

# Dynastic Impacts on Political Outcomes

Replication and Extension of Smith and Martin (2017)

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Gov 1006 Final Paper

April 31, 2019

## Abstract

In this project, I analyze Smith and Martin (2017)'s "Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers". I begin by replicating Smith and Martin (2017)'s figures and tables. While some of this output cannot be replicated due to missing data or the inability to reproduce in R (the authors used Stata), I find similar results to the authors in what was producible. From there, I extend the results by using their dataset to analyze the gendered impact of two covariates, dynasty and local experience, on winning election.

## Introduction

The importance of political dynasties in legislatures cannot be understated.

## Literature Review

Whether these dynasties are beneficial is another question entirely. Using economic data from India, Eapen George and Ponattu (2017) estimate that dynastic rule tends to slow economic growth within each dynastic constituency, worsen the provision of public goods across constituencies, and heighten ethnic polarization among voters. This evidence goes against the common refrain that members of political dynasties are better at legislating because of a greater familiarity with the political system. Indeed, it may be the case that dynasties lead to worse governance. Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre (2013) conclude through their analysis of dynasties in the Philippines that provinces dominated by dynasties tend to spend money less effectively on infrastructure and health than other provinces, while they also have more crime and unemployment. Most strikingly, even though the presence of dynasties tends to include higher levels of congressional earmarks, dynasties spend the money less effectively than their counterparts.

That said, there is reason to believe dynasties can be normatively beneficial. Lacriox et al (2019) analyze the French Parliament during the initial stages of World War Two and find that members of dynasties were significantly more pro-democratic in their voting records than non-dynasties. However, there were striking disparities between dynasties, leading the authors to conclude that there exist separate types of dynasties, each with their own goals toward coalescing power. While dynasties founded by or filled by members of a pro-democratic party (or non-affiliated members who openly supported a democratic France) tended to defend democratic rights, other dynasties acted no more democratic than non-dynasties.

## **Why Ireland?**

Closely choose candidates, weak parties, multimember districts, explain STV.

## **Replication**

Smith and Martin (2017) use Stata to create the 7 tables and 6 figures in the paper. As a result, my output does not perfectly match their paper cosmetically. That said, the results are the same (save that the graphs look a bit better and some of the regression numbers are ever so slightly off). Smith and Martin (2017) fail to include replication code to create Tables 1 or 2. The replication code create Figure 5 cannot be translated into R. Although I may try producing them on my own later, I am skipping them for now.

## **Figures**

## **Tables**

## **Extension**

I will extend Smith and Martin (2017) in two ways: analyzing the gendered effect of dynasties on winning election and looking at the effect of another potentially gendered covariate, local experience, on winning election.

## **Gendered Effect of Dynasty**

Smith and Martin (2017) note that “legacies of both types are more likely to be women, which suggests that dynasties may be a significant pathway into politics for female candidate in an otherwise male-dominated

Table 3. The Electoral Advantage of Legacy: Election Result

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1)	(2)	result (3)	(4)	(5)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.378*** (0.017)	0.253*** (0.016)	0.397*** (0.019)	0.212*** (0.015)	0.305*** (0.017)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.350*** (0.025)	0.238*** (0.024)	0.399*** (0.027)	0.199*** (0.022)	0.311*** (0.025)
female				-0.058*** (0.014)	-0.055*** (0.016)
firstrun				-0.324*** (0.010)	-0.401*** (0.011)
Constant	0.335*** (0.005)				
Observations	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,715
R <sup>2</sup>	0.069	0.281	0.126	0.368	0.266
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.069	0.248	0.026	0.338	0.182
Residual Std. Error	0.470 (df = 8712)	0.422 (df = 8332)	0.481 (df = 7818)	0.396 (df = 8330)	0.440 (df = 8330)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 4. The Electoral Advantage of Legacy: Share of Quota

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	quotashare				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.294*** (0.013)	0.160*** (0.010)	0.291*** (0.013)	0.129*** (0.009)	0.218*** (0.012)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.303*** (0.019)	0.182*** (0.015)	0.352*** (0.019)	0.153*** (0.014)	0.282*** (0.017)
female				-0.052*** (0.009)	-0.047*** (0.011)
firstrun				-0.245*** (0.006)	-0.321*** (0.007)
Constant	0.451*** (0.004)				
Observations	8,693	8,693	8,693	8,693	8,693
R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.456	0.237	0.547	0.402
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.081	0.431	0.149	0.526	0.333
Residual Std. Error	0.346 (df = 8690)	0.272 (df = 8310)	0.333 (df = 7797)	0.248 (df = 8308)	0.295 (df = 8308)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5. The Legacy Advantage in Cabinet Selection

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	cabappt				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.034*** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	−0.014** (0.007)	−0.023* (0.007)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.093*** (0.011)	0.072*** (0.011)	0.072*** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.010)	0.039** (0.010)
cwins				0.025*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
cwins2				−0.0003 (0.0002)	0.001** (0.0002)
quotashare					0.147** (0.009)
Constant	0.034*** (0.002)				
Observations	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,715	8,693
R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.035	0.090	0.166	0.193
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.010	0.033	0.071	0.148	0.176
Residual Std. Error	0.198 (df = 8712)	0.196 (df = 8696)	0.192 (df = 8537)	0.184 (df = 8535)	0.181 (df = 8534)

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table 6. Unpacking the Informational Advantage: Strength of the Dynasty?

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	cabappt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.083*** (0.019)	0.077*** (0.018)	0.078*** (0.018)
cwins	0.053*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)
cwins2	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
generation	-0.005 (0.008)		
samename		-0.045* (0.025)	
samedistrict			-0.006 (0.017)
Observations	1,210	1,208	1,208
R <sup>2</sup>	0.203	0.205	0.203
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.116	0.118	0.116
Residual Std. Error	0.264 (df = 1090)	0.263 (df = 1088)	0.264 (df = 1088)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 7. Unpacking the Informational Advantage: Party Strongholds?

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	cabappt	
	(1)	(2)
as.factor(legacyscale)1	0.023*** (0.008)	−0.005 (0.008)
as.factor(legacyscale)2	0.073*** (0.012)	0.055*** (0.012)
cwins		0.025*** (0.002)
cwins2		−0.0003 (0.0002)
Observations	8,715	8,715
R <sup>2</sup>	0.224	0.289
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	−0.016	0.070
Residual Std. Error	0.201 (df = 6661)	0.192 (df = 6659)
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

parliament” (p. 151). This observation inspired me to dig deeper into the gendered effects of being in a political dynasty. Does being in a dynasty help female candidates counteract the gender gap in winning elections?

To answer this question, I manipulated the Smith and Martin (2017) dataset to include a binary variable, **dynasty**, that was coded 1 if the candidate qualified as a dynasty. I then regressed election result on that and the candidate’s sex. I ended up with three models: one that had no fixed effects, one that used the party-year fixed effects from Smith and Martin (2017), and one that used the authors’ district-year fixed effects. That output is below in Table X.

That said, it must be mentioned that this analysis is not unique. After creating my models, I found that one of the co-authors of the initial paper, Daniel Smith, currently has a working paper that studies this same topic with a similar dataset using approximately the same modeling technique. As a result, this portion of the extension should be characterized as a replication of Folke, Rickne, and Smith (2017) since, while I did not know it at the time, they were the first to flesh out this idea. This portion of the extension also serves as a replication of Folke, Rickne, and Smith (2017) who, with a similar dataset to Smith and Martin (2017), question whether there is a gender-specific impact to being a legacy in terms of winning election.

The major difference between my analysis and Folke, Rickne, and Smith (2017) is that they restrict their

sample to Ireland's three major parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and Labour). They justify this decision because those parties have been consistently nominating candidates in most districts. However, I think the results should still hold without subsetting the data in this fashion because (a) there is still a model that creates party-year fixed effects and (b) since Ireland's electoral system places an emphasis on individual candidates, it should not necessarily matter that a party was consistently nominating in each district.

## Loading required package: Matrix

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## Please cite as:

## Hlavac, Marek (2018). stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables.

## R package version 5.2.2. <https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=stargazer>

Table X: Gendered Effect of Dynasty

	Dependent Variable:		
	Election Result		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	-0.180*** (0.017)	-0.108*** (0.017)	-0.134*** (0.019)
Dynasty	0.360*** (0.016)	0.249*** (0.015)	0.391*** (0.017)
Female * Dynasty	0.119*** (0.041)	0.037 (0.037)	0.082* (0.044)
Constant	0.354*** (0.006)		
Fixed Effects?	No	Party-Year	District-Year
Observations	8,715	8,715	8,715
R <sup>2</sup>	0.080	0.263	0.131
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.080	0.247	0.032
Residual Std. Error	0.467 (df = 8711)	0.422 (df = 8536)	0.479 (df = 7817)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Gendered Effect of Local Experience

I then wondered whether other covariates could have differing effects by gender. I thought local political experience was an interesting covariate to study because there seem to be two schools of thought surrounding its gendered effects.



The first is pessimistic. Okimoto and Brescoll (2010) observe that female candidates seen as ambitious are punished by voters, while male candidates seen in a similar light are not penalized. Excluding a general “feeling” potential voters could get after meeting a candidate face-to-face or watching them in a debate, local experience seems to be the best signal for ambition available to study. While the overall effect of holding local office is positive for men, the effect for women would be expected to be diminished or even negative if the “ambition hypothesis” holds.

The second possibility is more optimistic about the effect of local experience on female representation, even though it relies on a sexist electorate. Survey data from Fox (2003) demonstrates that fewer women run for office than men because they are more pessimistic about their qualifications. Additionally, research from Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) suggests that female candidates are held to a higher standard than male candidates in elections. It follows, then, that local experience can both incentivize better female candidates to run and give them the extra qualifications necessary to beat male candidates. In fact, if the assumptions prove true, female candidates should gain more benefit from local experience than male candidates do since the electorate seemingly demands more qualifications from women before voting them into office. As a result, the effect of women holding local office should counteract the gender gap.

To determine which of these hypotheses most accurately reflected the data, I recreated the models from the first extension and applied them to the interaction between candidate sex and local political experience. Again, three models were created: one without fixed effects, one taking party-year effects into account, and one taking district-year effects into account. As in the first extension, I did not subset the data to only include the major parties. The results of the models are summarized below in Table X.

## Appendix

Below are the figures and tables included in Smith and Martin (2017) that I chose not to display in the “Replication” portion of the paper.

## References

- Folke, O., Rickne, J., and Smith, D. (2017). Gender and dynastic political recruitment. *Research Institute of Industrial Economics*. Retrieved from ifn.se
- Smith, D., and Martin, S. (2017). Political dynasties and the selection of cabinet ministers. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42(1). Retrieved from wiley.com

Table X: Gendered Effect of Local Experience

	Dependent Variable:		
	Election Result		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	-0.242*** (0.031)	-0.114*** (0.030)	-0.149*** (0.034)
Local Experience	0.150*** (0.014)	0.100*** (0.014)	0.166*** (0.016)
Female * Local Experience	0.102** (0.041)	0.024 (0.039)	0.095** (0.044)
Constant	0.510*** (0.011)		
Fixed Effects?	No	Party-Year	District-Year
Observations	5,754	5,754	5,754
R <sup>2</sup>	0.042	0.228	0.178
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.206	0.027
Residual Std. Error	0.483 (df = 5750)	0.439 (df = 5590)	0.486 (df = 4856)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Smith, D., and Martin, S. (2017). Replication data for: Political dynasties and the selection of cabinet ministers. *Harvard Dataverse*. Retrieved from [dataverse.harvard.edu](https://dataverse.harvard.edu)