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parent WH Division. In that year total obligations for Cuban operations were <sup>99</sup> \$41,498,743, or almost four times the <sup>99</sup> \$11,003,991 spent in the rest of Latin America. Except for Cuba 1961 was a representative year, and these were the obligations for regular stations throughout the hemisphere:

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Brazil	\$1,498,101	Colombia	\$301,389
Mexico	1,384,505	Dominican Rep.	261,148
Venezuela	922,424	Costa Rica	231,351
Argentina	802,302	El Salvador	222,037
Chile	646,768	Honduras	103,820
Panama	579,310	Nicaragua	92,088
Uruguay	521,082	Haiti	77,675
Guatemala	418,778	Paraguay	54,606
Peru	380,422	West Indies	41,864
Ecuador	336,367	Puerto Rico	24,377
Bolivia	303,210		

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Until the nearly 1,200 prisoners taken at the Bay of Pigs could be ransomed with shipments of pharmaceuticals, CIA regularly supported their dependents in the United States. In the opinion of the General Counsel, if a dependent had sued, courts would probably have found that Cuban Brigade members were entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Thus by mid-1962 CIA was disbursing \$311,500 per month to the dependents, plus bonuses and medical care for invaders who managed to return. These expenses, however, were paid from special funds outside

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CIA had seven different microphones in the Cuban Embassy, one hidden in a leg of the coffee table in the Ambassador's office. Like most audio operations, this one produced a lot of chaff, but it also yielded bits of operational information showing connections between the Embassy and local Communists and students. At the airport the station was getting photographs of all travellers to Cuba, plus about 300 photos per day of their passports and documents.

<sup>24</sup>  
[Included in the take from the Cuban Embassy were the serial numbers of weapons bought by Communists for smuggling into Guatemala, plus the names and positions of the sellers. Complicating the exploitation of this information was the fact that the weapons had been sold by Mexican officials, and while the station wanted to stop the smuggling and apprehend the Communist smugglers it had no desire to upset sensitive relations with the Mexican Government.]

8 [Two high-level officers of the Cuban Embassy, one of them the cultural attache] were recruited CIA penetrations. The station had sent three agents into Cuba and was getting reports from them by secret

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blocs in the country: Barrientos, supported by the campesinos; General Alfredo Ovando Candia, supported by the army; and the Communists and leftists, supported by tough mine and factory workers. To have Barrientos elected, CIA first had to promote a credible election by underwriting the campaigns of both the selected winner and his token opposition at the polls.

98 The real question was whether elections would be held at all. In 18 months the La Paz Station spent \$585,000, first to persuade the armed forces to clamp down on the leftists, then to persuade Barrientos to run, then to convince Ovando he should not interfere, and finally to promote enough political opposition to make the election plausible. In a genuine tour de force, COS Lawrence M. Sternfield produced what OAS observers called a democratic and honest election--and got the results from the electoral tribunal four days before the election.

On 7 April 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson presided at a White House meeting which laid down general guidelines for CIA action against Cuba. Others at the meeting included Secretary of State

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be considered in order to make sure that we will have the ability to speak to him when or if the time comes. On this score I do not feel there is any reason for worry. There are a number of ways in which we can communicate to Fidel Castro virtually at a moment's notice. 312/

Part of CIA's economic warfare against Cuba involved an elaborate scheme to supply tampered petroleum additives through an Agency mechanism **in Antwerp.** This was planned as subtle sabotage; after being mixed with Soviet petroleum the additives would surely but imperceptibly incapacitate Cuban machinery. Unfortunately, the doctored additives proved anything but subtle and the Cubans promptly discovered they were unusable. 313/

Also a failure was an attempt by Francis S. Sherry and William C. Boner, Jr., of the Cuban Operations Group (WH/COG) to persuade **Detroit automobile** executives to produce spare parts deliberately designed to break down. Sherry and Boner went to **De-**  
**troit** in early March 1965 and explained to **manufac-**  
**turing** vice presidents that the defective parts could be sent to Cuba through third-country suppliers. But **the automobile executives** refused to cooperate; they feared that their companies' reputations would

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in Mexico. <sup>319/</sup>

CIA's clandestine information on Oswald, including a photograph showing him in front of the Soviet Embassy, was turned over to the FBI, which promised to safeguard Agency sources and methods. Instead, the Bureau showed the photograph to Oswald's mother in Dallas and told her it was a CIA photo. The mother gave the press a garbled story about the photo, the FBI gave the press the correct story, and eventually CIA's clandestine information became part of the voluminous Warren Commission report on the Kennedy assassination. In the process Mexico City Station had to abandon its photosurveillance base houses, which had been thoroughly blown. <sup>320/</sup>

In the early 1960's WH Division built an extensive political polling mechanism around the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, a proprietary whose project cryptonym was JMTUBA. From 1962 to 1966 the institute conducted 20 polls in nine Latin American countries. Their cost cannot be computed because many of the expenses were charged to other projects.

In FY 1965, for example, political polls in

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