Cosa2:

A Performant, Adaptable, and Extensible SMT-based Model Checker

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
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
Outline

- Role of Formal Verification
- Model Checking and Cosa2
- Primary Project Goals: The MiniSAT for model checking
- Cosa2 Interface
- [Time Permitting] Inductive Proofs and Example

Role of Formal Verification


- Exhaustive Coverage
 - To avoid expensive or threatening failures
- Goal: Left side of V as automated & foolproof as possible
 - Make right side of V faster / less necessary







Model Checking



- Given a System Description (M) and an Expected Behavior (φ), check if $M \vDash \varphi$
- Bounded techniques can only provide No or Unknown (bounded proof)
- Unbounded techniques can also prove the property: answer Yes

Project Goal: "The MiniSAT of Model Checking"

• Performant: Competitive Implementations of Standard Model Checking Algorithms

Adaptable: Clean Interface

• Extensible: Infrastructure for Prototyping New Algorithms

Performant: Competitive Implementations of Algorithms

- Existing Algorithms
 - Bounded Model Checking
 - Bounded Model Checking with Simple Path Check
 - K-Induction
 - Interpolant-based Model Checking
- Has all the same safety checking algorithms as CoSA1
- Up Next
 - Various forms of IC3/PDR: Functional IC3, Syntax-guided IC3, IC3 via Implicit Predicate Abstraction
 - Practical Optimizations: Cone of influence reduction
 - CEGAR techniques: Lazy functional abstraction, ProphIC3

Performant: Hardware Model Checking Competition 2019

sponsors







Results

In the SINGLE bit-vector track the top three places are:

1. **AVR**

Aman Goel, Karem Sakallah (University of Michigan)

2. CoSA2

Makai Mann, Ahmed Irfan, Florian Lonsing, Clark Barrett (Stanford University)

3. CoNPS-btormc-THP
Norbert Manthey (hobbyist, former postdoc @ TU Dresden)

In the SINGLE bit-vector+array track the top three places are:

1. CoSA2

Makai Mann, Ahmed Irfan, Florian Lonsing, Clark Barrett (Stanford University)

2. **AVR**

Aman Goel, Karem Sakallah (University of Michigan)

3. CoNPS-btormc-THP

Norbert Manthey (hobbyist, former postdoc @ TU Dresden)

Oski Award

CoSA2 for solving the largest number of benchmarks overall.

Performant: Comparison to CoSA

- Case Study with large Transition System
 - SQED on Black Parrot RISC-V core developed at UW
 - Large design lots of error checking
 - Cosa2 reaches bound 10 in 14s
 - CoSA with same solver runs out of memory at bound 10 after 3m38s

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 - Cosa2 reaches bound 10 in 14s
 - CoSA with same solver runs out of memory at bound 10 after 3m38s
- Run on HWMCC19 (smaller benchmarks) with TO=1hr, Mem=8gb, maximum bound = 200
 - Portfolios: CoSA1 317/688, Cosa2 326/688
 - Breakdown by engine tells different story
 - BMC/K-induction about the same
 - Interpolant-based: CoSA1 83, Cosa2 157
 - Many of the ones CoSA1 failed on were picked up by BMC or K-Induction eventually

Performant: Comparison to CoSA

- Conclusion: expected results
 - Cases where Cosa2 is much better, lots of cases where it doesn't matter
 - Reason to believe difference will increase for algorithms that do more work outside of solver
 - Interpolants need to be translated to PySMT level in CoSA1 (slow for "bad" i.e. complex interpolants)
 - Algorithms like IC3 or CEGAR techniques do more work outside the SMT solver

Adaptable: Limitations of a Black Box

What matters in model checking? Invariant Property Checking!!



- Issues
 - The way a problem is encoded to invariant checking can have drastic performance impacts
 - Straightforward invariant checking not a big portion of the problems in AHA
 - Common complaint from users of commercial formal tools is lack of insight
 - Get yes/no/non-terminating
 - Not even clear what algorithm is used
 - Custom proofs are difficult (not impossible) to construct
 - Tweaks to search strategy are usually impossible

Adaptable: Common Problems in AHA

- Equivalence Checking
 - Many important problems are stateful equivalence checking
- Lake memory access mapping
- Debug infrastructure
 - Coverage analysis
 - Fault injection?
- PEak mapping with state

Adaptable: Integrated Verification

- All these applications benefit from integrated verification
 - incorporate model checking earlier
 - additional structure is important
- This is **not** a novel idea
 - But it is hard in practice
- Moving target for collateral and design tools
 - New design tools
 - Lots of different applications
 - Slow feedback loops

CoSA: Integrated Verification for Agile Hardware Design

Cristian Mattarei, Makai Mann, Clark Barrett, Ross G. Daly, Dillon Huff, and Pat Hanrahan Stanford University Stanford, California (USA)

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Abstract—Symbolic model-checking is a well-established technique used in hardware design to assess, and formally verify, functional correctness. However, most modern model-checkers encode the problem into propositional satisfiability (SAT) and do not leverage any additional information beyond the input design, which is typically provided in a hardware description language such as Verilog.

In this paper, we present CoSA (CoreIR Symbolic Analyzer), a model-checking tool for CoreIR designs. CoreIR is a new intermediate representation for hardware. CoSA encodes model-checking queries into first-order formulas that can be solved by Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers. In particular, it natively supports encodings using the theories of bitvectors and arrays. CoSA is closely integrated with CoreIR and can thus leverage CoreIR-generated metadata in addition to user-provided lemmas to assist with formal verification. CoSA supports multiple input formats and provides a broad set of analyses including equivalence checking and safety and liveness verification. CoSA is open-source and written in Python, making it easily extendable.




Fig. 1. AHA Flow

CoSA was developed as a tool for verifying correctness at various stages of the toolflow in the Agile Hardware (AHA) Project at Stanford University [18]. This project aims to improve performance and design productivity by incorporating ideas from agile software development to speed up the development cycle.



Adaptable: Big Picture on Clean Interface

- Need more than a black box model checker
 - Clean API for encoding specific problems
 - Transparent suite of algorithms for trying on different problems
 - Different backend solvers to rely on improvements and new techniques

Clarifications

- Not advocating that designers become experts in formal methods
- Not removing support for push-button techniques

Goal

- Allow interested users to encode their own unique problems
 - Should understand transition systems but not necessarily model checking algorithms
- Straightforward interface for communicating with model checker

Extensible: Infrastructure for Prototyping New Algorithms

- Adaptability is for users
- Extensibility is for developers

cheating: removed comment here


- Goal: Provide expressive, easily understood infrastructure for model checking algorithms
 - Allow formal methods experts to quickly try new ideas
 - Open-source and simple (BMC fits on one screen)

```
Bmc::Bmc(const Property & p, SmtSolver & solver) : super(p, solver)
  initialize();
Bmc::~Bmc() {}
void Bmc::initialize()
  super::initialize();
  solver_->assert_formula(unroller_.at_time(ts_.init(), 0));
ProverResult Bmc::check_until(int k)
  for (int i = 0; i <= k; ++i) {</pre>
    if (!step(i)) {
      return ProverResult::FALSE;
  return ProverResult::UNKNOWN:
bool Bmc::step(int i)
  if (i <= reached k ) {</pre>
    return true;
    solver_->assert_formula(unroller_.at_time(ts_.trans(), i - 1));
  solver_->push();
  logger.log(1, "Checking bmc at bound: {}", i);
  solver_->assert_formula(unroller_.at_time(bad_, i));
  Result r = solver ->check sat();
  if (r.is sat())
    res = false:
   else
    solver_->pop();
  ++reached_k_;
  return res;
```

Cosa2: Interface Choices

- Very modular: pieces exposed for interested users
 - If they don't care, can use them as black boxes
 - Use abstract classes with different implementations
- New Python API (basically done needs more testing)
- Driving principle is correctness, occasionally had to sacrifice convenience
 - Don't want to let users shoot themselves in the foot
 - Enforces strict semantics of transition system get expected behavior
 - Example: restrictions on use of states vs inputs
 - Example: safety properties only over state elements

Let's look at an architecture diagram



Functional Transition System looks just like hardware

Star shows dependence on a Smt-Switch solver or term Cosa₂ Architecture Smt-Switch Encoders 🔭 Solver-agnostic API SMV (in PR) BTOR2 CVC4 Msat Btor **Property** TransitionSystem RelationalTransitionSystem **FunctionalTransitionSystem** Init Init **Transition** Property Trans Trans 🔭 System Term Syntactically restricted Unroller **Printers** Prover Engines 🜟 check_until Witnesses) System Interpolation witness BMC K-induction SMT-LIB BTOR2 prove

Cosa2 TransitionSystem Interface Preview

```
* Sets initial states to the provided formula
void set_init(const smt::Term & init);
void constrain_init(const smt::Term & constraint);
void assign_next(const smt::Term & state, const smt::Term & val);
void add_invar(const smt::Term & constraint);
/** Add a constraint over inputs
void constrain_inputs(const smt::Term & constraint);
* throws an exception if it has next states (should go in trans)
void add_constraint(const smt::Term & constraint);
* Note: giving multiple names to the same term is allowed
 oid name_term(const std::string name, const smt::Term & t);
```


```
Oparam name the name of the input
  Oreturn the input term
smt::Term make input(const std::string name, const smt::Sort & sort);
 /* Create an state of a given sort
 * Oparam name the name of the state
 * Oparam sort the sort of the state
 * @return the current state variable
smt::Term make state(const std::string name, const smt::Sort & sort);
  Oparam t the term to map
 * @return the term with all current state variables
smt::Term curr(const smt::Term & term) const;
 /* Map all current state variables to next state variables in the term
 * Oparam t the term to map
 * Oreturn the term with all next state variables
smt::Term next(const smt::Term & term) const;
 '* @param sv the state variable to check
  Oreturn true if sv is a current state variable
bool is_curr_var(const smt::Term & sv) const;
 /* Oparam sv the state variable to check
 * @return true if sv is a next state variable
bool is_next_var(const smt::Term & sv) const;
```

Recap of Cosa2 Goals: "MiniSAT of Model Checking"

- Performant: Competitive Implementations of Push-Button Algorithms
- Adaptable: Clean Interface for Adapting to Specific Problems and Providing Hints
- Extensible: Reliable Semantics and Strong Infrastructure for Prototyping New Techniques

Cracking Open Model Checkers: Inductive Proof

- Big Hammer of Model Checking: Inductive proofs
 - "Property-directed" as opposed to direct reachability
 - K-Induction: strong mathematical induction of property
 - Interpolant-based: refining over-approximations until inductive
 - IC3: educated guessing of possible inductive invariants until convergence
- Difficulty of Transition System / Property pair
 - Hard to quantify for PSPACE problems
 - In practice, appears strongly correlated to "inductiveness"
 - As in programming
 - State is extremely useful
 - State is extremely complex





Inductive Invariant

- Symbolic Transition System: $\langle X, I, T \rangle$
 - X: variables, X' are corresponding next state variables
 - I(X): initial state constraints
 - T(X,X'): transition relation
- Inductive Invariant: $\phi(X)$
 - $I(X) \vDash \phi(X)$
 - $\phi(X) \wedge T(X, X') \models \phi(X')$


- Proving safety property P(X)
 - If $\phi(X) \models P(X)$
 - Then we've proven the property



If ϕ holds before a transition, then ϕ must hold after a transition

i.e. ϕ describes a *closed* set of states

Inductive Invariant






If ϕ holds before a transition, then ϕ must hold after a transition

i.e. ϕ describes a *closed* set of states

Example

Contrived example for demonstrating inductive properties




Specification

Configured Implementation


cfg starts at 0 and maintains value $I \coloneqq cfg = 0, T \coloneqq cfg' = cfg$

Example: Not Inductive

- Property: $P := spec_{res} = imp_{res}$
 - ullet Does not mention cfg at all



- Can start in a P state
 - And transition to a $\neg P$ state
- Alternative *Inductive* Property
 - $P_{ind} := cfg = 0 \land spec_{res} = imp_{res}$
 - Manually-strengthened property
 - Not always worth the effort to make fully inductive manually, but the "more inductive", the better



Arbitrary *P* state

$$a = 0$$

 $b = 0$
 $spec_{res} = 0$
 $imp_{res} = 0$
 $cfg = 1$

$$a = 2$$

 $b = 2$
 $spec_{res} = 4$
 $imp_{res} = 0$
 $cfg = 1$

Takeaways

- Cosa2 Goal: MiniSAT of Model Checking
 - Performant
 - Adaptable
 - Extensible
- Simple Transition System Interface
 - Can be manipulated directly for specific problems
- Inductive Proofs
 - Keep induction in mind when using model checkers

Thank You!

- Questions/Comments/Concerns?
- Future Work
 - IC3 Implementations
 - Preprocessing Passes: Cone of Influence, ITE rewriting
 - CEGAR Loops: Functional Abstraction, ProphIC3
 - More frontends: SMV (in a PR by Yahan Yang), CorelR
 - Temporal logic support
 - Not currently a high priority
 - Lenny working on an alternative solution that should be easier for developers as well

Backup: Comparison to CoSA

Solver	Solved	Unsafe	Safe	Unknown	ТО	МО
1-BMC	275	275	0	94	316	3
2-BMC	274	274	0	93	319	2
1-KIND	300	270	30	18	332	38
2-KIND	302	269	33	0	385	1
1-INT	83	54	29	0	524	81
2-INT	157	124	33	2	519	10

Solver	Solved	Unsafe	Safe
CoSA1	317	275	42
Cosa2	326	277	49