

Top SecretCHAPTER VISEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: BOSENKO's claimed Second Chief Directorate service during 1955-1960, in which he was involved with Seventh Department operations against American and British tourists, coincides with the growth of a substantial American and **British** Intelligence program aimed at exploiting tourists visiting the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1956, the growth of tourism which followed the post-Stalin thaw in the USSR had grown to the point where it could be usefully exploited by CIA. Initially, returning American tourists were debriefed on their experiences in the Soviet Union and particularly with regard to their acquaintances there with Soviet citizens who might be susceptible to eventual recruitment. Gradually, leads were developed to Americans planning to visit the USSR, and from among these, agents were selected, trained in clandestine operational techniques, briefed on intelligence requirements, and instructed how to identify and develop potential agents from among their Soviet contacts. The American agents performed a variety of clandestine tasks including passive assessment of Soviet candidates for recruitment, propaganda activities, and infiltrating equipment, loading deaddrops, or mailing letters bearing secret writing, all destined for CIA agents in the Soviet Union.

The program reached its height in 1959, by the end of which over one hundred and fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA alone had performed missions in the USSR; by

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued)

then a substantial number of similar missions had also been launched by American military intelligence organizations and by the **British** and allied services.

It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture, that as early as 1957 a large number of these agents were coming to the attention of the KGB within the Soviet Union. Few were arrested. Instead, all were surveilled, and some provoked or entrapped, as the Second Chief Directorate and its provincial KGB counterintelligence elements sought to identify the Soviet citizens with whom the American agents were in contact, as well as the agents' specific clandestine tasks. By the summer of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British agent, George BLAKE, complete details of the objectives and methods of CIA and **British** Intelligence tourist programs, together with a number of case examples.

It is within this context that one must examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in and consequent knowledge of Second Chief Directorate counterintelligence operations against American and British tourists in 1955-1960.

NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department from June 1955 until January 1960. According to him, the Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union, including businessmen, seamen, foreign delegations and some tourists, as well as the hotels and restaurants utilized by these visitors. He said that by 1958, however, the number of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created. NOSENKO explained that one of the new sections became

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: ⁰⁶ [DREW] reported the approach in 1959, describing a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV" in Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's account of the operation. Re-interviewed by the FBI on 12 May 1964, [DREW] identified NOSENKO's ⁰⁶ photograph as that of his interrogator and said that, although NOSENKO was a young man, from the way everyone reacted to him it was clear that he was the man in charge. Another man was present, [DREW] said.

Recruitment of ⁰⁶ [LUKIS] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a British subject, (fnu) [LUKIS (or LUCAS)], in a room of the ⁰⁶ Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after [LUKIS] had been compromised ⁰⁶ by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with [LUKIS] subsequently.

Comment: ⁰⁶ [LUKIS] has not yet been identified by the British services 29

Recruitment of ⁰⁶ [WILBY] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information ⁰⁶

By himself NOSENKO recruited [William Stanley WILBY] in a hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after [WILBY] had been compro- ⁰⁶ mised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual agents. [WILBY] is a British citizen and his case was also ⁰⁶ (like [LUKIS], see above) turned over to TARABRIN.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

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Comment: [David TAYLOR] confessed homosexual, is described by [British services] as a neurotic 29 type who had been discharged from the [R.A.F.] 29 on grounds of mental instability. In 1962 (before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR admitted his recruitment to [British authorities] indicating that it took place in August 1959 on the basis of his homosexuality. He reported in 1962 that the recruitment had been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV", and when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitatingly identified NOSENKO as 'Colonel SERGEYEV'," adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph "sent shivers down his back". TAYLOR also identified a photograph of VOLKOV.

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Recruitment of [MERTENS] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

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 [Gerard MERTENS] visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally 06 met [MERTENS] in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. ([MERTENS] had been 06 the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.) Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between 06 VOLKOV and [MERTENS] on two separate occasions in Moscow. 06 When [MERTENS] later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod. [He did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a physical description.] [MERTENS] was then brought before 06 NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

⁰⁶ [PREISFREUND] was used in no KGB operation other than in the development of [STORSBERG]. His usefulness declined because he was suspected, particularly by his fellow [Finns], of having some relationship with the KGB. 11

Comment: A report of the Finnish security service advised CIA in December 1960 that [PREISFREUND] ⁰⁶ "is a Soviet agent who calls at the America Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an attempt to penetrate Western circles".

After GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who had by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and KOVSHUK concluded that [PREISFREUND] thereby had been identified as a KGB agent to American Intelligence; and that ⁰⁶ [PREISFREUND] should not be used again against American Embassy personnel. NOSENKO was told to use the [Finn] in the Seventh Department operations, but he was unsuitable since he knew only Finnish and Russian.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

In the February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO provided some additions as well as further amendments to what he had related earlier about [STORSBERG]. GRYAZNOV wrote the initial operational plan, which NOSENKO read and approved. The plan called for a detailed study of [STORSBERG] ⁰⁶ and the creation of some basis on which to make an operational approach. The case developed slowly in 1960. From a female clerk named [YAZHINSKAYA] and other employees in the ⁰⁶ Finnish Embassy, [PREISFREUND] obtained background information ⁰⁶ on [STORSBERG], who sometimes visited the sauna in the Finnish ⁰⁸ Embassy. [PREISFREUND] was directed to visit America House ⁰⁶ in order to strike up an acquaintance with [STORSBERG], and ⁰⁶ when he was successful, he managed to lure [STORSBERG] to his ⁰⁶ hotel room, where the KGB obtained incriminating photographs ⁰⁶ of [STORSBERG] and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. [STORSBERG] ⁰⁶ visited [PREISFREUND]'s rooms many times at different hotels ⁰⁶ in Moscow, but the KGB took incriminating photographs on

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow, GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy in 1952, and he served CIA under Naval cover in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer. He returned to active duty with the Navy in June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally proposed as a candidate for the position of Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow. In response to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official biographic summary, followed by an official call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER had served in Korea where he was acquainted with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had admitted passing to the Soviets. (See p. .) CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his arrival in Moscow. This assumption was confirmed by an article appearing in Izvestiya in October 1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER had earlier been involved in subversion and espionage in Sweden.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: (Continued)
a British double agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time.

Association with Other Soviets

According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the "ANDREY" case: see p. 33 .)

A.K. KISLOV

TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other delegates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva. NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds. [the loss he asked CIA to make good], and on the night of 10 June, when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women. With reference to the threat posed his security by KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event constituted no threat.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference. On the basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.

In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Association with ⁰⁸ [British] Female Secretary

NOSENKO has described his association with a ⁰⁸ [British] secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational interest in the girl. After several dates, NOSENKO could no longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had probably believed him to be an intelligence officer.

Comment: According to an ¹¹ [Official British] report, when NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her superiors she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland and she later resigned from the [Foreign Office].²⁹

This same incident came to the attention of the [Swiss service], which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO to recruit the girl. According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties". A [Swiss official] in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent BELITSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the American Embassy Section of the American Department. He

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