Dynastic Impacts on Political Outcomes

Replication and Extension of Smith and Martin (2017)

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Abstract

In this project, I analyze Smith and Martin (2017)'s "Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers". I begin by replicating Smith and Martin (2017)'s figures and tables. While some of this output cannot be replicated due to missing data or the inability to reproduce in R (the authors used Stata), I find similar results to the authors in what was producible. From there, I extend the results by using their dataset to analyze the gendered impact of two covariates, dynasty and local experience, on winning election.

Introduction

The importance of political dynasties in legislatures cannot be understated.

Literature Review

Whether these dynasties are beneficial is another question entirely.

Why Ireland?

Closely choose candidates, weak parties, multimember districts, explain STV.

Replication

Smith and Martin (2017) use Stata to create the 7 tables and 6 figures in the paper. As a result, my output does not perfectly match their paper cosmetically. That said, the results are the same (save that the graphs

look a bit better and some of the regression numbers are ever so slightly off). Smith and Martin (2017) fail

to include replication code to create Tables 1 or 2. The replication code create Figure 5 cannot be translated

into R. Although I may try producing them on my own later, I am skipping them for now.

Figures

Tables

Table 3. The Electoral Advantage of Legacy: Election Result

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | |
| | result | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.378***	0.253***	0.397***	0.212***	0.305**
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.017)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.350***	0.238***	0.399***	0.199***	0.311**
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.025)
female				−0.058***	−0.055*
				(0.014)	(0.016)
firstrun				−0.324***	−0.401*
				(0.010)	(0.011)
Constant	0.335***				
	(0.005)				
Observations	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,715
R^2	0.069	0.281	0.126	0.368	0.266
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.248	0.026	0.338	0.182
Residual Std. Error	0.470 (df = 8712)	0.422 (df = 8332)	0.481 (df = 7818)	0.396 (df = 8330)	0.440 (df =

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p

Extension

I will extend Smith and Martin (2017) in two ways: analyzing the gendered effect of dynasties on winning

election and looking at the effect of another potentially gendered covariate, local experience, on winning

election.

Table 4. The Electoral Advantage of Legacy: Share of Quota

			Dependent variable:		
			quotashare		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.294***	0.160***	0.291***	0.129***	0.218**
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.012)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.303***	0.182***	0.352***	0.153***	0.282**
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.017)
female				−0.052***	−0.047*
				(0.009)	(0.011)
firstrun				−0.245***	−0.321*
				(0.006)	(0.007)
Constant	0.451***				
	(0.004)				
Observations	8,693	8,693	8,693	8,693	8,693
R^2	0.081	0.456	0.237	0.547	0.402
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.431	0.149	0.526	0.333
Residual Std. Error	0.346 (df = 8690)	0.272 (df = 8310)	0.333 (df = 7797)	0.248 (df = 8308)	0.295 (df =

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p

Table 5. The Legacy Advantage in Cabinet Selection

			Dependent variable:		
			cabappt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.034***	0.015**	0.014**	−0.014**	−0.023*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.093***	0.072***	0.072***	0.054***	0.039**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
cwins				0.025***	0.004*
				(0.002)	(0.002)
cwins2				−0.0003	0.001**
				(0.0002)	(0.0002)
quotashare					0.147**
					(0.009)
Constant	0.034***				
	(0.002)				
Observations	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,693
R^2	0.011	0.035	0.090	0.166	0.193
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.033	0.071	0.148	0.176
Residual Std. Error	0.198 (df = 8712)	0.196 (df = 8696)	0.192 (df = 8537)	0.184 (df = 8535)	0.181 (df =

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p

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Table 6. Unpacking the Informational Advantage: Strength of the Dynasty?

	Dependent variable:		
	cabappt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.083***	0.077***	0.078***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
cwins	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
cwins2	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
generation	−0.005		
	(0.008)		
samename		−0.045*	
		(0.025)	
samedistrict			−0.006
			(0.017)
Observations	1,210	1,208	1,208
R^2	0.203	0.205	0.203
Adjusted R^2	0.116	0.118	0.116
Residual Std. Error	0.264 (df = 1090)	0.263 (df = 1088)	0.264 (df = 1088)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7. Unpacking the Informational Advantage: Party Strongholds?

	Dependent variable:	
	cabappt	
	(1)	(2)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.023***	−0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.073***	0.055***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
cwins		0.025***
		(0.002)
cwins2		−0.0003
		(0.0002)
Observations	8,715	8,715
R^2	0.224	0.289
Adjusted R^2	−0.016	0.070
Residual Std. Error	0.201 (df = 6661)	0.192 (df = 6659)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Gendered Effect of Dynasty

This portion of the extension also serves as a replication of Folke, Rickne, and Smith (2017) who, with a similar dataset to Smith and Martin (2017), question whether there is a gender-specific impact to being a legacy in terms of winning election.

To accomplish this, I take the Smith and Martin (2017) dataset with the same changes detailed above.

Gendered Effect of Local Experience

Appendix

Below are the figures and tables included in Smith and Martin (2017) that I chose not to display in the "Replication" portion of the paper.

References

Folke, O., Rickne, J., and Smith, D. (2017). Gender and dynastic political recruitment. *Research Institute of*

Industrial Economics. Retrieved from ifn.se

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