# Perceived versus Calibrated Income Risks in Heterogeneous-agent Consumption Models

Tao Wang, Bank of Canada January 4, 2024, ASSA 2024

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#### Roadmap

#### Motivation

**Empirical Evidence** 

Framework

Perceived v.s. calibrated risks

Unemployment risks

Perceived risks and decisions


#### Mode

Objective mode


Subjective mode

Conclusion


## Conventional calibration: estimated from panel data




# This paper: reported perceived risks in a survey




#### Perceived versus Calibrated Risk



# Heterogeneous risks → differential savings



# Smaller risks → lower level of savings



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### Log wage process

$$\underbrace{w_{i,t}}_{\text{log wage}} = \underbrace{z_{i,t}}_{\text{predictable by the agent}} + \underbrace{e_{i,t}}_{\text{stochastic component}}$$

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Wage growth

$$\Delta w_{i,t+1} = \Delta z_{i,t+1} + \Delta e_{i,t+1}$$

- individual i at time t
- the time-series nature of  $e_{i,t}$  to be specified later

### Perceived risks (PR)

• To the agent: conditional variance under FIRE

$$Var_{i,t}^*(\Delta w_{i,t+1}) = Var_{i,t}^*(\Delta e_{i,t+1})$$

# Perceived risks (PR)

To the agent: conditional variance under FIRE

$$Var_{i,t}^*(\Delta w_{i,t+1}) = Var_{i,t}^*(\Delta e_{i,t+1})$$

• To econometricians: approximated unconditional variance

$$Var_c(\Delta \hat{e}_{i,c,t+1}) = Var_c(\Delta w_{i,t+1} - \Delta \hat{z}_{i,t+1})$$

- $\hat{e}_{i,c,t+1}$ : the first-step regression residual controlling observable vars
- group c: assumed to share income process/risks
  - e.g. education/year of birth/gender/age

### Limitations with risk estimates from panel data

- Superior information/unobservable heterogeneity:  $\hat{z}_{i,t} \neq z_{i,t}$ 
  - $\hat{z}_{i,t}$  unlikely capture all in the information set of i at t
    - 1. Intrinsic heterogeneity of individual i
    - 2. Foresight about individual circumstances

## Limitations with risk estimates from panel data


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- Model misspecfication
  - lacksquare Risks may differ within group c

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    - 1. Intrinsic heterogeneity of individual i
    - 2. Foresight about individual circumstances
- Model misspecfication
  - $\blacksquare$  Risks may differ within group c
- Surveyed PR can be a useful alternative
  - Directly conditional on information set of each i at t
  - $\blacksquare$  No need to restrict risk heterogeneity by group c
  - But need to be careful with measurement errors


### Perceived risk v.s. wage volatility

#### Conditional v.s. unconditional




- PR < wage volatility</li>
- PRs are more heterogeneous than the dispersion of wage volatility explained by observable factors


# Average PR < calibrated risk



### PRs < calibrated risks within groups



### PRs < calibrated risks within groups




- The wage risk estimates by Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri, 2010:
  - low education: permanent risk = 0.09, transitory risk = 0.08
  - high education: permanent risk = 0.106, transitory risk = 0.08

What explains the PR heterogeneity?

- Observables + time FE:  $R^2 = 0.10$
- Individual fixed-effects only:  $R^2 = 0.60$


# Accounting for the survey evidence




Fit a truncated log-normal dist over the cross-section of PRs



#### Perceived UE risks and realization





realizations are computed from CPS panel data of workers following
 Fujita and Ramey, 2009

# Individual PRs explain their own spending decisions

$$E_{i,t}(\Delta c_{i,t+1}) = u_0 + u_1 E_{i,t}(\Delta w_{i,t}) + \frac{\mathbf{u_2}}{\mathbf{v_2}} Var_{i,t}(\Delta w_{i,t+1}) + \xi_{i,t}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
expected wage growth	0.324***	0.306***	0.254***	0.243***	
	(0.0825)	(0.0828)	(0.0334)	(0.0334)	
perceived wage risk	6.127***	6.185***	2.096***	1.711***	7
	(1.163)	(1.165)	(0.439)	(0.442)	
perceived UE risk next 4m					0.353***
					(0.0553)

	(1.103)	(1.100)	(0.439)	(0.442)	
perceived UE risk next 4m					0.353*** (0.0553)
R-squared	0.000939	0.00318	0.953	0.953	0.633
Sample Size	56046	56046	56046	56046	6269
Time FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Individual FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Higher perceived risks → higher expected spending growth.

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
Conclusion


#### Model overview

- Overlapping generation
- Uninsured idiosyncratic income risks
  - Permanent+ transitory idiosyncratic wage shock
  - Persistent unemployment spells
- Partial/general equilibrium
- No aggregate risk a la Krusell and Smith, 1998
- A blend of Huggett, 1996 and C. D. Carroll, 1997
- Only one risk-free asset
- Calibrating income risks using survey versus estimates from panel
- Extension: subjective model
  - subjective PR ≠ objective income risks

#### StE distribution in the baseline model


- $\sigma_{\psi}=0.15$ ,  $\sigma_{ heta}=0.15$ , U2U=0.18, E2E=0.96 other parameters
- H2M: net liquid asset < half-month income Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2018</li>







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


### Model Comparisons





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 $\text{HPRUR: } \sigma_{\psi} = \sigma_{\theta} = [0.01, 0.02, 0.04] \text{, } U2U = [0, 0.02, 0.24] \text{, } E2E = [0.96, 0.99, 1.0]$ 

# Taking stock

Model/Data	Gini	Bottom 0.9	Bottom 0.7	Bottom 0.5	Mean wealth/income ratio	H2M share
SCF (liquid)	0.88	0.18	0.04	0.01	0.67	0.34
baseline (PE)	0.64	0.47	0.22	0.10	1.17	0.01
LPR (PE)	0.72	0.40	0.15	0.06	1.06	0.04
HPR (PE)	0.69	0.45	0.17	0.07	1.03	0.04
HPRUR (PE)	0.79	0.33	0.08	0.03	0.70	0.17
SHPRUR (PE)	0.81	0.29	0.08	0.03	0.78	0.16
SCF (net worth)	0.81	0.29	0.09	0.02	6.72	0.12
baseline (GE)	0.64	0.47	0.22	0.10	2.17	0.00
LPR (GE)	0.71	0.41	0.15	0.07	1.20	0.03
HPR (GE)	0.67	0.46	0.18	0.08	1.23	0.02
HPRUR (GE)	0.73	0.41	0.14	0.06	1.12	0.11
SHPRUR (GE)	0.76	0.35	0.12	0.05	1.22	0.10

Extension: subjective PR

#### Key assumption:

- Ex-ante: saving decisions ← subjective PRs
- Ex-post: realized income inequality ← objective size of income risks

#### Two purposes:

- A robustness check: what if PRs are incorrect?
  - but we did find people behave according to their PRs
- A model breakdown into ex-ante and ex-post channels

#### Evolution of the distribution over state variables

objective:


$$\psi_{\tau}(B) = \int_{x \in X} \underbrace{P(x, \tau - 1, B)}_{\text{transition funcs}} d\psi_{\tau - 1} \quad \text{for all} \quad B \in B(X)$$


subjective:

$$\tilde{\psi}_{\tau}(\tilde{B}) = \int_{\tilde{x} \in \tilde{X}} \tilde{P}(\tilde{x}, \tau - 1, \tilde{B}) d\tilde{\psi}_{\tau - 1} \quad \text{ for all } \quad \tilde{B} \in \tilde{B}(X)$$

 $ightharpoonup ilde{P}$  depends on both subjective and objective risks

# Subjective (SHPRUR) v.s. Objective (HPRUR)





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- People's saving behaviors better explained by their perceptions
   ... than what economists assume to be their perceptions
- Survey data can inform incomplete-market macro models
  - Direct evidence for heterogeneity in perceptions that *matter*
  - Closer to agents' information set that truly affects their decisions
- More work needed on
  - heterogeneous beliefs in HM models
  - understanding risk perception formation

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  - "heterogeneity or risk": Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005, Primiceri and Van Rens, 2009, Guvenen and Smith, 2014
  - "insurance or information": Pistaferri, 2001, Kaufmann and Pistaferri, 2009, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011, Kaplan and Violante, 2010
- subjective/probabilistic survey of beliefs: Manski, 2004, Delavande, Giné, and McKenzie, 2011, Manski, 2018, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Armantier et al., 2017
- incomplete market macro: Bewley, 1976, Aiyagari, 1994, Huggett, 1996, Krusell and Smith, 1998, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante, 2009, C. Carroll et al., 2017, Krueger, Mitman, and Perri, 2016, Bayer et al., 2019
- consumption/saving under incomplete information/imperfect perception: Pischke, 1995, Wang, 2004, Rozsypal and Schlafmann, 2017, C. D. Carroll,

## Benchmark model

$$\max \quad \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\tau=0}^{\tau=L-1}(1-D)^{\tau}\beta^{\tau}u(c_{i,\tau})\right]$$
 
$$\underbrace{a_{i,\tau}}_{\text{Savings}} = \underbrace{m_{i,\tau}}_{\text{Cash in hand}} -c_{i,\tau}$$
 
$$\underbrace{m_{i,\tau+1}}_{\text{Income tax}} = a_{i,\tau}R + (1-\underbrace{\lambda}_{\text{Income tax}})(1-\underbrace{\lambda}_{\text{SS}})y_{i,\tau+1}$$
 
$$a_{i,\tau} \geq 0$$

- CRRA:  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}$
- Work age:  $\tau = 1, 2, ..., T$ ; retirement :  $\tau = T + 1, ..., L$  (since entering job market)
- Survival probability: 1-D

# Income process over the life-cycle

income

$$y_{i,\tau} = n_{i,\tau} W$$
$$n_{i,\tau} = p_{i,\tau} \xi_{i,\tau}$$

permanent component

$$p_{i,\tau} = G_{\tau} p_{i,\tau-1} \psi_{i,\tau}, \quad log(\psi_{i,\tau}) \sim N(-\sigma_{\psi}^2/2, \sigma_{\psi}^2) \quad \forall \tau \leq T$$

# Income process over the life cycle

income

$$y_{i,\tau} = n_{i,\tau} W$$
$$n_{i,\tau} = p_{i,\tau} \xi_{i,\tau}$$

persistent/transitory component

$$\xi_{i,\tau} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \theta_{i,\tau} & \text{if} \quad \nu_{i,\tau} = e \quad \& \quad \tau \leq T, \quad log(\theta_{i,\tau}) \sim N(-\frac{\sigma_{\theta}^2}{2}, \frac{\sigma_{\theta}^2}{2}) \\ \zeta & \text{if} \quad \nu_{i,\tau} = u \quad \& \quad \tau \leq T \\ \mathbb{S} & \text{if} \quad \tau > T \end{array} \right.$$

• transition probability between  $\nu = u$  and  $\nu = e$ 

$$\pi(\nu_{\tau+1}|\nu_{\tau}) = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} & 1 - \mathbf{0} \\ 1 - E & \mathbf{E} \end{bmatrix}$$

Technology

$$Y = ZK^{\alpha}N^{1-\alpha}$$

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Government (balance budget)

$$\lambda \left[ 1 - \Pi^{\mho} + \zeta \Pi^{\mho} \right] = \zeta \Pi^{\mho}$$
$$\lambda_{SS} \sum_{\tau=1}^{T} G_{\tau} (1 - \Pi^{\mho}) = \mathbb{S} \sum_{\tau=T+1}^{L} G_{\tau}$$

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- Demographics
  - Stable age distribution  $\{\mu_{\tau}\}_{\mu=1,2,..L}$

$$\mu_{\tau+1} = (1-D)\mu_{\tau}, \quad \sum_{\tau=1}^{L} \mu_{\tau} = 1$$

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### Value function and transitions

Value function

$$\begin{split} V_{\tau}(\underbrace{\nu_{i,\tau}, m_{i,\tau}, p_{i,\tau}}_{x_{i,\tau}}) &= \max_{\{c_{i,\tau}, a_{i,\tau}\}} \ u(c_{i,\tau}) \\ &+ (1-D)\beta \mathbb{E}_{\tau} \left[ V_{\tau+1}((\nu_{i,\tau}, m_{i,\tau+1}, p_{i,\tau+1}) \right] \end{split}$$

Transitions

$$\psi_{\tau}(B) = \int_{x \in X} \underbrace{P(x, \tau - 1, B)}_{\text{transition funcs}} d\psi_{\tau - 1} \quad \text{for all} \quad B \in B(X)$$

- $\blacksquare$  B(X): distribution measure on state space X
- $lack \psi_{ au}$ : distribution over state variables x for agents in age au
- lue  $\psi_1$  depends on initial draws of income shocks

# Stationary equilibrium (StE)

- ullet Optimal consumption and saving policies given W , R ,  $\lambda$
- Distribution evolution consistent with optimal c and a policies and income risks
- The factor markets clear

$$\sum_{\tau} \mu_{\tau} \int_{X} a(x, \tau) d\psi_{\tau} = K$$

$$\sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} \mu_{\tau} \Pi_{\tau}^{E} = N$$

• Firm optimization under competitive factor markets.

$$W = Z(1 - \alpha)(K/N)^{\alpha}$$


$$R = 1 + Z\alpha (K/N)^{\alpha - 1} - \delta$$


### Calibration of the benchmark model


Block	Parameter name	Values	Source
risk	$\sigma_{\psi}$	0.15	Median estimate from the literature
risk	$\sigma_{\theta}$	0.15	Median estimate from the literature
risk	U2U	0.18	Median estimate from the literature
risk	E2E	0.96	Median estimate from the literature
initial condition	$\sigma_{\psi}^{init}$	0.629	Estimated for age 25 in 2016 SCF
initial condition	bequest ratio	0	assumption
life cycle	n	0.005	U.S. census
life cycle	T	40	standard assumption
life cycle	L	60	standard assumption
life cycle	1 - D	0.994	standard assumption
preference	ρ	2	standard calibration
preference	β	0.96/0.98	standard calibrations
policy	S	0.65	U.S. average
policy	$\lambda$	N/A	endogenously determined
policy	$\lambda_{SS}$	N/A	endogenously determined
policy	$\mu$	0.15	U.S. average
production	W	1	target values in steady state
production	K2Y ratio	3	target values in steady state
production	$\alpha$	0.33	standard assumption
production	δ	0.025	standard assumption

# Calibrating heterogeneous PRs

Fit a truncated log-normal dist over the cross-section of PRs










# Deterministic wage profile over life cycle



Estimated from SIPP with a fourth-order age polynomial regression