Place of Residence and Political Attitudes in Democracies Worldwide


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
Research Question

- 1. Does place of residence influence political attitudes and ideology?
- 2. How do certain factors of the regime, including its age and electoral formula, influence these results?

The United States




ALSO the United States



NOT the United States



Polities in the CSES



Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 – Place Matters

Hypothesis 2 – Issue Stances

Hypothesis 3A – Level of Democracy

Hypothesis 3B – Regime Age

Hypothesis 3C – Electoral Formula

Hypothesis 3D – Polity Differences

Data - CSES Module IV



Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

QUICK LINKS: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Election Study Table | Variable Table | Other Comparative Projects

CSES Secretariat Staff

The CSES is a collaborative program of research among election study teams from around the world. Participating countries and provinces include a common module of survey questions in their post-election studies. The resulting data are deposited along with voting, demographic, district and macro/electoral system variables. The studies are then merged into a single, free, public dataset for use in comparative study and cross-level analysis.

The research agenda, questionnaires, and study design are developed by an international committee of leading scholars of electoral politics, political science.



2017 Planning Committee Meeting in Mannheim Germany

Independent Measures

- Country
- Place of Residence
- Level of Democracy
- Regime Age
- Electoral Formula

Dependent Measures

- ➤ Self-Placement Ideology (0-10)
- ➤ Liberalism Public Expenditure and Income Inequality (0-9)

Controls

- Gender
- Education
- Socioeconomic Status
- Age
- Party Identification
- Closeness to Party
- Religiosity

Models

- Self-Placement Ideology = Place of Residence + Controls
- Liberalism = Place of Residence+ Controls


Table: General Trends in Ideology

Place of Residence	Self-Placement	Liberalism
Small Town	.1647**	.0432
	(0722)	(.0278)
Suburban	.2714***	.0082
	(.0934)	(.0352)
Urban	.2679***	.0995***
	(.0721)	(.0272) 2.7915***
Constant	5.1086***	2.7915***
	(.1993)	(.0762)
N	10,548	`9.662 [´]
R^2	0.0454	0.0195

Notes: *p<.1, **p<.05. ***p<.01

Reference: A rural place of residence serves as the baseline for comparison

Regional Urban-Rural Splits



Macro Variables

- 1. Level of Democracy
- 2. Regime Age
- 3. Electoral Formula

Table: By Electoral Formula

Place of Residence	Majoritarian	Proportional	Mixed
Small Town	2413	.3437***	.0425
	(.1583)	(.0982)	(.1377)
Suburban	0981	.2715**	.4923**
	(.2307)	(.1174)	(.2124)
Urban	3787 [*]	.1999**	.5009***
	(.1995)	(.0981)	(.1298)
Constant	1.776***	5.3337***	5.9321***
	(.5730)	(.2616)	(.3651)
N	1,440	6,057	3,043
R^2	0.1375	0.0549	0.0221

Notes: *p<.1, **p<.05. ***p<.01

Reference: A rural place of residence serves as the baseline for comparison

Variable	Self-Placement	Liberalism
Place of Residence		
Small Town	.0231	0151
	(.0519)	(.0271)
Suburban	.0555***	0777* [*] *
	(.0688)	(.0350)
Urban	.1214**	.0598
	(.0507)	(.0267)
Democracy	Ì599* [*] *	.0153
	(.0190)	(8800.)
Regime Age	.0013	.0086***
	(.00027)	(.0003)
Electoral Formula	.0789***	.0744***
	(.0302)	(.0151)
Constant	6.510***	2.335***
	(.2067)	(.1012)
N	18,748	9,292
R^2	0.0406	0.0930

Notes: *p<.1, **p<.05. ***p<.01 Reference: A rural place of residence serves as the baseline for comparison

Hypotheses Revisited

Hypothesis 1 – Place Matters

Hypothesis 2 – Issue Stances

Hypothesis 3A – Level of Democracy

Hypothesis 3B – Regime Age

Hypothesis 3C – Electoral Formula

Hypothesis 3D – Polity Differences

Conclusions



That's All, Folks!

