

Information Monitoring in Routing Networks

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We define and analyze two models of information monitoring in routing networks related to the Border Gateway Protocol. We develop algorithms to measure the potential for groups of dishonest agents to divert traffic through their infrastructure while ensuring the messages still reach their destinations. We relate our two models and define and prove admissibility or optimality of algorithms in special cases. In particular, we derive an efficient optimal monitoring strategy for subsets of agents in which no two are adjacent and relate this strategy to the general case. Finally, we use these tools to analyze the susceptibility of real and synthetic networks to endogenous information monitoring, including the Autonomous Systems (AS) graph of the United States. We find that corrupting merely 18 random nodes in the AS graph is enough to monitor 10% of all traffic in the network in expectation.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In February of 2008 the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority made a series of mistakes that caused Google's popular YouTube service to be unavailable for a large fraction of the world for about two hours [Stone 2008]. The mistakes ultimately boiled down to a misuse of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), in which Pakistan Telecom broadcast a fake route to YouTube to its neighbors in the Autonomous System (AS) graph of the internet. The misinformation propagated through the network and created a so-called "black hole" in the AS graph, preventing users worldwide from reaching YouTube. In response to this and similar outages, researchers spanning the spectrum from theory to application have analyzed threat models, incentive schemes, and secure alternatives for BGP; see the works [Butler et al. 2010; Goldberg et al. 2010; Ballani et al. 2007; Nordström and Dovrolis 2004; Goldberg et al. 2008; Levin et al. 2008] among others.

The work on analyzing and improving BGP  is impressive. However, we are interested in more generic models of information routing. We want a tool for analyzing the structural vulnerability of a network  to agents misbehaving in protocols that require honesty. One example that motivated this work is the notion of betweenness centrality,  introduced by [Freeman 1977]. In brief, the betweenness centrality of a node x is

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the fraction of node-pairs u, v such that a shortest path from u to v passes through x . Betweenness centrality is considered a measure of power in a network, because nodes with overwhelming betweenness centrality can influence information flow and the evolution of processes operating on the network. An often cited example is Florentine nobility network [Padgett and Ansell 1993] shown in Figure 1, where the Medici family has the largest betweenness centrality and is agreed by historians to be the dominant family of their time. If information does flow via shortest paths, and if shortest-path information is provided in a BGP-like fashion, these contemporary routing protocols raise an obvious question. In the absence of creating new edges, can a node (or group of nodes) use *deception* to gain more influence in this network as measured by betweenness? After defining our model rigorously in Section 2 we show that deception can indeed give a significant advantage.

It is crucial to understand the susceptibility and limitations of a network to information monitoring. It is relevant not only to inform discussions of data collection policies and the design of resilient networks, but also in the discussion and design of encryption and anonymization tools. For example, it has been demonstrated that sufficient traffic monitoring can be used to deanonymize users of Tor (an example of an “onion” routing protocol for anonymous web browsing) [Akhoondi et al. 2012]. This is significant because Tor claims immunity from such monitoring. Information monitoring is also related to so-called “man-in-the-middle” attacks where an attacker modifies intercepted messages, but our models focus primarily on malicious agents re-routing information, making no assumptions on what is done with the data.

We focus on the setting where malicious agents are incentivized to *avoid* black holes, yet still want to monitor or tamper with information flowing through the network. We present two models consisting of honest agents in a network, all following a generic version of BGP for routing messages, and a group of colluding agents which lie in order to maximize the amount of traffic intercepted while ensuring intercepted messages reach their destination. In particular, we focus on how network structure admits vulnerabilities for computationally bounded colluders. The central problem we address in this paper is, given a set of agents who wish to collude, how find a strategy which causes a maximal fraction of all network traffic to pass through the colluders’ nodes. One consequence of our desire for genericity is that our models omit some details of the real BGP protocol, such as business differentiation of customers and providers.

The central difference between our two models is in the allowed type of lies: a *uniform broadcast*, where each lying agent must broadcast the same lie to all its honest neighbors, versus a *nonuniform broadcast* where lies may depend on the neighbor. We show that finding suitable subsets of agents to collude is NP-hard in both models. When trying to find the optimal strategy for a specified set of agents we show that the nonuniform case reduces to the uniform case. We define an efficient optimal strategy in the uniform setting under the condition that no two colluding agents are adjacent. We generalize this strategy to work when colluders may be connected, prove an inefficient characterization for this setting, and evaluate our strategies empirically on an Erdős-Rényi network and on the Autonomous Systems (AS) graph of the United States. In particular we find that choosing roughly 0.2% of nodes in the AS graph to collude intercepts 10% of all traffic in the network on average, while smarter choices (picking vertices with large degree or betweenness centrality) can easily allow one to monitor the entire network. These observations add a new perspective on the attack tolerance of such scale-free networks [Albert et al. 2000]. In addition to being vulnerable to connectivity attacks by removing high degree nodes, they are vulnerable even to random monitoring attacks.

This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we define our models and make preliminary observations. In Section 2.3 we return to the case of the Florentine nobility

network. In Section 3 we define our strategies for the uniform model, and in Section 3.2 we prove our main theorem for the separated case. In Section 4 we empirically evaluate the quality of our strategies, and in Section 5 we conclude with open problems.

2. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES

In this section we formally define our model and make some preliminary observations. The entire model takes place on an unweighted, undirected graph $G = (V, E)$ with $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$ being the agents.

2.1. What honest agents do

We now describe the protocol followed by honest agents for updating their beliefs and forwarding messages in G . Each agent i maintains two length- n vectors indexed by superscripting rounds. The first is d_i^t , so that the entry $d_{i,j}^t$ is the current best-known (according to i) shortest path length from i to j . The second is b_i^t , whose entry $b_{i,j}^t$ is the set of all neighbors of i on a shortest known path from i to j .

During a *synchronization protocol*, the agents in G iteratively broadcast $d_{i,j}^t$ to their neighbors and update their information based on received broadcasts. More specifically, each agent initially sets d_i^0 to

$$d_{i,j}^0 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = j \\ 1 & \text{if } i \sim j \\ \infty & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and sets b_i^0 to

$$b_{i,j}^0 = \begin{cases} \{j\} & \text{if } i \sim j \\ \{\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Now the protocol proceeds in rounds. In round t every vertex i simultaneously broadcasts d_i^t to its neighborhood, and updates its vector given the information broadcast to i as follows.

$$d_{i,j}^{t+1} = \min\{d_{i,j}^t, 1 + \min_{k \sim i} d_{k,j}^t\},$$

updating $b_{i,j}^{t+1}$ to be the union over all argmins of the above value. The distance vectors d_i^t are entrywise nonincreasing, and the process converges when the d_i^t all converge. If all agents are honest this happens in at most n rounds. Note this differs from the BGP protocol in that BGP requires agents to broadcast its chosen path to the destination, not just the distance.

After the synchronization phase there is a *message passing protocol* in which agents route messages according to their beliefs about shortest paths in the obvious way, breaking ties randomly. We assume traffic is uniformly distributed across the network, so that determining the amount of network traffic diverted is equivalent to counting the number of source-destination pairs for which messages are guaranteed to pass through a colluding agent.

In our models we assert that ties are broken uniformly at random by honest agents. In particular, this ensures that a cycle caused by the combination of a colluding agent's lie and an honest agent's tie break will repeat m times with probability vanishing exponentially in m . For ease of analysis, we will replace this random condition by a deterministic one representing worst-case arbitrary choices made by the honest agents

(conditioned on avoiding cycles at all costs). We find a worst-case assumption relevant because, as noted by [Goldberg et al. 2010] and others, the internal policies used by autonomous systems in BGP are private information. Our tie breaking assumption on honest nodes is as follows:

- (1) If possible, an honest node will not break a tie in such a way that causes a cycle.
- (2) If possible, an honest node will break a tie in such a way that avoids colluding agents.

2.2. What colluding agents can do

In our collusion model we allow malicious agents to broadcast false information during the synchronization protocol and to follow an arbitrary deterministic forwarding algorithm during message passing protocol. We call this pair of data a *strategy*. Allowing any strategy will potentially cause messages to cycle, so we restrict the space of admissible strategies to be those that do not deterministically cause infinite cycles. In the language of BGP, we disallow “black holes.” We call such strategies *admissible*.

We introduce two different types of lies that give rise to two versions of our model. We call the first *uniform broadcasts*, where an agent commits to one lie per round of the synchronization protocol which is broadcast to all of its neighbors. In notation, a *broadcast policy* is a sequence of functions $\rho_t(x, y) \geq 1$ for each vertex $y \neq x$ describing the “distance” from x to y that is broadcast by x to all its neighbors in round t . We explicitly disallow broadcasting a false identity, i.e. $\rho_t(x, y) = 0$ for $x \neq y$. We also define a *nonuniform broadcast* to be a lie $\rho_t(x, y, z)$ that depends on the neighbor z of x that is receiving the message. We relate the two kinds of lies in Section 2.5.

A *forwarding policy* $\phi(x, y)$ is a deterministic function specifying to which neighbor x forwards a message whose destination is y . For a strategy θ and a subset $S \subset V(G)$, let $p_{S, \theta}$ be the proportion of intercepted messages. We call a strategy *admissible* if it does not deterministically cause cycles and *beneficial* if $p_{S, \theta}$ is strictly larger than $p_{S, \theta_{\text{honest}}}$, where θ_{honest} is the strategy for honest agents.

2.3. Florentine nobility

We can now imagine a scenario in which an information network has honest nodes operating according to the synchronization and message passing protocols described above. Further imagine a group of unhappy agents decide to collude. Can they improve their joint “betweenness centrality” (the value of $p_{S, \theta}$) by broadcasting false information during the synchronization protocol? The answer is obviously yes, but the degree to which they can is striking.




Fig. 1. The Florentine nobility network. The Medici family achieves a betweenness centrality of 0.522 by itself. However, if the Tornabuoni and Strozzi families decide to collude, they can improve their betweenness centrality from 0.414 to 0.623, effectively wresting the majority of influence in the network from the Medici.

Take, for example, the Florentine nobility network [Padgett and Ansell 1993], shown in Figure 1. The Medici family has a betweenness centrality of 0.522 by itself, and the next best single family has betweenness centrality of 0.255 (Guadagni). However, there are many pairs of individually weak families which can significantly improve their status by lying during the synchronization protocol. For example, the Tournabuon and Strozzi families may use the strategy we define in Section 3 (essentially, lying by an additive factor of two) to improve their betweenness centrality from 0.414 to 0.623, a multiplicative improvement of 1.5. In fact, there are many pairs that can make such improvements, and similar opportunities arise in other classic networks such as Zachary’s karate club [Zachary 1977].

2.4. NP-hardness and submodularity

To provide a contrast with our collusion model, we present a model of monitoring information that involves no lies. In other words, if the colluding agents are forced to follow the synchronization and information routing protocols, how do we pick which nodes should collude?

PROBLEM 1 (*p*-SHORTEST PATH DOMINATING SET). *Given a graph $G = (V, E)$ an integer $k \geq 1$ and $p \in [0, 1]$, is there a set $S \subset V$ of size k so that at least $p \binom{n}{2}$ shortest paths pass through S ?*

We abbreviate this by $\text{SPDS}(p, k)$ and say a vertex v *covers* a path if it lies on the path. There are two natural optimization problems associated with SPDS. The first, $\text{MAX-SPDS}(-, k)$, is to maximize the p achieved over all sets of size k . The second, $\text{MIN-SPDS}(p, -)$, minimizes k while attaining a prespecified p . $\text{SPDS}(p, k)$ is trivially NP-hard because $\text{SPDS}(1, k)$ is VERTEX-COVER.

By a standard argument, the function $f : 2^V \rightarrow [0, 1]$ mapping S to the proportion of shortest paths covered by S is submodular¹ and monotone. Hence, by a classic theorem of Nemhauser, Wolsey, and Fisher [Nemhauser et al. 1978], the greedy algorithm provides a $(1 - 1/e)$ -approximation algorithm for $\text{MAX-SPDS}(-, k)$. A slight variant of the greedy algorithm presented by Wolsey [Wolsey 1982] achieves a p -proportion of shortest paths with a set S of size

$$|S| = \left\lceil 1 + \log \max_{v \in V} f(\{v\}) \right\rceil \text{OPT} = [1 + O(\log(n))] \text{OPT}$$

where OPT is the size of the smallest set covering a p -proportion of shortest paths.

A similar reduction from VERTEX-COVER shows that the problem of picking colluding nodes *and* a good strategy for lying is also NP-hard. Moreover, the collusion problem is not submodular. We prove this below, and as such, we will henceforth focus on the problem of determining the optimal strategy for a given set of colluding agents.

PROPOSITION 2.1.

Fix $\theta(S)$ mapping subsets of vertices to optimal strategies. Define $f : 2^{V(G)} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by letting $f(S) = p_{S, \theta(S)}$. Then f is not submodular.

PROOF.

Let $G = K_{m,2}$ be the complete bipartite graph on parts X, Y with $X = \{p, q\}, |Y| = m$. Let $S = \{\}$, $T = \{p\}$. Then adding q to T captures every path in G . Adding q to S captures only the messages sent to and from q , because other messages are routed via p . In particular,

¹Recall a set function $f : 2^X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is *submodular* if for every $S, T \subset X$ with $S \subset T$ and for every $x \in X \setminus T$, the marginal gain $f(S \cup \{x\}) - f(S) \geq f(T \cup \{x\}) - f(T)$

$$f(S \cup \{q\}) - f(S) = 2(m+1) = O(m)$$

$$f(T \cup \{q\}) - f(T) = 2 \binom{m+2}{2} - 2(m+1) = O(m^2),$$

disproving submodularity.

□

There are also interesting examples of this that rely on lies in a nontrivial way, for example when $G = C_n$ for sufficiently large n . In this case a single node has little advantage, but adding a second adjacent node allows for an interesting collusion. One of the two colluders may broadcast 1 for most targets, and forward incoming messages to the its neighboring colluder who in turn forwards along C_n to the target. We discuss the broadcast bounds for this case in Section 3.3.

2.5. A reduction



We define decision problems for the uniform and nonuniform variants of our model and prove that the nonuniform case reduces to the uniform case with a small blowup.

PROBLEM 2 (UNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING).

Given a graph $G = (V, E)$ a subset $S \subset V$ and a $p \in [0, 1]$, is there an admissible strategy θ for S such that in the uniform broadcast model $p_{S,\theta} \geq p$?

For nonuniform lies, we analogously define **NONUNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING**. Nonuniform lies might appear at first glance to provide a substantial increase in power (there are many more strategies, and it seems easier to accidentally introduce a large cycle as in Figure 2), we show that algorithmically finding the optimal nonuniform strategy for a fixed subset is no harder than finding the optimal uniform strategy. This justifies a detailed study of the uniform model.

PROPOSITION 2.2.

NONUNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING reduces to UNIFORM-SUBSET-MONITORING.

PROOF.

Given a graph G , a subset S , and a fraction p for the nonuniform model, we produce a new graph G' , a subset S' , and a fraction p' for the uniform model as follows. For simplicity we will prove the case where G is D -regular. For each edge $e = (u, v)$ where $u \in S$, subdivide e in G' with a new vertex w_e . Also for each such edge, add u, w_e to S' . Finally, set




Fig. 2. In this nonuniform example, w is the target of a message sent from x . The colluding agent u broadcasts $\rho(u, w) = 1$ to v , and $\rho(u, w) = 7$ to x . However, u 's lie propagates around the cycle to y , so that any message sent through y to w would be forwarded to v .

$$p' = \frac{p\binom{|V|}{2} + \binom{|S|^D}{2} + |S||V|}{\binom{|V|+|S|^D}{2}}.$$

Suppose there is a strategy θ for S, G achieving a p fraction in the nonuniform model. We'll convert θ into a strategy θ' for S' . Whenever a colluding agent $u \in S$ would broadcast ρ to a neighbor v , we have the agent $w_{(u,v)}$ uniformly broadcast ρ . And whenever a message goes to $w_{(u,v)}$ with some other destination, $w_{(u,v)}$ forwards it through u , who in turn forwards it to the $w_{(u,v')}$ corresponding to the same v' that u would forward to in the nonuniform setting. This simulates θ , and hence achieves the same $p\binom{|V|}{2}$ paths in G ; the formula for p' simply counts the paths introduced by the new vertices (all of which include a colluding agent). So if $p_{S,\theta} \geq p$ in G , $p_{S',\theta'} \geq p'$ in G' .

Conversely, we can collapse any uniform strategy for S' into a nonuniform one for S by contracting all the newly added edges in G' and combining their broadcasts in the obvious way. The case where G is irregular is analogous, and it's clear the appropriate p' can be efficiently computed.

□

3. STRATEGIES FOR THE UNIFORM MODEL

We now turn to a detailed study of the uniform broadcast model. In this section we prove our main theorem, stated below.

THEOREM 3.1.

Let $G = (V, E)$ be a graph and $S \subset V$ a fixed subset of vertices such that $d(x, y) \geq 2$ for all $x, y \in S$. Then the strategy ρ^ defined in Section 3.2 intercepts an optimal fraction of traffic in G .*

The proof consists of two parts. After defining the broadcast policy ρ^* in Section 3.2 and the associated forwarding policy, we first prove in Proposition 3.10 that the strategy is admissible, and then in Proposition 3.11 that ρ^* is the minimal broadcast for any admissible strategy.

3.1. A single agent

We start by characterizing the case of a single colluding agent. This case is useful because it forms a sort of “base case” for our more complicated strategies. In this case the best strategy is simple: lie exactly two less than your true distance to a target. This is guaranteed not to cause cycles, while any larger lie causes a cycle of length 2. In this case broadcasts will not change across rounds, and so we use $\rho(x, y)$ to denote the broadcast by x about its distance to y across all rounds.

THEOREM 3.2.

Let x be a colluding node and t be a target node whose true distance in G is $d(x, t) = k$. Suppose that x broadcasts $\rho(x, t) = k'$. Then this strategy is admissible and beneficial if and only if one of the following conditions hold.

- (1) $k' = k - 2$ and there is a neighbor z of x with $d(z, t) = k = k' + 2$.
- (2) $k - 2 \leq k' \leq k - 1$ and there is a neighbor z of x with $d(z, t) = k + 1$, and there is a shortest path from z to t that does not pass through x (before x 's lie).

PROOF.

Note that $d(x, t) = k$ if and only if the closest neighbor y of x to t has distance $d(y, t) = k - 1$. The strategy for x will be to route all messages to t through y who.



For one direction, suppose one of the above conditions holds and let z be a neighbor of x satisfying the desired property. Then z will send messages to t through x , which x can forward through y . We further claim that no message forwarded through y to t will ever come back to x . Call y, v_2, v_3, \dots the vertices on the route taken by the sent message after passing through x . The tie-breaking assumption implies $v_2 \neq x$, and it follows that the preceived distances $\rho(v_i, t)$ along the message's path from t are monotonically decreasing in i . This follows from the fact that x broadcasts the same lie to all its neighbors. In particular, $\rho(x, t) = \rho(v_2, t)$ and so for all $j \geq 2$, v_j will always have a closer neighbor than x .

For the converse, suppose the strategy is admissible and beneficial. First, x cannot broadcast $\rho(x, t) < k - 2$, or else y (and by minimality all neighbors of x) will route messages to t through x , causing a cycle. If $k' \geq k$, then no neighbor of x would change its behavior, contradicting beneficialness. This implies the conditions on k' in (1) and (2). Moreover, beneficialness implies x has a neighbor z that now forwards messages through x , implying its new perceived distance is $\rho(z, t) = k' + 1$. By the fact that $d(x, t) = k$, every other neighbor z of x has $k - 1 \leq d(z, t) \leq k + 1$. If all neighbors have distance $k - 1$ then the tie-breaking assumption implies the strategy is not beneficial, so let z be a neighbor with $d(z, t) \geq k$.

If $d(z, t) = k$ then the shortest path from z to t already does not pass through x and we must choose $k' = k - 2$ to change z 's behavior. On the other hand, if $d(z, t) = k + 1$ but has no other shortest path to t except through x , then lying is not beneficial. If z has another path to t then setting $k' = k - 1$ breaks the tie.

□

One can simplify the above lemma by noting that setting $k' = k - 2$ is always non-detrimental, and this is the minimal nondetrimental lie. So if an agent has incentive to lie, it may as well lie as much as possible. This proves the following corollary.

COROLLARY 3.3.

Let x be a single lying agent in G in the uniform local broadcast model. An optimal admissible strategy for a single lying agent x is to broadcast $\rho(x, t) = \max(1, d(x, t) - 2)$ for all $t \in V(G)$.

The same algorithm can be jointly and independently used by multiple colluding agents in the uniform broadcast model. We make this rigorous with the following proposition.

PROPOSITION 3.4.

If any set of colluding agents lie independently according to Corollary 3.3, then their joint strategy is admissible.

PROOF.

In the proof of Theorem 3.2, we showed that a vertex x lying in this way cannot produce any cycles of length 2, since it does not alter the behavior of the neighbor through which x routes messages to t . It remains to show that there are no longer cycles.

Suppose to the contrary that when s tries to send a message to t , there is a cycle $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m, v_{m+1} = v_1$, with $m \geq 3$. Let i be the index of a vertex on the cycle which minimizes the true distance $d(v_i, t)$. Call this distance a , and note that v_i is not a colluding agent (or else it could correctly forward messages so as to break the cycle). Because there is a cycle, v_{i+1} is broadcasting $\rho(v_{i+1}, t) \leq a - 2$, but $d(v_{i+1}, t) \geq a$. And since v_{i+1} forwards to v_{i+2} , we have $\rho(v_{i+2}, t) \leq a - 3$ while $d(v_{i+2}, t) \geq a$. We claim this is a contradiction: a colluding agent lies by exactly two less than the truth, and so v_{i+2}

cannot be a colluding agent. But the effect of a colluding agent's lie does not change the perceived distances of any vertex in G by more than two. This shows the claimed contradiction.

□

3.2. Separated agents

We now turn to the case of multiple colluding agents. By Proposition 2.2, we know that allowing neighboring colluding agents introduces the ability for nonuniform broadcasts. So we characterize the alternative where no two colluding agents are adjacent. The optimal strategy we define generalizes to a nontrivial admissible strategy for the general case in Section 3.3.

For a set X and an integer j , define $S_X(j)$ to be the set of all permutations of j elements from X . In this section $C = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$ will denote the set of colluding nodes, and no two are adjacent in G .

Definition 3.5. The j -th colluding distance between two colluding agents x and y is defined as

$$d_j(x, y) = \min_{\substack{\sigma \in S_C(j) \\ \sigma(1)=x \\ \sigma(j)=y}} \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} d(\sigma(i), \sigma(i+1)).$$

In other words, it is the length of the shortest path from x to y that contains exactly j colluding nodes. Call any path minimizing this quantity a j -th colluding path. If no such path exists, call $d_j(x, y) = \infty$ by convention.

We will consider j -th colluding paths directed from x to y when appropriate. Now given a set of colluding nodes and a target vertex t , we want to identify the strategy that minimizes $\rho(-, t)$ for all of our colluders. We start by defining a candidate strategy ρ^* , observe that it is admissible, and then prove it is indeed a lower bound on admissible strategies.

Definition 3.6. Let $\rho'(x, t) = \max(d(x, t) - 2, 1)$. Let $\rho''(x, t)$ be defined as

$$\min_{1 \leq i, j \leq k} [d_j(x, x_i) - 2(j-1) + \rho'(x_i, t)].$$

Then define the strategy $\rho^*(x, t) = \min(\rho'(x, t), \rho''(x, t))$.

To give some intuition, this strategy takes the minimum of Corollary 3.3 and the best j -th colluding path (followed by the end of that path using Corollary 3.3 to get to t).

Definition 3.6 is useful in the following scenario depicted in Figure 3. Suppose $(s, x_1, y_2, x_2, \dots, y_j, x_j, t)$ is a path of length $2j + 1$, where t is the target of a message sent by s and x_i are colluding agents. Then every x_i may broadcast $\rho^*(x_i, t) = 1$, and the tie breaking assumption ensures that the honest agents will forward along the path toward t .

We call x *proper* for t if it (strictly) minimizes $\rho^*(x, t)$ via the j -th colluding distance for some $j \geq 2$ and *improper* otherwise, and we call a j -th colluding path realizing this minimization a *witness* for the properness of x . We define the *forwarding number* of a j -th colluding path to be j , and define the forwarding number of a vertex v to be the smallest forwarding number of any j -th colluding path minimizing $\rho^*(v, t)$ starting at




Fig. 3. An example of a better strategy than $\rho(x, t) = d(x, t) - 2$ when taking into account other colluding agents. The shaded agents are colluding, and x may broadcast $\rho^*(x, t) = 1$.

v. Note that a vertex with a forwarding number 1 is by definition improper, and that all of these definitions depend on the choice of t .

The forwarding policy is as follows. Improper colluding nodes forward as in Corollary 3.3. Proper colluding agents pick a j -th colluding path which minimizes their broadcast, breaking ties by minimizing forwarding number, and deterministically forward along that path. We now prove that ρ^* is an admissible strategy under worst-case tie breaking assumptions. First we prove that j -th colluding paths can be extended in a nice way.

PROPOSITION 3.7.

Let x, y be colluding vertices in G . Then $\rho^(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho^*(y, t)$.*

PROOF.

If y is improper, then $\rho^*(x, t)$ has a 2-th colluding path and trivially $\rho^*(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho^*(y, t)$ so we are done.

So suppose y is proper with forwarding number j . By definition, there is a y' such that $\rho^*(y, t) = d_j(y, y') - 2(j - 1) + \rho'(y', t)$. Call the witness path σ . Then there is a corresponding path σ' for x constructed by prepending a path from x to y to σ . This path is some j' -th colluding path for $j' > j$ whose cost is an upper bound on $d_{j'}(x, y')$. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho^*(x, t) &\leq d_{j'-j}(x, y) - 2(j' - j) + d_j(y, y') - 2(j - 1) + \rho'(y', t) \\ &\leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho^*(y, t). \end{aligned}$$

This proves the proposition.

□

In fact, if x is proper, $\rho^*(x, t)$ is minimized by computing $d(x, y) - 2 + \rho^*(y, t)$ for some colluding agent y . It will have the property that there is a path from x to y that passes through no other colluding agents. Proposition 3.7 trivially extends to non-colluding agents y , giving the following corollary. Note here we use ρ to denote the broadcast (honest or lie) of any agent.

COROLLARY 3.8.

If all colluding agents are following ρ^ , then for all $x \in C, y \in V(G)$, $\rho^*(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho(y, t)$.*

Another simple consequence of Proposition 3.7 is that the forwarding number decreases along minimal j -th colluding paths.

PROPOSITION 3.9.

Suppose x is a proper colluding agent with respect to $\rho^(x, t)$, that x has forwarding number j , and that σ is a witnessing j -th colluding path. Let x' be the first colluding agent on σ after x . Then x' has forwarding number $j - 1$.*

PROOF.

The same technique from the proof of Proposition 3.7 shows that whatever the forwarding number of x' is, we can prepend a path from x to x' to get a path with forwarding number $j + 1$.

□

In particular, the i -th visited colluding agent on a witness for $\rho^*(x, t)$ of forwarding number j has forwarding number exactly $j - i$, and the end of the path is an improper colluding agent.

At this point one might expect some sensible extension of the pair of (forwarding number, broadcasted distance) to honest agents would produce a potential function that is monotonically decreasing along the message path and zero at the target. Indeed, a version of this is true when the colluding agents are separated by distance at least three, with ready counterexamples for distance two. Still, we present a different argument that ρ^* is also admissible when the agents are distance two apart.

PROPOSITION 3.10.

Let $C = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$, and suppose that $d(x_i, x_j) \geq 2$ for all $x_i, x_j \in C$. Then ρ^ is admissible.*

PROOF.

Let s, t be arbitrary vertices in G , and let $L = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$ be a cycle in the path of a message sent from s to t (possibly infinite and repeating). If the y_i are all honest or improper agents we are reduced to the case of Proposition 3.4. So some of the y_i must be proper colluding agents.

Without loss of generality suppose y_1 is a colluding agent, and let p be the minimal colluding path it forwards along, extended to the target t . Let y_j be the last vertex on L that is not also on p . The claim is that y_j 's decision to forward along L or p is a tie break. This proves the proposition because the tie-breaking assumption would force y_j to break the cycle.

Let z be the vertex following y_j on p , and suppose to the contrary $\rho(y_{j+1}, t) < \rho(z, t)$. Let x be the last colluding agent on p before y_j . Let x' be the first colluding agent on p after y_j (it may be the case that $x' = z$). If x is the last colluding agent on p , then let $x' = t$ and the proof proceeds similarly. First we expand $\rho^*(x, t) + 2$ along p .

$$\begin{aligned} \rho^*(x, t) + 2 &= d(x, x') + \rho(x', t) \\ &= d(x, y_j) + 1 + d(z, x') + \rho(x', t) \\ &= d(x, y_j) + 1 + \rho(z, t) \end{aligned}$$

We now bound $\rho^*(x, t) + 2$ along L using Corollary 3.8.

$$\begin{aligned} \rho^*(x, t) + 2 &\leq d(x, y_j) + 1 + \rho(y_{j+1}, t) \\ &< d(x, y_j) + 1 + \rho(z, t) \\ &= \rho^*(x, t) + 2 \end{aligned}$$

A contradiction.

□

Next we prove that in the separated setting ρ^* is a lower bound on admissible broadcasts.

PROPOSITION 3.11.

Any colluding agent broadcasting $\rho(x, t) < \rho^(x, t)$ necessarily causes a cycle.*

PROOF.

Suppose to the contrary some colluding agent x broadcasts $\rho(x, t) < \rho^*(x, t)$. We will show that all neighbors of x forward to t through x , necessarily causing cycle of length 2. Fix any neighbor z and suppose to the contrary that there is a neighbor $y \neq x$ of z with $\rho(y, t) \leq \rho(x, t)$. But then $\rho(x, t) < \rho^*(x, t) \leq d(x, y) - 2 + \rho(y, t) = \rho(y, t)$ by Corollary 3.8, a contradiction.

□

This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.

Finally, ρ^* can be efficiently computed. The idea is to grow a search tree of colluding agents from t , noting that the value of ρ^* for a new vertex is minimized by using some set of previously visited nodes. More rigorously, for each target $t \in V(G)$ run the following procedure. Set $S = \{t\}$. While $C \not\subseteq S$ is missing some colluding agent, take any colluding agent with minimal distance to S (true distance in G), and calculate the value of $\rho^*(x, t)$ as $\rho^*(x, t) = \min_{y \in S} d(x, y) - 2 + \rho(y, t)$. Then add x to S and continue. Using the same arguments used previously, it is easy to see that this will compute the correct value of ρ^* for every colluding agent and every target. Moreover, one can construct the corresponding j -th colluding paths during this process. We provide some example simulations of using this strategy on synthetic and real-world networks in Section 4.

3.3. Adjacent colluding agents

In this section we extend the strategy from Section 3.2 to the setting where colluding agents may be adjacent in the network. We show this generalization is not optimal, and instead give a family of strategies, one of which must be optimal.

Before we state our theorems, we describe another connection between the uniform and non-uniform models from Section 2, that we can transform an instance of the uniform model into an instance of the nonuniform model in which colluding agents are separated. Specifically, one can take the quotient G/\sim of the graph G by declaring two colluding agents to be equivalent if they are in the same connected component of colluding agents. Uniform strategies translate into nonuniform ones as follows. If A is a connected component of colluding agents collapsed to v_A with neighbors $\partial_G A = N_{G/\sim}(v_A)$, then the broadcast for v_A to a neighbor w is the minimum over all such broadcasts from vertices in A . Whenever the forwarding policy in G had the form: “receive from some w with target t at $x \in A$, forward through A to some final node $y \in A$, who forwards to w' ,” the forwarding policy in G/\sim is: “Forward messages from w with target t to w' .”

Moreover, the concepts of forwarding number and colluding paths defined in Section 3.2 for separated agents in the uniform model have analogous definitions in the nonuniform model. So when we say that a component $A \subset V(G)$ has a minimal j -th colluding path, the j refers to the path in the quotient graph, which lifts to a path in G (one of many, and possibly involving many more than j colluders). The strategy of forwarding along a minimal colluding path lifts from the quotient graph to a strategy that forwards along paths between connected components.

With this understanding, the main strategy can be sketched as follows. Each connected component of colluding agents $A \subset C$ determines a minimal j -th colluding path p_t for each target $t \in V(G)$ using the algorithm from Section 3.2. Pick any $x \in A$ which is adjacent to the first honest vertex w on p_t , call this the t -exit node for A , and have x broadcast $\rho(x, t) = \rho(w, t) - 1$ as usual. If every non- t -exit node in A broadcasts so that

the message never returns to A , then the proof of Proposition 3.10 generalizes to prove no cycles occur for this strategy.

We now describe bounds on the minimality of such broadcasts. For $A \subset V(G)$, denote by $d_{G-A}(x, y)$ the distance from x to y in the subgraph induced by $V(G) - A$. When $A = \{a\}$ is a single node we abuse notation and write d_{G-a} . We further write ρ_{G-A} to denote the perceived/broadcast distances when A is removed. Note these values change for honest agents when paths are eliminated, but not for colluding agents.

As a simple illustrative first case, suppose there are exactly two colluding agents x, y and they are adjacent. Let $t \in V(G) - \{x, y\}$. If y forwards a message to x , who in turn forwards to t through $w \neq y$, then in order to prevent the message cycling back through y , we require $d_{G-x}(w, y) + \rho(y, t) \geq d(w, t)$, which rearranges to give a condition on y 's broadcast. If $d_{G-x}(w, y) = \infty$ this is interpreted as no restriction, and $\rho(y, t)$ may be 1.

For a connected component A and target t , a similar bound is imposed on every node in A which is not the t -exit node. We state it as a theorem.

THEOREM 3.12.

Let G be a graph, $C \subset V(G)$ be a subset of colluding agents whose induced subgraph has components $C_1 \cup \dots \cup C_s$. For each component C_i and target t , pick a t -exit node $v_{i,t} \in C_i$, who behaves as described above, and have every $x \in C_i$ forward messages with target t to $v_{i,t}$. Call $w_{i,t}$ the node that $v_{i,t}$ forwards to. Pick any broadcast of the non-exit nodes $x \in C_i$ such that for all j with C_j having no larger forwarding number,

$$\rho(x, t) \geq \rho(w_{j,t}, t) - d_{G-(C_j-\{x\})}(w_{j,t}, x),$$

setting $\rho(x, t) = 1$ if all of the above bounds are nonpositive or $-\infty$. This strategy is admissible.

PROOF.

As discussed above, it suffices to show that a message for t forwarded through C_i to the t -exit node $v_{i,t}$ never returns to A . Suppose to the contrary the message follows some path p hitting $x \in C_i$. Without loss of generality, $x \neq v_{i,t}$ is the first to receive the message. Now $\rho(w_{i,t}, x) \geq d_{G-(C_i-\{x\})}(w_{i,t}, x)$, and so by assumption (that x gets the message), they are equal and $w_{i,t}$ is in a tie-break situation.

□

This strategy is not optimal. Figure 4 gives a counterexample, in which the central issue is that two components which are tied for minimal forwarding number could improve their joint strategy by having one component forward through the other. In particular, the optimality depends on ties broken by the algorithm for picking forwarding numbers. It is straightforward to see that the optimal strategy arises from some choice of forwarding between the components, and once the forwarding choices are fixed the lower bounds on the broadcasts are efficiently computable. Still, it is unclear whether it is NP-hard to pick the optimal forwarding policy.




Fig. 4. A counterexample to the optimality of our strategy in the setting where agents can be adjacent. Shaded nodes are colluding. If the component with z, y is processed first then our algorithm correctly chooses the w, x component to have forwarding number 2 (with x broadcasting 1), capturing all traffic from a, b to t . On the other hand if w, x is processed first the result will miss traffic from a, b .

4. SIMULATIONS

We simulated the protocols described in this paper on three networks.² The first is an Erdős Rényi random graph $G(n, p)$ where $n = 1000, p = 4/1000$. The second is a preferential attachment model with 100 nodes. The third is a snapshot of the Autonomous Systems subgraph of the United States, which has 9,296 nodes and 17,544 edges. The AS graph comes from the website of Newman [Newman 2006]. For both, we ran two tests to inspect the potential advantage of the ρ^* strategy of Section 3.2 over the strategy in which all agents act independently according to $\rho(x, t) = d(x, t) - 2$. We also compared the success of the best strategy for a randomly chosen subset of nodes versus nodes of high degree.

As expected large degree nodes tend to be better colluders than randomly chosen nodes. Still, the benefit of colluding is clear even for randomly chosen nodes. Also striking is the susceptibility of the US AS network, in which only 18 random nodes (roughly 0.2%) must be compromised to monitor an expected 10% of the entire network's traffic.




Fig. 5. Fraction of paths intercepted by a varying number of colluding agents on a Erdős-Rényi random graph (top left), a preferential attachment graph (top right), and the US AS network (bottom center). Blue curves represent subsets of colluding agents chosen uniformly at random, while red curves represent subsets chosen by largest degree. Dashed curves indicate the strategy where each agent independently lies by an additive factor of two, while solid curves indicate the optimal separated strategy of Section 3.2. The red curves for the US AS network are omitted because they quickly dominate the entire network and dwarf the blue curves.

²The code used to run the experiments is available at <https://github.com/j2kun/information-monitoring-simulations>.

5. DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS

In this paper we introduced and related two models of information monitoring in networks, one for uniform broadcasts and one for non-uniform broadcasts. We characterized the optimal strategy for the uniform setting in which no two colluding agents are adjacent, and provided a family of strategies for the general case.

There are a few directions for future work. The most natural question is whether one can efficiently characterize the general case of adjacent agents, or whether deciding the appropriate forwarding mechanism is NP-hard. In either case, another open direction is to provide approximation algorithms when the optimal subset of colluding agents is unknown. This is likely to correlate with betweenness centrality to begin with, but more interesting is to find the subset of agents with the largest *relative* improvement.

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