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responses to the committees. Did you . . .

MR. HALPERN: I wasn't in there so I can't say. But I would say based upon what I know about the bureaucracy, it had to have a bad impact, a very adverse impact on: a. the morale of the people, b. the initiative of the people, which goes to zero or less than zero, you know, why should I stick my neck out kind of thing. It's got to then badly impact on any prospective agent you might want to recruit. A foreigner's got to have rocks in his head to be willing to work for the US Government these days in a clandestine capacity. And if I were a Case Officer today, I'd have to think about the sanity of the guy I am trying to recruit. Doesn't he read the newspapers? Doesn't he watch television? In my day, we were able to protect the identities of a source. Really protect the identity of a source. And there were really, literally, no more than a handful of people who knew the true name of an individual. They might know something about the guy's background, his capabilities, his access, that kind of stuff. A person might never ask but even if they did it would go in one ear and out the other. We usually referred to sources by their cryptonyms. And that was good enough for us. And that goes all the way up to Director. True names were things that you just don't talk about. And so in this day and age though, I'm not sure they can protect the true name of an individual. I was told, this is all hearsay, I was told that during the Carter administration that true names of agents were requested by and given to staff members of the White House staff. They obviously had the authority to ask for it and somebody gave it to them. I don't know how often that was done, but it was done enough. The mere fact that the cryptonym, mind you the cryptonym, of Hussein, King Hussein, from Jordan was front page of The Washington Post and that scared the pants off them. And that was early on in

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of Mount Sinai. You know. And he said, "Most of these things are done by people like you and me." He said, "I don't know what you had for breakfast. Whether you had a fight with your wife. Whether you had a cold and a headache that day." And a lot of these decisions are done this way. And they are made at the spur of the moment. They are human decisions by human beings. And I remember very clearly, I was still wet behind the ears, this is 1948 or '49, '49 I guess it was. I happened to be the desk officer in **Indonesia (Clandestine Services).**

And we had very good operations. This was, oh yes, the Dutch police action, I guess, in '49. And we had a very good agent in Indonesia who was able to follow and keep us very current, almost minute by minute, actually hour by hour the location of where the Dutch were taking the Indonesian political leader that they had captured in Jakarta. And where they were moving him, from city to city to city to city or town to town to town to town and where they finally put him. And I was going over regularly because I didn't want to trust the telephone. And I was going over from the old building around the well known Reflecting Pool. I was grabbing the intelligence and it was in raw form. We didn't even bother going through the Reports Board in those days which had to clear everything go out, be sure the commas and the semicolons were in the right places and what have you. And I had some hot intelligence that I got permission from my boss just take it over to my opposite--well, he was more than my opposite number, he was the Chief of the

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South East Asia desk -- all the Southeast Asian countries --

William S.B. Lacey, W.S.B. Lacey. Nice guy. Nice big moustache.

INTERVIEWER: L-A-C-E-Y?

MR. HALPERN: L-A-C-E-Y I think. Yeah, Bill Lacey. And I was

all of 26 or 27 at that time. And I kept bringing this stuff over to him. Piece by piece. As we got it. I was wearing a path between us and the State Department and the Reflecting Pool where we were. And I saw how US policy toward the Dutch and hanging onto Indonesia, how that changed like that. Bill Lacey said to me, he said, "The Dutch should have told me -- not the US -- should have told me that they were going to do this and what they were going to do with the political leaders. They should not have surprised me." Sure, Bill. I said, "I'm not involved in that, I'm just giving you the poop. You are making the policy." He says, "You're damn right, Sam." He says, "As of now Indonesia is going to be a free country. And we are not going to stop the Indonesians. We are not going to help the Dutch anymore. They didn't tell me that they were going to do this."

INTERVIEWER: Oh wow.

MR. HALPERN: There's American foreign policy.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, exactly.

MR. HALPERN: Right there. You know, Bill didn't have to sit around with a lot of people, a lot of staff. I'm sure he went and got whatever he needed to do to get the thing approved and

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in the air.

INTERVIEWER: How about a couple of the Senators, Church and Mondale, have emphasized that accountability to the President and to the Congress was needed. And they were referring to the Agency.

MR. HALPERN: Yeah, I think you have to have accountability. And we always thought we had accountability. We went and got our money from Congress to do all the covert action that everybody is objecting to now. They didn't object then. I mean, those handful of guys didn't. I mean, the so-called Laos Secret War. They provided every penny. We don't make our own money. We don't print our own money. We might print somebody

else's counterfeit money but that is another story. But the Congressional leadership knew. Again, under the ground rules that the Congress laid down we always had oversight. Four oversight committees. We reported to those four oversight committees. If they didn't want to listen, if they didn't want to ask questions and if they didn't want to know more, that's their problem, not ours. We've got a war to fight, kind of. But we keep on going. When they stop us, we stop. And yeah, you've got to have Congressional Oversight. The system we've got, fine. But oversight is oversight. Oversight does not mean management. Not in my opinion anyway. Oversight does not mean daily running of the office. And I am told that there are guys on the Hill, and they've got badges just like the next guy. They've got all the clearances. They've got badges and

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overruling Seymour most of the time or some of the time. I don't know. But I can't imagine Bolton, knowing Seymour very well indeed, that Seymour would want to go rushing forward with this thing because if nothing else, Bolton was a political animal. He had the best political sense of many guys there.

INTERVIEWER: He did?

MR. HALPERN: Oh, he was terrific on this. He was basically a political action officer and always was. And particularly in Germany, he knew the German scene very well indeed. And the German leaders very well indeed, some of whom were on his

payroll. But that is another story. Or had been on his

payroll, let me put it that way. Years ago. Anyway, I can see Colby saying, "Oh I know better than that, Seymour. I know how to handle those guys. Let me handle it my way. And I'll handle it my way." But Seymour would be a good staff officer and provide Colby with all the information that Colby should have. And it would be up to Bill then to make the decision on what to do. That Congressman, I think, thought there was much more and thought that probably Bill was holding out on him. My own gut feeling, and it is purely that, was that Bill did not hold out. And he wasn't trying to hold anything back. I think he really believed, probably to this day, that he did the right thing by making things easier by showing a cooperative spirit, by putting things forward, and I think the other apocryphal statement I made, you know, about, do you have to go to