

MAKING ROOM FOR MODEST CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONALISM

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**ARE
PHENOMENAL
CONCEPTS
FUNCTIONAL
CONCEPTS?**

ARE PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTS?

YES →

Conceptual Functionalism

NO →

Conceptual Dualism

“Phenomenal concepts are conceptually irreducible in this sense: they neither a priori imply, nor are implied by, physical-functional concepts. ...”

“Phenomenal concepts are conceptually independent of physical-functional descriptions...”

— Loar, “Phenomenal States”

MODEST CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONALISM

Phenomenal concepts

- Not *merely* functional
- Still have functional content

AGENDA →

- 1. Set Up Framework**
- 2. Immodest Conceptual Functionalism**
- 3. Modest Conceptual Functionalism**

PHENOMENAL

Subjective,
Qualitative

FUNCTIONAL

Abstract
Causal Structure

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1

F_1

P_2

F_2

P_3

F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n

F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

**Q→
PHENOMENAL/FUNCTIONAL
CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP?**

**A→
PATTERN OF ENTAILMENTS**

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n



F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1



F_1

P_2

F_2

P_3

F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n

F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1

F_1

P_2

F_2

P_3

F_3

⋮

⋮

P_n

F_n

PHENOMENAL

FUNCTIONAL

P_1

F_1

P_2



F_2

P_3



F_3

⋮


⋮


P_n

F_n

IMMODEST CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONALISM


Every phenomenal description has a matching functional description






ABSENT QUALIA

“x is p-conscious” ← “x is a-conscious” ?



ABSENT QUALIA

“ x is p-conscious” ← “ x is a-conscious”



ABSENT QUALIA

“ x is p-conscious” \xleftarrow{X} “ x is a-conscious”

UPSHOT →
No functional
description entails
p-consciousness





INVERTED QUALIA

“ x is a red experience” ← “ x is F ” 



INVERTED QUALIA

“ x is a red experience” ← “ x is F ” 

UPSHOT →

For *some* phenomenal types,
functional descriptions do
not entail fully determinate
phenomenal descriptions



**IMMODEST
CONCEPTUAL
FUNCTIONALISM**

P \leftrightarrow F

**MODEST
CONCEPTUAL
FUNCTIONALISM**

P \rightarrow F

**CONCEPTUAL
DUALISM**

P / F

MODEST CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONALISM

Phenomenal concepts

- Not *merely* functional
- Still have functional content

ANALOGY

- Color concepts are spatial concepts

TWO PATHS TO FUNCTIONAL CONSTRAINTS


1. Structure of Phenomenal Subject
2. Structure of Quality Space

SUBJECT-BASED CONSTRAINT

Functional constraints embedded in
concept of phenomenal subject

CONCEIVABILITY TEST →

Keep phenomenal fixed, subtract functional




QUALITY-SPACE-BASED CONSTRAINTS

Functional constraints embedded in concepts of specific sensory modalities, phenomenal types.

CONCEIVABILITY TEST →

Keep phenomenal type fixed, switch up functional structure



MODEST CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONALISM

SUBJECT CONSTRAINT

“*x* is p-conscious” → “*x* is a-conscious”

QUALITY-SPACE CONSTRAINTS

“*x* is p-kind K₁” → “*x* is F₁”

“*x* is p-kind K₂” → “*x* is F₂”

⋮

CONSEQUENCES

1. Provides a criterion for consciousness.
2. The right theory of consciousness will be *a priori*.

NOT A CONSEQUENCE→

No rationality requirement for subjects

**IMMODEST
CONCEPTUAL
FUNCTIONALISM**

P \leftrightarrow F

**MODEST
CONCEPTUAL
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P \rightarrow F

**CONCEPTUAL
DUALISM**

P / F