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Jean E. Fox Tree

To cite this article: Jean E. Fox Tree (2002) Interpreting Pauses and Ums at Turn Exchanges, Discourse Processes, 34:1, 37-55, DOI: [10.1207/S15326950DP3401_2](https://doi.org/10.1207/S15326950DP3401_2)

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1207/S15326950DP3401_2



Published online: 08 Jun 2010.



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Interpreting Pauses and *Ums* at Turn Exchanges

Jean E. Fox Tree
Psychology Department
University of California, Santa Cruz

In 3 experiments, this article compares how overhearers interpreted second speakers' contributions to a conversation depending on whether the second speaker responded to a first speaker immediately; paused and responded; said *um* and responded; or said *um*, paused, and then responded. The conversational snippets tested were unscripted and diverse; an example of one exchange is, "Are you here because of affirmative action?" (pause, *um*, or both) "It helped me out a little bit." Overhearers thought speakers had more production difficulty, were less honest, and were less comfortable with topics under discussion when speakers either said *um* or paused, and even more so with both. The best explanation for the data is that overhearers are judging, for each question asked, what it means for speakers to produce an anticipated or an unanticipated delay.

Pauses, *ums*, and *uhs* are popularly understood as meaningless or as hindrances to good communication. One common conception of pauses, *ums*, and *uhs* is that they are all versions of the same thing. The traditional label for *ums* and *uhs* in the research literature, *filled pauses*, emphasizes this seeming interchangeability. In this view, whether a person uses an *um* or an *uh* or a pause would be a matter of personal style or habit, like speaking quickly or speaking softly. However, researchers have shown that they do have meaning; when estimating respondents' knowledge of the answers to questions, overhearers interpreted *ums* and *uhs* as amplifying what pauses did (Brennan & Williams, 1995). For example, overhearers judged an immediate "I don't know" to "What is the answer to Question 4?" as reflecting more commitment to not knowing the answer than "[pause] I don't know," which in turn reflected more commitment than "*um* I don't know." Similarly, overhearers thought an immediate answer, such as "Ottawa," reflected more commitment to the answer than "[pause] Ottawa," which reflected more commitment than "*um* Ottawa." Therefore, it mattered whether overhearers heard a pause or an *um* or an *uh*,

although *ums* and *uhs* had similar effects (Brennan & Williams, 1995). In other work, researchers have suggested further that *ums* and *uhs* are used to signal upcoming delays, with *ums* signaling major delays and *uhs* minor (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Fox Tree, 2001; Smith & Clark, 1993).

There has been some experimental evidence to support the delay-signaling view. Smith and Clark (1993) found that in answering factual questions like, "What is the capital of Canada?," people reliably used *um* before a long delay and *uh* before a short delay in the amount of time it took for them to answer. Fox Tree (2001) found that people recognized words in a speech stream more quickly after *uh* than when the *uh* was digitally excised. In the word monitoring task used to test processing, people saw a word on a computer screen, and then listened to an utterance. If they heard the word they saw, they pressed a button as quickly as possible. Their pressing speed, which is related to their ability to integrate information (Fox Tree, 1995; Fox Tree & Schrock, 1999; Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980), was faster after an *uh* was heard; it was not affected by hearing *um*. These findings replicated cross linguistically, in English and Dutch (Fox Tree, 2001). A possible explanation is that as indicators of minor delay, paying attention after *uh* may be worth the listener's while. However, as indicators of major delay, paying attention after *um* may not pay off, because the listener cannot gauge how long it will be before the speaker will resume.

In the research described here, I tested the hypothesis that delays that are signaled by *um* differ from delays that are not signaled. I tested overhearers' interpretations of speakers' speech production difficulty, honesty, and comfort with topic, because many researchers have identified links between these variables and *um* use (Brotherton, 1979; Christenfeld & Creager, 1996; Fox Tree & Clark, 1997; Hosman & Wright, 1987; Jefferson, 1974; Kasl & Mahl, 1987; Lalljee & Cook, 1969, 1973; Martin, 1967; Reynolds & Paivio, 1968; Schachter, Christenfeld, Ravina, & Bilous, 1991; Siegman, 1979; Tannenbaum, Williams, & Hillier, 1965; Vrij & Winkel, 1991). I selected *um* to study because (a) prior research has suggested that *um* and *uh* be treated as distinct elements, and (b) prior research has found effects for *uh* but not for *um*, inviting testing with alternative tasks to see if *um* effects can be found (Fox Tree, 2001). I investigated the role of *ums* at turn exchanges because turn exchanges seem to be a salient part of speakers' utterances. *Ums* are also more likely to occur at the beginning of intonation units as compared to positions later in intonation units (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002; an intonation unit is a segment of talk produced as a prosodic whole; the beginning of a turn is always also the beginning of an intonation unit).

ATTRIBUTIONS TESTED

In this research, I explored the attributions made by overhearers about speakers depending on the type of turn exchange. I measured the following types of attributions:

Speaker's Speech Production Difficulty

Forewarning delays may help listeners anticipate what will come next, or more broadly, cue listeners to be attentive because the upcoming talk may be difficult to process. If *ums* are linked to increased speech production difficulty, and if overhearers are sensitive to this, then overhearers should rate speakers as having more production difficulty with *ums* than without. This was measured with the question, "How difficult do you think it was for the respondent to put their response into words?" 1 (*not difficult*) to 7 (*very difficult*).

Speaker's Honesty or Evasiveness

One study found that *ums* and *uhs*, in combination with pauses, made courtroom defendants appear more guilty than they would have appeared without them (Hosman & Wright, 1987). The researchers did not tease apart the contributions of *ums* or *uhs* versus pauses. Another study found that people who were instructed to deceive police officers in a mock interrogation used more *ums* and *uhs* than those telling the truth (Vrij & Winkel, 1991). If *ums* are linked to increased evasiveness, and if overhearers are sensitive to this, then overhearers should rate speakers as more evasive with *ums* than without. I tested overhearer's interpretations of speaker's honesty with, "How close do you think the respondent's answer is to what the respondent truly thinks?" 1 (*not close—deceptive*) to 7 (*very close—honest*).

Speaker's Comfort With the Topic

Research findings have generally not supported a correlation between *ums* or *uhs* and anxiety (Mahl, 1987), and at least one controlled study has shown that *ums* or *uhs* can actually make speakers sound more relaxed (Christenfeld, 1995). Nonetheless, laypeople tend to believe that speakers who use *ums* or *uhs* are "inarticulate, uninteresting, ill-prepared, [and] nervous" among other negative things (Christenfeld, 1995 p. 173). The controlled study is worth replicating. My studies differ from the earlier studies in that I test more stimuli, and I test the effects of an individual *um* on judgments, instead of a group of *ums* and *uhs* taken as a whole. If *ums* are linked to increased discomfort at turn exchanges, and if overhearers are sensitive to this, then having *ums* should make overhearers interpret speakers as being less comfortable with the topic. I measured overhearers' interpretations of speakers' comfort with the question, "How comfortable do you think the respondent feels with the topic of discussion?" 1 (*not comfortable*) to 7 (*very comfortable*). I chose to investigate comfort with topic because it was more relevant to the task at hand—judgments of brief turn exchanges—than the more trait-directed query about a speakers' anxiety level.

The links researchers identified between *ums* or *uhs* and speech production difficulty, honesty, and comfort with topic reflect the deeper link between *ums* or *uhs* and delays in speaking (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002). For example, pauses increase with greater upcoming syntactic complexity (Clark & Wasow, 1998; Ferreira, 1991) and speech production trouble (Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Levelt, 1989; Maclay & Osgood, 1959). People also take longer to start talking when telling a sensitive story than when telling a less personal story (Horowitz, Weckler, Saxon, Livaudais, & Boutacoff, 1977). In all these cases, an increased need for planning time (because of production difficulty, figuring out how to talk about an uncomfortable topic, or some other reason) will lead to delays, and speakers will recognize those impending delays and mark them with *ums* or *uhs* (Clark & Fox Tree, 2002). In this way, *ums* may be linked to speech production trouble, honesty, and comfort with topic even though their underlying function is to indicate upcoming delays in speech.

TURN INTERVALS TESTED

To hold as many spontaneous speech variables constant as possible, the same snippets of conversation were edited to create different types of turn exchanges, with different overhearers hearing different versions of each snippet.

An approximately 1-s pause is the amount of silence comfortably sustained before a conversational participant tries to fill the gap, either by the current speaker continuing or by the next speaker beginning (Jefferson, 1989). For example, when searching for a word, speakers make an attempt to continue after about 1 s of hiatus, as in “Harry *uh* [1 s pause] Schirmer?” (adapted from Jefferson, 1989, p. 191). As if to highlight the normality of this base metric of 1 s, delays several seconds long are often accompanied by expletives (Jefferson, 1989, pp. 183, 191). Very long pauses, such as those over 6 s, can often be attributed to nonverbal activities interlocutors are engaged in at the time that they are talking (Jefferson, 1989). Pauses over 3-s long, without ongoing activities to attribute them to, make interlocutors uncomfortable (McLaughlin & Cody, 1982), and people probably try to avoid silences of this length; in one study of conversations, almost all pauses were under 2 s in length, and none were over 3 s (Goldman-Eisler, 1968).

In Experiment 1, I compared the three turn intervals of a 1-s pause, a 3-s pause, and a .5-s pause plus *um* plus 1-s pause (the *um* condition). The *um* was preceded by a .5-s pause to make the turn exchange sound natural, as an *um* coincident with the offset of the last speaker’s turn sounded premature. The 1-s versus 3-s pause conditions should replicate earlier research that uncomfortably long interturn pauses yield negative attributions (McLaughlin & Cody, 1982).

The outcome of the *um* condition is less predictable. If *ums* are filtered out and ignored (*the filter hypothesis*), we might expect attributions for the *um* condition to

be more similar to the 1-s condition than the 3-s condition (ignoring *um*, there is a .5-s difference between the *um* and 1-s conditions, compared to 1.5-s difference between the *um* and 3-s conditions). If *ums* and pauses contribute to attributions based on their lengths in time (*the duration hypothesis*), we might expect attributions for the *um* conditions to be halfway between attributions for the 1-s and 3-s conditions (*ums* average .5-s long; so the durations of the interturn intervals would be 1 s, ~2 s, 3 s). *Ums* may also affect interpretations independently from pauses (*the separate contributions hypothesis*). Because there are a variety of ways of thinking about separate contributions, I discuss this hypothesis in the following section.

In Experiment 2, I compared the three turn intervals of a .5-s pause, a 3-s pause, and a .5-s pause plus *um* plus 3-s pause (the *um* 3-s condition). This test once again provides endpoints for measuring the effects of an *um* on the interpretations of pauses: The .5-s versus 3-s pause conditions should replicate earlier research that uncomfortably long interturn pauses yield negative attributions (the 1-s interturn pause was reduced to .5 s to more closely match the pause preceding the *um* in the *um* 3-s condition and to assure the perception of a smooth turn exchange in the .5-s condition). Unlike in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 the *um* precedes an unusually long pause.

Like in Experiment 1, the outcome of the *um* 3-s condition is less predictable. According to the filter hypothesis, we might expect attributions for the *um* 3-s condition to be more similar to the 3-s condition than the .5-s condition (ignoring *um*, there is a 3-s difference between the *um* 3-s and the .5-s conditions, compared to .5-s difference between the *um* 3-s and the 3-s conditions). According to the duration hypothesis, we might expect attributions for the *um* 3-s condition to exceed attributions for .5 s and 3 s (durations of the interturn intervals would be .5 s, 3 s, ~4 s). Possible outcomes predicted by the separate contributions hypothesis are discussed in the next section.

Experiment 3 controlled for the time elapsed between the main messages of the first and second speakers, to directly test the duration hypothesis. In Experiment 3, I compared the turn intervals of a .5-s pause, a .5-s pause plus *um* plus 3-s pause, and a long pause equivalent in length to the .5-s pause plus *um* plus 3-s pause. That is, in Experiments 1 and 2, the time elapsed in the long pause condition is 3 s; but in Experiment 3, the time elapsed in the long pause condition is about 4 s, with the time varying depending on the length of the *um* for each stimulus. This ~4 s equals the amount of time between the first and second speakers in the *um* plus 3-s pause conditions of Experiments 2 and 3. According to the filter hypothesis, we might expect attributions for the *um* 3-s condition to be closer to the ~4-s condition than the .5-s condition (ignoring *um*, there is a ~.5-s difference between the *um* 3-s and ~4-s conditions, compared to a 3-s difference between the *um* 3-s and .5-s conditions). According to the duration hypothesis, we might expect attributions for the *um* 3-s condition to equal attributions for the ~4-s condition (durations of the

interturn intervals would be .5 s, ~4 s, ~4 s). Once again, possible outcomes predicted by the separate contributions hypothesis are discussed in the next section.

THE SEPARATE CONTRIBUTIONS HYPOTHESIS

There are at least three subhypotheses of the separate contributions hypothesis, and they predict different things. In the *expectation subhypothesis*, listeners expect *ums* to forewarn major delays. According to this subhypothesis, (a) ratings for the *um* condition will be similar to the 3-s condition in Experiment 1, (b) ratings for the *um* 3-s condition will be similar to the 3-s condition in Experiment 2, and (c) ratings for the *um* 3-s condition will be similar to the ~4-s condition in Experiment 3. In each of these cases, hearing an *um* (and expecting a major delay) and experiencing a major delay (in the form of a 3-s or ~4-s pause) would lead to the same changes in attributions as compared to a short interturn interval (.5 s or 1 s). It would not matter whether the *ums* were actually followed by long silent pauses.

In the *responsibility subhypothesis*, *ums* play a role in assigning responsibility for long interturn pauses. With a 3-s pause alone, part of the responsibility for the long interturn interval could be carried by the first speaker. Long pauses that follow *ums*, however, can be unambiguously attached to the *um*-producer. That is, the second speaker says *um*, gains the floor, and therefore takes the responsibility for a pause following *um*. *Ums* can be used to give up the floor as well (see Clark & Fox Tree, 2002), but in this case, their positions in the utterances would likely be different; for example, they might be turn final, which was never the case for the current materials. According to this subhypothesis, (a) ratings for the *um* condition will be similar to the 1-s condition in Experiment 1, (b) ratings for the *um* 3-s condition will be more negative than the 3-s condition in Experiment 2, and (c) ratings for the *um* 3-s condition will be more negative than the ~4-s condition in Experiment 3.

In the *interpreting-in-context subhypothesis*, the attributions made when hearing *um* will be related to what it means to indicate advance knowledge of an upcoming delay for that attribution with this task. I say “with this task” because having a pause means different things in different situations. When driving, a pause can mean “I am paying attention to the road now” (Fox Tree, 2000; Jefferson, 1989), but when talking face-to-face it could mean “I am having trouble saying what I want to say.” With respect to attributions of speech production difficulty, overhearers may reason that to have advance knowledge of a delay, speakers must have had a greater awareness of their production difficulty, and therefore be having a more serious problem than a silent pause alone would indicate. Similar reasoning may apply for attributions of honesty and comfort with topic. Long silent pauses may suggest speakers are planning what to say, perhaps in the service of deception or figuring out how to talk about an uncomfortable topic. Awareness of the upcoming silence may indicate even more serious planning problems. According to this

subhypothesis, (a) ratings for the *um* condition will be more negative than the 1-s condition in Experiment 1, (b) ratings for the *um* 3-s condition will be more negative than the .5-s condition and the 3-s condition in Experiment 2, and (c) ratings for the *um* 3-s condition will be more negative than the .5-s condition and possibly the ~4-s condition in Experiment 3. This subhypothesis does not make any particular predictions about the relative lengths of long silent pauses on attributions, or the relative contribution of *ums* versus long silent pauses to attributions.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Participants. Forty-two University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) students participated in exchange for course credit. All were native English speakers. No student participated in the other experiments reported here.

Materials. Stimuli came from recorded conversations of 11 pairs of UCSC students who had a conversation in exchange for course credit. Some pairs were acquainted, others were not. Speakers were instructed to engage in a conversation on any topic for about ½ hr. If they needed help finding something to discuss, they could use a topic list that a research assistant had prepared in advance. These topics were considered to be of interest to UCSC students and included questions such as, “Are you for or against the ban on assault weapons?”; “What crime, if any, warrants the death penalty?”; and “Do you believe in aliens? ghosts? Elvis?” Speakers knew that they were being recorded and consented to allow their speech to be used in future experiments.

Thirty turn exchanges from these spontaneous conversations were investigated (see the Appendix). In each segment, one speaker began talking, followed by a turn exchange in which a second speaker responded, with one exception: In addition to the response, one second speaker also produced the backchannel, *uh huh*, before the end of the first speaker’s turn. Most exchanges were question–answer pairs. The three that were not included two statements of opinion followed by reactions, and one description of an event followed by a reaction. Twenty-three of the questions could be interpreted as yes–no questions, although no responses were in fact only yes or no. Each segment of conversation was edited to create three versions, as in the following example:

- (1) A: Are you here because of affirmative action?
B: (1-s pause) It helped me out a little bit.
- (2) A: Are you here because of affirmative action?
B: (.5-s pause + *um* + 1-s pause) It helped me out a little bit.

- (3) A: Are you here because of affirmative action?
 B: (3-s pause) It helped me out a little bit.

Any nonpropositional information between the first and second speakers' propositional statements, such as nonword vocalizations, were removed. Pauses were created by copying background noise from elsewhere in the recording, and *ums* that were not spontaneously produced at the beginning of the turn were digitally spliced in. In stimuli with spontaneous *ums*, pauses surrounding the *ums* were edited. This means that editing took place in all conditions, which distinguishes the experiments described in this article from other experiments using the editing technique to test the role of *ums* (Fox Tree, 2001). In the *um* condition, a .5-s pause was added before the *um* to make the stimuli sound more natural. *Ums* averaged 505 ms long ($SD = 112$), with a range from 309 ms to 803 ms. The editing procedures yielded 90 stimuli.

In addition to the critical stimuli, there were also 10 lure stimuli. Lure stimuli also consisted of one speaker followed by a second speaker, but the turn exchanges did not contain *ums* or pauses. Instead, turn exchanges contained discourse markers such as *like*, *I mean*, *I guess*, *well*, and *oh*, as well as overlaps or false starts. The purpose of lure stimuli was to mask the manipulation. No participant in the three experiments detected the manipulation, although this also might have occurred without the lures.

To prevent the overhearers from focussing on the turn exchange, they were told that the experiment was about how people get acquainted with one another, and that they would hear recorded samples of conversations followed by questions about the interactions. The questionnaire was numbered, and each exchange was labeled by a topic phrase, such as *Affirmative Action* for the earlier example. After hearing each trial, participants responded to five questions using a 7-point Likert scale, of which three questions and their ratings are discussed here (the other two questions supported the cover story; they were, (a) How well do you think these two people know each other? and (b) How likely do you think it is that the respondent will seek out further contact with the other person?). The questions of interest were, (a) How difficult do you think it was for the respondent to put their response into words? 1 (*not difficult*) to 7 (*very difficult*); (b) How close do you think the respondent's answer is to what the respondent truly thinks? 1 (*not close—deceptive*) to 7 (*very close—honest*); and (c) How comfortable do you think the respondent feels with the topic of discussion? 1 (*not comfortable*) to 7 (*very comfortable*). Questions were always presented in the same order. This held constant any potential order effects across conditions.

Design. Three counterbalanced lists were created for the 90 critical stimuli. Each list contained 10 stimuli with a short pause between turns, 10 stimuli with a long pause, and 10 stimuli with an *um* such that a particular version of a stimulus

only occurred once per list. The 10 lures were constant across lists, yielding 40 stimuli per list. Stimuli conditions were presented in a random order. The item order was constant across lists.

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three lists. After reading instructions, participants sat in front of a tape player with a questionnaire before them, put on headphones, and pressed *play*. They first heard a practice trial, after which they stopped the tape and consulted with the experimenter to make sure they understood the instructions. Thereafter, the experiment was self-paced. After each trial, a voice on the tape said "Please stop the tape now and answer the five questions." When they had finished answering the questions, participants were instructed to press *play* to hear the next trial. Participants were told that it was important to stop the tape to answer the questions and to keep in mind that the questions always referred to the second speaker of the dyad. Participants were not allowed to rewind the tape.

Results Results are discussed by question asked. Means and standard deviations, averaged across participants and items, are presented in Table 1.

1. How difficult do you think it was for the respondent to put their response into words? Both *ums* and 3-s pauses made a respondent appear to have speech production difficulty, although 3-s pauses suggested more difficulty than *ums*: contrast 1 s to *um* 1 s, $F(1, 41) = 27.64, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 36.37, p < .001$; contrast 1 s to 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 72.15, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 90.64, p < .001$; contrast *um* 1 s to 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 12.56, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 13.83, p < .001$.

2. How close do you think the respondent's answer is to what the respondent truly thinks? Either an *um* or a 3-s pause made respondents appear less honest, and to the same extent: contrast 1 s to *um* 1 s, $F(1, 41) = 21.06, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 36.48, p < .001$; contrast 1 s to 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 10.09, p < .01$ and $F(1, 29) = 17.44, p < .001$; contrast *um* 1 s to 3 s, $F(1, 41) = .45, p = .50$ and $F(1, 29) = .82, p = .37$.

TABLE 1
Experiment 1 Means and Standard Deviations Averaged Across
Participants and Items

Time	Question 1 ^a		Question 2 ^b		Question 3 ^c	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1 s pause	2.9	.9	5.4	.7	4.8	.8
3 s pause	4.1	.9	5.0	.8	4.1	.8
<i>um</i> 1 s	3.6	.8	4.9	.8	4.3	.8

^a1 = easy to talk; 7 = hard to talk. ^b1 = deceptive; 7 = honest. ^c1 = uncomfortable; 7 = comfortable.

3. How comfortable do you think the respondent feels with the topic of discussion? Either an *um* or a 3-s pause made respondents appear less comfortable with the topic, and to the same extent: contrast 1 s to *um* 1 s, $F(1, 41) = 15.68, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 30.11, p < .001$; contrast 1 s to 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 37.2, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 40.86, p < .001$; contrast *um* 1 s to 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 2.89, p = .10$; $F(1, 29) = 3.02, p = .10$.

Summary

As expected, the 1-s interval between turns was always rated more positively than the 3-s interval. With a shorter interval, overhearers rated second speakers as having less production difficulty, being more honest, and being more comfortable with the topic discussed. The *um* plus 1-s interval always fell within the boundaries of the other two intervals. It was never more positive than the 1-s interval, or more negative than the 3-s interval. With respect to judgments of honesty and comfort with the topic, it was similar to the 3-s interval. With respect to judgments of speech production difficulty, *um* plus 1 s fell between the other two, similar to neither.

EXPERIMENT 2

Method

Participants. Thirty UCSC students participated in exchange for course credit. All were native English speakers. No student participated in the other experiments reported here.

Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiment 1 except that the 1-s turn exchanges were reduced to .5 s, and the 1-s pause after *um* was increased to 3 s.

Design and procedure. The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.

Results

As before, results are discussed by question asked. Means and standard deviations, averaged across participants and items, are presented in Table 2.

1. How difficult do you think it was for the respondent to put their response into words? As in Experiment 1, the short *um*-free turn interval was associated with the least difficulty in speech production. However, whereas in Experiment 1 an *um* 1-s pause entailed less production difficulty than a 3-s pause, in Experiment 2 an *um*

TABLE 2
Experiment 2 Means and Standard Deviations Averaged Across
Participants and Items

<i>Time</i>	<i>Question 1^a</i>		<i>Question 2^b</i>		<i>Question 3^c</i>	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
.5 s pause	2.3	.8	5.7	.7	5.4	.7
3 s pause	3.6	1.0	5.1	.9	4.5	.8
<i>um</i> 3 s	4.4	.8	4.8	.9	4.1	.9

^a1 = easy to talk; 7 = hard to talk. ^b1 = deceptive; 7 = honest. ^c1 = uncomfortable; 7 = comfortable.

3-s pause entailed more production difficulty than a .5-s pause: contrast .5 s to 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 57.02, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 65.01, p < .001$; contrast .5 s to *um* 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 113.24, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 255.98, p < .001$; contrast *um* 3 s to 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 42.25, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 29.99, p < .001$.

2. How close do you think the respondent's answer is to what the respondent truly thinks? As in Experiment 1, the short *um*-free turn interval was considered the most honest. However, whereas in Experiment 1 an *um* 1-s pause entailed the same honesty level as a 3-s pause, in Experiment 2 an *um* 3-s pause entailed less honesty than a 3-s pause: contrast .5 s to 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 22.09, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 15.86, p < .001$; contrast .5 s to *um* 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 49.6, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 36.37, p < .001$; contrast *um* 3 s to 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 7.07, p = .01$ and $F(1, 29) = 8.81, p < .01$.

3. How comfortable do you think the respondent feels with the topic of discussion? As in Experiment 1, the short *um*-free turn interval was associated with the most comfort. However, whereas in Experiment 1 an *um* 1-s pause entailed the same comfort as a 3-s pause, in Experiment 2 an *um* 3-s pause entailed less comfort than a 3-s pause: contrast .5 s to *um* 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 49.62, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 99.84, p < .001$; contrast .5 s to 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 46.2, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 74.79, p < .001$; contrast *um* 3 s to 3 s, $F(1, 29) = 8.37, p < .01$ and $F(1, 29) = 12.34, p = .001$.

Summary

As with Experiment 1, the .5-s interval between turns always yielded the most positive judgments. Unlike Experiment 1, the *um* interval did not fall within the boundaries of the other two intervals for any question. Instead, when followed by a 3-s pause, the *um* interval made all interpretations more negative than a 3-s pause alone. With either an *um* or a 3-s pause, interlocutors were thought to have more speech production difficulty, to be less honest, and to be more uncomfortable with the topic, and even more so with both.

EXPERIMENT 3

Method

Participants. Forty-two UCSC students participated in exchange for course credit. All were native English speakers. No student participated in the other experiments reported here.

Materials. The materials were the same as in Experiment 2, except that the 3-s turn exchanges were increased in length. Each stimulus was increased by exactly the amount of time that the *um* took up in the *um* version of each stimulus. Therefore, the interturn intervals varied across stimuli, averaging about 4 s.

Design and procedure. The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.

Results

As before, results are discussed by question asked. Means and standard deviations, averaged across participants and items, are presented in Table 3.

1. How difficult do you think it was for the respondent to put their response into words? As in Experiment 2, overhearers thought respondents had least speech production difficulty with .5-s turn exchanges, more with ~4-s turn exchanges, and most with *um* 3-s turn exchanges: contrast .5 s to ~4 s, $F(1, 41) = 18.85, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 135.95, p < .001$; contrast .5 s to *um* 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 84.69, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 188.70, p < .001$; contrast *um* 3 s to ~4 s, $F(1, 41) = 6.74, p = .01$ and $F(1, 29) = 15.34, p = .001$.

2. How close do you think the respondent's answer is to what the respondent truly thinks? Like Experiment 2, overhearers thought respondents were most honest in the .5-s turn exchanges. However, unlike Experiment 2, they were less honest in either the *um* 3-s exchanges or the ~4-s exchanges: contrast .5 s to ~4 s, $F(1, 41) = 12.48, p = .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 22.00, p < .001$; contrast .5 s to *um* 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 25.40, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 42.03, p < .001$; contrast *um* 3 s to ~4 s, $F(1, 41) = 1.96, p = .17$ and $F(1, 29) = 1.89, p = .18$.

3. How comfortable do you think the respondent feels with the topic of discussion? Like Experiment 2, overhearers thought respondents were most comfortable in the .5-s turn exchanges. However, unlike Experiment 2, they were less comfortable in either the *um* 3-s exchanges or the ~4-s exchanges: contrast .5 s to ~4 s, $F(1, 41) = 20.89, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 70.20, p < .001$; contrast .5 s to *um* 3 s, $F(1, 41) = 63.89, p < .001$ and $F(1, 29) = 103.20, p < .001$; contrast *um* 3 s to ~4 s, $F(1, 41) = .04, p = .84$ and $F(1, 29) = .05, p = .82$.

TABLE 3
Experiment 3 Means and Standard Deviations Averaged Across
Participants and Items

Time	Question 1 ^a		Question 2 ^b		Question 3 ^c	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
.5 s pause	2.9	1.0	5.4	.7	5.1	.9
~4 s pause	4.1	.8	5.0	.8	4.2	1.0
<i>um</i> 3 s	4.5	.8	4.8	.8	4.2	.8

^a1 = easy to talk; 7 = hard to talk. ^b1 = deceptive; 7 = honest. ^c1 = uncomfortable; 7 = comfortable.

Summary

As with Experiments 1 and 2, the .5-s interval between turns always yielded the most positive judgments. Like Experiment 2, more production trouble was attributed to speakers in the *um* 3-s condition than in the ~4-s condition; the length of the silence (3 s in Experiment 2 and ~4 s in Experiment 3) did not matter. Unlike Experiment 2, the same honesty and comfort was attributed to speakers in the *um* 3-s condition as in the ~4-s condition; the extra ~1-s pause over Experiment 3's materials increased negative attributions as much as *ums* did.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Delays in spontaneous speech are unavoidable, and speakers have many choices about how to handle them. One is to leave a silent stretch of speech until the speaker is ready to continue. Another is to mark that upcoming silence with an *um*. Prior research has shown that the choice between one or the other can affect overhearers' interpretations of a respondent's feeling of knowing (Brennan & Williams, 1995). In this research, I explored how three other types of judgments—of speech production difficulty, honesty, and comfort with topic—are influenced by *ums* and pauses. Each of these other judgments have been linked to *ums* by prior researchers, but little direct exploration of their effects on overhearers has been done.

In the context of these judgments, I tested three hypotheses: (a) the filter hypothesis, that *ums* are filtered out by overhearers and have no effect on judgments; (b) the duration hypothesis, that the effects of *ums* can be linked to their durations; and (c) the separate contributions hypothesis, that there is an effect of the phonological form of *um* that is separate from the effects of silent pauses. I introduced three subhypotheses of the separate contributions hypothesis: (a) the expectation subhypothesis, that listeners hear an *um* and expect a major delay regardless of whether there is a delay; (b) the responsibility subhypothesis, that listeners attribute full responsibility for the negative effects of long, silent pauses to the second speak-

ers when second speakers begin their turns with *ums*; and (c) the interpreting-in-context subhypothesis, that listeners interpret *ums* and pauses according to what *ums* and pauses imply for the attributions they are making. For ease of comparison, Table 4 summarizes the predictions of each hypothesis and the results obtained.

There was overwhelming evidence against the filter hypothesis. The predicted results were obtained in only two out of nine cases (Experiment 3 honesty and comfort with topic questions). The Experiment 3 production difficulty results and all the results from Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the presence of *um* mattered; *ums* were not filtered out and ignored.

In contrast, the duration hypothesis predicted six out of nine results. The Experiment 1 production difficulty results, all the Experiment 2 results, and the Experiment 3 honesty and comfort with topic results fit the duration hypothesis, but the Experiment 1 honesty and comfort with topic results and the Experiment 3 speech production difficulty results did not. The duration hypothesis is a clean and durable hypothesis; it goes a long way in explaining the results of the experiments discussed in this article as well as prior data. Brennan and Schober (2001) found that it was the time that *uhs* took up (*ums* were not studied) rather than their phonological forms that led to listeners' improved recoveries from speech errors. Nonetheless, for these materials and methods, the duration hypothesis comes up short, particularly because it fails at some point for each of the three types of ratings collected (otherwise, it might have been the case that, e.g., judgments of honesty were sensitive to duration, but judgments of production difficulty were not).

Two of the separate contributions subhypotheses fared less well than the duration hypothesis. The expectation subhypothesis predicted four out of nine results.

TABLE 4
Summary of Predictions and Results

Predictions	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Filter hypothesis	(1 s = <i>um</i> 1 s) < 3 s	.5 s < (<i>um</i> 3 s = 3 s)	.5 s < (<i>um</i> 3 s = ~4 s)
Duration hypothesis	1 s < <i>um</i> 1 s < 3 s	.5 s < 3 s < <i>um</i> 3 s	.5 s < (3 s = ~4 s)
Separate contributions hypothesis:			
Expectation subhypothesis	1 s < (<i>um</i> 1 s = 3 s)	.5 s < (<i>um</i> 3 s = 3 s)	.5 s < (<i>um</i> 3 s = ~4 s)
Responsibility subhypothesis	(1 s = <i>um</i> 1 s) < 3 s	.5 s < 3 s < <i>um</i> 3 s	.5 s < ~4 s < <i>um</i> 3 s
Interpreting-in-context subhypothesis	1 s < 3 s 1 s < <i>um</i> 1 s	.5 s < 3 s < <i>um</i> 3 s	.5 s < ~4 s .5 s < <i>um</i> 3 s
Results			
Production difficulty	1 s < <i>um</i> 1 s < 3 s	.5 s < 3 s < <i>um</i> 3 s	.5 s < ~4 s < <i>um</i> 3 s
Honesty	1 s < (<i>um</i> 1 s = 3 s)	.5 s < 3 s < <i>um</i> 3 s	.5 s < (<i>um</i> 3 s = ~4 s)
Comfort with topic	1 s < (<i>um</i> 1 s = 3 s)	.5 s < 3 s < <i>um</i> 3 s	.5 s < (<i>um</i> 3 s = ~4 s)

Note. < = more positive than.

The Experiments 1 and 3 honesty and comfort with topic results fit the hypothesis, but the Experiments 1 and 3 production difficulty results and all the Experiment 2 results did not. The responsibility subhypothesis also predicted four out of nine results. The Experiment 2 results and the Experiment 3 production difficulty results fit the hypothesis, but the Experiment 1 results and the Experiment 3 honesty and comfort with topic results did not. As with the duration hypothesis, both the expectation subhypothesis and the responsibility subhypothesis fail at some point for each of the three types of ratings collected.

The remaining separate contributions hypothesis, the interpreting-in-context subhypothesis, can account for all the results, but this is in part because it makes looser predictions. In addition, although it can explain the main results, it does not explain all the detailed results.

With respect to the attributions of production difficulty, the data show that displaying advance knowledge of delays with *um* indicates a problem, having long delays indicates a problem, and having both indicates even more difficulty. The three experiments together demonstrate that *ums* and pauses contribute separately to attributions of speech production difficulty. It makes sense that overhearers would judge a delay that speakers were aware of in advance (i.e., signaled by *um*) as more noteworthy than a delay they were potentially not aware of in advance (i.e., long, silent pauses). It also makes sense that both the anticipation of a silent pause and the silent pause itself would impact production difficulty judgments. However, the data also lead to the conclusion that the actual experience of a 3-s silence implies more production difficulty than the expectation of a major delay signaled by *um* (Experiment 1), and there is no clear explanation for why.

With respect to attributions of honesty and comfort with topic, the data show that long silences indicate speakers' constructions of more carefully worded replies, and anticipated long silences indicate more serious struggles with wording. The careful wording could result from either preparing a dishonest answer or figuring out how to talk about an uncomfortable subject. Somewhat differently from the production difficulty question, the data lead to the conclusion that the actual experience of a 3-s silence implies about the same wording struggles as the expectation of a major delay signaled by *um* (Experiment 1), and these judgments of wording struggles appear to be sensitive to the lengths of pauses (judgments of dishonesty and discomfort were greater in the *um* 3-s condition than the 3-s condition of Experiment 2, but as great in the *um* 3-s condition as the ~4-s condition of Experiment 3). As before, however, there is no clear explanation for why.

The three studies presented here explored a number of ways of thinking about the role of *ums* and pauses at turn exchanges. There are still some questions. Why does a long, silent pause lead to attributions of greater production difficulty than an *um*, but the same amount of dishonesty and discomfort as an *um*? Is it just chance that the ~1-s extra silent pausing leads to similar increases in negative ratings as an *um* for the honesty and comfort with topic questions of Experiment 3, or is there

something systematic going on? For now, the interpreting-in-context subhypothesis of the separate contributions hypothesis explains the data best.

Prior research has also supported a separate contributions approach to pauses and *ums*. Brennan and Williams (1995) found that controlling for pause length, *ums* and *uhs* had an additional amplifying effect. The difference between Brennan and Williams, Brennan and Schober (2001), and the experiments in this article may have to do with the different types of tasks used (rating speech vs. following instructions in real time), whether *ums* or *uhs* were studied, whether the surrounding speech was disfluent or not, or the type of talk studied (tending toward scripted or tending toward natural dialogue).

Despite lingering questions, the experiments presented here demonstrate that *ums* and pauses are not the same thing, as the term *filled pause* implies. The presence or absence of an *um* has implications for how far in advance speakers were aware of their upcoming delay. With only silent pauses, overhearers do not know if speakers anticipated the pauses or not. *Ums* before long pauses show advance knowledge of delays. For judgments of speech production difficulty, honesty, and comfort with the topic, it matters whether speakers say *um*, or pause, or do both.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research was supported by faculty research funds granted by the University of California, Santa Cruz, and by a Summer–Short-Term Research publication grant from the American Association of University Women Educational Foundation.

I thank Millicent Alvarado, Greg Bryant, Izabel Caetano, Susan Daugherty, Kenny Han, Timothy Higgins, Nicole Mamier, Charles Metzger, Kristin Mayfield, Emily Murai, Dominique Peters, Meria Rivera, Monika Rosicka, Chad Schrock, Delia Silva, Ripple Suthar, Cassidy Taylor, and Laura Underwood for help preparing and running the experiments and for inspiring discussions. I thank Nameera Akhtar and Erich Fox Tree for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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APPENDIX

Transcript of Materials With Topic Phrases

1. Drugs. A: Should any other drugs be legalized?
B: I don't think so.
2. Aliens. A: Do you believe in aliens?
B: I believe there's life out there, I just don't believe it's visited here.
3. Death penalty. A: Do you feel, for any reason, do you think that there's a reason why *um* the state should put people to death?
B: Anyone who kills someone should die.
4. Prison. A: Do you think that everybody in jail has the potential to be rehabilitated?
B: I don't think that once they are past the age of twelve it's too late for them to change.
5. Weapons. A: Are you for or against the ban on assault weapons?
B: I'm for it.
6. Santa Cruz. A: Do you like Santa Cruz?
B: There's lots of different kinds of people here.
7. Animal test. A: Are you for animal testing?
B: I think idealistically I'm against it, but I think it's benefin- benefitted modern science in a lot of ways.
8. Abortion. A: Are you for it or against it?
B: I'm gonna say pro choice.
9. Weapons. A: Are you for or against the ban on assault weapons?
B: It's so bad, because like the whole weapon thing's has got so out of control where just anybody can get one.
10. Drugs A: Should alcohol be illegal?
B: Alcohol can be controlled better than marijuana can, I think.
11. Rape. A: What do you think we should do to rapists?
B: I think they should surgically remove their penis.
12. Aliens. A: Do you believe in aliens?
B: I do to the extent that everybody has their own truth and so I'm not gonna doubt somebody and, if they say they've had that experience.
13. Religion. A: So do you believe in a divine being?
B: I think that if there is a divine being that it's a Goddess, not a God.
14. Affirmative Action. A: Are you here because of affirmative action?
B: It helped me out a little bit.
15. Abortion. A: Should the state fund abortions for the poor?
B: It's gonna be a lot of money putting into them.

16. Aliens. A: I believe in ghosts and aliens.
B: I think it's like just absurd.
17. Relationships. A: That must be hard, though, having to deal with a long distance relationship. Do you get to talk to him often?
B: Before when he went to boot camp, I didn't talk to him at all.
18. Euthanasia. A: And it's just ma- it's just taking its toll on your life and you just say, hey I don't need to go through this, I just wanna die. Is that wrong?
B: Technically no, but I think I'm a moral kind of guy.
19. Immigration. A: Do you think that the U.S. should keep the borders open?
B: I don't think that the U.S. should keep the borders open.
20. Aliens. A: Do you believe in aliens?
B: I'm into it.
21. Welfare. A: How do you feel about California's welfare system?
B: I'm not that opposed to it. I'm- I'm generally more in favor of like a socialized form of government.
22. Abortion. A: So how do you feel about abortion?
B: I'm pro choice.
23. Aliens. A: Do you think that aliens have come here?
B: All that alien stuff is so supernatural and I don't know if life on other planets would really be like that, or I don't know if it's some image we've all created in our mind.
24. Philosophy. A: Are people inherently good?
B: I think that's strictly a matter of belief. It's almost as subjective as "Do you believe in God?"
25. Religion. A: Are you religious?
B: I consider myself religious.
26. Death penalty. A: So is it- you think it'll get to the point where you kill a person, you- you die?
B: I think it's gonna come down to that.
27. Immigration. A: See, like I've been over the border like a lot of times
and um
B: *uhhuh*
A: all they do is make me talk.
B: I just think that's racist. I don't know. (Asterisks indicate overlap.)
28. Music. A: So what kind of music you like
B: I'm pretty much like into hip-hop and rap.
29. Prison. A: The three strikes thing, I mean, I think it should focus only on violent criminals.
B: People are there for, like, selling acid.
30. Death penalty. A: Like Charles Manson, you know, if he'd I don't know if he I don't know how's his whole story is, but if he killed all the people that they say he supposedly killed, should he be killed?
B: Yes. I do believe in eye for an eye.