ADP 3-0
OPERATIONS

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OPERATIONS

Contents

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Preface

ADP 3-0 constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains. It sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for multidomain operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the core for training and Army education system curricula related to multidomain operations.

The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army use this publication as well.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for more information on the law of armed conflict.)

ADP 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms and definitions for which ADP 3-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are bolded and italicized in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ADP 3-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 3-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@army.mil; on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCD (ADP 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

ADP 3-0 describes how the Army, in multidomain operations, contributes to the joint operational concept of unified action to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate military activities designed to overcome the challenges posed by peer threats, such as Russia and China. These peer threats employ capabilities and formations unlikely to be defeated by single, decisive attacks focused on a specific domain. Army forces need an approach to victory based on the ability to build advantages over time, attacking multiple decisive points, across five domains—land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace—and in all three dimensions: physical, information, and human.

The strategic environment and U.S. policy drove the development of multidomain operations. The Army focuses its readiness on China and Russia because they pose the greatest threats to U.S. vital interests. They, and to a lesser extent North Korea and Iran, possess capabilities to contest U.S. Army and joint forces in every domain. Their focus on stand-off capabilities presents challenges and opportunities that require Army forces to employ a multidomain approach as part of a larger joint and multinational team. Multidomain operations demand a shift in mindset that includes thinking beyond how the joint force enables operations on land—Army forces must be able to enable operations in other domains for the overall joint force to win.

Multidomain operations expand combined arms beyond the traditional one- and two-domain approaches to the full depth of an enemy's capabilities and formations. Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of enemy capabilities and formations by disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations and by exploiting opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail.

ADP 3-0 modifies key topics and updates terminology and concepts as necessary. These topics include the discussion of an operational environment, operational and mission variables, and operational framework, as well as discussions of unified action and combat power. ADP 3-0 maintains combined arms as the application of arms that multiplies Army forces' effectiveness in all operations. However, it expands combined arms to include joint and multinational capabilities as integral to combined arms and discusses how the Army conducts these operations across multiple domains. (For more detailed information on specific tactics and procedures, see FM 3-0.)

ADP 3-0 contains four chapters:

Chapter 1 defines military operations, in context, for the Army. It describes the Army's view of war and warfare and provides two general methods for conducting warfare: conventional warfare and irregular warfare. The chapter describes the current strategic environment facing the Army and introduces the Army's strategic contexts. It provides an explanation of unified action and how the Army supports joint operations through execution of the Army's four strategic roles. Finally, it discusses the importance of training to gain skill in land warfare.

Chapter 2 is a discussion of the warfighting functions and combat power. It defines the warfighting functions and describes how the application of the warfighting functions in complementary and reinforcing ways generates combat power. It defines combat power and identifies the dynamics of combat power: leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and survivability. The chapter concludes with a discussion on considerations for organizing combat power through force tailoring, task organization, mutual support, and reconstitution.

Chapter 3 addresses the Army's operational concept of multidomain operations. It identifies the key challenges facing the Army today, and it describes how commanders will likely apply landpower as part of multidomain operations to defeat enemy forces on land and establish conditions that accomplish the joint force commander's objectives. The chapter defines the tenets and imperatives of multidomain operations. The chapter ends with a discussion on the strategic and operational frameworks and their application to the conduct of operations.

Chapter 4 provides the Army's support to joint campaigning. It defines and describes operational art and the elements of operational art. This chapter addresses the application of operational art. It details how commanders should consider defeat and stability mechanisms when developing an operational approach. It also discusses the operations structure commanders use to array forces and conduct operations.

See introductory figure for ADP 3-0 logic chart.

Certain terms for which ADP 3-0 is the proponent have been added, rescinded, or modified. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. (See introductory table beginning on page viii for a listing of new, modified, and rescinded Army terms.)

As outlined in the National Defense Strategy, the U.S. joint force addresses pacing and acute threats, rogue regimes, violent extremist organizations, and transboundary challenges through unified action.

Army forces contribute to unified action through...

Strategic roles
Shape operational environments; Counter aggression during crisis; Prevail during large-scale combat operations; Consolidate gains.

and

Multidomain operations
The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.

Multidomain operations are conducted as part of joint campaigns and guided by operational art during the strategic contexts of competition, crisis, and armed conflict.

Competition ⟷ **Armed conflict**
Crisis

Army forces synchronize warfighting functions to generate combat power against enemy forces during operations...

respecting the

Principles of war
Objective   Offensive   Mass   Economy of force   Maneuver
Unity of command   Security   Surprise   Simplicity

reflecting the

Tenets of operations
Agility   Convergence   Endurance   Depth

executed through

Offensive operations   Defensive operations   Stability operations
Defense support of civil authorities

to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains that meet joint and national objectives.

Introductory figure. Logic chart

Introductory table. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms

Term	Reasoning
agility	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
close operations	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
combat power	ADP 3-0 adopts joint definition.
command and control warfighting function	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
consolidate gains	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
consolidation area	ADP 3-0 rescinds term.
conventional warfare	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
convergence	ADP 3-0 modifies and takes proponency from FM 3-0.
cyberspace electromagnetic activities	ADP 3-0 moves proponency to FM 3-12.
decisive action	ADP 3-0 rescinds term.
decisive operation	No longer a defined term
deep operations	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
defensive operation	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
disintegrate	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
dislocate	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
endurance	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
fires warfighting function	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
flexibility	No longer a defined term.
human advantage	New term and definition.
hybrid threat	ADP 3-0 moves proponency to TC 7-100.
irregular warfare	ADP 3-0 modifies and takes proponency from FM 3-0.
large-scale ground combat operations	No longer a defined term.
line of effort	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
maneuver	ADP 3-0 moves proponency to ADP 3-90.
movement and maneuver warfighting function	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
multidomain operations	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
national strategic level of warfare	ADP 3-0 modifies and takes proponency from FM 3-0.
operational framework	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from ADP 1-01.
physical advantage	New term and definition.
position of relative advantage	No longer a defined term.
protection warfighting function	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
rear operations	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
relative advantage	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
sector	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
setting the theater	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
shaping operation	No longer a defined term
simultaneity	No longer a defined term.
stability operation	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
support area operations	ADP 3-0 modifies and takes proponency from FM 3-0.
supporting distance	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.
sustaining operation	No longer a defined term.
sustainment warfighting function	ADP 3-0 modifies definition.

Introductory table. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms (*continued*)

Term	Reasoning
theater strategic level of warfare	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.
unified land operations	No longer a defined term.
zone	ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0.

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Chapter 1

Foundations

This chapter starts with a discussion on war. It then covers Army strategic roles, the strategic environment, and operational environments. It also describes how Army forces support joint campaigns and unified action. The chapter concludes with discussions of readiness and theory of victory.

OPERATIONS AND WAR

1-1. The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. Army forces accomplish their missions by conducting operations on behalf of the joint force commander (JFC) and achieving objectives on land that contribute to sustainable policy outcomes, as determined by U.S. political leadership. An *operation* is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Army forces conduct operations to achieve objectives that are in the United States' national interest. Army forces prepare to conduct operations across the range of military operations as part of a larger joint effort with allies and partners.

WAR AND WARFARE

1-2. War is chaotic, lethal, and a fundamentally human endeavor. It is a clash of wills fought among and between people. All war is inherently changing human behavior with each side trying to alter the behavior of the other by force. Success requires the ability to outthink an opponent and exploit the opportunities that come from positions of relative advantage. The side that is best prepared, best understands an operational environment, adapts more rapidly, and acts more quickly in conditions of uncertainty is the one most likely to win.

1-3. Understanding friendly, enemy, and other environmental factors is essential to being able to create and exploit the relative advantages that allow Army forces to defeat adversaries and enemies using economy of force. Commanders cannot presume that superior military capability alone creates the desired effects on an enemy force. Intangible factors, such as leadership, morale, will, surprise, and the human condition, can overcome physical disadvantages and decide the outcome of operations. Commanders apply both the art of command and science of war. They continually synchronize and converge all elements of combat power to obtain a relative advantage by influencing enemies and populations, eroding the enemy's will, and achieving their higher commanders' intended purposes.

1-4. War is inextricably tied to the people inhabiting land. All military capabilities ultimately link to land. In most cases, the ability to prevail in ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking an enemy force's will. Understanding the human context that drives the enemy's will, which includes culture, economics, and history, is as important as understanding the enemy force's military capabilities.

1-5. While the nature of war does not change, the way in which armies conduct warfare does change based on many factors. The factors can include policy objectives and relative advantages of the opposing sides, popular will and national interests, methods employed, types of capabilities employed, and the influence of terrain and weather.

1-6. Warfare rarely fits neatly into a specific category, but it often reflects a blend of conventional and irregular warfare methods. **Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states.** Conventional warfare is almost always complemented and reinforced by irregular warfare. **Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and nonmilitary capabilities by state and nonstate actors to achieve policy objectives other than military domination of an enemy, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.** Irregular warfare is historically the most common form of warfare conducted by Army forces and combines a variety of methods and types of forces to achieve objectives. (See FM 3-0 for more information on conventional and irregular warfare.)

OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND STABILITY

1-7. Offensive, defensive, and stability operations occur during conventional and irregular warfare. Divisions and higher echelons typically perform some combination of all three operations simultaneously in their operations. However, the lower the echelon, the more likely that formation will focus on conducting one type of operation at a time.

1-8. Offensive and defensive operations dominate the conduct of large-scale combat operations and focus on the destruction of an opponent's ability to fight. Offensive operations are generally high-risk efforts, but they have the greatest impact on the enemy. Defensive operations hold ground, economize combat power, and buy time to generate combat power for future offensive operations. Although large-scale combat focuses on enemy forces, Army forces conduct minimum stability tasks throughout armed conflict because of moral, legal, and mission requirements.

1-9. Offensive operations impose the commander's will on an enemy force. An *offensive operation* **is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers.** The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical advantage. Offensive operations capitalize on speed, surprise, and shock to destroy enemy forces. If an offensive operation fails to destroy an enemy force, operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. An offensive operation compels an enemy force to react, creating new or larger weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of the offense.)

1-10. Defensive operations preserve control over land, resources, and populations, and they retain key terrain, protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against attack. A *defensive operation* **is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.** Normally the defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek to destroy as much of the attacking enemy force as possible. Commanders can conduct defensive operations in one area to free forces for offensive operations elsewhere. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of the defense.)

1-11. Stability operations contribute to regional security in support of U.S. security and humanitarian interests. They can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions in an area while supporting a transition of responsibility to a legitimate authority. Stability operations involve coercive and constructive action. A *stability operation* **is an operation conducted outside the United States, in coordination with other instruments of national power, to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.** Stability operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Army forces are required to perform minimum-essential stability tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. Army forces establish civil security and civil control, and they provide for immediate needs, including food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risk they can accept to the mission. (See ADP 3-07 for a detailed discussion of stability.)

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

1-12. When directed, Army forces conduct operations in support of civil authorities and in support homeland defense operations. Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) are tasks executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. It is performed to support another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. DSCA is support provided in response to requests for assistance for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (Refer to DODD 3025.18 for details on DSCA. See the glossary for the full definition of DSCA.) When the Secretary of Defense authorizes DSCA, National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under federal military command and control at all times.

1-13. The Department of Defense (DOD) has lead responsibility for homeland defense. *Homeland defense* is the military protection of United States sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or,

as directed by the President, other threats (JP 3-27). The strategy for homeland defense (and DSCA) calls for defending U.S. territory against attack by state and nonstate actors through an active, layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and to simultaneously protect the homeland. The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland. (See DODD 3025.18, JP 3-27, JP 3-28, and ADP 3-28 for detailed discussions of DSCA and homeland defense.)

LEVELS OF WARFARE

1-14. Army leaders understand their environment and organize their activities among four levels of warfare—national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical. Commanders use the levels of warfare model to help visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a strategic purpose, informed by the conditions within their operational environments.

1-15. The *national strategic level of warfare* **is the level of warfare at which the United States government formulates policy goals and ways to achieve them by synchronizing action across government and unified action partners and by employing the instruments of national power.** The national strategic level of warfare focuses on developing global strategy and providing global strategic direction.

1-16. The *theater strategic level of warfare* **is the level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners and employ all instruments of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of the national strategy.** Based on strategic guidance, theater army commanders update their theater strategic estimates and develop theater strategies to support their combatant commands.

1-17. The operational level of warfare links the tactical employment of forces to national and theater strategic objectives. The *operational level of warfare* is the level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives (JP 3-0). The operational level of warfare focuses on the design and building of an operational approach to execute major operations or globally integrated joint campaigns. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on campaigns and operational art.)

1-18. The *tactical level of warfare* is the level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military objectives (JP 3-0). The tactical level of warfare involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.

ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES

1-19. Army forces accomplish their mission by supporting the joint force and unified action partners in four strategic roles. The Army's strategic roles are shape operational environments, counter aggression during crisis, prevail during large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles are not tasks to subordinate units. They clarify the enduring reasons for which the Army is organized, trained, and equipped. Army forces demonstrate credible combat readiness and discourage malign adversary behavior on land. The threat of lethal force supports integrated deterrence and makes other instruments of national power more effective.

SHAPE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-20. Army operations to dissuade adversary activities strive to achieve regional goals short of military conflict and establish conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a military confrontation. The Army provides trained and ready forces to combatant commanders to support the execution of joint campaigns. Theater armies and subordinate Army forces help the combatant commander build partner capacity and capability while promoting stability across an area of responsibility. Successful prosecution of large-scale combat operations in one theater of war can deter adversary malign behavior in other theaters.

1-21. Army forces help the joint force shape operational environments through many activities. These activities include—
- Supporting security cooperation.
- Maintaining a forward presence to promote U.S. interests.

- Developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Continuously setting and maintaining the theater for the joint force.
- Providing peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners.
- Demonstrating credible combat capabilities during training and exercises.

1-22. Accomplishing objectives to strengthen the global network of multinational allies and partners and to prevent conflict requires regionally aligned and engaged Army forces. Army forces pre-position equipment in areas that enable national leaders to respond quickly to contingencies. Army forces conduct operational readiness, training, and planning for potential operations as home station activities that also shape operational environments.

COUNTER AGGRESSION DURING CRISIS

1-23. Army forces enable the joint force to counter aggression on the ground when an adversary begins to escalate tensions in a theater of war. Typically, indications and warnings provide signs that an adversary intends to conduct military operations or activities. Army support to countering adversary aggression aims to change an adversary's risk calculus by immediately raising the adversary's costs for actions that threaten U.S. interests. Operations and activities designed to counter aggression are time sensitive and weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and to indicate U.S. intent to begin execution of an operation plan if needed.

1-24. As part of a joint force, Army forces often have a significant role in the execution of directed flexible deterrent options and flexible response options. These responses could include shows of force and demonstrations to highlight selected ground force capabilities and demonstrate national will. Army operations and activities designed to counter aggression may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other predeployment activities. They may also involve initial deployment into an operational area, including echeloning command posts; employing intelligence collection assets; and further developing communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the JFC's concept of operations. No matter the methods selected, successfully countering aggression requires the demonstrated ability to rapidly deploy a properly manned, equipped, and trained Army force that can enable the joint force to prevail in large-scale combat operations.

PREVAIL DURING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1-25. *Large-scale combat operations* **are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives.** When conducted on land, large-scale combat operations involve multiple corps and divisions. Large-scale combat can occur above and below the nuclear threshold and is not synonymous with total war. Planning for large-scale combat operations against enemies possessing nuclear weapons and the will to employ them must account for the possibility of their use against friendly forces. The operational approaches employed by JFCs may thus be constrained to avoid nuclear escalation in terms of their geographic depth and assigned objectives. Large-scale combat operations, while potentially enormous in scale and scope, are typically limited by the law of armed conflict and political objectives of the conflict itself. Against nuclear-armed enemies, the political objectives of a conflict are also informed by the strategic risk inherent in escalation. While the scale and scope of conventional conflict since 1945 has been smaller than World War II, large-scale combat operations retain their inherent lethality and complexity.

1-26. During large-scale ground combat, Army forces focus on defeating enemy ground forces as part of a joint and combined team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break an opponent's will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, perform stability tasks, and consolidate gains to accomplish national objectives during joint campaigns. Field armies (when constituted), corps, and divisions are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale ground combat operations. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy's ability to continue a conflict. Conflict resolution usually requires Army forces to conduct sustained operations with unified action partners to consolidate gains as long as necessary to accomplish national objectives.

1-27. Successful operations against peer threats with chemical and nuclear weapons have unique planning considerations. Operational commanders must understand the risk of an enemy miscalculating the consequences of first use and units must be prepared to operate degraded in contaminated environments.

Army forces survive, maintain cohesion, and continue to operate and achieve objectives in chemical and nuclear environments. Planning and training include active and passive measures for protection against the effects of these weapons and techniques for mitigating their effects to preserve combat power. This planning and training includes greater emphasis on dispersion, survivability, and redundant communications at all echelons. Survivability in contaminated environments is a training and readiness imperative. Survivability must be incorporated into every facet of doctrine and training, so units and commanders are operationally and psychologically prepared for the environments they may encounter. (See ATP 3-72 for more information on operations in a nuclear environment.)

CONSOLIDATE GAINS

1-28. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving success across the phases of an operation. *Consolidate gains* **are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable strategic environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.** Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation as part of defeating enemy forces in detail and accomplishing overall political and strategic objectives.

1-29. Consolidation activities are a form of exploitation performed while other operations are ongoing, and they enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time. When commanders consolidate gains throughout an operation, they may accept the risk of slower tempo in the near term to prevent the enemy from protracting the conflict with bypassed or irregular forces that can be reorganized to continue fighting. Some circumstances exist when a commander accepts risk by deciding to consolidate gains in a later phase during operations because of an initial need to conduct operations at a higher tempo.

1-30. Army forces perform consolidation activities through and with unified action partners. In some instances, Army forces will oversee activities to consolidate gains. In other situations, Army forces will support an ally or partner. Army forces may consolidate gains for a sustained period over large land areas. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the overall focus of Army forces at the conclusion of large-scale combat operations.

1-31. Army tactical forces integrate indigenous populations and institutions to consolidate gains. Indigenous populations and institutions are the societal framework of an operational environment that includes governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private entities. Effectively integrating indigenous populations and institutions significantly reduces the need for U.S. Army conventional forces to conduct security and stability operations. Commanders integrate special operations forces and civil affairs forces to effectively plan and execute operations with indigenous populations and institutions. (See JP 3-57 for additional information on civil-military operations.)

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

1-32. The strategic environment is characterized by great power competition. It includes a wide range of threats and hazards that face the nation—none more dangerous to U.S. vital interests than large-scale combat operations against peer threats. To better describe this fluid environment, joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. The joint competition continuum establishes three broad categories of strategic relationships—cooperation, adversarial competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These relationships are defined as between the U.S. and other strategic actors relative to a specific set of policy aims. (See JP 3-0 for more information about the joint competition continuum.)

1-33. Combatant commanders, working with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, campaign across the competition continuum in a globally integrated manner to employ limited military resources in the most efficient way possible. Theater armies support joint campaigns across the competition continuum with Army forces in their assigned areas of responsibility.

STRATEGIC CONTEXTS

1-34. Army formations below the theater army level typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. Within these contexts, Army forces execute operations. There are three strategic contexts in which Army forces conduct operations:
- Competition below armed conflict.

- Crisis.
- Armed conflict.

1-35. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or nonstate adversaries have incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete using all instruments of national power to gain and maintain relative advantages that help them achieve their goals. Competition is when Army forces prepare for crisis or armed conflict, exploit opportunities to demonstrate U.S. commitment to allies and partners, and help set conditions to prevent crisis or armed conflict through activities that contribute to deterrence. Army forces enable deterrence through training, by enhancing interoperability with key multinational allies and partners within the strategic landpower networks, and by maintaining a high level of individual and unit readiness.

1-36. A crisis may occur when adversary behavior creates undesirable conditions to which the United States must respond. A *crisis* is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indications and warnings of imminent action. During crisis, armed conflict has not yet occurred, but it is a distinct possibility that requires rapid response by forces prepared to fight.

1-37. Armed conflict occurs when a state or nonstate actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Entering and terminating armed conflict is a political decision. Army forces may enter armed conflicts either with some advanced warning or abruptly if an enemy provides no clear warning or indications. How well Army forces are prepared to enter an armed conflict ultimately depends upon decisions and preparations made during competition.

1-38. No matter the context, the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve forces support the defense of the homeland. The interconnected global capabilities of peer threats, terrorist groups, and proxy groups require Army forces to assume all current and future operations will impact the homeland in some manner. This means the total Army contributes to homeland defense and DSCA. Army forces are uniquely postured to provide national, state, and local leaders with the requisite capabilities and capacity to counter adversary and enemy activities across the homeland.

THREATS AND HAZARDS

1-39. Threats are a fundamental part of an operational environment. A ***threat*** **is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland.** Threats may include individuals, organized or unorganized groups, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliance forces. Threats to the United States are hybrid, reflecting a range of different capabilities, types of forces, and methods combined in ways that make them resilient, adaptive, and difficult to defeat in a single, decisive effort. Commanders and staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time.

1-40. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy force with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where the threat enjoys multiple positions of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographic proximity to a conflict area. Peer threats may also have a cultural affinity with specific regions, providing them relative advantages in the physical, information, and human dimensions. They generate national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical challenges that contest the joint force in all domains.

1-41. In general, threats qualify as either an enemy or an adversary. An ***enemy*** **is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized.** An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as one under the laws of war. Enemies will apply advanced technologies, such as a cyberspace attack, and simple and dual-use technologies, such as improvised explosive devices. Enemies avoid U.S. strengths, such as long-range surveillance and precision strike missiles, through countermeasures, such as Global Positioning System (known as GPS) jamming, integrated air defense systems, dispersion, concealment, and intermingling with civilian populations. An *adversary* is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Below the threshold of armed conflict, Army forces

contribute to integrated deterrence by preparing to defeat adversaries, countering adversary aggression, and controlling escalation of violence.

1-42. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. Hazards include disease, extreme weather phenomena, solar flares, and areas contaminated by toxic materials. Hazards can damage or destroy resources, reduce combat power, and contribute to early culmination that prevents mission accomplishment. Commanders consider hazards and their effects on operations in the context of terrain, weather, and various other factors related to a particular mission.

1-43. Peer threats can employ resources from multiple domains to create lethal and nonlethal effects throughout an operational environment. To achieve their operational and strategic objectives, they often will seek to delay deployment of U.S. forces and inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short time. Peer threats use various methods to employ their instruments of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. Five broad methods, used in combination by peer threats, include—
- Information warfare.
- Preclusion.
- Isolation.
- Sanctuary.
- Systems warfare.

(See FM 3-0 for an expanded discussion on contested deployments and these five broad threat methods.)

1-44. Enemies and adversaries pursue antiaccess and area denial (known as A2AD) approaches, putting U.S. power projection at risk and enabling an extension of their coercive power well beyond their borders. As a result, the United States may be unable to employ forces with complete freedom of action. The ability of U.S. forces to deliberately build up combat power, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct operations on their own initiative will likely be limited.

1-45. Threats might use cyberspace attack capabilities (such as disruptive and destructive malware), electronic warfare, and space capabilities (such as electromagnetic pulse weapons). These capabilities can create a denied, degraded, and disrupted space domain to disrupt—
- U.S. communications.
- Positioning, navigation, and timing.
- Synchronization.
- Freedom of maneuver.

(See FM 3-14 for detailed space operations.) Finally, threats may strike installations inside and outside the continental United States to disrupt or delay deployment of forces. Cyber and space threats are not specific to any single theater of operations since there are few geographic constraints on their employment.

CURRENT THREATS

1-46. While states are the principal actors on the global stage, violent extremist organizations continue to undermine regional security in areas such as Southwest Asia and Africa. These groups radicalize populations, incite violence, and employ terror to further their political and social goals. Violent extremist organizations often coexist with criminal organizations, where both profit from illicit trade and the spread of corruption, to further undermine security and stability. Violent extremist organizations may be in possession of or be in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction which threaten stability across the globe and in the United States. To meet these threats, the Army maintains doctrine and subject matter experts focused on irregular approaches. Army leaders recognize that significantly less risk occurs in transitioning a force optimized for large-scale combat operations to conduct less intense types of operations than in taking a force organized, trained, and equipped for less intense operations and transitioning it to conduct large-scale combat operations.

1-47. Rogue regimes are a persistent threat to U.S. interests. They can contest the joint force under certain circumstances and achieve objectives counter to U.S. policy. Currently, North Korea seeks to guarantee survival of its regime and to increase its leverage. It actively stocks both conventional and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and it adds to its ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Similarly, Iran seeks dominance over its

neighbors by asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony. Iran uses state-sponsored terrorist activities, a network of proxies, and its missile capabilities to achieve its objectives.

1-48. China and Russia possess capabilities and forces that are evenly matched with those of the U.S. joint force, and they can threaten U.S. survival and its vital interests. Their combination of threat methods makes them difficult to counter during competition and difficult to defeat in a single, decisive effort during armed conflict. China and Russia employ standoff capabilities that increase risk to the joint force's ability to access and maintain freedom of maneuver throughout contested areas. China and Russia both combine irregular and conventional approaches in pursuit of their objectives. During competition, China and Russia pursue their objectives without triggering armed conflict with the United States but while employing irregular methods that include information warfare. Large-scale combat operations against China and Russia represent the least likely, but most demanding, type of conflict for Army forces. Therefore, during competition, Army forces must prepare for large-scale ground combat operations.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-49. When preparing for armed conflict, commanders and staffs consider a set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Leaders use these variables together to analyze an operational environment. An *operational environment* is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains understood through three dimensions (physical, information, and human). Army forces also consider operational and mission variables to understand their operational environment.

DOMAINS AND DIMENSIONS

1-50. A *domain* is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills (FM 3-0). Army leaders conceptualize an operational environment that includes five domains (land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace) and three dimensions (physical, information, and human). Despite the domains being differentiated by their physical characteristics, the dimensions remind leaders that Army forces conduct operations to influence human behavior. The dimensions enable commanders and staffs to better assess relative advantages and anticipate the impacts of their operations. (See Figure 1-1 for a depiction of the domains and dimensions of an operational environment.)

1-51. Although leaders must understand the broad interdependencies among the domains, no two operational environments are the same. An operational environment consists of many relationships and interactions among interrelated variables. How entities and conditions interact within an operational environment is often difficult to understand and requires continuous analysis using operational and mission variables.

1-52. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military operations. Commanders and staffs continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their assumptions. (See FM 3-0 for an expanded discussion of operational environments.)

Figure 1-1. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-53. Commanders and staffs use operational and mission variables to build an understanding of an operational environment. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population's influence on it. Using the Army design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations.

MISSION VARIABLES

1-54. Upon receipt of an order, Army leaders filter information from operational variables into mission variables during mission analysis. The mission variables known as METT-TC (I)—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations—act as a filter. Army leaders use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the situation. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables with the mission variables ensures that Army leaders consider the best available information about the mission. (See FM 5-0 for more information on the operational and mission variables.)

ARMY SUPPORT TO JOINT CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

1-55. Army forces support joint campaigns in various ways, including integrating with unified action partners, conducting a range of military operations, and dominating close combat on land. The joint force persistently campaigns to build credible integrated deterrence. When deterrence fails, the joint force campaigns to impose the nation's will on its enemies. *Campaigning* is the persistent conduct of related operations, activities, and investments that align military actions with the other instruments of national power, supporting global integration across the competition continuum in pursuit of strategic objectives (JP 3-0). The Army primarily contributes to joint force campaigning and integrated deterrence efforts by providing forces able to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas.

1-56. Swift campaigns, however desirable, are the historical exception. Whenever objectives involve controlling populations or dominating terrain, campaign success usually requires employing landpower for protracted periods. ***Landpower*** **is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.** The Army's expeditionary campaign capabilities provide sustained landpower to support unified action.

1-57. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, and force projection—from anywhere in the world—all contribute to the Army's expeditionary capabilities. The Army's ability to sustain forces from all Services and designated allies and partners provides the joint force with the endurance required to sustain campaigns through to mission accomplishment. (See Chapter 4 for more information on campaigning.)

1-58. Army forces continuously develop a global landpower network with allies and other unified action partners. Conventional forces and Army special operations forces contribute in different ways to develop and maintain this network across the competition continuum.

INTEGRATING WITH UNIFIED ACTION PARTNERS

1-59. Army forces conduct multidomain operations as part of the joint force and unified action. *Unified action* is the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1). Commanders improve the cohesion of unified action partners by cultivating unity of effort. *Unity of effort* is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action (JP 1, Volume 2). All participants contributing to an operation are considered unified action partners. ***Unified action partners*** **are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.** Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after campaigns and subordinate operations. (See paragraphs 3-1 through 3-3 for more information on multidomain operations.)

Joint Operations

1-60. Single Services may perform tasks and missions to support DOD objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more Services in a single operation across all domains, particularly during combat, through joint operations. *Joint operations* are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). A *joint force* is a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments that operate under a single joint force commander (JP 1, Volume 1). Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action using all domain approaches.

1-61. Army forces are the dominant U.S. fighting force in the land domain. Army forces both depend upon and enable the joint force across the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains. This mutual interdependence creates powerful synergies and reflects the fact that all operations by Army forces are combined arms conducted in multiple domains and dimensions. Army forces depend on other Services for strategic and operational mobility, joint fires, and other key enabling capabilities. Army forces support the other Services, combatant commands, and unified action partners with ground-based indirect fires and ballistic missile defense, defensive cyberspace operations, electromagnetic protection, communications, intelligence, rotary-wing aircraft, logistics, and engineering.

1-62. The Army's ability to set and sustain a theater of operations enables joint force freedom of action. ***Setting the theater*** **is the broad range of activities continuously conducted to establish conditions for the successful execution of operations in a theater.** Setting and maintaining the theater for the joint force never ends. It is conducted to enhance an operational environment in ways favorable to friendly forces, and it occurs during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. While setting the theater occurs across each strategic context, its importance is greatest during competition because that is when friendly forces have the initiative and the most available time. Army forces must set the theater during competition to enable quick transitions during crisis and armed conflict, when the initial time advantage is with the aggressor. Each warfighting function has a role in setting the theater. Army forces use military engagements, security cooperation, and other activities to assess and understand the current conditions within the theater and to execute specific

theater setting activities. Setting the theater enables Army forces, the joint force, and interagency partners to conduct successful offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA. Army forces establish, maintain, and defend vital infrastructure. They also provide the JFC with unique capabilities, such as port and airfield opening; logistics; CBRN defense; and reception, staging, and onward movement, and integration of forces.

Coordination and Cooperation

1-63. Interagency coordination is integral to successful unified action. *Interagency coordination* is the planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using established liaison, personal engagement, and planning processes.

1-64. Unified action may require interorganizational cooperation to build the capacity of unified action partners. *Interorganizational cooperation* is the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Building partner capacity and capabilities helps to secure populations, protects infrastructure, and strengthens institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity and capabilities results from comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements united by a common purpose. The Army integrates capabilities of operating forces and the institutional force to support interorganizational capacity and capability-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation interactions.

1-65. When directed, Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations. Within the context of interagency coordination, this refers to non-DOD agencies of the U.S. Government. Other government agencies include, but are not limited to, the Departments of State, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture.

1-66. An international organization is created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states or for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the United Nations, the European Union, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and International Red Cross.

1-67. Army forces and nongovernmental organizations are often in situations when their interests overlap. A *nongovernmental organization* is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). The mission is generally humanitarian and not one concerned with assisting military forces in accomplishing their objectives. In some circumstances, nongovernmental organizations may provide humanitarian aid simultaneously to elements of both sides in a conflict.

1-68. A contractor is an individual or business, including authorized subcontractors, that provides products or services for monetary compensation, or other consideration, in accordance with the terms and conditions of a contract. Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support, but it may also include interpreter communication, infrastructure, and other related support. Contractor employees include contractors authorized to accompany the force as a formal part of the force and local national employees who normally have no special legal status. (See ATP 4-10 for more information on contractors.)

1-69. Most civilian organizations are not under military control, nor the control of the American ambassador or a United Nations commissioner. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces; others may not. Civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have begun, making personal contact and team building essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as much as possible with Army and joint operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison. (See FM 3-57 for more information on civil-military integration.)

Multinational Operations

1-70. Army forces should anticipate that most operations will be multinational operations demanding human, technical, and procedural interoperability with allies and partners in accordance with campaign requirements. *Multinational operations* is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). While each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to an operation. Each nation's force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to an operation's legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. (See FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.)

1-71. Whether being conducted as part of an alliance or a coalition, multinational operations are challenging. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (commonly known as NATO), allow partners to establish formal, standard agreements. Army forces must understand and abide with standard agreements. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Nations usually form coalitions for specific, limited purposes. A coalition action is an action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually in a narrow area of common interest. Army forces may participate in coalition and alliance actions under the authority of a United Nations' resolution or other international agreement. By preparing for armed conflict with allies and partners, Army forces can effectively participate in an alliance or a coalition.

CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION

1-72. Army forces integrate conventional and special operations forces to create complementary and reinforcing effects during operations. The mission and operational environment drive the command and support relationships between conventional and special operations forces during an operation. Regardless of command and control and support arrangements, both types of forces integrate and synchronize operations to increase effectiveness, provide mutual support, limit the redundant use of resources, and reduce the risk of fratricide. Army forces establish human, technical, and procedural interoperability between conventional and special operations forces as part of integration.

1-73. Conventional forces integrate with special operations forces. During large-scale combat, conventional forces contribute mass across all warfighting functions required to defeat enemy forces. Conventional forces can partner with all unified action partners and employ security force assistance brigades that are specially trained and organized for security force assistance missions. Special operations forces complement conventional forces by performing core activities in deep, close, and rear areas, and in extended deep areas. Army special operations forces are critical integrators of indigenous forces and other unified action partners. A special operations joint task force acts as the unit of execution; facilitates conventional and special operations forces integration, interoperability, and interdependence; and functions as a single special operations forces headquarters to plan, coordinate, command, and control special operations elements in theater and adjacent joint special operations areas. Army special operations forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations units support joint special operations forces and conventional Army formations. (See FM 6-05 for more information on integrating conventional forces and special operations forces.)

THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

1-74. Army forces conduct a wide variety of operations that contribute to joint campaigns and unified action. The range of military operations is a model that helps relate Army operational categories that vary in scope and purpose across the spectrum of violence and Army strategic contexts. During competition and crisis, Army forces conduct operations to shape the strategic environment and prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives without using armed force. During armed conflict, Army forces conduct operations to defeat enemy forces. In all cases, Army forces conduct operations to establish the conditions necessary to achieve their objectives. Grouping operational themes helps to describe the general characteristics of a major operation or campaign, not the details of its execution. Characterizing the employment of military capabilities as one or another type of military operation has several additional benefits. For example, publications can be developed that describe the nature, tasks, and tactics associated with specific types of diverse operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations and counterinsurgencies.

The three operational categories in the range of military operations are—
- Military engagement and security cooperation.
- Crisis response and limited contingency.
- Large-scale combat operations.

(See FM 3-94 for more information on the range of military operations.)

CLOSE COMBAT

1-75. Close combat or the threat of close combat is required to defeat enemy forces. While deep fires are critical to operations, enemy forces retain the ability to continue fighting until they are defeated or destroyed in close combat. The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces maneuver using combined arms to close with and defeat or destroy them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat. **Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets.** Units involved in close combat employ direct fire weapons supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Units in close combat defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize and retain ground. Close combat at lower echelons contains many more interactions between friendly and enemy forces than any other form of combat.

1-76. When conducting close combat, enemy forces may seek to execute operations in difficult terrain where friendly advantages in technology and weapon capabilities are negated. Urban terrain represents one of the most likely close combat challenges. The complexity of urban terrain and the increased density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and long-range weapons. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and a dynamic system of varying operational entities containing hostile forces, local populations, and infrastructure. (See ATP 3-34.80 and ATP 3-06 for additional information regarding complex terrain.)

1-77. Deception operations are essential for successful close combat and limited only by imagination. Tactical deception in close combat operations involve the fight between the committed forces and the readily available tactical reserves of both combatants. Deceptions employed during close operations—
- Can be deliberate or hasty.
- Should center around facilitating the tactical scheme of maneuver and fire support plan.
- Should have localized, immediate effects during battle.

Tactical deception is an activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level commanders to cause enemy decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders' objectives (FM 3-13.4). Commanders conduct tactical deception to influence military operations to gain a relative, tactical advantage over the enemy, obscure vulnerabilities in friendly forces, and enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces.

1-78. Effective close combat relies on lethality informed by a high degree of situational understanding across multiple domains. The capacity for physical destruction is the foundation of all other military capabilities, and it is a building block of military operations. Army formations are organized, equipped, and trained to employ lethal capabilities in a wide range of conditions. The demonstrable lethality of Army forces provides the credibility essential to deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners.

1-79. An inherently complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. In wartime, each situation requires a different mix of violence and restraint. Lethal and nonlethal effects used together complement each other and create multiple dilemmas for opponents. During operations short of armed conflict, the inherent lethality of Army forces enables them to perform other tasks effectively with minimal adversary interference.

READINESS THROUGH TRAINING

1-80. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations. It is the cornerstone of combat readiness and the foundation for successful operations. Effective training must be commander driven,

rigorous, realistic, and performed to the established standard under the conditions in which units expect to operate during combat. Realistic training with limited time and resources demands that commanders focus their unit training efforts to maximize repetitions under varying conditions to build proficiency. Units execute effective collective and individual training based on the Army's principles of training as described in FM 7-0. Through training and leader development, units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct successful operations across the competition continuum. Achieving this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. Training continues for deployed units so they can sustain skills and adapt to changes in an operational environment. (See FM 7-0 for training doctrine.)

1-81. Army training enables formations to determine, acquire, and practice necessary operational skills. The Army's training system emphasizes experiential practice and learning to build teamwork and cohesion within units. It recognizes that Soldiers ultimately fight for one another and their units. Training instills discipline. It conditions Soldiers to operate within the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement. Training prepares unit leaders for the harsh reality of land combat by emphasizing the fluid and disorderly conditions inherent in land operations. Effective training accounts for employing space, cyberspace, and other capabilities that influence the warfighting functions. Training must also account for the threat's use of similar capabilities. Well-rounded training includes candid assessments, after action reviews, and applied lessons learned to ensure improved readiness. Adversaries assess the training readiness of Army forces continuously, which is how training helps to shape operational environments. Training creates combat credibility by demonstrating the ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations against an adversary. This in turn contributes to deterrence.

1-82. Regardless of the importance of technological capabilities, success in operations relies on Soldiers to accomplish the mission. Demanding operational environments require professional Soldiers and leaders whose character, commitment, and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army. Soldiers and leaders adapt and learn while training to perform tasks both individually and collectively. Soldiers and leaders cultivate their ability to exercise judgment and disciplined initiative under stress.

1-83. The complexity of integrating all unified action partners and capabilities across multiple domains into operations is challenging. This complexity demands that Army forces maintain proficiency that is difficult to achieve quickly. Leaders at all echelons seek training opportunities involving conventional forces, special operations forces, the Regular Army, Reserve Components, and unified action partners at home station, at combat training centers, and when deployed. Formations train in contested conditions that emphasize degraded friendly capabilities, reduced time for preparation, and austere expeditionary conditions.

1-84. U.S. responsibilities are global, and Army forces prepare to operate in any environment. Because Army forces face diverse threats and mission requirements, commanders adjust their training priorities based on a likely operational environment. As units prepare for deployment, commanders adapt training priorities and conditions to best address tasks required by actual or anticipated operations.

THEORY OF VICTORY

1-85. The Army is a globally engaged, regionally responsive force that provides its full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in four primary roles. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression during crisis, prevail during large-scale combat, and consolidate gains on land for the joint force. Army forces adapt to shifting operational environments and new technologies in a threat-focused manner that creates dilemmas for opponents. As part of an interdependent joint team, Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations with allies and partners to achieve objectives for joint force commanders. Army forces defeat capable threats through a combined arms approach that creates and expands relative advantages over time. They do so in three operational contexts: competition below the threshold of conflict, crisis, and conflict.

1-86. During competition, Army forces help combatant commanders set theaters and improve regional security in ways that support mutual interests through joint campaigning that involves numerous cooperative actions with other nations' armies. Army forces alter conditions that, if left unchanged, can precipitate international crisis or war. The support the United States provides through Army forces to partner nations improves their ability to secure themselves and improves access to key regions. Security cooperation also communicates the U.S. position to adversaries in those regions. When necessary, combat-ready Army units

deploy to threatened areas, reinforce host-nation forces, complement U.S. air and sea power, and unmistakably communicate American intent to partner and adversary alike. These are tangible effects of the Army's role during competition. Other benefits are less tangible; these benefits are realized through face-to-face training involving Soldiers and military partners. Working together develops interoperability and trust between military forces and furthers the landpower network essential to deterring malign behavior by adversaries. The positive impression Army forces make upon militaries, local leaders, and other government agencies who interact with and observe them on the ground produces lasting benefits.

1-87. During crisis, Army forces set conditions to deny adversaries the ability to achieve objectives at acceptable military and political costs. Crisis activities include actions to protect and secure friendly forces, assets, and partners, and they indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of planned operations. As an extension of operations during competition, Army forces conduct security cooperation tasks designed to thwart the short-term success of an adversary, such as improving the readiness and effectiveness of conventional military forces. Army forces may also assist partners with unconventional capabilities that enable protracted resistance against a more powerful neighbor, should they face occupation after the defeat of their conventional military forces. Credible capability and capacity for long-term irregular warfare can deter adversaries sensitive to the economic and military costs of long-term conflict. Building irregular capability and capacity in partner nations is likely to be more effective in situations where resource constraints and geography make other options unrealistic.

1-88. Preventing conflict during competition and crisis requires combat credible Army forces. To prevent conflicts, friends and adversaries must believe that the Army is credible. Credibility equates to capability, and capability is built upon combat-ready forces that are forward positioned or can be tailored and deployed rapidly. Partner nations under external threat need to understand that introducing U.S. forces alters the regional military balance in their favor and bolsters their capability to resist aggression. Credible Army forces, prepared to win during large-scale combat operations, reduce the risk of miscalculation by an adversary and contribute to integrated deterrence when combined with the capabilities of the joint force, allies, and partners.

1-89. During conflict, Army forces attack and defend against enemy forces using combinations of defeat mechanisms employed through the tenets and imperatives of operations. JFCs require Army forces skilled in the use of combined arms and able to employ all available Army and joint capabilities in complementary ways. If an enemy cannot be defeated from a distance using Army and joint capabilities, then Army units close with and destroy that enemy. Enemies whose operational approach depends upon integrated fires and air defense systems require a level of centralized control and an information collection capability vulnerable to deception, disruption, and isolation. Operations that effectively isolate parts of the system can destroy key components of it in detail. Destroying those components enables rapid tactical maneuver at operational depth and exploits disruptions to the system before the enemy can establish or re-establish the ability to mass effects. Repeatedly exploiting the effects of isolation, destruction, and dislocation ultimately disintegrates the enemy's ability to resist. Establishing conditions for freedom of action while retaining mobility is critical to creating a relative advantage on the ground for maneuver forces to exploit.

1-90. Tactical success wins battles but is not enough to win wars. Enduring security and political outcomes require ending enemies' abilities to resist by following through on initial battlefield successes. Army forces play a vital role in the consolidation of gains. Rapidly consolidating gains is a form of exploitation that transitions tactical advantages into enduring operational and strategic outcomes. Ensuring that enemies cannot transition a conventional military defeat into a protracted irregular conflict that negates initial successes is foundational to victory. Commanders account for every part of an enemy's ability to resist and address it during planning. Consolidating gains builds irreversible momentum towards the desired end state and is a continuous process, and commanders should pursue that momentum towards the desired end state relentlessly.

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Chapter 2

Warfighting Functions and Combat Power

This chapter defines the six warfighting functions and discusses how they generate combat power. It concludes with a description of the dynamics of combat power.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

2-1. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of war. A ***warfighting function* is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.** Warfighting function capabilities are not confined to any domain, and they typically include capabilities from all domains. Each warfighting function complements and reinforces the other functions. Their integration and synchronization generate the combat power available for commanders to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by higher echelons.

2-2. Warfighting functions are not branch specific. Many capabilities that contribute to one warfighting function also contribute to others, often simultaneously. For example, an aviation unit conducting a reconnaissance mission may simultaneously contribute to the command and control, intelligence, and fires warfighting functions. To ensure synchronization across warfighting functions, commanders at all echelons focus on the combined arms employment of specific capabilities in terms of task and purpose over time rather than the warfighting function of the capability.

> *Note.* Although some branches, functional areas, staff sections, and types of units have a role or purpose that aligns with a specific warfighting function, all formations must account for each warfighting function.

2-3. The tasks associated with each warfighting function help establish responsibilities for doctrine, capability modernization, and leader development in the institutional force. However, Army forces take a flexible approach during operations and synchronize tasks based on the situation. The purpose for which Army forces use a capability determines its associated warfighting function in an operational context.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2-4. The primary purpose of command and control is to assist commanders in integrating and synchronizing the other warfighting functions effectively at each echelon, applying combat power to achieve objectives, and applying combat power to accomplish missions. The ***command and control warfighting function* is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to exercise authority and direction to accomplish missions.**

2-5. Command and control synchronize the systems and capabilities that comprise the other warfighting functions. Strategy, operational art, planning, operational approaches, operational frameworks, risk assessment, and decision making are all part of command and control. Command and control reflect leader action and how Army forces achieve unity of effort and unity of purpose during operations. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force through the command and control warfighting function. These tasks are—

- Command forces.
- Control operations.
- Conduct the operations process.
- Employ the command and control system.

2-6. The command and control system includes people, processes, networks, and command posts. All components of the system are critical in supporting effective decision making and the tempo required to defeat enemy forces. The command and control system supports information advantage by developing situational understanding, decision making, and operating networks.

2-7. Mission command helps commanders seize operational initiative by creating and exploiting opportunities within the commander's intent. *Mission command* is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command supports the Army's operational concept of multidomain operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Seizing initiative requires subordinates who seek opportunities and commanders who accept risk for subordinates trying to meet their intent. Subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation help manage uncertainty and enable necessary tempo at each echelon during operations. Retaining operational initiative requires sustained, relentless pressure on enemy forces. Commanders maintain pressure by integrating and synchronizing the warfighting functions to present enemy commanders with continuously changing combinations of combat power at a tempo they cannot effectively counter. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on the command and control warfighting function.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

2-8. The *movement and maneuver warfighting function* **is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage with respect to the enemy.** Movement is necessary to echelon and position the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes these tasks:
- Move.
- Maneuver.
- Employ direct fires.
- Occupy an area.
- Conduct mobility and countermobility.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Employ battlefield obscuration.

2-9. *Movement* is the positioning of combat power to establish the conditions for maneuver (ADP 3-90). Army forces direct movement using movement techniques, using movement control formations, and conducting battle drills to mitigate the risk of making contact with the enemy before maneuvering. Movement includes force projection of forces into a theater of operations. However, movement does not include administrative movements of personnel and materiel which fall under the sustainment warfighting function.

2-10. *Maneuver* is movement in conjunction with fires (ADP 3-90). Through maneuver, commanders can concentrate forces at decisive points and times to achieve surprise, generate lethal and nonlethal effects, and gain operational initiative over enemy forces while protecting their own forces. Preserving combat power is a significant component of maneuver decisions. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Both tactical and operational maneuver requires sustainment support. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on movement and maneuver.)

INTELLIGENCE

2-11. Intelligence drives operations. The *intelligence warfighting function* **is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment.** The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Other significant aspects of a given operational environment include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, which vary with the nature of operations.

2-12. Intelligence is driven by commanders, and it involves conducting operations to develop the situation and analyzing information from all sources. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through operations and intelligence processes, with emphasis on information collection, analysis, and the production of intelligence products. The intelligence warfighting function provides commanders and staffs with observations about the threat and relevant aspects of an operational environment through collection resulting in data that they process and exploit into useable information for analysis and production. This results in intelligence. The intelligence warfighting function includes these tasks:

- Provide intelligence support to force generation.
- Provide support to situational understanding.
- Conduct information collection.
- Provide intelligence support to targeting.

2-13. Timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence enables decision making, optimal tempo, and agility during operations. Due to the fog and friction of warfare, commanders must fight for intelligence and share it with adjacent units and across all echelons. Intelligence supports information advantage by developing an understanding of enemy forces and various populations in an operational environment to enable decision making. (See ADP 2-0 for additional information on the intelligence warfighting function.)

FIRES

2-14. The *fires warfighting function* **is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations.** These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint forces as well as from other unified action partners. Ground-based fires complement and reinforce firepower in the other domains and enable the joint force.

2-15. Commanders must execute and integrate fires with the other warfighting functions to create effects and achieve the desired end state. Commanders and staffs must expect and account for collateral effects of fires within one domain impacting capabilities in other domains. Commanders and staffs must anticipate planning timelines associated with requesting, shifting, and lifting multidomain effects such as space and cyberspace from higher Army echelons or from joint forces. Fires tasks are those necessary actions that must be conducted to create effects in all domains. The tasks of the fires warfighting function are—
- Execute fires across the five domains employing—
  - Surface-to-surface fires.
  - Air-to-surface fires.
  - Surface-to-air fires.
  - Cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare.
  - Space operations.
  - Multinational fires.
  - Special operations.
- Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through—
  - Targeting.
  - Operations process.
  - Fire support planning.
  - Airspace planning and management.
  - Electromagnetic spectrum management.
  - Multinational integration.
  - Rehearsals.
  - Air and missile defense planning and integration.

(See ADP 3-19 for additional information on the fires warfighting function.)

PROTECTION

2-16. Protection encompasses everything that makes Army forces hard to detect and destroy. The *protection warfighting function* **is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve the force, deny the enemy freedom of action, and enable commanders to apply combat power.** The protection warfighting function tasks are incorporated into the operations process in a comprehensive, integrated, layered, and redundant approach to minimize the vulnerabilities of the force.

2-17. Protection activities endure in ways that differentiate them from defensive and specific security operations. While a unit defends for a specific purpose over time, and a formation provides security in a manner that maintains freedom of action, protection is persistent and serves one purpose—the preservation of friendly forces. As they develop their scheme of protection, commanders understand threats and hazards

in an operational environment, including threats from space, cyberspace, and outside their assigned area of operations.

2-18. Prioritizing protection assets is situationally dependent and resource informed. Protection capabilities integration aims to balance protection with the freedom of action throughout the duration of military operations. Commanders balance their protection efforts with the need for tempo and for resourcing the main effort. They often assume risk in potentially vulnerable operations or areas, but these operations or areas are likely low enemy priorities for targeting or attack. Protection is as much about how units conduct operations as it is the employment of specific capabilities designed to provide protection. It is an outcome that results from a variety of tasks, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

2-19. Since protection encompasses everything that makes Army forces hard to destroy, it includes many tasks. Protection can be effectively understood as requirements to manage risk and to protect capabilities, areas, and information. The protection warfighting function tasks include—
* Conduct survivability operations.
* Provide force health protection.
* Conduct CBRN operations.
* Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
* Coordinate air and missile defense support.
* Conduct personnel recovery.
* Conduct detention operations.
* Conduct risk management.
* Implement physical security procedures.
* Apply antiterrorism measures.
* Conduct police operations.
* Conduct populace and resources control.
* Conduct area security.
* Conduct cybersecurity and defense.
* Conduct electromagnetic protection.
* Implement operations security.

(See ADP 3-37 for more information on the protection warfighting function.)

SUSTAINMENT

2-20. Sustainment enables the depth and duration of Army operations. The *sustainment warfighting function* **is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.** Successful sustainment integration and synchronization increases the number of options available to the commander. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements:
* Logistics.
* Financial management.
* Personnel services.
* Health service support.

2-21. The principles of sustainment apply in any context and reflect the fundamental characteristics necessary for victory against a peer threat able to effectively contest the joint force in all domains. The principles of sustainment and the principles of logistics are the same. They are—
* Integration.
* Anticipation.
* Responsiveness.
* Simplicity.
* Economy.
* Survivability.
* Continuity.
* Improvisation.

(See ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for additional information on the sustainment warfighting function.)

COMBAT POWER

2-22. Commanders and their staffs at all echelons employ the art and the science of tactics. The art generally is in the purview of commanders and select staff members whereas the science is everyone's responsibility. Each branch, functional area, or staff section is the master of specific knowledge and the underlying science based upon its training, experience, and focus. Members of a staff must be ready to provide subject matter expertise on all aspects of their specialties. This specialized knowledge on its own, however, is not enough. Large-scale combat operations demand military professionals be more than just experts in their specialties and branches. It requires grounding in the doctrine about combined arms application of combat power. Leaders must understand their unit's specialty, capability, and limitations; the will of their Soldiers; and the best method to employ their specialized knowledge with other units in complementary and reinforcing ways.

2-23. Military operations executed in the land domain require the continuous generation and application of combat power. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). Army forces generate combat power by integrating the systems and tasks of the warfighting functions, and then they use command and control to synchronize its application against enemy forces at decisive places and times or against combinations of objectives across multiple domains.

2-24. Combat power represents the measurable military potential combined with the intangible advantages of an organization. It is viewed in relation to adversary or enemy forces, and it is variable in context. Combat power is based upon a detailed analysis of the underlying science as it applies to the specific operational variables of an area of operations and the mission. The science of combat power largely defines what is possible during operations. It can also provide a way for echelons to divide tasks when resources and time are limited and provide a way to avoid unnecessarily duplicating effort that wastes critical resources. At all echelons, commanders balance the ability to mass effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those effects. At higher echelons, commanders also balance this with the need to employ capabilities and effects that they do not directly control and that are not necessarily deployed in the operational area.

2-25. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield powerful blows that overwhelm enemy forces and create friendly momentum. A combination of five dynamics determines the force of these blows. Each dynamic represents a variable within a formation that changes during operations as circumstances changes. Enemy action, logistical challenges, weather, and fatigue all tend to degrade one or more dynamics during combat. The dynamics of combat power are—
- Leadership.
- Firepower.
- Information.
- Mobility.
- Survivability.

(See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of each combat power dynamic.)

2-26. Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential. Factors that contribute to generating and maintaining combat power include—
- The availability of reserves.
- The ability to rotate combat forces out of close operations prior to culmination, network viability, and access to cyberspace and space capabilities.
- Access to joint support.

Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal effects with the need to employ, protect, and sustain the units that produce those effects. They allocate combat power to the main effort and supporting efforts of an operation to defeat enemy forces, seize objectives, and consolidate gains. (See Figure 2-1 on page 22 for an illustration of generating combat power.)

Figure 2-1. Generating combat power

RELATIVE COMBAT POWER ANALYSIS

2-27. Analyzing relative combat power requires measuring both defined performance parameters and judgment. Relative combat power analysis is not solely a mathematical computation. It is an estimate incorporating both objective and subjective factors. It is also greater than an assessment of opposing formations. It involves assessing tangible factors (such as equipment, weapon systems, units, and capabilities) and intangible factors (such as morale and training levels) of opposing forces. It also considers the mission variables that directly or indirectly affect the potential outcome of an operation. At higher echelons, or in operations short of large-scale combat, it may include relevant operational variables as well. Regardless of echelon, planners begin their analysis by comparing units two echelons lower than their echelon. For example, field army planners having multiple corps assigned would compare divisions. Brigade planners would compare companies.

2-28. Analyzing relative combat power supports calculation of force ratios and comparison of strengths and weaknesses. This analysis allows commanders and their staffs to gain insight into the types of operations possible for both friendly and enemy forces, determine friendly and enemy vulnerabilities, determine any additional resources required to execute the assigned mission, and identify possible ways to allocate existing resources.

ORGANIZING COMBAT POWER

2-29. Commanders consider many factors when organizing combat power. These factors include force tailoring, task-organizing, and mutual support. Equally important for commander consideration is reconstitution.

Force Tailoring

2-30. Commanders tailor forces for specific situations. ***Force tailoring* is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander.** It involves selecting the right force structure for a joint operation from available units within a combatant

command or from Service-retained forces. Commanders then sequence forces into the area of operations as part of force projection. JFCs request and receive forces for each campaign or operational phase, adjusting the quantity of Service component forces to match the weight of effort. Army Service component commanders tailor forces to meet land force requirements as determined by JFCs. Army Service component commanders also recommend forces and a deployment sequence to meet those requirements. Force tailoring is continuous.

Task Organization

2-31. Commanders task-organize units for effective combined arms operations. ***Task-organizing* is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.** Characteristics to examine when task-organizing a force include, but are not limited to, the mission, training, experience, unit capabilities, sustainability, the operational environment, and the enemy threat. Task-organizing includes allocating assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within tailored force packages as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize reflects their agility, and it requires practice. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available resources and match unit capabilities with assigned tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements.

Mutual Support

2-32. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces, assigning areas of operations, and positioning units. *Mutual support* is that support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). Understanding mutual support and the time to accept risk during operations are fundamental to good tactics. Mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command relationship. Mutual support has two aspects—supporting range and supporting distance. When friendly forces are static, supporting range equals supporting distance.

2-33. ***Supporting range* is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems.** It depends on available weapons systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit's indirect fire weapons. For small units such as squads, sections, and platoons, it is the distance between two units that their direct fires can cover effectively. Visibility may limit the supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire to support another, the first may not be in supporting range even though its weapons can shoot that far.

2-34. Units may not be within supporting range of each other, but they may be able to provide mutual support through maneuver. ***Supporting distance* is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a stability or defense support of civil authorities situation.** These factors affect supporting distance:
* Terrain and mobility.
* Distance.
* Enemy capabilities.
* Friendly capabilities.
* Reaction time.

2-35. The capabilities of supported and supporting units affect supporting distance. Units may be within supporting distance, but if the supported unit cannot communicate with the supporting unit, the supporting unit may not be able to affect the operation's outcome. In such cases, the units are not within supporting distance regardless of their proximity to each other. If the units share a common operational picture, relative proximity may be less important than both units' abilities to coordinate their maneuver and fires. To exploit the advantage of supporting distance, units synchronize maneuver and fires more effectively than enemy forces do. Otherwise, enemy forces may be able to defeat both units in detail.

2-36. Army forces request joint capabilities and integrate with allied and partner units to mitigate the risk of operating at the limits of mutual support. For example, security force assistance brigades and Army special

operations forces conduct security force assistance with indigenous forces. This cooperation improves the cohesion of multinational operations and creates opportunities for commanders by multiplying the effectiveness of available combat power.

Reconstitution

2-37. Commanders also consider reconstitution when organizing combat power. During large-scale combat operations, they should expect significant losses to personnel, supplies, and equipment. Commanders must plan and implement reconstitution operations to restore attrited units' combat effectiveness as quickly as possible to maintain tempo and avoid culmination.

2-38. Reconstitution consists of two elements—reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization is the expedient cross-leveling of internal resources within an attrited unit in place to restore necessary combat effectiveness and maintain endurance. Regeneration is the intentional restoration of a unit's combat power. Such restoration requires time and resource intensive operations which include equipment repairs and replacements, supply replenishment, mission-essential training, and personnel replacements in accordance with theater commander guidance. (See ATP 3-94.4 for more on reconstitution.)

Chapter 3

The Army's Operational Concept

This chapter discusses the Army's operational concept of multidomain operations. The chapter begins by explaining how multidomain operations create relative advantages for Army forces. Next, the chapter describes the tenants and imperatives, followed by a description of the strategic and operational frameworks in which multidomain operations occur in an operational environment. The chapter ends by describing the challenges multidomain operations address.

MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS

3-1. The Army contributes multidomain operations to the joint force. *Multidomain operations* **are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.** Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from multiple domains to accomplish the mission. During conflict, Army forces use multidomain operations to close with and destroy enemy forces, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations to deliver sustainable political outcomes. In other contexts, Army forces use multidomain operations to demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners.

3-2. Almost all operations are inherently joint, and most operations occur in a coalition or alliance effort. Joint and multinational capabilities enable Army forces to achieve objectives, and Army capabilities enable joint and multinational forces to achieve objectives. To generate complementary and reinforcing effects necessary to create and exploit relative advantages, leaders must understand the interdependencies among their own assigned capabilities and the capabilities provided by others. Army forces employ joint and combined capabilities to the degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest the joint force in all domains, Army forces must stay prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities cannot support mission accomplishment. Army forces must also account for threat capabilities from domains other than land and often outside their assigned areas.

3-3. Multidomain operations seek to fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches. They first break up interdependent enemy systems and formations. They then exploit opportunities this disruption provides to defeat enemy forces in detail. Army forces therefore require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, capabilities, objectives, and courses of action. Intelligence drives what combinations of defeat mechanisms that commanders pursue as they employ the capabilities of their forces in space and time against the enemy.

COMBINED ARMS

3-4. Leaders combine arms in complementary and reinforcing ways to protect capabilities and amplify their effects. *Combined arms* **is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially.** Confronted with a constantly changing situation, leaders create new combinations of capabilities, methods, and effects to pose new dilemmas for adversaries. The combined arms approach to operations during competition, crisis, and armed conflict is foundational to exploiting capabilities from all domains and their dimensions.

3-5. Complementary capabilities compensate for the vulnerabilities of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different one. Infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems, while tanks provide mobile protected firepower for the infantry. Ground maneuver can make enemy forces displace and become vulnerable to joint fires, while joint fires can disrupt enemy reserves and command and control to enable operations on the ground. Cyberspace, space capabilities, and electromagnetic warfare can prevent enemy forces from detecting and communicating the location of friendly land-based fires capabilities. Army fires capabilities can destroy enemy ground-based cyberspace nodes and electromagnetic warfare platforms to protect friendly communications.

3-6. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities to amplify the overall effects a formation brings to bear in a particular context. During urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and armor units closely coordinating can reinforce protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of each unit type while creating cascading dilemmas for enemy forces. Close air support, air interdiction, and naval surface fire support can reinforce Army artillery, greatly increasing both the mass and range of fires available to a commander. Space and cyberspace capabilities can reinforce a brigade combat team's ground-based jamming effort by simultaneously disrupting enemy communications and identifying enemy systems disrupting friendly systems. Military information support operations can amplify the effects of physical isolation on an enemy echelon, making it more vulnerable to friendly force exploitation.

3-7. The combined arms approach includes using different methods and types of forces. Army operations often combine conventional and irregular warfare and employ conventional forces, special operations forces, and unified action partners in complementary and reinforcing ways. The organic composition, training, and task organization of Army units set conditions for effective combined arms. Throughout operations, commanders assess an operational environment and adjust priorities, change task organization, and request capabilities to create exploitable advantages, extend operational reach, preserve combat power, and accomplish missions.

RELATIVE ADVANTAGES

3-8. When conducting operations against peer threats, small advantages can have significant impacts, especially as commanders expand them over time. A *relative advantage* **is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective.** There are many ways to categorize and understand positions of relative advantage, but they can typically be broken down into physical, information, and human advantages. Visualizing these advantages heavily depends on each situation. When commanders achieve multiple relative advantages, they are able to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than their enemies can thereby achieving decision dominance. (See FM 3-0 for an expanded discussion on decision dominance.)

3-9. Physical advantages are most familiar to tactical forces, and they are typically the immediate goal of most tactical operations. A *physical advantage* **is a condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of a combination of quantitative capabilities, qualitative capabilities, or geographical positioning.** Finding enemy forces, defeating them, and seizing land areas typically require the creation and exploitation of multiple physical advantages, including occupation of key terrain, the physical isolation of enemy forces, and the imposition of overwhelming fires. The exploitation of physical advantages reduces an enemy force's capability to fight and enables information and human advantages.

3-10. Physical and human advantages during operations are easier to achieve and more enduring when the friendly force possesses multiple information advantages. An *information advantage* is a condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of situational understanding, decision making, and relevant actor behavior (ADP 3-13). Information advantages enable operations to have the desired impact on the human will of enemy leaders, enemy forces, neutral populations, and friendly populations. This means the information is protected and reliable. Protected information enables shared understanding and allows for sound decision making throughout an operation.

3-11. Human advantages are individual and group characteristics that provide opportunities for friendly forces. A *human advantage* **is a condition whereby a force holds the initiative in terms of training, morale, leadership, and will.** Human advantages enable friendly morale and will, degrade enemy morale and will, and influence popular support. Cultural factors predispose populations to opinions, beliefs, and interpretations of military operations. Understanding these factors is essential in understanding an operational environment, and it is critical in creating an operational approach that achieves the political aim.

3-12. Achieving relative advantages and pursuing decision dominance requires action—waiting for perfect friendly advantages increases risk to maintaining the operational initiative. *Operational initiative* **is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation.** Army forces seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative by causing enemy forces to respond to friendly actions. By presenting an enemy force with multiple dilemmas in different domains, commanders make that enemy force react continuously until driven into an untenable position. Exploiting operational initiative pressures enemy commanders to abandon their preferred options, react to friendly actions, and make mistakes. As enemy forces make mistakes or

weaken, friendly forces seize opportunities that create new relative advantages and set the conditions to dominate the enemy. The tenets and imperatives link the core principle of combined arms with the employment of combat power in multiple domains to create and exploit these advantages.

TENETS

3-13. The tenets of multidomain operations are desirable attributes to be incorporated into all Army plans and operations. Commanders use these tenets to inform and assess courses of action throughout the operations process. Success depends on the ability of Army forces to conduct operations with—

- Agility.
- Convergence.
- Endurance.
- Depth.

Agility is critical to protection, and it enables speed during large-scale combat operations. Enemy forces with numerical and firepower advantages demand that Army forces avoid becoming lucrative targets. Convergence enables the creation of opportunities against evenly matched enemy forces that are adaptive and resilient to attacks against a single decisive point. Army forces achieve convergence with Army and joint capabilities that achieve complementary and reinforcing effects, while preserving combat power to maintain options for the JFC. Opportunities created by convergence require exploitation through endurance and depth. Endurance allows Army forces to absorb the enemy's attacks and sustain operations over the time and space necessary to accomplish the mission. Depth applies combat power throughout the enemy's formations, all echelons, and operational environment, securing successive tactical and operational objectives for the joint force.

AGILITY

3-14. In operational environments characterized by friction, uncertainty, violence, and change, the ability to act faster than the enemy is critical for success. *Agility* **is the ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy.** While initiative implies a bias for action, agility enables the action to occur before enemy forces can effectively react. Agility is about transitions. It requires leaders to anticipate needs or opportunities to change, and it requires trained formations be able to change direction or focus as quickly as the situation necessitates. Agile forces fight the enemy and not the plan. They organize for purpose as necessary. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore favorable conditions. Leaders maintain agility by controlling tempo during armed conflict.

CONVERGENCE

3-15. Peer threats employ adaptable and durable capabilities. Their formations can cover large geographic areas and multiple domains. They cannot be easily defeated in a single, decisive effort. Success requires Army forces to sustain attacks against multiple decisive points over time through convergence**. *Convergence* is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, or decision maker, or in a specific geographic area.** Senior Army tactical echelons drive convergence from the top down. Senior Army tactical echelons are informed by the larger land tactical situation, and they have access to and can direct multinational, joint, and Army capabilities.

3-16. Convergence involves integrating Army and joint capabilities at the most effective echelon and synchronizing their employment against decisive points to create effects that friendly forces can exploit through maneuver. Convergence employs mass at multiple locations in different domains in an economical way that avoids confronting enemy strengths head on. Commanders choose combinations of decisive points against which to mass effects, based on what most enables the enemy's preferred tactical or operational approach. Commanders visualize decisive points across multiple domains and dimensions. Categories of decisive points include—

- Functions (including command and control, intelligence, protection, fires, maneuver, and sustainment).
- Key terrain or formations (including position areas for artillery, airfields, and troop concentrations).

- Key events (including gap crossings, breaches, counterfires, and resupply).
- Intangible factors (including morale, will to fight, cohesion, and trust).

3-17. Convergence leaves enemy forces with more problems than options. No matter how commanders employ their available combat power, some part of their force's capability will be degraded. Attacking enemy command and control systems as part of convergence may also have a paralyzing impact on enemy commanders' abilities to make decisions and communicate them to their units. An enemy force incapable of effectively adapting during combat creates a major advantage for Army forces.

3-18. Units may have to adapt their approach multiple times before achieving convergence. Leaders assess when and if their operations have produced the desired effect, and they must remain ready to exploit rapidly when they are successful. Because enemy forces adapt, the window of opportunity is temporary. Commanders and staffs continuously assess the situation and plan branches and sequels to preempt the enemy force's reaction.

3-19. Generally, land component commands and corps set conditions for convergence by defeating an enemy's integrated fires complex and integrated air defense complex. Land component commands and corps must also achieve convergence to attrit enemy maneuver forces so subordinate formations can combine favorable force ratios with intangible advantages that enable success. Divisions and lower echelon units take advantage of the resulting freedom of maneuver to conduct combined arms operations that achieve their purpose in close combat. Divisions and corps expand the disintegration of enemy forces by employing the tactics of exploitation and pursuit to finish the defeat of enemy maneuver forces in detail and to strengthen the control of land areas.

ENDURANCE

3-20. Convergence plays a key role in creating positions of relative advantage and the effective employment of combat power. However, to effectively exploit the advantages that convergence creates, leaders ensure they plan and coordinate operations in ways that maintain the endurance required to follow through and accomplish the mission. ***Endurance* is the ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment.** Endurance enhances the ability to project combat power and extends operational reach. Endurance is about sustaining and protecting the force to preserve combat power while continuing operations for as long as is necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

DEPTH

3-21. While the focus of endurance is on friendly combat power, the focus of depth is on enemy locations and dispositions across all domains. ***Depth* is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results.** Commanders seek to engage enemy forces throughout the depth of their forces while denying the enemy sanctuary, mutual support, and the ability to focus on one problem at a time. Commanders likewise moderate their tempo to ensure they have the endurance to reach the physical depth of their assigned objectives.

IMPERATIVES

3-22. Imperatives are actions Army forces must take to defeat peer enemy forces and succeed in the multidomain environment. They are based on the principles of war, but they are specific to the contemporary battlefield. Imperatives include—
- See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment.
- Protect against constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.
- Own the electromagnetic spectrum.
- Create and exploit positions of physical, information, and human advantage.
- Make initial contact with sensors, unmanned systems, or the smallest element possible.
- Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy.
- Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions.
- Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort.
- Consolidate gains continuously.
- Understand and manage the effects of operations on units and Soldiers.

Commanders develop their operations with the imperatives of multidomain operations in mind, which are essential considerations for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of operations. (See FM 3-0 for a detailed description of the tenets and imperatives of multidomain operations.)

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

3-23. The strategic framework primarily serves for those Army forces designated as a joint task force or joint force land component command. The strategic framework accounts for factors in the strategic environment and the connection of strategic capabilities to operational- and tactical-level operations. (See FM 3-0 for an expanded discussion on the strategic framework.) The strategic framework includes four areas:
- Strategic support area.
- Joint security area.
- Extended deep area.
- Assigned operational area.

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

3-24. Leaders organize their forces and operational concept within the broader context of strategic plans while using the operational framework. The *operational framework* **is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations.** The operational framework takes into consideration the commander's assessment of an operational environment, including domains and dimensions. The way commanders organize forces within their assigned area of operations is the basis of the operational framework.

3-25. Within the area of operations, each subordinate echelon nests its operational framework with that of its higher echelon headquarters. Commanders can use any model they find useful, but they do not diverge from that of the higher headquarters. They may create new models to fit the circumstances, but they apply the most common models according to doctrine to facilitate shared understanding. (See FM 3-0 for an expanded discussion on the operational framework.) Commonly used models to build an operational framework are—
- Assigned areas.
- Deep, close, and rear operations.
- Main effort, supporting effort, and reserve.

ASSIGNED AREAS

3-26. The JFC assigns land forces an operational area within a joint organizational construct. The land component or ARFOR commander subdivides the area of operations into subordinate-assigned areas to best support the desired scheme of maneuver. The responsibility to consider the conduct of operations across multiple domains does not automatically include authority to synchronize activities in unassigned physical domains. An assigned area that is too large for a unit to effectively control increased risk allows sanctuaries for enemy forces and limits joint flexibility. A higher headquarters remains responsible for any area not assigned to a subordinate unit. Within their assigned area, units use control measures to assign responsibilities, prevent fratricide, facilitate command and control, coordinate fires, control maneuver, and organize operations. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their assigned areas. There are three types of assigned areas that a land component or ARFOR commander uses:
- Area of operations.
- Zone.
- Sector.

3-27. An *area of operations* is an operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). Forward, rear, and lateral boundaries define an area of operations. Within their area of operations, units integrate assigned and supporting capabilities, synchronize warfighting functions, and generate combat power against enemy forces to accomplish the mission. Important area of operations activities include—
- Terrain management.
- Information collection, integration, and synchronization.

- Civil affairs operations.
- Movement control.
- Clearance of fires.
- Security.
- Personnel recovery.
- Airspace management.
- Minimum-essential stability operations tasks.

> *Note.* By definition, a land area of operations does not include a volume of airspace to control. Airspace control authorities delegate airspace control to Army commanders based on the situation. All commanders must be prepared to enable or coordinate airspace management. (See JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 for more information on airspace control.)

3-28. A *zone* **is an operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries.** The nonbounded side of a zone is open towards enemy forces. A higher echelon headquarters uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as a limit of advance and a coordinated fire line to synchronize its deep operations with those of a subordinate unit. Zones allow higher echelon headquarters to adjust deep operations without having to change unit boundaries. This gives greater flexibility to the higher echelon headquarters for controlling deep operations, allowing subordinate units to focus on close and rear operations. Units treat everything behind the friendly forward line of troops as an area of operations with the associated nine responsibilities. Units can subdivide a zone into subordinate areas of operations, zones, or sectors.

3-29. A *sector* **is an operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral boundaries and interlocking fires.** The nonbounded side of a sector is open towards enemy forces. A higher echelon headquarters uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as battle positions and trigger lines to synchronize subordinate units. Higher echelon headquarters are responsible to synchronize combat power forward of the main battle and security areas or coordinated fire line. Higher echelon headquarters use sectors to synchronize and coordinate subordinate force engagement areas and allow for mutually supporting fields of fire, which do not require deconfliction between adjacent units. Units treat everything behind the friendly forward line of troops as an area of operations with the associated nine responsibilities. Units can subdivide a sector into subordinate areas of operations, zones, or sectors.

Area of Influence

3-30. An *area of influence* is an area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). This area is bounded by the ranges of the commander's assigned maneuver and fire support units. A commander's area of influence is normally larger than that commander's assigned area of operations, but it is smaller than the commander's area of interest.

Area of Interest

3-31. An *area of interest* is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest varies in size and shape from operation to operation. It should include all enemy activities which might affect a friendly force throughout the duration of an operation. An area of interest will usually surround an area of operations, extending forward and to the flanks of that area of operations. Depending upon the operation, it may also extend rearwards. During offensive operations, portions of the area of interest may become part of an area of operations as friendly forces advance.

DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR OPERATIONS

3-32. Within assigned areas, commanders organize their operations in terms of time, space, and purpose by synchronizing deep, close, and rear operations. Commanders consider the physical, information, and human dimensions of deep, close, and rear operations. The focus of operations in time, space, and purpose, not

necessarily their physical location, determines whether they are deep, close, or rear operations. Organizing by time, space, and purpose helps commanders synchronize. Each echelon modifies existing graphic control measures and creates new ones during the course of operations. Management of graphic control measures allows commanders to create and exploit opportunities because they promote a common understanding of the operational framework, simplify command and control, and facilitate subordinate echelons' freedom of action.

3-33. Divisions and above align their deep, close, and rear operations to corresponding areas on the ground. This alignment facilitates command and control of forces spread over wide distances, which may or may not be contiguous, whose physical locations do not correspond to the location and purpose of their effects. Typically, divisions and corps assign command posts to enable control of these areas. For example, a division may position an artillery battery in a position area for artillery located in the rear area, but it may employ its fires in support of close operations. In this case, the rear command post might control the battery's movement, sustainment, and protection, but the division main headquarters controls its fire support priorities.

3-34. *Deep operations* **are tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to shape future close operations and protect rear operations.** At the operational level, deep operations isolate current battles and influence the timing, location, and enemy forces involved in future battles. At the tactical level, deep operations set favorable conditions for close combat and subsequent engagements. Deep operations require detailed planning. Because of the relative scarcity of resources with which to perform these activities, deep operations focus on the most dangerous enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities to exploit in the future.

3-35. *Close operations* **are tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate support to them, whose purpose is to employ maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces.** At the operational level, close operations comprise the efforts of large tactical units—corps and divisions—to win current battles by directly closing with and defeating enemy forces after setting favorable terms to do so. At the tactical level, close operations comprise the efforts of smaller tactical units to win current engagements through maneuver while physically in contact with the enemy forces they intend to defeat. Each echelon focuses on setting conditions for subordinate unit success during close operations. (See FM 3-90 for more information on deep and close operations.)

3-36. *Rear operations* **are tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo.** Rear operations typically include the protection and security of support areas. A *support area* **is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations**. *Support area operations* **are tactical actions that secure lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon's sustainment and command and control.** This includes continuity of sustainment and command and control. Rear operations enable close and deep operations. At the operational level, rear operations sustain the current fight and prepare for the next phase of the campaign or major operation. (See FM 3-0 for more information on rear operations.)

Main Effort, Supporting Effort, and Reserve

3-37. Units at each echelon designate main efforts, supporting efforts, and reserves. The tasks units assign subordinates should align with the purpose of and support their higher echelon.

3-38. The *main effort* **is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.** It is usually weighted with additional combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources to maximize combat power. Commanders establish clear priorities of support, and they shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the commander's intent require.

3-39. A *supporting effort* **is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.** Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission, accepting risk to weight the main effort. Supporting efforts conduct supporting attacks, economy of force missions, and tactical deception tasks.

3-40. A *reserve* is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). A reserve is an uncommitted force, and thus it does not normally have a full suite of combat multipliers available to it until it is committed. It is normally the echelon's main effort once committed. Commanders constitute a reserve and base the size of the reserve on the level of uncertainty; more uncertainty requires a larger reserve. Commanders provide priorities of planning for the reserve and position it where it can best support these priorities. Commanders who commit their reserve form a new one.

CHALLENGES

3-41. Adversary methods focus on layered standoff, are integrated across all domains, use all instruments of national power, and achieve effects in the physical, information, and human dimensions. These adversary methods are designed to make military options for the United States both politically difficult and prohibitively expensive. (See FM 3-0 for a detailed overview of threat challenges.) Examples of these challenges are—
- Subversive political and legal strategies through international organizations.
- Physical presence on the ground to buttress resource claims.
- Coercive economic practices against weaker countries.
- Supporting proxy forces.
- Spreading disinformation through social media platforms.
- Integrated air defense systems, integrated fires complexes, and global sensing networks.

3-42. At the operational level, there are two complementary fights: a joint fight enabled by Army formations to defeat enemy integrated air defense systems and fires complexes, and a ground fight led by Army forces and enabled by the joint force. Army surface-to-surface fires, counterair and missile capabilities, attack aviation, ground maneuver capabilities, and command and control are critical to defeating the components of an enemy's antiaccess and area denial approach. Defeating enemy capabilities and formations at the operational level requires multiple lines of effort and attacks against combinations of decisive points to create expanding relative advantages over time. As an enemy force's antiaccess and area denial capabilities are degraded, Army forces conduct operations on land to achieve JFC objectives.

3-43. At the tactical level, forward-postured Army forces defend critical terrain and infrastructure with allies and partners against immediate enemy offensive action. Other Army forces conduct expeditionary offensive operations against peer threats who have prepared deliberate defenses. Most enemies have significant advantages at the outset of armed conflict. They often operate on shorter lines of communications from their bases of support. They likely have greater familiarity with terrain, weather, local populations, and their cultures. They also have combat power advantages in terms of numerical superiority and volume and range of fires.

3-44. Enemy forces typically seek to fix and isolate reserves, troop concentrations and other suitable targets with fires, maneuver, and CBRN contamination. Whenever possible, they infiltrate rear areas and attack command posts and vulnerable units first. They also employ electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, and disinformation to hinder communications and degrade friendly morale and cohesion. Understanding the tactics of the most likely adversaries is essential for leaders at all echelons.

Chapter 4

Army Campaign Support

This chapter discusses Army support to joint campaigning and the elements and application of operational art. It discusses defeating enemy forces and concludes with information on the defeat and stability mechanisms.

ARMY SUPPORT TO JOINT CAMPAIGNING

4-1. Effective campaigning is not possible unless operational-level objectives nest with strategic objectives. Army forces plan, prepare, execute, and assess major operations in support of joint campaigns. These major operations aim to achieve theater strategic and operational objectives, and they may occur during competition, crisis, or armed conflict.

ROLE OF STRATEGY

4-2. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction to the military to safeguard and advance national interests. The President's decisions drive the Secretary of Defense's strategic guidance, which the joint force operationalizes. The President and Secretary of Defense generally communicate strategic direction to the armed forces through a body of documents representing strategic guidance. Strategic guidance comes in the form of national strategies, presidential directives, and strategic plans. These documents inform military strategies and joint campaigns. Military strategy involves employing armed forces to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force. Successful strategies achieve political aims at the lowest possible cost in lives and resources. (See JP 1, Volume 2, for more information on strategic direction and guidance.)

4-3. Army forces conduct major operations in support of joint campaigns and joint campaign plans that are based on joint military strategy. A *campaign* is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A *campaign plan* is a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). Campaign plans can support global and enduring joint campaigns or discrete theater specific campaigns. They may also be developed in response to an unforeseen crisis or in the event of war.

4-4. The theater army supports its assigned combatant command with the development and execution of campaign plans. The theater army does this through military engagement, exercises, posturing of forces, and supporting activities designed to support U.S. objectives, protect national interests, prevent armed conflict, and set conditions for successful combat operations should deterrence fail. Theater armies may also conduct campaigns as directed by the combatant commander.

ARRANGING OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

4-5. The joint force normally will not achieve victory in a single decisive effort. Therefore, Army forces will need to conduct successive operations to defeat enemy forces and achieve assigned theater objectives. Commanders will have to choose and then arrange their operations in time and space to achieve their assigned theater objectives. The proper arrangement of operations allows commanders to use all available resources while retaining the flexibility to respond to the uncertainty and risk inherent in combat. Operational art helps commanders and staffs determine the optimal arrangement of their forces and operations.

THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

4-6. *Operational art* is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). It serves two main functions:
- To ensure that military actions are aligned with and directly support strategy.
- To ensure that tactical actions occur under the most advantageous conditions possible.

4-7. Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of warfare. During the planning and execution of Army operations, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational art as they assess the situation. The elements of operational art, used in conjunction with the Army design methodology and the military decision-making process, assist leaders with effectively arranging operations based on the overall objectives, the forces involved, the defeat mechanisms, and the kind of approach envisioned. (See Table 4-1 for the elements of operational art.)

Table 4-1. Elements of operational art

Operational art consists of these elements:	
• End state and conditions.	• Phasing and transitions.
• Center of gravity.	• Culmination.
• Decisive points.	• Operational reach.
• Lines of operations and lines of effort.	• Basing.
• Tempo.	• Risk.

END STATE AND CONDITIONS

4-8. The *end state* is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives (JP 3-0). Commanders include the end state in their planning guidance. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort; facilitates integration, synchronization, and disciplined initiative; and helps mitigate risk.

4-9. Operations focus on achieving a military end state that supports a higher purpose. Army forces contribute to diplomatic, information, and economic outcomes. Commanders consider each factor and explicitly describe the end state and its conditions for every operation. Otherwise, missions lack purpose, and operations lose focus. Successful commanders direct every operation toward a clearly defined, conclusive, and attainable end state—the objective. Military operations require Army forces to consolidate gains to achieve a desired political end state.

4-10. The desired end state may evolve as an operation progresses. Commanders continuously monitor operations using formal and informal assessment methods. They monitor to assess their progress in achieving an end state and to determine if they need to reframe their approach. An end state should anticipate future operations and establish conditions for transitions.

CENTER OF GRAVITY

4-11. A *center of gravity* is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). A center of gravity is an analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point and identifies sources of strength and weakness. However, the concept of center of gravity is only meaningful when considered in relation to other elements of operational design such as objectives, lines of operation or effort, and military end state. (See JP 5-0 for more on operational design.) Because most enemy forces represent adaptive, complex systems, they are likely to have multiple centers of gravity. Destroying or capturing one center is unlikely to resolve most conflicts.

4-12. Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces. They are part of a dynamic perspective of an operational environment, and they may change as an environment changes. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and account for than moral centers of gravity. Physical centers of gravity can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or united population. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power over time.

DECISIVE POINTS

4-13. A *decisive point* is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Decisive points help commanders select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving an end state. Commanders visualize decisive points in each of the five domains and

three dimensions. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities, communications networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force can be decisive points. Examples of these events include commitment of the enemy reserve or enemy resupply efforts. Space and cyberspace-enabled capabilities may also represent decisive points. Enemy morale could be a decisive point, and the ability of enemy forces to communicate with their sources of support could also be a decisive point.

4-14. Decisive points apply to both operational and tactical levels when shaping the concept of operations. Decisive points enable commanders to see where to seize, retain, or exploit an operational initiative. Commanders identify decisive points that offer the greatest physical, temporal, or psychological advantage against centers of gravity. Controlling decisive points is essential to mission accomplishment. Enemy control of a decisive point may stall friendly momentum, force early culmination, or enable an enemy attack.

LINES OF OPERATIONS AND LINES OF EFFORT

4-15. Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives to the end state physically and conceptually. Commanders may describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both. A *line of operations* **is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives.** Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. A *line of effort* **is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state.** Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have less relevance. Commanders often employ a combination of lines of operations and lines of effort because most operations require both the control of terrain and linkage of tasks to fully realize assigned objectives and end state.

4-16. A force operates on interior and exterior lines. *Interior lines* **are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point.** Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operation. *Exterior lines* **are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy.** Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy.

TEMPO

4-17. *Tempo* **is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.** Controlling tempo helps commanders keep operational initiative during combat operations or rapidly establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During combat operations, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher tempo than enemy forces do. A rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy force's ability to counter friendly actions. During other contexts, commanders act quickly to control events and deny enemy forces positions of relative advantage, particularly in the information and human dimensions.

PHASING AND TRANSITIONS

4-18. A *phase* **is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity.** A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling, and it may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event.

4-19. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Transitions normally occur whenever there is an abrupt change to an operational environment, a threat, or friendly forces.

CULMINATION

4-20. Culmination relates to the force's ability to generate and apply combat power. The *culminating point* is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Typically, culmination is caused by direct combat actions or lack of support. Planning to address culmination is critical to success during large-scale combat operations.

OPERATIONAL REACH

4-21. *Operational reach* is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). It reflects the ability to achieve success through a well-conceived operational approach,

and it is applicable to Army forces operating as part of the joint force. Operational reach is a tether; it is a function of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and combat power relative to enemy forces. The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point. Operational reach balances the natural tensions among endurance, momentum, and depth. Commanders continually strive to extend operational reach. They assess friendly and enemy force status and civil considerations, anticipate culmination, consolidate gains, and plan operational pauses if necessary.

4-22. Protection is an important contributor to operational reach. Commanders anticipate how enemy actions and environmental factors might disrupt operations, and then they determine the protection measures required to maintain sufficient reach. Protection closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander's ability to extend operations in time and space. Commanders can influence the degree to which protection is achieved by how they prioritize and sequence operations, when they conduct them, and the degree to which they can deceive enemy forces.

BASING

4-23. Lines of operation and operational reach are intimately linked with basing. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported. Basing is a critical consideration when arranging operations at any echelon. Basing directly supports or determines the joint and multinational force's proximity to an operational area; the force's reach and endurance; the depth the force can achieve; and how quickly the force can generate, apply, and reconstitute combat power.

RISK

4-24. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Commanders delegate risk acceptance to subordinates through their commander's intent and other guidance. Leaders maintain a common operational picture with their counterparts in higher and lower echelons, since any risk accepted at one echelon may impose additional risk at other echelons. When commanders accept risk, they create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative and achieve decisive results. Embracing risk as opportunity requires situational awareness and imagination as well as audacity. Successful commanders assess, mitigate, and accept risk continuously throughout the operations process.

THE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL ART

4-25. In applying operational art, Army commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an operational environment and visualize and describe their approach to conducting an operation. Their broadest application applies to long-term operations.

4-26. Operational art is not limited to a specific echelon or role, but it is primarily the focus of corps and higher echelons. The application of operational art is not limited to a particular activity in the operations process. Rather, multiple units at all echelons performing joint and Service roles in the scope of their assigned missions contribute to operational art by arranging tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic objectives. Operational art links the echelons above brigade to each other, and to the larger joint and multinational forces, to ensure unity of effort. It is a core reason for why theater armies, field armies (when constituted), and corps exist. It is fundamental to the planning, execution, and support of joint campaigns. (See Figure 4-1 for a depiction of the scope of operational art.)

Scope of operational art

Figure 4-1. Scope of operational art

4-27. Commanders and their staffs apply operational art throughout all phases of the operations process. Army commanders use the principles of joint operations and the elements of operational art to envision how they establish conditions that accomplish missions and assigned objectives. For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations.

4-28. The principles of joint operations are comprised of the traditional nine principles of war plus three joint principles of operations (restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy). Together, the twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations. The principles are broadly applied considerations, and their relevance varies in each situation. They are not a checklist. Commanders generally consider all twelve principles, but they rarely apply them the same way in every operation. The principles summarize the characteristics of successful operations throughout history. Their greatest value lies in educating military professionals. While considering the principles of joint operations, commanders determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. The principles of joint operations are—

- Objective.
- Offensive.
- Mass.
- Economy of force.
- Maneuver.
- Unity of command.
- Security.
- Surprise.
- Simplicity.
- Restraint.
- Perseverance.
- Legitimacy.

(See JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion on the principles of joint operations.)

4-29. When applying operational art, commanders and staffs ensure a shared understanding of purpose. This requires open, continuous collaboration between commanders at various echelons to define the problems and conditions of an operational environment. Effective collaboration facilitates assessment and fosters critical analysis.

4-30. Operational art encompasses all levels, from strategic direction to tactical actions. It requires creative vision, broad experience, and a knowledge of capabilities, tactics, and techniques across multiple domains. A *concept of operations* is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (JP 5-0). Commanders write their own concept of operations and staffs help refine it. This process helps ensure the commander and members of the staff have a shared understanding for how an operation is supposed to unfold. Commanders then position and maneuver forces to perform tasks that best achieve a desired end state.

4-31. It is through operational art that commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations. The successful application of operational art relies heavily on the science of operations. Considerations such as movement times, capability ranges, loiter times, consumption rates, available supplies, combat power status, and electromagnetic spectrum management determine whether an operational approach is feasible or not. An *operational approach* is a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). The earlier details are integrated into conceptual planning, the better.

4-32. During planning, commanders and their staffs use the Army design methodology to develop an operational approach that informs detailed planning. The *Army design methodology* is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). By applying the Army design methodology, commanders and staffs gain a shared understanding of the environment, and they can define the problems preventing the desired end state. This differs from mission analysis since the Army design methodology is not mission specific. These items assist commanders and staffs using Army design methodology:

- The principles of joint operations and principles of war.
- The tenets and imperatives of multidomain operations.
- The elements of operational art.
- The defeat mechanisms.
- The stability mechanisms.

4-33. Application of the Army design methodology results in an operational approach. Many operational approaches prove unhelpful for driving detailed planning because they fail to consider operational realities. However, a good operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning, allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and helps produce an executable order. The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. As detailed planning yields new information, leaders reassess their operational approach—and the Army design methodology that informed it—and adjust it accordingly to ensure relevancy. These actions continue throughout preparation and execution, and they inform commanders' decision making. When assessing operations, the logic of the operational approach provides the basis for developing assessment criteria, including measures of performance and effectiveness. (See Figure 4-2 for a graphic depiction of the commander's visualization process to determine an operational approach. See ADP 5-0 for more information on assessments.)

Figure 4-2. Commander's visualization

DEFEATING ENEMY FORCES

4-34. Armed conflict implies the need to defeat enemy forces. ***Defeat*** **is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives.** During competition and crisis, Army forces render threats incapable of achieving their objectives through contributions to integrated deterrence and by countering threat aggression. Defeat is not a tactical mission task. However, it is usually the overall purpose of tactical operations during armed conflict. Large enemy formations and their capabilities are complex, adaptive systems. Defeating them requires attacking multiple decisive points. Lower echelons fighting against smaller formations with more limited capabilities typically attack one decisive point during their operations.

4-35. When U.S. forces possess overwhelming advantages across all domains and dimensions, joint forces can attack multiple elements of an enemy force simultaneously. Simultaneity disrupts the enemy's command and control system and can overwhelm an inferior force quickly. By definition, peer threats possess a scale and quality of warfighting capability that is too extensive to attack all at once. When fighting a peer threat, commanders identify portions of enemy formations and specific warfighting systems that are vulnerable to defeat in detail. *Defeat in detail* is concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once (ADP 3-90). Defeating enemy forces in detail requires leaders to understand the various parts of an enemy force and its vulnerabilities, then discern the best ways to apply combat power against those vulnerabilities.

DEFEAT AND STABILITY MECHANISMS

4-36. Defeat and stability mechanisms complement each other. Both help commanders to visualize how to employ their forces in multidomain operations. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations; stability mechanisms relate to stability operations, security, and consolidating gains in an area of operations. All operations combine stability and defeat mechanisms to some degree. When considered together during planning, they help to focus the commander and staff in framing complex problems and developing potential solutions. Combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms can defeat threats, create conditions for stabilization, and set conditions to transition security and stability operations to other partners, the host nation, or other actors to achieve U.S. government objectives.

4-37. Commanders and staffs translate these mechanisms and desired effects into clearly defined tasks for subordinates arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve the desired end state and objectives. During combat operations, most tasks will focus on defeating enemy forces, while initial stability tasks will focus on the minimum-essential tasks and limited stability operations to establish conditions for future operations as combat ends.

DEFEAT MECHANISMS

4-38. A ***defeat mechanism*** **is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.** Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, isolate, and disintegrate. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat

mechanism achieves results relative to how much effort is expended. Using a combination of defeat mechanisms creates multiple dilemmas for enemy forces that magnify their effects significantly.

4-39. When commanders destroy, they apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function. *Destroy* is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat ineffective until it is reconstituted (FM 3-90). Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. An enemy cannot restore a destroyed force to a usable condition without entirely rebuilding it.

4-40. **Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.** Dislocation aims to make enemy forces expose themselves by reacting to the dislocating action or delay their actions until it is too late for an effective response. Commanders often achieve dislocation by placing friendly forces in locations where enemy forces do not expect them. Dislocation requires enemy commanders to make a choice: accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning.

4-41. **Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat.** Isolation can encompass different domains, and it can have both physical and psychological effects detrimental to accomplishing a mission. Isolating a force in the electromagnetic spectrum exacerbates the effects of physical isolation by reducing situational awareness. The ability of an isolated unit to perform its intended mission generally degrades over time, decreasing its ability to interfere with an opposing force. When commanders isolate, they deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable an enemy unit to maneuver at will in time and space.

4-42. **Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy's command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations.** Commanders often achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an enemy's command structure and communications systems. Disintegration is difficult to achieve; however, prolonged isolation, destruction, and dislocation can produce it. Attacking the enemy's will can accelerate disintegration.

4-43. Commanders describe the defeat mechanism impacts using the dimensions of an operational environment:
- Physical dimension impacts on material capabilities.
- Information dimension impacts on processes used to exchange information and the data itself.
- Human dimension impacts on people and on their decision making, morale, and will.

STABILITY MECHANISMS

4-44. In addition to defeating an enemy force, Army forces often seek to stabilize an area of operations by performing stability tasks. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. There are six primary stability tasks:
- Establish civil security.
- Conduct security cooperation.
- Support to civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

(See ADP 3-07 for more information on stability.)

4-45. Army forces are morally and legally required to conduct minimum-essential stability tasks within their means to do so during all operations. This includes establishing civil security to protect the population from violence, restore public order, and provide food, water, and emergency medical treatment for the immediate needs of the local population. During large-scale combat operations, divisions and higher echelons typically take responsibility for these requirements, and they may task subordinate echelons to perform supporting tasks. (See ADP 3-07 for more information about stability.)

4-46. The situation determines the combination of stability tasks for which staffs plan. In some operations, the host nation can meet most of or all the population's requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the local population and work with civilian organizations to restore security and basic services. In both environments, commanders employ civil affairs forces to enhance awareness of and manage the interactions with the civil component, to identify and mitigate causes of instability in the society, or to apply functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of the civil government. (See ATP 3-57.60 for an expanded discussion on civil affairs planning.)

4-47. A *stability mechanism* **is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.** Stability mechanisms are rarely used in isolation from each other. As with defeat mechanisms, combining them produces complementary and reinforcing effects helping to shape an operational environment more effectively and efficiently than in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

- Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.
- Control involves imposing civil order.
- Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions.
- Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which ADP 3-0 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*).

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
ATP	Army techniques publication
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
FM	field manual
JFC	joint force commander
JP	joint publication
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
TC	training circular
U.S.	United States
USSOCOM Pub	United States Special Operations Command publication

SECTION II – TERMS

adversary

A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

*agility

The ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy.

area of influence

An area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 3-0)

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory. (JP 3-0)

area of operations

> An operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

ARFOR

> The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (FM 3-94)

Army design methodology

> A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

campaign

> A series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

campaigning

> The persistent conduct of related operations, activities, and investments that align military actions with the other instruments of national power, supporting global integration across the competition continuum in pursuit of strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

campaign plan

> A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

center of gravity

> The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

*close combat

> Warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets.

*close operations

> Tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate support to them, whose purpose is to employ maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces.

combat power

> The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. (JP 3-0)

*combined arms

> The synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially.

*command and control warfighting function

> The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to exercise authority and direction to accomplish missions.

concept of operations

> A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 5-0)

*consolidate gains

> Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable strategic environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.

*conventional warfare

> (Army) A violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states.

*convergence

An outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, or decision maker, or in a specific geographic area.

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

culminating point

The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. (JP 5-0)

decisive point

Key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

*deep operations

Tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to shape future close operations and protect rear operations.

*defeat

To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives.

defeat in detail

Concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once. (ADP 3-90)

*defeat mechanism

A method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.

defense support of civil authorities

Support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18).

*defensive operation

An operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations.

*depth

The extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results.

destroy

A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat ineffective until reconstituted. (FM 3-90)

*disintegrate

To disrupt the enemy's command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations.

*dislocate

To employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.

domain

A physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. (FM 3-0)

*enemy

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized.

end state

The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

*endurance

The ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment.

*exterior lines

Lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy.

*fires warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations.

*force tailoring

The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander.

homeland defense

The military protection of United States sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or, as directed by the President, other threats. (JP 3-27)

*human advantage

A condition whereby a force holds the initiative in terms of training, morale, leadership, and will.

information advantage

A condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of situational understanding, decision making, and relevant actor behavior. (ADP 3-13)

*intelligence warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment.

interagency coordination

The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (JP 3-0)

*interior lines

Lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point.

interorganizational cooperation

Interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08)

*irregular warfare

(Army) The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and nonmilitary capabilities by state and non-state actors to achieve policy objectives other than military domination of an enemy, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.

*isolate

To separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat.

joint force

A force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments that operate under a single joint force commander. (JP 1, Volume 1)

joint operations

Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0)

*landpower

The ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.

*large-scale combat operations

Extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives.

*line of effort

(Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state.

*line of operations

(Army) A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives.

*main effort

A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.

maneuver

(Army) Movement in conjunction with fires. (ADP 3-90)

mission command

(Army) The Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0)

movement

The positioning of combat power to establish the conditions for maneuver. (ADP 3-90)

*movement and maneuver warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage with respect to the enemy.

*multidomain operations

The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.

multinational operations

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

mutual support

That support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)

*national strategic level of warfare

The level of warfare at which the United States government formulates policy goals and ways to achieve them by synchronizing action across government and unified action partners and by employing the instruments of national power.

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

*offensive operation

An operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers.

operation

A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1, Volume 1)

operational approach

A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

operational art

The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational environment

The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

*operational framework

A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations.

*operational initiative

The setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation.

operational level of warfare

The level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

operational reach

The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

*phase

(Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity.

*physical advantage

A condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of a combination of quantitative capabilities, qualitative capabilities, or geographical positioning.

*protection warfighting function

The related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve the force, deny the enemy freedom of action, and enable commanders to apply combat power.

*rear operations

Tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo.

*relative advantage

A location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective.

reserve

(Army) That portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive movement. (ADP 3-90)

*sector

An operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral boundaries and interlocking fires.

*setting the theater

The broad range of activities continuously conducted to establish conditions for the successful execution of operations in a theater.

*stability mechanism

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.

*stability operation

An operation conducted outside the United States, in coordination with other instruments of national power, to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

*support area

The portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations.

*support area operations

Tactical actions that secure lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon's sustainment and command and control.

*supporting distance

The distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a stability or defense support of civil authorities situation.

*supporting effort

A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.

*supporting range

The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems.

*sustainment warfighting function

The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.

tactical deception

An activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level commanders to cause enemy decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders' objectives. (FM 3-13.4)

tactical level of warfare

The level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military objectives. (JP 3-0)

*task-organizing

The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.

*tempo

The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.

*theater strategic level of warfare

>The level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners and employ all instruments of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of the national strategy.

*threat

>Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland.

unified action

>The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Volume 1)

*unified action partners

>Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.

unity of effort

>Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1, Volume 2)

*warfighting function

>A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.

*zone

>An operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries.

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