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to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cuban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, **high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party** says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that

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this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Communists which have been repeated to us, have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first

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Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information mentioned above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it increased in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One **of our Brazilian agents** took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An **Argentine** trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

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sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Argentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any determined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smuggled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send

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ANNEX D - ECUADOR

Well-placed and reliable agents have reported that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than \$40,000 to the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training.

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean paratroopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano, and Efraín Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders involved with the guerrilla operation in order to restore full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him undergoing guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac. Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name.

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An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla warfare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up business firms to cover espionage and agent operations, and information on location of and access to police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian police, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that persuaded the junta to move against the extremists.

The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peruvian authorities to have received his guerrilla training in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops because the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bolivian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Communist share of the \$100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

As one example of the activities of the coordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guerrillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills.

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