

Jackson Kernion

CONTACT

jk@jacksonkernion.com · <http://jacksonkernion.com> · (724) 816-2396

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Epistemology

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics, Early Modern

Employment

Harvard College · Web Developer (Part-Time)

2020-2021

Updating legacy web app (<http://deductivelogic.org>), from PHP/jQuery/mySQL to SvelteKit/mongoDB

MIT · Postdoctoral Associate

SPRING 2020

Taught a lecture course with 70+ students, and managed 3 teaching assistants

Education

UC Berkeley · Ph.D, Philosophy

2020

DISSERTATION: *Constraining Consciousness*

Philosophers regularly commit themselves to a conceptual distinction between phenomenal experience and functional architecture. But this is a mistake. It generates a series of unsatisfying, intractable debates, and creates insurmountable methodological difficulties for a science of consciousness. We can't make sense of experiences *as* experiences unless they meet certain functional constraints. This much can be demonstrated by considering test cases that keep the phenomenal facts fixed while 'zeroing out' or altering the functional facts, cases that are an inversion of the classic absent qualia and inverted qualia thought experiments. The result is a modest form of conceptual functionalism that reconciles competing dualist and physicalist intuitions.

COMMITTEE: John Campbell, Geoffrey Lee, Tania Lombrozo (Psychology)

New York University · Visiting Ph.D Student

2018-2019

FACULTY SPONSOR: David Chalmers

Harvard College · A.B. *cum laude*, Philosophy

2012

Certificate in Mind, Brain, and Behavior

Presentations

REFEREED

Making Room for Modest Conceptual Functionalism

JUN 2018

Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness

The Mental Measurement Problem

JUN 2017

The Society for Philosophy and Psychology

The Mental Measurement Problem

JUN 2017

The Science of Consciousness Conference

Strange Experience: Why Experience Without Access Makes No Sense Pacific APA	APR 2017
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DEPARTMENTAL EVENTS

General Intelligence, The Very Idea Work In Progress Lunch (MIT)	MAY 2020
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Defending Modest Conceptual Functionalism Work In Progress Lunch (NYU)	MAR 2019
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Strange Experience Philosophy of Mind Group (NYU, Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness)	OCT 2018
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Dissonant Qualia Washington Square Circle (NYU, Weekly Grad Student Talk)	OCT 2018
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The Mental Measurement Problem Mind Research Group (Rutgers)	OCT 2018
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Phenomenal Residue and Phenomenal Realism The Dennes Lectures on Mind (UC Berkeley, Semi-Annual Workshop)	MAY 2018
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Making Room for Modest Conceptual Functionalism Richard Wollheim Society (UC Berkeley, Weekly Grad Student Talk)	APR 2018
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The Case for Austere Conceptual Functionalism Richard Wollheim Society	SEP 2017
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The Mental Measurement Problem Work In Progress Lunch (UC Berkeley, Weekly Departmental Event)	FEB 2017
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The Conceptual Interaction Problem Richard Wollheim Society	JAN 2017
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Strange Experience Phil Forum (UC Berkeley, Undergraduate Organization)	SEP 2016
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The Mental Measurement Problem Richard Wollheim Society	SEP 2016
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Strange Experience The Dennes Lectures on Mind	APR 2016
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P- vs. A-Consciousness: A Methodological Puzzle Richard Wollheim Society	OCT 2015
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The Core of Wittgenstein's On Certainty Phil Forum	DEC 2014
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Do Experiences Immediately Justify External-World Beliefs? Richard Wollheim Society	DEC 2014
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Can Illusions Look Illusory? Richard Wollheim Society	APR 2013
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How We Make Emotions Richard Wollheim Society	OCT 2012
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COMMENTS

Complex Thought and Private Language Sebastian Grève · Eastern APA	JAN 2018
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How Does Acausal Physics Underwrite Special Science Causation? Alexander Franklin · Berkeley-London Conference	MAY 2017
Can Matching Systems Contribute To a Solution of the Refugee Crisis? Philippe van Basshuysen · Berkeley-London Conference	MAY 2016

Teaching

AS PRIMARY INSTRUCTOR (MIT)

Minds and Machines	SPRING 2020
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AS GRADUATE STUDENT INSTRUCTOR (UC BERKELEY & NYU)

History of Early Modern Philosophy (NYU) · <i>Tim Maudlin</i>	SPRING 2019
The Nature of Mind · <i>John Campbell</i>	SPRING 2018
Metaphysics · <i>Geoffrey Lee</i>	FALL 2016
Modern Philosophy · <i>Hannah Ginsborg</i>	SPRING 2016
Philosophical Methods · <i>Barry Stroud</i>	FALL 2015
The Nature of Mind · <i>Umrao Sethi</i>	SUMMER 2015
Knowledge & Its Limits · <i>John Perry</i>	SPRING 2015
Theory of Knowledge · <i>Barry Stroud</i>	FALL 2014
Introduction to Logic · <i>Daniel Warren</i>	SPRING 2014
The Nature of Mind · <i>John Campbell</i>	FALL 2013
Philosophy of Mind · <i>Paul Skokowski</i>	SUMMER 2013

Service

AI Reading Group (NYU) · <i>Co-Organizer</i> With Robert Long, organized a reading group for grad students and faculty	2018-2019
Dennes Lectures on Mind · <i>Lead Organizer</i> Organized semi-annual research workshop, for UC Berkeley's philosophy of mind community	2018
Philosophy of Mind Group · <i>Founder, Co-Organizer</i> With Greyson Abid, started a reading/working group for grad students and faculty	2016-2018
GSI Assignment Committee · <i>Lead Organizer</i> Lead an effort to revise the system by which GSIs are assigned, move it online	2015-2017
Prospective Graduate Student Visit · <i>Co-Organizer</i>	2013, 2014
Faculty Meetings · <i>Grad Student Co-Representative</i>	2013, 2015, 2017

Graduate Studies

QUALIFYING EXAMS	2014-2015
P- vs. A-Consciousness: A Methodological Puzzle · <i>Geoffrey Lee</i>	
How Perceptual Experiences Justify External World Beliefs · <i>John Campbell</i>	
Concepts and Correctness · <i>Barry Stroud</i>	

COURSEWORK (* = Audited)

Why Is There Anything Except Physics?* · Shamik Dasgupta & Geoffrey Lee	SPRING 2018
Causation and Perception* · John Campbell	SPRING 2017
Topics in Philosophy of Perception* · Geoffrey Lee	SPRING 2017
Objective and Subjective in Experience* · Michael Martin	FALL 2016
Learning By Thinking* · Tania Lombrozo	FALL 2016
Some Varieties of Mental Causation* · John Campbell	SPRING 2016
Space, Time, and Consciousness* · Geoffrey Lee	FALL 2015
Does the Mind Have a Causal Structure?* · John Campbell	FALL 2014
Later Wittgenstein* · Barry Stroud	SPRING 2014
Time, Experience, and Mental Representation · Geoffrey Lee	FALL 2013
Aristotle's Physics I · Timothy Clarke	FALL 2013
Foundations of Cognition* · Tania Lombrozo & Tom Griffiths	FALL 2013
Metaphysics · Barry Stroud	SPRING 2013
Theory of Meaning · John MacFarlane	SPRING 2013
Reasons and Normativity · Jay Wallace	SPRING 2013
Perceptual Attention, Disorders, & the First Person · John Campbell	SPRING 2013
Spinoza · Tim Crockett	FALL 2012
Art and the Limits of Neuroscience · Alva Noë	FALL 2012
First-Year Graduate Seminar · Hannah Ginsborg & John MacFarlane	FALL 2012

References

David Chalmers
NYU
chalmers@nyu.edu

Geoffrey Lee
UC Berkeley
geoffrey_lee@berkeley.edu

Carlos Montemayor
SFSU
cmontema@sfsu.edu