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II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Introduction

From the CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection handling of NOSENKO from February 1964 to date. The rest of Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.

B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him by sight from conference meetings, approached U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. In the late afternoon of 6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he would like to talk to him privately as soon as possible. He told MARK that he was "not going to pump him for information, but simply wanted to tell him some things." A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although the Soviet clearly preferred an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet delegation to the arms talks.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of 1962, was "near ciphers" in the Washington area; the second was the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Although NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and professional past. MARK explained that although he was not an intelligence officer, he could place NOSENKO in contact with the Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that evening, and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB Major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA

Another Soviet source, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ has also reported that the KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer; although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a number of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

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A. Earlier information on NOSENKO in Geneva

NOSENKO's name first came to the attention of CIA in October 1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delegation. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba. There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in Geneva in March 1962, he was accorded no more than the interest routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the West German services.

The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. According to the secretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Ministry of Shipping. He himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO also told her that he was acquainted with [redacted] of the [redacted] publishing house in London.** When NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland, and later resigned from the Foreign Office.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.

*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) concerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in those reports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.

**[redacted] was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his contacts with [redacted] and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of [redacted])

this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip they wanted to have a chief of section because of the seriousness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the assignment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU."

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was questioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S. TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers:

A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a [redacted] double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO included GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an officer of the Intelligence and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-Scandinavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILATOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and stated that he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."

NOSENKO was also requested during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a permanent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drinking. (See Part V.E.4.a.)

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't separate these tasks."

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier investigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations Department of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these preparations provided the basis for the questioning which followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before.

Question: When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin?

NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Resident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow. After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was considered he must be the Resident in Geneva. All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him.

Question: What about the report?

NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry

*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow, although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October 1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was the only one he cited.

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Case Officer: You know that I would not bring any pressure. That's something we understand because we are both in this business. You and I are in the same business, so you can't--

NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so now? So that I will say something more to you. I said: 'Let's meet again.' Maybe I will tell [more]. Now I will give you only these two items because we have made a deal. I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know.

Case Officer: That's all right.

NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must understand me. This has not come to me simply. I had time to think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. And after I go it will also be very difficult for me.

Case Officer: But you knew that when you came. Why did you come to us? Why to the American residentura [CIA Station] and not to the British?

NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong... You don't have to explain to me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't refuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people].

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell; the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases.

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent record of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you something. But not today. I can tell how LANGELE blew POPOV--not LANGELE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELE was not guilty. It was not LANGELE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."

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GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands.)

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO stated that it was his close relationship with M.S. TSYMBAL* which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "According to the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAVRICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relationship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL "sort of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said: 'You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at the same time) who gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome. NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Directorate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for some reason. We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,' and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to be doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, come on, stop in.' But I

* TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias "ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that TSYMBAL was Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief Directorate.

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The Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in a car accident.* Two more days passed without Soviet authorities making any additional public or private statements on the subject. Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's defection are presented below in chronological order:

8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days.

9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.

A U. S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to

Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until 1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February. Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine precedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning of 10 February.

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H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed disbelief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or anywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSENKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would

* Only once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under KGB control.

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

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2. ~~Source~~ source

At the time of NOSENKO's defection, ~~Source~~ told CIA in 1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the NOSENKO case and partly for other reasons not specified to ~~Source~~. One of his handlers informed ~~Source~~ that the NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the KGB was on a "major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been halted to make readjustments.

3. ~~Source~~ source

In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, ~~Source~~ reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. ~~Source~~ also reported that the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to ~~Source~~ that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK, said ~~Source~~, who had known and reported on GUK for years, was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G. KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the defection.)

* MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said ~~Source~~ to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. ~~Source~~ identified MEDVEDEV, then a Counselor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, "but his role is not important and he works mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

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service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.* NOSENKO told his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had two daughters.

D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported and other portions contradicted by the statements of several Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with reference to other aspects of the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who later went to the U.S. Embassy after his defection) include a reference to one of the daughters as his "double" and two other personal letters in his possession at the time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and G. I. DUCHKOV, referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.

- A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. TULAYEV later told the agent that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**

- A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALIV, said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and was "famous for his character."

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO in 1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved, however, differs from NOSENKO's.)

sensitive source

- [redacted] reported NOSENKO is the son of a former Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot himself to avoid going to the front with the rest of his class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his father's influence avoided damage to his career. *sensitive*

source

[redacted] from conversations with fellow officers [redacted] He has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.

* FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part V.D.5.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.

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sensitive source

- [REDACTED] said that when NOSENKO was a young man, he attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent a short time, perhaps a year, in the Information Department at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO had been a "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," [REDACTED] continued, and he was discharged from the GRU. However, his father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [REDACTED] said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) in Moscow.

- The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV and ROSENAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was "closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families, and homes" and that his "father who died several years ago was an important official in the Party and state organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENAL also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's wife and daughters.

source

- [REDACTED] said she heard from her KGB friend V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was Jewish and "was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She could not explain this connection other than to say that all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either officers or "relatives" of the KGB.)

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