

## Information Monitoring ~~Interception~~ in Distance-Vector Routing Networks

DAVID BURSTEIN  
*University of Pittsburgh*

FRANKLIN KENTER  
*Rice University*

JEREMY KUN  
*University of Illinois at Chicago*

FENG SHI\*  
*University of Chicago*

\*Corresponding author: bill10@uchicago.edu

[Received on 28 January 2016]

Despite the large effort devoted to cybersecurity research over the last decades, cyber intrusions and attacks are still increasing, ~~constantly challenging the design of the current system. The increasingly frequent events of BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) route hijacking have brought the topic of traffic interception into attention. While numerous edits and improvements are proposed for BGP, a theoretical understanding of the fundamental design of this system is missing. Here,~~ With respect to routing networks, route hijacking has highlighted the need to reexamine the existing protocols that govern traffic routing. In particular, our primary question is how the topology of a network affects the susceptibility of a routing protocol to endogenous route misdirection. In this paper we define and analyze an abstract model of information monitoring in traffic interception (i.e. eavesdropping) in distance-vector routing networks. Specifically, we study algorithms that measure the potential of groups of dishonest agents to divert traffic through their infrastructure under the constraint that messages must reach their intended destinations. We relate two variants of our model based on the allowed kinds of lies, define strategies for colluding agents, and prove optimality in special cases. In our main theorem we derive a provably optimal monitoring strategy for subsets of agents in which no two are adjacent, and we extend this strategy to the general case. Finally, we use our results to analyze the susceptibility of real and synthetic networks to endogenous information monitoring traffic interception. In the Autonomous Systems (AS) graph of the United States, we show that compromising only 18 random nodes in the AS graph surprisingly captures 10% of all traffic of paths in the network in expectation when a distance-vector routing protocol is in use.

*Keywords:*

~~Information monitoring~~ Traffic interception, Routing networks, ~~Border Gateway Protocol, Autonomous Systems, Route Hijacking, Traffic Interception~~ Distance-vector routing protocols, Distance fraud  
2000 Math Subject Classification: 68M10, 68M12, 68R10, 94C15

### 1. Introduction

Several recent events have demonstrated that internet routing protocols are particularly vulnerable to misdirections in routing [6, 10, 11, 15]. ~~See Figure 1 for a real-life example.~~ This brings up the question: How vulnerable are trust-based communication protocols to malicious agents who can abuse this trust?




Figure 1. A real-life incident in connection with information-monitoring-traffic interception as reported in [15], where a “colluding agent” (square) in Ukraine, broadcasts a false distance and intercepts a message sent from an honest agent in Texas whose target is the British Telecom, that services the UK Atomic Weapon’s Establishment. The solid line indicates how the message should be routed under the presence of only honest agents. The dotted line demonstrates how the message is routed when the “colluding agent” (square) broadcasts a false distance, and reroutes the message to its intended target. The above image is a simplification of the documented rerouting, as the circle in the UK is in fact representative of multiple honest agents (autonomous systems).

To answer this question, we present and study a model of information-monitoring-traffic interception in routing networks largely inspired by real-life incidents. See Figure 1 for an example. In practice, a wide range of routing protocols are developed and implemented for communications. For example, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). The model is used for inter-domain communications between autonomous systems in the modern Internet; distance-vector and link-state routing protocols are used for intra-domain communications. Instead of going into the technical details of the protocols and their business models, we study a mathematical and parsimonious model for traffic interception in general. The model closely resembles the distance-vector protocols such as the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [12, 16]. Due to their simplicity and efficiency, distance-vector protocols are widely used in moderate-size IP networks and ad hoc mobile networks [13, 22]. Therefore, in this work we study a theoretical model for “distance frauds” [20] in an abstract setting of distance-vector protocols, and aim to provide a starting point to investigate security issues of other complex routing protocols.

The model is stated formally in Section 3, but can be loosely described as follows. For a graph  $G$  in which vertices are agents. A, a subset  $S$  of agents are designated “colluders”, and the rest are “honest”. Honest agents maintain a record of beliefs about their distance-vector recording their believed distances to all other agents in the network, broadcasting this information to their immediate neighbors in each round and updating their beliefs with the information broadcasted to them. When honest agents send or forward a message, they route it to any neighbor that is closest to the message’s recipient. Meanwhile, colluding agents have knowledge about the entire graph and want to maximize the number of messages that are routed through at least one member of  $S$ . They can achieve this by lying in their broadcasts to their neighbors making it appear they are closer to the message’s destination than they actually are. As a result, the honest agents will unknowingly forward messages to the colluding agents along a potentially suboptimal path (See, for example, Figure 1).

While it would seem easy for the colluding agents to lie in order to intercept messages, we impose the additional requirement that every message must eventually reach its intended destination, as frequently dropped messages would raise an alarm causing the colluders to be discovered. This makes strategy design difficult for the colluding agents, as they must carefully balance lying in order to attract messages while not overstating their proximity to the recipient which would cause never-ending cycles.

Solving this problem not only provides a tool for analyzing the susceptibility of a network to endogenous information ~~monitoring~~interception, but further informs protocol designers of the vulnerability of honest agents naively following protocols of this type. Our contributions are to analyze this model at many levels from both ~~a~~-theoretical and practical ~~perspective~~perspectives. In this article, we accomplish the following:

- Formulate appropriate generalized combinatorial models for trust-based communication in networks (Section 3);
- Demonstrate that the case where each colluding agent may broadcast a different piece of information to each of its neighbors, the non-uniform broadcast model, reduces to the case where each individual colluding agent must broadcast the same information to its neighbors, the uniform broadcast model (Proposition 4.4);
- Given a set of malicious agents  $S$  where none of them are adjacent, provide the optimal strategy regarding how the agents of  $S$  should broadcast (Theorem 5.1);
- Show that optimally choosing a set of colluding agents is NP-complete (Section 4.1); and
- Provide simulations demonstrating that, for various types of real-world and synthetic networks, a very small portion of colluding agents, acting strategically, can in fact intercept a significant proportion of messages. These results add a new perspective on the attack tolerance of scale-free networks [1]. In addition to being vulnerable to connectivity attacks by removing high degree nodes, they are vulnerable even to random ~~monitoring~~interception attacks (Section 6).

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review related work. In Section 3 we define our models, and discuss their complexity in Section 4. In Section 5 we define our strategies, and in Section 5.2 we prove the optimality of our strategy (Theorem 5.1). We generalize the strategy of Theorem 5.1 to the general case of connected agents in Section 5.3. In Section 6 we empirically evaluate the quality of our strategies, and in Section 7 we conclude with open problems.

## 2. Related work

~~Misuse of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a routing protocol used to direct internet traffic, has resulted in widespread and~~

There has been an extensive literature on secure designs of the distance-vector routing protocol [13, 22, 24, 25] and on algorithms that detect potential security issues [5, 7, 21]. Our work deviates from those lines in mainly two ways. First, as discussed in the Introduction we study a theoretical model for “distance frauds” [20] in an abstract setting of distance-vector protocols. Second, rather than developing algorithms to detect malicious agents we aim to understand the potential of groups of dishonest agents to divert traffic through their infrastructure. Recent high-profile internet outages [23] : In response, researchers have analyzed have proven that traffic attraction or interception is an important

security issue of modern Internet, attracting large attention on the threat models, incentive schemes, and secure alternatives for BGP; see the works [2, 4, 8, 9, 14, 19].

Our work is in the spirit of [2], where the authors seek to provide estimates on the amount of traffic that can be intercepted or hijacked by colluding agents. In contrast to their work, we want to focus on information ~~monitoring~~ interception and we disallow “black-holes”, a type of attack ~~against BGP~~ that results in numerous dropped messages. Consequently, identifying strategies that promote information monitoring by maximizing traffic to the colluding agents becomes highly non-trivial. In order to ease the theoretical analysis, we ~~omit certain details of BGP including business rules that differentiate between customers and providers~~ move away from BGP and adopt the framework of distance-vector routing protocol. Furthermore, we assume that the honest agents are unsuspecting of the possibly nefarious objectives of the colluding agents. We prioritize studying ~~information monitoring over traffic interception~~ traffic interception over hijacking attacks with “black holes”, as in the latter case the honest agents would immediately realize that one of their routing paths has been compromised. Consequently, we believe our model will serve as a fundamental tool in analyzing the more involved problem (not discussed here) where honest agents actively seek out the colluding agents, and the colluding agents must not only optimize the amount of traffic sent to them, but also they must conceal their identities from the honest agents.

### 3. Model and preliminaries

For our study, we focus on a finite, unweighted, undirected graph  $G = (V, E)$  with  $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$  being the agents. We will write  $i \sim j$  if  $\{i, j\} \in E$ , i.e., nodes  $i$  and  $j$  are ~~connected~~ adjacent.

The model employs two types of agents represented by the vertices. First are *honest* agents which follow an automated protocol. This protocol allows the honest agents to learn about the distances between ~~itself~~ themselves and various other agents over time. As a result, for any given destination, each honest agent learns to which of its neighbors it should “optimally” route a message. Second are *colluding agents* who make various choices within mild constraints. Colluding agents act cooperatively with the goal of intercepting as many messages as possible. They achieve this by broadcasting (potentially) false distances thereby tricking the honest agents into routing messages along a suboptimal path.

#### 3.1 What honest agents do

Each honest agent  $i$  maintains an  $n$ -length vector,  $(\rho^t(i, 1), \rho^t(i, 2), \dots, \rho^t(i, n))$ , corresponding to all the believed distances for agent  $i$  between  $i$  and every agent at time  $t$ .

Each agent,  $i$ , initially sets  $\rho^0(i, j)$  to

$$\rho^0(i, j) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = j \\ \infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (3.1)$$

While honest agents do not know the topology of the network, they can learn about the distances between other nodes with a *synchronization protocol*. At each step, each honest agent will receive broadcasts from its neighbors (including both honest and colluding agents) on their believed distances and update the information as follows.

$$\rho^{t+1}(i, j) = \min\{\rho^t(i, j), 1 + \min_{k \sim i} \rho^t(k, j)\} \quad (3.2)$$

An example of the synchronization process is illustrated in Figure 2. One can observe that the




Figure 2. (Left) Initially, nodes  $x$  and  $y$  know that they are neighbors to node  $z$  and have a perceived distance  $\rho$  of  $\rho = 1$  to  $z$ . In contrast, node  $w$  does not know its distance to  $z$  and denotes it as  $\infty$ . (Right) After 1 round, nodes  $x$  and  $y$  both tell  $w$ , that they are distance 1 from  $z$ . Hence, node  $w$  updates its distance  $\rho$  to  $z$  to be 2 and stores which of its neighbors ( $x$  and  $y$ ) are on the shortest path from  $w$  to  $z$ .

distance  $\rho^t(i, j)$  is nonincreasing with respect to  $t$ . Further, if all agents are honest the  $\rho^t(i, j)$  will converge in at most  $n - 1$  rounds. We will denote  $\rho(i, j)$  the stationary distances in the end of the synchronization protocol. All our analyses are based on the stationary distances  $\rho(i, j)$ .

Afterwards, each honest agent,  $i$ , establishes a *forwarding policy* which is an array of  $n$ -sets,  $\mathbf{b}_i = (b_{i,j})_{j=1}^n$  where  $b_{i,j}$  is the set of neighbors of  $i$  advertising the shortest path to  $j$ . That is,

$$b_{i,j} = \operatorname{argmin}_{k \sim i} \rho(k, j) \quad (3.3)$$

where the *argmin* is a set of all such minimizing arguments. Finally, when agent  $i$  must forward a message whose destination is node  $t$ , it forwards to a uniformly random node in  $b_{i,t}$ . The random choice is made independently for every forwarding event.

Observe that if all agents are honest, the  $\rho(x, y)$  is precisely the graph distance from  $x$  to  $y$  which we denote as  $d(x, y)$ , and also for any shortest-distance path  $x = v_0, v_1, \dots, v_\ell = y$ , we have  $v_{i+1} \in b_{v_i, t}$  for all  $i = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$ . Conversely, for a node  $w$  to optimally route a message to  $y$ ,  $w$  simply forwards the message to any member of  $b_{w,y}$ .

### 3.2 What colluding agents can do

The colluding agents work together and form a *strategy* by choosing a broadcasting distance  $\rho^t(v, \cdot)$ , and a *forwarding policy*  $\mathbf{b}_v$  for each colluding agent  $v$ . The colluding agents do not update their believed distances  $\rho$  based on the broadcasting distances from their neighbors; instead, they can broadcast any distances to gain traffic, and our goal is to find the “best” value of  $\rho(v, \cdot)$  for every colluding agent  $v$ . In this case broadcasts will not change across rounds, which means that agent  $v$  will broadcast the same  $\rho(v, \cdot)$  across all rounds, and so we drop the superscript for time for colluding agents.

During each step of the synchronization protocol, each colluding agent will broadcast its  $\rho$  to all of its neighbors. The honest neighbors will perceive these distances to be real and update their believed distances  $\rho$ , and  $\mathbf{b}$  in equations 3.2 and 3.3 accordingly, converging in  $n - 1$  steps.

Allowing any strategy will potentially cause messages to be routed in a loop without reaching its destination. For example, see Figure 3. Hence, we restrict the space of admissible strategies to




Figure 3. For simplicity, in the figure above we drop the time subscript for  $\rho$  and assume the broadcast does not change. Consider an undirected graph (top left) where the node  $q$  wants to send a message to  $z$ . If nodes are broadcasting their true distances (top right), the induced directed graph illustrates how the message travels from node  $q$  to node  $z$ . If node  $x$ , a colluding node, overzealously broadcasts a distance that is too small to all of its neighbors (bottom left), the message will never reach  $z$  and hence is inadmissible. However, if  $x$  broadcasts the same false distance (of 3) to all of its neighbors as in the uniform model (bottom left), node  $x$  captures the traffic coming from  $q$ . We construct a corresponding path by considering the case where node  $s$  forwards the message to  $u$  (as  $u$  and  $x$  are broadcasting the same distance), which demonstrates that the strategy is indeed admissible.

be those that do not deterministically cause such loops. Further, agents cannot falsely advertise to be destinations they are not. In the language of BGP, we disallow “black holes.”

To define this formally, we say a path from  $s$  to  $t$ ,  $s = v_0, v_1, \dots, v_\ell = t$ , is a *corresponding path* if  $v_{i+1} \in b_{v_i, t}$  for  $i = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$  if an honest agent. That is, a corresponding path has each honest agent forward each message to a neighbor advertising a minimum distance where colluding agents choose to whom they forward messages. A strategy is then *admissible* if there is a corresponding path between every pair of nodes.

An admissible strategy is one for which every message, will with high probability over tie breaks by honest agents, eventually reach its destination. Although it may travel along cycles during its routing, with overwhelming probability the number of steps will be polynomial in the size of the graph. This may be thought of as the weakest form of avoiding black holes, and it allows our analysis to focus on ensuring the existence of some optimal path from the source to the target. Equivalently (up to high probability over tie-breaks), we may assume that honest agents, when faced with a tie between an option that will cycle and an option that will not cycle, its choice will break the cycle.

It is worth noting that for every set  $S$  the strategy where each agent in  $S$  acts like an honest agent by broadcasting the true distance is admissible. We call this the *honest strategy*.

We analyze the effectiveness of a strategy by the number of node-pairs for which the colluding agents necessarily intercept a message. In this sense, we take the worst-case approach for the colluding agents. To make this formal, given a set of colluding agents  $S$  and admissible strategy  $\theta$ , let  $p_{S,\theta}$  be the proportion of pairs of nodes  $\{i, j\}$  such that *every* corresponding path between  $i$  and  $j$  passes through some node in  $S$ . Further, a strategy is *beneficial* if  $p_{S,\theta} > p_{S,\theta_{\text{honest}}}$ , where  $\theta_{\text{honest}}$  is the honest strategy.

#### 4. Algorithmic Analysis

In this section, we explore various algorithmic questions. First, we demonstrate that optimally selecting a set of colluding agents of a fixed size is NP-hard. We achieve this by reducing the problem to vertex covering. Additionally, we give examples where the optimal effectiveness of a set of colluding agents  $S$  is not submodular. Finally, we prove that a variant model where the colluding agents  $S$  may broadcast different, potentially false, messages to its neighbors reduces to the case where the broadcast is uniform.

##### 4.1 NP-hardness and submodularity

We investigate the algorithmic properties of optimally choosing a set of colluding agents by considering the case when the agents use the honest strategy,  $\theta_{\text{honest}}$ . In which case, how do we pick which nodes should collude? **This** In fact the problem of optimally selecting nodes reduces to the following **problem**:

**Problem 4.1 ( $p$ -Shortest Path Dominating Set)** Given a graph  $G = (V, E)$  an integer  $k \geq 1$  and  $p \in [0, 1]$ , is there a set  $S \subset V$  of size  $k$  so that at least  $p \binom{n}{2}$  shortest paths pass through  $S$ ?

We abbreviate this by SPDS( $p, k$ ) and say a vertex  $v$  *covers* a path if it lies on the path. There are two natural optimization problems associated with SPDS. The first, MAX-SPDS( $-, k$ ), is to maximize the  $p$  achieved over all sets of size  $k$ . The second, MIN-SPDS( $p, -$ ), minimizes  $k$  while attaining a prespecified  $p$ . SPDS( $p, k$ ) is trivially NP-hard because SPDS( $1, k$ ) is VERTEX-COVER.

By a standard argument, the function  $f : 2^V \rightarrow [0, 1]$  mapping  $S$  to the proportion of shortest paths covered by  $S$  is submodular<sup>1</sup> and monotone. Hence, by a classic theorem of Nemhauser, Wolsey, and Fisher [17], the greedy algorithm provides a  $(1 - 1/e)$ -approximation algorithm for MAX-SPDS( $-, k$ ). A slight variant of the greedy algorithm presented by Wolsey [27] achieves a  $p$ -proportion of shortest paths with a set  $S$  of size

$$|S| = \left\lceil 1 + \log \max_{v \in V} f(\{v\}) \right\rceil OPT = [1 + O(\log(n))] OPT$$

where OPT is the size of the smallest set covering a  $p$ -proportion of shortest paths.

A similar reduction from VERTEX-COVER shows that the problem of picking colluding nodes *and* a good strategy for lying is also NP-hard. Moreover, the collusion problem is not submodular. We prove this below, and as such, we will henceforth focus on the problem of determining the optimal strategy for a given set of colluding agents.

**PROPOSITION 4.2** Fix  $\theta(S)$  mapping subsets of vertices to optimal strategies. Define  $f : 2^{V(G)} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  by letting  $f(S)$  be the number of shortest paths passing through  $S$  when  $S$  uses the strategy  $\theta(S)$ . Then  $f$  is not submodular.

<sup>1</sup>Recall a set function  $f : 2^X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is *submodular* if for every  $S, T \subset X$  with  $S \subset T$  and for every  $x \in X \setminus T$ , the marginal gain  $f(S \cup \{x\}) - f(S) \geq f(T \cup \{x\}) - f(T)$



*Proof.*

Let  $G = K_{m,2}$  be the complete bipartite graph on parts  $X, Y$  with  $X = \{p, q\}, |Y| = m$ . Let  $S = \{p\}, T = \{q\}$ . Then adding  $q$  to  $T$  captures every path in  $G$ . Adding  $q$  to  $S$  captures only the messages sent to and from  $q$ , because other messages are routed via  $p$ . In particular,

$$\begin{aligned} f(S \cup \{q\}) - f(S) &= 2(m+1) = O(m) \\ f(T \cup \{q\}) - f(T) &= 2 \binom{m+2}{2} - 2(m+1) = O(m^2), \end{aligned}$$

disproving submodularity.  $\square$

There are also interesting examples of this that rely on lies in a nontrivial way, for example when  $G = C_n$  for sufficiently large  $n$ . In this case a single node has little advantage, but adding a second adjacent node allows for an interesting collusion. One of the two colluders may broadcast 1 for most targets, and forward incoming messages to the its neighboring colluder who in turn forwards along  $C_n$  to the target. We discuss the broadcast bounds for this case in Section 5.3.

#### 4.2 Non-uniform broadcasting and a reduction

Previously, we required each colluding agent to broadcast its false distances uniformly to all of its neighbors. However, realistically, a colluding agent could make varying broadcasts to different neighbors. We refer to this as the *nonuniform model* and the previous as the *uniform model*.

Formally, the only difference between the models is that for the nonuniform model, the colluding agents must establish a more precise broadcast strategy,  $\rho(v, t, i)$ , for each colluding agent  $v$  and each neighbor  $i$ .

~~Although nonuniform~~ Nonuniform lies might appear at first glance to provide a substantial increase in power. ~~In particular, there are many more strategies, and it seems easier to accidentally introduce a large cycle), we show that algorithmically finding the, so it seems computationally harder to find an optimal solution. However, we show this is not the case. Finding the optimal nonuniform strategy for a fixed subset is no harder than reduces to finding the optimal uniform strategy. Hence, this Because the uniform model is also a special case of the nonuniform model, this shows the two problems are computationally equivalent. This~~ justifies a focused study of the uniform model.

Consider the following decision problem:

**Problem 4.3 (UNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING)** Given a graph  $G = (V, E)$ , a subset  $S \subset V$  and a  $p \in [0, 1]$ , is there an admissible strategy  $\theta$  for  $S$  such that in the uniform broadcast model  $p_{S, \theta} \geq p$ ?

Similarly for nonuniform lies, we analogously define NONUNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING. We will prove that the nonuniform case reduces to the uniform case with a small blowup construction.

**PROPOSITION 4.4** NONUNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING reduces to UNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING.

*Proof.*

Given a graph  $G$ , a subset  $S$ , and a fraction  $p$  for the nonuniform model, we produce a new graph  $G'$ , a subset  $S'$ , and a fraction  $p'$  for the uniform model as follows. (See figure 4 for an illustration). For simplicity we will prove the case where  $G$  is  $D$ -regular. Start by setting  $G' = G$ . For each edge  $e = (u, v)$  where  $u \in S$ , subdivide  $e$  in  $G'$  with a new vertex  $w_e$ . Also for each such edge, add  $u, w_e$  to  $S'$ . Finally, set






Figure 4. An illustration for Proposition 4.4. Given a graph  $G$ , a set of colluding agents  $S$  (shaded circles), and a fraction  $p$  for the nonuniform model (left panel), we produce a new graph  $G'$ , a new set of colluding agents  $S'$  (shaded circles), and a fraction  $p'$  for the uniform model (right panel) by inserting a new colluding agent to every edge connecting a colluding agent in  $S$  and a honest node. We show in the proposition that a nonuniform broadcasting strategy in the left is equivalent to an uniform broadcasting strategy in the right.

$$p' = \frac{p \binom{|V|}{2} + \binom{|S|D}{2} + |S||V|}{\binom{|V|+|S|D}{2}}.$$

Suppose there is a strategy  $\theta$  for  $S, G$  achieving a  $p$  fraction in the nonuniform model. We'll convert  $\theta$  into a strategy  $\theta'$  for  $S'$ . Whenever a colluding agent  $u \in S$  would broadcast  $p$  to a neighbor  $v$ , we have the agent  $w_{(u,v)}$  uniformly broadcast  $p$ . And whenever a message goes to  $w_{(u,v)}$  with some other destination,  $w_{(u,v)}$  forwards it through  $u$ , who in turn forwards it to the  $w_{(u,v')}$  corresponding to the same  $v'$  that  $u$  would forward to in the nonuniform setting. This simulates  $\theta$ , and hence achieves the same  $p \binom{|V|}{2}$  paths in  $G$ ; the formula for  $p'$  simply counts the paths introduced by the new vertices (all of which include a colluding agent). So if  $p_{S,\theta} \geq p$  in  $G$ ,  $p_{S',\theta'} \geq p'$  in  $G'$ .

Conversely, we can collapse any uniform strategy for  $S'$  into a nonuniform one for  $S$  by contracting all the newly added edges in  $G'$  and combining their broadcasts in the obvious way. The case where  $G$  is irregular is analogous, and it's clear the appropriate  $p'$  can be efficiently computed.  $\square$

## 5. Strategies for the uniform model

We now turn to a detailed study of the uniform broadcast model. In this section, we define the optimal strategy in Section 5.2 and prove that it is optimal. Minimizing the distances broadcasted by the colluding agents optimizes the traffic captured by the agents; therefore, to prove the optimality of the strategy we show that it achieves the minimal distances that could be broadcasted by the colluding agents without causing “~~block holes~~”black holes”. Our main result is the following:

**THEOREM 5.1** Let  $G = (V, E)$  be a graph and  $S \subset V$  a fixed subset of vertices such that the actual distance  $d(x, y) \geq 2$  for all  $x, y \in S$ . Then the strategy  $\rho^*$  defined in Section 5.2 intercepts an optimal

fraction of traffic in  $G$ .

The proof consists of two parts. After defining the broadcast policy  $\rho^*$  in Section 5.2 and the associated forwarding policy, we first prove in Proposition 5.8 that the strategy is admissible, and then in Proposition 5.9 that  $\rho^*$  is the minimal broadcast for any admissible strategy.

### 5.1 A single agent

We start by characterizing the case of a single colluding agent. This case is useful because it forms a “base case” for our more complicated strategies later. In this case, the best strategy is simple: lie exactly two less than your true distance to a target. We show that this is guaranteed not to cause cycles while any larger lie causes a cycle of length 2.

Before we state the theorem below, we remind readers that  $d(x, t)$  is the true graph distance from node  ~~$x$  to node  $t$~~   $x$  to node  $t$ .

**THEOREM 5.2** Let  $x$  be a colluding node and  $t$  be a target node whose true distance in  $G$  is  $d(x, t) = k$ . Suppose that  $x$  broadcasts  $\rho(x, t) = k'$ . Then this strategy is admissible and beneficial if and only if one of the following conditions hold.

1.  $k' = k - 2$  and there is a neighbor  $z$  of  $x$  with  $d(z, t) = k = k' + 2$ .
2.  $k - 2 \leq k' \leq k - 1$  and there is a neighbor  $z$  of  $x$  with  $d(z, t) = k + 1$ , and there is a shortest path from  $z$  to  $t$  that does not pass through  $x$  (before  $x$ 's lie).

*Proof.*

Note that  $d(x, t) = k$  if and only if the closest neighbor  $y$  of  $x$  to  $t$  has distance  $d(y, t) = k - 1$ . The strategy for  $x$  will be to route all messages to  $t$  through  $y$ .

For one direction, suppose one of the above conditions holds and let  $z$  be a neighbor of  $x$  satisfying the desired property. Then  $z$  will send messages to  $t$  through  $x$ , which  $x$  can forward through  $y$ . We further claim that no message forwarded through  $y$  to  $t$  will ever come back to  $x$ . Call  $y, v_2, v_3, \dots$  the vertices on the route taken by the sent message after passing through  $x$ . We construct a corresponding path by requiring that  $v_2 \neq x$  (as  $d(y, t) = k - 1$  ensures that  $y$  has a neighbor  $v_2$  such that  $d(v_2, t) = k - 2$ ) and it follows that the perceived distances  $\rho(v_i, t)$  along the message's path from  $t$  are monotonically decreasing in  $i$ . This follows from the fact that  $x$  broadcasts the same lie to all its neighbors. In particular,  $\rho(x, t) = \rho(v_2, t)$  and so for all  $j \geq 2$ ,  $v_j$  will always have a closer neighbor than  $x$ .

For the converse, suppose the strategy is admissible and beneficial. First,  $x$  cannot broadcast  $\rho(x, t) < k - 2$ , or else  $y$  (and by minimality all neighbors of  $x$ ) will route messages to  $t$  through  $x$ , causing a cycle. If  $k' \geq k$ , then no neighbor of  $x$  would change its behavior, contradicting beneficialness. This implies the conditions on  $k'$  in (1) and (2). Moreover, beneficialness implies  $x$  has a neighbor  $z$  that now forwards messages through  $x$ , implying its new perceived distance is  $\rho(z, t) = k' + 1$ . By the fact that  $d(x, t) = k$ , every other neighbor  $z$  of  $x$  has  $k - 1 \leq d(z, t) \leq k + 1$ . If all neighbors have distance  $k - 1$  then no node is forced to send messages to  ~~$x$~~   $x$  and implies the strategy is not beneficial, so let  $z$  be a neighbor with  $d(z, t) \geq k$ .

If  $d(z, t) = k$  then the shortest path from  $z$  to  $t$  already does not pass through  $x$  and we must choose  $k' = k - 2$  to change  $z$ 's behavior. On the other hand, if  $d(z, t) = k + 1$  but has no other shortest path to  $t$  except through  $x$ , then lying is not beneficial. If  $z$  has another path to  $t$  then setting  $k' = k - 1$  breaks the tie.  $\square$

One can simplify the above lemma by noting that setting  $k' = k - 2$  is always nondetrimental, and this is the optimal nondetrimental lie. So if an agent has incentive to lie, it may as well lie as much as possible. This ~~proves~~ motivates the following corollary.

**COROLLARY 5.1** Let  $x$  be a single lying agent in  $G$  in the uniform local broadcast model. An optimal admissible strategy for a single lying agent  $x$  is to broadcast  $\rho(x, t) = \max(1, d(x, t) - 2)$  for all  $t \in V(G)$ .

*Proof.* In the proof of Theorem 5.2, we showed that a vertex  $x$  lying in this way cannot produce any cycles of length 2, since it does not alter the behavior of the neighbor through which  $x$  routes messages to  $t$ . It remains to show that there are no longer cycles.

Suppose to the contrary that when  $s$  tries to send a message to  $t$ , there is a cycle  $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m, v_{m+1} = v_1$ , with  $m \geq 3$ . Let  $i$  be the index of a vertex on the cycle which minimizes the true distance  $d(v_i, t)$ . Call this distance  $a$ , and note that  $v_i$  is not a colluding agent (or else it could correctly forward messages so as to break the cycle). Because there is a cycle,  $v_{i+1}$  is broadcasting  $\rho(v_{i+1}, t) \leq a - 2$ , but  $d(v_{i+1}, t) \geq a$ . And since  $v_{i+1}$  forwards to  $v_{i+2}$ , we have  $\rho(v_{i+2}, t) \leq a - 3$  while  $d(v_{i+2}, t) \geq a$ . We claim this is a contradiction: a colluding agent lies by exactly two less than the truth, and so  $v_{i+2}$  cannot be a colluding agent. But the effect of a colluding agent's lie does not change the perceived distances of any vertex in  $G$  by more than two. This shows the claimed contradiction.  $\square$

The same algorithm can be jointly and independently used by multiple colluding agents in the uniform broadcast model. We make this rigorous with the following proposition.

**PROPOSITION 5.3** If any set of colluding agents lie independently according to Corollary 5.1, then their joint strategy is admissible.

*Proof.*

In the proof of Theorem 5.2, we showed that a vertex  $x$  lying in this way cannot produce any cycles of length 2, since it does not alter the behavior of the neighbor through which  $x$  routes messages to  $t$ . It remains to show that there are no longer cycles.

Suppose to the contrary that when  $s$  tries to send a message to  $t$ , there is a cycle  $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m, v_{m+1} = v_1$ , with  $m \geq 3$ . Let  $i$  be the index of a vertex on the cycle which minimizes the true distance  $d(v_i, t)$ . Call this distance  $a$ , and note that  $v_i$  is not a colluding agent (or else it could correctly forward messages so as to break the cycle). Because there is a cycle,  $v_{i+1}$  is broadcasting  $\rho(v_{i+1}, t) \leq a - 2$ , but  $d(v_{i+1}, t) \geq a$ . And since  $v_{i+1}$  forwards to  $v_{i+2}$ , we have  $\rho(v_{i+2}, t) \leq a - 3$  while  $d(v_{i+2}, t) \geq a$ . We claim this is a contradiction: a colluding agent lies by exactly two less than the truth, and so  $v_{i+2}$  cannot be a colluding agent. But the effect of a colluding agent's lie does not change the perceived distances of any vertex in  $G$  by more than two. This shows the claimed contradiction.  $\square$

## 5.2 Separated agents

We now turn to the case of multiple colluding agents. By Proposition 4.4, we know that allowing neighboring colluding agents introduces the ability for nonuniform broadcasts. So we characterize the alternative where no two colluding agents are adjacent. The optimal strategy we define generalizes to a nontrivial admissible strategy for the general case in Section 5.3.

For a set  $X$  of integers and an integer  $j$ , define  $S_X(j)$  to be the set of all permutations of  $j$  elements from  $X$ . In this section  $C = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$  will denote the set of colluding nodes, and no two are adjacent in  $G$ .

**DEFINITION 5.4** The  $j$ -th colluding distance between two colluding agents  $x$  and  $y$  is defined as

$$d_j(x, y) = \min_{\substack{\sigma \in S_C(j) \\ \sigma(1)=x \\ \sigma(j)=y}} \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} d(\sigma(i), \sigma(i+1)).$$

In other words, it is the length of the shortest path from  $x$  to  $y$  that contains  $j$  colluding nodes. Call any path minimizing this quantity a  $j$ -th *colluding path*. If no such path exists, call  $d_j(x, y) = \infty$  by convention.

We will consider  $j$ -th colluding paths directed from  $x$  to  $y$  when appropriate. Now given a set of colluding nodes and a target vertex  $t$ , we want to identify the strategy that minimizes  $\rho(-, t)$  for all of our colluders. We start by defining a candidate strategy  $\rho^*$ , observe that it is admissible, and then prove it is indeed a lower bound on admissible strategies.

DEFINITION 5.5 Let  $\rho'(x, t) = \max(d(x, t) - 2, 1)$ . Let  $\rho''(x, t)$  be defined as

$$\min_{1 \leq i, j \leq k} [d_j(x, x_i) - 2(j-1) + \rho'(x_i, t)].$$

Then define the strategy  $\rho^*(x, t) = \min(\rho'(x, t), \rho''(x, t))$ .

To give some intuition, this strategy takes the minimum of Corollary 5.1 and the best  $j$ -th colluding path (where the end of that path uses Corollary 5.1 to get to  $t$ ).

Definition 5.5 is useful in the following scenario depicted in Figure 5. Suppose  $(s, x_1, y_2, x_2, \dots, y_j, x_j, t)$  is a path of length  $2j+1$ , where  $t$  is the target of a message sent by  $s$  and  $x_i$  are colluding agents. Then every  $x_i$  may broadcast  $\rho^*(x_i, t) = 1$ , and the honest agents will forward along the path toward  $t$ .

We call  $x$  *proper* for  $t$  if it (strictly) minimizes  $\rho^*(x, t)$  via the  $j$ -th colluding distance for some  $j \geq 2$  and *improper* otherwise, and we call a  $j$ -th colluding path realizing this minimization a *witness* for the properness of  $x$ . We define the *forwarding number* of a  $j$ -th colluding path to be  $j$ , and define the forwarding number of a vertex  $v$  to be the smallest forwarding number of any  $j$ -th colluding path minimizing  $\rho^*(v, t)$  starting at  $v$ . Note that a vertex with a forwarding number 1 is by definition improper, and that all of these definitions depend on the choice of  $t$ .

Improper colluding nodes forward as in Corollary 5.1. Proper colluding agents pick a  $j$ -th colluding path which minimizes their broadcast. We now prove that  $\rho^*$  is an admissible strategy. But first, we prove that  $j$ -th colluding paths can be extended in a nice way.

PROPOSITION 5.6 Let  $x, y$  be colluding vertices in  $G$ . Then  $\rho^*(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho^*(y, t)$ .

*Proof.*

If  $y$  is improper, then  $\rho^*(x, t)$  has a 2-th colluding path and trivially  $\rho^*(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho'(y, t)$  so we are done.

So suppose  $y$  is proper with forwarding number  $j$ . By definition, there is a  $y'$  such that  $\rho^*(y, t) = d_j(y, y') - 2(j-1) + \rho'(y', t)$ . Call the witness path  $\sigma$ . Then there is a corresponding path  $\sigma'$  for  $x$  constructed by prepending a path from  $x$  to  $y$  to  $\sigma$ . This path is some  $j'$ -th colluding path for  $j' > j$  whose cost is an upper bound on  $d_{j'}(x, y')$ . Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho^*(x, t) &\leq d_{j'-j}(x, y) - 2(j'-j) + d_j(y, y') - 2(j-1) + \rho'(y', t) \\ &\leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho^*(y, t), \end{aligned}$$




Figure 5. An example of strategies for colluding agents  $x, y$  and  $z$  (shaded circles). Suppose that  $s$  wants to send a message to  $t$ . (a) If no lies involved,  $s$  would send the message to  $u$  who is closest to  $t$ . (b) When agents  $x, y$  and  $z$  do not collude, the best strategy for  $x$  without causing “black holes” is to broadcast  $\rho(x,t) = d(x,t) - 2 = 3$ .  $s$  would still send the message to  $u$ . (c) When taking into account other colluding agents,  $x$  may broadcast  $\rho(x,t) = 1$  according to the optimal strategy defined in 5.5, and deceive  $s$  to send the message through  $x$ .

as desired.  $\square$

In fact, if  $x$  is proper,  $\rho^*(x,t)$  is minimized by computing  $d(x,y) - 2 + \rho^*(y,t)$  for some colluding agent  $y$ . It will have the property that there is a path from  $x$  to  $y$  that passes through no other colluding agents. Proposition 5.6 trivially extends to non-colluding agents  $y$ , giving the following corollary. Note here we use  $\rho$  to denote the broadcast (honest or lie) of any agent.

**COROLLARY 5.2** If all colluding agents are following  $\rho^*$ , then for all  $x \in C, y \in V(G)$ ,  $\rho^*(x,t) \leq d(x,y) - 2 + \rho(y,t)$ .

Another simple consequence of Proposition 5.6 is that the forwarding number decreases along minimal  $j$ -th colluding paths.

**PROPOSITION 5.7** Suppose  $x$  is a proper colluding agent with respect to  $\rho^*(x,t)$ , that  $x$  has forwarding number  $j$ , and that  $\sigma$  is a witnessing  $j$ -th colluding path. Let  $x'$  be the first colluding agent on  $\sigma$  after  $x$ . Then  $x'$  has forwarding number  $j - 1$ .

*Proof.*

The same technique from the proof of Proposition 5.6 shows that whatever the forwarding number of  $x'$  is, we can prepend a path from  $x$  to  $x'$  to get a path with forwarding number  $j + 1$ .  $\square$

In particular, the  $i$ -th visited colluding agent on a witness for  $\rho^*(x,t)$  of forwarding number  $j$  has forwarding number exactly  $j - i$ , and the end of the path is an improper colluding agent.

At this point one might expect some sensible extension of the pair of (forwarding number, broadcasted distance) to honest agents would produce a potential function that is monotonically decreasing

along the message path and zero at the target. Indeed, a version of this is true when the colluding agents are separated by distance at least three, with ready counterexamples for distance two. Still, we present a different argument that  $\rho^*$  is also admissible when the agents are distance two apart.

**PROPOSITION 5.8** Let  $C = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$ , and suppose that  $d(x_i, x_j) \geq 2$  for all  $x_i, x_j \in C$ . Then  $\rho^*$  is admissible.

*Proof.*

Let  $s, t$  be arbitrary vertices in  $G$ , and let  $L = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$  be a cycle in the path of a message sent from  $s$  to  $t$  (possibly infinite and repeating). If the  $y_i$  are all honest or improper agents we are reduced to the case of Proposition 5.3. So some of the  $y_i$  must be proper colluding agents.

Without loss of generality suppose  $y_1$  is a colluding agent, and let  $p$  be the minimal colluding path it forwards along, extended to the target  $t$ . Let  $y_j$  be the last vertex on  $L$  that is not also on  $p$ . The claim is that  $y_j$ 's decision to forward along  $L$  or  $p$  is a tie break. This proves the proposition because we can then construct a corresponding path.

Let  $z$  be the vertex following  $y_j$  on  $p$ , and suppose to the contrary  $\rho(y_{j+1}, t) < \rho(z, t)$ . Let  $x$  be the last colluding agent on  $p$  before  $y_j$ . Let  $x'$  be the first colluding agent on  $p$  after  $y_j$  (it may be the case that  $x' = z$ ). If  $x$  is the last colluding agent on  $p$ , then let  $x' = t$  and the proof proceeds similarly. First we expand  $\rho^*(x, t) + 2$  along  $p$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \rho^*(x, t) + 2 &= d(x, x') + \rho(x', t) \\ &= d(x, y_j) + 1 + d(z, x') + \rho(x', t) \\ &= d(x, y_j) + 1 + \rho(z, t) \end{aligned}$$

We now bound  $\rho^*(x, t) + 2$  along  $L$  using Corollary 5.2.

$$\begin{aligned} \rho^*(x, t) + 2 &\leq d(x, y_j) + 1 + \rho(y_{j+1}, t) \\ &< d(x, y_j) + 1 + \rho(z, t) \\ &= \rho^*(x, t) + 2 \end{aligned}$$

A contradiction. □

Next we prove that in the separated setting  $\rho^*$  is a lower bound on admissible broadcasts.

**PROPOSITION 5.9** Any colluding agent broadcasting  $\rho(x, t) < \rho^*(x, t)$  necessarily causes a cycle.

*Proof.*

Suppose to the contrary some colluding agent  $x$  broadcasts  $\rho(x, t) < \rho^*(x, t)$ . We will show that all neighbors of  $x$  forward to  $t$  through  $x$ , necessarily causing cycle of length 2. Fix any neighbor  $z$  and suppose to the contrary that there is a neighbor  $y \neq x$  of  $z$  with  $\rho(y, t) \leq \rho(x, t)$ . But then  $\rho(x, t) < \rho^*(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho(y, t) = \rho(y, t)$  by Corollary 5.2, a contradiction. □

This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.

Finally,  $\rho^*$  can be efficiently computed. The idea is to grow a search tree of colluding agents from  $t$ , noting that the value of  $\rho^*$  for a new vertex is minimized by using some set of previously visited nodes. More rigorously, for each target  $t \in V(G)$  run the following procedure. Set  $S = \{t\}$ . While  $C \not\subseteq S$  is missing some colluding agent, take any colluding agent with minimal distance to  $S$  (true distance in  $G$ ), and calculate the value of  $\rho^*(x, t)$  as  $\rho^*(x, t) = \min_{y \in S} d(x, y) - 2 + \rho(y, t)$ . Then add  $x$  to  $S$  and

continue. Using the same arguments used previously, it is easy to see that this will compute the correct value of  $\rho^*$  for every colluding agent and every target. Moreover, one can construct the corresponding  $j$ -th colluding paths during this process. We provide some example simulations of using this strategy on synthetic and real-world networks in Section 6.

### 5.3 Adjacent colluding agents

In this section we extend the strategy from Section 5.2 to the setting where colluding agents may be adjacent in the network. We show this generalization is not optimal, and instead give a family of strategies, one of which must be optimal.

Before we state our theorems, we describe another connection between the uniform and non-uniform models from Section 3, that we can transform an instance of the uniform model into an instance of the nonuniform model in which colluding agents are separated. Specifically, one can take the quotient  $G/\sim$  of the graph  $G$  by declaring two colluding agents to be equivalent if they are in the same connected component in the induced subgraph of colluding agents. Uniform strategies translate into nonuniform ones as follows. If  $A$  is a connected component of colluding agents collapsed to  $v_A$  with neighbors  $\partial_{G/\sim} = N_{G/\sim}(v_A)$ , then the broadcast for  $v_A$  to a neighbor  $w$  is the minimum over all such broadcasts from vertices in  $A$ . Whenever the forwarding policy in  $G$  had the form: “receive from some  $w$  with target  $t$  at  $x \in A$ , forward through  $A$  to some final node  $y \in A$ , who forwards to  $w'$ ,” the forwarding policy in  $G/\sim$  is: “Forward messages from  $w$  with target  $t$  to  $w'$ .”

Moreover, the concepts of forwarding number and colluding paths defined in Section 5.2 for separated agents in the uniform model have analogous definitions in the nonuniform model. So when we say that a component  $A \subset V(G)$  has a minimal  $j$ -th colluding path, the  $j$  refers to the path in the quotient graph, which lifts to a path in  $G$  (one of many, and possibly involving many more than  $j$  colluders). The strategy of forwarding along a minimal colluding path lifts from the quotient graph to a strategy that forwards along paths between connected components.

With this understanding, the main strategy can be sketched as follows. Each connected component of colluding agents  $A \subset C$  determines a minimal  $j$ -th colluding path  $p_t$  for each target  $t \in V(G)$  using the algorithm from Section 5.2. Pick any  $x \in A$  which is adjacent to the first honest vertex  $w$  on  $p_t$ , call this the  $t$ -exit node for  $A$ , and have  $x$  broadcast  $\rho(x, t) = \rho(w, t) - 1$  as usual. If every non- $t$ -exit node in  $A$  broadcasts so that the message never returns to  $A$ , then the proof of Proposition 5.8 generalizes to prove no cycles occur for this strategy.

We now describe bounds on the minimality of such broadcasts. For  $A \subset V(G)$ , denote by  $d_{G-A}(x, y)$  the distance from  $x$  to  $y$  in the subgraph induced by  $V(G) - A$ . When  $A = \{a\}$  is a single node we abuse notation and write  $d_{G-a}$ . We further write  $\rho_{G-A}$  to denote the perceived/broadcast distances when  $A$  is removed. Note these values change for honest agents when paths are eliminated, but not for colluding agents.

As a simple illustrative first case, suppose there are exactly two colluding agents  $x, y$  and they are adjacent. Let  $t \in V(G) - \{x, y\}$ . If  $y$  forwards a message to  $x$ , who in turn forwards to  $t$  through  $w \neq y$ , then in order to prevent the message cycling back though  $y$ , we require  $d_{G-x}(w, y) + \rho(y, t) \geq d(w, t)$ , which rearranges to give a condition on  $y$ 's broadcast. If  $d_{G-x}(w, y) = \infty$  this is interpreted as no restriction, and  $\rho(y, t)$  may be 1.

For a connected component  $A$  and target  $t$ , a similar bound is imposed on every node in  $A$  which is not the  $t$ -exit node. We state it as a theorem.

**THEOREM 5.10** Let  $G$  be a graph,  $C \subset V(G)$  be a subset of colluding agents whose induced subgraph has components  $C_1 \cup \dots \cup C_s$ . For each component  $C_i$  and target  $t$ , pick a  $t$ -exit node  $v_{i,t} \in C_i$ , who



behaves as described above, and have every  $x \in C_i$  forward messages with target  $t$  to  $v_{i,t}$ . Call  $w_{i,t}$  the node that  $v_{i,t}$  forwards to. Pick any broadcast of the non-exit nodes  $x \in C_i$  such that for all  $j$  with  $C_j$  having no larger forwarding number,

$$\rho(x, t) \geq \rho(w_{j,t}, t) - d_{G-(C_j-\{x\})}(w_{j,t}, x),$$

setting  $\rho(x, t) = 1$  if all of the above bounds are nonpositive or  $-\infty$ .

This strategy is admissible.

*Proof.*

As discussed above, it suffices to show that a message for  $t$  forwarded through  $C_i$  to the  $t$ -exit node  $v_{i,t}$  never returns to  $A$ . Suppose to the contrary the message follows some path  $p$  hitting  $x \in C_i$ . Without loss of generality,  $x \neq v_{i,t}$  is the first to receive the message. Now  $\rho(w_{i,t}, x) \geq d_{G-(C_i-\{x\})}(w_{i,t}, x)$ , and so by assumption (that  $x$  gets the message), they are equal and  $w_{i,t}$  is in a tie-break situation.  $\square$

This strategy is not optimal. Figure 6 gives a counterexample, in which the central issue is that two components which are tied for minimal forwarding number could improve their joint strategy by having one component forward through the other. In contrast to the separated case, a different choice of forwarding policy implies different broadcasts for the nodes. Indeed, if  $X$  is the space of all strategies induced by all possible forwarding configurations and the implied broadcasts from Theorem 5.10, it is easy to see that an optimal strategy is a member of  $X$ . Still, it is unclear whether it is NP-hard to pick the optimal forwarding policy.




Figure 6. A counterexample to the optimality of our strategy in the setting where agents can be adjacent. Shaded nodes are colluding. If the component with  $z, y$  is processed first then our algorithm correctly chooses the  $w, x$  component to have forwarding number 2 (with  $x$  broadcasting 1), capturing all traffic from  $a, b$  to  $t$ . On the other hand if  $w, x$  is processed first the result will miss traffic from  $a, b$ .

## 6. Simulations

We simulated the protocols described in this paper on four networks (Figure 7). (The code used to run the experiments is available at <https://github.com/j2kun/information-monitoring-simulations>.) The first is an Erdős-Rényi random graph  $G(n, p)$  where  $n = 1000, p = 4/1000$ . The second is a preferential attachment model [3] with 100 nodes. The third is a Watts-Strogatz model [26] with  $n = 1000$ , degree  $k=10$ , and edge-rewiring probability  $\beta = 0.04$ . The fourth is a snapshot of the Autonomous Systems (AS) subgraph of the United States, which has 9,296 nodes and 17,544 edges. The AS graph comes from the website of Newman [18].

For each network, we inspect the potential advantage of the  $\rho^*$  strategy of Section 5.2 over the strategy in which all agents act independently according to  $\rho(x, t) = d(x, t) - 2$ , and for each strategy we also compared the performance for a randomly chosen subset of nodes versus nodes of highest degrees. For various number of colluding agents, we report the number of paths intercepted by the colluding agents in the worst-case scenario, i.e., when there are multiple shortest paths (some of which may be “perceived shortest paths”<sup>22</sup>) between the source and target of a message, the message would go through the paths with no colluding agents.

It is worth noting that for each of these cases, we assume the demand between every pair of nodes is uniform. That is, there is no advantage for the colluders to intercept one shortest path over another.

Often, large degree nodes tend to be better colluders than randomly chosen nodes. Regardless, the benefit of colluding is clear even for randomly chosen nodes. In fact for the US AS network, if we compromise only 18 random nodes (roughly 0.2%) we can ~~monitor~~ intercept an expected 10% of the entire network's traffic. For smaller percentages, the randomly selected colluding nodes capture more traffic in the US AS network than in the synthetic models. However, for larger percentages the amount of captured traffic in the US AS network levels off quite dramatically, revealing additional topological structure in the US AS network that is not present in the synthetic models. It is also interesting to note the relatively small difference between the two strategies in the US AS graph, implying that in this setting collusion does not provide a quantitatively large improvement over a simpler strategy. We stress that since the  $\rho^*$  strategy (as defined in Section 5.2) may not be optimal when there are adjacent colluding nodes, the plots are lower bounds for the amount of traffic captured by the optimal strategy with a given percentage of colluding nodes. For uniform broadcasts and small random colluding sets, our estimates are fairly accurate because with high probability none of the colluders are adjacent. On the other hand, for nonuniform broadcasts the optimal strategy for 18 random nodes could very well capture more than 10% of ~~the US-AS~~ messages on the AS networking with uniform traffic.




Figure 7. Fraction of paths intercepted by a varying number of colluding agents on a Erdős-Rényi random graph (top left), a preferential attachment graph (top right), a Watts-Strogatz model (bottom left), and the US AS network (bottom right). Blue curves correspond to subsets of colluding agents chosen uniformly at random, while red curves to subsets chosen by largest degrees. Dashed curves correspond to the strategy where each agent independently lies by an additive factor of two, while solid curves to the optimal separated strategy of Section 5.2. The inset graph for the AS network magnifies the leftmost portion of the blue curves.

## 7. Discussion and open problems

In this paper we introduced and related two variants of a model of ~~information-monitoring-in-networks~~~~traffic interception in routing networks with distance-vector protocols~~, one for uniform broadcasts and one for non-uniform broadcasts. We characterized the optimal strategy for the uniform setting in which no two colluding agents are adjacent, and provided a family of strategies for the general case. We simulated the impact of the optimal strategy in the uniform broadcasting model on an assortment of graphs and found that in expectation for the US Autonomous Systems network, randomly selecting 0.2% of the nodes to act as colluding agents captured 10% of the entire network traffic ~~paths~~.

There are a ~~few-number-of~~ directions for future work. ~~The-most-natural-question-is~~ For example, we could consider alternate definitions of admissibility. In this work we defined strategies to be admissible as long as there exists a corresponding path between every pair of nodes, motivated by the model assumption that honest nodes break ties uniformly at random. Instead we can consider different definitions of admissibility, where for every pair of nodes *all* corresponding paths that start and end with those nodes must also be simple paths. In the case of the uniform model with a single colluding agent  $x$ , broadcasting the distance to  $t$ ,  $\rho(x, t) = \min(d(x, t) - 1, 1)$  satisfies this more restrictive definition of admissibility. Alternatively, we may call a strategy admissible if the length of a typical corresponding path under the strategy does not drastically differ from the length of a typical corresponding path under the honest strategy. The last admissibility definition is not meant to be taken as a rigorous one; we only wish to illustrate the diversity of these alternate admissibility definitions.

We could also ask whether one can efficiently characterize the general case of adjacent agents, or whether deciding the appropriate forwarding mechanism is NP-hard. In either case, another open direction is to provide approximation algorithms when the optimal subset of colluding agents is unknown. ~~This-While this~~ is likely to correlate with betweenness centrality ~~to-begin-with, but more interesting is to find we would also be interested in finding~~ the subset of agents with the largest *relative* improvement. A further improvement to this work may also consider realistic network traffic, as opposed to considering an absolute number of traffic paths as the interception objective.

## Acknowledgement

We thank everyone involved in the 2014 AMS Network Science Mathematical Research Community for inspiration and many helpful comments, especially the organizers Aaron Clauset, David Kempe, and Mason Porter. We also thank Lev Reyzin for his helpful comments.

Research supported in part by NSF grants CMMI-1300477 and CMMI-1404864.

## REFERENCES

1. Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A.-L. (2000) The Internet's Achilles' Heel: Error and attack tolerance of complex networks. *Nature*, **406**, 200–0.
2. Ballani, H., Francis, P. & Zhang, X. (2007) A Study of Prefix Hijacking and Interception in the Internet. *SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.*, **37**(4), 265–276.
3. Barabasi, A.-L. & Albert, R. (1999) Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. *Science*, **286**(5439), 509–512.
4. Butler, K., Farley, T., McDaniel, P. & Rexford, J. (2010) A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions. *Proceedings of the IEEE*, **98**(1), 100–122.
5. Chakrabarti, A. & Manimaran, G. (2003) An efficient algorithm for malicious update detection recovery in distance vector protocols. In *Communications, 2003. ICC '03. IEEE International Conference on*, volume 3, pages 1952–1956 vol.3.

6. Cowie, J. (2013) The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic Misdirection. .
7. Ghosh, T., Pissinou, N. & Makki, K. (2004) Collaborative trust-based secure routing against colluding malicious nodes in multi-hop ad hoc networks. In *Local Computer Networks, 2004. 29th Annual IEEE International Conference on*, pages 224–231.
8. Goldberg, S., Halevi, S., Jaggard, A. D., Ramachandran, V. & Wright, R. N. (2008) Rationality and Traffic Attraction: Incentives for Honest Path Announcements in Bgp. In *Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 Conference on Data Communication, SIGCOMM '08*, pages 267–278, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
9. Goldberg, S., Schapira, M., Hummon, P. & Rexford, J. (2010) How secure are secure interdomain routing protocols. In *SIGCOMM*, pages 87–98.
10. Goodin, D. (2015) Hacking Team orchestrated brazen BGP hack to hijack IPs it didn't own. *arstechnica.com*.
11. Gorman, S. & Valentino-DeVries, J. (2013) New Details Show Broader NSA Surveillance Reach. *The Wall Street Journal*.
12. Hedrick, C. (1988) Routing Information Protocol. *RFC 1058*.
13. Hu, Y.-C., Johnson, D. B. & Perrig, A. (2003) SEAD: secure efficient distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks. *Ad Hoc Networks*, **1**(1), 175 – 192.
14. Levin, H., Schapira, M. & Zohar, A. (2008) Interdomain Routing and Games. In *Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC '08*, pages 57–66, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
15. Madory, D. (2015) UK traffic diverted through Ukraine. .
16. Malkin, G. (1998) RIP version 2. *RFC 2453*.
17. Nemhauser, G., Wolsey, L. & Fisher, M. (1978) An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions - I. *Mathematical Programming*, **14**(1), 265–294.
18. Newman, M. (2006) I. Accessed: 2015-01-24.
19. Nordström, O. & Dovrolis, C. (2004) Beware of BGP Attacks. *SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev.*, **34**(2), 1–8.
20. Papadimitratos, P. & Haas, Z. (2002) Securing the Internet routing infrastructure. *Communications Magazine, IEEE*, **40**(10), 60–68.
21. Pei, D., Massey, D. & Zhang, L. (2003) Detection of invalid routing announcements in RIP protocol. In *Global Telecommunications Conference, 2003. GLOBECOM '03. IEEE*, volume 3, pages 1450–1455 vol.3.
22. Smith, B., Murthy, S. & Garcia-Luna-Aceves, J. (1997) Securing distance-vector routing protocols. In *Network and Distributed System Security, 1997. Proceedings., 1997 Symposium on*, pages 85–92.
23. Stone, B. (2008) Pakistan Cuts Access to YouTube Worldwide. *The New York Times*.
24. Wan, T., Kranakis, E. & van Oorschot, P. (2004a) S-RIP: A Secure Distance Vector Routing Protocol. In Jakobsson, M., Yung, M. & Zhou, J., editors, *Applied Cryptography and Network Security*, volume 3089 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 103–119. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
25. Wan, T., Kranakis, E. & van Oorschot, P. (2004b) Securing the Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector Routing Protocol (S-DSDV). In Lopez, J., Qing, S. & Okamoto, E., editors, *Information and Communications Security*, volume 3269 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 358–374. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
26. Watts, D. J. & Strogatz, S. H. (1998) Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks.. *Nature*, **393**(6684), 409–10.
27. Wolsey, L. (1982) An analysis of the greedy algorithm for the submodular set covering problem. *Combinatorica*, **2**(4), 385–393.