104-10110-10245

2028 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

diff-jfk: record 104-10110-10245 - Page 1 - (diff between 2025 and 2023)

Highlighted changes between 2025/104-10110-10245.pdf and 2023/104-10110-10245.pdf - fresh pages only

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

DATE: 1 July 1963

FROM

: Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT

: Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa

#210 838

 On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension 6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials, including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concerning the "new program" for the exiles.

 Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed in the house to monitor their comments.

Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days. The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt also said that the house would be retained for several more months and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably be requested for these latter visits also.

4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr. Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:

House

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Page Two #210 838

- (a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, basement, or garage, and using a voice-operated relay to actuate the recorder.
- (b.) With the use of directories, search the environs of the safehouse for the purpose of locating a potential listening post where radio transmissions could be monitored.
- 5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief, Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of a transmitter and a nearby listening post.
- 6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the covert site through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas, Jr. (#57 328), of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee. Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas at the Langley Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. Thomas the fact that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to "bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house. Mr. Thomas explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, I D Pakistan, on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS, and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the

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- 13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Headquarters to announce that one SET-7 transmitter had been installed in the ceiling over the bar and telephone, in the basement of the safehouse and that the SER-1 receiver was picking up the trans-size missions satisfactorily in Mr. Thomas shasement. The QSC-2 voiceoperated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape in recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse. The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating range is supposed to be approximately one mile.
- The IFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive discussions and to turn it on when they leave.
 - 15. Mr. Thomas and his wife have consented to do most of the operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement. With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will be almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a day by a field office agent should be necessary to pick up the day's take and to make minor adjustments, repairs, or corrections to the receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. Thomas is well-known to his friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment in his basement would not raise the eyebrows on any of his visitors, some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries Mr. Thomas will be going to Karachi under Department of State cover.

cc = #57:328

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