

diff-jfk: record 157-10011-10006 - Page 1 - (diff between 2025 and 2022)

Highlighted changes between 2025/157-10011-10006.pdf and 2022/157-10011-10006.pdf

Date: 08/15/92
Page: 1

09/29/93

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10006

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

[R]
[R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS

[R]

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 495

SUBJECTS :

[R]
[R]

CASTRO
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 139, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET		
PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gold ✓ Dr. Edward Gunn	October 25, 1966	Persons
Orta		
Raymond Treichler		
Cornelius Roosevelt		
SOURCE: In discussing the possibility of assassinating Fidel Castro, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms, as he could be furnished with a type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated he has a prospective nominee in the person of Dr. Cornelius Roosevelt, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling industry. Since he had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Dr. Raymond Treichler, and Dr. Edward Gunn were assigned to develop a pill that was highly soluble, high lethality, and little or no traceability. These items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward Gunn, three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission.	Events	
SOURCE: CIA Justice R-153 to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence dated June 24, 1966.	July 1, 1975	Persons
		Places
		People
		Organizations
		Items
		Events
		Geography
		Communication
		Information
		Concepts
		Relationships
		Style
		Text
		Other

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6-4-94

les

(1)(B)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
	Oct. 6, 1960	Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization <i>Card 3 of 3</i>

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960 FILE: Cage	DATE: Bob Kelley June 29, 1975

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*6-4-94
(1)(b)*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Father Peyton Peter Grace ✓	Dec. 5, 1960	Mongoose Special Group

<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>
(The Special Group discussed (1) the possibility of providing sixty thousand dollars from the Cuban budget to sponsor the illegal activity of Father Peyton; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.)

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960	Bob Kelley
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>
	June 29, 1975

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6-4-94 (21)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GUNN, Dr. Edward
TSD

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

DR. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960, he received a box of Cuban cigars from Castro's favorite brand. (21). He understood them to be CASTRO's favorite brand. (21). GUNN's notes show that within the next month he contacted Ray [redacted] (21) and gave him a box of cigars (21). GUNN recalls "that he did contaminate a box of Cuban cigars with Botulinum Toxin, a virulent poison," (21) which would kill the intended victim upon entering his mouth. (21) Notes showed delivery of the box of cigars to TSD, (21) and dated February 13, 1961, although they do not indicate to whom.

FILE:

16 (cigar) (21)

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6-4-94
(21)

CATEGORIES:

Cuba
(Cuban Cigars)

CARD 1 of 2

DATES:

August 16,
1960

TOP SECRET

DR. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960, he received a box of Cuban cigars from Castro's favorite brand. (21). He understood them to be CASTRO's favorite brand. (21). GUNN's notes show that within the next month he contacted Ray [redacted] (21) and gave him a box of cigars (21). GUNN recalls "that he did contaminate a box of Cuban cigars with Botulinum Toxin, a virulent poison," (21) which would kill the intended victim upon entering his mouth. (21) Notes showed delivery of the box of cigars to TSD, (21) and dated February 13, 1961, although they do not indicate to whom.

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773/75

16 (cigar) (21)

773/75

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101-7-93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

- OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate ASTERO:
1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
 2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DCI
 3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
 4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
 5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
 6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
 7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
 8. ~~JAMES REED~~, Chemical Division, CSC
 9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, CSC

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp.

FILE:

<u>CATEGORIES:</u>	<u>TOP SECRET</u>		<u>STAFF:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>
	<u>DATE:</u>	<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		
<u>CATEGORY:</u> <i>(Card 1)</i>	<u>DATE:</u> <i>FEB. APPROXIMATE</i>	<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> <i>CUBA - PHASE I</i>		
<u>CATEGORY:</u> <i>(Card 1)</i>	<u>DATE:</u> <i>1967 MAR 31</i>	<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> <i>CUBA - PHASE I</i>		
<u>CATEGORY:</u> <i>(Card 1)</i>	<u>DATE:</u> <i>28.6.75</i>	<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> <i>Baron</i>		

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Gold

Orta

Trechler

Cornelius Roosevelt

OCCURRENCE:

In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but "use if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink." Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the family of Cornelius Roosevelt, an official, who still has access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, a Cuban official, who still has access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Cornelius Roosevelt had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethality, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TPO nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-175 memorandum to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence dated June 24, 1966.

CATEGORIES:

Castro

Dr. Edward Gunn

Orta

Trechler

Cornelius Roosevelt

Gold

Orta

Trechler

Cornelius Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Osborn
Maheu

Rheia

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-175 memorandum to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence dated July 1, 1975.

STAFF:

J. Osborn

Rheia

A. Maheu

Robert A. Maheu

J. Osborn

Rheia

A. Maheu

J. Osborn

Rheia

DATE: July 1, 1975

CATEGORIES:

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		<u>CATEGORIES:</u>	
COLLECTION BY THIS SOURCE	Samuel HALPERN ✓	Centre	
COLLECTION AND BY THIS SOURCE	Edward GUNN ✓	Nov	
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>	
Samuel HALPERN reported that although SMLASH had been within effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards, he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)	Nov. 20, 1963	High-powered, silenced "high-powered rifle 20,000 yards." (92) he decided to use some technical means to assist him to catch a plane at noon the next day. (93)	High-powered, silenced "hypodermic syringe"
Samuel HALPERN and SANCHEZ requested assistance from the Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to SANCHEZ a poison known as "black leaf 40". (92)		Edward GUNN and COLLECTOR requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA. On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93)	High-powered, silenced "hypodermic syringe"
<u>SOURCE:</u>	IG REPORT 1963		
<u>FILE:</u>	TOP SECRET		
	STAFF:	F Baron	
	DATE:	7/1/75	

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~~ONS/ENTP: (ES:~~
~~Hector~~
~~Harold~~
~~Gunn, Edward~~
~~RECORDED~~

~~The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plots in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were Notes of William Harvery; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services); and, Brief records of [REDACTED] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used.~~

For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people whose memories are fogged by time. (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DUBLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees at Tab A. "If there are significant inaccuracies in the sequence of events, they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of records of TSD." (2)

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

ONS/ENTP: (ES:

Castro

~~The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plots in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were Notes of William Harvery; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services); and, Brief records of [REDACTED] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used.~~

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11-4-74

DATE:
Baron

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

DATE:

11-4-74

Baron

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11-4-94 [initials]

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
ZOOKEY Harvey Bissell	Kennedy, Robert HALPERN ✓ [REDACTED] 1961 October,	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was the Branch Chief (S). The meeting occurred in the middle of Oct. of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [REDACTED] and to me were to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (S) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (S). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Halpern 6/18/75	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75

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11-4-94

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Halpern ✓ Bissell Zoobey	Gen Lansdale Oct 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Shortly after ~~his~~ meeting with Bissell, Halpern, and ~~Zoobey~~ were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove ~~in~~ the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	Halpern 6/18/75	<u>STAFF:</u>	None
<u>FILE:</u>		<u>DATE:</u>	7/1/75

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11-4-94 *lee*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
[REDACTED] Harvey Halpern Helms <i>MC CONE</i>	Dec 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

[REDACTED] sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) [REDACTED] told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he should be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to [REDACTED] office, checked into the organization of [REDACTED] operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the EU Division (14).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF:

Rica

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>		<u>CATEGORIES:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>
FITZGERALD, Desmond	HARRIS, Sam ✓	CASTRO	4886 Ranney	6/29/75
<u>REFERENCE:</u>		DATES:		
FITZGERALD and FITZGERALD originated a scheme to assassinate CASTRO: "The idea was to take an unusually spectacular sea shell that would be certain to catch CASTRO's eye, load it with an explosive trigger to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where CASTRO often went skin diving." (77) FITZGERALD explored this idea at several sessions with SAM HALPERN and BRUCE ✓ (CHIEVER), but it was ultimately dismissed as impractical. (77)	Early 1963			
<u>DISCOVERY LEADS:</u> Note: There is no indication that FITZGERALD told anyone above him in the CIA hierarchy of this plan.		CONFERENCE:		
SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1968	TOP SECRET	REPORTER:		
FILE:		STAFF:	4886 Baron	
		DATE:	6/29/75	
		TITLE:		

NO CLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING OF THIS DOCUMENT	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>	CHIEF HAS NO OBJECTION TO CLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED -94	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> SANCHEZ Samuel HALPERN GUNN Edward GUNN	<u>DATES:</u> Nov. 20, 1963	DR. EDWARD GUNN reported that he had selected "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards." (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)	<u>STAFF:</u> F Baron <u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75
<u>OCURRENCE:</u> SANCHEZ reported that although ANLASH had selected "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)	<u>DATES:</u> Nov. 20, 1963	DR. EDWARD GUNN reported that he had selected "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)	<u>STAFF:</u> F Baron <u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75
<u>SOURCE:</u> IG REPORT 196	<u>INVESTIGATOR:</u> Samuel HALPERN Edward GUNN	DR. EDWARD GUNN reported that he had selected "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)	<u>STAFF:</u> F Baron <u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75
<u>FILE:</u>	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET

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11-4-94

[Signature]

(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KING, J. C. HARVEY
 IG REPORT EDWARDS
 BISSELL
 HALPERN ✓

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, [Bruce Cheever], J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray French [Ray French], John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, [Henry Bortner], Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

TOP SECRET

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(1)(b)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,
LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-
PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

Harris Craig

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four agents had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, ~~Rolfe~~, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as USG representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE (00400)
FILE:

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented

DATES:

June 4, 1962

June 5, 1962

June 21, 1962

June 22, 1962

July 1, 1975

ENTITIES:

LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

Craig

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four agents had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, ~~Rolfe~~, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as USG representative.

CATEGORIES:
 Special Group Augmented
 MONGOOSE

June 4, 1962

June 5, 1962

June 21, 1962

June 22, 1962

July 1, 1975

Memorandum for Special Group Augmented
 Lansdale 8: Genoa
 July 1, 1975

STAFF:
 di Genova
DATE:

July 1, 1975

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 OF THIS DOCUMENT
 7-4-74
 (1)(b)~~

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A SECRET~~

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE
LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-
MONROE, MC CONNE, RFK, LEMNITZER

Craig

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. On June 22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, ~~Raquel~~, has begun to provide names of other Cuban personnel abroad. Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE
from Lansdale re: Operation MONKEY (Ref ID: NW 00400)
FILED:

CATEGORIES:

DATE: 27, 1962 Special Group Augmented
25, 1962 MONGOOSE

June 27, 1962
June 25, 1962
6/27/62
6/25/62

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A SECRET~~

June 27, 1962
June 25, 1962
6/27/62
6/25/62

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SAME IS NOT
A SECRET~~

CATEGORIES:
Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. On June 22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, ~~Raquel~~, has begun to provide names of other Cuban personnel abroad. Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

STAFF: Lansdale re: Operation MONKEY (Ref ID: NW 00400)
DATE: July 1, 1975

CLASSIFICATION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

REASONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY
AS SANITIZED
AS IT IS
QJWIN

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that K.J.Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through [REDACTED] for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use. HARVEY was never advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose-use [REDACTED] he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination he would have considered the people spotted by K.J.Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before anyone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was never involved in connection with an operation in the Congo, which was not an assassination.

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, 25 June 1975, pp. 15-16

FILE:

TOP SECRET

CATEGORIES:EXECUTIVE ACTIONDATES:

CLIPS NO OBJECTION TO
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AS SANITIZED
4/1975

REASONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY
AS SANITIZED
AS IT IS
QJWIN

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/or
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

REASONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY
AS SANITIZED
AS IT IS
QJWIN

REASONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY
AS SANITIZED
AS IT IS
QJWIN

CATEGORIES:STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75

CATEGORIES:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75

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11-4-94

law

(1) (C)

(1) B

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard
Harvey, Mr.

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he does not recall whether he selected Harvey to head the Cuban operation, but that he did certainly approve Harvey's selection. Prior to receiving the commitment Harvey had been in charge of a staff in the foreign intelligence staff whose function was to mount operations against [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
~~ESPIONAGE ACTS (11-30)~~

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/28/75

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AS SANITIZED

11-4-94 *em*

(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William ✓

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that during World War II he worked on counterespionage matters with the FBI, having entered the Bureau as a Special Agent in 1940. He continued in that job until 1947, when he joined the CIA as the head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch. Between 1947 and 1952, he worked on Soviet counterespionage and special operations in the Department of Plans. Between 1952 and 1959, he was in Berlin as [redacted] for the CIA. He was instrumental in the Berlin tunnel operation. In 1959, he became Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division, D. This is the Division which is responsible for communications intelligence, Operations of Staff D [redacted] current [redacted] of [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 [redacted] entry, intercepting couriers, monitoring of communications, and microwave.

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 5-9

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75

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~~AS SANITIZED~~

(1)(A)

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he worked with a man called [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of [REDACTED]. HARVEY testified that [REDACTED] told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL stated that he had requested [REDACTED] to undertake an operation. (10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any proposals to eliminate [REDACTED] in connection with any proposals to eliminate [REDACTED]. (10)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1977

FILE:

~~TOP SECRET~~

CATEGORY/E:

DATES:

LUMINA:

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11-4-71

HARVEY testified that he had undertaken steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency to assist BISSELL in the conduct of an operation. (9-10)

(A)

~~CATEGORIES:~~

(10), (b), (d)

~~HARVEY TESTIMONY, JUNE 25, 1977~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF: RHEA
DATE: 30-6-75

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rhea

~~TOP SECRET~~

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6/30/75
(A)(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM
~~IS STANLEY ARNOLD~~
KUBARK

OCCURRENCE: Harvey was asked about his program and the notes from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning his role in the CIA. In this section of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one fact at a time, for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GPO authority is not clear, what does it mean? DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a program for specific targeting and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in the connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear, he should not be advised, means he should be advised. He should always be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). Harvey testified further that "circumstances the DCI should be brought up again at any time the DCI is involved in any operation or specific targeting or specific operation or specific targeting." (59)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 1, 1975

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

DATES:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM
~~IS STANLEY ARNOLD~~
KUBARK

OCCURRENCE: The CIA was asked about his program and the notes from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning his role in the CIA. In this section of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one fact at a time, for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GPO authority is not clear, what does it mean? DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a program for specific targeting and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in the connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear, he should not be advised, means he should be advised. He should always be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). Harvey testified further that "circumstances the DCI should be brought up again at any time the DCI is involved in any operation or specific targeting or specific operation or specific targeting." (59)

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

DATES:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM
~~IS STANLEY ARNOLD~~
KUBARK

OCCURRENCE: The CIA was asked about his program and the notes from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning his role in the CIA. In this section of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one fact at a time, for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GPO authority is not clear, what does it mean? DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a program for specific targeting and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in the connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear, he should not be advised, means he should be advised. He should always be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). Harvey testified further that "circumstances the DCI should be brought up again at any time the DCI is involved in any operation or specific targeting or specific operation or specific targeting." (59)

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6/30/75

(A)(4)

DATE: 6/30/75

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AS SANITIZED
11-4-94 *See*
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY ✓

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Riffle

OCCURRENCE:~~TOP SECRET~~

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives". The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division ~~B~~ with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed. (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75

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AS SANITIZED *em*
11-4-74
(1)(b)
(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRR.R.FL

OCCURRENCE:**TOP SECRET**

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:FILE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:DATE:

Rhea

6/30/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE ACTION</u>		<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
HARVEY STEVEN R. BISSELL	DATE: January 26, 1961		TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52
<u>OCCASION:</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE ACTION</u>		
HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with BISSELL about the project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52). HARVEY testified that he learned early in the conversation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ARTHUR SCHWARTZ. (52)			
<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>NAME:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
HARVEY TESTIMONY	William J. Bissell	HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52	Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>NAME:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>	
	Richard	30.6.75	

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CIA ACTION

TOP SECRET

~~PERSONS IDENTITIES:~~

Silver, Arnold
Harvey, William
Bissell, Richard

~~OCCUPATION:~~ Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter. (52) Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver. (52)

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY: June 25,

FILE:

100 /
Treas /
charged

CATEGORIES:
EXECUTIVE ACTION

DATES:
12/26/61

~~CLASSIFICATION AND/OR
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AMERICAN
PROJECT
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APPROPRIATIZED
(4)

CATEGORIES:
EXECUTIVE ACTION

STAFF: Rhea
DATE: 6/30/75

Project (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver. (52)

HARVEY TESTIMONY: June 25, 1975. 52
Project (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver. (52)

STAFF: Rhea
DATE: 6/30/75

~~TOP SECRET~~

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AS SHOWN
11-14-74

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY ✓
K. G. WIN

CATEGORIES:

DATES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION:
TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled "Pre-emptive Strike" dated October 27, 1961, describe K. G. Win as a principal agent candidate. These notes mention a narcotics operation into the United States and specifically refer to K. G. Win as a principal agent candidate. They also mention travel expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates \$2,000. Fees for services by and standby of agents and staff employees engaged in pre-emptive strike

SOURCE: (Harvey Exhibit 1, pages 1 -

FILE: Harvey 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

✓

CURRENT/STAFF:

✓

NAME:

✓

K. G. Win
is a principal agent candidate. His primary task was to contact K. G. Win in Luxembourg. In October 1960, he was contacted by the chief of section Luxembourg in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For services of a year and a half he was

brought into the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960, K. G. Win annual salary \$7,200. Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates \$2,000.

Fees for services by and standby of agents and staff employees engaged in pre-emptive strike

Travel expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates \$2,000. Total \$14,700

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AS SHOWN
11-14-74
DATE: 6/30/75
STAMP: (C)(3) Rhea

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION:
TOP SECRET

FILE:

✓

FILE: Harvey 6/30/75

~~CLASSIFIED BY THE ASSASSINATION OF PATRICE LUMUMBA~~

~~REF ID: A65407~~

(A) (4)

SOURCES/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard ✓ O'DONNELEY, Justin ✓
 HARVEY, William ✓ BRECKENRIDGE, S.
 HEIMS, Richard
 QJWIN

OCCURRENCE:

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ~~synthetic~~ HARVEY for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by ~~JUSTIN O'DONNELEY~~ (O'DONNELEY made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Commission, the ribbon stamp, which was the only text of the report in existence, phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Commission that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HEIMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967,

FILE:

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

DATES: FEB. 1967

LOCATIONS: CONGO

CHARACTER: ASSASSINATION

HELD: QJWIN

POLICY: ASSASSINATION

PRINCIPALS: PATRICE LUMUMBA

INFLUENCE: ASSASSINATION

EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ~~synthetic~~ HARVEY for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by ~~JUSTIN O'DONNELEY~~ (O'DONNELEY made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released - which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Commission, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Commission that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HEIMS when he read the report. Why?

STAFF: Baron
 I.G. REPORT 1967
 28.6.75

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(A)

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AS SANITIZED

11-4-94 *les*

(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT
HARVEY, WILLIAM ✓

DATES:

2/61

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO
EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (80) of the Project was to ~~steal codes~~ rather than to develop the capability for assassination. (80)

Breckinridge testified that on the face of the documents relating to Project ZRRIFLE, the Project was only directed at ~~stealing codes~~. The fact that it related to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviews with William Harvey. (81)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 6/2/75

FILE:

STAFF: WALLACH

DATE: 7/5/75

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**AS IDENTIFIED
IN THIS DOCUMENT**

REFERENCE:

BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability" to carry out assassinations when required. (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with [REDACTED] and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

FILE: [REDACTED]

PERSONS/ENTITIES: [REDACTED]
CATEGORIES: [REDACTED]
EXECUTIVE ACTION / Z'RIFLE

i.e.,
EXECUTIVE ACTION capability? (37)
DATES: February 1961
NOTE: (HARVEY) roughly estimate

EXECUTIVE ACTION capability? (37)
DATES: February 1961
NOTE: (HARVEY) roughly estimate

EXECUTIVE ACTION capability? (37-38)
DATES: February 1961
NOTE: (HARVEY) roughly estimate

EXECUTIVE ACTION capability? (37-38)
DATES: February 1961
NOTE: (HARVEY) roughly estimate

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IN THIS DOCUMENT**

DATE: 24-7-74

STAFF: Baron
DATE: 28.6.75

STAFF: Baron
CATEGORIES: [REDACTED]
EXECUTIVE ACTION / Z'RIFLE

i.e.,

[REDACTED]

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REF ID: A4-44-
(U) (A)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HELMS, Richard

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)
CARD 2 of 2

HARVEY used STEWART in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION concept, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, 37-38

FILE:

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REF ID: A4-44-4
(U) (A)

STAFF: Baron
DATE: 28.6.75

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SECRET

STAFF: Baron
DATE: 28.6.75

~~PERIODIC REPORTS OR INFORMATION ON THIS DOCUMENT
OR THIS SUBJECT ARE SANITIZED~~

(See the names listed below)

~~TOP SECRET~~

- ~~CONFERENCE:~~ The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate Khrushchev.
1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
 2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DCI
 3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
 4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
 5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security
the case officer
 6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
 7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
 8. MAY TRECHLER, Chemical Division, ASD
 9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp 34-35

FILE:

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

DATES: FEB. 1961

3 names listed below

Co. 1
-688K - PHASE I

APPROX. (approx.)

(Card 1)

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DATES: FEB.
1961

APPROX. (approx.)

Co. 1
-688K - PHASE I

(Card 1)

10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, WH/4
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to
the DD/P (OTH) (OTH's name was en-
countered repeatedly in this inquiry,
but he denied knowing of the opera-
tion in 1960-61.)

12. ROBERT SUMMERS, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too
denied knowing of the operation at
the time.)

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

(Card 1)

new, in late 1960

10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, WH/4
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to
the DD/P (OTH) (OTH's name was en-
countered repeatedly in this inquiry,
but he denied knowing of the opera-
tion in 1960-61.)

12. ROBERT SUMMERS, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too
denied knowing of the operation at
the time.)

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

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W.Y. 64

(b) (6)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See list of names below.)

- OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with whom HARVEY met during the CUBA ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of his activities during the CUBA ASSASSINATION OPERATION.
1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
 2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
 3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
 4. SHEPPIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)

SOURCE: I:07 REPORT 247 55

FILE:

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
SYNDICATE/PHASE II —
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

DATES: APR 67 61

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with whom HARVEY met during the CUBA ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of his activities during the CUBA ASSASSINATION OPERATION.

SOURCE: I:07 REPORT 247 55
AND HELMS, DD/P
WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with whom HARVEY met during the CUBA ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of his activities during the CUBA ASSASSINATION OPERATION.

SOURCE: I:07 REPORT 247 55
AND HELMS, DD/P
WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
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SOURCE: I:07 REPORT 247 55
AND HELMS, DD/P
WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)

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W.Y. 64

(b) (6)

28.6.75

STAFF:

Baron

28.6.75

CATEGORY: TOP SECRET
SYNDICATE/PHASE II —
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

DATES: APR 67 61

CATEGORY: TOP SECRET
SYNDICATE/PHASE II —
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

DATES: APR 67 61

CATEGORY: TOP SECRET
SYNDICATE/PHASE II —
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

DATES: APR 67 61

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4-4-94

(U) (P)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. ~~RAY TREISCHLER~~, TSD (~~TREISCHLER's~~ participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

SOURCE:

FILE:

Continuation as card 1.

CATEGORIES:

DATES:

Apr 17 '66

CARD 2 of 3

REFERENCE:

II. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO possibly knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO possibly knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(cont.)

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4-4-94

(U) (A)

DATE:

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

SOURCE:

FILE:

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11-4-94 [Signature]
(1)(A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Zogby Harvey ✓ Bissell HALPERN	Sept 1961 October	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [REDACTED] Zogby was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occurred in the middle of Octo of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [REDACTED] and to me [REDACTED] to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Halpern 6/18/75	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 7/1/75

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1-4-94 [initials]
(1)(4)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Zogby Halpern Helms McCONE	Harvey ✓ Dec 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Zogby, sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) Zogby told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to Zogby's office, checked into the organization of Zogby's operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the MI Division (14).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF:

Rica

FILE:DATE: 7/1/75

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/or RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT <i>(X)</i>		<u>CATEGORIES:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> Harvey, Lansdale <i>Poigo, Roig</i>		<u>DATES:</u> June 19, 1962	<u>DATE:</u> July 1, 1975
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate stories from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The Cuban regime's source to story-need not await your determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration"</p> <p><u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum from William Harvey, 19 June 1962 (05395) dale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (05395) <u>FILE:</u> 73-105395-1</p> <p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate stories from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The Cuban regime's source to story-need not await your determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration"</p> <p><u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum from William Harvey, 19 June 1962 (05395) dale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (05395) <u>FILE:</u> 73-105395-1</p>			
		<u>CATEGORIES:</u> <i>MONKEY</i>	<u>STAFF:</u> di Genova
		<u>STAFF:</u> <i>(X)</i>	<u>DATE:</u> July 1, 1975

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SANITIZED

7-4-94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

11-4-94 (A)
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE, HARVEY, RUIZ

~~de Cinha, Virginia~~

DATES:

July 10, 1962
~~June, 11, 1962~~
~~July 1, 1962~~
~~May 1962~~

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with ~~Juana Castro Ruz, half sister of Fidel and Raúl Castro Ruz~~, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Mrs. Virginia Leitão ~~de Cinha~~, she contacted ~~Ruz~~ and obtained ~~Ruz~~ agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm ~~to her brothers Raúl and Fidel~~". Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of ~~Ruz~~ in Mexico.

SOURCE:

Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re:
~~Juana Castro Ruz~~, 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF:

di Genova
 July 1, 1975

<u>DA HAS NO OBJECTION TO CLASSIFICATION AND DA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DISSEMINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT</u>		<u>DATE:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<u>PERSONAL TIES:</u>	<u>KIRKPATRICK</u>	<u>14 Nov. 1962</u>	<u>Special Group Augmented</u>
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	DUP Mr. Halpern <u>CHEEVERS</u>	Nov. 21, 1962	Operation Mongoose
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>14 Nov. 1962</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<p>With regard to paragraph 1 of paragraph 1 of memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had no information on this operation since early October was patently false." Specific references made to the penultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever, which is referred specifically in paragraph 1 of memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and Lansdale and recall very clearly that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place at the beginning of the discussion of previous operations which is reflected in paragraph 1 of memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and Matahambre operations. According to Cheever's recollection, any specific question concerning assets available for future operations which would logically have led to the discussion of the Matahambre operation."</p>			
<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>FILED:</u>	<u>Harvey</u>	<u>DATE:</u>
<p>Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (011818) FBI - Washington, D.C.</p>			
<p>DA HAS NO OBJECTION TO CLASSIFICATION AND DA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DISSEMINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT</p>			
<p>DATE: July 1, 1975</p>			

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

14-4-94 O (s)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	CATEGORIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	KIRKPATRICK DDP Mr. Halpern CHFEVER	Nov. 21, 1962 O (s) 10/30/63 10/30/63	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cobra SGA dated 14 Nov. SGA dated 11 Oct.
OCCURRENCE:	With regard to paragraph 21 of memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962, Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had been undertaken since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 20 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 7 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recall that he had no information on conversation with Lansdale on this date. We discussed at length the operations which during this conversation there was no discussion concerning assets or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."	Nov. 21, 1962 10/30/63	SGA dated 14 Nov. SGA dated 11 Oct.
SOURCE:	Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01155) FILE:	Harvey Lansdale Elder	SGA dated 14 Nov. SGA dated 11 Oct.

MEMORANDUM TO
RELEASER OF THIS DOCUMENT

DATE: July 1, 1975

14-4-94 O (s)

REASON: With regard to paragraph 21 of memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962, Harvey states that the statement that Operation Mongoose had been undertaken since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 20 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recall that he had no information on conversation with Lansdale on this date. We discussed at length the operations which during this conversation there was no discussion concerning assets or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

REASON: With regard to paragraph 21 of memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962, Harvey states that the statement that Operation Mongoose had been undertaken since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 20 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recall that he had no information on conversation with Lansdale on this date. We discussed at length the operations which during this conversation there was no discussion concerning assets or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

REASON: With regard to paragraph 21 of memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962, Harvey states that the statement that Operation Mongoose had been undertaken since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 20 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recall that he had no information on conversation with Lansdale on this date. We discussed at length the operations which during this conversation there was no discussion concerning assets or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

REASON: With regard to paragraph 21 of memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962, Harvey states that the statement that Operation Mongoose had been undertaken since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 20 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recall that he had no information on conversation with Lansdale on this date. We discussed at length the operations which during this conversation there was no discussion concerning assets or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

CHANGES MADE TO THIS DOCUMENT
DO NOT AFFECT THIS DOCUMENT

AS SHOWN
14-4-75
(S)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY, William ✓
Chief, FI Staff, CIA
QJWIN

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

DATES:

27 June 1963

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, CIA stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41) ~~was terminated by~~

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

WILLIAMS, ✓
FI Staff, CIA

OCCURRENCE:

WILLIAMS writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, CIA stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41) ~~was terminated by~~

STAFF: Baron
DATE: 28.6.75
FILE:

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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AS SANITIZED
14-4-75
(S)

DATE:

14-4-75
(S)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SUBMITTED

74-V-44

Q)(p)

KING, J. C. *HARVEY*
EDWARDS
 IG REPORT
 BISSELL
 HALPERN

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of NH Division, and by Col. J. C. King, former Chief of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Alfonso Rodriguez, Sidney Gottlieb, John Warner, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortman, Richard Oberholser, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Stephen Edwards, Richard Edwards, Lawrence Houston, John Warner, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortman, Richard Oberholser, John Warner, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortman, Richard Oberholser.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

STATES:

May 23, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

CASTRO

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of NH Division, and by Col. J. C. King, former Chief of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Alfonso Rodriguez, Sidney Gottlieb, John Warner, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortman, Richard Oberholser, John Warner, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortman, Richard Oberholser, John Warner, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortman, Richard Oberholser.

~~TOP SECRET~~
 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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CATEGORIES:

STAFF:
 DATE: 7/2/75

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

~~TOP SECRET~~

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RESONENTIES:

Harvey, Jim
Gunn, Dr. Edward

~~RESONENTIES~~ the memorandum of April 15, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plots in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of Mr. William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services); and, brief records of ~~General~~ [REDACTED] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used. Some operational files relied upon by the Inspector General's office were also used. Some operational files relied upon by the Inspector General's office were also used.

For the most part, the Inspector General's report was as follows: "We interviewed everyone whom we could find who was likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. DUBBS and GENERAL CABELL." (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could find who was likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Mr. DUBBS and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant inaccuracies in the sequence of events, they are most likely to occur in family order." (3)

SOURCE:

16 Report 10/67

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

DATES:

1967

CONVENTIONAL

W.M. HARVEY

Baron

RESONENTIES: That the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of Mr. William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services); and, brief records of ~~General~~ [REDACTED] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used. Some operational files relied upon by the Inspector General's office were also used.

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AS SANITIZED

14-4294
(1)(A)

RESONENTIES:

CASTRO

DATES:

1967

CONVENTIONAL

W.M. HARVEY

Baron

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Edwards	Gomez
King	Holcomb ✓
Bannerman	O'Connell

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not ~~witting~~ of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or Holcomb knew (100).

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Edwards	Gomez
Bannerman	Holcomb ✓
	O'Connell

JURIDICENCE:
O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not ~~witting~~ of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100).

CATEGORIES:

Castro

DATES:

11/62

DATE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not ~~witting~~ of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100).

CATEGORIES:

Castro

STARF:

John Bayly

DATE:

5/30/75

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14-47
O
STAFF
DATE:

AS SANITIZED
John Bayly
5/30/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

14-4-94
(U)(B)

law

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
HOUSTON	'50-'60 '60's <i>assume mid date</i>	Castro
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		
Houston testified that he cannot remember that his legal advice as to not continuing a project was ever rejected by CIA, (47) although Houston recalls vetoing two propositions: one concerning personnel for refueling [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]		

Houston testified that he cannot remember that his legal advice as to not continuing a project was ever rejected by CIA, (47) although Houston recalls vetoing two propositions: one concerning personnel for refueling [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted]

HUR GLA

<u>SOURCE:</u> Testimony of Lawrence Houston, 6/2/75	<u>STAFF:</u> John Bayly
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/30/75

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED~~

14-4-94
(u)(b)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BUNDY COL. KING
KILPATRICK
MCCONE
HUGHES ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On June 20, 1963 the Special Group approved a CIA paper dated June 1970 regarding political action in [Haita]. (The substance of the paper is not expressed). "Mr. MCCONE said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for [DUVALIER] but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent [DUVALIER] eventually going very far to the left." KING... said that in his opinion, we have no feasible alternatives to cooperate with [DUVALIER] in attempting to unseat [DUVALIER]...

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

DATES: June 20, 1963 DUVALIER
Special Group

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COL. KING

DUVALIER
Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On June 20, 1963 the Special Group approved a CIA paper dated June 1970 regarding additional action in [Haita]. (The substance of the paper is not expressed). "Mr. [DUVALIER] said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for [DUVALIER] but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent [DUVALIER] eventually going very far to the left." KING... said that in his opinion, we have no feasible alternatives to cooperate with [DUVALIER] in attempting to unseat [DUVALIER]..."

June 20, 1963

DUVALIER
Special Group

TOP SECRET

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED~~

14-4-94
(u)(b)

CATEGORIES:

JUNE 20, 1963

DUVALIER
Special Group

SOURCE:
FILE:
DATE:

Kelley
6/28/75

TOP SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS DRAFTED
IV-4-94

(C)(A)

CATEGORIES:

SCA
MURKIN
CASTRO

~~TOP SECRET~~

RE: CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS DRAFTED
IV-4-94

see

Barros, 8/19/94

DATE:

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES
BUNDY	PAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE
JESSUP	RFK	
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE	
JMWAVE	VANCE	

DATES:

7/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

RE: CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS DRAFTED
IV-4-94

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 503 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact MR. PAPICH of the FBI, in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro, and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, CIA, which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nazi Security Affairs, SCA, Sact. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI, DDCI and the SEC. The 6/10/64 report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme. The asking price was \$150,000. [REDACTED] SCARIO, PEPIN, [REDACTED] [REDACTED], [REDACTED] would contribute \$50,000. [REDACTED] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. [REDACTED] was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to furnish information concerning its existence.

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rep. J. R. Gandy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI interviews with the [REDACTED] last record of [REDACTED] reporting the results of FBI interviews with the [REDACTED] nothing came of the plot." (117)

FILE:

~~TOP SECRET~~

NW 50955 DocID:32203774

7/1/75

GA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS BOUNDARY
(117)
(J/M)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES
BUNDY	OPAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE
JESSUP	RFK	
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE	
JMWAVE	VANCE	

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MEWDOSE
CASTRO

DATE:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

JUZNIAK
WP 100
SK
JMWAVE

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "it was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP (the Director, FBI) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs; Director, for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; OSA and the DDCI. The 6/10/64 information report stated a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The asking price was \$150,000. The source also indicated that the plot was to be carried out by CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot.

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG file, reporting the results of FBI liaison with the alleged participants of the plot. (117)

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "it was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP (the Director, FBI) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs; Director, for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; OSA and the DDCI. The 6/10/64 information report stated a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The asking price was \$150,000. The source also indicated that the plot was to be carried out by CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot.

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG file, reporting the results of FBI liaison with the alleged participants of the plot. (117)

FILE:

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "it was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP (the Director, FBI) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs; Director, for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; OSA and the DDCI. The 6/10/64 information report stated a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The asking price was \$150,000. The source also indicated that the plot was to be carried out by CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot.

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG file, reporting the results of FBI liaison with the alleged participants of the plot. (117)

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "it was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP (the Director, FBI) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs; Director, for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; OSA and the DDCI. The 6/10/64 information report stated a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The asking price was \$150,000. The source also indicated that the plot was to be carried out by CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot.

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG file, reporting the results of FBI liaison with the alleged participants of the plot. (117)

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "it was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP (the Director, FBI) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affairs; Director, for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; OSA and the DDCI. The 6/10/64 information report stated a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The asking price was \$150,000. The source also indicated that the plot was to be carried out by CIA's only involvement was to provide information to the plot.

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG file, reporting the results of FBI liaison with the alleged participants of the plot. (117)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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AS BANISHED

Ag-4-474
(u)(e)

CATEGORIES:

SCA
MCCARTHY
CASTRO

DATES:

7/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

~~TOP SECRET~~

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES
BUNDY	OPAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE
JESSUP	RFK	
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE	
JMWAVE	VANCE	

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JK

JK
REPORT

REMARKS: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "it was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact MR. PAPICH concerning the 303 Committee's report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) "The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, FBI, which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat'l. Security Affairs; Asst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intel. and Research; Director, CIA; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the PG." It was made clear that the plot was made by prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia apparently had no role in the plot. The asking price was \$150,000. The CIA approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute \$10,000. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report to the AG on the existence of the plot." (117)

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IC Agent, 1967, is dated 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI interviews with the participants of the plot. There is no record of the results of the investigation.

FILE: 144-1175

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS BANISHED

Ag-4-474
(u)(e)

7/1/75

THIS HAS NO SECTION ON
CLASSIFICATION AND/OR
DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SHOWN
N.Y. (NYC)

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongomery

DATES:

14 Nov 1962 - 21 Nov 1962
10 Oct 1962 - 30 Oct 1962

SOURCE:

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (010014)
FILE: T-1
as Harvey
ansdale
Elder

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

William Harvey
Gen. Lansdale
Walter Elder
DCI

KIRKPATRICK
DDP
Mr. Halpern
CHEEVER

DATE(S):

Nov. 21, 1962

Oct. 30, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongomery

Cuban

Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongomery had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the penultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum dated 31 Oct 1962 concerning the COBRA operation between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 of the above memorandum, is reflected in my recollection of this conversation." I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of operations and Lansdale and Cheever, as basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct 1962, is reflected in my reference memorandum. Any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussion concerning the Matahambre operation."

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (010014)
FILE: T-1
as Harvey
ansdale
Elder
DATE: July 1, 1975

THIS HAS NO SECTION ON
CLASSIFICATION AND/OR
DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SHOWN
N.Y. (NYC)

Paul Wallach
DATE: July 1,

REASON: NO OBJECTION TO
CLASSIFICATION AND/OR
DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SHOWN
N.Y. (NYC)