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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Deputy Director (Plans)
Cost of Cuban Operations
Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Fiscal Year	<u>Support^a</u> /	<u>Covert^b/Collection</u>	<u>Covert Action^c/</u>			<u>Total</u>
			<u>PA/Prop^d/</u>	<u>Post-Invasion^e/Paramilitary^f/Brigade Support</u>		
1960	\$319,534	\$131,063	\$1,677,161	\$318,409	-	\$2,446,167
1961	6,293,580	457,633	5,168,584	30,164,698	\$1,627,824	43,712,319
1962	3,599,274	793,824 ^g /	6,444,098	2,975,635	4,176,000	17,988,831
1963	5,343,973	1,738,977 ^g /	5,786,797	5,038,880	3,899,830	21,808,457
1964 (est.)	5,030,000	1,767,500	3,520,000	9,317,500 ^h /	565,000	20,200,000
Total	20,586,361	4,888,997	22,596,640	47,815,122	10,268,654	106,155,774

- a/ Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of equipment and supplies, rental of properties and facilities, etc.
- b/ Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.
- c/ Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412.
- d/ PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.
- e/ Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.
- f/ Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade members, etc.
- g/ Includes a total of \$345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: \$95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and \$250,000 for fiscal year 1963.
- h/ Includes \$5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.

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About 1/25/64

See page 114-62

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA

I. - The Current Situation in Cuba

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological

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- 2 -

lift. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about \$20 million to almost \$100 million during the year.
2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchev assurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices. The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.
3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear.
4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.
5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

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- 3 -

These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

II - Current U. S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world

- 1. Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba:** We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to its

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- 4 -

economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade: We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended). To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.
3. The reduction of free world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.
4. The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba: As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.
5. Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image: By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.

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- 5 -

B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion

1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.
2. Outside Cuba:
 - a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and inshore surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.
 - b. Bilateral: Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.
 - c. Unilateral: In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.

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- 6 -

C. The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.

D. The collection of intelligence

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

E. Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.

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- 7 -

By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measurable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

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- 3 -

CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. Covert collection of intelligence to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.
2. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.
3. Economic denial actions in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.
4. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA is identifying, contacting and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.
5. General sabotage and harassment as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe that the

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- 9 -

that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.;

Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;

Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

Both are Cuban and employ Cuban nationals exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation.

The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba.

The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.

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- 10 -

Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below.

IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 30 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted.¹ All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

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1. Annex I contains a brief review of these operations.

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- 11 -

The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low ebb" of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale."

In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that the "most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition." Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months ago.

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- 12 -

ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the Maximum Leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture." Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevara had indicated concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announcement of the raids, the average man on the street seemed apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy, and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S. shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January 1964 that the 23 December Siguanea raid which destroyed a P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban government officials and in the Western community in Havana has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight continues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very successful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguanea had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered which depress the people, they are anxious for something to happen."

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- 13 -

The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine military training but also with work on construction and agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.

In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network from 46 observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the end of October. These posts have radio communications and are manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort to seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations have been established since June, and we have evidence tentatively identifying 7 more.

Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency is reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psychological or economic repercussions inside Cuba. He has conducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving units of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force elements have been put on special alert, either on a local or island-wide basis, on at least 36 occasions during 1963 as a result of rumored or actual maritime operations. Residents in areas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation in suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal security force, the Lucha Contra Piratas, was formed to attempt to cope with off-shore raiding parties. In September new training courses were initiated for command cadres of "popular defense units." The purpose of these units is to organize the people to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers and installations from sabotage.

Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive capability against raids, we have continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate

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- 14 -

Cuba's defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of this sort, however, always present risk and we must assume that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they have done in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, although Khrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon a U.S. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted.

If Castro is to be brought down without overt military action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to reach a point where it can become self-sustained.

V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S./Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however, disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

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- 15 -

As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

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- 16 -

VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

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- 17 -

B. OAS Action

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

1. A break in diplomatic relations

The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

2. A break in economic relations

Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

3. A break in air and surface communications

Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.

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- 18 -

4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in connection with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such an act was estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. Condemnation of the Castro regime

This would be a pro forma action, with only limited psychological force.

6. Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. Increased efforts against subversion

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be

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- 19 -

guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.

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Annex I

The five sabotage raids run by CIA:

1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked using 4.2 mortars. One tank car was destroyed and one storage tank breached, causing considerable fire damage.
2. On 19 August the sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked. There was considerable fire damage and fuel lines were broken. We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines as a result of the raid causing additional damage.
3. On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia de Maraví, Oriente Province, a minor installation of local economic importance, was 70 per cent destroyed by a raiding party.
4. On 21 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabela, Las Villas Province. The vessel was sunk.
5. On 23 December an underwater demolition team attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 13 others injured in the explosion.

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AHRVY Ex 1 R371

6/25/75

9pp

Project ZRRIFLE



1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use foreign agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~will not~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WF and FF areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other liaison areas. The project will be operated against third-country institutions and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, ^{and information concerning such materials,} in accordance with requirements levied on the Classified Areas, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~as to~~ sporadically by C.S., Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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Rfvin annual salary: \$7,200

Travel + ops expenses for

Rfvin + other agents + agent candidates: 2,000

Fees for services by and

standby of agents and

agent candidates: 2,000

Travel of staff employees

engaged in Zorille activity: 2,500

Hire of safecrackers, automobiles

and other operational expense: 1,000

\$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political; non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Langley) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/ KGB (Cossack, Banderas group, Khobbs) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CI-experienced opers offensives (few available), able to conduct patient search + agents to pull back if instant or knowledge tells him he should, ^{w/ known high regard for operational security}. Assessments are all important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Hubback only (e.g., what does Director now know?); no approach to other Intel. agencies.

b. Within Hubback, one focal point for control, search, training, case officiating, etc. - DCI authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security, cable communos for immediate cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with owner (non-state) communo, word of mouth + no backchannels re traps

d. No PAs, ^(except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officing, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govt.

REF ID: A6515
REVISED

f. No use of ^{PA} any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training by opposition would need.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Marshall) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Hubbackers who can

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5

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretext: Nutake/D search; this establishes, know,
- j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go if it all.
- 4. Blackmail:
 - a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.
 - b. No chain of connectivity: strictly person to person; singleton ops.
 - c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.
 - d. Exclude organization ^{e.g., Sicilians} criminals, those w/record of arrests, those infidelity of purpose as criminals.
 - e. Staffers involved - selection.
- 5. Cover: planning should include provision for
 - Abusing horses or goods in case of blow.
 - f. Testing of nominees essential; re following fictitious, security, blackmail.
 - g. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
 - h. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will just be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as follow to travel, wanted lists, etc.
 - i. Should have phony 201 in R to backstop this, all documents therein forged & backdated. Should look like a CE file.
 - j. Possible use of staffers for the action.
 - k. Silverthorne.

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Keeping of files.~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~foolish, not to travel

b

Legal; operational + ethical → morale problem. Khrushchev case.

- ~~highly not receive enough.~~
- 1) Maximum security + within Khrushchev only (e.g., how much does Syria now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Use of double objective.
 - 2) One fixed point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this fixed point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-US) commos.
 - 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officer; no side-shift PA's.

~~Non-attributability:~~

- 4) No American citizen or American resident for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited official reference.
- 5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

- 6) Don't meet any selected in home territory.

- 7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., officers) has been examined.

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- 8) Planning should include provision for blowing Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ^{is 4 above essential?}

- 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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(7)

10) Corsicans recommended. Actions could lead to
Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (AES
archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each
selected.

13) ^{All} French personnel involved should have some CE
experience.

14) Silvethome & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individual role
selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Danger of standbys.

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26/1 - 25^{1/2} - exec actions
 "The magic button" 8
 sarcotics Büro ~~for a lung~~
 "for a lung" PIS 201 cover
 Cuckoos - Bankruptcy - no Star
 eyes - Jim A. / Contradict
 not a TSD problem from U-2
 } apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &
 a confession of weakness. —
 El Benefactor \Rightarrow assumptions -
 Example of 3 "wrong"

framework of Sid's job. *(Redford)*
 Elut R&D - Memo • *(O)*

"Translating machines" - ¹⁰ I.E.
 classic sounds project -
 phenons - (4 mth, CB)

Commit - Gear

REC'D. 1974

JUN 24 1975

Guatemala -

CIA

26/1 - AS - Fanfon-DCI - Matter -
 no fil Review - new never mention
 and assassination

1. Select proper open to run -
2. Places & cover *May 4, 2*
3. Security Rules B-WHM-AS-³
4. Thus leaves Sid - Recov.
- 5 Last Resort - Brakes - *Select to b - 4/6 rev x*

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6. no other agencies (2)
7. no projects or papers
except for cover. (9)
8. Principal Agent - G (Mankel)? -
AF - Project draft LCN -
Ticket 1500 - from NB.
Mark spot name - start at
project - obs Bliko.
9. Disposal -
10. Targets who's names -
Must know before
we can spot -
11. Case officiating
12. Cover file - create & from
RIS or old it. - non sec
13. had dangers of RIS counter
actions & monitor if they
are blamed -
- 7d list - Remember

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JUN 24 1975

CIA

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P
11/11/56

- C O P Y -

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~~S E C R E T~~

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY:	Cuba	REPORT NO.	HKH-1385
SUBJECT:	Assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico Solved	DATE OF INFO:	28-29 November 1956
		DATE ACQUIRED:	29 November 1956
PLACE ACQUIRED:	Habana	DATE OF REPORT:	30 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official (B)
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence Service) are reported to have identified definitely the assassins of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, former chief of SIM killed on 28 October 1956 at the Montmartre nightclub. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents interrogated Dr. Armando CARDENAS Aranguren,¹ instructor of pathology at the University of Habana, and succeeded in obtaining an admission from CARDENAS that Juan Pedro CARBO Serviá and Rolando CUBELAS Secades² had sought refuge at his house after the assassination of BLANCO Rico and had remained there approximately three or four days. CARDENAS stated during interrogation that CARBO had arrived at his house carrying a sub-machine gun. On the basis of CARDENAS' admissions, SIM officials are convinced that CARBO and CUBELAS were the ones who killed BLANCO Rico.
2. Implication of CARDENAS and CUBELAS resulted from the interception of a cable by SIM sent from Miami, Florida, by a friend of CUBELAS to Virginia SECADES,³ mother of CUBELAS, in Habana. On 27 November 1956 Virginia SECADES was arrested by SIM and taken to SIM headquarters for questioning concerning her son's participation in the assassination of BLANCO Rico. SIM agents were unable to obtain any information from SECADES concerning her son's role in the killing but succeeded in learning that CARDENAS was a close friend of her son. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents picked up CARDENAS, who, under pressure, admitted that he was a homosexual, that CUBELAS was his intimate friend, and that he had hidden CUBELAS and CARBO in his home for about four days. These admissions were made at SIM headquarters in the presence of Colonel Irénaldo GARCIA Baez, deputy chief of SIM, Lt. Col. Marcelo TABERNILLA, who was wounded during the shooting of BLANCO Rico, and other high SIM officials.
3. Interrogation of CARDENAS failed to reveal the destination of CARBO and CUBELAS after they left the home of CARDENAS. On the basis of the intercepted cable, dated 23 November 1956, however, SIM officials believe that CARBO and CUBELAS fled to the United States by ship, since both possessed visas to the United States which were still valid.⁴ CARBO and CUBELAS are believed to be in Miami at the present time.

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REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 2

DATE 30 November 1956

4. SIM has transmitted the results of interrogation of SECADES and CARDENAS to President Fulgencio BATISTA, but the latter's reaction to these new developments is not known. Further action by the Cuban authorities is complicated by the fact that the Government's main witness, CARDENAS, is of dubious reliability, because of his homosexuality. CARDENAS is also reported to be the doctor of the family of Santiago VERDEJA Neyra, Minister of Defense, who vouched for him when he was arrested by SIM.

Field Comments:

1. Office files contain no previous record of CARDENAS in connection with anti-BATISTA activities. A Dr. Armando CARDENAS was listed in Hoy (defunct newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party), issue of 22 April 1949, as one of the persons who sent greetings to the World Congress of Peace Partisans, scheduled to begin in Paris on 20 April 1949.
2. Both CARBO and CUBELAS have been the subjects in the past of denunciations and arrests by the Cuban authorities as a result of their anti-BATISTA activities. They were accused in August 1955 by Colonel Orlando PIEDRA, chief of the Department of Investigations, of having fled from the police from the site of an arms cache. In February 1956 CUBELAS was arrested and tried on charges of participating in student disorders, according to articles which appeared in local newspapers on 15 March 1956 and 1 April 1956. CARBO was denounced by the Cuban police as one of BLANCO Rico's killers immediately after the shooting incident at the Montmartre nightclub.
3. Office files contain no previous record of Virginia SECADES, Habana newspapers of 29 November 1956 carried an item in which the University of Habana Student Federation protested against the detention of Virginia SECADES by SIM.
4. Files of the Consular Section, United States Embassy, Habana, revealed that CARBO was issued a tourist visa on 3 June 1954 and that CUBELAS received a similar visa on 15 October 1954. The files do not indicate whether these visas were valid for a single entry or multiple entries, but they could still be valid, on the basis of the dates of issue.

FROM

- AMG 15 1956
5. Police officials announced immediately after the assassination of BLANCO Rico that they had information as to the identity of the two assassins, naming CARBO but not his accomplice, and that they were on the trail of the latter. The police have failed to find the killers, however, and reportedly, under pressure from President BATISTA and General Francisco TABERNILLA, Chief of Staff, Cuban Armed Forces, SIM and the police have been making desperate efforts to solve the BLANCO Rico killing. It is

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REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 3

DATE , 30 November 1956

possible that CARDENAS may have been forced by SIM interrogators to make statements implicating CARBO and CUBELAS which were not altogether true.

6. The local press and radio reported on 29 and 30 November 1956 that United States authorities were looking in New Orleans for two Cubans who were suspected of being the killers of BLANCO Rico. They were identified by name as Rolando CUBELAS Secades and Guillermo GARCIA Riestra. The latter, while a student at the University of Havana, was accused of having participated in an attempt against the life of Rolando MASFERRER in September 1949, according to office files.
7. Avance, Havana afternoon newspaper, published the official SIM version of CARDENAS' arrest on 30 November 1956; other newspapers carried it subsequently. It contained substantially the same information as reported above, but it also implicated among others, former president Carlos PRIO Socarras in the assassination of BLANCO Rico, alleging that PRIO had helped CARBO and CUBELAS to escape from Cuba.

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16-March 1965

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Proposal to Explicit *L-1* and
Jose Rebello in *An* Operation

U-15 1. It is proposed that at the next meeting with
we pass a message as follows:

"A big comandante or captain who used
to be a leader of the university students
opened a numbered (secret) account in
Switzerland through Colombian Suarez (my
successor). He was traveling in Europe at
that time, roughly December 1964-January 1965.
The deposit was in the amount of \$10,000."

The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both *L-1* and Jose Rebello. Both are past presidents of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.

2. Subject proposal has taken the following information into consideration.

L-1

a. The record: The file shows that since April 1959 and repeatedly since then, *L-1* has threatened to eliminate *CASITRO*, but has not done so. He also was reportedly on the verge several times of defecting but never did. There are numerous reports of varying credibility that he has been and is a Castro agent. His character is such that he has been described in a report as "a probable thief, a possible user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave man." Various reports indicate that he is a heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person with such traits could reasonably be believed to be involved in irregular financial transactions.

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b. . Favorable factors (from ~~OPS~~
standpoint): In the summer of 1962, L-1
gave W-1 \$500 in Helsinki to be deposited
for L-1 in a European bank "for a rainy
day." In March 1961, L-1 showed great
sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts
in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that
he might shoot any official so involved.

c. Conclusion: While it cannot be
discounted that L-1 may be a Castro
agent, it may be that he has been sincere
in his dealings with CIA. Resolution of
doubts through an PolyGRAPH interview has
been impossible since L-1 hit the
ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably CIA's interest in
L-1 is to see him carry out his mission
to eliminate CASTRO. The above proposal
may actually stimulate the desired action.
If L-1 is questioned by the regime in
connection with this charge, and should the
investigation involve a certain amount of
harassment and unpleasantness, he might well
reach the conclusion that the time to take
matters into his own hands (which he has
threatened to do for several years) has at
last arrived.

If L-1 is a Castro agent and
Castro should be aware of L-1's relation-
ship with CIA, Castro might conclude that
L-1 received the money from CIA
banked it without reporting it, and was in
fact working with CIA against Castro.
(At the recent meetings in Paris, L-1
asked us for \$10,000. We did not give him
this sum, though W-1 gave him \$7,000.)

If for any reason the regime should
do away with L-1, his alleged sympathizers
in the Armed Forces might feel they must react
at once to save their own skins. Given the
tense political situation in Cuba today, this
is not out of the question and certainly this
proposal could split the regime more.

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GIA

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Jose Rebellon

Rebellon is a non-controversial good target for inclusion in this OPS play for the following reasons:

a. He is close to Castro, as well as to L-1, and has a Communist background.

b. He is familiar with the \$80,000 account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has been authorized by Castro to draw on that fund for purchases related to Castro's pet projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro's own official fund.

As with L-1, any action by the regime against Rebellon might widen splits in Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness and tensions in interpersonal relationships that we desire.

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10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff
 ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Elder
 VIA: SA/DDO
 SUBJECT: SSC Request
 REFERENCE: RS 76-0083/A (14 January 1976)

REC'D. (1)
FEB 11 1976

CIA

1. Re question number 1 of reference: Attachment "A" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City, Mexico, during the period 1 September 1963 through 31 December 1963 and who are still on duty. Attachment "B" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City during this same period but are now retired or no longer on duty. It is understood that these attachments will be retained in the Headquarters building for use by the Committee Staff.

2. Re question number 3(a) of reference: For your background, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) was a Cuban student exile entity founded in September 1960 as an anti-Communist revolutionary organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime. The parent organization of the DRE was the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a revolutionary organization of Cuban students opposed to the Batista regime which actively joined the Castro forces by organizing a guerrilla movement which contributed greatly to the collapse of the Batista regime. The Castro government, themselves of student origin, recognized the DR power and by-passed them politically by forming the new regime without their participation. The original DR became Communist controlled and directed. While the Agency had no role in the founding, the DRE was an entity used by the CIA as a unilateral asset in pursuing U.S. policy objectives. CIA support to the DRE ceased on 30 September 1966 and formally terminated on 1 January 1967. At that time DRE files were reviewed and material dealing with CIA support and operations were either destroyed or turned over the JMWAVE Station. The DRE was expected to continue as an organizational entity and continue its activities independent of CIA.

3. The DRE files of both Station JMWAVE and Headquarters that are available have been reviewed and Lee Harvey Oswald's name does not appear in these files. WAVE cable 8049 (in 66782) of 22 November 1963, states in the third sentence, "according AMSPELL files, Oswald", undoubtedly refers to the DRE files maintained in the DRE office in Miami, Florida.

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These entity files were independent of the JMWAVE Station files. Had Station JMWAVE referred to its files in WAVE 8049 the cable would have been worded, "according A11SPELL Station files." The file of AMHINT-53, a former executive of the DRE, has also been reviewed and no reference to Oswald was found. The file number which appears on WAVE 8049 is no longer in use and the contents of this former file were transferred into Oswald's and other 201 files by the CI Staff. A tape of the radio debate cited in WAVE 8049 is included in the Oswald 201 held by the CI Staff.

4. Re question number 3(b) of reference: We have been unable to determine if Station JMWAVE was instructed to review its files for information on Oswald. For many years the CI Staff has been the focal point for the collation of any and all information concerning Oswald and if the JMWAVE files on any Cuban groups contained information on Oswald such information should be reflected in Oswald 201 file.

Richard S. Sampson
Richard S. Sampson
Chief

Latin America Division

Attachments:

A & B as stated

REGD. - ROM

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CIA

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R2125
R~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM

TO: Jim Johnston, Paul Wallach

FROM: Dan Dwyer

DATE: January 21, 1976

SUBJ: CIA Briefing with Raymond Rocca Regarding Oswald

Early in our investigation of CIA's handling of the Oswald case, Raymond Rocca briefed Wallach, Dwyer and Greissing on November 11 and 13, 1975. Some of Rocca's comments merit consideration in light of our present knowledge of the case.

1. Opening of 201

Rocca explained that Oswald's 201 was opened by Betty Egerter from a list of American defectors 1958-1960 from the State Department.

2. Status of 201, 11/22/63

Rocca explained that on November 22, 1963 all documents in the Oswald 201 were originated by other agencies; Mexico City cable traffic was not included in the 201 because it was routed through a compartmentalized channel and therefore would not be circulated via the 201.

3. Oswald's Defection to USSR

With regard to Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Rocca said Oswald would have been of interest to the military and the FBI and that CIA was only interested in the "information" aspect of the case. Rocca could not cite any example of a U.S. citizen defecting on behalf of any interest of the U.S. government.

With regard to the "Hoover" memorandum of June 3, 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter could be using Oswald's birth certificate, Rocca believed Hoover would not have generated it. Rocca suggested someone at the Bureau who was familiar with Soviet technique of using birth certificates for illegals -- Larry McWilliams, Brannigan or Cregar -- would have authored the memo. (Rocca could never establish if, in fact, Oswald took his birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union.) Rocca commented that the Bureau memo, sent to State and ONI, should have been forwarded to CIA by State, but never was.

In Rocca's determination, Oswald was the only American defector who was allowed to stay in Russia following a suicide attempt. Rocca said that Oswald would have been subjected to one or two assessments by the KGB.

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Rocca referred to an SB study, directed by Lee Wigren and conducted by Virginia Valpi which compared the Oswald case to other U.S. defectors and their wives. SB concluded Oswald was not given special handling by the KGB. Rocca maintains Oswald was given special treatment. He believes Oswald's relationship with the "Red Cross" (from which Oswald received financial assistance) and the Red Cross' relationship with the KGB should be clarified.

Rocca also finds it peculiar that Marina married Oswald since Marina's uncle was KGB. Rocca said that Oswald was the only defector who married someone with a KGB connection of that kind. Rocca said that the CIA developed this information after the assassination.

Rocca described Minsk as "not an unsensitive section" of Russia and added that Oswald was the only American defector in Minsk, a white Russian area.

Rocca commented on Oswald's surprise visit to the American Embassy in Moscow by saying that "people don't do that kind of thing in Russia."

Rocca believes Oswald's Soviet diary is bona fide. Rocca admitted that although there are perceptible changes in the quality of Oswald's written material, Oswald's mentality seemed conducive to periods of attention to thoroughness and detail.

4. Alleged Debriefing of Oswald

Rocca did not have any knowledge of an alleged debriefing of Oswald in New York City by the DCD. Rocca said that if a debriefing report existed, it would have been distributed in 00 series (overt operations) of the DDI (now DDO). Rocca also noted that a debriefing report would not have been filed in the Oswald 201. Rocca noted that a Dr. Froyn (phonetic) supervised DDI records. Rocca also said that Traveler's Aid was a legitimate charitable organization which had no ties with the CIA.

5. Oswald and Mexico City

Rocca said that Chief, WH could clarify aspects of technical operations on Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Rocca said that David Phillips organized the technical surveillance.

Although the Cuban Embassy was officially closed on September 28, Rocca found nothing unusual about Oswald's visit there and meeting Silvi Duran, Cuban consulate employee.

Rocca emphasized that Oswald's activities in Mexico City were the responsibility of the FBI.

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6. Possible Oswald-Cuban Connections

Rocca described document gaps in the materials that the Russian and Cuban governments forwarded to the WC via diplomatic channels. He described these areas as "open and relevant."

Rocca drew attention to Oswald's Marine duty in California in 1958. Basing most of his analysis on testimony of DelGado, Oswald's sergeant in California, Rocca maintained that Oswald had made contact with the Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Los Angeles. Rocca said that DelGado had to release Oswald from guard duty because someone from Los Angeles reinitiated contact while Oswald was on duty.

Rocca placed specific emphasis on Castro's "impromptu" comments to Harker at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963. Rocca viewed Castro's comments as a "message" to American leaders and said it was a "very important signpost." Rocca added that the Mexico City Station brought Castro's comments to Headquarter's attention on 11/25/63. Rocca also viewed Castro's comments in terms of Oswald's possible perception of them, since New Orleans Times Picayune ran the Harker article on September 9, 1963. (This is the line Slawson adopted: could Oswald have read the piece?)

In regard to the Castro comments (unfortunately my notes are sketchy here) Rocca refers to a 10/24/63 cable, memo, or letter from "Des to Paris." He then refers to an 11/5/63 memo for the record and said "man never heard from again." Rocca should be asked to clarify these references.

Rocca briefly outlined Cuban-Russian relations in the early 1960s. He described 1961 as the "seed time" between Cuba and the USSR. Rocca said that following the missile crisis, the KGB and DGI began a "preliminary relationship." Rocca mentioned Srotoff (phonetic) and Alexiev (sic) as being KGB principals involved. Rocca said that when Castro visited Moscow in June-July 1963, Alexiev and Leonoff served as liaison between Kruschev and Castro. Rocca referred to an escalation of Alpha-66 activity (sporadic revolutionary attacks on Cuban ports, vessels, etc.) in July-August 1963. Rocca places Castro's "warning" of September 7, 1963 in the context of these activities.

Rocca said that Oswald's activities for the FPCC in New Orleans were apparently self-motivated. Rocca added, however, that V. T. Lee, national chairman of the FPCC, visited Cuba in 1964. Rocca noted that (fnu) Hernandez handled Lee's case and that Hernandez' office was next to Azcue's, who, according to Duran, argued with Oswald at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. According to Rocca, Hernandez was mentioned in penetration reports from Guatemala where Hernandez was running two DGI agents. Rocca outlined these relationships briefly to demonstrate DGI-FPCC connections. Rocca concluded that the Warren Commission should have paid more attention to the DGI. Rocca also mentioned that the CIA picked up a DGI defector named Mugg in April or May of 1964, who was handled by WH Division.

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- 4 -

7. Oswald, New Orleans, Garrison Case

Rocca said that the CI/R and A stayed on top of the Garrison case and "summarized overt developments." Rocca identified the analyst for the Garrison material as Donald Pratt. Rocca said that by NSA intercepts and associated relationships, the CIA believed Garrison was operating (unwittingly) under KGB manipulation. (Rocca briefly described Soviet technique of misinformation. He recalled an interview that Drew Pearson had with Kruschev in Cairo in 1964 or 1965. Kruschev told Pearson that his "gut feeling" was that American right-wing extremists and capitalists were responsible for the President's assassination. Rocca said this typified KGB disinformation.)

Rocca characterized Oreste Pena's allegations as "absolute fabrication." Rocca said CIA files revealed that Clay Shaw was a contact of the DCD until 1956.

Rocca said that he was never informed in 1962 or 1963 about a revolutionary training camp around Lake Pontchartrain. He believes that the CIA did not know of its existence. Rocca said there is evidence that messages from the Lake Pontchartrain camp were going to a drop in Mexico City.

8. GPFLOR Period

GPFLOR was the crypt used to describe the investigation conducted by CIA following the President's assassination (11/23-1/12-15/63.) The Mexico City aspect of GPFLOR was controlled by WH: J. C. King, Chief; Jack Whiten, Desk Chief, and Win Scott, COS, Mexico City. Rocca said that Whiten would report Mexico City developments to Helms who would then inform McCone.

9. End of GPFLOR: Warren Commission

With the formation of the Warren Commission, the GPFLOR period ended. Rocca explained that Helms served as the major liaison between the CIA and WC. Rocca served as chief of research for matters of interest to the WC -- mostly concerning Oswald's defection to Russia. Rocca's staff included: Thomas Hall, Arthur Dooley and Paul Hartman. Hall conducted research on Soviet service in DDO. Dooley followed all Bureau developments forwarded to CIA. Hartman was responsible for exploration of overt references and Soviet service." Additionally, Hartman researched DeMohrenshildt's relationship to the Oswalds.

Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca had no contact with Helms. Rocca explained that he had some liaison with Slawson of the WC staff. Rocca said that any negotiation between the CIA and WC was conducted by Helms, Dulles, and Rankin. Rocca said he had no knowledge of any CIA assassination attempts against Castro.

Rocca emphasized that the FBI was the investigative arm for the Warren Commission. Rocca said that Sam Papich, Dick O'Niell (sic) and Jim Hunt were the Bureau personnel involved with the WC.

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Rocca said that additional research in CI was conducted by David Murphy and Bagley, Chief and Deputy Chief of CI/SB. Rocca said that Lee Wigren and Virginia Valpi were also involved in Soviet R&A.

10. Rockefeller Commission Inquiry

Rocca served as CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission in regard to Warren Commission allegations. Belin and Robert Olsen were involved in the investigation. Belin wanted Rocca to review documentation regarding the photo of the unidentified individual in Mexico City. Belin told Rocca that the Warren Commission was not clued in on Cuban emigree issues and Operation MONGOOSE. Rocca developed the impression that the Rockefeller Commission was looking into CIA's operations aimed at Castro. Belin asked Rocca for the Castro comments of September 7, 1963. Belin was not aware of the statements during the Warren Commission. (Slawson, however, was but only at the conclusion of the WC.)

Rocca also said that Belin is writing another book on Oswald and the President's assassination.

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7

1 I then got a call from Bundy on October 2nd, and he said
2 that -- Chase, I think his name was. Peter Chase, one of his
3 assistants -- is the person to be in touch with, and to keep
4 him apprised of all developments.

5 I later again got a word from Jean Daniel, the French
6 correspondent who had come back from Havanna saying Cuba seemed
7 ripe for a conversation. So this also came from another source,
8 a Greek town planner named Doxiati, who said that Castro was
9 very much interested in some kind of normalization relation,
10 but that Che Guevara and Raul were opposed.

11 October 21st, I got a call again from Bundy's office asking
12 me what was new. I said, well the ball is now in the Cuban's
13 court.

14 On the 28th, I saw Lochuga again at the UN who said that
15 Havanna didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now, but
16 he would be glad to maintain continuous contact with me anyway.

17 The 4th of November I briefed Stevenson on these develop-
18 ments and meanwhile, Miss Howard had been on the phone with
19 Rene Valao who was Fidel Castro's aide at that point, and who
20 was one of the so-called pro-Americans in the group and who
21 suggested that I get in touch with him by telephone.

22 I then briefed Bundy on this on the 5th of November.
23 Bundy told me that the President was more in favor of pushing
24 towards an opening toward Cuba than was the State Department,
25 the idea being -- well, getting them out of the Soviet fold and

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1 perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into
2 normal.

3 Chase then said. Bundy wanted a chronological memo about
4 the entire thing. I might say I have forgotten one point. When
5 I first told Adlai Stevenson about this demarche or approach
6 by the Cubans he said he liked it, but, and I quote, he said
7 the CIA, unfortunately, is still in charge of Cuba. But he
8 said -- he still offered to take it up with the White House.

9 Anyway, we're now on November 12th, and I went to Miss
10 Howard's apartment where she said he had set up a phone call to
11 Havanna with Valao. We never could get through to the bad
12 connections, but she had spoken to him before I arrived and
13 he had suggested that I come to Marianao from Key West and
14 talk directly with Fidel Castro, because they wanted to avoid
15 going through Havanna.

16 Bundy called me the same day to say that the White House
17 favored preliminary talks with Valao at the UN but not down in
18 Cuba and told me to tell Valao this. I finally reached Valao
19 on the telephone on November the 14th and delivered a message
20 about his coming here. He said -- and that we wanted to discuss
21 agenda.

22 He said he would send instructions to LaChuga and that he
23 would -- or rather Castro, through him, to LaChuga, that they
24 should discuss an agenda with me. He was very cordial on the
25 telephone.

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TAB K p.9

6

1 we referred to our talk in '59 and he said another talk might
2 be possible and useful at this time, and that was the first real
3 indication. At this point, I said I'm no longer a private
4 citizen but a government official and we agreed that the
5 current situation was different, at the same time, things were
6 a bit abnormal and he said the Cubans were very much annoyed at
7 the exile rate, the CIA rate on Cuba, as well as the freezing
8 of their assets.

9 The next step was my visit to Washington on September 24th
10 when I came down to see Robert Kennedy who was then Attorney
11 General. His position was -- I showed him the memoranda, which
12 I had prepared on what had happened up to that point. He said
13 that a trip to Cuba which is what LaChuga had suggested would
14 be rather risky, said it was bound to leak and said it might
15 result in some kind of Congressional investigation or something.
16 Anyway, it might be a problem. But he did think the matter was
17 worth pursuing through UN channels, and he would be talking to
18 Averell Harriman and Bundy about it.

19 At that point, LaChuga said he would be making a very
20 violently anti-American speech on November 7th and not to worry
21 too much about it, so Stevenson asked me to help prepare a speech
22 in reply. On the 27th of September, I saw Lochuga again, told him
23 I could not accept any invitation to come to Cuba, but I would
24 be glad to keep in touch with him and he could talk with
25 anyone who wanted to come up and he said he would notify Havanna.

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9

I reported this to Bundy on the 19th of November -- by the way, my call to Valao was the 18th -- he said that after their agenda had been received, the President wanted to see me at the White House and decide what to say and whether to go or what we should do next. That was the 19th of November, three days before the assassination.

On the 29th of November, LaChuga had :seen: Miss Howard and he wondered where things stood now. I passed the word to him that I didn't know, but that until we were told differently that we would continue our conversation.

On the 2nd of December he confirmed getting a letter from Valao and he wanted to know if anything had changed again. He said he was authorized to talk to me in general terms.

I called the White House, Chase in this case, to say that the ball was now in our court.

On December 4th, LaChuga again looked me up at the UN, said he now had a letter directly from Castro approving the detailed talks and an agenda. Again, I informed Chase.

He said the decision would take some time now because all our policies were under review.

This went on. I kept seeing LaChuga and LaChuga would say he was waiting for an answer, and I kept saying well the door isn't closed, I just don't know.

On the 17th of December the President, this time President Johnson, came to the Waldorf to meet with the delegation at

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10

1 Stevenson's apartment and told me that he had read my Cuban
2 memo recapitulating the events or the discussions in the fall
3 with interest and that was that. And I then was in Washington.
4 Averell Harriman asked me about the Cuban project. I said I
5 didn't know, that it was lying down in Chase's office in the
6 White House and that he told me he'd get back to me after the
7 holidays.

8 Well, that ended my diary in '63. I then went to Kenya
9 as Ambassador in February of '64. However I do recall that
10 some time in January I again called Chase and I said, well, if
11 this thing is going to be continued I would suggest either
12 John Case or someone on that mission. He said, well, it doesn't
13 look as though it's going to be continued now because it's an
14 election year, or whatever the reason was, and anyway we'll keep
15 it in mind but that it was a dead issue.

16 The interesting thing, I think in terms of your investiga-
17 tion is that whatever was going on in terms of assassination
18 plots, certainly there seemed to be two tracks, because it seems
19 hard for me to believe that the Executive would be approving this
20 type of negotiation while other covert operations were happening,
21 although it could conceivably have happened.

22 The Chairman. If it did happen, what we are in search of
23 is an explanation.

24 I think your testimony is helpful. Certain inferences
25 can at least be drawn. But it is very helpful.

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-23

MEMORANDUM

To: File
From: Mason Cargill *MC*
Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal Division. The file was about one-half inch thick, was marked "#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET." It contained documents relating to the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

The documents in this file indicated the following items of interest:

1. The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to March 1, 1963.
2. IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified information she had obtained from Giancana.
3. Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General) to U.S. Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.
4. Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA - The file contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962.
(We have a copy of this from CIA.)

RMC:clb

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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- 2 -

5. Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of April 24, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti - Wiretap Case - Sam Giancana - This memo recommends prosecution in this case would be against national interest. It contains no mention of assassination.
6. The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re Las Vegas case. They did not mention assassination.
7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961, relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically outlined facts of the Balletti matter.
8. FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12, 1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.
9. There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961 of participants in the Las Vegas incident.
10. Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22, 1961, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an interview with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject: "Arthur James Balletti, et al."]
11. FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu. It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if Giancana or McGuire were leaking information.
12. There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.
13. Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI, Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications transmitted a report of an FBI agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas. This report contains the details of the arrest.
(This document is the last entry in this Criminal Division file on the Las Vegas Incident.)

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- 3 -

14. Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investigative work in Las Vegas. Maheu declined to name the attorney.

Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview on April 18, 1961 [after the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information. (Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he undertook for CIA.)

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-X1-2 2

MEMORANDUM

To: File
From: Mason Cargill *MC*
Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassination, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971. According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963. Basically these files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.

Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several entries in these files respecting allegations by people who claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination. One claimed to have been a CIA agent. There are also many letters from assassination "nuts." Other documents relate to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.

One document is an FBI report, dated February 2, 1972, stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963. Kleist was not a State Department employee. He appeared to be a free-lance magazine writer.

MC:clb

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CLASSIFICATION

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T//NOFORN//LIMITED

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L-N 100-
201-2522-34

CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCCB-3/550,097

1. ATTEMPTS OF FIDEL CASTRO TO COUNTERACT
COMMUNIST PLANS TO CONTROL CUBAN
GOVERNMENT.
2. MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO OUST ERNSTO CASTRO.

DATE DRAFTED 2 MAY 1962

PRECEDENCEROUTING

REFERENCES

IN 23109

MARCH 1962

FIELD REPORT NO.

UNITED STATES (2 APRIL 1962)

AL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE; APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. FIDEL CASTRO CALLED ON A GROUP OF ARMY COMMANDERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE OUSTER OF ANTONIO ESCALANTE ON 26 MARCH 1962 AND TOLD THEM THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN CUBA. THE ARMY OFFICERS CONTACTED BY CASTRO WERE ROLANDO COFFRIN, JOSÉ MARÍA DE LA AGUILERA, FELIPE GUERRA MATOS, JUAN ALFREDO JORGE SANCHEZ RIVERA, EDUARDO MIRTEL PASTO. CASTRO ASKED THEM TO PICK HIM UP, SO HE INTENDED TO REGAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THEY AGREED.

2. AT THE TIME OF ESCALANTE'S OUSTER CASTRO ALSO ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF A COMMUNIST LEADER IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO AN AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE IN ORIENTE PROVINCE. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE LEADER TRANSFERRED).

3. CASTRO ALSO ORDERED A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF FELIX TORRES, COMMUNIST LEADER IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. CASTRO TOLD THE ARMY COMMANDERS WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT

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ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	CNE	OCB	ORR	ODA	VIA	POL
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T-1 CUBA
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201-2522-34

WEEKLY INFORMATION REPORT

SOLD FROM

UG 15 1962

CIA

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TDCSDB-3/650,097

IM 28109

PAGE 2

"IF NECESSARY I WILL HAVE TROOPS SHOT IN THE CENTRAL PARK OF SANTA CLARA."

4. CASTRO MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS ARMY CONFIDANTS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT DEVIATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE, HE WOULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT LAZARO PENA, BLAS POCA, AND OTHER COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT BE OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP.

5. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ARMY LEADERS AGREED TO BACK UP CASTRO, THEY HAVE IN MIND A PLAN WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL, RAUL CASTRO, AND CIE VERA AT SOME PROPITIOUS MOMENT AND THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES. THESE MEN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A PLAN WILL SUCCEED, AS THEY ARE IN CHARGE OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIA TROOPS IN CUBA. THE ARMY LEADERS SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND THEY REALIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, BUT ALSO A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF CUBA, ARE FED UP WITH CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: *SOURCE* SAID THAT THE SABOTAGE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE CITY AND PROVINCE OF HABANA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS GROUP OF ARMY LEADERS. HE BASED HIS OPINION IN PART ON THE FACT THAT DE LA IG ERA IS A LEADER OF THE BANK WORKERS' UNION, AND THE NEW CUBAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING IN HABANA WAS THE RECENT OBJECT OF SABOTAGE BY BURNING.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: CINCILANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

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CIA

COS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-3593

Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	ORG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL XX IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI - 7029
NUMBER

KAPOK

A
REF: DIR 84888

3. MEXI- 7029

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWALD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 26 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref F)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

REF ID:

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONW.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

COS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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