On the Performance of Secure Graph Algorithms in Detecting Routing Loops

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
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Network Verification


Edge List Representation



SRC	DEST	
6	5	
5	8	
8	D	
• • •	•••	


Network Verification

Graph Theory Approach



- Cycles can cause delays and outages
- Detecting
 misconfigurations
 securely requires
 MPC and graph
 algorithms

Network Verification





Whoops!

No Internet connection found. Check your connection or try again. es can cause 's and outages cting onfigurations rely requires and graph ithms

Challenges and Goals


Potential Challenges

- Network administrators are reluctant to expose BGP configuration information
- Algorithms may function on smaller examples, but fail to scale to large networks

Multi-Party Computation - Secret Sharing

Shamir's Secret Sharing

(Additive SS)




Shares scalars with summable pieces

Challenges and Goals

Potential Challenges

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


Choosing an MPC Framework

- We first reviewed all frameworks in Rotaru's awesome-MPC list
- We filtered out frameworks without documentation and/or <3PC support

NOTE: We also worked with TinySMPC for educational purposes

TNO-MPC




- √ Comprehensive documentation
- ✓ Wide array of arithmetic operators
- √ Extensive Shamir SS support

The Algorithm

Breadth-First Search

- Create visited, in-progress, and to-be-visited sets
- Add dest_node to queue and in-progress set
- Continually look at front node in queue and search for a neighboring node that is inprogress ---> Cycle exists




GeeksforGeeks (2023)

For UNdirected graphs


Equality Check TinySMPC

Allows for node comparison



Network graph

Basic Scheme




Choosing CAIDA Datasets

- From the CAIDA ITDK, we choose six datasets from various teams
- Each had varying amounts of edges and nodes from different years
- Each contained >= one cycle

Dataset Specifications

ITDK dataset	Node count	Node count Direct edge count	
Team 1/20100101	16695	33315	
Team 1/20180101	25194	54086	
Team 1/20190101	27895	55675	
Team 1/20200101	34796	77650	
Team 2/20180101	24868	53910	
Team 3/20180101	25059	54375	

Benchmarking Protocol




V+E vs. Execution Time

ITDK dataset	Nodes + Edges	TNO-MPC time (s)	TinySMPC time (s)
Team 1/20100101	50010	0.247 ± 0.0249	0.661 ± 0.113
Team 1/20180101	83570	0.392 ± 0.0164	1.213 ± 0.145
Team 1/20190101	112446	0.597 ± 0.0291	1.199 ± 0.0934
Team 1/20200101	79280		1.711 ± 0.214
Team 2/20180101	78778	0.317 ± 0.0343	2.868 ± 0.152
Team 3/20180101	79434	0.466 ± 0.0383	0.806 ± 0.120

† Significantly slower

These points are outliers and likely represent worst-case time complexity

V+E vs. Execution Time




V+E vs. Execution Time on TinySMPC 3.0 T1 2019 2.5 Execution time (s) T3 2018 1.5 T1 2018 T2 2018 1.0 T1 2020 T1 2010 0.5 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000 110000 120000 Nodes + Edges

P value ****

P value ****

PC vs. Execution Time on TNO-MPC

Party count	Execution time mean (s)	
2	0.849	
3	1.124 minimum security	
4	1.439	
5	1.439 1.837 2.273 2.589	
6	2.273	
7	2.589	
8	3.0606	
9	3.564	
10	4.252	



Results in Context

Privacy

Securities

- Node addresses will remain private to computing parties
- Node order will remain secure


Insecurities

- Corrupted parties can gain information about general network structure
- Vulnerable to malicious actors

Results in Context

Scalability

Secure BFS execution time is relatively fast, but too slow to be run at extremely high rates



Useful for:


- Large network changes
- New network backbones

Not useful for:

- Rerouting
- Frequent backbone edits

Future Direction

- Higher specificity in location of cycles
- Experimentation with local BFS (next-hop traversal)
- Integration with broader network verification system



Acknowledgements

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