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8 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report on Meeting with AMERUNG-1 201-270613

1. On 5 November at 1130 hours, AMERUNG-1 and WINCEKER were met at the Washington Airport by undersigned. They were then taken by taxi to the Mayflower Hotel, where a room had been reserved ... for their use. After having lunch at the hotel, the party adjourned to the room, where AMERUNG-1 was given a short briefing on Francisco ⁰³ Castell, the W/T operator who was scheduled to meet AMERUNG-1 at 1400 hours.

2. At 1400 hours, the undersigned ⁰³ went to the lobby of the hotel where Francisco was waiting with Ray Garcia, his escort officer. ⁰³ Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco up to the room. It was agreed in advance of this that all principals would withdraw from the room to give AMERUNG-1 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone. However, it was suggested that Garcia return a half hour before the interview was terminated to clear up any points as to the nature of Francisco's training, or any aspects that AMERUNG-1 might wish to clarify. The interview with Francisco was terminated about 1510 hours, as AMERUNG-1 stated he would be pleased to have Francisco assigned to him. All indications were that a happy rapport was established between the principals and a complete understanding was reached as to the future role of Francisco as the W/T operator for the ANTON group in Cuba.

3. At approximately 1535 hours, ⁰³ Andy Rogers put in his appearance at the room and was introduced to AMERUNG-1 as Mr. Rodrick. Prior to this meeting, AMERUNG-1 was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator for operations and would like to discuss some of the more specific aspects with him, prior to his return to Cuba. Cecil Cartwright, who ⁰¹ had escorted AMERUNG-1 to Washington, asked to sit in on this meeting along with Peters and Rogers, as he felt that MASH should be fully informed on whatever operational matters were discussed with AMERUNG-1 for more effective future coordination between Headquarters and MASH. ⁰³ Rogers indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have him sit in at this meeting.

4. In substance, ⁰² Rogers covered most of the highlights dealing with previous attempts to supply the ANTON group with arms and ammo, and air-maritime operations currently being planned. In this connection, AMERUNG-1 was highly pleased to learn that a 1,000 pound

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shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and again urged that more such shipments should be stepped up in the future. 03 [Rogers] then briefly discussed the SINGA operation and asked AMENG-1 if he didn't think this area for the EE was already "blown" due to the number of people who already knew of his operation. (This includes 5 other people besides AMENG-1 and AMENG-1.) AMENG-1 stated he was not sure, but would investigate this upon his return. However, he felt that this was an excellent EE site and should be utilized for any subsequent airdrop scheduled in the Pinar del Rio province. 03 [Rogers] informed AMENG-1 that his overlays on various LZ's and EE's had been received and were being reviewed by the operations people. He complimented AMENG-1 on the excellent work of his cartographer and expressed the view that these EE areas would be put to good use. Finally, he assured AMENG-1 that no stone is being left unturned to provide his group with the necessary material support which is critically needed and that this support will be stepped up as our infiltration capabilities are increased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned AMENG-1 not to take any unnecessary chances when he resumed operational activities in Cuba, since his leadership in the AMENG group was vital to our overall interests. The meeting was terminated about 1720 hours as [Rogers] and Peters took their departure. 03

5. Some of the more significant highlights of the conversations which took place between AMENG-1 and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the W/T operator (Francisco) and [Rogers] are noted herewith:

- a. Security: Castro has taken stringent action in tightening up his internal security against counter-revolutionary forces inside Cuba. The militia are being used to search houses for concealed weapons (usually by a block system), and anyone failing to produce proper identification is removed for questioning by the DIER. Hence, AMENG-1 and his organization are largely confining their activities to the daylight hours from 0700 to 2000 hours. He considers night operations - particularly on the streets of Havana - as highly dangerous inasmuch as the DIER (security organs) are constantly on the alert to stop individuals on the street to check their identification documents.
- b. Documentation of Agents in Cuba: AMENG-1 suggested using an identification card issued by the Havana University for their students. He had a sample copy in his possession, which he claims was readily accepted by Castro security forces as being valid. Similarly, a driver's license properly authenticated along with a health certificate were considered to be good "cover" documents for agents operating in the Havana area. A supply of blank identification cards will be turned over to the Station by AMENG-1 for transmittal to headquarters for any subsequent documentation of

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agents who can be passed off as students at the Havana University. (He suggested preparing one for his W/T operator (Francisco).

- c. Operational Expenditures: Queried on this aspect, AMUNG-1 stated his organization would need a minimum of 50 to 60,000 pesos a month to cover their overall operational expenses. These funds are being used for safehouse maintenance, travel expenses, purchase of vehicles and gasoline, allocation of funds to various sub-divisions of the AMUN organization located in various provinces of Cuba, and purchase of food and support of various agents whose families may be in dire need of food and medical supplies.
- d. W/T operators: To date, both AMPANIC-14 and ANGLEN-1 have not met the requirements for effective communication with us on AMUN operations. However, AMUNG-1 feels that AMPANIC-14 has not been compromised or turned by the DIRM and once he gets over his nervous state, it is possible he can still be used. Similarly, although ANGLEN-1 is considered to be a good W/T operator, AMUNG-1 feels his usefulness to him has been considerably negated by the nature of his assignment at the Naval base and his recent restrictions to this base by orders of the Castro regime. In short, AMUNG-1 feels communication is the weakest link in his current operations and that direct communications with the Embassy is growing increasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy personnel are under close surveillance by the Castro security forces. For this reason he feels that Francisco will fill a serious void in this respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMUN organization in Cuba.
- e. Support for other anti-Castro groups in Cuba: AMUNG-1 stated that all materiel support should be funneled directly to his organization for distribution to other anti-Castro groups in Cuba. In his view this would serve as a control factor in unifying the overall effort of the various splinter groups seeking such support in Cuba and could also enhance the prestige of the MRR as the spearhead for the FRENTE. He then went on to add that he was fully aware of our efforts to support other groups in Cuba, which he assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis. (i.e., he cited Nino Diaz in Oriente). AMUNG-1 felt this was a serious mistake, as this unilateral support would affect the leadership and direction now being provided by the MRR throughout Cuba. The undersigned told AMUNG-1 that he agreed on the desirability of a coordinated effort on the part of all counter-revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rallying center. However, the question of support being directed through one channel namely: his organization in Cuba, was neither feasible nor practical. The fact that Castro had tightened up security throughout the various provinces of Cuba, would make it difficult or impossible for the AMUN group to ship arms and other equipment from Havana to the eastern coast provinces (i.e., Las

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Villas, Camagüey or Oriente) without jeopardizing both shipments and personnel. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our part to supply these fighting groups in these provinces. This explanation appeared to satisfy AMRONG-1, however he still insisted that his organization should at least be appraised of any materiel support provided other groups in Cuba. He was assured that we would take his request under consideration.

- f. AMBIDEX-1: AMRONG-1 feels that no useful purpose would be served in sending his associate to join forces with him in Havana. He feels that AMBIDEX-1 should continue to represent the ANYUM faction in the FRD and when the counter-revolutionary forces are fully prepared to overthrow the Castro regime, AMBIDEX-1 will be brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the ANYUM forces in this province.
- g. Manolo Ray: AMRONG-1 considers RAY as a highly dangerous individual because of his great ambition to play a prominent role in any subsequent Cuban government following the overthrow of the Castro regime. In his opinion, RAY poses a serious threat to VARENA's leadership and the FRD inside Cuba. He is attempting to draw various dissident groups to his banners and appears to have support from the middle class represented by business interests, politicians, and the professional class. Should RAY be persuaded to join forces with the FRD, AMRONG-1 thinks he will continue to operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede the FRD with his own organization in Cuba.
- h. Tony Varona and the FRD: Although AMRONG-1 recognizes the need to support the FRD as a political front for rallying counter-revolutionary groups against the Castro regime, he nonetheless feels that the FRENTE and Tony VARENA have lost considerable face in Cuba by inaction and political maneuvering. He further pointed out that he is aware that thousands of dollars had been poured into the FRENTE, but dissident groups in Cuba have seen no evidence of any of this money to support their efforts to overthrow Castro. Hence, confidence in the FRD is at a relatively low ebb among the people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel and financial support is needed to restore this confidence. According to AMRONG-1 this support must be forthcoming soon because such people as Manolo RAY are taking the initiative and will soon control the entire counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba.

John D. Peters

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