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In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Philippine Affairs (SSC) published their Final Report (Book II) which in essence faulted the CPB and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the existing government in Cuba and its attempt on the life of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~president~~ <sup>President</sup> Fidel Castro. The Committee's statement is ~~found~~ on pages 6-7 of its Final Report but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CPB officials who should have realized that their agency was not fulfilling its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They <sup>P7</sup> <sup>Book II</sup> ~~have~~ <sup>have</sup> ~~realized~~ that CPB operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they failed to hire subordinates to conduct an ~~inquiry~~ <sup>inquiry</sup> without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPB had no

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existence of a foreign conspiracy?

Spurred by the Senate criticism and the "reveling effect" that book ~~of the~~ occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency the critical questions posed in the SSC Final Report. However even the <sup>CIA's</sup> 1977 Report failed to recognize the inadequacy of the CIA's response to the Warren Commission's quest for all <sup>possible</sup> relevant information. [ "Relevancy" is of course the "bugwood" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position of the anti-Castro plots to the communists' work.] On page 10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that; "

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement <sup>SECRET</sup> because of <sup>the</sup> <sup>possible</sup> <sup>possibility</sup> (JFK) because of tensions of the time.

The Agency should have

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P10  
117 ~~red~~  
Report taken broader in its terms than,  
as well."

It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CDTA with regard to the significance <sup>the work of the various committees</sup> of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts and to resolve <sup>the parties</sup> ~~the~~ controversy as to <sup>the operations</sup> importance. ~~rather~~ Instead this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all the facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized Cuban involvement or potential involvement in CDTA operations against Cuba during 1960-63. Certain influences and conclusions ~~will~~ will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivation of ~~the~~ <sup>of the</sup> ~~participants~~ participants in the operations.

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Development of Dreyfus' Mine in  
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the ~~use~~ <sup>utilization</sup> of the United States command syndicate of the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is ~~as~~ <sup>in</sup> the 1967 Director Annual Report as occurs during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~the~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheppard Edwards.

[1967 FBIS p. 1; DIA Annual Rep of 74, Sec 2001, p. 3] Edwards assigned the specific task of creating the right just to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahan who had been previously utilized by the Agency in several ~~secret~~ cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

[Mahan's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Enkum Report]

Although Mahan and O'Connell differ <sup>0002181</sup> as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahan and Rosselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1968 [DIA Annual Report pp 74-75]

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[Comment: Mahan sees the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Rosseli for several reasons. In an office of Jerry's file on Ed Morgan, Makin's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the Mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Makin advised that he had met one John Rosseli on several occasions while very far legs. He only knew him usually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice making machine on the Strip! Makin believed that, if Rosseli was in fact a member of the crew, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling joints."

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Comment

Confirmation of the earliest Makin-Rosseli contact is found in Rosseli's FBI file and consists of an illegal telephone call in 1959. [See Rosseli from Makin to Rosseli *wiring*]

Comment

Makin and Rosseli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950, including Hank Kinsman, editor of the *Las Vegas Sun*.

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Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maher and Connell to discuss further details.

L Tenth Report p76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov 1970.

Although the Projector General Report places the meeting at the Plaza Hotel on 14 September 1960, Roselli recalled that the ~~secret~~ discussions took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment:

[P.3] Tony de la Torre admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or L Tenth Report of de la Torre, that his visit had an assassination motivation.

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the DCT, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maher) to a friend, "Sam Gold", who knew the Cuban crowd".

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Frank Casha~~ (Gold) and Traficant ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the MAF in the Castro assassination plots. Lund

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to the 1967 F.B.I. Report, the ~~extram~~  
of Biancana took place<sup>in</sup> during the  
week of 25 September 1960. ....  
[ 1967 I.B. Report, p18 ]

In contrast, the SSC Inform  
Report at p.76, does not ~~find~~  
~~for~~ Biancana's initial appearance ~~but~~  
~~it was~~ "certainly prior to October  
18." (p76) because of conflicting  
~~testimony~~ evidence between the  
1967 I.B. September date and Mahan  
Senate testimony which set the meeting  
in November 1960. As a compromise, the  
Inform Report reasoned that Biancana  
had been introduced to the Mahan  
"prior to October 18" because (1) the  
Las Vegas wiring occurred on October  
30, 1960; and (2) the DDP Bissell had  
received an FBI memo dated 18 October  
1960 which revealed an FBI PLSAR  
questioning Biancana as to his/her  
involvement in an assassination  
plot against Castro. (FBI memo, dated  
18 Oct 1960 from Horatio Bissell, Inform  
Report, p79)

[ Comment: 0002184 ]

Each of the dual reasons listed in the  
Inform Report on p 77 are subject to  
critical analysis which will be  
dealt with ~~singularly~~ ~~below~~ below.

[ Comment: SECRET ]

Although the 1967 I.B. Report stated

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that "Mahan pointed out "bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "bold" or Joe", the Inform Report disputes COR this observation by apposite quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support brief, who was using the name "Tom Icks," said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then only briefly. S.O.C. 5730/75, pp. 26-27; Inform Rep't p. 7.

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Comment

~~Comment~~ Several conflicts appear also on ~~the~~ of many minor points concerning the September 1968 meeting in N.Y. and Miami. For instance:

- 1) Did Rosseli know from the beginning that ~~that~~ the squadron was C.I.A.?
- a) O'Connell stated that Mahan told Rosseli that they were representing international business interests whereas Rosseli testified that Mahan told him that O'Connell was C.I.A. (Inform Rep't p. 20 Abs. footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Rosseli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Faraona, that "I am not bidding to whom will you work for".

The importance of Rosseli's recognition of C.I.A. ~~as~~ SECRET is that it is doubtful if Faraona and Trappetto

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could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

3) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some American interests of Wall Street that had nickel interests and properties around Cuba... (Roselli; 4/24/75 pp 9,17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 17, 1971, which stated that, (4) Could the plot against Castro have backfired against J. F. Kennedy? .... "None of the assassin teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA investigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings".  
Tyndall's source for this attack were Roselli and ~~and~~ William Harry, who was not party to the details of Phase I, it is another ~~example~~ <sup>which was</sup> of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Tyndall version which all purport to depend, in major degree, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged "~~surprise~~" discovery by Maher and O'Conor as to the ~~present~~ identification of "Sam bold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~the~~ although it is

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Possible that the Senate Committee  
staff overlooked the ~~other~~ Miami newspaper  
Sunday supplement (Pacifist) which purportedly  
indicated existence of Korman  
and Tippman's ~~secret~~ ~~confidential~~  
showing Mahan and O'Connell ~~etc.~~ ~~etc.~~ the  
nature of the people with whom  
they were dealing. It is a relatively  
easy matter to research Pacifist  
Magazine for the months of October  
and November. It would appear  
that ~~etc.~~ O'Connell and Mahan  
were looking for an ~~etc.~~ post  
facto reason for continuing  
the operation after the introduction  
of two of the top Mafia in the  
United States. O'Connell justified that  
his discovery was after "we  
were up to our ears in it" which  
is difficult to fathom since the operation  
was in the embryonic stage and no  
file was delivered to Rosseli et al  
until approximately March 1941, therefore the  
reason, the Senate staff insists it could not fail the Pacifist staff. *In turn down*  
*Q77.F4 I*

The principle in Please D of  
the operation ~~etc.~~ also disagree  
as to the roles which were  
to be played by both "Bob" and Joe  
in Please the pre-buy of pigs  
phase of the operation.

"Although Mahan described  
Korman as playing a "key" role,

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0002189 (Mahm, 7/29/75, p.34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the mission"; Rosseli downplayed Broncoeur's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Rosseli 6/24/75, p.15) ~~All of the information also~~

In either Rosseli received a "warning" from Broncoeur's murder four days before Rosseli's Senate appearance is open for question. T. Rosseli's characterization of Broncoeur's role as minor ~~is~~ is in contrast to his alleged ~~recruitment of~~ Broncoeur's "knowledge of the Cuban world" which the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recited.

Trafficanato's involvement in Phase I is even more furnished by the available evidence. The 1967 FBI Report and Senate Inform Report ~~also~~ states that "Gold" identified "Joe" to Mahm as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there" (ibid. p.19; Inform Report, p.775). To support the description of Trafficanato as a courier, the ~~1967 FBI Report~~ Inform Report quotes p.19 of the 1967 FBI Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficanato was making regular trips between Miami and Havana." In syndicate business

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0002150 Comment ~~partially~~

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government <sup>of other agencies</sup> records. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traficante applied for a passport <sup>in Cuba</sup> on October 7, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 1, 1960.

(See Traficante file, State Dept.) ~~None~~ ~~None~~ No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or F B I record any later 1960 handle even though the Bureau ~~and~~ maintained diligent surveillance on Traficante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Traficante recalled ~~remembered~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months of his release <sup>from prison</sup>. Testimony, pg 4-53, Oct 1970 His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the mid-1960's, ad law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~visiting~~ during the pre-Playboy Piggy period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Rosseli; however, Traficante role had diminished to a point

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even below Gracanica, he had been reduced<sup>from "courier"</sup> to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate contact between Rosseli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. In turn, Traficante and Rosseli 1975 and 1977 congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~of~~ facts as they were being reported in 1963 by the ~~of~~ Times.

### Comment

The Senate testimony of Rosseli and Traficante needs to be outlined ~~especially to~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier or interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not rigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the assets had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Army took the simplest, straight forward approach of shortening Castro but this plan was rejected

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by Bimcana. In a Comment  
to its 1967 Report, the Inspector  
General noted that "Bimcana  
was flatly opposed to the use  
of firearms. He said that no one  
could be recruited to do the job  
because the chance of survival  
and escape would be negligible.  
Bimcana stated a preference for  
lethal pills that could be put  
into Castro's food and drink.  
Traffanted Joe (the courier) was  
~~in~~ in touch with a ~~dead~~  
~~dead~~ ~~dead~~ speed with access to  
Castro Park presumably of a sort  
that would enable him to  
superficially poison Castro. The  
gangster named their man  
inside as Juan Orta who was  
then office chief and Director General  
of the Office of the Prime Minister  
Castro. The gangster said that  
Orta had once been in a position  
to receive kickbacks from the  
gangster officials but had since  
lost that source of money and  
needed the money. [F-B Report, 825]

#### Comment

The observations of the 1967 F-B  
Report ~~are~~ are ~~not~~ extremely significant  
in several respects. First, the poison  
pill of ~~most~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> grand robbery  
with Bimcana, not the Agency; a point

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which is crucial to the final conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trujillo is identified as ~~possibly~~ having access to and providing the assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his self-savory role as captain of "Mr. Fletcher". His ability to recruit ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> opponent ~~as~~ was directly tied to his of former gamblers empire associations which formed a constant pattern for ~~Trujillo~~ both during and after his Cuban days. (See Trujillo profile.)

### Comment

note

Speculation concerning Fidel's role during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, carrying Frank Stugis, written by Paul Marshall of the New York Daily News. Stugis was quoted as saying, "The Third Commission scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the same minister's office," Stugis said, "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Mota. I recruited him to work with the Embassy - [SECRET] American Embassy in Havana]. What was his family to the

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writer of the 1977 Report was the fact that Ota's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassin plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Trujillanos and with a "family partner" of Trujillanos, Norman Rottemer (See ~~rottemer~~ Rotter). Coupled with Stugis' other relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~the~~ insinuating the family members of Castro or Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an outlet with Ota in relay family high tech.

A second aspect of Maskil's ~~news~~ news series concerned a claim by Mauta Jorong that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1965 in attempting to poison Castro who were failed with the 18 October 1965 FBI memorandum of conversational electronically surveilled curricula in which he stated that "he was drunk and annoyed with a girl, not further described, to drop a <sup>SECRET</sup> pill <sup>SECRET</sup> some drink or food of Castro." (MMS, Horns to DCISAB, DDCI/MIA, 1965)

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The sentence continues above  
in the 1972 Report as follows:

(b) It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be devised, none of least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities.

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own ~~uniting~~ prior to CDTI informant in late 1970. Also, could have been Agency when CDTA caught them in 1962 but
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News ~~shown~~ in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis has not been a USAID agent. He probably knew Ota in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Ota arrived north of Mexico.

If there was an earlier operator w/ Ota, it was not CDTI; it would have been earlier operator of syndicate. Sturgis would have known or been involved in syndicate operations or gained info gossip ~~from~~ from in 1965 off ~~the~~ with USAID.

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Neither the 1967 T-6 Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency passed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Rosseli [Interim Report, p80]. The chain of custody, according to the 1967 T-6 Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal pills to be delivered from Rosseli to Trujillo. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Rosseli reports to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Pata in Cuba in late February - early March 1961. [Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 80]

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon ~~which~~ whose story was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Foundation Hotel in Miami on March 12, 1961 attended by "Mahan, Rosseli, Trujillo, and the Cuban". [Interim Rpt p 13] Shimon's ~~version~~ ~~the~~ story is filled with ~~the~~ detail which are documented on p 52 of the report, but his credibility as subject to serious question as his ~~version~~ ~~the~~ not shared by anyone else connected with the plan ~~and~~ nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Rosselli, broncana, or Trafficante  
appear as "coy" as he would  
lead one to believe.

The real problem with Shimoni's  
story is that the will was  
returned to the CJA for a  
few weeks because CJA could  
not would not, attempt the  
joining; a fact apparently  
unknown to Shimoni before  
his "leads" to Brodman and his  
Senate testimony.

## Comment

One additional fact concerning  
Orta's inability to carry out the  
mission lies in with the final thesis  
of this report. Orta "lost his  
position in Castro's office on  
20 January 1961, while ~~he~~ planning for  
the operation was still going on  
in Miami and Washington."

It would seem though, that the  
gangster did know that Eta had  
already lost his access to Castro  
(~~1967~~ 1968 Report p.27)

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With the failure of Onstar  
0002199 to produce the desired results,

the project was at a standstill.  
Until, once again, Santos Taaffe was  
assured command. Rosselle told  
Taaffe that "Taaffeante believed  
a certain leading figure in  
the Cuban exile movement ~~that~~ might  
be able to accomplish the assassination  
[Foot 1967 DO LPT, P 29; DIA LPT p8]

### Comment:

The exile leader was, of course  
Tony de la Guardia, ~~the~~ ~~who~~  
~~who~~ was the subject of speculation  
in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961  
accusing him of receiving financial  
aid from American gangsters for  
anti-Castro activities which would  
be CIA operation.

If you find of his involvement ~~in~~  
into the CIA plot, de la Guardia was already  
very funded by the Agency through  
the Revolutionary Front and was already  
involved in CIA planning for the  
Bay of Pigs invasion which was  
in mind.

In fact in 1960-61 <sup>very</sup>  
in 1960-61 while Mekong were already  
operating ~~SECRET~~ engaged in  
plotting Vann's usage in  
collaboration with Mekong friend

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00022 "Cubri" or "Chile" Mendez and Medina  
is described in Tippicanis FOIA files  
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of  
support for Varona is the promotional  
efforts of the Dino and Eddie  
Ullini, Michael and Lansky business  
associates, who were reportedly  
working through a Washington DC  
public relations firm, Edward  
& Moss and Associates. Moss had  
previous CPUSA associations and  
was supposed acting as a conduit  
for funds supplied by the Cuban  
Confederation with the understanding  
that their group would have  
"privileged treatment" in the  
Cuba of the future. Attempts  
to verify these reports were  
unsuccessful. [1967 FOIA Report  
p.30]

The Lansky influence  
using the Ullini brothers as a  
"front" is particularly instructive  
in light of Varonai's admission  
that Jorge Pujol arranged a  
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer of~~  
1960 wherein <sup>Varonai</sup> Lansky offered to  
financially "back" Varonai  
efforts to ~~secret~~ "educate"  
the American people about Castro,  
which may be a euphemism for  
anti-Castro plots. [See same prospectus]

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency and engaged some; and other persons involved in removing the Castro regime had settled upon de Viana, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~other~~ multiple exile groups who were in a continued ferment furnished. de Viana was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. (See Viana testifying -)

Although de Viana has no memory of meeting Traffante, the Tampa unit does admit that he acted as an "intermediary" in several meetings attended of de Viana, Rosseli, Bernacca, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Nacho" Pena, a Traffante family partner from Havana who confined to see Traffante in Miami during the 1950's. Traffante claimed that Rosseli had previously met Pena but this appears unlikely in view of Traffante's long-standing ~~SECRET~~ relationship with Pena in Cuba. And Rosseli's claim to

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O'Connell that ~~Triffauts~~ Triffauts  
0002202 would provide the replacement  
for the ill-fated Juan Jose  
who had escaped to the Venezuela  
embassy in April 1961.

Comment: Paralleling the situation at  
the Senate hearing May 1975 when  
Rosseli's description of Triffauts role  
~~changed~~ changed from that his  
"cousin" ~~characterized~~ in 1960 as reported by  
the Agency to conform to Triffauts'  
"interpreter" statement, is the recent interview  
with Gómez who agrees with the  
Triffauts' committed leading role in Cuban  
as well as intermeddling with Rosseli.  
Rosseli and the other United in both  
instances to to minimize Triffauts'  
exposure (See C.F. Fonzi interview  
with Gómez, May 7, 1978 and Triffauts  
testimony, Oct 7, 1977.)

However, the meeting with  
Vargas came to pass, the  
ambiguity exists as to the  
scope of the introduction of de Vargas into place  
one of the Castro assassination plots, more  
~~confusing~~ confusion surrounds  
de Vargas' actual participation  
prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the  
I & R Report indicates that de Vargas  
attempted a second ~~from~~ <sup>name</sup> before the ~~other~~ invasion that  
Rosseli was positive that no one

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attempt, (Ortiz) was null. He  
was also possessed that he  
0002203 delivered both pills, money  
and supplier to de la Rosa which is  
corroborated by O'Connell ~~and~~  
July 1961. The conflict is reduced  
by the sentence in speculate  
that only one pre-May of Pigs attempt  
was made, and that... de la Rosa was  
the contact in the United States who  
arranged for... [Ortiz]... to administer  
the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no feasible  
way to resolve de la Rosa's initial  
contribution to the poison attempts  
especially since I would dismiss even  
having received poison gifts  
from Reseghi or any involved in  
any attempt on Castro's life at any time.  
(See Vann report)

Comment

The Agency was aware of  
the possible dangers inherent  
in having de la Rosa participate  
in the plots given while ~~a~~ working  
his part on the ~~was~~ Rosenberg Board.  
However, "Steps taken to end his  
participation in the syndicate plan  
but they were apparently ineffective"  
SAC Report, p 323

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Harry's responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish about the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harry "tore over a going operation" [I.O. Rep p 33]. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be known~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~in~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962, was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Viana ~~was~~ was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there will some significant ~~important~~ difference between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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succinctness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. To contrast, the details of the mission and the ability of the ~~Castro~~ <sup>Castro</sup> assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~when~~ Harry met up with Roselli in Miami in Sept 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the lethal method was to be introduced into Castro's food [which involved] an visit of Vannini who had access to some ~~in~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~at~~ restaurant frequented by Castro." By June 1963 after the Vannini had received money and munition from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the info back to Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli reported to Harry on 21 June that Vannini had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to meet others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the B-52s. Harry never learned

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work for Pearson and did know  
that Anderson had more than a  
passing acquaintance with Mayn.  
Pat Ryan also fight with  
Pat Cayne of N.S.C.

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their names or nothing about them"  
L 1967 DO, Report P513

Comment

As the 1967 DO authors correctly observed, Harry's tale of the "Fronde restaurant" "personality opportunity ~~with the other place that I know~~" was familiar in that Edwards had disclosed pieces of the same plan". The fact that Vassena related the "last modus operandi" to Harry as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibility that:

- (1) Harry was correct in saying that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) he had been away d. Vassena before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CDR to provide logistical support and future protection against the Castro Department; or
- (3) d. Vassena was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in expense to deliver from organized crime

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The cast. of underworld

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character changed. Harry had insisted that Mafeo not become involved from the operation which Rosseli readily acceded to. Truffaut's "in superci" role was assumed by "Malo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Buccommy and today.

### Comment

"Malo's" infiltration into one of the most sensitive CDT covert actions in history without any attempt to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely to bed ~~to~~ ~~the~~ of the top mobsters in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the FBI Report characterizes Malo as "Rosseli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~also~~ drafted by Truffaut who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still pursued, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

SECRET

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Q. ~~00000008~~ termination of the CDTA -  
mafia was plots slow and undramatic  
Rosseli, in May 1962, reported to  
Hawley that the pills and guns which  
had been delivered to Cuba in Miami  
in April had arrived in Cuba, and an  
unidentified three-man team had been deployed  
in June to execute the plan [Interven Report  
p84]

7. During September 1962, Rosseli  
related to Hawley that d'Uomo ~~crossed~~  
was readying a second three-man team  
who were "supposedly" militia men  
whose assignment was to penetrate  
Castro's body guard. During this period  
the 'medicine' was reported as still in  
place and the three men of the first  
team safe [1967 D.S. Report, p57]  
However, the second team never  
made Cuba and a series of alibis  
were constructed during December and  
January 1963. Nevertheless, d'Uomo  
supposedly collected \$270 for the maintenance  
of these individuals from Rosseli  
who had received the payment from  
Hawley. [1967 D.S. Report p52]

In mid-January 1963 both  
Hawley and Rosseli agreed that "nothing  
was happening and that there was  
not much chance that anything would  
happen in the future" [1967 F.B.I. Rep. p52].  
Rosseli was instructed to ease  
his way out of touch with  
~~Hawley~~ personally did.  
The last meeting between Hawley

SECRET

0002209  
and Roselli occurred in Washington  
D.C. on June 1963. When he was  
having ~~had~~ overnight guest. Her  
husband obviously was not doing  
what he was amassing other plots.

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# Conclusion

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0002210

The available evidence suggests  
 in part, ~~that~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~expended~~ <sup>available</sup> time the thesis which  
 it tacitly assumed by the Agency in its  
 1977 internal Disputed Benefits report  
 wherein it states that, "It is possible  
 that CTB singly found itself  
 involved in providing additional  
 resources for independent operations  
 that the Syndicate ~~likely~~ had  
 under way. -- In a ~~sense~~, CTB  
 may have been piggy-backing  
 on the Syndicate, and, in addition to  
 its material contributions, was  
 also supplying an aura of  
 official sanction." L 1977 IB Rpt 8208

? The relevant evidence is as follows  
 1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re  
 Biancana ET SUR:

... Biancana reportedly asserted  
 those present that Castro's assassination  
 would occur in November. Moreover,  
 he allegedly indicated that he had  
 already met with the assassin to be  
 on three occasions ... Biancana  
 claimed that everything has been  
 perfect for the killing of Castro, and  
 that the assassin had arranged  
 with a girl, not further described, to  
 drop a 'bill' in some hut or  
 food of Castro! L 1977 IB Rpt 8193

Comment

Although <sup>SECRET</sup> dates of  
 between Makh, Donati, and Biancana

~~SECRET~~

are subject to different interpretations,  
it is clear that no plans were  
<sup>000221</sup>formulated between the parties  
until sometime after October 1960  
the date of the <sup>FAT'S</sup> interrupted conversation of  
Biancana.

The grim pile, reported by the  
CPA at Geneva's report, will  
not say for all we know until late  
fall - early March 1961, so that it  
is difficult to see how Biancana's  
November 1960 assassination plot  
could be a part of the CPA's plan.  
Rather, it appears that the MOB had  
its own plan in progress using  
BIA, when the CPA fortuitously  
happened along to offer its support.  
The MOB was then in a perfect  
position. If their ~~secret~~ <sup>secret</sup> plan  
plot actually worked and Castro died,  
then the Syndicate had enormous  
political capital against the CPA  
which it could utilize at the  
opportune moment. However, if their  
~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position  
would be that they were  
only attempting to execute the  
wishes of their government.

#### Additional Comment

The opinion of Biancana's  
"hired hand", Richard Cain ~~was~~  
~~not to raise~~ some interesting  
possibilities. Cain's admission

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0002212

To the FBI that he had been joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on permanent payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the C.I.A. Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~information~~ information of the Cuban communist appears ~~as~~ <sup>a little more than</sup> coincidental, then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (~~and~~ one stay), and to "buy" influential Cuban in Havana ostensibly for his friend Prio (second stay) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent off scenario to assassinate the poisoner attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called all the "arrangements" what became referred to in ~~the~~ Oct 11, 1960 wire as the contact man for the operation.

2 Tie in memo on Cain with Sakuris open which is strongly supported of the source, that Cain was the missing second man in the Las Vegas wire of Oct 30, 1960. Nahm needs to be guided on this point.

Cain confirmed to "volunteer" information and service to the C.I.A. during 1961 & 1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the D.R.T. Student Project in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In February, Cuba

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0002213

was the former head of the Directorio  
in Cuba when he was a major  
~~power~~ in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported  
to the Chicago office of the CDTA that  
DAB was in a debt to purchase  
a large arms shipment. He was  
told by the Agency to "get out  
of the picture" ~~and~~ a situation  
which is subject to several stipulations  
including the fact that the CDTA  
was a willing participant in the debt.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain  
now the chief investigator for Cook  
County Sheriff's Office, gave the Agency  
some information that Oswald was  
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in April 1963 with  
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and  
had purchased the messandue  
until in March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of ~~Castro~~ <sup>the potential</sup> assassin

In trying the putative assassin,

Biancara spoke <sup>on December 10</sup> of an individual  
who was close to Castro while the  
individual recruited for the CIA killing  
was Juan Gómez, a secretary in  
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred  
to by Biancara can never be ascertained  
but Trapparito was clear in the  
best position to recruit ~~Castro~~ to  
one of Castro's Cuban supporters due to  
his multifaceted contacts in the  
Cuban community and position as a well

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000221A

IT WAS COMMON FOR BRONSON, GUYER,  
have Cuban members and  
Trafford, Rothman, and Trainee  
will typified. Also, one notes  
that the Committee that Castro was  
accustomed to arrive at the MacLean  
Hotel (owned by Mike McLean) comes with  
on a regular basis to visit one  
of his paramours there. It would  
have been relatively easy for Trafford  
to have arranged for a young  
woman to service Castro and to  
attempt to poison him.

Maria Loury is a very  
woman to say the least, and her  
potential as an assassin recruit  
of Frank Sugis has been fully  
assessed. However, one interesting  
point is that she was also involved  
in Tormen's misdeeds and, three such  
have been solicited to activate  
the poison plot. Unfortunately, Trainee  
was not asked about her relationship  
with Tormen in Cuba so that we  
do not know the full match.  
Comment

— Juan Orta, the man identified  
in the Agency as the younger contact  
in Castro's inner circle, was personally  
introduced by Trafford, due to Orta's  
former receipt of jointly "hot tubs".  
One fact is extremely bothersome  
however, in attempting to gauge the  
depth of the most senior in using  
Orta to execute the assassination plan.  
According to the SECRET DD Report Log #2:

Otta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 22 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington". According to the official version Otta accepted for the pills on 1st February 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" L 1967 to Rpt p 273

If the MOB was close enough to Otta to have pills smuggled out of Cuba, then why had to know that Otta had lost his position of accessibility??, the other ~~government~~ <sup>ambassadors</sup>, i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to you to de Mano when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the MOB was running their own Missionary plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the long awaited, albeit uncertain motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, there ~~are~~ the same possibilities exist. If Haug and O'Conor are correct in assuming that Haug had walked into an "ongoing operation", then it ~~will~~ be assumed that the MOB will, along with de Mano, which all dated the CIA participation according to the FBI D almost 21 Dec 1960, and 15 January 1961, had confirmed uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs ~~with~~ with the resumption

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0002218

of the CFT's participation, funding  
and official support could, once again  
be returned to the Agency although  
de Viana would continue to deal  
through his most contacts, Russell  
and "Mac".

True to the loose structure of  
Phase II in terms of the ambiguous  
nature of the operational means of attack  
the lack of identity of the government  
and sources, the complete reliance of  
Harry upon Roselli and ~~not~~ that unknown  
but actual ~~or~~ ~~ability~~ to actually bring him out, the Agency's  
information, the ~~suspicious~~ speculation  
was that the ~~suspicious~~ syndicate was not  
so much trying to assassinate Castro  
as for the Bay of Pigs ~~plans~~ <sup>from Cuban arms</sup> of  
the solidification of Soviet influence  
in Castro's Cuba. Being ~~sold~~ <sup>from Cuban arms</sup> ~~rumored~~  
Tafforni, family and ~~that~~ <sup>from Cuban arms</sup> must have  
believed that the "golden goose" of power  
had laid its last egg, and that fortune  
will to be made elsewhere. Certainly, the  
evidence showed <sup>going</sup> hardly ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> influence in the  
Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Tafforni projects  
in the Dominican Republic and a new  
opportunity for ~~solid~~ <sup>from Cuban arms</sup> ~~reputation~~ in  
Florida with the <sup>from Cuban arms</sup> influx of Cuban  
refugees. It was also abundantly clear  
that the next Justice Department  
program in regard would never  
permit the "wide-open" Cuba of  
~~an~~ and all his <sup>from Cuban arms</sup> ~~associates~~ could  
be eliminated. SECRET

~~SECRET~~ Despite the ~~abundant~~

SECRET

nsid 0002217 business sense in  
continuing the paramilitary attempts  
against Castro in a substantive way.  
There still was a percentage in  
"stirring up the Agency along." First, there  
was no upside to the syndicate  
because the Agency was already fully  
committed to support for U.S. - Second,  
there was the mounting pressure  
from the ~~left~~ FPD and Justice Department  
which had to be blunted, if possible.  
No better weapon to accomplish this  
goal could be found than to use  
one Agency (CPA) against another.  
A brief look at the record shows the  
supplement of ~~the~~ strategy at ~~the~~ moment  
of crisis for those who preferred col-  
the plts.

1. Robert Matum

- Quality of long committee subversion  
in 1966 [ Inform Report, p 79, note 3; Dikem final  
B & Morgan ]
- Solidification of position with  
CPA and with Hughes Organization  
[ Hughes was definitely told of the project by Matum  
in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an  
alliance with the CPA which in fact, occurred  
long before Matum was Hughes' principal agent ]
- Inform Report, p 75, note 2: Matum Senate Testimony?  
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971  
on office of secretary tell on Donald P Morgan

2. John Rosselli

- evading criminal prosecution [ Inform  
Report, p 85, note 4,
- use in ~~legal~~ memo in March 1971 to  
attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempting to delay deportation  
troups with DNS which included

0002218

JACK ANDERSON'S GENERAL INTERVENTION  
WITH PR-S (See ANDERSON INTERVIEW, and  
CIA Rovelli file; ~~see~~ CDA office  
of Gandy file re Edward P. Morgan)

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 went up in Las Vegas  
where Giancana got Nixon to take the heat  
for him by claiming the trip was a  
result of the CIA plots.

- Early 1962, interview with FNC  
Farrell of INS re possible deportation  
(See Tab C, Rovelli CIA file,  
stating that my Ed Walsh, Osborn, Fletcher  
Locca, & Houston knew)

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance  
in 1963 & 1967 (D.C. Report p 129)

- Conversation with Sam Pupkin  
on 3 May 1967. Sam commented that  
Rovelli and Giancana have CIA  
over a barrel "because of" that operation.  
He said that he doubted that the FBI  
would be able to do anything about either  
Rovelli or Giancana because of their  
previous activities with your people  
(1967 F.G. Rpt p 137)

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Notice re Jack Anderson  
"Castro Retaliation" Theory,

0002219

March 3, 1967 }  
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson B744

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosseli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Andrus and Pearson the recipients  
(P120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosseli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has failed

(P120)

- Impact

The Rosseli-Baum contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for US attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Baum may also know this (P120)

Mahan

~~SECRET~~

does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfortunately public might cause him to lose his lucrative

~~SECRET~~

132721

client, Taylor. There might be some value to be gained from enclosing his suggestion that he approach Hagan and perhaps Roselli and we go directly

The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is only found in Phase Two: the three-man team comment

Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3 man team initially and only used Roselli in the concept in Phase Two or Roselli first didn't mention the 3 man team to Nansen or O'Connell during Phase 1 comment

In figuring out "favor motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point-

If protection was what the source has seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CDA for help Eq 123  
Some Agency c/n figure are favor motives, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and ~~the~~ fully to Morgan who is also drinking and fully to been given to Pearson

Comment

~~SECRET~~

Dow Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best go ges: the story of the jilted

~~SECRET~~

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting  
GOO2232 P 1275 ~~SECRET~~

Committee

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high level meeting at the Dept of state at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I do speculate that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 1972 meeting of the special group (Squad) which was attended by Harvey. (812)  
S R F K was not present.

### Other Sources

1) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCP aware that Rosseli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosseli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident".

C memo in office of Secretary file re Morgan

2. Memo : 20 May 1972

Subject: Dubbed

Mr. H. Please (from C.I.A & now with DDCI) said Maher & Andrew Taylor on some oil mix deal. Recent exposure of Andrew re Maher oil in the Carter kerfuffle was a deliberate exposure investigated by ROBINS. Maher using his son Peter as an intermediary.

Please' theory is that Maher probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re: installed in now CIA stuff to embarrass Higley)

"Morgan makes noises to clobber Hughe's officials that they had better take it easy on Maher because of his past involvement with CIA  
S Memo in Secrecy File re Morgan

4. Memos 19 Nov 1970

? ?  
- Harry had contacts with Roselli in November-December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli conviction - 17 Nov 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who informed Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would have stay. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maher agreed.

"Maher further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it reflected him personally"

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Series of conversations instigated by Harry on Roselli's behalf to get CIA intervention directly or at least deserve new and/or new case against Roselli issue.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Harry. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Maher with Gen. Long require DCI Morgan told

Roselli

- Also, the Director (Helm) had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Ponzona (formerly the Bryant 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said he left Las Vegas from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

b. Memo 28 April 1967

- "I" Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Ponzona story

- Maher admitted telling Morgan some of the "Phone T" operation due to Agency delaying on long committed telephone

- Maher visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maher) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with higher-ups in FBI

? - Maher denied it, saying "letter from [unclear] said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962"

- Roselli met Morgan through Kent Greenbaum in the 1950's

- Maher recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Baum in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~suspicion~~ impression that Roselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI didn't suspect he had a 19 yr old girl

- Billed Morgan had done some

John Hamann  
Office of Security

SECRET

Jan 6<sup>th</sup>

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade Co  
investigator for information on  
S. Cuban:

1. a. Ramon Don Festervey  
b. Rolando Masferrer Regas  
c. Luciano Nunez  
d. Jose De La Torrente  
e. Jose Quintana  
f. Joaquin Hurtado Cortijo  
g. Manola Artiles  
h. MULAT
2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in  
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.  
Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec  
1970 Office of Security memo:
  - i. No background investigation done on  
Roselli or Francisco
  - ii. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect  
between Roselli's Agency officials and contacts  
approx. 1971.
  - iii. O'Connell has always been informed  
by Dade Co.
  - iv. Office of Security has no such  
evidence that Cuban Intelligence Service may have  
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area  
during time of his death.

SECRET

0002225

Nievis

- c. Released in March 1965 after serving  
about 16 months of a 20 yr sentence  
for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain  
briefly where he was of interest to Madrid  
 - August 1965 entered US <sup>States</sup>  
 - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational  
interest to DDO

Shivani

He is mentioned on the John Roselli  
file as a personal friend of Roselli. It  
is further noted that Shivani knew Roselli  
but nature & extent of their official/social  
relationship unknown.

30 August 1970 report by SIS Edward  
C. Rudeger, Alexandria FBI Office.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

## 1. Juan Orta

Was an official of the Centro Revolucionario  
circa 1960-61 and was a contact of  
Santos Trafficante. Orta was reportedly selected  
by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt  
against Castro.

## 2. Tony Vannone

When Juan Orta was not successful  
in carrying out the munition against Castro,  
Trafficante suggested Vannone be used. Roselli  
contacted Vannone. Vannone was to use

SECRET

0002227

acts of his in to carry out the mission). Varon also reportedly used his son, in law to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the man in law.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known Harry as "Maceo", who also used the names Garcia Govea and Gober. Harry was unable to identify Maceo, who was found to be Cuban who spoke Italian.

4. No info in regard to death or  
517-339-3523. relate threats against Roselli or  
cuban in GL or MEX, Bremen - Troy,  
St. Louis, or Memphis in GL

3 Memo 15 Feb 1972

5. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequence that my action in the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack & Wilson details of the incident.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

0002229

Mon 20 May 1971

G/S

Supt. Enfer Tel

Morgan had been engaged by Hyde  
Toll during the Makin efforts. H Pease  
from Agency man's telephone, said Morgan  
made no secret of certain Hyde officials, that  
they had better take it easy on Makin because  
of his past involvement w/ CJA.

L John Southard - on 1942-04 soon on back  
w/ Makin & simultaneously worked out details  
of a **non official cover** arrangement w/  
Aircraft Div of Hyde Off.

For past seven days had been just mch

In May 10, 1971 M. Pease and Makin  
& Hydem are involved together on some rdng  
deals. It would look into this & all other  
such similar matters to trace the source & disposition  
of funds. Recent exposé by Friedman &  
Haber's role in the Cuban blockade was a  
deliberate exposure instigated by both Makin  
unary his son Peter as an attorney.  
Pease thinks is that Makin prob. that  
such publicity would 'scare them off'.  
The Pufekel staff is aware of a series of  
contacts & meetings between Peter Makin  
and Rich Anbum & a number of his staff.

~~SECRET~~

0002230  
Memorandum

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I  
Sally Roselli, JMWAVE

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Brisell approached Col. Sheffield Edwards to inform of the offer of security and assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring "paramilitary-type" action. The mission target was Field Officer R.
3. Mr. Madan advised that he had met with R on several occasions which recently. He did know him casually prior, clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the "syndicate" and controlled all of the oil money making in the States.
- Madan seconded that, if R were in fact a member of the CIA, he undoubtedly had connections friendly with the Cuban friendly interests.
4. Madan to approach R who knew Madan as a person having fanatic's frenzied attitude.
5. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza. His stated reason was to sound gotten word here, thru Mo Johnson, he could to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew "the Cuban crowd." No money required or paid.
6. During the week of 25 Sept, Madan introduced to Sam staying at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was ~~dead~~ killed.

SECRET

0002232

- To him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade
9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of poison pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kick-back payments from the quality Mills, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.
11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta, after several weekly repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.
12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Buckley knew . . . and seemed disappointed w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Orta and even willing to handle the mission themselves anyway.
13. He added, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for transportation expenses & time for orientation

SECRET

SECRET

7404  
to secret says ROK on numerous cases up  
to make it in court or write. At our right pursued  
dugged.

17. May 1962 Harry took me as Case  
Officer & it is not known by this office  
whether R was used against him  
plus point in

0002233

17. Alleged w/ Nov. 1967

18. 2 Dec 1968 R accused of Tax evasion.

19. Harry reported to Office of Justice his  
contact w/ R in Nov-Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.  
It was his belief that John will exhaust  
the legal途程 available in deportation  
unless he actually faced deportation.  
R expressed confidence that he would receive  
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahan called I could go advise  
how Mahan's attorney, Ed Morgan, had  
rec'd a call from Tom Weddin who stated  
appeal exhausted & R faced deportation.

If someone didn't interfere on R's  
behalf, he would make a complete  
expose' of his attempt w/ Harry

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCT advised & directed  
not to arrest R. Mahan was so  
clothed & equipped for a swim & he was in  
immediate jeopardy w/ his health. He further  
advised that he was not concerned about  
any publicity as it affected him personally.

Inden W/ H. June 18, 1971

by attorney Edward Mahan, last known as a

SECRET

rooftop; last of Feb or first of March 1963  
March 13, 1961 R delivered express to us  
contact at Fontaner  
- a few weeks later on 4/11

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the radio bars  
San Francisco to line up a contact.  
He confidential files report that he had  
"gambly interests and an interest in the  
shrimps business in Cuba". However, the  
big gangster took no direct part in the  
mass murder plot.

19 Dec 1967

*Memorandum*

Telephone number Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The fact revealed Dir of Geology  
the subject of our last written communication  
i.e. J.R. the validity of the information were  
right form; & whether or not the Agency plans  
to consider any possible inference made  
his behalf.

3. Harry decided that he thought the  
risk of "sitting tight" might be slight,  
but that he felt it would be a simple  
matter for the D.O. to see how reasonably  
& differently we are unopposed, leaving his  
what acted case the Justice Dept. had.

Osborn - speculate it may try to  
find out validity of use in pump & may  
have to work for Mayor **SECRET**

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported London meeting w/  
Ragin on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1967 R calls Harry.  
Whe met him at Madison Hotel for  
3 hrs.
- 27 Nov., they "buried" into Jim Johnson's  
Harry with R as "Mr. Carlson".
- 28 Nov. spent 11 hours at Bottleda
4. Harry to Harry, County Club.  
R in town to see Morgan re a  
radio station in San Jose. Not  
worried re visit which will be brought.
- R said he had not seen him since  
since 1965 (Papach checking & may  
explain to Harry)
- R didn't state or imply that he  
wanted help from Harry.
5. Jolly told Harry re his  
meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1964 & Aug  
meeting O'Connell had w/ Mohr & R  
in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East
6. Harry wants that he must know  
status of case. If it is a good case,  
then Harry feels the Army must exert  
influence to have the "other" killed. If  
it is not a good case, then Harry will tell  
Jolly & he will well stand.
10. Harry independent at moment his  
interest was never there to protect Harry.

**SECRET**

0002237

He had my file kept ready for Harry  
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

P. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but  
Harry refused to see us as R's attorney  
- R wondered why ~~Nguyen~~ would not  
do as much for him as it did for Mahan.  
Ed Morgan knew what ~~Nguyen~~ did for Mahan  
W/Jen Long & had told Gallego about this.

4 Oct 67

Orban & Harry at lunch,

- R quote vehement & bitter re  
Mahan evidently Mahan would "sell anyone  
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping  
re use of banana. R said leak came  
from Sen. Kennedy office whom he was still ~~still~~ to

Pys Off Mahan

28 April 67

1. Connell - Nguyen allegedly contacted some high level  
officials in and indirectly he had a client  
who had been involved in an informant operation.  
~~Mahan~~ recalled & said he had told Nguyen  
when Harry delayed on long subpoena.

2. Mahan really upset today if he  
had been identified as client since

SECRET

0002238 publicly on his relationship w/ Hayes.  
6. No knowledge of manor after April 1960  
& never discussed latter phases w/ R  
& M. Miller - R met Mayn thru business  
in 1950's when Mayn did legal work  
for San Joaquin Sun.

R & Mayn in Vegas somewhat in  
Much. Jim Cannon informed "it was Miller's  
recollection that these individuals spent  
some time together. He was under the  
impression that they sought legal advice  
from Mayn but I do know nothing of their  
conversations.

7. Claude R had discussed rapidly  
murder; 11 yr old girl & award of <sup>Sherrif</sup> damages  
for fault to negot. R putting pressure  
for Miller to hire his friends.

8. Believed Mayn had done some  
work for Pearson & did know that Freddie  
had more than a passing acquaintancy w/  
Mayn.

Mayn fight w/ Pat Cayne for  
NSA,

He knows only heavy pattern of the  
FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Miller is deeply  
involved about possibility of being connected  
w/ Castro project but placed cooperation down  
to Mayn's involvement

SECRET

002239

Sen Long Maken

S. Barker, Long's friend H.P., told him  
that Maken advised of Long.

7 June 66

Maken reported of Morgan or Kelly  
w/ St. Louis H.P., a friend friend of Long,  
in Maken's appearance -

3. Fornstwald had identified Sam  
Onam, etc by name to O'Connell &  
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois  
& a couple of his technicians now aware  
of Maken tie-in w/ Francisco.

31 May 1966

Maken asked if "Sam plant" was in  
the wind

12. Morgan had advised Maken that he  
knew Long's friend H.P. who exerted great  
influence on Long. They flew to St. Louis  
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met  
w/ Long & Fornstwald. Fornstwald  
wanted Maken as his "all in the hole"  
in that Maken clients have great appeal  
for T.V. He told Maken and got great  
enough to sell Gold. Waller Long says  
Mr. Fornstwald would proceed

13. Maken clients seemed very good to

SECRET

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances  
that will remain at our request.  
Mr. Tim Rd. RFK was orally  
briefed on the background that led up  
to Mahui movement & Top Secret  
document furnished to Justice Dept  
which served as backbone of the  
briefing

EEB??A

0062241

SECRET

1967 D.B. Rpt

0002242

SECRET

P3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt's attitude toward the Cuban regime  
a) Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed out at discrediting Castro personally by inflating his behavior or by attacking his appearance  
in August 1960 to October

Plots against him planned; viewed by at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime culminating on 20th April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BDR & unnamed informant to several men.

b) Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme developed in early 1962 & pushed forward in era of MONTOS & late 1962 until well into 1963

After mid-1963's collapse of Project MONTOS, aggressive scheme begun Aug 60; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated in early 1963

c) Drew Pearson column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CDT plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

- a) Staff Dept meeting at which assassination team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

5. If ~~signified~~<sup>SECRET</sup> really is our  
opinion, tends to reinforce thought  
that details named have been  
classified by document or record before  
FMF Oct 1962 arrived.

16<sup>th</sup> Final Report receives that pub  
plots bore no alarm on a procon  
bury

### Riley - Traffonto

#### I. The Report Assessment

5 agent messages were identified that  
make reference to plans to kill Castro or  
proposing such action. Three of the  
messages related to the same operation  
the other two referring to separate  
proposals; there is no indication  
that any of these proposals was the  
result of CIA initiation.

MABRMC/5 issued 29 May 1962  
and was received 30 August 62. He has  
been reported as never admitting that  
he was a CDT agent. His name not  
given to me. Three others were

0002243

SECRET

AMHABH

0002244

SSC

SECRET

- 1) inform that AMHABH a Custo agent with the view of providing a plot against Castro so that Castro had justification for killing him,  
or
- 2) AMHABH so indirect you details will have been known thus providing Castro  
what he should have been required to use  
know - the character of the relationships  
between CIA and AMHABH, prior to actual  
assassination of President Kennedy, was so insidious  
and inconclusive that it would not have been for  
AMHABH to feel that he had any feasible  
CIA support for plotting against Castro.  
..... There was little for him to  
rely on or trust!

Committee p 5

Over a year passed between August  
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next  
confided to CIA. In terms of the  
relationship that he had with CIA the  
exact word, in his defense between  
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963

of 11/3. Known for Hitler is that  
final report AMHABH in name Cuban he was  
monitored due to his potential.

SECRET

SECRET

0002245  
Cable on Sept 7th says "BMLASH very  
totally spoilt but who will always  
be a control problem.

"... is best approached as a  
chief propagator allowed to recruit  
his own cohorts among whom we  
may then find persons susceptible  
to long distance and covert messages."

Clearly, at that point, while BMLASH  
was viewed as potentially important, he  
was also viewed as a person of uncertain  
loyalties, requiring careful but long  
range development for whatever course  
of action that might later ensue.

AB3-A of SSC Sammy and Tendays, grants  
BMLASH as an informant plus  
a refund of test costs Sept 7th  
you will might have had result of that  
by BMLASH

8/10 "The fact remains that whatever  
was BMLASH may have expressed, he  
had no response from his C.I.A contacts  
of my support for his proposal at that time

Folappell nothing stated he reported  
high power sigs w/ telltale segmts

SECRET

14 Nov Mr WHIP reported that ~~MILLS~~ satisfied w/ policy immediately but willing over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given "certain small pieces of equipment which presented a financial situation & the problem".

Comment

In essence Mr ~~MILLS~~ was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. It will that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what ~~MILLS~~ was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p15) to the effect that it was not clear how ~~MILLS~~ interpreted the just off the top.

After Aug 1964 FBI Report states that ~~MILLS~~ in unhappy with CIA program and A. Kennedy had refused to support ~~MILLS~~

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald approved fully ~~MILLS~~ he would be given a cache inside ~~SEC~~ Cuba. The cache

~~SECRET~~

0002248

could, if he requested it, include  
high power rifle w/ scopes..

19 Nov. Marshall tells CIR he is  
returning to Cuba.

Request by Headquarters to ask him  
to delay for 1 more month.  
Marshall agreed "if it is ~~simply~~  
~~nothing~~"

On 19 SSC speculates that this is fact  
indicating he might return specific sug-  
gestions - at best a few of these  
speculations and ideas, not definitely  
all under.

L fails to mention any w/ absolute  
certainty

M H Ward J

n 26

"A"

"members of MRASHI 1963 association  
w/ CIA"

No info at least 1½ years ~~ago~~,  
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963  
CIA ties w/ Marshall what were  
very mischievous

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

0002251

c CIA knew (but in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to US gamblers syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 just before gambler up. To a Cuban wife leader Fidel who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader would that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

OF While the events around of Dean Rusk did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one committee says, all implications of a direct, cumulative relationship among them is unfounded.

Q18 During the week of 25 Sept 1962, O'Connell & Nihon went to Miami where Roselli introduced my brother to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Nihon pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q19 At that time the gamblers known were still operating in Cuba. Trujillo was making regular trips to Miami & he was a significant figure.

SECRET

p.2d Despite the ~~dream~~ that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

00022528 Comment - Biacana was fully opposed to the use of poison. He said that no one could be induced to do the job because the chance of survival except would be negligible. Biacana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Traf. (five; the carrier was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to supply poison Castro. The gangster named this man as Juan Díaz who was then Captain Chief and Director General of the Office of the State Mafat (an). The gangster said that Díaz had once been a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had some lost that source of income and needed the money.)

P27. Late Feb - March 1961

is traced the pills to Traf. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Cuban P.D.A. Díaz is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangster, Díaz got cold feet.

Comment ~~On~~ SECRET

~~SECRET~~

offer on 26 Jan 1961, will play for the  
Soviet was still going on in Miami & Mexico.  
He took refuge on the ~~Soviet~~ ~~Bulgarian~~  
0002254 April 1961 ...

... It would seem that, that the  
gangster did know that Dato had already  
lost his access to Castro.

P30. The Ullini brothers were believed to be  
in touch with Vanna. They were also  
reported to have offered Vanna large sums  
of money for his operations against Castro, with  
the understanding that they would receive  
"friendly treatment" in the Cuba of the future.  
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

P31. Truff appeared before and told him  
that he had clients who wanted to do away with  
Castro so that they would pay big money for the  
assassination.

Roselli said in a legal manner he would  
whatever he could to would never divulge  
the spoken.]

P31. R wrote letter may to Vanna for signature.

- O'Connell recalls 50m; Edwards recalls  
25m; Penruddock recalls <sup>20</sup> 25m

P32 Roselli gave the gifts and may to Vanna. Mr.  
Roselli dealt with ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ a pseudonym. Little  
is known of the attorney channels beyond Vanna

~~SECRET~~

p. 32 Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

00022.55

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was unwind April 1962, Harry took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have raised the funds, but he has no specific recollection of how he did so.

p. 49. Resende needed Gran & Toff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Vargas. However, it would be naive to assume that Resende did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.)

p. 49 <sup>5</sup> June 1962 Harry said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. ~~SECRET~~ perhaps using the girls.

SECRET

0002256

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p.52 Harry says Roselli wasn't kindly just. He argued with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p.53 RFK - I trust that if you ever ~~try~~ to do business with organized crime - with gangsters - you will let the ADA find him before you do it.  
Houston quotes Edwards as saying that this was a reasonable request.

p.64. The ADA's general copy of the memo for the record of that briefing (May 62) by Senator L. Houston is in archive of the ADA's office.

p.67. Mayor Jim-Tamm letter of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - may intended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his rise of co-operation w/ another party"

Trichell puts his co-operation from 1959 to same time in 1960 - long before the ultimate rebel invasion at the Day of Pigs in April 1961 (Report McBride suggesting incident).

SECRET

269 20 August 1963 Always Dangerous

FBI agent factory beam who allegedly  
says:

0002258 Why don't you fellows leave me alone?  
I'm one of you.  
Cuban pictured as being approached  
CIA but denying

AM 1884

- 879 - DR took Presidential Bath which they  
refused to surrender to Che; DR did to Fidel  
- Cuba believed to be on part of plot on  
assassination of Lt Col Antonio Blanco Rico, head  
of Cuban military intelligence  
- DR quite apart from 2nd of July but  
said a not just

= " Agency was primarily involved in helping  
Cuban active in [REDACTED] PRSN whom declared  
against Cuban military leaders, with respect to his  
plan for technical assistance on an economic  
attempt. The obvious project files and information  
published us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuban base  
officer, do not wholly support this recollection.  
The Agency offered both direct and indirect  
support for Cuban's project."

287 16 Sept 1963

Cuban wrote Tapedero - "I don't intend  
to see (be interrogated) your friend again!  
which you should tell him, " so they don't

make the trip? I want to get away from politics completely?

PM-2 Sandy says that, while Cubella was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubella was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro. What Cubella really wanted were high-powered, silenced rifles with an effective range of hundred or thousands of yards. Cubella finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was), he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

### The New Pearson Story

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| a) <u>Published Details</u><br>Prof. Kennedy may have it not true. He was brief on Phase 1 and an amateur plot<br>b) Three(3) hand weapons were caught in Havana; one still in gun | <u>Our Facts As We Know Them</u><br>All after it was over - It was not<br><u>the brief on Phase 2</u><br>Rebels hung on 21 Jan 62, but<br>Americans say 3 men in Cuba. We do not<br>know their identity or what may<br>have happened to them. We have<br>no proof that they were actually<br>executed. Ninety six thousand<br>copies and execution very fast<br>found off this farm |
|--|---|

Castello said enough about this reportedly has come so  
to believe that it was ready to tell in the barum investigator. It  
was also stated by Castello no  
the Phillips under secret  
information. We have no  
independent corroboration of any sort. (No  
that remains not w) Reindeer  
in Las Vegas in March 1968

0002260

SECRET

1977

9 May 1967

SECRET

Bearbovoff apparently to be used as a man  
of tomorrow to show Oswald a CPAT agent  
is said to be used to minimize Castro. However  
allies he has either regard to CPAT rep  
or to Sen. RFK authority within America  
to work with Cubans for removal of Castro.  
This memo is intended to - send that  
such little will work & Hutton could  
not be in Fauci's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain also <sup>Robert Scully Cain</sup>  
Richard Scalgette  
DOB OCT 1931 Miami

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not found off
- 18 Jan 1961 identified individuals
- Identity of W1 ROOGC
- April 01 to Paul 62 Madrid
  - ~~Reagan~~ "something going on"  
independent Agency
- RFT security called on 4 March 67  
to obtain info; always knew article  
of 7 March 67
- 15 March 65  
Bangs in Madrid & claims groups  
in Cuba ready.
  - Jailed in July 62
- 1 March 66 arrests in Cuba
  - Trial opened after late fall 1964 or early 1965  
w/ Asturine meetings

SECRET

10 June 67 "Pepen" Brenda Ramo approach thru WTB

~~SECRET~~

0002266

O'Conor interview of Malone in May 1968

- Additional info on S.T. GR o. 50  
contained in material previously  
shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trip

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain

- Fall 1968, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1969 - Mexican City

- April 1970 - Mexican City

- 4 June 1970 - deported

- 19 Aug 1970 - Chicago

- 26-30 Aug 1970 - Info - re Student  
Directory, Miami'

- 12 Sept 1970 - DRK arms purchase

- 10/11 so got out of picture

- 1 May 1972 - Disappear.

27 Nov 63

- Fair Play met on Feb 63 at 907  
~~S. Spaulding~~ S. Spaulding and director Michael Ondey

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Stay away LHO in Diego 1963 April

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

6002267

1. Ramon Don Pescador Dominguez  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas  
DOB 12 Jan 1918

3. Luciano Neves

4. Jose de la Torriente

5. Jose Quintana  
DOB 3 Oct 45 *spouse of man*

6. Joaquin Antonio Borjas DOB 10 Jun 43

7. Ward Peirce Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 *son*

SECRET

TAB B

(2-9-28)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Secrecy Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use  
as "cut out" re negotiations for sale of Howard  
Diff studios & John Hopkins' bus.

Amended 8 August 1951 to include  
Morgan use in providing covert legal support for  
operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice,  
maximum of funds in controller at DDO payed.  
∴ DDO should make decision whether to  
release info.

Resorts Ent. #591727

Walker Groves O.S. file # 473 865

- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky

- Corp. Orient Bahama Development Corp  
w/ Robert Whisnant (#633 974) and  
John P. Roulette (#639 997)

Cain

According to Dr. Max, Cain in  
Mexico 1948 into 1962

-1964-45

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

John Hornbeck  
9 FEB 1978

0002269

Bradley Earl Ayers

7-Mar-35  
St Paul, Minn  
36 yrs

Bogalusa, LA

Apr 17, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

Call name? Daniel B. Williams

Paragon Air Service

Lemith Technical Personnel - south

Campus of Mum U.

Ruth; Harry, Roberton (Wife) Big Dader

Frazee S/S

Palo Alto Key

Upper Key Lamp

Card found on edge of Briefcase

Secret Approval

Date 10 Aug 1964

Refine 23826 (DDP / WTH / 5H)

Case No. 366085

Request For Return

Serial No

366085

Nature

Separation Return to Parent SVC

12-15-64

Organizational Designations:  
DDP / SRS Forward operating Station - JMWAVE  
G-3 Full Office Command Branch Sector II  
Reserve C R C Indep Pol Organs

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

0002270

ZR/RIFB

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFB to  
be enclosed in small envelope to Chief  
FI/Div. D, 1502L B14 <sup>only</sup>  
- Personally approved of DD plan!

Harry  
Chief FI/Div. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATM  
for ZR RIFB activities thru Dec 1962.

Because of sensitive nature of this  
activity, accounting for funds will be by  
general category & by year, i.e.

2. Salary Tanger; \$750 - an addit to salary
3. Mono to be considered in lieu of  
project & constitute authorization for all travel  
per diem, operational & other expenses
4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Maher - Gamm

- Mackin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Maher

- 1) Puerto Hugos
- 2) Hugos to Aguilas (B68)
- 3) Aguilas to Latia 61
- 4) Latia 61 to Latia 62 (Custom misse min
- 5) Latia 62 to <sup>SECRET</sup> Latia 63

SECRET

0002271

Roselli org started in Sept 66  
(Malin to Roselli to Granceno)

To Suff 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS  
on 9 Aug 67

Push, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy,  
O'Donnell, Gilpatric, Landale,  
Munn, McCone

Memo for Record

Rept at request of DCF, consigned  
to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback been wpp (DD)  
all notes, o other derived source material  
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Ctry WTT (Dawn)  
From: DoD of SecDef  
Subject: WTT (SecDef Report)

Factual account of monies expended on  
a semi-annual report of contract to DD/P, ctry WTT  
✓ DoD of SecDef  
Dobrusinski,

25 Sept 1968 thru 25 Oct 1968  
6 Feb 1969 SECRET 0900

SECRET

0002272

11 Feb 1961 TO General Hefel 1900  
31 Jan 1961  
14 Feb 61 COMMINT EXPURGE 1,043  
26 Sept 1961  
Heny  
12 Feb 1961 0 995

Pap<sup>3</sup>  
PJB Ppt

c. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 & collapse of MONROVIA, apparent scheme that was begun in Aug 1962; ended in April 1963, was formally abandoned July 1963.

Two other plots were reported in 1963 but were impractical & nothing came of them.

P?

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of special group (Kingsford) wherein McNamara broached subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MONROVIA named by

See(c)

Lansdale

31 July 64

Decum at Special Group of a clandestine Service memo of exile plot to kill Che. CIA had refused to fund. CIA had no warning

and Santos

MISSING  
PAP

P2 Gonzalez Gallanitha

Press Release  
9 March 1964

- program of contact for intelligence; no  
further to 10,000 persons  
- Jose ROBLES, Alberto BLANCO RAMOS alias Tapetuna

You in ~~India~~ were soon away

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Russell all present  
unsuccessful; Edwards then briefs  
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahan called P. Connell & pointed out  
Paradise sector very bold & Joe  
(Prennally informant, Mahan & Connell  
know names)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make  
arrangements there according to Gold

Troff making regular visits to Havana

10. 7 Jan 59 - arms closed  
13 Jan 59 - Castro announces opening  
17 Feb 59 - Cuban arms open up  
30 Sept 61 - last arms closed

②<sup>23</sup> Technical Clue TSD

4 approaches: (1) highly facile like shelffreak  
person to be admiring w/a pin (which's Conde  
Roselli said was supplied to Gary Powers  
(2) bacterial mated in legend or (3) cigar  
(4) handbag

P21. Much April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Troff knew a  
man high up in espion network. (Vann  
Rpt from SECRET suggests him Troff)

SECRET

0002274

Know Value:

- a) 21 Dec 1962 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to and from Castro  
b) 18 Jan 1961 amounts &c with these schemes; What hired Moss as a front-man

CIA had contact in MSS but no indication of my involvement in Cuba.

Mach (1959) for use in (N.B. I am an  
ambassador to Indian Embassy)

- Nov 62 by CIA staff with 20 major  
a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselli to deliver \$100,000  
very last P.R. time says 10,000 + 100 of  
communism as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev.  
P.R. Frank's name involved in B.O.P. steps  
taken to end his participation in syndicate  
plan but apparently ineffective.

People who know:

1. J. O - original man to gain
2. A U -
3. son-in law of H.V.

SECRET

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefd by authority of Bissell  
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general  
stand-by capability for Executive action  
Harry had already learned problem  
W/ <sup>05</sup>(Arnold Silver) & Soddy both believe  
both parties probably cut in to Cuba  
project

Helms briefd on general concept but  
not on ongoing Cuba plot

AT WIN request of <sup>(Arnold 05)</sup> Silver use  
in Congo; Justin O'Donnell mounted act.

ZR RIFLE covered as a FID operation  
(extensively to develop a capability to enter safe  
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses application of  
ZR RIFLE to Cuba; instead of Bissell  
to new syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in  
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy  
February March 62

- March 62 Harry takes over ZR RIFLE
- Harry view-

came to think of Castro operation &  
ZR RIFLE as being symmm.

- Exec Agent is synonymous w/ AT INR
- ZR RIFLE ~~SECRET~~ used to Exec Agent  
ZR RIFLE same meant centre

Handwritten note:  
ZR RIFLE

SECRET

0002276

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing.

(Permit himself Castro operation & L/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE)

- Mens of Harry after he left Tank Force W & goes to Rome on 27 June 1963, to City FL (staff had ~~original~~ reason to keep QJ won no longer wanted & support Kennedy).

- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show transmission of a teletype statement on 21 April 64.  
~~available~~ that in no indication in the file that the Exec Admin capability (ZR/RIFLE/QJWIN ever used)

Edwards -

- No activity after B of D until Harry met Roselli & met him April 62.

- Edwards met contact w/ RFK over McGuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Harry called Edwards & indicated he was dragging Roselli further into it.

NY

Harry - took me a "young" operator since he desired plan for getting poison to a favorite Castro restaurant. The mechanics were identical to those devised by Edwards and as reported in Phase one.

- I "convinced" Henika "something going on" before April 61 <sup>SECRET</sup> but can't remember

SECRET

April 8<sup>th</sup> approx 0002277

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell

- O'Connell pointed Mahan there

I Harry say he would have recruited  
Mahan; saw him socially once or twice  
after 1947 when Harry came to Army; not  
since '52 when Harry sent to Berlin.

- Edwards, although did not mention Mahan when he first

p 45 O'Connell out of Germany when  
he was assigned PCS to Germany

p 41  
18 April 62

O'Connell gets  
info for Roselli  
about W/H Harry  
in Miami

O'Connell says operated going on  
when Harry took it over altho he did not  
mention when "re-acquired"

Harry specified that Brian not to be  
brought in for 2nd phase & before  
Roselli turned up.

Roselli right that Brian asked him  
what was going on; R replied "nothing"  
Brian - "too bad"

P 48 Macio - unlikely a Vassalito friend  
Hector MACEDO Mackle who Harry  
probably would have known. Also, 15'  
clear Macio was! Roselli never  
Roselli mentioned to 2nd place as a  
contact to Vassalito.

SECRET

④ When the plans were known to him,  
V and his men were assigned to  
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20,30 caliber
- d) rifles
- e) 20,45 cal. machine guns
- f) radios
- g) 100 ft. radar

V reported under support & Roselli  
joined road to Harry. With help  
of Shadley, chief of TMWATOS,  
about 5M of weapon & equipment.  
Harry & Shadley went to Haul,  
& put truck in parking lot for  
delay to Macio, U, or US soon after,  
Harry, Shadley set up watch on  
Roselli & Cornell.

Shadley not aware of plan.

⑤ May 62 - Roselli advised that the place in Cuba at the  
Jame restaurant regularly used regularly by Castro.

V had ~~sent~~ <sup>disposition</sup> 3 man team to Cuba  
Sept 1962

Harry saw Roselli in Miami on  
7-11 Sept. This was 3 man team  
of militia men assigned to penetrate  
Castro body guard but never happened.  
"Medevac" medical staff still in place and first team safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

⑥ 11/11/62  
military men  
assigned to  
take off  
delay due to  
air conditioners

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - to San  
Santo Roselli & Macio served papers. gave  
Roselli 27 D to 1 hr. ago of 3 militia  
men who never left (in Fla Keys)

Feb 63

⑦ Feb 1963  
Harry left word for Macio in  
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked  
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this  
word for Macio is not clear)

SECRET

**SECRET**

0002279

April May 63

Helms approved a last meeting  
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left  
for Rome.

⑤5 People who knew  
Bruce Cheever (Hemp Dept 1962)  
how Harry meeting w/ gangsters in  
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Sluf Edwards & Lavelle Houston helped  
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to  
prosecute murder case but wanted to be  
informed if Agency nor staff w/ "gangster" again.  
RFK asked for a memo of  
the meeting via a phone call memo  
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Hank.  
No briefing of Melvin, <sup>General</sup> Carter, or Helms

RFK not told that there it had  
begun; that V had written a memo in late April —

On 14 May or Harry ~~helps~~ Helms;  
advises against helping Melvin & ~~and~~  
Carter. Writes Edwards & Hank Roselli  
is not going to be used

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67  
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

**SECRET**

SECRET

0002280

of Press articles of 7 March 62 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been brief'd upon.

Helms had talked w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He didn't have a copy.

---

1454-55 Makin hired by Nardino to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil Agency. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell reported that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Makin stated he might brief his attorney at Morgan Wadsworth attorneys.

SECRET

10-11 Augst 62 SECRET

(Wainwright) Tepeduo & Cubela via  
Copenhagen (Wainwright) used "assassins"  
& Cubela <sup>03</sup> "insiders" eliminated

000225

14-23 Augst 62

Cubela, Tepeduo, (Wainwright)  
(Carl Wimmer) from Madrid: met in Paris.  
Cubela given S/W training &  
supplies; shown a *Lemnophyton diminutum*.  
Refused to be photographed.

(Wimmer) <sup>03</sup> Cubela did no physical  
elimination missions be given as a  
requirement but he might do it on his  
own initiative. Headquarters: strongly concur that  
no physical elimination missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brasil - met by (Wainwright)  
Tepeduo & Nestor Sanchez who became  
close allies.

Cubela claimed 2 S/W missions but  
only 1 record. afraid of brutal censorship.  
that night of Ramon Giron Day  
INTRUNK-10 who was likely Miguel  
DIAZ Isalgues (PNICZ-14) who had  
been sent to recruit Brazil

14 Sept 63

SECRET

From Brasil Cubela flew to Paris  
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

~~AMERICAN~~ SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 03

P/S

(Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela  
in Mexico City, arranged w/ Carlos  
Tepedeno Brumfitt, a long-time  
friend. Cubela won (Guanad) from  
Havana where he was once based.

Cubela 2nd leader of DR  
an elite group of leftist students based in  
1954 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Cde wanted to  
defect; according to account of Mimi Stoln.  
Ex-father called off ex-report  
that Cuban police aware of Cubela's  
desire to defect? his departure plan  
(Commit).

Fout of 3 small units w/ MIM; but  
unknown if Cubela command of unit in Cuba?  
Other two units are even more nebulous  
~~15 Jan 61~~ Heighted

Message from airline stats (quid pro quo)  
Tepedeno that Cubela going to Paris &  
wanted to <sup>quid pro quo</sup> ~~quid pro quo~~ information of any  
military.

SECRET

15 June 62

Sonia Tchervonina Bianchi told  
an agent (AMERICAN) that Cubela going  
to Venezuela & wanted to defect.

21P

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tejedor

0002283

27 June 1962

Tejedor appraised FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA service they knew Tejedor to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tejedor discussed w/ CIA handle of Cuban "defector" in Paris in '61 so he contacts FBI. Stated his source of info on means for defection were Pichiarrius.

30 July - Agent A7 03

Wm Wainright met w/ Tejedor, a jeweler in NYC & both went to Helsinki, Cuba. Told into being "or with in place" is not deferring.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refinery; Bill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Fredriksson.

7-9 August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki too noisy. Wainright stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tejedor in Helsinki.

SECRET

(PPV)

~~SECRET~~

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet WI Cubile who had written Tepeduo on my shot he didn't want to continue.

CIA had to tell French Govt [24]  
[that contacts were for purpose of defense]  
[French evidently keeping Cubile under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy tells that Cubile  
insists on making w/ RFT "an armed  
Cubile going to try an attempt on Castro  
even without US support."

29 Oct 63

Fitzgerald, Army SAS, goes to Paris  
& got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubile that  
US would have no part in attempt on  
Castro's life.

Written word from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy now states Fitz assumes  
that Cubile would get each of  
refuge WI scopes inside Cuba, in regard

22 Nov 63

~~SECRET~~

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22  
after getting in w/ ~~Blackhead to gain~~

Sandy says Cubile accepted offer  
but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287 Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK D  
[2 high-power (new) telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000 C-4 explosive  
fuses] to stay until they left. They heard  
JFK shot.

Sandy stated he record an OP in CABLE from Fitzgerald that supply  
is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela will take SWW with him to Prague

1 Dec 63

Cubela return from Prague to Cuba  
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in  
place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 in  
AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Torcedero had been briefed to  
meet Carlos Jorge ROBREDO, may  
who has message from Cubela.

091 3 May 64 - Robredo says Cubela wanted a silencer

30 August 64

Arfene record info thru Madrid  
that a group of dissident members of Castro  
regime wanted to establish direct  
contact. 7 Oct 64, Arfene sends  
Alberto BLANCO Romany.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Arfene agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1  
of turns out he is contact man  
for intended叛乱 group. Arfene

~~SECRET~~

Thanks if AMRAST-1 is chief of Madrid group we can forget about agents  
 4 Dec 64

Sandy began a memo for 6370 for Arteme to maintain contacts w/demand group's reps in Brussels. Arteme does  
 6-7 Dec 64

~~10~~ Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was  
~~not~~ going to endorse his plan  
 told us. could not be involved.

10 Dec 64,

Arteme didn't know nor Cubela  
 that CIA in direct contact with each.  
 Rather SAS confined to just both  
 men together.

CIA didn't want to put silent  
 weapon in ~~the~~ Cubela's hands since  
 CIA could do it themselves.

27 Dec ; 30 Dec (initial)

Cubela & Arteme met in Madrid.  
 Arteme reports to Sandy that Cubela  
 had received a salvo from FAL rifle  
 but Americans didn't give him one.

Arteme to come up w/ whatever  
 different info in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to use pistol at silent  
 & Belgian FAL rifle w/ silencer from  
 Arteme's story ~~SECRET~~ weapons come  
 from U.S. & are now in Madrid.

Argent

12 Feb 65

~~SECRET~~

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Castro  
in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cuban in Havana; source  
~~is~~ is friend of Tepedino who tells him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Dorval  
arrived in Madrid from Cuba & informed  
of a State affair.

Publicly close friend of Castro; & claims  
to be in touch w/ group of military leaders  
planning to eliminate Castro.

Dadd in perf. for exp. Trapp  
as target for Cuban KGB. Trapp - ex-mayor  
Anviller name - wife

15 March 65  
Victor ESPINOSA Hernández, a former  
PM friend who was eliminated as a moleman  
on 20 March 1961, contacted IN's new liaison  
FBI on 3 June 65.

Esparanza states he had secret letter  
from a friend in Paris urging him  
to meet w/ Alberto Bolívar who had a  
message from Castro who wanted it directed  
to CIA

Mungs - Cuba is in a position to kill Capt.  
& would CIA & US Govt be willing to support him  
If 'yes', then details on what he needed.

~~SECRET~~

Castro had wanted mungs in Paris  
on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & agreed - \$10,000

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave him two.  
0002290 Tepeduo 7,000 m NY C.

~~SECRET~~

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable Kennedy confid. "Cuban prof that entire AMERICAS group insure", tenuto AGTO

1 March 66 - Cubala & basin must for activities w CIA

José Luis González Ballarita, Alberto Alvaro Romay,  
Juan Alsina Navarro, confid  
Bss appear - Guillermo Canhillo  
Alvarez, Héctor Hernández Vidal

González Ballarita<sup>03</sup> - attests in official  
enlistment of James W. [with cover "officer"]  
at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cubala must w/ Artemio in Jan  
in Feb 1965.

Artemio sent Ballozo to US to get  
telegraphic sight & telecon. Delivered to  
Alberto Romay who delivered it to  
González Ballarita then to Cubala the  
day before he left Madrid.

Tasco telegraphic sight, FAL reflet.  
9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that  
death sentence not be applied.

10 March 66

Cubala testifying:

~~SECRET~~  
Silence did not break; I thought  
any minute it was burning my hands

0002291 I spoke to Fidelis Jarry. He opened  
the door to me ~~SECRET~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> I did not have  
the courage to tell him  
(Censored)

Trial evidence confirmed to agree to  
Purchase in Dec 64 & early 05 to result  
w/ B format. No mention of March 05 then  
Nov 05 conflicts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

*Speculare*

If full details would have come out,   
Custer would have little to excuse himself,   
especially in regard to execute summary in own battle.

2 high class Special Group (August)  
encompassing 18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson  
here after State). Dean Bush, Helms Johnson, Odman  
aravandy Martin, Richard Baldwin, Robt Hurwitz  
discuss White House

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RPT absent)  
Defuse;

McNamee, Belafonte, Lemontier, Lansdale  
CIA - McCone Harry

USA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson  
Secy - Thomas Penott

Parrot's note I'm not a member  
but Madon & Lucy would NOT VOTE ~~RE~~  
name it & Munson County.

No one named Captain & McNamee  
"heartily agreed" <sup>SECRET</sup>

Lindale wrote memo on 13 August  
to Harry, Harwich, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Probably Pelecanis info re a high-level  
meeting was 10 August 62.

O'Connell informed Mahan in May 67  
& wrote a report:

1 - Mahan heard Morgan in Rosey's

2 - Never heard of Rosey II from Roselli

0002293 or anyone

3. Roselli stated to Morgan by transcript

4 - Mahan suspects Roselli is client of Morgan

5 - Roselli denied having; Morgan in  
Vegas many "in secret"

6 - Garrison <sup>began with</sup> Morgan, Roselli in Vegas  
in March. In touch w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

This is our impression that Greenstein also involved  
in the conversations.

<sup>222</sup> Point finger to Roselli as source of info  
<sup>and so confirm</sup> & Morgan as Pelecanis source.

<sup>223</sup> Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, Roselli  
had much & Edwards said he told Roselli  
he informed RFK of Roselli's connection.

Pearlman story seems to rely on my  
phase. Could be Harry if my source  
is Roselli.

Probably from 2 sources:  
State Dept meeting + not aware  
of Roselli's chief suspect.

SECRET

Drafus: Roselli denied too much &  
Morgan surely & talking to a newspaperman first (newspaper)

~~SECRET~~

Lansdale memo copied drafting papers  
for various subjects related to Cuban  
operation. A portion excerpted from CIA  
copy of memo was "an orderly elimination  
of leaders". Lansdale reportedly held to  
raise assassination of Castro w/ Harry over  
not several weeks but Harry denied.  
At least 5 people in Lansdale office  
knew Moon would go to Lansdale without an  
assassination as part of it.

0002292

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Saturday Room  
of White House.

McGeorge Bundy, Vassar, Melvin, Thomas  
Hughes & Des. Fotygaard for a dinner  
of Cuba

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jennings as Secy,

10 June 64 memo from DDP to Don  
Re Mafra plot to assassinate Kennedy.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 expenses.  
Cuban exiles; Jose Alvaro "Pepito" Bosch,  
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed  
GM WAVE for US participation. Refused outright

19 August 64

DCT (McDonald to Bundy - re  
FBI's interview w/ all participants

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

0002294

Publicly has not run its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the  
pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Brown has not revealed full case; CIA  
should be prominently displayed when he does
- c) Puerto Rican in custody will be deported

Pearson's story in detail I detail found  
out in phone to the 3 main firms.

Put on it best light - that there is no  
other issue in speeding the story

P 127. We do not know that Castro actually  
tried to assassinate, but we do know  
that there were such plots against Castro.  
Unhappily, it now appears that Brown  
may also know this.

P 129. Wilson reports that Trujillo is in  
pluma now, still in his Vega, very quiet &  
register <sup>with police</sup> very few if it in form. None of  
them would have any objection about dropping  
in his GFA connection when he was pulled  
by law enforcement authorities. Everyone has  
already done it when the FMT was hunting  
him in 1963. Trujillo agreed to do so right on  
his conversation with Morgan & Brown.

P 131. Report - 3 May 1967

Comments: R&B based over a barrel

TAB A

SECRET

0002295

24 July 75 memo

Santos Tropp

4. ST believed Gorin fails to agent + who  
had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T suggested  
another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Makin family contact subject w/ Office of Security  
- Rosseli convictions

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Francis Ober

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc staff  
NO 838-73

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by  
Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on confirming the action capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another  
(alleged Castro asset) DDO

6. - WIRROUNZ operated aliases?

- who was WIZARD 14 (John Stein memo)

- 2 young officers who handled WIRROUNZ DDO

- Want talk w/ John Stein & all WIRROUNZ files  
by Walt Ober

SECRET

1/2

Memo

~~SECRET~~

5 May 1967

July - Wm K. Harry

6002296

Bill

1. ~~Hector~~ ~~Harold~~ contacted Pagetti to report to Pagetti some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his coop to F.B.I. He informed to Pagetti -- --

MISSING

16 May 67

TAB B      October 23, 1977  
                    David Cohen  
                    Jim bambino      7 April 77  
                    "Dade Co."  
Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951  
as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of  
conflict to DDO.

Stuart Piergent Morgan

DDB 28 May 1913 St. Louis

Richard Sculff Cain

MCA - Richard Scalgretto SS 357-22-333

1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Comm. on behalf of ex-wife George Howard.

SECURE

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963  
in column Daly Diary by Maggie Daly -  
rumor that ~~Assassination~~ planned carbon ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~Cuban~~ <sup>group</sup>

~~SECRET~~

1 sept 67 issue of life

barron a guest of Mario Moreno,  
a bushman of Marcella, as far as he  
know denied family of Moreno connect  
to Marcella.

To Chey SRS  
Subj. Carr

9 Oct 1967

TAB  
R  

---

Info re meeting of Fair Play  
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo ESCOBAR  
who was 'Int' of Horace Speeds (SSB)  
leads obtained from Ralf PORTEZ (44426  
Speed LFC 199499)

Escobar recruiting Cubans for Communist  
Party in Chicago.

0002297

~~SECRET~~

*File* SEC 1710 VCT for DOB of Secret

Roselli, John

9 August 1974

SECRET

Blind minit Saly "John Roselli"

0002298

Tab B o c

Added info re Troff, Roselli, & Branson contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo of Breckinridge

re Arthur Ballitte & Ted Hammie

1. 12 Jan 1961 Mahur told FBI he recommended DuBois to an AAGC whom he was close

2. A Hay or James Coninden per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Col. Edwards who said he contacted Maher in fall of 1960 for use as a "cutout" for CIA. Edwards gave very information to Maher he would attempt to implement several clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hopkins Voren

Subj: Salvatore Brancaccio Richard Cain

Re: Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DIB Oct 1931 in Chicago

left rice sprawl in 1960; recovered  
information.  
a J.F.K. film

CIA contacts

A. Fall 1960

SECRET

0002299

Cain contacts contacts w/ Chicago office  
& worked w/ on Cuban left groups in  
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohman of Chicago Field Office  
re a Mr. Kroug <sup>an</sup> who was negot w/  
President of Panama to overthrow Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staffer  
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama  
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unnamed visit to Hong  
Kong. Winston Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City  
say he had an investigation agency w/  
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to  
provide training to Mexican secret agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for loaded orders  
has contacts & information a Mexican official  
& working

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Motor  
Club & Padofer Club of Horse Speed W/ H  
Dev staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office

SECRET

0002300

He would like to work overseas  
for CIA

Cain worked for Costa of Schiff  
& was in contact with Cubans in Clujos  
area & would provide info on Waller  
activities of Cubans specifically Paulino Sierra  
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain informed the Student Dorothy,  
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Mario Cordoyos import via  
pushay arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRP people who had guarded  
arms. (Ron Speed) re Washington & Clujos  
told Cain to get out of the Justice  
H. 1967

FBI investigated Cain's name w/ PDB  
& learned CIA never contacted

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Clujos from Mexico  
City, then arrested 1 May 1972 says he  
was going to Latin America. Involved  
in illegal arms deals (international)  
on various occasions stated he was CIA  
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked  
Mexico City station for info on Cain  
Eastern Airlines plot ad. Cain as  
suspect who fled from Honduras 5 May 17-

SECRET

SECRET

0002301

27 Nov 63

By Robt B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Riley, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Dr. Martin

3. LHO passed info in March 1963

Shuff's office had not informed LHO of Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago on April 1963 & responsible for firing the offices of UPT

4. Shuff Olegario did in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI

~~could not stand!~~ "that info in 1963 the Chicago took over again in US to Fair Play.

15 August 63

Sands Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he called C/I it re right branch used to get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butman but to someone in Butman's office (justified)

SECRET

Buchenrieg Memo to DDCI of request

1. Person in Sec A of paragraph 3 is contained in the 50 volumes of material.
2. Section B lists 3 known citizens.  
Contact is minimal
3. Question in Section C  
B 1 is extreme; Also used by Mafia in last operation

Detectives have already interviewed & concluded who is referred.

Tab C

1. Ramon Don Pestervey Dominguez (shorty)  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas (bully)  
DOB 12 Jan 1948
3. Luciano Nieves (shorty)
4. Jose de la Torreto (shorty)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45  
agent of a group of mafios to Radell
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 45
7. Manuel Artemio

TAB C

SECRET

14 March 1974

0002303

Mutiny at Terry Kerrigan

Frank & O'Mally refused Hunt to  
Bob Muller of the Muller Corp.

- O'Mally knew Hugler a client of  
Muller; this information picked up in  
course of a credit relationship between  
O'Mally & Muller in early 60's in connection  
with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Muller met in Paris during  
Marshall Plan

- When Muller disclosed to Hunt  
possible impacts on coal placements caused  
by inflation.

- Hunt approached O'Mally for an  
individual basis before a suggestion only daily.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul as intervenor w/ Farrell of  
TNS re possible deportation of Branstad

- off people who knew well Edward  
Osborn, Angleton, Roca, & Houston

SECRET

~~1977~~ Report

SECRET

0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use infiltrated personnel in armed forces in Cuba.

Early 63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayoado Robera developed Fernando Plain & Ernesto Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/ Jorge Volksy, Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Prisoner USSR <sup>1940</sup> & then in Poland Ar Fnd under British Command. Married Cuban & arrived in Miami May 61.

Volksy contacts Ted Sorel & met with Ordwin & Herwitz (Stet). CIA designs plan to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK.

Never planned very far & by Sept 63 had 3 sources including Burn

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AMTRUNK due to indecision. He was going to appeal to TFK than Volksy & Sorel.

Had some contacts but no real action capability, In '65 Burn & Peay ousted.

Sorel & Volksy both Polish met in Cuba in 195-60

SECRET

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunes  
suspected agent who defected Dec 62  
joined AMTRUNK, returned to Cuban after

SECRET

0002305

X in 65 to exfiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RABBIT a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibly

DMTRUNK might have been an impure Cuban plan from the beginning. If so then was trying to do some info & exfiltration.

M.b.

NY Daily News 20-25 Apr 1975 by Paul Marshall  
- quotes Sturgis on assassin attempts including using Juanito to bomb Castro I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US)

Sturgis' id of Fata, prior to its disclosure by Cuban investigator, was in progress & what he knew

Office of Senate wrote memo on 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1962 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Bianconi in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be & fills in Castro's plot or unit.

Since CIA didn't until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan

SECRET

- Lorenz claims Sturgis would have in 1960

Venez

~~SECRET~~

30 0  
0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MOB support for exile

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receiving some of that support

Strugis could have learned of Cuban's role after Yrba settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement of a person jailed in Cuba w/ Traff.

### Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he was given a rifle & a memento will Mtro. Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Andean column re Antonio Varela

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Hydaco) he proposed to C/H. The Unsmiling Castro In 1970 report he made a proposal to an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

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1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents

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so probay same plan

0002308

1. 27 March 1961 AMBROME 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in  
Havana & hit Castro at Sport Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with different  
time on 30 March but no commun or  
assassination

3. 5 April 61

only own for 50 min, would try  
9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBROME infiltrated several times  
& finally executed 30 August 62 after May  
62 arrest. Reported as pure drafting he was  
CIA & not mentioned in McGeorge Bundy

b) AMCOAX 11 ~~both~~ persons in

c) AM PUE 11 touch w/ AMBROME

d) AM PANIC 17 mentioned in McGeorge Bundy, Doug  
38 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P-0  
none had assassination mission. Only  
AMBROME mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]  
claimed he had plans for invasion within  
30 days after Kennedy's fall.

Reply was that info was  
untrue & (Moratori) unknown.

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50 3 May 61

- from a member of Revolutionary Recovery movement saying they would try to kill Fidel today" <sup>0002309</sup>
- Reply was "Leave"
- May be from Puf /

Tab D

AM LASST

- Rejects notion that AM LASST a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AM LASST is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as well performer; best approach in chief consequence allowed to recruit his own cohorts.

P 3-4 Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Barker off AM LASST lead Summary & Findings list C/A had not proposed anything at that time. In fact until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AM LASST told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov he was reported as being en route to Guatemala.  
"if something unlikely" AM LASST

P 26 SEC FOIA Rpt. ~~SECRET~~

On 24 Nov. Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico,

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Puyane was to determine significance  
LHO's contact w/ Soviets

But AM/LHSTH 11 name was excluded  
in reference to contact between a number  
of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural  
attache. NOT a report of a meeting between  
AM/LHSTH 11 and the Soviets

"F" role - Cleary did not know of  
AM/LHSTH 1963 association w/ CTI

Table 5

24 Nov 63 Sub: Cuban Reaction to Policy  
Assassination of Benito Hernandez

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)  
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FBI request, Agency agrees Alvarado  
be furnished to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCF-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)  
Supt - Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCF-3/779,814 (CT/SCB,  
Supt: Jack Ruby - LHO

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20 March 1964 CSCF-3/780/012 (SR/CDFR)  
Photos of individual classified LHO

~~SECRET~~

10 June 1964 C 5 CI - 3181,841 (CCT/Roll)  
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 C 5 CI - 316101446-64

VIA DUCT inform on 9 Sept 1964

No Comments on 7 Photos Forwardly ~~7000~~

W.C. Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

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RECORDED

June 21/1977

1977 D.O. Report

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1 Comments on Part D

The columns of the CFTI on base are sums of judgment of how various individuals shall be handled, and in the case regarding of Dawn Tooley equal attention is given that the SSC Final Report failed to have been relevant to the Woman Comm Inquiry.

2. It stated further of the SSC Final Report is that the exercise of the influence against them showed a negative influence on the quality of their support for the W.C. investigation.

"If your pleasure ... investigate or they should have ... facts ... or  
Closely ... information, I?"

A central feature of the attitude in the Unitek staff of Carter had toward these activities it would have caused him in mitigation against D.O. Tooley, the SSC Final Report make it clear that it felt this theory should have been pursued and accepted at the time of the W.C. since it was not to mention the W.C. called for a review of the Government Unitek program to see what it might reveal.

Any view you may take fully on the Final Report & part four of "the

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result of an evolution in perception.  
The Program itself is 63 from  
both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs,  
Mikellinis, along with the array of US  
Colon program.

If the 55 C FA did what has been to  
emphasize instead CIA operated actions  
against Cuba is requiring specific attention.

#### Review of Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ know detail of 1963  
& 1964 operations for the most part are no  
longer available. Primary reliance is now on  
memoranda.

CIA has now conducted such a  
review - being at "the other end"  
of a possible chain of evidence, when they  
theoretically could have started. This has  
produced no new evidence bearing on the  
massacre, altho' it has produced the basis  
for new basis of speculation. In fact, the  
review sometimes seemed to become  
a kind of apologetic or trying to fit  
facts to the program they  
rather than being all so easily  
disbelieved actually play on the  
massacre of Mrs. Kennedy. In other  
words became one of asking if this  
happened (which will not make much)  
would have worked out to do after  
the assassination. President Kennedy had

had Carter) learned of it. The SSC, in its final report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the KMTB/T operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

AMH/KH

The Agency had set a terrible ulterior with this man during Mrs. Kennedy's life, altho the SSC final report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so intensively in the SSC final report, it is treated in a separate entry in this paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Mrs. Kennedy death the Agency ~~had~~ with KMTB/T was amorphous and without substance. Had Carter learned of it he could ~~not~~ have only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p14 New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Nitkin in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturz as follows:

"In 1964 I was working in the New York Customs office. I had

Access to the Prime Minister's office, stages  
said. To today Fidel's private secretary from  
Orta. F recruited him to work with the  
Workers' (newspaper emblem) Party.

"He (Sturgis) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of C.I.A., altho this is in mind of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the C.I.A. liaison employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Arota was the director of the office of the  
Santos Márquez, which gave him power that  
would make it possible for him to poison  
Castro. The plan failed because Mr.  
lost his position, and with it his man,  
in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery  
of the poison pills to him on 1st Feb or  
early March 1961. Other info in this section  
was over when he took refuge in the  
Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He  
was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964  
and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

Same news since and me 13 June 1974  
relationship between Stagni and Tschudi,  
the majority of whom Roman as a  
family author of Tschudi. Only  
recently written a memorandum in 1975, noting

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a connection between Stang and Johnson in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Precious Art Spiegel is reported to have had a role in gamblers and for his availability due to his "lost papers." One could deduce that Stang and Orlin could have known one another because of their connection with the gamblers themselves as well as having contacts with the men heading the gamblers' organization.

From 1974 Stang also makes claim by Manita (Manita) Loveng that she and her husband of Stang in 1960 in Jonestown in Jerry's face claim.

Quotes - FBI memo on Beauchamp:  
"This seems to confirm some hot  
gossip a woman to kill C.I.A. with poison  
knows, the timing of event does not fit the  
time from home to C.I.A. While consideration  
had been given to various schemes,  
there were no C.I.A. pills for killing  
until February 1961. It suggests that the  
syndicate may have been money  
head or its man."

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In fact, it is possible that Vienna  
already was involved in independent

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operations with the command syndicate when first appeared prior to P-17 guys in March 1961 to intercept the Cuban messages. The 1967 DO Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1960, underlines support by the command underground for some of the Cuban rebels. The other report, on 18 Janu 1961, suggests that Vann was one of those giving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

To late as June 64 another younger plot in Miami area for 15 days.

I speculate that when Vann was killed in April 1962 can officer felt "blue" over somethy already "ongoing."

It is possible that CDTI simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate itself had underway.

In a sense CDTI may have been proxy banking in the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions note also supplying an aura of "legit" source for

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