# Problem Set 8

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## H8.1

Zero-knowledge interactive proof system for graph isomorphism problem.

RSA cryptosystem: Key pair (p, q, e, d), message x and encrypted message y.

Graph isomorphism: Graphs G=(V,E) and G'=(V',E') are isomorphic if and only if there exists a bijection

$$\chi: V \to V'$$

such that for all  $(i, j) \in E$  there exists  $(\chi(i), \chi(j)) \in E'$ .

We say that  $\chi$  is a certificate of graph isomorphism.

**Alice** wants to convince **Bob** with high probability that she has certificate of graph isomorphism without revealing any other information about the certificate.

**Alice** and **Bob** know the input x = (G, G') which is a pair of graphs G = (V, E) and G' = (V', E') such that |V| = |V'| and |E| = |E'|.

Alice claims to have a certificate  $\chi$  of graph isomorphism of input x.

Protocol: In each round

#### 1) Alice

- Creates a random permutation  $\pi: V' \to V'$
- For each vertex  $i \in V$ : Generate RSA key pair  $(p_i, q_i, e_i, d_i)$  and compute  $y_i$ , a randomized RSA coding of  $\pi(\chi(i))$  and reveals  $(e_i, p_i q_i, y_i)$  to Bob.
- Reveals the permutation of the edges  $E'_{\pi}=\{(\pi(i'),\pi(j'))\mid (i',j')\in E'\}$  to Bob.

(I am not sure if this needs to be encrypted as well? Bob might be able to infer knowledge from  $E'_{\pi}$ )

- 2) **Bob** picks two random vertices  $i, j \in V$  and Alice reveals values  $d_i, d_j$ .
- 3) Bob decodes  $y_i, y_j$  to obtain  $i_\pi' = \pi(\chi(i)), j_\pi' = \pi(\chi(j))$  and checks

  - Bijectivity: If  $i \neq j$  then  $i'_{\pi} \neq j'_{\pi}$ . Adjacency: If  $(i,j) \in E$  then  $(i'_{\pi},j'_{\pi}) \in E'_{\pi}$  otherwise  $(i'_{\pi},j'_{\pi}) \notin E'_{\pi}$ .

Alice must send the whole encrypted certificate so that she cannot fake the certificate for vertices  $i, j \in V$  after Bob asks for them.

Bob must pick the vertices at random so that Alice cannot predict these vertices and fake the certificate for those vertices.

## H8.2

$$\mathbf{P^{PP}} = \mathbf{P^{\#P}}$$

If a polynomial time Turing machine with #P oracle does a query and receive answer x, then a polynomial time Turing machine with **PP** oracle can do |x|queries to obtain x, such that first one obtains the most significant bit of x, second one the second most significant bit of x and so forth.

Since the difference between the amount of queries is linear, the classes are equal.

## H8.3