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### JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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**CASTRO** 

MAFIA

SPECIAL GROUP

BISSELL,

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**HARVEY** 

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The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.

I would like to ask Mr. Schwarz if he would give us a brief synopsis of what we intend to question our witness about this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. The witness this morning will only be a single witness. He is Mr. Samuel Halpern. He was in the Far East, and I have now found out he was involved in the Sukarno moving and some alleged killing of an agent in Tailand, which are collateral matters that we may want to take up with him at the end.

But he came back here in the fall of 1961 and was instructed as assistant to get into the Cuban matter. And he will testify that he was told that they would proceed to overthrow the Castro government, and that there were no holds barred.

He will then describe the way in which they worked with the Special Group.

The Chairman. What was Halpern's position?

Mr. Schwarz. Halpern's position was as Executive Assistant to Harvey. And Harvey, you will remember, was the man that was actually in charge of the Cuban position.

> The Chairman. When are we going to get Harvey? Mr. Schwarz. He is coming next Wednesday morning.

We are going to get some of this same conflict between the no-holds-barred testimony, which in his mind I guess he

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Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir.

Who else was present at that meeting? Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Halpern. A Mr. Ghose Zogbey. He was my branch chief.

> Mr. Schwarz. Is he alive today, or is he dead?

Mr. Halpern. He died last year.

Mr. Schwarz. Approximately when in the fall of 1961 did that meeting take place?

Mr. Halpern. About the middle of October 1961.

Mr. Schwarz. What instructions were you given by Mr. Bissell at tht meeting?

Mr. Halpern. Mr. Bissell said he had recently -- and he didn't specificy the date or the time -- he had recently been chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by borh the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both Mr. Zogbey and to me were to plan for an operation to accomplish that end.

Mr. Schwarz. Was any content put into the term "get rid of", or was that the term that was used, and only that term?

Mr. Halpern. To the best of my recollection, that was it. There was no limitation of any kind. Nothing was forbidden, and nothing was withheld. And the objective was to

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remove Castro and his regime.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you talk about tactics at all in that meeting, or was it just a general discussion about getting organized.

Mr. Halpern. Just a general discussion as to what we would do, how we would proceed, and what we would need. And at that point I had no idea how many people were left on the staff in the branch only having been on the job a day or a day and a half.

Mr. Schwarz. Shorly after that time did you get put in contact with a general?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir. General Lansdale.

Mr. Schwarz. And what was his function when you were introduced to him?

Mr. Halpern. Both Mr. Zogbey and I were introduced to him as the new chief of Operations for a government-wide effort to accomplish the removal of Castro and the Castro regime. This effort was to include not only CIA but the Department of State and the Department of Defense. And General Lansdale was to be the Chief of Operations for that outfit.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you brief him about Cuba or did he brief you about the operation, or what was the nature of that?

Mr. Halpern. No, we briefed him first in the old
Situation Room, what used to called the Ibell Building, which

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Mr. Halpern. It wasn't a matter of General Lansdale's being in charge, or the Attorney General being in charge, nobody objected to General Lansdale reporting to the Attorney General.

It was a matter of whether this would be done through the normal chain of command, or whether we would actually be under the General's direct command.

Mr. Schwarz. But it still is a chracterization, you were dealing with organization and bureaucracy?

Mr. Halpern. That is right. And drafting papers.

Mr. Schwarz. Drafting papers to do what?

Mr. Halpern. To try to get organized in terms of how we would accomplish the objective.

Mr. Schwarz.Did any of those papers that you drafted in those early stages include any reference to assassination as a device to accomplish the objective?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, did Mr. Helms enter the picture in the latter part of December 1961?

Mr. Halpern. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Describe how he came into the picture.

Mr. Halpern. To my knowledge, Mr. Zogbey described to me a meeting he had been at at the Director's morning staff meeting -- this is Mr. McCone's morning staff meeting -- in which Mr. McCone, almost in terms of a bombshell for the

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group at the meeting, stated that Mr. Helms would henceforth be -- the words were, his man on Cuba. This was something that nobody in the room apparently had any inkling of, and particularly Mr. Helms, nor Mr. Zogbey.

The Chairman. May I ask you to repeat that? I am sorry, I just didn't catch it.

Mr. Halpern. At a meeting sometime in December 1961, which was the morning staff meeting that the Director held, and Mr. Zogbey was present --

Mr. Schwarz. But you were not?

Mr. Halprrn I was not, I got this from Mr. Zogby the Director, Mr. McCone, announced that Mr. Helms would be his man on Cuba, Mr. Helms would then be the Chief of Operations for the Deputy Director of Plans, and Mr. Bissell was in the room as the DDP.

Mr. Helms had no inkling of this before the meeting, and so stated to Mr. Zogbey, and even asked Mr. Zogby if he had had any inkling before the meeting.

Mr. Zogbey told me that he had none whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Helms then come and visit your new organization and tell you to make some changes?

Mr. Halpern. Yes. He came to Mr. Zogbey's office and looked at the list of officers, male and female, who were still working in the branch. Most of them were the remnants of the people from the old Bay of Pigs operation who had not yet been reassigned.

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involved in this operation? That was the first reference I recall to a female operative.

Mr. Schwarz. There was no such previous evidence.

Mr. Halpern. We had a number of female officers, and still do, in our branches. And there were some in the Cuban branch and the Cuban task force.

Senator Huddleston. What types of activities did they participate in?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, recruting of agents, the handling of agents, disseminating reports, preparing propaganda guidances, preparing papers for a special group as appropriate, doing the work of any other officer.

Senator Huddleston. Can you name one or suggest one that was heavily involved in the assassination attempt?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, I don't know of any in the assassination attempt per se.

Senator Huddleston. You don't know of any?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. I am sorry I cam e in late, Mr. Halpern, and missed some of your testimony. As I came in you were saying that orders came from somewhere to get off your ass.

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir. Mr. Bissell told Mr. Zogbey

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cers whose objective would be to plan for the overthrow of the Castro regime.

Mr. Smothers. Was it your understanding that these plans were to extend to assassination?

That word was not used, sir. But no Mr. Halpern. holds were barred, and we had no limitation.

Mr. Smothers.Let me ask you it another way. What was your understanding of what Mr. Bissell had been told to do by the President and the Attorney General?

Mr. Halpern. To get rid of Castro and the Castro regime on the Island of Cuba.

Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. Bissell convey to you the idea that that included killing Castro?

Mr. Halpern. The subject never came up per se.

Mr. Smothers. What did you come away from that meeting expecting to do?

Mr. Halpern. We were very hard put to come upwwith any real ideas. We didn't know what to do, frankly. And we went back -- one thing we both agreed on, both Zogbey and I, is that we were not going to come up with a piece of paper which said this was going to be easy or could be done overnight, or could be done with mirrors.

The Chairman. Did you come away after your conversation with Mr. Bissell with the idea that he had instructed you to come up with a plan of some kind designed to overthrow,

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later.

The Chairman. I would like to take this and several other questions up with the committee, one of which deals with the question of the August recess! And I want to confer with you on that, too.

How many more questions do you have?

Mr. Schwarz. Instead of asking the other questions I will ask whether he knows anything about them, and we could bring him back later if he does.

Do you know anything about the sale made and

respectate growth and sukaring by abowing in

Gaart?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. We will bring you back on that.

The Chairman. Can we get that done now?

Mr. Schwarz. Such and was made with the wood, was it?

Mr. Halpern. I don't know where it was made, sir, but I know it was made.

Mr. Schwarz. It was made in the U.S.?

Mr. Halpern. As far as I know it was.

Mr. Schwarz. And was that done under your direction?

Mr. Halpern. Well, it was done at the Far East Division request, and I was the one who did the negotiating with the Office of Security.

Mr. Schwarz. And was the plan that a rimewould show



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a mode who looked liver ver Sukarno pur	porting to have
sexual activity with some female, and t	has when the film
wouldwhe released in Indonesia, and it	would be attributed to
the Bussians in Somewashion?	

Mr. Halpern. No, sir, that was not the plan at all.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the plan?

Mr. Halpern. The plan was to have such an element of the propaganda activity against was a same to be a such as a same as a same to be a such as a same as a same to be a such as a same as a same to be a such as a same as a same to be a such as a same as a same to be a such as a same a same as a same a same as a same a same

Mr. Schwarz. In short, it was a fake movie which was designed to put Mr. Sukarno in an undesirable light, soy showing that he was having relations with some Russian female?

Mr. Halpern. And, therefore, Friendsupposed to get to

Mr. Halpern. It wasn't a film. The original plan was to use clips from it in propaganda leaflets, and pamphlets, and things like that, just presures from the film.

Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized that?

Mr. Halpern. Market dimer, who was then Division Chief.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000	1	- Mr. Schwarz. Do you know if any higher authority
	- 2	authorized it?
e lares	. 3	Mr. Halpern. Not offhand, no, sir, personally I don't
į	4	know.
	5	Mr. Schwarz. And was it done, or was it turned off?
	6	I mean, the produces were taken?
	7	Mr. Halpern. The pictuse was taken, and that was the
	8	end of it.
	9	Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Maheu was used to accomplish it?
	10	Mr. Halpern. I have no idea whatsoever.
	11	Mr. Schwarz. And were the sleeps used har Indonesia?
4	12	Mr. Halpern. No, they were not.
3	13	Mr. Schwarz. Why not?
WARD	14	Mr. Halpern. We didn't have any proper outlets to
	15	get it done.
	16	Mr. Schwarz. You had breakfum, but you had no way to
	17	distribute it ingladonesia?
	18	Mr. Halpern. aNotathemellm, but the chips.
603	19	Mr. Schwarz. What do you know about the killing of a
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003	20	postoni/Gallledwkillelum?
	21	Mr. Halpern. The name is brand new to me, sir.
	22	Mr. Schwarz. Do you know anything about the
	23	or a CO amployee or escorbice in that and the district?
	24	Mr. Halpern. No, sir.
410	25	Mr. Schwarz. Donyou, know any changpabous schemburial of

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
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Mr. Halpern. That I participated? No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz.



# of a compressive in sanguals.

Mr. Halpern. No, sir. I was only in Bangkok, I think, once in my life.

Mr. Schwarz. That doesn't ring a bell at all?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know about any other killings?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

The Chairman. Any other questions?

Senator Schweiker. I just want to say, Mr.Chairman, that I would like to compliment the witness for some very clear and impartial answers, instead of the partial amnesia that we have run into lately.

And I think your kind of candor is very helpful to us in this committee to do the job. And I think it was very refreshing to hear some clear-cut specific recommendations of what did or did not happen. I just want to thank you.

The Chairman. I agree.

Thank you very much.

If there are no further questions, I think that completes the interrogation.

(The witness left the hearing room.)