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# The United States Senate

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ON 5/23/77

BY 94

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## Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED

ON 3/13/77

BY EC

## Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

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Saturday, January 10, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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1 in?

2 Mr. Hunt. I am not.

3 Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period  
4 of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you  
5 talked with Colonel Pash?

6 Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

7 I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters  
8 at that time and within a very short period of time after I  
9 had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the  
10 Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.

11 Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up  
12 on the problem with this particular suspected double agent  
13 after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

14 Mr. Hunt. That certainly could have been one reason.  
15 On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see I'm really going  
16 to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be  
17 dry and dull stuff for you.

18 ~~The late King Zog was a client of mine in the sense that~~  
19 ~~we had brought him to a safe area. We were keeping him housed~~  
20 ~~in Egypt. I had made a trip at one time over to Egypt to~~  
21 ~~try to intercede indirectly with Colonel Nasser for King Zog~~  
22 who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all  
23 of his partisans in the operations that the Agency was conducting.

24 ~~And he was my concern much less~~ -- the the counter-  
25 intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but

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1 I had a silent King to worry about. And also, we were trying  
2 to bring Zog into this country. So I became interested as  
3 a matter of King Zog's disaffection in what was happening to  
4 his retainers. Why were they being parachuted to their  
5 deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole  
6 scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers were  
7 being held by the CIA. Well, not being held, but where they  
8 were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

9 Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

10 Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got  
11 out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best  
12 describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his  
13 personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had  
14 four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion  
15 of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken  
16 over thanks to Zog, who, in effect, ordered them to cooperate  
17 with us. And then he never saw them again. He naturally

18 became apprehensive.

19 So that was my interest in what was happening to the  
20 Albanians that we parachuted in through King Zog. I had no  
21 functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This  
22 would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief  
23 of Counter-espionage for the Division.

24 Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the time?

25 Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.

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1 title designation rather than the name of the individual because,  
2 so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was  
3 in that particular era.

4 ~~Peter Michel~~, who at that time was a member of the German  
5 branch of the Western Europe Division, he has since retired  
6 and is running his family's ~~wine~~ business in New York. Certainly  
7 the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany  
8 was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western  
9 Europe should know.

10 I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had  
11 direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff.  
12 The Chief of base in ~~Berlin~~, if in fact Pash conducted any  
13 activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in  
14 ~~Berlin~~ would have been knowledgeable about it.

15 Also, the Chief of base at ~~Wolfsburg~~, which was where we  
16 had the ~~Wolfsburg~~ operation going on. I don't know whether  
17 Bill Harvy, that is William Harvy, at that time was Chief of  
18 Operations ~~for Berlin~~ or whether he was simply running the  
19 tunnel, but Harvy might well have some knowledge of Pash.

20 I would certainly assume that when we're talking about  
21 liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency's overall  
22 Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved,  
23 such German Division personnel as might be available today,  
24 West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might  
25 be knowledgeable for this reason.

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1 Mr. Hunt. No.

2 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone  
3 other than Colonel Pash?

4 Mr. Hunt. In that context?

5 Mr. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning  
7 any kidnappings. Again, I would suggest that I might very  
8 well have gone back to ~~Blumfeld~~, who was the most interested  
9 individual, because he was responsible at the branch level  
10 ~~for King Joe~~ as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall  
11 political responsibility ~~for King Joe~~. And I have described  
12 the background of that, the rubric under which I became  
13 interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and  
14 then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural  
15 for me to have said to ~~Blumfeld~~, look, I've talked with Pash  
16 and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority.  
17 Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you  
18 get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have to  
19 carry the ball and take it on up the line.

20 Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

21 Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think,  
22 a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

23 Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did  
24 ~~Artie Lazarus~~ ever mention it to you again?

25 Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw ~~Artie Lazarus~~ in ~~Taipei~~ in

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1 Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

2 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with  
3 Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent  
4 took place in that time period?

5 Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

6 Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East  
7 European problems or --

8 Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

9 Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with  
10 a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian  
11 double agent in West Germany during that time period?

12 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The West  
13 European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would  
14 have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is  
15 that this was generated at a later time when I was in the  
16 Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become  
17 interested in the matter.

18 I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe  
19 5 percent possible.

20 Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to  
21 the hypothesis that you actually talked to Pash about this  
22 problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in  
23 operations in West Germany at that point.

24 Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

25 Mr. Baron. And King was not your client at that

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1 account of an incident when he was stationed at **Taipei** and he said  
2 had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda that he  
3 program because he was involved in propaganda operations at  
4 that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else  
5 in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station  
6 attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the  
7 assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng  
8 Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important  
9 spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

10 And the way that **Artie Lowmyer** recounted the incident,  
11 he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to  
12 his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the  
13 negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out  
14 to **Taipei** to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for  
15 suggesting assassination.

16 Do you have any recollection of that incident?

17 Mr. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does  
18 **Artie** refer to because I was in **headquarters at our North**  
19 **Asian command headquarters** in Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to  
20 '56 or '57. And I would have seen most of the traffic that  
21 came out of **Taipei** in that period of time. But I don't know  
22 if -- I know that **Artie** stayed on in **Taipei** much after my  
23 time in the Far East.

24 I don't know when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I  
25 remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.

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1 to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was  
2 alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others  
3 have given that the matter had been discussed long before my  
4 arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

5 Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

6 Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually  
7 made my trip to Havana the summer of 1960, and then we had  
8 the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April of '61.

9 Mr. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our  
10 assassination report that no action was taken to carry out  
11 an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring  
12 of 1960.

13 Did something --

14 Mr. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic  
15 answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in  
16 the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain

17 and I have described a defection attempt of the Cuban military

18 attaché in Madrid.

19 Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring  
20 and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of  
21 my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell  
22 and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period  
23 of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and  
24 by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

25 Mr. Baron. July of '60?

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1 Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to  
2 me.

3 Mr. Baron. Why is that?

4 Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban  
5 activities for more than three years at that time. I was  
6 purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay  
7 of Pigs.

8 Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a  
9 period of time but it was later than September of '64?

10 Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.

11 I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't  
12 recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. **I was on**  
13 **the outside. My presence there was known to the station.** My

14 communications were handled independently between myself and  
15 Tom Karramesines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.

16 This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms.

17 **I had no station contact at all and I had no responsibilities**  
18 **to the station,** and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

19 Mr. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relationship,  
20 to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place  
21 during a university ceremony?

22 Mr. Hunt. No.

23 Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different  
24 area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general  
25 role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to

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1 organization, which had been operating out of ~~the National~~  
2 ~~Press~~ Building in Washington. We had a project in ~~India~~ which  
3 I visited on one occasion called ~~Allied Radio~~ which we ran  
4 out of a ~~Leesburg~~ Virginia office.

5 I had no personal media contacts with American magazines  
6 or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

7 Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area,  
8 both contacts with specific reporters or media people dome-  
9 stically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad  
10 in the publishing field.

11 Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing  
12 houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet  
13 and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large  
14 textbook publishing house and their main offices were in  
15 New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull  
16 it out.

17 But beside from that publishing house, we never did any  
18 business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses  
19 beyond ~~Frederick A. Praeger~~, that is trade publishers, that  
20 we dealt with.

21 We had our own press agency, ~~Continental Press~~, which I  
22 imagine you're quite familiar with.

23 Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of  
24 operating with these various publishing outlets?

25 In other words, how would you have supplied them with

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1 the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds  
2 to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

3 Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of.  
4 I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying  
5 that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just  
6 don't recall now.

7 Mr. Baron. Was there any other aspect to your liaison  
8 with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds  
9 to publish books that you were interested in having published?

10 Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally  
11 brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my  
12 part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and I  
13 would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had  
14 a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and  
15 vice versa. And he knew fully of the ~~Prager~~ relationship.

16 Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would  
17 go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA  
18 was interested in having published? An example that I was  
19 given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this  
20 was books written by or ghosted for Chinese ~~defectors~~.

21 Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese branch sort of  
22 ran a parallel operation. I don't recall their coming  
23 through us. I don't recall a ~~defector~~ book when I was in  
24 that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the  
25 Near East Branch bringing to our attention a book that they

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1 would like to have ~~Prager~~ publish, and it had to do with the  
2 ~~Chinese-Pakistan border~~ dispute, the name of which I can't  
3 recall. So the manuscript would have been read by ~~Prager~~  
4 or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication  
5 of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point --  
6 well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East  
7 Division. When it came down to that, why should DOD, who had  
8 no interest in the ~~Pakistan border~~ dispute, provide money for  
9 that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be  
10 transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation.  
11 It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it  
12 when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with  
13 ~~Prager~~ on the matter. My office would keep the division  
14 apprised of the project, when publication could be expected,  
15 and so forth.

16 Mr. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietaries  
17 than the two you have mentioned, ~~Allied Pacific and Continental?~~

18 Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the  
19 Domestic Operations Division, no.

20 Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the  
21 Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

22 Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations or Inter-  
23 national Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a few  
24 things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom,  
25 for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.

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1 Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting for non-CIA publi-  
2 cations?

3 Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of -- I'm very reluctant  
4 to go into this, although I have discussed it with John  
5 Crowdson. But this is another one of those difficult areas  
6 where it's very hard for me to prove.

7 There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the  
8 spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked  
9 me if I could cause to have published something on the --  
10 by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operation  
11 Division. I was with Western Europe -- on the increasing use  
12 by the KGB of such covers as ~~Houseflat~~ and things like that,  
13 and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

14 And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief  
15 of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of  
16 Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the  
17 article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the  
18 byline of ~~C.L. Sulzberger~~. And it was not a fabricated article.  
19 It was just information which was supplied which he wrote  
20 somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which  
21 appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by  
22 Dick Helms.

23 Mr. Baron. Also under ~~Sulzberger's~~ byline?

24 Mr. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties  
25 involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.

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1 Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of  
2 thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

3 Mr. Baron. By other people? Was it a general practice  
4 to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for  
5 articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

6 Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the **Reader's Digest** book,  
7 **"2005"** which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency,  
8 and that was done by the SR Division.

9 You are aware of that, aren't you?

10 Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own.  
11 Penkoski Papers was another example. We had nothing to do  
12 with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And  
13 I can understand why.

14 But basically, in answer to your question, I have given  
15 you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

16 Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with **C.L. I**

17 **Saul Lubliner**

18 Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

19 Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

20 Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

21 Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or  
22 were there other people knowledgeable?

23 Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie  
24 arrangement.

25 Mr. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable

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1 ~~Frederick A. Praeger~~ organization. I felt that a strict  
2 construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect  
3 because if we were doing a book, for example, on ~~Indonesian~~  
4 Communism, who was the target? It would have been highly  
5 inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target  
6 of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on  
7 ~~Indonesian~~ Communism. It became about this thick. I can't  
End Tape 2B8 recall the title.

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1/10 Hunt  
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1 If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They  
2 don't all necessarily read English, and we had a **bilateral**  
3 **agreement with the British that we wouldn't propagandize their**  
4 **people.** So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is  
5 published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca.  
6 then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this  
7 was rationalized by the project review board that looked over  
8 the **Prager** operation, and the **Feder thing** and **Continental**  
9 **Press** and things like that was that the ultimate target was  
10 **formed**, which was true, but how much of the **Prager** output  
11 actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.

12 Now, in the case of **Continental Press**, the material was  
13 physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the  
14 **Turkish** newspapers, I think particularly the **Mideast News**  
15 Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was  
16 rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility  
17 lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of  
18 Washington then it was probably okay.

19 But I - **Continental Press** had no domestic U.S. papers  
20 as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled  
21 operations which were based domestically in the United States,  
22 the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary  
23 airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was  
24 abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was  
25 not the United States citizen.

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1 keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do  
2 the same in France and so forth.

3 Mr. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know  
4 of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that  
5 the CIA generated or fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance,  
6 a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters  
7 that the CIA had planted abroad.

8 Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would  
9 guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum  
10 Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it  
11 would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

12 Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things  
13 you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the U.S.  
14 press by the CIA?

15 Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the **Left Book** which was a  
16 cooperative venture with **Readers Digest** the two **Salisbury**  
17 things. No, I can't recall.

18 Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of  
19 disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These  
20 were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit  
21 either a foreign political leader or a foreign political fac-  
22 tion, or domestic political groups or leaders?

23 Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am  
24 not aware of any.

25 I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it

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1 kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of  
2 KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for  
3 example, they would make sure that the local press got the  
4 man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would  
5 know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation  
6 is doing today against the CIA.

7 Mr. Baron. Did you make arrangements, or did you know  
8 of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces  
9 that were favorable to the CIA?

10 Mr. Hunt. No.

11 Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of opera-  
12 tion?

13 Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable  
14 publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

15 Mr. Baron. Right.

16 Mr. Hunt. No.

17 Mr. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to  
18 write stories of any sort, or books of any sort that the CIA  
19 was interested in having published?

20 Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where  
21 in the past we had given ~~Prager~~ a commitment to buy X copies  
22 of his book on the ~~Himalayas, Himalayan~~ problem, obviously  
23 we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was  
24 our money that ~~Prager~~ was ultimately passing to the indi-  
25 vidual, but that was ~~Prager~~ doing it rather than us. In

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1 other words, there was never any face to face contact.

2 Mr. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses  
3 that you had established contact with, did you deal individually  
4 with authors who were non-CIA employees?

5 Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don't think DOD did. I think that  
6 Far East Division did.

7 Mr. Baron. Do you know with whom?

8 Mr. Hunt. You mentioned Chinese **defectors** for example.  
9 Well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with  
10 **Frank Gidney** on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with  
11 **Frank** while he was doing the Penkoski Papers. So that was  
12 an example.

13 Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

14 Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

15 Mr. Baron. Both of those two divisions?

16 Mr. Hunt. Yes.

17 Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would  
18 need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the  
19 relations to the media or the publishing industry?

20 Mr. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good  
21 deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that  
22 directly under him when he was Chief of the International  
23 Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy  
24 Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would  
25 probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's

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AND FACT HE OUT FOR GOLD, PLUS LITTLE EVIDENCE CAPABILITY  
PRODUCE INFO OF INTEREST.

5. ~~CIS~~ WHO LEFT MEETING FIRST, CLEARLY INFERRED TO SUBJ IT HAD BEEN "GREAT WASTE OF TIME." OTHER CIA OFFICER PROCEEDED POLITELY "CHEW OUT" SUBJ FOR GETTING US TO ABOVE MEET ON FALSE PRETENSES. SUBJ FRANKLY ADMITTED HIS "RECRUITMENT" BY CIS WAS HANDLED IN SUCH SLOPPY MANNER AS BE CONSTRUED A FARCE. VIEW VAGUENESS HIS MISSION AND LACK SECURE CONTACTS, REPORTING CHANNELS, IT APPARENT CIS NOT EXPECTING MUCH RESULTS FROM OP WHICH PROBABLY MADE ON "HIT OR MISS" BASIS. QUITE LIKELY "EDUARDO" WILL NEVER APPEAR TO CONTACT SUBJ.

6. SEEING HIS "UTILITY" TO US AS DUBIOUS, SUBJ BEGAN SCRATCHING HEAD FOR LEADS AND MENTIONED FOLL "FRIENDS" HE MIGHT CONTACT: ORLANDO BLANCO ~~(NO RELATION)~~, CHARGE IN BERN WHO COMING ~~HERE~~ 25 SEPT; (FNU) TRASANCO OF PAIR EMB WHO CONFIDANTE AMLAH 1 ALSO KNOWN AMLAH ~~28~~ AND ENRIQUE RODRIQUEZ LOECHES, AMB TO MOROCCO ~~WHO COMING MADRID~~ 20 SEPT.

7. C/O SAID NOW UP TO SUBJ SHOW BONAFIDES SUGGESTING HE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE HIS "UNIQUE STATUS" AS CUBAN AGENT GAIN ENTRY OFFICIAL CIRCLES. SUBJ FEARS WE MAY DENY VISA AND DENOUNCE HIM TO ~~SPANISH~~ POLICE. ALTHOUGH HE PROMISED MAKE EVERY EFFORT, INDICATIONS TO DATE ARE HE WILL HAVE LITTLE, IF ANY, OPS UTILITY. IN ANY EVENT WAS TOLD EXAMINE THOROUGHLY ANY LEADS HE MIGHT HAVE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. WE WILL DECIDE IN NEXT MEETING OR TWO WHETHER HE DOES APPEAR TO HAVE ANY UTILITY, IF NOT HE WILL BE DROPPED.

S E C R E T

RE ~~FROM~~ DISSEM APPLICABLE TO SENSITIVE CABLES

NOV 1975

CIA

S E C R E T