

File #:

602-116395

Serial Scope:

51 THRU 100

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
38296 Date: 2025

285-6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE ~~x 20~~

I find this in my file,
x255
dating back two months. As I
understand it everybody is
agreed on it. What is the next
step?

F. D. R.

Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommending coordination of activities of all agents of the govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is related to the others, and all in their relation to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations of coordination.

x67

674

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

542

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: William G. Miller

[105-213145] (S)

Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did not provide any particularly significant information concerning [the Soviets with whom he had contact]. (S) While it is not known at this time whether he could presently provide meaningful information, an interview with him at this time, when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and indiscreet.

ACTION:

(1) In view of impending contacts which will be had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence services and may be continuing to have same. (S)

WWD WRSP
EF WRW/CSF

(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS - R (SOVEMB-KGB)" which denies authority for an interview with Mr. Miller at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which may come to its attention. (S)

WWD WRSP
EF

WRW/CSF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

PBM

QPA

~~SECRET~~

1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 10, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of March 19, 1975.

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.

It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available as soon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to privacy considerations.

We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified, immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your Committee.

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Telephone Rx. _____

Director Sec'y _____

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

ALL:vb

(6)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.
~~CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

ENCLOSURE

The Attorney General

- 2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

Hof
Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

AMORIO
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/HG

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds to the Committee's request for the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.

Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.

REC-106

Enclosures - 13

62-11135-75

EWL:jvl.
(7)

12 APR 23 1975

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ENCL BEHIND FILE

3-ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11801 BY SP2 ALM/FB
#16

2 - Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 9, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with this request the following material is enclosed:

1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for FBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionage (classified "Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 86. Sabotage; 6) Section 87. Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 88. Sedition; 8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorhis Act; 10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.

Not included as enclosures are Section 105, Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (Foreign Intelligence), classified "Secret"; Section 107, Part I, Internal Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107, Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assets; or Section 130, Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deemed to contain extremely sensitive information and for that reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.

Under IV. B. the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of this Manual were requested. There is enclosed a copy of the table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations.

EWL:jvl
(7)

~~SECRET~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

GPO 94-545

NW 65360 DocId:32989628 Page 129

75

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DD/A 75-1549

1 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration *J. W. K.* 2 APR 1975

SUBJECT : Security Survey, Senate Select Committee
Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building,
Capitol Hill

1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to
Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.

2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee
facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by
Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee,
was completed on 24 March 1975.

3. With the security procedures now in effect and
those planned for implementation, the facility will provide
adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA
documents of all levels of classification. Also attached
for your information is a copy of the survey report.

Charles W. Kane
Charles W. Kane

Director of Security

Att:

cc: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM

Refer
CTA

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)

NW 65388 DocId:32989628 Page 143

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CL BY 063417

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SURVEY REPORT

Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C.

1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700) Messrs. Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive security survey of the Senate Select Committee's Facility on 24 March 1975.
2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.
3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:

A. Type of Facility

The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G 308) of the Dirksen Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the 1st and C Streets entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight, however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition precludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.

The auditorium (Room G 308) is approximately 100' long x 45' wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which

~~SECRET~~

air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equipment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into the walls.

The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors on the opposite side of the countertops which have been converted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor. The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented information storage room and a compartmented document reading room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.

The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and 3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed. A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall. The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was discussed with him.

The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a large projection room, currently filled with projection equipment, and five small private film viewing rooms.

The five small rooms will be converted into witness interview rooms. The windows in each of these rooms will be covered during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.

B. Access Controls

Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not checked.

Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the door. His instructions are that all persons entering must show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment. They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday, and from 1300 hours Saturday to 0700 hours Monday everyone must sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr. Marshall is alerted.

C. Guards

The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson 38 caliber revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire auditorium for classified material that may not have been secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters. There will be no rotation of police officers during the occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned to these posts.

D. Alarms

All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact (microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire protection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain the alarms.

E. Safes

The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class 2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all other safes are in good working order.

The safe combination and repairs are under contract with the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the combination himself should staff personnel rotate.

F. Document Control

Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Compartmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Compartmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will

be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in the Research Section.

Further control of classified documents is directed through the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the reproduction of documents on the xerox machine. He will control the number of copies made on typewriters.

All classified material is secured in safes at the end of the working day.

H. Classified Waste

It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste will be generated each week while the Committee is in session. Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incinerator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incinerator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure disposition of Committee classified waste.

I. Compartmented/TS Storage

A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A pre-fabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.

J. Telephone

The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium. Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation

masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system is maintained by the local telephone company.

K. Security Briefings

All new members of the committee receive a thorough briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically reinforced when conditions warrant.

L. Security Duty Check Procedures

Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them, i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen, and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure all classified material has been secured at the end of the day.

M. Counteraudio Inspection

Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee with as much security protection against the Audio threat as possible.

N. Shredder

The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other documents are not shredded in this machine because of its limited shredding capability.

O. General Observations

The security procedures implemented within the Senate Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper environment for the protection of classified materials. The survey officers were pleased with the security director's dedication to the objective of providing the best security possible for the Committee.

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The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented information. They also meet the requirements as set forth in DCID 1/44 ^{W/MH}

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
William G. Miller	8-15-31 N.Y.	109-26-4349 JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)
Frederick A. O. Schwarz	4-20-35 N.Y.	084-30-2047
William Bader	9-8-31 N.J.	545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides	6-14-41 N.J.	139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell	7-24-46 N.Y.	133-34-4225 JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)
Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42 Ill.	239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan	4-18-43 D.C.	042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48 N.Y.	068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz	7-23-46 N.Y.	053-38-7410 JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19 Neb.	485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham	2-11-40 Cal.	528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry	6-10-23 Md.	216-14-8891 JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)

#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-2015 BY SP2 Attn: JTG

ATTACHMENT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
David Aaron	8-21-38 IL	550-44-7971 JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)
Nancy Brooks	2-14-40 KY	313-38-6773
Barbara Gheznik	4-18-46 WI	390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo	6-13-47 OH	287-42-6258
Daniel Dwyer	8-24-52 MA	023-44-8792
Peter Fenn	12-12-47 MA	213-50-1123 JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)
Edward Greissing	11-27-50 Germany	296-50-4113
Mark Inderfurth	9-29-46 NC	245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson	6-8-25 OR New Zealand	540-20-6413
Loch Johnson	2-21-42	566-62-0478
Howard Liebengood	12-29-42 IN	307-44-9707
Naldeen MacDonald	10-19-51 Brazil	225-78-8708 JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)
Benjamin Marshall	5-4-19 ME	485-28-4503
William G. Miller	8-15-31 NY	109-26-4349 JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)
Susan Pitts	10-24-53 Canada	020-40-7638
Alan Romberg	12-1-38 NY	107-30-8583
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, III	4-20-35 NY	084-30-2047
Patrick Shea	2-28-48 UT	528-64-1965 JFK Act 5 (g)(2)(D)
Stephanie Smith	3-23-54 OH	282-58-6476
Mary Towell	4-25-44 TN	566-64-7628

63-116395-77

ENCLOSURE

The Attorney General

2 - Legal Counsel Division
 (1 - Mr. Farrington)
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
 1 - Mr. W. O. Gregar
 April 21, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
 ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 ALM/jms

Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.

The purpose of this letter is to make available for your information a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.

The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.

REC-106 62-11633-70

Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This will be done at the earliest possible time.

Enclosure

APR 21 1975

ALL:vb

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP2 AEM/HG

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

April 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Attached are copies of various documents which are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney General with reference to investigative responsibilities between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.

1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949, with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.

2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified "Secret."

3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.

RLM:mam
(6) n/a

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The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Director, FBI

April 8, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records. Processing of additional requests is continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.

Enclosures (2)

REC. 106

RLM:mam
(6)nsm

PLH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 11/18/01 BY SPAM/HK

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency
Operations in the United States

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (3)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (5)

~~SECRET~~

ORCHID FORM NO. 10
MAY 1964 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
RODERICK HILLS, ASSOCIATE
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/4/75

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
(60324 UC BPRW/SAB/mL
1/12/2011)1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

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MON 16 1-17-01
 CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/1796
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President, on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.

As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter, who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters of a sensitive nature relating to the [ORCHID] and similar programs, electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants, and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman.

Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that we did not agree to those that we could furnish summaries of material from the files. Wilderotter said he did not feel that

WRW:dsh
(5)

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CONTINUED - OVER

APR 11 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

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 Exempt from GDS Categories 2 and 3
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

34 APR 16 1975
 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
~~RODERICK HILLS ASSOCIATE~~
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter said that this was a matter which he would afford further consideration.

As during the conference with Buchen and Hills, it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way might be considered questionable. The White House is making every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation prior to the Committee hearings.

Classified ~~"Top Secret"~~ to protect highly sensitive investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign relations.

ACTION:

For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.

~~TOP SECRET~~

AMERICAN
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JK

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey

Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan

Section Chief

Eugene C. Peterson

Number 1 Man

Special Cases Unit

Unit Chief

James P. Lee

Five Special Agents

New York Unit

Unit Chief

Alfred E. Smith

Five Special Agents

Washington Unit Chief

Unit Chief

Wilfred R. Schlarman

Four Special Agents

One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.

Section CI-2

William O. Cregar

Section Chief

James W. Redfield

Number 1 Man

This document is prepared in response
to your request and is not for dissemination
outside your Committee. Its use is limited
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the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized
personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Chinese Unit
Herbert J. Morgan
Five Special Agents

Unit Chief

Satellite Unit
Howard H. Wallace
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Coordination Unit
John P. Thomas
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.
Sebastian S. Mignosa
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit
Richard J. Daily
Four Special Agents

Section Chief

Number 1 Man

Unit Chief

Middle East Unit
Carl F. Freeman
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Far East Unit
William W. Hamilton
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Cuban Unit
Charles H. McCarthy
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Nationality Unit
Vinicio Henry Nasca
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.
H. C. Flemister, Jr.

Section Chief

Number 1 Man

Liaison Supervisors
Six

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan	Section Chief
William H. Atkinson	Number 1 Man
Black Nationalist and White Hate - Central Unit William D. Neumann Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White Hate - East Unit Paul E. Nugent Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White Hate - West Unit Garnett T. Tunstall Three Special Agents	Unit Chief
Black Nationalist - South, Klan and Informant Unit Homer A. Newman, Jr. Two Special Agents	Unit Chief
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit Seymor F. Phillips Two Special Agents	Unit Chief

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson Number 1 Man

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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W. Raymond Wannall
 Assistant Director

Thomas W. Leavitt
 Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
 Counterintelligence Branch

Hunter E. Helgeson
 Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
 Internal Security Branch

4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Section CI-1

William A. Branigan

Section Chief

Eugene C. Peterson

Number 1 Man

Special Cases Unit

Unit Chief

James P. Lee
 Five Special Agents

New York Unit

Unit Chief

Alfred E. Smith
 Five Special Agents

Washington Unit Chief

Unit Chief

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 Four Special Agents

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Section CI-2

William O. Cregar

Section Chief

James W. Redfield

Number 1 Man

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 personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~(S)~~ Chinese Unit

Herbert J. Morgan
Five Special Agents

Unit Chief

Satellite Unit

Howard H. Wallace
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Coordination Unit

John P. Thomas
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-3

Forrest S. Putman, Jr.

Section Chief

Sebastian S. Mignosa

Number 1 Man

Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit

Richard J. Daily
Four Special Agents

Unit Chief

~~(S)~~ Middle East Unit

Carl F. Freeman
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

~~(S)~~ Far East Unit

William W. Hamilton
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

~~(S)~~ Cuban Unit

Charles H. McCarthy
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Nationality Unit

Vinicio Henry Nasca
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Section CI-4

Homer A. Boynton, Jr.

Section Chief

H. C. Flemister, Jr.

Number 1 Man

Liaison Supervisors

Six

Foreign Liaison Unit
Robert A. Birmingham
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

IS-1 Section

Joseph G. Deegan Section Chief

William H. Atkinson Number 1 Man

Black Nationalist and White
Hate - Central Unit
William D. Neumann
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White
Hate - East Unit
Paul E. Nugent
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist and White
Hate - West Unit
Garnett T. Tunstall
Three Special Agents

Unit Chief

Black Nationalist - South,
Klan and Informant Unit
Homer A. Newman, Jr.
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

Civil Disorders Reporting Unit
Seymor F. Phillips
Two Special Agents

Unit Chief

IS-2 Section

Robert L. Shackelford Section Chief

Conrad W. Thompson Number 1 Man

Trotskyist Unit	
George J. Lex, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Communist Party Unit	
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Security Informant Unit	
Edward P. Grigalus	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Extremist-West Unit	
William N. Preusse	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Extremist-East Unit	
Thomas J. McNiff	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	

Section IS-3

Arthur B. Fulton	Section Chief
Fred J. Cassidy	Number 1 Man
Training Unit	
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.	Unit Chief
Three Special Agents	
Central Research Unit	
Robert P. Finzel	Unit Chief
Four Special Agents	
Special Records and Related	
Research Unit	
Russell H. Horner	Unit Chief
Two Special Agents	
Analytical Research Unit	
David Ryan	Unit Chief
Seven Special Agents	

ATTACHMENT

The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as identified below by date and place of birth and social security number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH</u>	<u>SOCIAL SECURITY NO.</u>
Charity Benz	7-23-46 N.Y.	JFK 053-38-7100
Michael Taylor Epstein	3-10-37 Mass.	JFK 026-28-6308 (D)
Mark Henry Gitenstein	3-7-46 Ala.	420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry	6-10-23 Md.	JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) 216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves	1-4-48 N.Y.	068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan	4-18-43 D.C.	042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell	7-24-46 N.Y.	JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) 133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham	2-11-40 Cal.	528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty	11-4-42 Ill.	239-62-8495
Jan Orloff	11-14-47 Cal.	558-74-8394
John F. Peterson	6-15-41 Cal.	JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D) 565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider	1-12-45 N.C.	246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides	6-14-41 N.J.	139-30-1936

As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will be sent to you.