some 1,000 people in the field of communications. 162 research studies have been distributed outside the Committee to a total of 11,500 people. Foreign language bulletins in each of the major tongues of the satellite countries, are distributed to some 5,000 exiles in 52 countries outside the Soviet orbit. These bulletins, which average 100 pages each, are the only complete and unbiased source of information about their captive homelands available to those who have escaped.
- f. Radio Free Europe - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - \$3,334,555 NY,  
\$5,009,971 Germany, \$1,201,755 Paris

Radio Free Europe's main broadcasting studio and equipment is located in Munich, Germany. Broadcasting facilities are maintained also in New York and there is a relay station in Portugal. RFE broadcasts an average of about 1,000 hours per week. Of this broadcasting time 187 $\frac{1}{4}$  hours are original programming, directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York. New York exercises policy control over RFE broadcasts through daily guidances and a teletype system between Munich and New York.

Radio Free Europe has its own information section to provide its broadcast materials. It has correspondents and offices in London, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Salzburg, Vienna, Linz (Austria), Wels (Austria), Graz (Austria), Rome, Trieste, Athens and Istanbul. These offices produce an average of over one thousand reports per month. In addition, material for broadcasting comes from: 1) satellite press publications; 2) RFE's monitoring service of satellite and Russian broadcasts; 3) information from the Division of Empire Relations, private letters, news service, the SIC, VOA and others.

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**II**

The foregoing is a cursory outline of NSFE and a brief record of our attempts to solve administrative problems. To complete the picture, the following is a brief outline of the major psychological problems we face with NSFE.

NSFE is not what it should be -- an integral and balanced part of the total U.S. program for dealing with the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. The top officials of NSFE have no detailed comprehension of U.S. policy, nor any understanding of how they can contribute to its development and operations. They give only lip service to the idea of obtaining policy guidance from Washington. Their apparent attitude has been that they can make a trip to Washington, determine what "high policy" is, and return to New York with the job done. This push-button mentality, added to their deep-seated suspicion of Government interference, has led them to resist our efforts to study their role and to develop new ideas, or reexamine old ones.

As a result of these attitudes, there has been considerable difficulty in gaining information about NSFE activities, problems and plans. For example, we do not receive any regular communication from Admiral H.W. Miller; we have received no list of NSFE personnel, nor any minutes of meetings of the Staff Executive Committee, or the Board of Directors. Even more important than this is the fact that the heads of divisions are prevented from having contact with us, except on occasions when Admiral Miller is out of town. As a result, for instance, Mr. Lang, the head of RPT, who has considerable problems and is anxious for the fullest liaison, is prevented from dealing with us personally. Conversely, every attempt to deal with NSFE personnel individually is looked upon with suspicion and carried on by NSFE personnel with some apprehension. The reasons for Admiral Miller's attitude are two-fold: (a) In his organization he wants everything done through him; and (b) He does not wish any outside "control" over his activities. (Admiral Miller's manner of conducting affairs within the Committee is resented by Mr. Spencer Sherix and other members of the Board of Directors, but Mr. Sherix and NSFE Directors support Admiral Miller in his reluctance to deal outside the Board.)

This lack of consultation and common study has clear reflections in the organization itself. NSFE is not an integrated organization. Each division operates separately, without any real relation to other divisions. Added to this, the lack of a clear understanding of the Committee's purposes and of its place in the total psychological warfare efforts of the United States has led to real dissatisfaction among the Division heads. They are anxious to know what they are doing, to integrate their own efforts and to cooperate to the maximum.

To formulate our own and NSFE's ideas, we have been and are carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NSFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department, has been a direct participant.

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These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

- (1) What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations? What is American policy? What modifications are likely?
- (2) How can NCFE, especially the Division of Refugee Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain, but in the Free World? For example - How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?
- (3) Should NCFE continue to support refugee councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of refugees for psychological warfare purposes?
- (4) How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?
- (5) Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Refugee Relations' dealings with refugees on the position of NCFE in Europe, etc?
- (6) How can we give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overruling jargons can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

III

There are, in addition, some specific current problems that should be mentioned. They are:

- (1) RFE's position in Germany. The position of Radio Free Europe in Germany is becoming increasingly difficult. The political situation in Germany has developed so that the German expellees, numbering some 9,000,000 voters, have joined with the extreme nationalist elements, some of whom are non-German extremists, & chauvinistic Separatists. This group holds a potential powerful balance of power between the CDU and the SPD. As a result, both parties, but particularly the SPD, are becoming more vociferously nationalistic. RFE, as an American operation in Germany, including the Voice of America, will be the subject of pressure, RFE is most vulnerable of all because of its Eastern European personnel and the nature of its broadcasts. RFE's problems are the subject of careful study at the present time by NCFE, and others.

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Should RFE be forced out of Germany -- its facilities in Portugal can be expanded to take over the job. Programming can be moved to London and Paris. In addition, RFE has asked us to consider the feasibility of their locating a station in Turkey to enable them to program full time with a strong signal into Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.

(3) Crusade for Freedom. The Crusade for Freedom, the fund raising cover mechanism of NCFE and CFA, is pretty much out of hand. It is operated as a separate corporation and the responsible officials of NCFE, except Admiral Miller, have literally washed their hands of any attempt to control or direct its activities. As a result, it has become a high pressure, fund-raising outfit which has little comprehension of the reasons for its existence or knowledge of the kind of publicity which should be undertaken. Among the working personnel of NCFE, it is looked upon with great skepticism and much apprehension. The single strength of the Crusade for Freedom is the fact that it does raise money from individual Americans, not much money, but still some 23,000,000 Americans have contributed. This fact is a powerful weapon. For example, Adenauer's party, the Bundestag, in defending RFE from attacks by the SED, cites as one of its main arguments the support and concern of 23,000,000 Americans that this activity be continued.

Immediate attention is being given to having the Crusade conducted next year by the Heritage Foundation. Mr. C. N. Vandenburg of that organization has stated he would take on the job.

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CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM1950 CAMPAIGN

1. The Crusade was launched by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on a nation wide broadcast.
2. The symbol of the Crusade, a ton ton World Freedom Bell, inscribed with a quotation from Lincoln, "This World under God shall have a new birth of freedom", toured the United States from coast to coast. The "Freedom Bell" was sent to Berlin to become part of a "Freedom Shrine", and tolled there over an international radio hookup.
3. Freedom Scrolls signed by 15,000,000 contributors were taken to Berlin to become a permanent part of the Freedom Shrine.
4. In the United States, local committees were established throughout the country. General Licius Clay was appointed chairman of the Fund raising campaign of the Crusade for Freedom. Mr. Abbott Washburn, Chief, Public Relations for General Foods Corp. was appointed as the director. Assisting companies were: Fund raising - John Price Co., Inc. - Advertising - Hewitt, Ogilvy, Benson & Mather Inc. Small mass contributions were solicited. Contributions from large individual donors were solicited later, in order to afford the fund raising campaign a broader continuity. Literature (samples attached) of all kinds, explaining Radio Free Europe were distributed.
5. Financial results were as follows:

Expenses; \$917,000.00

Contributions; \$1,317,000.00

1951 CAMPAIGN

The 1951 Crusade Campaign was begun by the launching of balloons into Czecholovakia and Poland containing pamphlets of encouragement to the people of these countries. Copies of the message and samples of the balloons were used to solicit contributions in the United States. Publicity dealt largely with Radio Free Europe. Free magazine advertising was widely used for the first time. A coast to coast telethon was used.

Inadvertently, through mistakes of the staff and the failure to adequately brief community leaders, the Crusade mistakenly implied that the Voice of America was ineffective — that only Radio Free Europe, the privately supported radio broadcasting station, could do an effective job.

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After conferences with the State Department, it was agreed that VOA and RFE were complimentary activities and that in the future the Crusade:

(1) Would not put out anything which might be interpreted as a criticism of the Voice. To that end, an attached leaflet was inserted as an insert in the January 1952 "Crusader", a newsletter which was sent out to the 8,000 regional chairman of the Crusade for Freedom. It was intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organizations with the facts about the Voice of America and to offset any criticism or unfortunate comparison between Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America.

Financial results were as follows:

Expenses; \$1,932,478

Contributions; \$2,011,229.94

#### 1952 CAMPAIGN

The 1952 Crusade Campaign was begun by General Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson and Henry Ford, II, the 1952 Campaign Chairman. The Campaign was endorsed in a letter from President Truman:

"I understand that on the success of the 1952 Crusade rests the plans of the Crusade for Freedom to build more radio stations in Free Europe and Asia. If this can be done, and I believe that it will be done, the Free world can more effectively get the truth behind the Iron Curtain.

"It is essential that the people everywhere know that we are working for peace, freedom and prosperity for all mankind."

The assistance of the Advertising Council was enlisted and for the first time outdoor billboard advertising was used. Records were made containing 2 fifteen minute programs on "The RFE story" and spot films were arranged for television with narration by Henry Fonda.

For the first time, fund raising letters seeking large contributions were sent to all leading corporations.

The Campaign was highly organized on the local level with state chairmen in almost every state. The Post Office Department permitted the use of a local post office address for receipts. Endorsements were obtained from many organizations such as the American Legion, VFW, CIO, National Auto. Dealers, American Brewers Foundation, and Catholic War Veterans etc. For fund raising

14-00000

- 3 -

purposes on a mass scale — a freedomgram to be signed by contributors has been distributed. These freedomgrams, translated into six languages will be broadcast over Radio Free Europe.

**SECRET**

Security Information

13 January 1953

MENORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF  
SUBJECT: Request by the Directors of NCFE for a statement from the responsible officer in CIA that NCFE has no responsibility of any kind for the initiation of, nor for the payments in respect to radio equipment known as the MB-50.

1. The enclosed letter, is as you suggested, drafted for the signature of Mr. Tracy Barnes, which when signed, should be transmitted to this Office for New York's attention.
2. Two versions have been prepared. Both should be signed, the sterilized version will be sent to New York, the unsterilized original will be retained in our files.

*Thomas W. Braden*

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachments:  
As stated above

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Executive Registry  
3-5021

*Mr. Holden*

Please speak  
12 January 1953

*McAuliffe Mrs.*

*Reed*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director Central Intelligence  
FROM : Chief, International Organizations

You may wish to speak to the Director about the fact that Charles Moore, a very close friend of mine who is Director of Public Relations for the Ford Motor Company, called me last week to suggest that his boss, Henry Ford, would like to be asked to become President of the Heritage Foundation.

I think this lays to rest any fears we may have had of Mr. Ford's (in reality Mr. Moore's) criticism of the Crusade for Freedom leading to Mr. Ford's becoming inactive on our behalf.

The Director might wish to call Mr. Ford and ask him to become President if it is feasible for Mr. McCloy to become Chairman of the Board. In discretion, the Director may not wish to mention to Mr. Ford the message passed to me by Mr. Moore.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF FACTS ON RADIO FREE EUROPE

Radio Free Europe (RFE) was established as a separate division of ROPF when the latter was incorporated on May 11, 1949. RFE has been on the air since mid-July 1950. At the close of 1950, RFE broadcasts were totaling 7½ hours daily, programs of 1½ hours each being addressed to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Russia and Bulgaria. The total cost of this earliest period, from 17 May 1949 to 30 June 1950, was \$1,937.77, operating and capital costs being roughly even. The next year saw to see these same costs rise in the same ratio - capital to operating - to a total of \$4,968,325.23.

Today, RFE broadcasts to all the above mentioned countries, with the addition of Albania, at a weekly total rate of 1086 hours, of which 120 hours are original programming - some 5% of the total free world broadcast hours directed at the Orient. The original program broadcasts are directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Russia and Albania are relayed or relayed from New York.

The estimated expenditures of RFE for the fiscal year 1953 are capital \$2,981,120, operating expenses, \$6,958,380 ~~estimated~~, for a total of \$10,939,280. Estimated operating expenses (only) for the same period are \$1,616,300. A summary of RFE expenditures to date is as follows:

	Capital	Operating	Total
For Period 17 May 50 to 30 June 50	\$ 2,6,471.11	3,237,123.14	\$ 3,243,594.25
For Period 1 July 50 to 30 June 51	2,461,036.12	3,197,433.10	5,658,469.22
For Period 1 July 51 to 30 June 52	2,777,116.56	6,500,227.11	9,277,343.67
For Period 1 July 52 to 30 June 53	2,581,325.15	6,347,161.10	12,928,486.25
TOTALS TO INCLUDE 30 JUNE 1953	<u>\$2,466,316.12</u>	<u>10,616,300.17</u>	<u>\$13,082,616.29</u>

RFE FACILITIES

RFE's principal installations are its main broadcasting station and production equipment, located in Berlin, Germany; broadcasting facilities maintained in New York City and the major relay center at Lisbon, Portugal.

In Germany, transmitters are in operation at Holzkirchen and Biblis, while monitoring, recording and receiving functions are at Aschaffenburg and Loosburg. In Portugal, the 50 and 100 kw transmitter complex is at Gloria, while receiving/monitoring facilities and production/editing are at Maiaqueria and Lisbon, respectively.

Original capital investment in Germany as of 30 June 1950 amounted to ~~\$ 2,6,471.11~~. Original capital, for Portugal as of 30 June 1950

~~\$ 193,193.10~~

~~COPY~~

was in one account of \$~~6,600.00~~ \$49,908.86

INVENTORIES OF FIXED ASSETS (At Cost):

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>NEW YORK</u>	<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>PORTUGAL</u>
Acquired:				
Prior to July 1, 1952	\$3,113,305.28	\$316,511.20	\$1,561,982.26	\$1,234,811.82
Current Fiscal Year	<u>1,034,937.62</u>	<u>27,909.22</u>	<u>261,727.89</u>	<u>475,300.62</u>
	<u>\$4,148,243.88</u>	<u>\$314,420.42</u>	<u>\$1,823,710.15</u>	<u>\$1,710,112.44</u>

Breakdown of revised 1953 budget as it applies to New York, Munich  
and Lisbon offices follows:

	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Total</u>
New York	\$ 158,000.00	\$2,405,000.00	\$2,563,000.00
Lisbon	768,261.00	1,232,696.00	2,000,957.00
Munich	<u>2,054,859.00</u>	<u>2,752,420.00</u>	<u>5,213,279.00</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b><u>\$3,981,120.00</u></b>	<b><u>\$2,390,160.00</u></b>	<b><u>\$12,571,280.00</u></b>

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

RFE is in part supported by the Crusade for Freedom, a major fund-raising mechanism. From September 1, 1950 to date, the Crusade has been responsible for some 4 million dollars in contributions to RFE and RFA. Expenditures for the Crusade, over the same period, amounted to some 2 1/4 millions. All monies raised, except expenditures, or a total of 1 3/4 millions have been spent directly and wholly on RFE's capital installations, i.e., transmitter, receivers, supporting equipment.

PERSONNEL

RFE in July 1950 employed 177, of whom 118 were Americans, 21 of whom were employed in Germany. At present, RFE has a total staff of 1776, of whom 252 are American. In New York, the policy and administrative headquarters, the staff number 125. In Berlin, which is the programming headquarters, there are 1249 employees. At London, the technical relay headquarters, there are now 334 individuals. These figures include only staff employees on the regular payroll.

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WAYS OF CONTRIBUTION

RFE is a major instrument in total U.S. political and psychological warfare efforts directed at Central and Eastern Europe. It has contributed in the following ways:

RFE made an intensive campaign of Stalin's death and linked this event with the death of Gottwald and the illness of Pieck. During the intensive period of the Stalin story, RFE was on the air 24 hours with all its 21 transmitters on a single frequency, which was switched continuously from country to country. It beat all Western press agencies by 24 hours in announcing Gottwald's illness and is usually about 2 hours ahead of VOA and BBC in announcing events of major importance.

Radio Free Europe was the first to inform the Agency of the recent riots in Pilzen, the reshuffle of the Hungarian Communist Government, etc.

RFE has contributed in the launching of two balloon operations: one in the summer of 1951, when barrages of balloons were buried at Czechoslovakia and Poland, another on 14 July 1953, when thousands of balloons were launched into Czechoslovakia.

RFE is an effective machinery through which the U.S. Government can work unofficially as cannot be done through VOA or RIAS.

RFE gives hope to those behind the Iron Curtain and its broadcasts have provided incentives to escape: e.g. escape of two Polish pilots, Freedom Train.

Interrogation of refugees and escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. Escapees often prefer to go to RFE reception center rather than more official U.S. outfits. Interrogation reports are of immense value to intelligence and formulation of U.S. policy.

RFE guidance: highly intelligent analyses of current situations and lines to be followed in broadcasts. Of extreme value to U.S. Government.

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE in Turkey

ACTION NECESSARY: Will you please decide or cause to be decided the following question: Should the National Committee for a Free Europe in its approach to Turkish authorities exploring the possibility of creating an RFE station in Turkey contact Turkish authorities as a non-governmental private Committee or as a CIA-financed institution?

Background

1. The State Department has asked that RFE not approach Turkish authorities until VOA's attempt to get into Turkey has been accepted or refused by the Turks. The Department has now given the Voice of America until 15 January to conclude its negotiations with the Turkish Government. These negotiations appear to be leading nowhere and, on the assumption that VOA will not gain entrance to Turkey, the Department has authorized RFE to begin negotiations on the above date.

2. Bob Lang, Bill Durkee and Mr. Wadsworth, former Ambassador to Turkey, as well as the NE Division have all been in on discussions as to how NCFE should approach the Turks. Mr. Wadsworth counsels that all cards be laid on the table, and he bases his reasoning on his belief that the Turks will know about it anyhow and that RFE is likely to get further if it comes clean. The NE Division on the other hand hopes that the approach can be that of a private committee and that no mention need be made of CIA's interest.

3. Your advice on the above question will not constitute approval of the building of a Turkish station or of operations from Turkey. By PRD decision at the last hearing on NCFE's budget these questions in Turkey must be brought back here for approval if the attitude of the Turks is favorable.

*Thomas Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

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