

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

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(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Carrez-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumber regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is bolder) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 123 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and as

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the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, someone-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractor-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

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it via air drops or sea infiltration. To date the internal opposition has not been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs. This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of Trujillo's security services, the understandable fear that prevails throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-Trujillo activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently consists of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) .38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.

B. CIA has established working relationships with selected exile groups. These relationships have taken into account that President Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican President Jose Figueres as his emissary and representative to work with Dominican exile groups. Through Figueres and with the knowledge of President Betancourt, CIA is providing financial support and technical guidance to the following activities:

- (1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose, Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,

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a representative designated by **Betancourt**, and chaired by **Figueres**. The council had its first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961. Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the concurrence of **President Betancourt**, CIA has indicated to **Betancourt** and **Figueres** that it is prepared to support the council's program in the amount of \$15,000 a month. It is **Figueres'** initial concept that the council will undertake propaganda activities directed against Trujillo, and train selected Dominicans in democratic process, administrative skills, and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of responsibility in any successor government. **Figueres** has also proposed that an exile paramilitary force be trained, but CIA has discouraged this activity to date since neither **Betancourt** nor **Figueres** have indicated a clear plan for its eventual use. It is CIA's judgment that the exile groups represented on **Figueres'** council have little if any popular support among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages that can and is being gained by support of the council is the number of credits that this gives to the United States Government in its dealings with **Betancourt and Figueres** in utilizing them in other operations. **Betancourt** has been adamant that no action be taken against Castro until Trujillo is disposed of. This support has served to neutralize his attitude on that point since it amounts to a guarantee **to Betancourt** of the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves to solidify the attitudes of dissident exiled Dominicans so that they are not anti-U.S. and will make them more approachable and amenable to U.S. Government objectives once Trujillo is overthrown. (2) The conduct

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of radio propaganda from Ponce, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction of **Horacio ORNES, Secretary General** of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as the voice of the **ORNES** organization.

(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht **belonging to ORNES** so as to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or personnel into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability has not been utilized to date. It is contemplated that both the **ORNES** propaganda program and this limited boat capability will be absorbed by the exile council now being formed **by Figueres.**

C. **With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his government as the ostensible source of funds,** CIA has provided limited financial support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing a para-military capability in Venezuela.

D. CIA has recently re-located **Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon** from Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico. **Jimenez, a physician and university professor,** is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence of the internal opposition. He is currently working with the Puerto Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to provide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes and selected administrative skills. Through **Jimenez** and a small group of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition, CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the internal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through

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FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT

1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subsequent to your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve uncertainties reflected rcf ___ but your comments and requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and yourself and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of dissidents, whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quantifies places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted, feel sure you will agree we should stand firm.

3. While fully cognizant of unique circumstances within Dominican Republic which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result ISG too openly identified with what should be clandestine activities.

4. Running through entire ~~all~~ dilemma has been conflict between two objectives

- (1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
- (2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.

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PROPOSED TELEGRAM
to US Consul General in
Ciudad Trujillo

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