

*see covering memo
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Analysis of Memorandum by Mr. **Craigton Scott**

The following memorandum, I believe, discusses most of the points raised by Mr. **Scott**.

1. Scripts prepared in Munich are almost never read by Americans before broadcast although the general content of each broadcast is agreed upon in programming conferences between the American and exile staffs. The reasons why the broadcasts are not read by Americans before they go on the air are as follows:

a. Because the natural inclination of Americans is to change the broadcasts, and such changes, RFE officials feel, are likely to lessen the "genuine" quality of exile broadcasts for the listeners.

b. Because the exiles feel themselves to be patriots working for their countries, and the submission of scripts to Americans before they are broadcast would be regarded by the exiles as casting doubt upon their allegiance and fervor.

The American staff believes that it can exercise policy control by suggestions during program discussions rather than by making deletions and corrections in the scripts themselves.

2. During my trip to Europe in June, I asked Mr. W. E. Griffith, Political Advisor for RFE, to institute the service of regularly translating the most sensitive RFE broadcasts after the fact. He has complied with this request and CIA now receives English translations of Munich scripts within a month after broadcast. CIA also receives an immediate teletype summary of all Munich broadcasts, as well as a weekly consolidated summary of all broadcasts. To provide for immediate English translation of all RFE programs after the fact would require an enormous staff of translators.

3. No doubt RFE has made the mistakes Mr. **Scott** mentions in connection with the items about the weakness of the Iron Curtain and the ease of crossing it, and the Czechoslovakian currency devaluation. On the first point, Mr. **Scott's** dates are in error, for RFE did not go on the air until July 4, 1950. Assuming that he means that such broadcasts were made from that date until April 1951, it should be noted that this was the very beginning of RFE when all of its broadcasts originated in New York. Such broadcasts certainly are not being continued. I assume they were the result of inexperience. The

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
will be discontinued when HICOG goes out of existence, and they should not be reestablished. You will remember that at the hearings which considered NSC's 1953 budget, the officials of NSC asked for \$500,000 to cover the expected loss of such privileges and because we felt that this was unjustified, we asked and were granted the right to retain this money in the CIA reserve pending further justification.

5. Mr. **Scott's** complaint that the Information Service of RFE has been too expensive and naive is probably correct. In part this is the result of CIA's inability, for justifiable security reasons, to make information on a large scale available to RFE. However, the Information Service is being reorganized. There is reason to believe that excellent professional newsmen, such as Russell Hill and Ed Chamberlayne will provide the competence necessary for an increase in efficiency.

6. In sum, Mr. **Scott's** criticisms and complaints seem a mixture of fact and fiction animated by a personal antagonism. His is but one of a number of such attacks by former employees. Our own approach to Radio Free Europe should be not so much an assessment of past success and failures, as an examination of future opportunities. A powerful instrument has been created, in the main successfully, in an incredibly short time. Where it goes from here, giving due consideration to criticism such as **Scott's**, seems to us to be our priority task.

SECRET

10-3-2117



22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

I had a talk with Spencer Phenix about NCFE matters and the following points were discussed.

(1) A Strategy Board to guide RFE. Spencer feels the need for some higher level political guidance than RFE is getting from their staff people and talked about getting together a board of people like George Kennan, etc. I told Spencer that I thought it unlikely that George would give very much time to this but might be willing to give them an occasional idea or suggestion.

(2) Spencer asked me about the possibility of their finding some job **for Sam Reber**. I told him to wait on this until I had time to discuss it with FW.

(3) Spencer seemed disturbed that the allocation of one million a month until our budget was passed would cramp their operations. I told him that if they had particular difficulties to let me know. He also asked what they should do about the proposed allocation of \$400,000 to help in the refugee situation. I told him I was not familiar with this particular issue.

(4) He suggested that it would be well to have a meeting here with some of the members of the Board and the Executive Committee and suggested a date around the first week in August. I told him I would do it if I had not already left the country by that time.

(5) Spencer is pleased with the better integration and coordination of activities between their shop and this office.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: DD/P

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND SENATE - 16 MARCH AT 9:00 AM

1. Mr. Shephardson said that he had gone over Alex Pearson's business with his entire staff and that they had all agreed that a policy of silence was clearly indicated. — that this was not a time to release the "ice-box" statement which he referred to as "ice-box" statement number 1 and number 2. Shephardson said he would feel out C. P. Jackson in his meeting with him today to determine whether C. P. thought any approach to Pearson should be made and whether he himself would be the one to do it. He agreed that such an approach to Pearson should be made by someone else.

2. When I queried him about the "ice-box" statement number 2, he said he referred to the NSAF Policy Statement which states the fact of US Government support. He said that it was his understanding that it had been cleared down here. I replied that to my knowledge this was not so. I told him all we had ever had was a draft statement which had been discussed informally. He agreed that if this was in fact the case, he would immediately send the policy statement for our formal approval.

3. During the course of our conversation he indicated that Albert Warshaw had arranged for NSAF to appear before the Jackson Committee on March 26 and also had arranged for the rest of NSAF to make a presentation some time in April. I asked whether Mr. Dulles was informed of this and he said he was not aware that he was. I suggested that some problem existed here for NSAF is Mr. Dulles' responsibility and that no one denied that NSAF/NSA should make such a presentation, it was still a fact that such a unilateral presentation might lead to some difficulties. I therefore suggested that we make a joint presentation whether written or oral, to which Mr. Shephardson agreed.

4. I discussed the problem of security in AFN, Munich, and our concern that a security man competent to deal with questions other than the mere internal security of RFE be placed in Munich. Shephardson immediately agreed that this should be done and we agreed that I would prepare a paper for him outlining what we thought our problems are. In the meantime, there will not be informed of our discussions on this subject. We also agreed that the matter of working out the placement of such a person in RFE would be a matter of joint study, but that it was largely a problem for him to work out with such assistance as we can give.

5. We discussed the question of construction funds for the TMY and Shephardson agreed that he would talk with Spencer Phenix in order to arrive at an over-all estimate of University affairs before submitting an official request for funds. It was agreed, therefore, at this time we would not take any action on Phenix's request dated 17 February 1953.

6. I stated that I was anxious for a thorough review of Albanian-Romanian emigre questions and we agreed that after Shephardson had time to give personal attention to details of these matters, we would have a full discussion here.

SECRET
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William P. Shephardson
WILLIAM P. SHEPHARDSON
Chief, IS/Tonic

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Security Information

7 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/PP
ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden
SUBJECT: Mr. Ramsey

1. Reference our conversation sometime ago, I would like to give you the results of our Registry checks on Ramsey, who may or may not be identical with the present British citizen employed by HFE in Hamburg.

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|------------------------|--|
| FTT-289 19 Aug 48 | Subject arrived in Trieste under sponsorship of Charles S. NOFFLY, director of AIS. He speaks fluent Serbian and during war was commander of a Yugoslav camp in Egypt. Has been assigned to planning section of AMG. AIS is cover for SIS. |
| FTTA-291 3 June 49 | Individual believed identical with subject signed interrogation report either as or for the Trieste Security Officer. |
| IN-44033 24 Sept 49 | ANTONIJE, suspected CA for British, has for three weeks been under constant BIS interrogation by Italian speaking British sergeant in apartment of Maj. A.I.E. RAMSEY. Surveillance reveals apartments several FOS officers in building. Gold, SI chief, seen entering and leaving building with subject and several unidentified British women. |
| FTT-371 5 Oct 48 | Subject is the head of five British officers who are in Trieste making a survey of the entire area prior to conducting special mission in Yugoslavia. |

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TONIC 10 March

what has
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T. to be
Having been talked
to Social on this

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| NAV- 100000 20 June 57 | Subject British FSO (Pub. Sec. Officer) Graz. Intervened in the case of Josef Neger. |
| IN-22001 2 Sept 47 | Subject is in Graz. Question as to whether in FFS or NI-6. |
| IN-21808 27 Aug | Subject was named by Mary Allison Nixon, now held in prison in Baden by the Soviets, as FFS officer in Graz. |
| WEL-593 12 Sept 47 | Public Safety Officer in Military Government in Graz. He has been in contact with representatives of British Austrian Station. |

2. Ramsey no doubt is an extremely desirable officer for RFE and I see no objection to a man with intelligence background being employed by RFE, since quite obviously the combination of language and background must be invaluable to their program, but I still believe that those RFE posts which could be exploited best by us should be occupied by American citizens, who can be cleared by us and who will have American intelligence interests closest to their hearts. You may or may not know that RFE, especially in such places as Berlin and Vienna, is one of the important screening points for refugees coming from the Satellite areas and as such the RFE representatives act as bird-dogs for this Agency's FI program wherever possible.

3. I should appreciate your keeping me advised on the possibility of keeping Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative.

PETER SINEL
EE/T/001

Source Information

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DD/P 117

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern European Division

SUBJECT: **Arthur Malxner; young Czech political refugee recommended by Mr. Ortona of the Italian Embassy.**

1. Attached hereto is a letter from Egidio Ortona of the Italian Embassy, who is recommending for our consideration the above-named individual who is said to be the son of Mr. Arthur Malxner, formerly the Minister Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia to the Vatican. Also attached is a brief curriculum vitae of Malxner.

2. It is rather unusual for a foreign diplomat, even though he be on good terms with officials of this Agency, to recommend personnel to us for our use, and under the circumstances I do not suppose that there would be any way in which you could make secure use of this young man even if you were to find him in other respects suitable. In other words, he is "blown" by the very fact of his having been recommended to us by a foreign diplomat. And I am also aware of the fact that this would be a good cheap way of effecting penetrations of the Agency were we to follow the practice of acting favorably on recommendations of this character. Nevertheless, there may be some aspect of this matter which would have significance to you or to Mr. Tamm which I do not readily perceive, and accordingly I am passing this on to you and to Mr. Tamm with this thought in mind. For example, there is a bare possibility that because of the contacts and connections of Malxner and his father, a former Czech diplomat, it might be possible to make use of him (on an arm's-length basis) in a program of defector solicitation.

3. I am also furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden in view of the possibility that Malxner might be of some use to Radio Free Europe, assuming that the objection of his having been introduced to this Agency by Ortona could be overcome.

4. In any case, I should appreciate your suggesting a suitable reply to Mr. Ortona, bearing in mind the fact that he has been helpful to us in the past and does seem to be well disposed.

Enclosures (2)
As specified.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/IO
C/PI
C/NE

SECRET

Security Information

WPD seeing
Security on
this man

Harry King