A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide consisting of two overlapping parallelograms. The front one is blue and the back one is a light green. They are positioned diagonally, with the blue one partially covering the green one.

# Request Mutation and Why WAFs Can't Save You

Dylan Ross



# \$ whoami

- Pentester at ivision
  - <https://research.ivision.com>
  - Focus on web apps, APIs, Android stuff, and embedded devices
- RPISEC alumnus
- The guy who factored an RSA key



ivision


The logo for ivision, featuring the word "ivision" in a bold, dark blue sans-serif font. The letter "o" is stylized with a blue circular graphic element that appears to be a partial ring or a stylized eye.

# Request Mutation



# It's not just WAFs

- It is important to note this technique does not just apply to WAFs
  - Input sanitization is another common defense technique that request mutation works against
- Could work for server-side and client-side attacks
- That said, let's talk about WAFs








# What the WAF?

- Before I go too far, let's talk about what a WAF is
- Web Application Firewall

“A WAF or web application firewall helps protect web applications by filtering and monitoring HTTP traffic between a web application and the Internet. It typically protects web applications from attacks such as cross-site forgery, cross-site-scripting (XSS), file inclusion, and SQL injection, among others.” - Cloudflare <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/glossary/web-application-firewall-waf/>







# What counts as malicious?

- WAFs need a way to detect malicious requests
- This is done through heuristics and pattern recognition
  - Weird characters like < and >
  - Absolute file paths
  - File uploads that don't match the declared MIME type






# Request Mutation

- Sometimes, the input will change *after* being approved by the WAF
- Imagine a database that HTML-decodes all input
- The WAF no longer knows what's malicious...







# Request Mutation

- “A technique where user input is changed *after* being approved by a security control into a value that would be blocked by that control” - Me
- WAFs are generic, they can't know what the server will do to the data after it gets approved
- WAFs, input filtering, etc all work on incoming data. They don't look at outgoing data

# Real Example






# Background

- .NET application using the ASP.NET Request Validator
  - Basically a WAF built into the web server
- Microsoft SQL Server
- User input stored in SQL database before being returned in future responses
  - Looking for stored XSS

# Request Validator



# Request Validator

- According to the docs, the request validator looks for unencoded HTML within requests
- Can't get XSS the old-fashioned way, need to mutate somehow






# SQL Server

- SQL Server performs unicode best-fit mapping
  - This isn't very well documented, and it's hard to know that it happens...
- Best-fit mapping effectively takes unicode characters and tries to change them into the ASCII character that it “looks like”
- Can actually see the mappings at <http://unicode.org/Public/MAPPINGS/VENDORS/>



# SQL Server

- Example: test database where the **Comment** column has type **varchar(50)**
- Run **INSERT INTO BlogComments VALUES ('ȚȚȚ');**



The screenshot shows a SQL query window with the text `SELECT * FROM BlogComments;`. Below the query, there are tabs for 'Results' and 'Messages'. The 'Results' tab is active, displaying a table with one row and one column. The column is labeled 'Comment' and the row contains the value 'ȚȚȚ'.

	Comment
1	ȚȚȚ



# Best-fit Mapping

- That shows best-fit mapping
- As previously mentioned, the mappings are publicly available

0x0118 0x45 ;Latin Capital Letter E With Ogonek

0x015e 0x53 ;Latin Capital Letter S With Cedilla

0x0164 0x54 ;Latin Capital Letter T With Caron

# Best-fit Mapping

- Maybe we'll find some mappings that are useful to us...

0xff1c   0x3c   ;Fullwidth Less-Than Sign

0xff1e   0x3e   ;Fullwidth Greater-Than Sign

< looks a lot like <, and > looks a lot like >





# Now we're getting places

```
INSERT INTO BlogComments VALUES ('<script>alert()</script>');  
SELECT * FROM BlogComments;
```

100 %



Results




Messages

	Comment
1	TEST
2	<script>alert()</script>

# Request Mutation

- Now we have everything we need for request mutation
  - There are security controls acting on the input that block our attacks
  - The data can be sneakily changed after being checked





# Surprisingly Common

- Since I first discovered this behavior, it keeps popping up
  - I now have a favorite Unicode character
- In addition to WAFs, have bypassed custom input filters
- Usually involves Microsoft SQL Server in my experience





# Defenses

- WAFs are good as a defense-in-depth
  - They're not sufficient on their own
- Place your security controls as late as possible
  - Location depends on the attack vector
  - Reduce opportunity for mutation after the controls
- Be aware of what software dependencies try to be helpful and change data for you
  - For Microsoft SQL Server, make sure your column can store Unicode
- Use character allowlists where possible







# Contact

- Please reach out if you have questions or comments!
- [dross@ivision.com](mailto:dross@ivision.com)

