

Malware Analysis Report

https://github.com/j3rmcyber/MalwareAnalysis

WannaCry Ransomware Malware

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
Executive Summary

SHA256 hash 24D004A104D4D54034DBCFFC2A4B19A11F39008A575AA614EA04703480B1022C

WannaCry is a ransomware malware introduced in 2017 that targets Windows computers. The program demands ransom in cryptocurrency (Bitcoin) and encrypts all data on the hard drive. The program will execute, then looks for remote systems to propagate to (worm capabilities). The program is also known as: WannaCrypt, Wana Decryptor 2.0, WanaCrypt0r 2.0, and Wanna Decryptor. The program contains packed executables which are dropped upon execution.

YARA signature rules are attached in Appendix A. Malware sample and hashes have been submitted to VirusTotal for further examination.

Dropped files on the desktop after execution:






The encryptor windows and wallpaper on the desktop:





High-Level Technical Summary

WannaCry consists of one executable that then drops several more files once the conditions are met:





Malware Composition

WannaCry consists of the following components:

File Name	SHA256 Hash
wannacry.exe	24D004A104D4D54034DBCFFC2A4B19A11F39008A575AA614EA04703480B1022C
Tasksche.exe	ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa
Taskse.exe	2ca2d550e603d74dedda03156023135b38da3630cb014e3d00b1263358c5f00d
Taskdl.exe	4a468603fdcb7a2eb5770705898cf9ef37aade532a7964642ecd705a74794b79

WannaCry.exe:

The initial executable that runs after successful conditions are met.

TaskSche.exe:

File drops after execution and sets a scheduled task. This also sets a startup program to persist when rebooted.

Taskse.exe:

This file performs the Wanna Decryptor pop-up window

Taskdl.exe:

This file performs the Wanna Decryptor pop-up window

Tasksvc.exe:

This opens a listening port on 9050



Basic Static Analysis

{Screenshots and description about basic static artifacts and methods} Function calls of interest:

0000A138 0000A7C8 Hint/Name RVA 0093 InternetOpenUrlA 0000A13C 0000A7B2 Hint/Name RVA 0069 InternetCloseHandle 0000A140 00000000 End of Imports WININET.dll 0000A00C 0000A6AC Hint/Name RVA 0244 SetServiceStatus 0000A010 0000A69A Hint/Name RVA 01AD OpenSCManagerA 0000A014 0000A688 Hint/Name RVA 0064 CreateServiceA 0000A018 0000A672 Hint/Name RVA 003E CloseServiceHandle 0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA 0000A02C 00000000 End of Imports ADVAPI32.dll	0000A134	0000A7DC	Hint/Name RVA	0092 InternetOpenA
0000A140 00000000 End of Imports WININET.dll 0000A00C 0000A6AC Hint/Name RVA 0244 SetServiceStatus 0000A010 0000A69A Hint/Name RVA 01AD OpenSCManagerA 0000A014 0000A688 Hint/Name RVA 0064 CreateServiceA 0000A018 0000A672 Hint/Name RVA 003E CloseServiceHandle 0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A138	0000A7C8	Hint/Name RVA	0093 InternetOpenUrlA
0000A00C 0000A6AC Hint/Name RVA 0244 SetServiceStatus 0000A010 0000A69A Hint/Name RVA 01AD OpenSCManagerA 0000A014 0000A688 Hint/Name RVA 0064 CreateServiceA 0000A018 0000A672 Hint/Name RVA 003E CloseServiceHandle 0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A13C	0000A7B2	Hint/Name RVA	0069 InternetCloseHandle
0000A010 0000A69A Hint/Name RVA 01AD OpenSCManagerA 0000A014 0000A688 Hint/Name RVA 0064 CreateServiceA 0000A018 0000A672 Hint/Name RVA 003E CloseServiceHandle 0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A140	00000000	End of Imports	WININET.dll
0000A014 0000A688 Hint/Name RVA 0064 CreateServiceA 0000A018 0000A672 Hint/Name RVA 003E CloseServiceHandle 0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A00C	0000A6AC	Hint/Name RVA	0244 SetServiceStatus
0000A018 0000A672 Hint/Name RVA 003E CloseServiceHandle 0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A010	0000A69A	Hint/Name RVA	01AD OpenSCManagerA
0000A01C 0000A662 Hint/Name RVA 0249 StartServiceA 0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A014	0000A688	Hint/Name RVA	0064 CreateServiceA
0000A020 0000A650 Hint/Name RVA 0096 CryptGenRandom 0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A018	0000A672	Hint/Name RVA	003E CloseServiceHandle
0000A024 0000A638 Hint/Name RVA 0085 CryptAcquireContextA 0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A01C	0000A662	Hint/Name RVA	0249 StartServiceA
0000A028 0000A714 Hint/Name RVA 01AF OpenServiceA	0000A020	0000A650	Hint/Name RVA	0096 CryptGenRandom
	0000A024	0000A638	Hint/Name RVA	0085 CryptAcquireContextA
0000A02C	0000A028	0000A714	Hint/Name RVA	01AF OpenServiceA
	0000A02C	00000000	End of Imports	ADVAPI32.dll

RegQueryValueExA
RegSetValueExA
RegCreateKeyW
CryptReleaseContext
CreateServiceA
CloseServiceHandle
StartServiceA
OpenServiceA
OpenSCManagerA



Strings of interest:

```
\Box
\%s\IPC$
Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0
%d.%d.%d.%d
mssecsvc2.0
Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service
%s -m security
C:\%s\geriuwjhrf
C:\%s\%s
tasksche.exe
CloseHandle
WriteFile
CreateFileA
CreateProcessA
http://www.iugerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
WANACRY!
CloseHandle
DeleteFileW
MoveFileExW
MoveFileW
ReadFile
WriteFile
CreateFileW
kernel32.dll
2/0- .X8w.+
Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider
CryptGenKey
CryptDecrypt
CryptEncrypt
CryptDestroyKey
CryptImportKey
CryptAcquireContextA
cmd.exe /c "%s"
115p7UMMngoj1pMvkpHijcRdfJNXj6LrLn
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw
13AM4VW2dhxYgXeQepoHkHSQuy6NgaEb94
Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA
tasksche.exe
TaskStart
icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q
attrib +h .
WNcry@2o17
```



USER32.DLL
Windows 2000 2195
Windows 2000 5.0
\172.16.99.5\IPC\$
Windows 2000 2195
Windows 2000 5.0
\192.168.56.20\IPC\$
kernel32.dll
WanaCrypt0r

CAPA output:

Capability	Namespace
reference analysis tools strings	anti-analysis
check for time delay via QueryPerformanceCounter	anti-analysis/anti-debugging/debugger-detection
contain obfuscated stackstrings	anti-analysis/obfuscation/string/stackstring
receive data (5 matches)	communication
send data (5 matches)	communication
connect to URL	communication/http/client
get socket status	communication/socket
initialize Winsock library	communication/socket
set socket configuration	communication/socket
create UDP socket (4 matches)	communication/socket/udp/send
act as TCP client	communication/tcp/client
generate random numbers via WinAPI	data-manipulation/prng
extract resource via kernel32 functions	executable/resource
contain an embedded PE file	executable/subfile/pe
get file size	host-interaction/file-system/meta
move file	host-interaction/file-system/move
read file on Windows	host-interaction/file-system/read
get number of processors	host-interaction/hardware/cpu
terminate process	host-interaction/process/terminate
run as service	host-interaction/service
create service	host-interaction/service/create
modify service	host-interaction/service/modify
start service	host-interaction/service/start
create thread (4 matches)	host-interaction/thread/create
terminate thread	host-interaction/thread/terminate
link function at runtime on Windows	linking/runtime-linking
linked against ZLIB	linking/static/zlib
inspect section memory permissions	load-code/pe
persist via Windows service	persistence/service



ATT&CK Tactic	ATT&CK Technique
DEFENSE EVASION	Obfuscated Files or Information::Indicator Removal from Tools T1027.005
DISCOVERY	File and Directory Discovery T1083 System Information Discovery T1082 System Network Configuration Discovery T1016
EXECUTION	Shared Modules T1129 System Services::Service Execution T1569.002
PERSISTENCE	Create or Modify System Process::Windows Service T1543.003



Basic Dynamic Analysis

{Screenshots and description about basic dynamic artifacts and methods}

TCP Connection:

_ 22 5.668017369	10.0.0.3	10.0.0.2	TCP	66 49677 - 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM
23 5.668047663		10.0.0.3	TCP	66 80 - 49677 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK PERM WS=128
24 5.668233979		10.0.0.2	TCP	60 49677 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=262144 Len=0
± 25 5.668386497	10.0.0.3	10.0.0.2	HTTP	154 GET / HTTP/1.1
26 5.668393381	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.3	TCP	54 80 → 49677 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack=101 Win=64256 Len=0
27 5.711181014	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.3	TCP	204 80 → 49677 [PSH, ACK] Seg=1 Ack=101 Win=64256 Len=150 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
28 5.711334564	10.0.0.3	10.0.0.2	TCP	60 49677 → 80 [ACK] Seq=101 Ack=151 Win=261888 Len=0
29 5.711345980	10.0.0.2	10.0.0.3	HTTP	312 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
30 5.711442324	10.0.0.3	10.0.0.2	TCP	60 49677 → 80 [ACK] Seg=101 Ack=409 Win=261632 Len=0
31 5.711583900	10.0.0.3	10.0.0.2	TCP	60 49677 → 80 FIN. ACK1 Seg=101 Ack=409 Win=261632 Len=0

Domain callout:

```
Hypertext Transfer Protocol

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n

Host: www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\r\n

Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n
\r\n

[Full request URI: http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com/]

[HTTP request 1/1]

[Response in frame: 29]
```



Advanced Static Analysis

{Screenshots and description about findings during advanced static analysis}

The main function that contains the kill switch:

```
[0x00408140]
     int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
; var int32_t var_64h @ stack - 0x64
     ; var int32_t var_50h @ stack - 0x50
     ; var int32_t var_13h @ stack - 0x13
     ; var int32_t var_fh @ stack - 0xf
     ; var int32_t var_bh @ stack - 0xb
     ; var int32_t var_7h @ stack - 0x7
     ; var int32_t var_3h @ stack - 0x3
     sub esp 0x50
push esi
push edi
     0x00408144
                     mov ecx, 0xe ; 14
mov esi, str.http:_www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com; 0x4313d0
     0x00408145
     0x0040814a
                      lea edi, [var_50h]
xor eax, eax
     0x0040814f
     0x00408153
     0x00408155
                       rep
                      movsb byte es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
mov dword [var_17h], eax
mov dword [var_13h], eax
     0x00408157
     0x00408158
                      mov dword [var_fh], eax
mov dword [var_bh], eax
mov dword [var_7h], eax
mov word [var_3h], ax
push eax
     0x00408164
     0x00408168
     0x0040816c
     0x00408171
                              eax
     0x00408172
     0x00408173
                               eax
     0x00408174
     0x00408176
                               byte [var_1h], al
     0x00408177
                               dword [InternetOpenA]; 0x40a134
                                0x84000000
     0x00408188
     0x0040818a
     0x0040818e
                               esi eax
                       mov
     0x00408190
     0x00408192
                              esi
dword [InternetOpenUrlA] 0x40a138
     0x00408193
     0x00408194
     0x0040819a
                               edi, eax
     0x0040819c
                               esi, dword InternetCloseHandle]; 0x40a13c
     0x0040819d
                                edi, edi
     0x004081a5
[0x004081a7]
                                                                [0x004081bc]
                                                                0x004081bc
0x004081be
                                                                                  call
0x004081a7
                           esi
                                                                                            esi
 0x004081a9
                                                                                           edi
                                                                                  pust
 0x004081ab
                                                                 0x004081bf
                           esi
                                                                                           esi
                          fcn.00408090 ; fcn.00408090
                                                                 0x004081c1
 0x004081ad
                                                                                   pop
                                                                                           edi
 0x004081b2
                           edi
                                                                 0x004081c2
                                                                                            eax.
                                                                                                 eax
 0x004081b3
                                                                 0x004081c4
                                                                                           esi
 0x004081b5
                           esi
                                                                 0x004081c5
                                                                 0x004081c8
                           esp,
                                                                                           0x10
 0x004081b9
```




The file then checks for a service, if not found it creates one:





Service creation:





The program then creates the staging directory:

```
[0x00407db9]
0x00407db9
                       ecx, 0x40 ; '@' ; 64
                mov
0x00407dbe
                       eax, eax
0x00407dc0
                       edi, [lpExistingFileName + 0x1]
                lea
0x00407dc4
                       byte [lpExistingFileName], bl
               mov
                       stosd dword es:[edi], eax
0x00407dc8
               rep
0x00407dca
                       word es:[edi], ax
               stosw
0x00407dcc
              stosb
                       byte es:[edi], al
0x00407dcd
              mov
                       ecx, 0x40 ; '@' ; 64
0x00407dd2
                       eax, eax
0x00407dd4
              lea
                       edi, [lpNewFileName + 0x1]
              mov
                       byte [lpNewFileName], bl
0x00407ddb
                      stosd dword es:[edi], eax
0x00407de2
               mov
                      esi, dword [sprintf]; 0x40a10c
0x00407de4
0x00407dea
                       str.tasksche.exe; 0x43136c
0x00407def
              stosw word es:[edi], ax
                                                               Tuchton to drop
0x00407df1
              stosb
                       byte es:[edi], al
0x00407df2
               push
                       str.WINDOWS; 0x431364
0x00407df7
               lea
                       eax, [lpExistingFileName]
0x00407dfb
              push
                       str.C:_s_s ; 0x431358
0x00407e00
               push
0x00407e01
              call
                       esi
               add
0x00407e03
                       esp, 0x10
                       ecx, [lpNewFileName]
               lea
0x00407e06
                       str.WINDOWS ; 0x431364
0x00407e0d
               push
               push
0x00407e12
                       str.C:_s_qeriuwjhrf; 0x431344
0x00407e17
                       ecx
0x00407e18
               call
                       esi
               add
0x00407e1a
                       esp, 0xc
               lea
                       edx, [lpNewFileName]
0x00407e1d
0x00407e24
               lea
                       eax, [lpExistingFileName]
0x00407e28
               push
                                  ; 1 ; DWORD dwFlags
0x00407e2a
               push
                       edx
                                  ; LPCSTR lpNewFileName
                                  ; LPCSTR lpExistingFileName
0x00407e2b
               push
                       eax
               call
                       dword [MoveFileExA]; 0x40a04c; BOOL MoveFileExA(LPCSTR lpExistingFileNa...
0x00407e2c
0x00407e32
               push
                       ebx
0x00407e33
               push
0x00407e35
               push
0x00407e37
               push
                       ebx
0x00407e38
               push
                       ecx, [var_258h]
0x00407e39
                lea
0x00407e3d
                       0x40000000
               push
0x00407e42
               push
                       ecx
0x00407e43
                       dword [data.00431458]; 0x431458
                call
0x00407e49
                       esi, eax
                mov
0x00407e4b
                       esi, Øxffffffff
                cmp
                       0x407f08
0x00407e4e
                je
```



Then begins to drop files:

```
esp.
                            0x260
0x00407ce6
                        ebx
                push
0x00407ce7
                push
                        ebp
0x00407ce8
                        esi
                push
0x00407ce9
                       edi
               push
0x00407cea
               push
                        str.kernel32.dll ; 0x4313b4 ; LPCWSTR lpModuleName
0x00407cef
                        dword [GetModuleHandleW]; 0x40a064; HMODULE GetModuleHandleW(LPCWSTR lp...
                call
0x00407cf5
                        esi eax
               mov
0x00407cf7
                        ebx ebx
0x00407cf9
                        esi ebx
                cmp
0x00407cfb
                        0x407f08
                je
        [0x00407d01]
                                 edi, dword [GetProcAddress]; 0x40a060
         0x00407d01
                         mov
                                 str.CreateProcessA ; 0x431344 ; LPOVERL PPED lpOverlapped
         0x00407d07
                         push
         0x00407d0c
                         push
                                 esi
                                            ; LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesWritten
         0x00407d0d
                                 edi
                         call
                                 str.CreateFileA; 0x431398; DWORD nNumberOfBytesToWrite
         0x00407d0f
                         push
                                            ; LPCVOID lpBuffer
         0x00407d14
                         push
         0x00407d15
                                 dword data.00431478, eax; 0x431478
                         mov
         0x00407d1a
                         call
                                 str.WriteFile; 0x43138c; HANDLE hFile
         0x00407d1c
                         push
         0x00407d21
                         push
         0x00407d22
                                 dword data.00431458, eax; 0x431458
                         mov
         0x00407d27
                         call
         0x00407d29
                         push
                                 str.CloseHandle; 0x431380; HANDLE hObject
         0x00407d2e
                         push
                                 dword data.00431460, eax; 0x431460
         0x00407d2f
                         mov
         0x00407d34
                         call.
         0x00407d36
                                 ecx, dword data.00431478; 0x431478
                         mov
         0x00407d3c
                                 dword data.0043144c, eax; 0x43144c
                         mov
                                 ecx, ebx
         0x00407d41
                         cmp
         0x00407d43
                                 0x407f08
                         je
```



Final file drop:

```
[0x00407d69]
0x00407d69
                push
                         data.0043137c ; 0x43137c ; LPCSTR lpType
                                   ; 1831 ; LPCSTR lpName
0x00407d6e
                push
                         0x727
0x00407d73
                                    , HMODULE hModule
                        ebx
                push
0x00407d74
                call
                        dword [FindResourceA]; 0x40a05c; HRSRC FindResourceA(HMODULE hModule, L...
0x00407d7a
                        esi, eax
                mov
0x00407d7c
                        esi, ebx
0x00407d7e
                        0x407f08
                je
[0x00407d84]
                                    ; HRSRC hResInfo
0x00407d84
                push
                        esi
0x00407d85
                                    ; HMODULE hModule
                push
                        ebx
0x00407d86
                call
                        dword [LoadResource]; 0x400058; AGLOBAL LoadResource(HMODULE hModule, H...
0x00407d8c
                         eax, ebx
0x00407d8e
                je
                         0x407f08
  [0x00407d94]
                                      ; HGLOSAL hResData
   0x00407d94
                   push
                   call
                           dword [LockResource]; 0x40a0a0; LPVOID LockResource(HGLOBAL hResData)
   0x00407d95
   0x00407d9b
                           eax, ebx
                           dword [var_29ch], eax
   0x00407d9d
                   mov
                           0x407f08
   0x00407da1
[0x00407da7]
0x00407da7
                push
                        esi
                                    ; HRSRC hResInfo
                                    ; HMODULE hModule
0x00407da8
                        ebx
                push
0x00407da9
                call.
                        dword [SizeofResource] ; 0x40a050 ; DWORD SizeofResource(HMODULE hModule,...
0x00407daf
                mov
                        ebp, eax
0x00407db1
                стр
                        ebp, ebx
0x00407db3
                         0x407f08
```



Indicators of Compromise The full list of IOCs can be found in the Appendices.

Network Indicators

Opens listening port:

📧 taskhsvc.exe (6	5032)		DESK	TOP-L88K1DR	9050			TCP	Listen
taskhsvc.exe (6	5032)		DESK	TOP-L88K1DR	50471	DESKTOP-L88K1DR	50472	TCP	Establish
taskhsvc.exe (6	5032)		DESK	TOP-L88K1DR	50472	DESKTOP-L88K1DR	50471	TCP	Establish
taskhsvc.exe (6	5032)		DESK	TOP-L88K1DR	9050	DESKTOP-L88K1DR	8643	TCP	Establish
taskhsvc.exe	4664	TCP	Listen	127.0.0.1	90	50 0.0.0.0	0	3/2/2024 3:0	7:33 PM taskhsvc.exe
■ ¹ taskhsvc.exe	4664	TCP	Established	127.0.0.1	90:	50 127.0.0.1	50925	3/2/2024 3:0	8:07 PM taskhsvc.exe
taskhsvc.exe	4664	TCP	Established	127.0.0.1	501	55 127.0.0.1	50166	3/2/2024 3:0	7:33 PM taskhsvc.exe
taskhsvc.exe	4664	TCP	Established	127.0.0.1	501	56 127.0.0.1	50165	3/2/2024 3:0	7:33 PM taskhsvc.exe


Scans the network for worm capabilities:

	coronic ron monni oup			
80 16.291492	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.4? Tell 10.0.0.3
81 16.715662	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.12? Tell 10.0.0.3
82 16.782115	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.13? Tell 10.0.0.3
83 16.788257	VMware d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.5? Tell 10.0.0.3
84 16.788311	VMware d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.6? Tell 10.0.0.3
85 16.788339	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.7? Tell 10.0.0.3
86 16.788375	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.8? Tell 10.0.0.3
87 16.788411	VMware d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.9? Tell 10.0.0.3
88 16.788431	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.10? Tell 10.0.0.3
89 16.788448	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.11? Tell 10.0.0.3
90 16.838749	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.11? Tell 10.0.0.3
91 16.908368		Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.15? Tell 10.0.0.3
	VMware_d8:06:c1			
92 16.960695	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.16? Tell 10.0.0.3
93 17.013477	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.17? Tell 10.0.0.3
94 17.076332	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.18? Tell 10.0.0.3
95 17.132366	VMware_d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.19? Tell 10.0.0.3
96 17.194917	VMware d8:06:c1	Broadcast	ARP	42 Who has 10.0.0.20? Tell 10.0.0.3
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30	445 3/2/2024 3:07:05 PM mssecsvc2.0
Market Committee	The state of the s	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	1200000000	445 3/2/2024 3:07:05 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent 1224 TCP Syn Sent 1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM ssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM ssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM ssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM ssecsvc2.0 446 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM ssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
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Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40 49692 10.0.0.12	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40 49692 10.0.0.12 49700 10.0.0.20	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40 49692 10.0.0.12 49700 10.0.0.20 49693 10.0.0.13	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40 49692 10.0.0.12 49700 10.0.0.20 49693 10.0.0.13 49694 10.0.0.14 49695 10.0.0.15 49696 10.0.0.16	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40 49692 10.0.0.12 49700 10.0.0.20 49693 10.0.0.13 49694 10.0.0.14 49695 10.0.0.15 49696 10.0.0.16 49697 10.0.0.17	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr	1224 TCP Syn Sent	10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3 10.0.0.3	49713 10.0.0.30 49716 10.0.0.31 49717 10.0.0.32 49719 10.0.0.33 49720 10.0.0.34 49721 10.0.0.35 49722 10.0.0.36 49723 10.0.0.37 49724 10.0.0.38 49725 10.0.0.39 49726 10.0.0.40 49692 10.0.0.12 49700 10.0.0.20 49693 10.0.0.13 49694 10.0.0.14 49695 10.0.0.15 49696 10.0.0.16	445 3/2/2024 3:07:06 PM mssecsvc2.0 445 3/2/2024 3:07:04 PM mssecsvc2.0




Host-based Indicators:

Service created:




Dropped / created files:






Created Directory and Dropped files (WannaCry Staging location):



Startup file:





Appendices

A. Yara Rules

Full Yara repository located at: https://github.com/j3rmcyber/MalwareAnalysis

```
rule WannaCry_Ransomware {

meta:
    last_updated = "2024-3-11"
    author = "j3rmcyber"
    description = "YARA Rule for Detecting WannaCry"

strings:
    // Fill out identifying strings and other criteria
    $string1 = "iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com"
    $string2 = "qeriuwjhrf"
    $string3 = "WANACRY!" ascii
    $string4 = "WNcry@2ol7" ascii
    $string5 = "tasksche.exe"
    $PE_magic_byte = "MZ"

condition:
    // Fill out the conditions that must be met to identify the binary
    $PE_magic_byte at 0 and
    4 of them
}
```

B. Callback URLs

Domain	Port
hxxp[://]www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com	80
127.0.0.1	9050