



# The Web, Revisited

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EECS 325/425  
Fall 2018

*“The black and white they cruise by ...  
... and watch us from the corner of their eye ...”*


These slides are more-or-less directly from the slide set developed by Jim Kurose and Keith Ross for their book “Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach, 5th edition”.

The slides have been lightly adapted for Mark Allman’s EECS 325/425 Computer Networks class at Case Western Reserve University.

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# **Securing Web Content**

# Reading Along ...



- Web security, chapter 8


# SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

- ❖ widely deployed security protocol
  - supported by almost all browsers, web servers
  - https
  - billions \$/year over SSL
- ❖ mechanisms: [Woo 1994], implementation: Netscape
- ❖ variation -TLS: transport layer security, RFC 2246
- ❖ provides
  - *confidentiality*
  - *integrity*
  - *authentication*
- ❖ original goals:
  - Web e-commerce transactions
  - encryption (especially credit-card numbers)
  - Web-server authentication
  - optional client authentication
  - minimum hassle in doing business with new merchant
- ❖ available to all TCP applications
  - secure socket interface


# SSL vs. TLS

- ❖ Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)  $\approx$  Transport Layer Security (TLS)

# SSL and TCP/IP



*normal application*



*application with SSL*

- ❖ SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications
- ❖ C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available

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- ❖ *data transfer*: data to be transferred is broken up into series of records

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- ❖ *key derivation*: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys to secure the *data*
- ❖ *data transfer*: data to be transferred is broken up into series of records
- ❖ *connection closure*: special messages to securely close connection

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# Toy: data records

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  - e.g., with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check over all bytes sent before displaying?
- ❖ instead, break stream in series of records
  - each record carries a MAC
  - receiver can act on each record as it arrives
- ❖ issue: in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC from data
  - want to use variable-length records




# Toy SSL: summary



bob.com

*encrypted*



# Toy SSL isn't complete

- ❖ how long are fields?
- ❖ which encryption protocols?
- ❖ want negotiation?
  - allow client and server to support different encryption algorithms
  - allow client and server to choose together specific algorithm before data transfer

# **A New Web “Transport” Protocol**

# HTTP-over-TCP

- “The web” is a combination of several pieces of technology that are used together
  - but, pieced together
  - not from an integrated design
  - shows the power of generality ...  
... but also the limitations


# HTTP-over-TCP

- Web transactions
  - 1 RTT to setup TCP connection
  - 2 RTTs to setup TLS
  - Then, HTTP request / response

# QUIC

- Developed by Google in 2014
- Goal: improve web load latency, video playback experience
- Initially deployed between Chrome & Google services
  - One-third of Google traffic now using QUIC
- Now, being standardized and used by others

# QUIC



QUIC Tutorial, IETF-98



# HTTP-over-QUIC

- Web transactions
  - 0 RTTs to setup connection to known server (common)
  - 1 RTT if crypto keys are not new
  - 2 RTTs if QUIC version negotiation is required
  - Then, HTTP request / response

# QUIC


- QUIC borrows liberally from many different technologies
  - deployment eased by riding on top of UDP
  - uses TLS
  - congestion control is based on decades of work with TCP CC

# QUIC


- signaling is richer, but based on experience
- e.g., TCP can send 3 SACK blocks ...  
... but QUIC can send 256
- e.g., built more machinery to avoid RTO

# **Content Distribution Networks**


# Web Transactions




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


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





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
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
# Web Trans. with CDNs




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
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
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


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





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
# Web Trans. with CDNs



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# Web Trans. with CDNs



# CDNs

# CDNs

- Why arrange things in this fashion?

# CDNs

- Why arrange things in this fashion?
- Advantages
  - sheds load from content providers
  - helps mitigate DDoS
  - perhaps moves data closer to the user
    - so, provides quicker retrieval
    - better “quality of experience” (QoE)

# CDNs



# CDNs

- Disadvantages

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  - content provider loses fine-grain control

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
# CDNs

- Disadvantages
  - content provider loses fine-grain control
  - content provider loses visibility
    - e.g., for accounting
  - content provider must trust CDN

# CDNs




192.150.187.30




Local DNS  
192.150.186.8


- Where are the Fastly nodes?
- Where should they be?




DNS Auth  
104.156.80.32




WWW  
128.28.34.104  
Allman




WWW  
132.10.4.101



WWW  
191.23.187.6



WWW  
151.101.41.67




WWW  
140.76.91.103

**fastly**

# CDNs




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


Local DNS  
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
• Which Fastly node to use?




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
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Allman




WWW  
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WWW  
140.76.91.103

**fastly**

# CDNs



# CDNs

- How should we set the DNS TTL?

# CDNs

- How should we set the DNS TTL?
- Some CDNs use anycast routing
  - why?

# CDNs

- Big distributed systems with lots of tradeoffs