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Handcarried to Perry's
office 1 Feb 75

31 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger

SUBJECT : Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States
by an ex-Member of the KGB

1. Several weeks ago I talked to Bill Nelson, DDO,* regarding a more thoughtful use of our Soviet KGB Source's knowledge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy. The information relates to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the United States as the "main enemy." My suggestion was to submit a number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr. Nelson stated that he had no objection as long as there was a description of the Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily represent the views of CIA. I should add that the FBI and other services are on record to the effect that they have never been able to disprove Source's factual information although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).

2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961. From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his

*Bill has taken sick leave for the next ten days and has not seen this letter. 054519

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young daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In 1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad, and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one where we unwittingly had an agent in place in the KGB who was breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was to obtain information of great value to the West should he have the opportunity to defect.

3. By way of special talents, he is essentially an analyst and historian. He was frequently called upon by senior members of the service to study and make recommendations where there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one department. In his drive to gain more knowledge outside of his particular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs of KGB production indicating the overall espionage production obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and Plans, NATO documents, etc. This gave Source freedom to inspect the processing of secret information and to trace its handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of the product and its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately, the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source, after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were identified by Western services on the basis of his description. This, in turn, led to investigative action and important counter-intelligence successes in the West.

4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and security services under our aegis. He has imparted first-hand knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelligence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School where he was able to milk KGB officers from many departments of the Service abroad who were brought back for short periods of retraining.

5. Because the Administration, the State Department and the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a preliminary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views.

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This could lead to a symposium in which he would be invited to participate and respond to adversary views. His reaction to such a proposal is unknown. He has always resisted control in the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he does make demands for classified information and position papers including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches were obtained from him using only unclassified information.

6. His production has run into several thousands of pages of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had with other foreign intelligence and security services. The range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet events. We have learned from experience that if we give him a problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and rearrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting his thesis, he often reveals new information of value.

7. Attachment C is a sensitive report received from our **Israeli liaison**; Attachment D is an assessment regarding the activities, role, modus operandi and reason for Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated); and Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM - A SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are partly drawn from a draft manuscript which he has in his possession. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique interest because of the classified information (based on documents) which he read in Moscow.

8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth below of Source's theme.

9. The major reorganization (which produced the KGB Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN succeeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV, who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a

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special committee headed by SHELEPIN who worked under the Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had not carried out deStalinization which required that the services follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was accomplished by suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful penetration operations into Western governments, the manipulation of agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation programs by feeding deception to the West through their intelligence services. Under STALIN the services degenerated into instruments of personal terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost sight of the overall political, economic, and military objectives of the Soviets.

10. Before STALIN's death, there were anti-Stalinist elements who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "boot-lickers."

11. MALENKOV was unfortunately outmaneuvered by the collective which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers. This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs which represented a return to LENIN.

12. In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelligence services and to set forth policies which would result in their reorganization and reorientation.

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13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN gave a broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay-behind net-workers should be abandoned. He outlined programs and reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be in harness with all other departments of the Government. He stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter "P" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN, SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation within the KGB but subject to the control and direction of the Central Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic. This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.

14. In discussing the various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped countries, noting that these courses of action were not contradictory.

15. Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee charged the KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of influence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change of balance of military power could only be achieved through this additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten its isolation.

16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.

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He stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the United States and swing the balance of military power to the Soviets.

17. The general stated that the USSR was fourteen years behind the United States in electronic technology but that the gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the following fields:

a. A greatly increased espionage effort because of the addition of one thousand staff officers to the S&T of the KGB and the Academy of Sciences;

b. Disinformation, i.e., programs to mislead the United States and the West regarding Soviet technology which would lead the Western scientific community into expensive and time-wasting blind alleys of R&D;

c. To acquire new technology through trade agreements; and

d. To make treaties and other diplomatic arrangements by which the Soviets and Bloc would acquire information and which would permit Soviet scientists to gain access to the United States scientific community for the purpose of spotting potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important, he said, was that treaties could be used to block the natural technological growth of the Western powers, in particular, the United States.

18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated 16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence Bulletin begins with the following:

"Leading officials of the Soviet electronics industry have told visiting US experts that the Soviet Union is four or five years behind the United States in integrated circuit technology. The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment in this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment.

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Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size, weight, power, and reliability of modern military equipment as well as the needs of many civil electronic systems."

Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of the question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.

19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to dispatch these papers for analysis and comment by your expert before my time runs out.

20. As previously noted, this package represents a unique dissemination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the future exploitation and/or discussions of the product and the Source. We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet defector since World War II.

21. At your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledgment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would appreciate their return for the use of my successor.

Kindest personal regards from,



James Angleton

Attachments: as stated

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U.S.S.R.

Report No.: 1-6444

Subject: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Source: Born 1938 in RIGA, has an academic education and is a sociologist by profession. He acquired his academic training in Moscow and Baku. In 1962 he worked for about six months with the M.V.D. in Baku and after that, until 1963, he worked as a lecturer in philosophy in Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the University of Moscow. From 1967 until December 1973 when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked in Yaroslavl and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Association of the U.S.S.R. From 1964 he was an active member of the Communist Party in Azerbaydzhan and was a member of its Central Committee. He was closely associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression of being a highly intelligent and educated man with analytical ability, good perception and excellent memory.

Validity of Information: November 1973

Reliability: B/2-3

U.S.S.R.Subject: THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA

1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people like KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (KOSYGIN's son-in-law), OSIPOV and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.O. in the BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:

- a. The danger of war with China is not taken seriously in official circles of the U.S.S.R. and particularly in military circles. General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests outweigh the differences between the two Communist countries. The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate piece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in order to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was often said that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda for her own internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., in order to keep millions of mobilized soldiers.
- b. In those circles it is thought that war with China is impossible for the following reasons:
 - (1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, it would take a tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential of China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 200 atomic bombs.

.. / ...

(2) War with China would in fact be a war of mutual attrition and even in the case of a formal Soviet victory and a change-over in Chinese leadership - the U.S.S.R. will be unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to GVISHYANI, there are a hundred million hungry people in China, and in the U.S.S.R. there is not enough food for the population. A Soviet victory would thus double the needs of the Soviet Union in this respect and would put too great a strain on her economy.

2. From some conversations mainly with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than with China; here are his reasons:

a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not because it is near to China, but, mainly, because it is near to the U.S.A.

b. According to KHALIPOV, two or three days will be enough for the Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated:

England has about 920 tanks and 1500 planes;

France - about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;

Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;

All this put together is but about a sixth of what the U.S.S.R. can put in the field against the West within 2 or 3 days; and until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.

3. According to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with the a/m people, not only is the Soviet Union in no fear of a war with China, but she even thinks China will join her in a war against the West.

U.S.S.R.

Subject: ANDROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

1. Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO's and GROMYKO's inclusion in the Politburo should be examined against the background of two tendencies current within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S.S.R. policy towards China and the U.S.A.

a. A policy of detente with China is supported, according to these personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by adopting a tough policy towards the capitalist countries; a policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position in the International Communist Movement and at the same time strengthens the ideological attitudes of China.

b. A policy of detente with the West

BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly KIRILENKO - on the other hand - support a policy of detente with the West in general and with the U.S.A. in particular. This group stresses the need for the modernization of Soviet production processes. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should adopt an even tougher policy towards the West than in the past.

2. Thus the membership of the three in the Politburo is designed to strengthen BREZHNEV's position. It should be remembered that these three owe a personal debt to BREZHNEV: it was BREZHNEV who made them what they are now. It should also be kept in mind that the membership in the

Politburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Minister, has a special significance; it is an indication that BREZHNEV is about to make most important decisions and needs the support of the Armed forces, the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Office.

The general opinion in circles of the Intelligentsia, and particularly in scientific circles, is that a war against the West is being planned.

According to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admission of these three Ministers to the Politburo is a very unusual act in the history of the Soviet Union.

A similar step was taken only once before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV, MOLOTOV and BERIA to the Politburo - about two months before the outbreak of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

*Potomac
Cayak*

DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITMENT APPROACHES TO AMERICANS

THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT IN THE DETENTE PERIOD

1. The aura of detente in the Soviet and Bloc relations during the last year and a half, we believe, has created a favorable climate for recruitment and penetration in the West. This paper deals with the problems as we see them. There are related counter-intelligence issues which involve internal security: the leakage and exchange of economic, scientific and political information; the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinformation and agents of influence on American policy. As has been noted in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us documentary evidence* that Soviet intelligence had launched a full-scale penetration effort against the "Main Enemy," we have seen a steady and continuing Soviet effort to effect penetrations of the U.S. Government. Detente has done nothing to blunt this effort. Soviet intelligence has worked steadily on the American target and has been quick to seize upon the openings to the West which KRUSHCHEV was the first to label "Detente." BREZHNEV has made the word the cliché of the moment. It has been clear to Soviet intelligence, as it has been apparent to Western counterintelligence, that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and, hopefully, change the balance of military power has created new opportunities for Soviet espionage.

2. These new opportunities may be characterized as a plethora of choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) period and the 1958 Central Committee decision to assign to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the West by returning to the principles of LENIN. Soviet intelligence now finds more Americans, both official and unofficial:

- a. Anxious to exchange all types of information;
- b. Willing to discuss virtually any subject;
- c. Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can be influenced if only the American people-to-people concept could prevail;

*Referred to and quoted in Attachment A.

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d. Convinced that there is a bonanza for the American businessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter the Soviet lifestyle and reduce governmental, i.e., CP control;

e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by America;

f. Anxious to atone for the "sins" of Vietnam and interventionist policies;

g. Anxious about China and nuclear weapons;

h. Believing there is more merit to direct USSR-USA negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in tandem with its Western allies or other nations;

i. Ready to believe there are many, if not legions, of Soviet citizens, particularly the young "intellectuals," who are willing to cooperate with the West to advance freedom for the Russians;

j. Ignorant about Soviet ideological consistency and purpose.

3. Addressing ourselves only to manifestations of the Soviet security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has become too permissive. The attitudes outlined have not only made America more vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence job more difficult. Not only has Soviet-American contact increased in geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that the always relatively loose security check rein on official Americans has lengthened even more. As discussed elsewhere, it is apparent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attempt to develop and recruit Americans.

4. In an attempt to cope with the problem of Soviet and Bloc recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 - collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis of recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information in order to:

a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist services;

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b. Identify U.S. Government employees who are being targetted by these adversary services;

c. Determine the scope of activity of these adversary services by area, date and modus operandi;

d. Determine the scope of targetting against any specific U.S. Government agency;

e. Help us understand the extent of foreign intelligence efforts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other perspectives about possible disinformation and deception operations;

f. Facilitate management of double agent cases;

g. Furnish counterintelligence and operational guidance to our field stations in their efforts to mount aggressive operations against the adversary;

h. Provide the Agency and other U.S. Government agencies, as appropriate, information about the scope and type of penetration efforts being made against U.S. Government installations abroad.

5. Our evaluated cases* of penetration and recruitment attempts over the last nine years by the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist services are as follows:

1965	-	117
1966	-	131
1967	-	72
1968	-	97
1969	-	86
1970	-	60
1971	-	56
1972	-	78
1973	-	<u>45</u>

Total 742 =

*2 solid
penetrations and
recruitment attempts
per week.*

*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as established by evaluation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or circumstantial information, and other specific reporting and information.

6. Over the whole period the penetration and recruitment efforts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows:

Soviet	-	58%	of the cases
Bloc	-	37%	"
Cuban	-	4%	"
Chicom	-	1%	"

7. Over the range of cases, recruitment and penetration efforts have been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30% of the cases, other staff in 5%, communications personnel in 5%, enlisted ranks in 9%, local employees in 30%;** others in 22% of the cases.

8. Looking more particularly at our information on Soviet and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente period--the past four years--there is the following distribution of adversary service case effort:

	<u>Soviet</u>	<u>Bloc</u>	<u>Cuban</u>	<u>CPP</u>	<u>Yearly Totals</u>
1970	41	29	-	-	60
1971	32	21	3	-	56
1972	47	28	3	-	78
1973	31	12	1	1	45

9. It is clear that Soviet penetration and recruitment operations, up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government installations and representatives abroad have not been materially affected or inhibited by "Detente." Some representative cases since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have been sanitized to protect the innocent. They are included solely to suggest the range, precision and persistence of the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist penetrations effort.

10. This is not the end of the problem. Our data consists essentially of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or because of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.

*This covers only local employees outside of Iron Curtain installations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control of their respective security services and are therefore not considered in this calculation.

11. Soviet Bloc modus operandi--the operational techniques used against Americans--include all the known gambits and have changed little over the past decade. There have been slight tactical shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic M/O remains what it was in the 1920's and 1930's.

12. In addition to diplomatic and official access to U.S. officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places--bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruitment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and they have offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common" interests and cooperation to obtain information. They have utilized the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for one or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy information to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development negotiations as well as in some recruitment attempts. They continue in their efforts to obtain access to both American and indigenous female employees throughout the world by using officers or local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target personalities. Recently they have used the language lesson gambit--even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to higher officials, have been recruited and targeted either to obtain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as official access to American officials. They have attempted to recruit foreign local employees to report about the interests and activities of their American employers. They employ sex and financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat, seek out personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportunities, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or nationalistic grounds, utilize audio and other technical mechanisms, etc.

13. This summary examination of the recent case evidence of the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story. There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S. students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort is to guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the U.S. Government. Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via students, as a continuing and long-range program.

14. A recent additional dimension to the problem of Soviet and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access the Soviets have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to

U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who travel to the USSR and entertain Soviet trade delegations in the U.S. The concern we have previously expressed about the role of Lt. General Yevgeniy N. PITOVANOV and the Soviet intelligence officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in fact, we believe was somewhat understated. It is now evident that PITOVANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on where American business encounters Soviet trade officials, in the International Trade Center to be built in Moscow, in exhibits in the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in the supervision of the travel of trade delegations to the U.S. and the like.

15. Reports which reveal that the KGB is active among American businessmen are beginning to surface. Not too surprisingly, these reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant. One of the most blatant approaches to American business involves Igor ARTEMYEV, who is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries and licensing agreements between U.S. and foreign companies. In the course of his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. companies. The questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities and Exchange Commission. While some companies do not respond, there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to talk with officials. On one occasion he replied to a question about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was "confidential." With that kind of access, who needs to recruit in the classic sense.

16. PITOVANOV's people are very evident in various trade delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch, although these devices are being employed against some American businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly expanding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to Moscow.

Attachments

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) professional career:

- September 1944:** Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School.
- 1945-1946:** Student at the one year course, Military Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH", Moscow.
- 1946-1948:** Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony - security of Soviet officials abroad) Department (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Headquarters in Moscow. During the period November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for Information), but his functions were unchanged.
- 1948-1950:** Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence School of the KI. Subject studied general subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course.

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1950-1951: Desk officer, Operation Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China, assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Department, First Directorate of the MGB Headquarters in Moscow, the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.

September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, Counterintelligence Department of the First Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer."

December 1951: The KI was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's functions continued the same, but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section of the American Department of the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

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