

Chapter 1: The ~RwB

In his seminal work ~stj-full, ~Vermes introduced the term “~rwB” to the discussion of ~2T Jewish literature as part of a larger project to trace the development of certain haggadic traditions from the late ~2T period into the rabbinic period. ~vermes used the term ~rwB to describe a number of texts which follow closely certain portions of the biblical narrative but also augment, elide, and emend the text in ways which produced new literary works in their own right. In this exegetical process, “the midrashist inserts haggadic development into the biblical narrative” in order to “anticipate questions, and to solve problems in advance.”¹ These interpretive traditions could be traced historically and demonstrate a degree of interpretive continuity between the ~2T and rabbinic periods. In other words, according to ~vermes, the authors of ~rwB texts *implicitly* made use of interpretive traditions that later works such as the Talmud and Mishnah expressed *explicitly*.

Since the publication of ~stj, ~vermes’s concept of ~rwB has taken on a life of its own and developed into its own discreet area of study as scholars from various related disciplines

1. Geza Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism: Haggadic Studies*, StPB 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 95; see also Geza Vermes, “The Genesis of the Concept of ‘Rewritten Bible’,” in *Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years: Texts, Terms, or Techniques? A Last Dialogue with Geza Vermes*, ed. József Zsengellér, JSJsup 166 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 3–9.

have reused, reinterpreted, and redefined it. The scope and nuance of the term ~rwB has shifted a great deal in the intervening years, yet, the trajectory set by ~vermes nearly sixty years ago has remained reasonably consistent by focusing on the relationships that exist between these unique works and the scriptural texts that inspired them.

In this chapter I will trace the emergence and evolution of the concept of ~rwB from ~vermes's use in ~stj to the present focusing on three key questions and ideas which have shaped the scholarly discourse around ~rwB studies: 1) the terminology surrounding ~rwB, 2) what works should fall under the rubric of ~rwB? and 3) whether ~rwB constitutes a literary genre, a process, or some combination of the two. Finally I will offer my own suggestions on how the ~rwB conversation can be augmented by memory studies.

1.1 SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION

The primary purpose of ~stj was not to offer a clear definition of the term “~rwB,” but to lay the groundwork for the historical, diachronic, study of aggadic traditions, of which ~rwB makes only a small part.² As ~vermes recounts, prior to the mid-twentieth century, the prevailing approach to the study of aggadic exegesis was to treat the aggadah as originating during the Tannaitic period. The aggadah were viewed as “the result of the adoption, and anonymous repetition, of popular interpretations by favourite preachers,”³ the earliest of which were from the second century CE and were represented by Targums Onkelos and

2. Vermes, “Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years,” 3.

3. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 3.

Jonathan. Furthermore, studies of ancient Jewish literature at this time focused on texts which modern Judaism considered authentic. As a result, a good number of earlier texts—for example, the apocrypha, pseudepigrapha, and sectarian texts—were often categorically excluded from discussions of the origins of aggadic exegesis.⁴

A series of publications and discoveries beginning in the 1930's, however, began to undermine the notion that these early exegetical traditions began in the second century CE. Vermes credits this broadening of aggadic studies to a series of major studies and discoveries such as Rappaport's *Agada und Exegese bei Flavius Josephus*,⁵ Paul Kahle's Schweich Lectures at the British Academy on the Cairo Geniza (given in 1941, published 1947),⁶ Kisch's new text edition of Ps. Philo's *~lab* (1949),⁷ the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls (1948) and Codex Neofiti (1956), as well as (and perhaps especially) Renée Bloch's work on midrash.⁸

4. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 2.

5. Salomo Rappaport, *Agada und Exegese bei Flavius Josephus*, Veröffentlichungen der Oberrabbiner Dr. H.P. Chajes-Preisstiftung an der Israelitisch-theologischen Lehranstalt in Wien 3 (Vienna: Alexander Kohnt Memorial Foundation, 1930).

6. Paul Kahle, *The Cairo Geniza*, The Schweich Lectures of the British Academy, 1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).

7. Guido Kisch, *Pseudo-Philo's Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum*, PMS 10 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1949).

8. Renée Bloch, "Écriture et tradition dans le Judaïsme: Aperçus sur l'origine du Midrash," *CaS*, 1954, 9–34; Renée Bloch, "Methodological Note for the Study of Rabbinic Literature," in

The overarching theme among these works was the evidence for continuity between biblical interpretive traditions prior to the second century, and later aggadah. For example, ~vermes notes that Rappaport's work on ~ant identified substantial overlaps between Josephus's text and Rabbinic aggadah and suggested, therefore, that Josephus had drawn from an already living tradition of interpretation. The implication of his suggestion is that the aggadah of the second century were not novel exegetical works, but were themselves products of earlier exegetical traditions.

Building on these recent advancements, the explicitly stated purpose of *Scripture and Tradition* was to push the field beyond synchronic analysis of haggadah toward diachronic, historical analyses to trace the development of these exegetical traditions.⁹ The book is eight chapters long and is divided into four parts.

The first three chapters of *Scripture and Tradition* make up the first part of ~vermes's study and is entitled "The Symbolism of Words." In this section, ~vermes focuses on the way that individual words and ideas take on localized symbolic meanings which are then applied globally to the interpretation of the Bible. In his first chapter, he notes the divergent treatment of Gen 44:18–19 among ancient commentators and proceeds through a synoptic

Approaches to Ancient Judaism: Theory and Practice, ed. William Scott Green, trans. William Scott Green, with William J. Sullivan, BJS 1 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 51–75, trans. of "Note méthodologique pour l'étude de la littérature rabbinique," *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 43.2 (1955): 194–225; Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 3–7.

9. Ibid., 1; See also Bloch, "Methodological Note," 51–75.

study of this passage in the Fragmentary Targum, Targum Neofiti, and the Tosefta of Targum Yerushalmi. He concludes that the Fragmentary Targum represents the most primitive work, whose interpretive strategy is essentially inner-biblical (by harmonizing Gen 44 and 49 with Exod 7–9), followed by the Tosefta, which seems to depend on the Fragmentary Targum but takes a different interpretive stance, and finally Targum Neofiti, which combines the two.

In his second chapter, ~vermes examines the way that the word “Lebanon” came to be used symbolically in the Hebrew Bible and other Jewish literature and how those symbolic meanings developed, particularly the association of Lebanon with Jerusalem and the Temple. He identifies the Song of Songs as the intermediary text which helped to establish this tradition within post-exilic Judaism, noting that the book occupies the unique position as the only biblical text which clearly uses the name Lebanon symbolically for the Temple. Importantly, ~vermes shows that the symbolic use of Lebanon to represent Jerusalem and the Temple is rooted in *biblical* exegesis. This is a key idea for ~vermes because it establishes a continuity between the production of the biblical text and its later interpretation. In chapter three, ~vermes examines other words which take on symbolic meaning in later Jewish texts (“lion,” “Damascus,” “*Meḥoqeq*,” and “Man”), and shows the relative similarity of the process between the ~dss texts and the targumic and midrashic materials.

It is in the second part of *Scripture and Tradition* that the topic of ~RwB is addressed most directly. This section—titled “The ~RwB”—covers two chapters (chapters four and five), both focusing on the figure Abraham and the aggadic traditions surrounding his life.

In chapter four, ~vermes embarks on what he calls a “retrogressive historical study”

by which he means beginning with the traditions in their later, more developed forms, and working back toward their origins. In this case, ~vermes begins with the 11th century CE text *Sefer ha-Yashar* (and the varied extra-biblical traditions contained therein) then works backward to identify sections of the text which exhibit earlier traditions, for example, in Targums, Josephus, ~jub, (Ps.) Philo, and others. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that even late texts can contain valuable information about earlier methods of exegesis. As ~vermes puts it, “[Sefer ha-Yashar] manifests a direct continuity with the corresponding tradition of the time of the second Temple, but reflects also the influence of the haggadah of the Tannaim and Amoraim.”¹⁰

In chapter five, ~vermes proceeds with a “progressive historical study,” by which he means a study beginning with the oldest materials and working forward. Still focusing on the figure Abraham, ~vermes treats in detail the relationship between Gen 12:8–15:4 and cols. 19–22 of the ~ga. ~vermes treats ~ga as “the most ancient midrash of all”¹¹ and views it as the “lost link between the biblical and the Rabbinic midrash.”¹² As I understand it, the ~ga, for ~vermes, occupies a unique position just one step removed from inner-biblical exegesis. The task of ~ga’s author was “to make the biblical story more attractive, more real, more edifying, and above all more intelligible” and he accomplishes this through a variety of means.¹³

10. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 95.

11. Ibid., 124.

12. Ibid., 124.

13. Ibid., 125.

The work of ~ga's author, therefore, was to "[reconcile] unexplained or apparently conflicting statements in the biblical text in order to allay doubt and worry."¹⁴ According to ~vermes, the interpretation of Genesis is "organically bound" to the text of Genesis and the additions that *were* made sprung from the interpretation of the Bible itself and not whole-sale from the mind of the author.¹⁵ Where texts like Jubilees sought to systematically advance a theological vision, according to ~vermes, the author of ~ga intended to simply "explain the biblical text," calling it illustrative of "the unbiased rewriting of the Bible."¹⁶

The third part of ~stj is titled "Bible and Tradition" and is composed of a single chapter engaging in a lengthy analysis of the traditions surrounding the seer Balaam from Numbers 22–24. ~vermes Observes that while the majority of post-biblical texts treat Balaam as a villain, in *LAB* he is treated as a sort of tragic hero.¹⁷ The more traditional portrayal of Balaam as a wicked prophet began within the nexus of biblical tradition itself. The various documentary strata of the Balaam story cast the prophet in differing lights, and it is the final stratum, the P layer, got the final say—within the biblical text—about him. ~vermes points out, however, that ignoring the Priestly additions yields a story somewhat similar to that of *LAB*. Thus, ~vermes concludes that the exegetical traditions found in the later Targums and rabbinic works are simply the continuation of the exegetical strategies employed within the

14. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 125.

15. *Ibid.*, 126.

16. *Ibid.*, 126.

17. *Ibid.*, 173.

Bible itself, which he calls “biblical midrash or haggadah”.¹⁸

The last two chapters make up the final section of ~vermes’s study, titled “Theology and Exegesis,” and push the discussion to include early Christianity. Chapter seven is entitled “Circumcision and Exodus 4:24–26” but offers a subtitle of “Prelude to the Theology of Baptism,” which gives some hint at the ultimate, if tacit, goal of the chapter. Discussing the topic of circumcision in Ex 4:24–26 and its treatment among the early exegetes, ~vermes’s primary observation is simply that the theology of circumcision and the exegetical traditions which surrounded it, were affected by historical forces and theological ideologies. For instance, he claims that ~jub omitted the rather odd statement that God was going to kill Moses—who was saved by the circumcision of his son by Zipporah—because “It was impossible for its author to accept that God tried to kill Moses as it was for him to believe that Moses neglected to circumcise his son on the eighth day after his birth.”¹⁹ Similarly, he notes that after the Bar Kokhba rebellion, the practice of circumcision was outlawed and so, “it is not surprising, therefore, to find the spiritual authorities of Palestinian Judaism emphasizing the greatness and necessity of this essential rite, and explaining away ... every possible biblical excuse for delaying the circumcision of their children.”²⁰ He ends the chapter by suggesting that the early Christian association of baptism with circumcision (citing Rom 4:3–4 and Col 2:11–12) was enabled by the traditional Jewish association of circumcision with blood

18. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 176.

19. Ibid., 185.

20. Ibid., 189.

sacrifice (“the Blood of the Covenant”).²¹ That Paul (to whom he attributes both Romans and Colossians) associated baptism with circumcision therefore, was “not due, therefore, to his own insight, but springs directly from the contemporary Jewish doctrine of circumcision which he adopted and adapted.”²²

~vermes makes a similar move in chapter eight, entitled “Redemption and Genesis XXII: The Binding of Isaac and the Sacrifice of Jesus.” In it, he compares a number of ancient works’ treatment of the Aqedah and demonstrates how the (near-)sacrifice of Isaac became a prototype for the entire sacrificial system in later Judaism. The sacrifice of animals in the Temple functioned as a “reminder” to God of the faithfulness of Abraham. Furthermore, he shows the ways the tradition grew to focus on the willingness of Isaac to be sacrificed and his function as a proto-martyr. Thus, he ends the chapter by addressing the New Testament’s portrayal of Jesus as a willing sacrifice to God and its putative relationship to the Aqedah. ~vermes makes the case that the redemptive theology of the NT—typically attributed to Paul—was not original to him. He writes:

For although [Paul] is undoubtedly the greatest theologian of the Redemption, he worked with inherited materials and among these was, by his own confession, the tradition that “Christ dies for us according to the Scriptures.”²³

21. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 190.

22. Ibid., 191.

23. Ibid., 221.

He then proceeds to push the origin of this theology back further into the first century CE, and, in rather dramatic fashion, suggests that the introduction of the Aqedah motif into Christian theology—by means of the Suffering Servant—may have been by Jesus himself.²⁴

~vermes concludes the chapter by discussing the Aqedah and the Eucharist. Just as the whole sacrificial system pointed back toward the binding of Isaac in targumic exegesis, the eucharistic rite likewise was intended—according to ~vermes—to point back to Jesus's redemptive sacrifice. Thus he concludes:

Although it would be inexact to hold that the Eucharistic doctrine of the New Testament, together with the whole Christian doctrine of Redemption, is nothing but a Christian version of the Jewish Akedah theology, it is nevertheless true that in the formation of this doctrine the targumic representation of the Binding of Isaac has played an essential role.

Indeed, without the help of Jewish exegesis it is impossible to perceive any Christian teaching in its true perspective.²⁵

The arc of ~vermes's study, therefore, is meant to establish a continuity between the earliest traditions of biblical interpretation with the later traditions of both Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity and to trace the evolution of those traditions historically.

24. Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition*, 223.

25. *Ibid.*, 227.

1.1.1 ~vermes's Use of ~RWB

The fact that ~vermes spent so little time explaining precisely what he meant by the term ~rwb bears witness to the fact that ~vermes thought the term was self-explanatory. ~vermes makes this sentiment clear in his short retrospective on the origins of the term, expressing shock over the debate that his term prompted and the scholarly confusion surrounding it. He writes:

The notion [of ~rwb], which over fifty years ago I thought was quite clear, seemed to the majority of the more recent practitioners nebulous and confused, and lacked methodological precision.²⁶

Only a few scholars, according to ~vermes, managed to remain true to his original vision.²⁷ Instead, many subsequent studies, according to ~vermes, “moved the goalposts” to better “suit the interest of their inquiry.”²⁸ Yet, one cannot help but push back against ~vermes here as scholars’ desire to narrow the scope of the term is, I think, a reasonable impulse.

26. Vermes, “Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years,” 3.

27. He specifically references Alexander ((Philip S. Alexander, “Retelling the Old Testament,” in *It is Written—Scripture Citing Scripture: Essays in Honour of Barnabas Lindars, SSF*, ed. D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 99–121)) and Bernstein ((Moshe J. Bernstein, “Rewritten Bible: A Generic Category Which Has Outlived its Usefulness?” *Text* 22 [2005]: 169–96)).

28. Vermes, “Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years,” 4.

After all, ~vermes's use of ~rwb covers texts written in several languages, across centuries, in no particular geographical region, and, while all the texts are "narratives," the formal similarities between ~ga, ~ant, ~jub, and the ~pTarg stop there. ~vermes specifically laments the narrowing of the term ~rwb to primarily focusing on the ~dss texts. Of course, when ~stj was first published in 1961 (~vermes notes that the manuscript, in fact, was submitted for publication in 1959), only a small portion of the scrolls were published or accessible to more than a few specific scholars. But the field's subsequent preoccupation with the ~qumran material, he suggests, is misguided.²⁹

This perception is—it seems to me—a bit over-blown. On the one hand, ~ga and the ~temple-scroll receive a lot of scholarly attention, but ~jub and ~ant do as well. Even so, whatever narrowing of the discussion of ~rwb toward the ~qumran scrolls has occurred is likely symptomatic of the "methodological [im]precision" attributed to ~stj and ~vermes's use of ~rwb. For example, ~vermes's inclusion of the medieval ~sefer muddies the waters for those who wish to discuss ~rwb as a process of scriptural interpretation which can be situ-

29. I am sympathetic to what ~vermes perceived as "moving the goalposts"—I think the context and purpose of how he used the term ~rwb is often ignored—but it is worth pointing out that the reason the term ~rwb is so often applied to the ~qumran texts likely has less to do with a conscious, scholarly effort, and more to do with the fragmentation of the various fields that deal with the texts in question. A scholar with a background primarily focused on the New Testament or Hebrew Bible may not be as familiar with the texts and traditions of rabbinic Judaism that ~vermes discusses in ~stj.

ated historically. On the other hand, his inclusion of the Palestinian Targums makes sense diachronically, but formally, the Targums are translations and not “new compositions” in the same sense that ~jub or ~ga are. Within ~stj, of course, ~vermes treats these texts with due care and nuance—in the case of ~sefer, he endeavors to show that traditions preserved in the text can be traced back to the ~2T period—but the fact that ~vermes sought to situate haggadic developments diachronically while implementing a category that spanned such broad socio-religious (~qumran, Early Christian, Rabbinic, Medieval), chronological (1st – 12th centuries CE), and literary (translations, narrative, revelatory/apocalyptic, history?) horizons has given some scholars a reasonable challenge when attempting to use the term in their own work. Thus, simply because ~vermes set the “goalposts” (to suit his *own* thesis, I might add), does not mean that others cannot or should not move them when appropriate, though hopefully along with a well-reasoned explanation for the change.

1.2 ~RWB AND REWRITTEN SCRIPTURE

Since ~vermes coined the term ~rwb a number of scholars have suggested that the term be modified to more accurately reflect the (now, well established) fact that there was no “Bible” in the late ~2T period and that many of the works that would eventually make up the Hebrew Bible did not have stable textual witnesses which could be meaningfully “rewritten.” Because of these difficulties, scholars have, in recent years, suggested alternate designations for the phenomenon under investigation, the most widely used of which is “rewritten *scripture*.” ~vermes’s original term ~rwb was a product of its time. It took for granted the exis-

tence of a canonical “Bible” that more-or-less resembled the Bible used by the rabbis in the early centuries CE and term rewritten scripture was intended to correct what scholars perceived as an anachronistic reference to this canon of scripture during the late ~2T period.³⁰

Apart from the anachronistic reference to a “Bible,” one of the primary objections to the use of the term ~rwb is the implicit assertion that ~rwb texts necessarily fall outside the Bible.³¹ The notion that a rewritten biblical text by definition, could not be considered “Bible” itself runs contrary to, on the one hand, texts such as Chronicles and Deuteronomy which—for all intents and purposes—“rewrite” their biblical *Vorlagen* but are themselves a part of “the Bible” and on the other hand texts such as ~jub and the ~temple-scroll which likely were considered “scripture” among certain groups in antiquity and, in the case of ~jub, remains a part of the biblical canon of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in the present.

Yet, I am not at all convinced that substituting the term “scripture” for “Bible” mean-

30. Jonathan G. Campbell, “Rewritten Bible: A Terminological Reassessment,” in *Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years: Texts, Terms, or Techniques? A Last Dialogue with Geza Vermes*, ed. József Zsengellér, JSJsup 166 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 49–81; See also Eugene Ulrich, “The Notion and Definition of Canon,” in *The Canon Debate*, ed. Lee M. McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002), 21–35; and Eugene Ulrich, “Crossing the Borders from ‘Pre-Scripture’ to Scripture (Rewritten) to ‘Rewritten Scripture’,” in *Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years: Texts, Terms, or Techniques? A Last Dialogue with Geza Vermes*, ed. József Zsengellér, JSJsup 166 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 83–104.

31. Campbell, “Rewritten Bible,” 61.

ingfully affects the way that scholars have continued to discuss the topic at hand. While I agree that “the Bible” as we know it from the early centuries CE did not exist during the late ~2T period, I likewise find the strict reading of “Bible” to mean “the Hebrew Bible (as we know it)” unnecessarily rigid. To say that ~jub was a part of the ~qumran Community’s “Bible” does not carry a vastly different nuance, it seems to me, than to say that the ~qumran Community considered ~jub to be “scripture.” Insofar as a particular group—given a set of texts—can determine which it considers to be “scripture” it has, at least in common parlance, a “Bible.” That said, I can appreciate the desire to fine-tune our terminology to better reflect the scholarly discourse.

It could, however, be argued that the term “scripture” is no more ancient a term than “Bible.” Scholars such as James VanderKam have done important work in trying to discern which texts may have been considered “authoritative scripture” at ~qumran,³² but the fact remains that such endeavors start with the assumption that the ancients utilized a notion at all similar to what we consider “textual authority.” While there is good reason to believe that some texts were more important than others during the ~2T period (e.g., the Pentateuch, Isa et al.), the degree to which they considered them “scripture” is not at all clear, much less as a binary category. Thus, replacing the term ~rwb with Rewritten Scripture, it seems to me, may very well shift the semantic burden from a well defined modern category of text to an ill-defined ancient category.

32. James C. VanderKam, “Authoritative Literature in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” *DSD* 5.3 (1998): 382–402.

For the sake of simplicity, I will follow ~vermes in this study and simply use the term “~RwB.” In doing so, I realize that I am deviating from what has become the common scholarly terminology. Yet, I find some comfort in ~vermes’s own take on the matter, who writes, “Frankly, replacing ‘Bible’ by ‘Scripture’ strikes me as a mere quibble...I suggest therefore that we stick with the ‘Rewritten *Bible*’ and let the music of the argument begin.”³³

1.3 DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF ~RWB

Early adopters of the ~vermes’s taxonomy experimented with applying the term ~rwb to a wide range of ~2T Jewish literature and the discussion about which texts should fall under the rubric of ~rwb has continued into the present. Insofar as “rewritten” texts can be measured by how closely they resemble their *Vorlagen*, defining the boundaries of ~rwb focuses on which texts are *too far* from their *Vorlagen* to meaningfully be considered “rewritten,” forming the “upper bound” and texts which are *too close* to their *Vorlagen* to be considered distinct literary works, forming the “lower bound.” At the upper bound, for example, the *Book of the Watchers* and the *Book of Giants* clearly are rooted in the biblical text, yet most scholars do not consider them sufficiently dependent on the text of Genesis to be considered “rewritten.” They take Genesis 6:1–4 as a point of departure, but do not return to the biblical text in a meaningful way. Conversely, at the lower bound, the Samaritan Pentateuch and the 4QReworkedPent, although they certainly modify their *Vorlagen* (and in that sense are “rewritten”), are more often considered examples of alternate textual “editions” rather than

33. Vermes, “Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years,” 3–9 (original emphasis).

rewritten works. Likewise, the Targums and LXX, as translations, are frequently excluded from discussions of ~rwb at the lower bound because they were meant to be perceived as the same literary work as their *Vorlagen*.

###The Upper Bound

~vermes's use of the term ~rwb grew out of the concrete examples of texts that exhibited the sorts of exegetical practices relevant to later aggadic traditions. As others adopted the term, however, the question of how to abstract the concept to something meaningful that could be applied to other texts was explored by a number of scholars. These early applications of the term ~rwb, like ~vermes's use, did not tend to carry a technical nuance and instead focused on the ways that numerous texts reappropriated biblical stories, figures and themes in their own works.

In his 1984 article "The Bible Rewritten and Expanded," George Nickelsburg discusses a number of texts which are "very closely related to the biblical texts, expanding and paraphrasing them and implicitly commenting on them."³⁴ We should note that, although the article does deal with ~rwb, it includes a discussion of texts which even Nickelsburg does not consider "rewritten" (as the title indicates) discussing texts which introduce wholly new material into the traditions of the Bible.³⁵

34. George W. E. Nickelsburg, "The Bible Rewritten and Expanded," in *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran, Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus*, ed. Michael E. Stone (Assen: Van Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 89–156.

35. *Ibid.*, 89–90.

Nickelsburg does, however, provide a list of texts which he loosely describes as examples of biblical rewriting: *1 Enoch*, *Book of Giants*, ~jub, ~ga, ~ant, the Books of Adam and Eve (*Apocalypse of Moses*, *Life of Adam and Eve*), and some Hellenistic Jewish Poets including Philo's *On Jerusalem*, Theodotus's *On the Jews*, and the *Exagoge* by one "Ezekiel the Poet of Tragedies." Compared to ~vermes's list, Nickelsburg's represents a maximalist understanding of the ~rwb phenomenon. The inclusion, especially, of *1 Enoch* illustrates his tendency to include works that build off of the biblical text (in this case, Genesis 6:1–4), but do track with the biblical narrative for long stretches.

One of the more interesting contributions that Nickelsburg makes to the conversation is his idea that biblical rewriting followed a trajectory from rewriting smaller units of the Bible—involving short stories that deal with particular events from the biblical text—to longer, more systematic, treatments which span multiple biblical books. His treatment of *1 Enoch* (which is, at least in part, the earliest text that he deals with) is illustrative of this approach. Rather than dealing with *1 Enoch* as a whole, Nickelsburg addresses the various rewritings of the flood narrative throughout *1 Enoch* as well as in the *Book of Giants* (which is not formally a part of *1 Enoch*, but has a clear connection to the work). Setting aside for the moment that *1 Enoch* is a composite work, we can appreciate that the flood story from Gen 6–9 is retold and to varying degrees reinterpreted throughout *1 Enoch*.³⁶

Although Nickelsburg generally accepts that the rewritten texts "comment" on the

36. By my count, there are six retellings of the flood in *1 Enoch*: 6–11; 54:7; 64–69; 83–84; 86–89; and 106–107.

Bible, he notes that the posture toward the biblical text is also not uniform even among the agreed upon ~rwb texts. He notes, for example, that while the author of ~jub's concerns are largely halakhic and the book makes explicit reference to the biblical text, the authority assumed by the author of ~jub does not (at least rhetorically) originate in the exposition of the Torah, but in the "immutable heavenly tablets."³⁷ Nickelsburg thus states:

This process of transmitting and revising the biblical text reflects a remarkable view of Scripture and tradition. The pseudepigraphic ascription of the book to an angel of the presence and the attribution of laws to the heavenly tablets invest the author's interpretation of Scripture with absolute divine authority."³⁸

In contrast, ~ga seems to have very little interest in halakhic matters and instead seems to just elaborate on the story by giving detailed geographic information and providing the reader with more dramatic characters.³⁹ Finally, he observes that ~lab likewise differs with ~jub in its omission of halakhic matters and its "highly selective reproduction of the text."⁴⁰ This selectivity also differs from the ~ga, which otherwise is "characterized by the addition of lengthy non-biblical incidence."⁴¹

37. Nickelsburg, "The Bible Rewritten," 100–1.

38. Ibid., 101.

39. Ibid., 106.

40. Ibid., 110.

41. Ibid., 110.

Ultimately, Nickelsburg differs from ~vermes mainly in the way he views the Bible during the late ~2T period. Although Nickelsburg observes that the preoccupation with certain texts suggests that they were held in high regard, he does not have the same interest in tying the exegetical practices of, for example, ~jub, with earlier inner-biblical or later haggadic traditions. Because Nickelsburg treats ~rwb as a process, he is able to highlight the fact that, e.g., 1 Enoch does indeed “rewrite” certain pericopae from Genesis despite the fact that the whole book (which, we should note, is a composite text to begin with) does not maintain a “centripetal” relationship with the biblical narrative.

Daniel Harrington’s 1986 contribution entitled “Palestinian Adaptations of Biblical Narratives and Prophecies I: The Bible Rewritten (Narratives),” adopts the term ~rwb to talk about texts produced around the turn of the era by Palestinian Judaism that “take as their literary framework the flow of the biblical text itself and apparently have as their major purpose the clarification and actualization of the biblical story.”⁴² In this regard, he follows ~vermes closely in how he imagines ~rwb to function. Yet, compared to ~vermes, he operates with a slightly expanded list of rewritten texts. In addition to ~jub, ~ga, Ps. Philo’s ~lab and Josephus’s ~ant, he also includes the *Assumption of Moses* and the ~temple-scroll. Furthermore, he makes a point to suggest that a number of other texts may be able to be included in the list, including *Paralipomena of Jeremiah*, *Life of Adam and Eve/Apocalypse of Moses*, and

42. Daniel J. Harrington, “Palestinian Adaptations of Biblical Narratives and Prophecies I: The Bible Rewritten (Narratives),” in *Early Judaism and Its Modern Interpreters*, ed. Robert A. Kraft and George W. E. Nickelsburg, BMI 2 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 239–47.

Ascension of Isaiah. Harrington's major contribution is his explicit rejection of ~rwb as a category or literary genre (more on this, below) in favor of a process-oriented approach. Because of this fact, Harrington takes a broad view of rewriting and allows, to some degree, that this process be understood similar to a reception history (although, this is my term, and not his).

Harrington's inclusion of the ~temple-scroll marked a significant deviation from ~vermes's use of the term by including non-narrative material under the rubric of ~rwb. While several of Harrington's other suggested text are not considered ~rwb by many scholars, the inclusion of other non-narrative texts, in particular the ~temple-scroll, has gained wide acceptance.⁴³

Building on the notion that ~rwb could also include non-narrative material, George Brooke, in a more recent treatment of the topic, defines ~rwb as "any representation of an authoritative scriptural text that implicitly incorporates interpretive elements, large or small, in the retelling itself."⁴⁴ Adopting a "loose" definition of the term Brooke includes in his discussion biblical texts that rewrite other biblical texts such as Deuteronomy and Chronicles in addition to examples of texts which "rewrite" portions of each of the major divisions of the

43. Bernstein, "Rewritten Bible," 169–96.

44. George Brooke, "Rewritten Bible," in *Encyclopedia of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, ed. Lawrence H. Schiffman and James C. VanderKam, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 777–81.

Hebrew Bible, most of which were found at ~qumran.⁴⁵

The purposes of rewriting, according to Brooke, are manifold, but in each case the (re)writer augmented or repurposed an authoritative base text for some new context. He writes:

The rewriting seems to have a variety of purposes, among which are the following: to improve an unintelligible base text, making it more comprehensible (11Q19); to improve a text by removing inconsistencies—often through internal harmonization (4QpaleoExod^m); to justify some particular content by providing explanations for certain features in the base text (1QapGen); to make an authoritative text serve a particular function, perhaps in a liturgical setting (4Q41); to encourage the practice of particular legal rulings (~jub); and to make an old text have contemporary appeal (~temple-scroll).⁴⁶

While I am sympathetic to the more maximalist approaches of Nickelsburg, Harring-

45. Brooke categorizes the texts as follows: Reworked Pentateuchs, Rewritten Pentateuchal narratives, Rewritten Pentateuchal laws, Rewritten Former Prophets, Rewritten Latter Prophets, and Rewritten Writings. Brooke, “Rewritten Bible,” 778–80; See also George Brooke, “The Rewritten Law, Prophets, and Psalms: Issues for Understanding the Text of the Bible,” in *The Bible as Book: The Hebrew Bible and the Judaean Desert Discoveries*, ed. Edward D. Herbert and Emanuel Tov (London: British Library; New Castle, DE: Oak Knoll Press, 2002), 31–40.

46. Brooke, “Rewritten Bible,” 778.

ton, and Brooke, none of these treatments offer any concrete criteria for delineating between ~rwb and texts that merely allude to biblical stories. Philip Alexander has suggested that certain works which are primarily “expansive” (the Book of Giants, the Book of Noah) should not be considered ~rwb because their relationship to the biblical text is “centrifugal”—that is, they take the biblical text as a point of departure while formally ~rwb texts show a “centripetal” relationship to the biblical text—that is, they expand beyond the biblical text, but remain tightly coupled to the text *as it exists in the Bible*. Alexander writes:

Rewritten Bible texts are centripetal: they come back to the Bible again and again. The rewritten Bible texts make use of the legendary material, but by placing that material within an extended biblical narrative (in association with passages of more or less literal retelling of the Bible), they clamp the legends firmly to the biblical framework, and reintegrate them into the biblical history.⁴⁷

This “centripetal” relationship to the biblical text, I believe, should form the upper bound of what is called ~rwb. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, works such as 1 Enoch, will not be treated because they do not exhibit this close centripetal relationship. On the other hand, I adopt a more expansive understanding of ~rwb than that of ~vermes and include works within the Hebrew Bible itself (Deuteronomy and Chronicles), as well as non-narrative works such as the ~temple-scroll which, I believe, do exhibit a centripetal relationship to the biblical text.

47. Alexander, “It is Written,” 117.

1.3.1 The Lower Bound: Between Bible and ~RWB

Another recent avenue of investigation has been to explore the boundaries between the biblical text, editions, translations, and rewritten biblical texts. ~vermes, of course, utilized the targums liberally in *Scripture and Tradition*, but his goal was to blur the line between post-biblical texts via the haggadah. Most scholars treating RwB, however, are not inclined to include the targums among RwB. But the targums—and for that matter the LXX and Samaritan Pentateuch—do uniquely represent interpretive traditions. Furthermore, the instability of the biblical text during the late ~2T period, as exhibited by the varied editions of Jeremiah found at Qumran and other liminal texts, such as 4QReworkedPent, has problematized the question of what may have constituted “Bible” (or, more properly, “scripture”) at the time.

Unsurprisingly, Emanuel Tov has been at the forefront of this investigation. In his 1998 article, “Rewritten Bible Compositions and Biblical Manuscripts, with Special Attention to the Samaritan Pentateuch,” Tov’s purpose is to specify the “fine line between biblical manuscripts and rewritten Bible texts.”⁴⁸ By this, Tov means that he is concerned with what I have termed the “lower bound” of the definition of RwB, specifically, the distinction between a text *edition* and a distinct composition, which Tov considers “rewritten.” The primary difference between these two categories of texts, according to Tov, is not how dramatically the daughter text diverges from its parent, but the *purpose* of the daughter text.⁴⁹ According to

48. Emanuel Tov, “Rewritten Bible Compositions and Biblical Manuscripts, with Special Attention to the Samaritan Pentateuch,” *DSD* 5.3 (1998): 334–54.

49. *Ibid.*, 334.

Tov, this purpose is mirrored in the putatively authoritative status of the “biblical” text vis-a-vis the rewritten text which, he says, is not authoritative (although, he seems to suggest that this is up for debate⁵⁰). For example, he notes that the extant texts of Jeremiah, while widely divergent in length and order, still represent “biblical Jeremiah” which carries some authoritative weight. Tov is, however, careful to point out that the nature of this authority is not clear and “the boundary between the biblical and non-biblical texts was probably not as fixed as we would have liked for the purpose of our scholarly analysis.”⁵¹

Tov makes explicit that he understands the SP as participating in this same sort of process as the rewritten texts from Qumran, making special mention of the ~temple-scroll, ~ga, and ~jub. Tov, therefore, is attempting to draw a parallel between the sorts of exegetical additions included in these three LXX texts and those included in the SP and the “classical” Rwb texts from Qumran.

The more significant contribution to this area, however, is Michael Segal’s 2005 article “Between Bible and Rewritten Bible,” which, in the tradition of Alexander, attempts to enumerate a series of criteria by which scholars can distinguish between editions of biblical texts and so-called rewritten texts.

Segal’s understanding of the role of Rwb is rooted in the conviction that a rewritten text is a “new” work that derives its own authority by means of its association with a biblical text. The new composition carries with it the purpose and any theological or ideological

50. Tov, “Rewritten Bible Compositions,” 337.

51. Ibid., 335.

Tendenzen of the new author, but keeps piggy-backs off of the status of the underlying text.⁵²

Segal writes:

Even though these rewritten compositions sometimes contain material contradictory to their biblical sources, their inclusion within the existing framework of the biblical text bestows upon them legitimacy in the eyes of the intended audience ... the inclusion of this material within the framework of the biblical passages under interpretation transforms the ideas of the later writer into authoritative and accepted beliefs.⁵³

And further:

The nature of the relationship between rewritten biblical compositions and their sources constitutes a paradox. On the one hand, the rewritten composition relies upon biblical texts for authority and legitimacy. The author claims that any new information included in the later work already appears in earlier sources. But simultaneously, the insertion of new ideas into the biblical text, ideas that may even contradict the beliefs and concepts of the original biblical authors, undermines the very authority that the rewriter hopes to utilize⁵⁴

52. Michael Segal, "Between Bible and Rewritten Bible," in *Biblical Interpretation at Qumran*, ed. Matthias Henze, SDSS (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 10–28.

53. Ibid., 11.

54. Ibid., 11–12.

While I find Segal's characterization of RwB texts problematic, his main contribution to the discussion are his criteria for distinguishing between "biblical" and RwB texts. He distinguishes between "external" and "internal" characteristics.

External Characteristics

Segal's external characteristics are by far his weakest. He notes two external characteristics of RwB texts: "language" and "relationship between the source and its revision."

1. Language: While he offers little rationale for this criterion, Segal categorically dismisses the possibility that any RwB text could have been written in a language other than its *Vorlage*. Notably, this criterion excludes, ~ga, Josephus's ~ant, and Ps. Philo's *LAB*.⁵⁵

2. The Textual Relationship between the Source and Its Revision: The underlying text must be "visible" in the RwB text. He uses the book of Chronicles as the parade example of this relationship and notes the caveats necessary in dealing with *Vorlagen*

55. Segal needlessly undercuts himself here. One might wonder that if a single criterion categorically excludes several texts which meet all the other criteria, perhaps the problem is with the criterion. In his discussions of other criteria, he begins by giving the principle by which the "edition" would assert itself as equal to its *Vorlage*, then contrast that with the RwB (see, esp. Expansion v. Abridgment). His reasoning is sound for a text edition (although I think the issue of textual authority and *translation* is, perhaps, too hastily ignored in this case), and could easily be contrasted with, for example the ~ga, which meets nearly all of his internal criteria.

from this period (i.e., it is difficult to say what is ‘rewritten’ versus what is just another variant in the *Vorlage*).

Segal notes that both of these criteria, in fact, apply to textual editions, as well as to Rwb texts.⁵⁶ In other words, these are not “distinguishing” criteria, so much as the baseline for consideration.

Literary Criteria for ~RWB

It is the “Literary Criteria” which Segal, ultimately, believes provide the *definition* of Rwb texts.⁵⁷ Segal provides six internal criteria:

1. Scope of the Composition: “Editions” of texts cover the same material as their source.

In other words, one expects an edition of Genesis to cover the same material as the book of Genesis; pluses and minuses do not stray into other works. On the other hand, rewritten texts “do not generally correspond to the scope of their sources”.⁵⁸ For example, he observes that ~jub Covers Genesis and part of Exodus, and Chronicles covers parts of Samuel and Kings. Oddly, he also notes that Ps. Philo—which is not written in Hebrew—runs from Genesis into 1 Samuel. He writes: “In all these examples the

56. Segal, “Biblical Interpretation at Qumran,” 20.

57. Ibid., 20.

58. Ibid., 20.

change in the scope of the composition created a new literary unit.”⁵⁹

2. New Narrative Frame: Several of the RwB texts include a framing narrative. His examples include the ~temple-scroll and ~jub, both of which re-frame the “biblical” material. In the case of both works, the Torah is assumed and the new work presumed to be a reflection of a second, direct revelation of the law to Moses, albeit by different means (and fragmentary, in the case of the ~temple-scroll). In ~jub, the angel of the Presence revealed this “second Torah” during Moses’s second ascent (Exod 24). On the other hand, the Temple scroll seems to begin in Exod 34.⁶⁰
3. Voice: While biblical narratives are generally written in a “detached” third person style, Segal observes that both ~jub and the ~temple-scroll “change the voice of the narrator throughout”.⁶¹ As far as I can tell, what Segal means is that in these RwB texts, certain events which are narrated in the third person in the biblical text are re-framed as, for instance, direct discourse in the first person by an angel, or even by God.⁶²

59. Segal, “Biblical Interpretation at Qumran,” 20–21.

60. Ibid., 22.

61. Ibid., 22.

62. This may seem like a minor quibble, but the “narrator” has a distinct and technical meaning in narrative criticism which should be maintained. I would note, however, that this sort of reframing is not unique to RwB, since, e.g., Deuteronomy does something similar (perhaps Segal considered Deuteronomy to be RwB?). This is a weak criteria, in my mind.

4. Expansion versus Abridgment: By-and-large, text editions are *additive*. That is to say, when there is a discrepancy between the amount of content (as opposed to the order), typically the shorter text is considered older. Segal is here concerned with editorial changes, and not with scribal errors, which, of course could go in both directions (through parablepsis et al.). This property, he contends, is rooted in the conviction of the scribes that in order to reproduce a text, one must reproduce the *entire* text.⁶³ Rewritten bible texts, however, felt free to add *or remove* material because they understood themselves to be composing an entirely new work.⁶⁴
5. Tendentious Editorial Layer: “Editions” do not change fundamental ideology of the work. For example, differing editions of Jeremiah may differ but those differences do not change the fundamental ideology of the work. Likewise, expansion and addition to the work (e.g. additions to Daniel) are in line with the theological *Tendenz* of the shorter book. On the other hand, RwB texts freely alter the ideologies of the text, for example, ~jub.⁶⁵
6. Explicit References to the Source Composition: “Editions” cannot (in a meta-discursive sense) reference its base text. RwB texts can.

In a more recent article, Tov returns to the topic of text editions and their relation-

63. Segal, “Biblical Interpretation at Qumran,” 24.

64. Ibid., 24.

65. Ibid., 25.

ship to the phenomenon of RwB.⁶⁶ Tov addresses three “strange” texts from the LXX which, for one reason or another, differ significantly from the preserved MT (3 Kingdoms, Esther, and Daniel). Evoking a number of Segal’s criteria⁶⁷ for inclusion in the category (which he acknowledges to be well accepted, if not terribly well defined), Tov suggests that these LXX texts likewise may exhibit 1) a new narrative frame, 2) expansion and abridgment, and 3) a tendentious editorial layer and therefore may be candidates for RwB.

It is important to think about what Tov and Segal are trying to accomplish in these articles: They are trying to connect scribal practices which allowed for exegetical additions and emendations to “authoritative texts”—dramatic examples of which are provided by SP and LXX (though one wonders why the Targums aren’t included here; perhaps because Tov is arguing for Hebrew *Vorlagen* of these texts, while the Targums represent a translation)—to the practices which produced the *new compositions* which scholars refer to as RwB texts. This is very similar to ~vermes, albeit from a more “textual” perspective.

What Tov’s articles in particular demonstrate, however, is that the issue of authorial *intent* and *purpose* may be at the heart of the distinction between text edition and RwB. Of

66. Emanuel Tov, “Three Strange Books of the LXX: 1 Kings, Esther, and Daniel Compared with Similar Rewritten Compositions from Qumran and Elsewhere,” in *Die Septuaginta – Texte, Kontexte, Lebenswelten: Internationale Fachtagung veranstaltet von Septuaginta Deutsch (LXX.D), Wuppertal 20.–23. Juli 2006*, ed. Martin Karrer and Wolfgang Kraus, WUNT 219 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 369–93.

67. Segal, “Biblical Interpretation at Qumran,” 10–28.

course, this is not something that can be objectively proven, but it *must* factor into the conversation, even if we must settle for speculation. The result is that, e.g., 4QReworkedPent should be understood as RwB insofar as we imagine the author attempting something *other* than creating a text edition of the Pentateuch. Presumably the author of GA did not imagine himself creating a new edition of Genesis; the same with ~jub and Chronicles. The issue of whether the resultant text was used authoritatively after the fact is beside the point; what matters was whether the text was either intended to be (or from the reader's perspective, whether the text was treated as) a copy of the text's *Vorlage*. And in the case of SP and LXX (and the Targums, I'd say), this seems to have been the case. Thus, it seems like these should not be treated as RwB.

1.4 ~RWB: A GENRE, PROCESS, OR SOMETHING ELSE?

One of the central issues with the term ~RwB is whether it should be treated as a "genre" or as a "process" or "activity." ~vermes, is not particularly helpful in clarifying the issue:

The question has been raised whether the "Rewritten Bible" corresponds to a process or a genre? In my view, it verifies both. The person who combined the biblical text with its interpretation was engaged in a process, but when his activity was completed, it resulted in a literary genre.⁶⁸

Within ~vermes's schema of aggadic development, ~rwb occupied a liminal space outside the genres of classical Jewish texts. Because these texts eluded categorization within

68. Vermes, "Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years," 8.

these established text groups (such as Targums, or midrash), ~vermes's treatment of ~rwb as a discrete group was not unreasonable. A number of scholars have since upheld the categorical approach and argued for ~rwb as a literary genre.

The parade example of this perspective is Philip Alexander's 1988 article "Retelling the Old Testament," which, although dated, remains the most widely cited exemplar of the "genre" perspective.⁶⁹ Alexander takes up four ~rwb texts (~jub, ~ga, ~lab, and ~ant) to determine whether there exists a set of concrete criteria by which scholars can admit or exclude text from the category. Although I ultimately disagree with his conclusion that ~rwb should be treated as a literary genre, his list of nine "principle characteristics" make a number of useful observations about the nature of ~rwb texts generally and are summarized as follows:

1. ~rwb texts are *narratives* which follow the order of the biblical text.
2. ~rwb texts are "free standing" literary works that take on the same form as the text they rewrite. They do not comment explicitly on their *Vorlagen*, but weave interpretation into their seamless retelling.
3. ~rwb texts are not meant to replace the biblical work.
4. ~rwb texts cover a large portion of the biblical narrative and exhibit a "centripetal" relationship to the biblical text.
5. ~rwb texts follow the biblical text's narrative ordering, but may omit certain, non-essential elements.

69. Alexander, "It is Written," 99–121; ~vermes himself even put his stamp of approval on it, see Vermes, "Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years," 4.

6. ~rwb texts offer an interpretive reading of scripture which, quoting ~vermes offer, “a fuller, smoother and doctrinally more advanced form of the sacred narrative”⁷⁰ and implicitly comment on the biblical text.
7. ~rwb texts are limited by their literary form which only allows a single interpretation of the biblical text that they rewrite.
8. ~rwb texts are limited by their literary form which does not allow them to explain their exegetical rationale.
9. ~rwb texts incorporate traditions and material not derived from the biblical text.

Despite Alexander’s emphatic conclusion affirming the genre of ~RwB, I find a number of these criteria to be unconvincing.

First, his criterion that the text be a *narrative* strikes me as arbitrary. While ~vermes focused on ~rwb as a narrative phenomenon, he has since noted that the reason for this was that his focus was on *aggadic* material, that is, non-halakhic interpretation, which by definition is non-legal. Coupled with the first half of his second observation—that ~rwb texts take on the same form as the text they rewrite—these observations seem self-fulfilling and suffering from a sort of selection bias.⁷¹

70. Citing ~vermes in Emil Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ: 175 BC – AD 135*, ed. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar and Matthew Black, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986), 305.

71. Although, all of the texts he surveyed are narratives, this fact illustrates one of the major shortcomings in Alexander’s method, specifically, that his conclusions were based on four texts

Second, several of his criteria are comments about the intention of the author or purpose of the work, which are both unverifiable. For example, the question of whether a ~rwb text was “meant” to replace its *Vorlage*, is not clear, particularly when discussing texts—as ~vermes does—such as the ~pTarg, or (now) the so-called Reworked Pentateuch (4QReworkedPent)⁷² Similarly, claiming that ~rwb texts “implicitly comment” on their *Vorlagen* speaks to the *intention* of the author, which in the edge cases is not clearly demonstrable. The fact that Alexander states that the author was “limited” by the genre of narrative to a single interpretation and could not provide his exegetical rationale illustrates the major, overarching assumption about Alexander’s (and ~vermes’s) approach to these texts—that the essential function of the texts and the purposes of their authors are the same as the later exegetes.

Alexander insists that “Any text admitted to the genre must display *all* the characteristics,”⁷³ These characteristics were inductively identified, yet Alexander offers no formal rationale for selecting his sample. The texts that he selects, indeed, represent the *core* of what is generally accepted to be ~rwb, but texts on the periphery of a genre, almost by definition, will not display *every* characteristic of the core texts. From my perspective, however,

“normally included in the genre.”(Alexander, “It is Written,” 99) Therefore the selection of these four texts was the result of a deductive selection, in part, based on their narrative form.

72. In fairness, 4QReworkedPent was not available to Alexander or ~vermes. Yet, one still may wonder why the LXX or Samaritan Pentateuch are not included.

73. Ibid., 99–121 (119 n. 11).

Alexander's criteria should not be treated as prerequisites for inclusion to the category of ~rwb, if we are to treat it as such. Instead, they should be used to describe a sort of literary *Idealtypus* for ~rwb.

Moshe Bernstein, too, has upheld a Vermesian understanding of ~rwb as a literary category and has argued that for the category to be useful to scholars, the boundaries must be clearly demarcated and reasonably narrow.⁷⁴ Notably, Bernstein never clearly articulates what it means for a category to be "useful." All the same, he writes that he set out to:

"examine the definition and descriptions of"rewritten Bible" proffered by ~vermes and several subsequent scholars, in order to delineate the variety of ways in which the term is currently employed and to make some suggestions for how we might use it more clearly and definitively in the future."⁷⁵

Bernstein begins by addressing the few small modifications that he makes to ~vermes's list, namely that Bernstein does not understand the Targums to be examples of Rwb. He excludes Targums from his discussion "*ab initio*," as well as "biblical" books, (by which he seems to mean "Chronicles"), and includes legal texts such as the ~temple-scroll. Despite this second exclusion, Bernstein acknowledges that "One group's rewritten Bible could very well be another's biblical text!".⁷⁶ Thus, Bernstein concedes that "matters of canon and audience

74. Bernstein, "Rewritten Bible," 169–96.

75. Ibid., 171–72.

76. Ibid., 169–96 (175). This seems particularly odd, since, and Ethiopian Christian may

may play a role,” but doesn’t address the topic further.

Bernstein critiques scholars such as Nicklesburg,⁷⁷ Harrington,⁷⁸ and Brooke⁷⁹ for excessively expanding the use of the term ~rwb at its “upper bound” (my term) to the point that they have weakened the term and have “not aided in focusing scholarly attention on the unifying vs. divergent traits of some of these early interpretive works.”⁸⁰ Likewise, Bernstein critiques Tov for including reworked texts (e.g., 4QReworkedPent) and therefore expanding the “lower bound” of the category. While Bernstein avers that “Rearrangement with the goal of interpretation is probably an earlier stage in the development of biblical ‘commentary’ than supplementation with the goal of interpretation,”⁸¹ he nevertheless distinguishes the former from the category ~rwb and declares that “the definitions of ‘rewritten Bible’ furnished by Tov and ~vermes are [not] even remotely compatible, and we need to choose between them simply for the purposes of clarity.”⁸² Bernstein, ultimately, argues that ~vermes’s category is worth keeping around, and admonishes the reader to maintain a narrow definition of

protest that ~jub should be excluded as well.).

77. Nickelsburg, “The Bible Rewritten,” 89–156.

78. Harrington, “The Bible Rewritten (Narratives),” 239–47.

79. Brooke, “Rewritten Bible,” 777–81.

80. Bernstein, “Rewritten Bible,” 179.

81. Ibid., 169–96 (PAGE).

82. Ibid., 185.

the category, because, in his own words, “the more specific the implications of the term, the more valuable it is as a measuring device,”⁸³ and conversely that “the looser the definition, the less precisely it classifies those items under its rubric.”⁸⁴

At the other end of the spectrum, a number of important scholars have treated ~rwb as a “process” or “activity” rather than as a genre or category. These scholars also have tended to be more “expansive” when it comes to which texts should be discussed as “rewritten.” Harrington, as noted above, is the parade example of those who wish to treat ~rwb as a process. He states:

Nevertheless, establishing that these books are not appropriately described as targums or midrashim is not the same as proving that they all represent a distinctive literary genre called “rewritten Bible.” In fact, it seems better to view rewriting the Bible as a kind of activity or process than to see it as a distinctive literary genre of Palestinian Judaism”⁸⁵

Instead, he observes that while texts such as ~jub and *Assumption of Moses* both constitute a rewriting of the Bible, both “are formally revelations of apocalypses.”⁸⁶ This is an important criticism of scholars who see Rwb as a distinct genre. Unlike, for example, the

83. Bernstein, “Rewritten Bible,” 195.

84. Ibid., 195.

85. Harrington, “The Bible Rewritten (Narratives),” 242–43.

86. Ibid., 243.

Gospels, which arguably have the same basic “form,” the texts typically described as “rewritten” come in a variety of “forms” such as narratives (~ga), apocalypses (~jub), and, legal (~temple-scroll). In other words, a single *genre*—insofar as the word describes a literary *form*—is not sufficient to subsume the varied *forms* which all can be described as “rewritten.” From my perspective, this observation is at the heart of the discussion.

More recently, Molly Zahn has attempted to move the conversation forward by interacting with modern genre theory—which is conspicuously absent from most discussions of “genre” and ~rwb.⁸⁷ Zahn addresses the difficulty that Harrington addresses by noting that works may participate in multiple genres simultaneously. While older conceptions of genre “pigeonhole” texts to specific genres, modern genre theorists—she cites Fowler—now prefer to talk about texts “participating” in a genre. Citing Fowler, Zahn notes that “genres are less like pigeonholes and more like pigeons” and further augments the metaphor to suggest that genres are “more like flocks of pigeons.” She writes:

Just as a flock of pigeons might change shape, lose and add members, be absorbed into larger flocks or break apart into several smaller flocks, genres and

87. Molly M. Zahn, “Genre and Rewritten Scripture: A Reassessment,” *JBL* 131.2 (2012): 271–88; Daniel Machiela noted the absence of genre theory in his 2010 article, as well, see Daniel A. Machiela, “Once More, with Feeling: Rewritten Scripture in Ancient Judaism—A Review of Recent Developments,” *JJS* 61.2 (2010): 308–20; Notable exceptions include George Brooke, “Genre Theory, Rewritten Bible and Peshet,” in “Rethinking Genre: Essays in Honor of John J. Collins,” *DSD* 17.3 (2010): 332–57.

their boundaries are not static.⁸⁸

This is a solid post-structuralist understanding of genre, and one that should be taken seriously. The implications for ~rwb is clear: although ~jub is a revelatory text while the ~temple-scroll is a legal text, they can both participate in their respective “formal” genres simultaneously with the supposed ~rwb genre.⁸⁹

Yet, it is not at all clear to me what we have gained by upholding ~rwb as a genre by simply changing what we mean by “genre,” however well rooted in theory.⁹⁰ If by “genre” we can no longer attribute any formal characteristics to ~rwb, what we are ultimately left with is a particular kind of relationship (rewriting) matched to a particular kind of biblical *Vorlage*

Based on the shortcomings of both traditional and more sophisticated treatments of ~rwb as a literary genre, I have adopted a process-oriented paradigm for my discussion of

88. Zahn, “Genre and Rewritten Scripture,” 277.

89. Zahn also explores the “functional” aspects of genre. She notes that genres are “not simply systems of classifications developed and used by literary critics, but are fundamental to all human communication.” *ibid.*, 280; Thus, genres manifest as common patterns recognized by both the author and the reader which aid communication and in this way, genre functions as a sort of “literary body language.” *ibid.*, 276; See also Carol Newsom, “Rhetorical Criticism and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in *Rediscovering the Dead Sea Scrolls: An Assessment of Old and New Approaches and Methods*, ed. Maxine L. Grossman (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 198–214.

90. Machiela critiques Zahn’s approach for similar reasons. See Machiela, “Once More, with Feeling,” 308–20.

~rwb texts.⁹¹

1.5 CONCLUSION

While each of these discussions has worked to expand and refine the study of ~rwb, the basic trajectory set by ~vermes—the conviction that ~rwb reflects an effort by the writer to implicitly comment on the biblical (or some “scriptural”) text—has remained surprisingly consistent. This tendency to focus first and foremost on the exegetical qualities of ~rwb reflects ~vermes’s original purpose for the term quite well, but given the current state of the discussion, I think it is worth reconsidering this central tenet. This is not to say, of course, that there is *no* exegetical purpose to *any* ~rwb text, rather that given a broader view of ~rwb, it is worth considering that the phenomenon of rewriting, as a literary process, was not primarily concerned with nor necessarily tied to the *explication* of a scriptural *Vorlage*.

Campbell, for example, has recently suggested that the practice of rewriting may have extended beyond works with scriptural *Vorlagen* and may better be understood as a more general literary phenomenon of the late ~2T period.⁹² In his article, Campbell observes that the rewriting of non-scriptural texts has by-and-large been ignored by scholars or ~rwb and offers a number compelling examples of ~2T texts which rewrite non-scriptural material following the same basic process as ~rwb. In particular, Campbell notes that while ~ant

91. I am in broad agreement with Campbell’s treatment of the matter. See Campbell, “Rewritten Bible,” 64–67.

92. Ibid., 49–81.

1–11 focuses on biblical material, ~ant 12–13 offers a rewriting of the *Letter of Aristeas* and portions of 1 Macc. These rewritings maintain the “structure and flow” of their base texts, just like ~rwb, but it is generally agreed that neither 1 Macc nor the *Letter of Aristeas* were viewed as scripture by Josephus, who, notably, provides us with one of the earliest lists of sacred writings from the period.⁹³ According to Campbell, “Josephus handles these compositions in the same way that he treats scriptural material in *Ant.* 1–11.”⁹⁴ Furthermore, 4 Macc 5–17 retells the story of the martyrdom of seven brothers along with their mother found in 2 Macc 3–7. As with ~ant 12–13, 4 Maccabees follows the structure and ordering of the account in 2 Maccabees while augmenting the story and using it to advance the author’s thesis as part of a philosophical treatise.

What these examples lack, as compared with ~vermes’s understanding of rewriting, is a tradition of *interpretation* (*aggadah* for ~vermes) which can account for the changes between the *Vorlage* and the rewritten work. None of these examples is primarily concerned with clarifying their *Vorlage*. At best, we might speculate that the authors refined the stories to better suit their needs (making corrections, emendations, etc.), but we do not imagine that there was any expectation that these “interpretations” carry any kind of normative force in later understandings of the original account. In other words, there is no reason for us to

93. Steve Mason, “Josephus and His Twenty-two Book Canon,” in *The Canon Debate*, ed. Lee M. McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002), 110–27.

94. Campbell, “Rewritten Bible,” 70; See also Mason, “Josephus and His Twenty-two Book Canon,” 126.

assume that the author of 4 Maccabees intended his reworking of the story of seven brothers to affect the way that readers would understand 2 Maccabees.⁹⁵ On the other hand, this is precisely what ~vermes was arguing for in ~stj: that the activity of rewriting was meant not only to be descriptive of *how* the authors understood the biblical *Vorlagen*, but that the *purpose* of these rewritten texts in some way functioned *prescriptively* within the tradition of biblical interpretation, that is, according to ~vermes, ~rwb texts were, by definition, *about* the texts that they rewrote.

This dissertation is meant to be an attempt to pivot away from reading ~rwb texts as primarily functioning “exegetically” (by which I mean, focused on the explanation—even if implicitly—of a particular text) toward reading rewritten texts as products of cultural transmission through the lenses of cultural and social memory theory. Biblical interpretation—to be sure—played a part in the production of these texts, but other social, cultural, and literary forces were at work behind these texts as well and I have chosen memory studies as a means to explore these additional dimensions of of the ~rwb phenomenon.

95. I hasten to point out that the later account certainly *would have* affected readers’ understanding of the story in 2 Maccabees, but here I am arguing that we do not imagine the *intent* of the author of 4 Maccabees to be affecting that change.

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Chapter 2: Social Memory Studies and the ~RwB

Over the past several decades, a dramatic increase in scholarly interest toward the topic of “memory” has swept throughout the social sciences and humanities. This precipitous rise in scholarly literature dealing with topics of memory coupled with its proliferation in popular media discourses has prompted some in the field to refer to a “memory industry” and to describe the ubiquity of memory discourses as a “boom” fast-approaching a bust.¹ Yet, as Olick et al. make clear in their Introduction to *The Collective Memory Reader*, there remain a significant number of scholars throughout the social sciences and humanities who continue to find memory to be a useful heuristic and a compelling theoretical basis for their various and sundry analytical applications.²

1. Graviel D. Rosenfeld, “A Looming Crash or a Soft Landing? Forecasting the Future of the Memory ‘Industry,’” *JMH* 81.1 (2009): 122–58; Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the 20th Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); David Berliner, “The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology,” *AQ* 78.1 (2005): 197–211; Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” *AHR* 102.5 (1997): 1386–403.

2. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy, “Introduction,” in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy (Oxford: Oxford

Although the topic of memory has been of interest to philosophers and thinkers since antiquity,³ as Olick and Robbins note, modern social-scientific approaches (which concern this study) almost exclusively trace their genealogy to the early 20th century work of sociologist ~Halbwachs.⁴ Although ~halbwachs's scholarly contributions were not limited to the topic of social memory (he also made contributions to statistics and probability theory, as well as sociological work on the topic of suicide and social morphology), the influence of his work in this area not only made a more lasting impact on the field of sociology than his other contributions, but it has also made a profound impact in a number of other fields such as history, anthropology, and (important for our purposes) biblical studies.⁵

University Press, 2011), 3–62.

3. Mary Carruthers, “How to Make a Composition: Memory-Craft in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages,” in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 15–29.

4. Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices,” *ARS* 24 (1998): 105–40; It should be noted, however, that ~halbwachs was not the first or only person to do work on memory or the impact of social structures on memory. See Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy, “Introduction,” 8–36.

5. Lewis A. Coser, Introduction to *On Collective Memory*, by Maurice Halbwachs, trans. Lewis A. Coser, HS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 1–34.

2.1 THE WORK OF ~HALBWACHS: A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW

~halbwachs published three primary works on the topic of memory, the first of which appeared in 1925 under the title ~Social-Frameworks.⁶ This monograph, along with the concluding chapter of his monograph dealing with the remembered geography the Holy Land (entitled ~Legendary-Topography) was excerpted and translated by Lewis Coser in a single volume under the title *On Collective Memory* in 1992.⁷ His final contribution, entitled ~Collective-Memory, was published posthumously in 1950 and translated into English in 1980 with an editorial introduction by Mary Douglas.⁸ This work simultaneously represents some of ~halbwachs's most developed ideas (responding to critics such as Charles Blondel) and

6. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (F. Alcan, 1925).

7. Several of the most important chapters of ~social-frameworks were included in full. Likewise, the entirety of the conclusion of ~legendary-topography was included Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser, HS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Maurice Halbwachs, *La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte: étude de mémoire collective* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1941).

8. Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter, with an intro. by Mary Douglass (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), trans. of *La mémoire collective*, Bibliothèque de sociologie contemporaine (Paris: University of Paris Press, 1950).

evinces an incompleteness which posthumous publications often suffer.⁹

The central contribution of ~halbwachs's work was the notion that human memory is intrinsically and inextricably tied to social frameworks. Humans are social beings and as such human processes, such as memory, can only be accomplished within the context of a society. This focus on the *social* dimensions of memory betrays the deep influence that Émile Durkheim's work had on ~halbwachs. Unlike Durkheim, however, ~halbwachs's approach was tempered by his desire to identify the physical (or, perhaps "biological") location of memory within the individual. Although the term "collective memory" evokes an ethereal or metaphysical idea, ~halbwachs's use of the term is entirely concrete. Collective memory is the sum total of those memories kept by *individuals*. However, an individual's ability to retrieve and utilize a particular memory is intrinsically tied to the individual's social context. Memories require social frameworks to function.¹⁰

To illustrate this point, ~halbwachs begins ~social-frameworks by attempting to prove the negative. *Without* a social framework, he argues, memories are always incomplete. Be-

9. Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*; As Coser observes, "One may doubt that the author himself would have been willing to publish it in what seems to be an unfinished state. The book nevertheless contains many further developments of ~halbwachs's thought in regard to such matters as the relation of space and time to collective memory as well as fruitful definitions and applications of the differences between individual, collective, and historical memory." Coser, Introduction, 2.

10. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 38.

cause humans—for all intents and purposes—always exist within a society, it is the dream state that most closely approximates the complete isolation of memory from society. Therefore, the way that the human brain deals with memories while dreaming can illustrate the (dis)function of memories lacking a social framework. Thus, he observes that “dreams are composed of fragments of memory too mutilated and mixed up with others to allow us to recognize them.”¹¹ Because the mind lacks the ability to “check” itself against anything external while in a dream state, dreams do not contain “true memories.”¹² This assertion is set against the “purely individual psychology” of Bergson and Freud which viewed *memory* as a location of social isolation.¹³ Regarding the incompleteness of the dream state, he writes:

Almost completely detached from the system of social representations, [the dream state’s] images are nothing more than raw materials, capable of entering into all sorts of combinations. They establish only random relations among each other—relations based on the disordered play of corporal modification.¹⁴

11. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 41.

12. *Ibid.*, 41.

13. See Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Bergson on Memory,” in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 61–76; and Richard Terdiman, “Memory in Freud,” in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 93–108.

14. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 42.

The “system of social representations” that Halbwachs refers to is not limited, however, to macro structures such as familial, religious, or class groups. Although these structures certainly *do* make up an important stratum of social frameworks, Halbwachs envisions something much more fundamental which betrays his broadly structuralist perspective. Halbwachs uses the phrase “social representations” to refer to a system of shared “signs” that encompassed not only these macro structures, but every aspect of a group’s social framework—a sort of “cultural *langue*.” Although, Halbwachs does not use the language of semiotics, the analogy is helpful. Just as Saussurian linguistics argues that the concrete arbitrary sign is given meaning only by participating in the broader, shared *langue*, so too memories (read: “signs”) require a framework to convey meaning, as do the concrete, individual expressions of remembrance (read: *parole*). Halbwachs writes:

It is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection..¹⁵

Memories, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation from their social frameworks and therefore should not be analyzed without consideration to the social context of the rememberer.

Of course, people participate in a plurality of social groups, often simultaneously, and the experiences that are later to be recalled, too, must be situated within these frameworks.

15. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 38.

In order to bring these autobiographical memories to mind, according to ~halbwachs, an individual attempts to mentally situate herself within those same frameworks. For instance, I find it much easier to recall whether a particular university course I have taken occurred in the Fall or Spring semester, rather than which month or even year it occurred. The social framework that is the “academic year” remains a potent framework for my own memories; I imagine the “year” beginning in the Fall, and often refer to “next semester.” On the other hand, my wife—who had the good sense to stop her formal education after one degree—no longer thinks in terms of semesters. Yet, when remembering events during her time at university, the semester once again becomes a useful framework for memory. It is for this reason that recent memories are more easy to call to mind: because the social frameworks that produced the memory (the people, places, customs, etc.) remain in close proximity for the rememberer and the effort required to situate the memory within the social frameworks that produced it is minimal.¹⁶ This notion is a central part of ~halbwachs’s thesis and provides a point of departure for his more in-depth studies of collective memory in the family, religion, and social classes.

2.1.1 A Note on Halbwachs’s Terminology

There is a grand tradition of imprecise and overlapping terminologies within memory studies going back to ~halbwachs himself. For example, on page 40 of *On Collective Memory*, ~halbwachs uses each of the terms “collective memory,” “social memory,” “social frameworks of

16. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 52.

memory,” and “collective frameworks of memory” and it is not entirely clear how ~halb-wachs is distinguishing between them. The way that he is able to use the terms almost interchangeably has led some in the current discussion to treat them as synonyms. As Anthony Le Donne observes, “In fact, [”social” and ”collective” memory] are currently used synonymously with such frequency that their nuances vary from author to author.”¹⁷ Yet, Le Donne points out, ~halbwachs actually uses these terms with slightly different nuances. On the one hand, ~halbwachs uses the term “sociaux” when he is describing the way social structures affect memory, while on the other hand “Collective Memory” tends to refer to the content of memories which are transmitted between individuals.

In other words, when ~halbwachs uses the term “social” memory, he is referring to individual memory and how it is recalled within externally defined social frameworks, i.e. how society provides the framework that makes individual memory possible.¹⁸ On the other hand, when he uses the term “collective” memory, he tends to refer to shared memory, “the shared cultural past to which individuals contribute and upon which they call; but ultimately a past that transcends individual memory.”¹⁹ The two ideas work together and

17. Anthony Le Donne, *The Historiographical Jesus: Memory, Typology, and the Son of David* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009), 42 n.8.

18. Sandra Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis: The Quest for an Adequate Application,” in *Cultural Memory in Biblical Exegesis*, ed. Pernille Carstens, Trine Hasselbalch and Niels Peter Lemche, PHSC 17 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2012), 175–99.

19. Chris Keith, “Social Memory Theory and Gospels Research: The First Decade (Part One),”

mutually influence one another. As Hübenthal puts it, “The difference [between social and collective memory] lies in the perspective: *social memory* is using the framework, *collective memory* is establishing it.”²⁰ Hübenthal’s use of the active verb “establish” is intentional: for ~halbwachs, collective memory is not a passive social accretion, but an actively constructed part of the group’s common identity which *speaks to the to concerns and needs of the community in the present*. Social frameworks shape the way that people remember. The retrieval of memories is shaped by those same frameworks, and as those frameworks shift, so too do the memories that are recalled in those societies.²¹

In his later work, ~halbwachs distinguishes between two kinds of memory which can be identified by the experiential-relation of the rememberer to the object of memory: autobi-

EC 6.3 (2015): 354–76; See also Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory,” 180.

20. Ibid., 180.

21. For a modern assessments on the malleability of human memory and the effects of social networks on the formation of collective memory, see Alin Coman et al., “Mnemonic Convergence in Social Networks: The Emergent Properties of Cognition at a Collective Level,” *PNAS* 113.29 (2016): 8171–76; Jeremy K. Yamashiro and William Hirst, “Mnemonic Convergence in a Social Network: Collective Memory and Extended Influence,” *JARMC* 3.4 (2014): 272–79; Alin Coman et al., “Mnemonic Convergence: From Empirical Data to Large-Scale Dynamics,” in *Social Computing, Behavioral–Cultural Modeling and Prediction*, ed. Shanchieh Jay Yang, Ariel M. Greenberg and Mica Endsley (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 256–65.

ographical and historical memory.²² Autobiographical memory refers to the sort of memories which are the result of individual, subjective experience, while historical memory refers to those which fall outside the experience of the individual. Elsewhere ~halbwachs refers to these as “internal” and “external” memory. Autobiographical memory is rooted in the individual, sensory experiences which provide a full, “thick” memory (to borrow from Geertz), while historical memory offers only a thin, schematic overview and by definition is never “experienced” by the rememberer.

Although ~halbwachs distinguished between these two forms of memory, he nevertheless emphasized their interrelatedness. In particular, ~halbwachs notes that autobiographical memory necessarily is dependent upon historical memory, insofar as our lives participate in “general history.”²³ For example, memories of a more indirect nature are able to shape autobiographical memory by shaping the social frameworks which produced them and the frameworks into which they are recalled. The quintessential example for Americans of my age would be the events of September 11, 2001. Although comparatively few people directly witnessed the events (I was asleep on the West Coast when the first plane crashed), the impact that those events had (and continue to have) on the orientation of American national memory is unquestionably a part of many people’s lived experience, including my own and would therefore constitute a part of America’s current “collective memory.” Although the incoming undergraduate class at the University of Texas at Austin, many of whom will have

22. Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 52.

23. Ibid., 52.

been born after 2001, have *no* autobiographical memory of these events, it is, nonetheless, a part of the collective memory of their society at large. On the other hand the War of 1812 is not a part of any living person's autobiographical memory and its impact on the collective memory of most Americans is likely restricted to a few popular media references, or localized to specific geographical regions with a close connection to major events in the conflict (e.g., New Orleans).²⁴

The memories of historical events, likewise, are shaped by the social frameworks of the rememberer. The events of September 11, 2001 in the memory of most Americans are now further shaped by the socio-political discourses surrounding the United States's continued military presence in the Middle East and its controversial pretexts for engagement in the region, especially with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Likewise, although no living person has an autobiographical memory of the American Civil War, the construction of certain confederate monuments on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin during the Jim Crow era, and their subsequent removal in August of 2017, illustrates how historical memory can be (consciously, in this case) reshaped and restructured as the remembering society changes.

It is the way that these remembered events change over time that makes social memory studies so interesting for the historian. ~halbwachs's own work in the area of history is

24. Such as Jimmy Driftwood's *The Battle of New Orleans*, best known as performed by Johnny Horton which topped *Billboard* charts in the US, Canada, and Australia in 1959 and was recently acknowledged to be one of the Top 100 Western songs of all time. See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battle_of_New_Orleans.

best seen in *The Legendary Topography of the Holy Land*, where he focuses on the ways that memories relate to particular geographic sites. Specifically, ~halbwachs's study focuses on the way that the sites in and around the Galilee and Jerusalem have been imbued with significance based on their putative connection with some significant event relating to Jesus, the Apostles, and early Christian communities. ~halbwachs makes a number of observations about the way that memories are formed and the ways that they interact.

~halbwachs's first observation comes in contrasting the portrayal of Jesus within the Gospels with what must have been the lived experience of the Apostles.²⁵ The involvement of the apostles in the day-to-day life of Jesus in some sense would have prohibited them from achieving the kind of "necessary detachment" to write something like the the Gospels. In other words (and to use ~halbwachs's later terminology), the memory of Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels is almost necessarily informed by *historical* rather than autobiographical memory.²⁶ Indeed, ~halbwachs rightly observes that the Gospels present Jesus and his ministry "as if Jesus's whole life was but a preparation for his death, as if this was what he had announced in advance."²⁷ Although the religious significance of Jesus's death continues to be remembered as a central component of Christianity, surely Jesus's mother remembered the death of her son differently than the way the Church later commemorated it.²⁸

25. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 193–98.

26. Ibid., 194.

27. Ibid., 198.

28. Regardless of whether ~halbwachs's conception of Early Christianity would be con-

~halbwachs, drawing on the Pauline epistles, observes that the earliest recollections of Jesus make no mention of the location of his death (Jerusalem) nor of his ministry (Galilee).

He writes:

In the authentic epistles of Paul, we are told only that the son of God has come to earth, that he died for our sins, and that he was brought back to life again.

There is no allusion to the circumstances of his life, except for the Lord's Supper, which, Paul says, appeared to him in a vision (and not through witnesses). There is no indication of locality, no question of Galilee, or of the preachings of Jesus on the shores of the lake of Gennesaret.²⁹

~halbwachs's point is that within the narrative of the Gospels, the location of Jesus's

sidered sound today, the idea that the Gospels represent several collective remembrances of Jesus's life, ministry and death each bearing marks from their own *Sitz im Leben* (to borrow from the form critics) seems relatively uncontroversial. A number of studies on the Jesus and early Christian memory have come about in the past several years. See Le Donne, *The Historical Jesus*; Rafael Rodríguez, *Structuring Early Christian Memory: Jesus in Tradition, Performance, and Text*, LNTS (London: T & T Clark, 2010); For an overview of the modern impact of ~halbwachs (and memory studies more generally) on the field of Historical Jesus studies, see Keith, "Social Memory Theory and Gospels Research," 354–76; and Chris Keith, "Social Memory Theory and Gospels Research: The First Decade (Part Two)," *EC* 6.4 (2015): 517–42.

29. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 209.

death—by virtue of the social and political reality of the day—*had* to occur in Jerusalem.³⁰ Whether or not it actually did, or whether or not that information was explicitly handed down to the authors of the Gospels is irrelevant for the purposes of collective memory. Sacred places become sacred through the process of memory *construction*, not simply through the transmission of autobiographical experience. They are spaces where significant ideas within the collective memory of a group can take concrete form. He writes, “Sacred places thus commemorate not facts certified by contemporary witnesses but rather beliefs born perhaps not far from these places and strengthened by taking root in this environment.”³¹ Localizing historical memory, therefore, functions as a way to move abstract ideas into the real world and reinforce fundamental components of the group’s collective memory.

Perhaps more interesting is ~halbwachs’s treatment of the ability for memories to coalesce and split over time. ~halbwachs makes the observation that, according to tradition (i.e., the collective memory of the Church), certain places in the Holy Land mark the location of *several* significant events. From an historical perspective ~halbwachs, obviously, doubts that these assertions are accurate—even assuming the events indeed occurred at all—but finds the clustering of these events to be more than just coincidence. For example, he writes:

One is surprised to find on the shores of the lake Gennesaret, near the Seven
Fountains, the place where apostles were chosen, the Sermon on the Mount, the

30. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 211.

31. *Ibid.*, 199.

appearance of Jesus on the waters after the Resurrection—all in the same place.³²

~halbwachs's assumption is that there was something about the location *itself*, some "earlier consecration,"³³ which attracted these memories to particular locales. Extending this rationale further, we can appreciate the fact that for Christianity, the significance of Jerusalem is not limited to the significance of the city as the location of Jesus's death, but rather by the prior significance of the city for Judaism. Within the collective memory of Christian tradition, one might say that Jerusalem is not significant because it is the location of the Passion and resurrection of Jesus, but that the Passion and resurrection of Jesus happened in Jerusalem *because Jerusalem was significant*. ~halbwachs writes:

The Christian collective memory could annex a part of Jewish collective memory only by appropriating part of the latter's local remembrance while at the same time transforming its entire perspective of historical space.³⁴

One might object to this suggestion by noting that, supposing Jesus *actually* was crucified in Jerusalem, one hardly needs to re-appropriate Jewish tradition or attribute this remembrance to some special process. Yet, it is worth pointing out in cases where the historical data are lacking (or, perhaps, where eyewitness accounts certainly did not exist),

32. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 220.

33. *Ibid.*, 220.

34. *Ibid.*, 215.

this same basic phenomenon occurred. For example, ~halbwachs points to the birth narratives of the Gospels, in particular that of Matthew, where Jesus is described as being born in Bethlehem, the “city of David.” Although there is no reason to think that Jesus was *actually* born in Bethlehem, ~halbwachs rightly observes, “the authors of the gospels seem entirely to have invented this poetic history which has occupied a considerable place in Christian History.”³⁵ In fact, Jesus’s entire portrayal in the Gospel of Matthew is an exercise in collective remembrance which is structured on the foundational narratives of the Hebrew Bible (e.g., the slaughter of innocents, and Jesus’s portrayal as a lawgiver “on the mount”), and framed as the fulfillment of Jewish prophecy.

The inverse of this phenomenon is also observable. According to ~halbwachs while some events converge to particular locations, other events diverge among several sites. One expression of this process is the way that significant events are themselves divided providing the opportunity for each portion of the event to be separately localized. For example, ~halbwachs notes how the memory of specific important events, such as the Passion, may be split and localized at a very fine level of detail:

Around Golgotha and the Holy Sepulchre, for example, we find the rock of anointing, the rock of the angel, the rock of the gardener, the place where Jesus was stripped, etc.³⁶

35. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 214.

36. *Ibid.*, 220.

The proliferation of these micro-sites of memory, according to Halbwachs, aide and reinforce the collective memory through repetition. Furthermore, the added detail serves in “renewing and rejuvenating an ancient image.”³⁷

The same event may also be localized in multiple places. Halbwachs describes several traditional locations of the Cenacle (the “Upper Room” from the Gospels), including the Mount of Olives, Gethsemane, and the Grotto of Jesus’s teaching. These traditions coexisted into the fourth century, yet, later, the site was moved to the Christian hill of Zion. Likewise, Halbachs notes that there were two locations for Emmaus and two different mountains on which Jesus is said to have appeared in Galilee after his resurrection. While it runs counter to our modern historiographical sensibilities, that seemingly contradictory traditions are able to coexist is well documented.

Halbwachs points out that autobiographical memory, however, does not allow for this kind of fragmentation. We all realize that the same event from our own past can not have happened in two locations simultaneously. Yet, Halbwachs points out that should that same person belong to two groups who disagree on a particular remembered event from history (one that the individual did not personally witness), individuals are generally able to hold such memories together (if in tension) without the need assert one or the other. The same is true of complex social entities such as religious groups who are themselves composed of smaller sects which may possess their own unique collective memory. Halbwachs writes:

37. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 220.

A community must often accommodate itself to contradictions introduced by diverse groups so long as none of these groups prevails, or so long as the community itself does not find a new reason for decisively settling the issue. This is especially true when the community faces a controversy about its rites, which are an anchor for its component groups.³⁸

2.2 THE MEMORY BOOM

Halbwachs's work, while not ignored, would not make its most significant impact until well after his death. It is frequently argued that the so-called "memory boom," which began in the 1980's in the wake of the "theory boom," picked up Halbwachs's terminology and central ideas in an attempt to deal with the perceived insufficiency of traditional historiography to deal with the sorts of major, traumatic events which characterized the mid 20th Century.³⁹ Works such as Yosef Yerushalmi's *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory* and Pierre Nora's *Les Lieux de mémoire* are typically cited as the foundational works of the modern

38. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 224.

39. Karl Galinsky, "Introduction: Memory and Memory Studies," in *Memory in Ancient Rome and Early Christianity*, ed. Karl Galinsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–39; See also Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy, "Introduction," 3–62 (29–36. One cannot help but speculate that—at least in the English-speaking world—the translation of *The Collective Memory* in 1980 contributed to the popularity of Halbwachs's terminology.).

memory boom.⁴⁰

In *Zakhor*, ~yerushalmi is quick to identify the tension between what traditional cultures and societies remember about their past and how the modern discipline of history treats the past. For remembering groups, what is preserved in the collective memory is what is useful for the edification of that group—whether through religious ritual, family stories, or some other combination of received traditions. Of course, prior to the enlightenment, this was the default mode of understanding the past for most people, and remains so for many social groups, including those within modern, Western societies. In particular, ~yerushalmi addresses this tension for the Jewish historian—a vocation which, he notes, is a recent phenomenon. Although, ancient Israel and Judah, clearly, were concerned with historical matters—much of the Hebrew Bible is preoccupied with narrating events from the perceived past—these codified traditions are preserved in a plurality of socio-religious groups for a complex set of purposes spanning cultural, social, and theological modes of discourse which are fundamentally at odds with the modern discipline of history. Thus, the biblical command to “re-

40. Kerwin Lee Klein, *From History to Theory* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 112–13; Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, SASLJS (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982; repr., New York: Schocken, 1989); Nora’s massive project has been abridged and translated into English as Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 3 vols., *European Perspectives* (New York: Columbia University Press), trans. of Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux de mémoire*, 7 vols. (Paris: Gallimard).

member,” is not a command to keep tedious notes of historically accurate events, but a cultural and theological imperative to maintain the foundational narratives of the community. Yerushalmi writes:

There the fact that history has meaning does not mean that everything that happened in history is meaningful or worthy of recollection. Of Manasseh of Judah, a powerful king, who reigned for fifty-five years in Jerusalem, we hear only that “he did what was evil in the sight of the Lord” (II Kings 21:2).⁴¹

In other words, what was remembered about Manasseh by the biblical tradants were those details which were useful for their socio-religious projects. The rules and methods of this process—remembering what is important and forgetting what is not—are generally not explicit or transparent.

The modern discipline of history, on the other hand, generally attempts to uphold a certain set of explicit methodological and theoretical criteria which—while not exempt from distortion by the subjectivity of the historian—can be corroborated or contradicted by evidence and argumentation.⁴² While the historian participates in the collective memory of her own society, her reconstruction of the past attempts to approach the topic from the outside.

41. Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 10.

42. As Daniel Pioske puts it, “What separates the act of historiography from the recounting of a culture’s sanctioned memories is consequently the historians’ determination to isolate and compare disparate testimonies about the past with other past traces that may corroborate or discredit their claims.” Daniel Pioske, “Retracing a Remembered Past: Methodological Remarks

The historian, too, (re)constructs the past, but the goals of the historian are, as Yerushalmi puts it, to recreate “an ever more detailed past whose shapes and textures memory does not recognize.”⁴³ Even the most theory-conscious historian cannot help but struggle in avoiding older discourses about “what really happened,” particularly when stated over and against memory in the form of received tradition. All of this is not to say that modern history writing is in any meaningful sense “objective,” nor that the historian is able to remove herself from her own socio-political context. So, although memory and history both offer reconstructions of the past, it is important to affirm that their modes of doing so are radically different.⁴⁴

Thus the memory “boom” has, in some circles, been viewed as anti-historical and an attempt at “resacrilization of the past” brought about by the disenchantment brought about by modern historical consciousness⁴⁵ Kerwin Klein, for example, traces the origins of scholarly interest surrounding memory and lists five narratives that others have offered as explanation Memory, History, and the Hebrew Bible,” *BibInt* 23.3 (2015): 291–315.

43. Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 94; See also Peter J. Verovšek, “Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm,” *PGI* 4.3 (2016): 529–43.

44. Pioske observes, “The epistemological tension observed by Ricoeur between memory and history is thus understood as the outcome of two processes that, though having the similar intent of re-presenting former phenomena, nevertheless pursue and mediate the past through quite disparate means.” Pioske, “Retracing a Remembered Past,” 302.

45. Winter, *Remembering War*, 282.

nations for the origins of memory discourse in society generally:

We have, then, several alternative narratives of the origins of our new memory discourse. The first, following Pierre Nora, holds that we are obsessed with memory because we have destroyed it with historical consciousness. A second holds that memory is a new category of experience that grew out of the modernist crisis of the self in the nineteenth century and then gradually evolved into our current usage. A third sketches a tale in which Hegelian historicism took up premodern forms of memory that we have since modified through structural vocabularies. A fourth implies that memory is a mode of discourse natural to people without history, and so its emergence is a salutary feature of decolonization. And a fifth claims that memory talk is a belated response to the wounds of modernity.⁴⁶

Although Klein finds none of these “fully satisfying,” it is noteworthy that the general trend among these narratives corroborates the thesis that memory represents a “reaction” against history in some form.

Whatever combination of these causes may have ultimately brought about the memory boom, the problem remains, according to Klein, that memory has come to dominate

46. Kerwin Lee Klein, “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” in *From History to Theory* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 112–37, repr. of “On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” *Representations* 69 (2000): 127–50.

historical discourse as a “therapeutic alternative” to history in place of a rigorous scientific methodology.⁴⁷ As Winter puts it, “It is a fix for those who cannot stand the harshness of critical thinking or historical analysis.”⁴⁸ Although I think Klein under-appreciates the value of the memory discourse as a meaningful mode of inquiry, I am in fact, quite sympathetic to his critique overall. As methodologies for querying the past, memory and history operate on different sets of hermeneutical and epistemological foundations, which is, I think, one of Yerushalmi’s main points. However, what Klein does not address is the way that, for modern Westerners, history *is* our collective memory (or at least, heavily influences our collective memory). This is what Nora means when he says that “We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left.”⁴⁹ And for Klein, this is a good thing—historical consciousness is uniquely valuable as a scientific endeavor and jettisoning this critical posture toward the past is tantamount to abandoning the enlightenment.

For modern historians studying the collective memory of other modern people, it is easy to conflate the historical consciousness of the historian subject and that of the object. Such historical work relies on court documents, news articles, eyewitness accounts, and other documentary evidence that operates within an historical consciousness that closely resembles that of the historian. As a result, the historian can utilize her own historical intu-

47. Klein, *From History to Theory*, 137.

48. Winter, *Remembering War*, 283 (summarizing Klein).

49. Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” in “Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory,” *Representations* 26, 1989, 7–24.

itions when interacting with her sources. In ~halbwachs's terms, the social frameworks (in this case the understanding of the way "history" is done) of the historian and their object of study are quite similar. For example, reading news reports from the mid-twentieth century does not require the historian to dramatically reorient her understanding of what "news" is. On the other hand, when studying ancient history, the intellectual distance between the source and the historian is, often, much more pronounced. Reading "historical" texts which present themselves in fairly neutral terms often requires a degree of hermeneutical suspicion that similar documents from the modern age do not.

In fact, biblical scholars in particular have been dealing with this problem since the enlightenment. The tension between memory and history is played out clearly in both Jewish and Christian circles ~vis-a-vis historical-critical study of the Bible. Insofar as the Bible forms a major portion of both Jewish and Christian collective memory, historical-critical approaches to the biblical text continue to be met with fervent opposition in more conservative traditions. Parallels to what Klein describes within the discipline of History can be seen within biblical studies as well. Consider, for example, the way that Brevard Childs's canonical approach attempted to "overcome the long-established tension between the canon and criticism."⁵⁰ For Childs, writing an introduction to the Old Testament in the traditional manner (i.e., as an historical-critical introduction) was insufficient for use in churches or synagogues because it bypassed a fundamental aspect of the biblical text, the canon. Although

50. Brevard S. Childs, *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 45.

he does not use the language of memory in his discussion of canon (though, it should be noted he made an important early contribution to the idea of memory in the biblical tradition which, I imagine, is not a coincidence⁵¹), here we can see that the various canons of scripture in use by Christians and Jews throughout the world nevertheless function as a form of collective memory by constructing and filtering what should and should not be remembered by the community.

The tension between history and memory (or “canon and criticism”) is most problematic—as evidenced by Childs—when the historian participates within the collective memory of the community under investigation. This is why both Childs and ~yerushalmi express their discomfort and dissatisfaction while attempting to operate with one foot in each world. This is the central critique of Klein: historians operate from the outside looking in (an etic approach), while practitioners of memory operate from within (an emic approach). Yet, this etic/emic distinction only makes sense when memory is placed on equal footing with history as a means of interrogating the past. From this perspective, I wholeheartedly agree with Klein that such an approach undercuts the epistemological foundations of modern historical inquiry. However, Klein does not address memory as the *object* of historical study. This, I think, is what makes ~yerushalmi’s approach so intriguing. Although he acknowledges his precarious position as a Jewish historian, ~yerushalmi discusses memory *as an historian* and it is this approach which I think is the most fruitful avenue of memory research. Thus, this dissertation will treat memory as a phenomenon which can be studied historically rather

51. Brevard S. Childs, *Memory and Tradition in Israel*, SBT 37 (London: SCM Press, 1962).

than as a source of information about the past.

2.3 MEMORY, MYTH, AND THE “ACTUAL PAST”

~halbwachs’s did not see any reason to assume that the remembered past had any meaningful connection to the “actual past.” Because memory is always constructed in the present for use in the present, the “actual past” does not carry any meaningful influence on this (re)construction. It was in his ~legendary-topography that ~halbwachs makes this case most forcefully, and I think he does so quite convincingly. ~halbwachs’s understanding of memory as a phenomenon of the present has thus earned him the label of “presentist” or “constructivist” over and against a number of more recent theorists who wish to attribute some normative force to the past.⁵²

2.3.1 The Presentist Perspective

This presentist mantle has been donned by a number of more recent scholars, perhaps most notably by the German scholars Jan and Aleida Assmann.⁵³ Where ~halbwachs distinguished

52. Coser, Introduction, 27–30.

53. See esp. Jan Assmann, “Memory and Culture,” in *Memory: A History*, ed. Dmitri Nikulin, OPC (New York: Oxford University Press), 325–49; Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Aleida Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

between autobiographical and historical memory, Jan Assmann describes what he calls communicative and cultural memory (German: *kommunikatives* and *kulturelles Gedächtnis*, respectively).⁵⁴ Rather than focus on the relationship of the rememberer to the experience (viz. whether the memory is “autobiographical”), this terminology essentially distinguishes between synchronic and diachronic processes of memory. On the one hand, communicative memory represents a synchronic, or “horizontal” memory shared by a society at a particular chronological horizon based on direct communication between individuals. According to Assmann, this memory has a temporal horizon of 80–100 years—limited by spatial (where people are) and chronological (how long people live) factors. He writes:

A typical instance would be generational memory that accrues within the group, originating and disappearing with time or, to be more precise, with its carriers.

Once those who embodied it have died, it gives way to a new memory.⁵⁵

On the other hand, at the end of this crucial period, as particular memories begin to drop from current discourse and lose relevance; as those individuals with direct connections to the events, people, and places which the memories involve die off, the remembering community will either forget or transform the memory for long-term transmission in the form of *cultural memory*. The canonization of memory at points during this period is a conscious,

54. Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 36; For a concise terminological crash-course, see Hübenthal, “Social and Cultural Memory,” 182–83.

55. Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 36.

constructive activity by a remembering group.⁵⁶

Where ~halbwachs's terminology took as its point of departure the psychological perspectives of Freud⁵⁷ and Bergson,⁵⁸ Assmann's taxonomy is rooted in ethnological research on oral traditions, specifically that of Jan Vansina and his notion of a "floating gap" between the present and the distant past.⁵⁹ Vansina observes that in oral cultures often there is an abundance of common knowledge about current goings-on and a similar abundance of shared knowledge about the distant past (esp. with regard to origin stories and the like), but there often exists a gap for the not-so-distant past. The proportion of collective knowledge, therefore, is unevenly distributed between two chronological poles of memory, although members of the society in question may not perceive it as such in their own reconstructions of the past.⁶⁰ In other words, from the perspective of the remembering society, often there exists a continuity between the distant past (often legendary or mythic) and the near-past (a few generations, at most) where in reality a good deal of the not-so-recent past has fallen from memory. Memory of the near-past—those things which, while not necessarily "autobiographical" to every rememberer, nevertheless are reinforced by those with autobio-

56. Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 45.

57. Terdiman, "Memory in Freud," 93–108.

58. Ansell-Pearson, "Bergson on Memory," 61–76.

59. Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

60. Ibid., 23–24; As Assmann, observes, "In the cultural memory of a group, both levels of the past merge seamlessly into one another." Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 35.

graphical memory—is categorized as “communicative” because it is memory that it generated and spread in the present by those with direct access to the events in question. Those memories which are deemed significant enough to not be forgotten—those which make up cultural memory—undergo a process by which they are transformed from “factual into remembered history,” and may take the form of myth or legend.⁶¹ Thus, according to Assmann, myth and legend cannot be distinguished from “history” as a part of cultural memory. The significance of an event is not tied to whether or not it is “factual,” but by its “truth” seen through its continued relevance to the remembering community in the present.⁶² Assmann writes:

Myth is foundational history that is narrated in order to illuminate the present from the standpoint of its origins. The Exodus, for instance, regardless of any historical accuracy, is the myth behind the foundation of Israel; thus it is celebrated at Pesach and thus it is part of the cultural memory of the Israelites.

61. Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 37–38.

62. Paul Veyne offers a particularly stimulating discussion of the perception of the past and its relationship to myth. He concludes his book with the insightful quote, “The theme of this book was very simple. Merely by reading the title, anyone with the slightest historical background would immediately have answered, ‘but of course they believed in their myths!’ We have simply wanted also to make clear that what is true of ‘them’ is also true of ourselves and to bring out the implications of this primary truth.” Paul Veyne, *Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination*, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 128–29.

Through memory, history becomes myth. This does not make it unreal—on the contrary, this is what makes it real, in the sense that it becomes a lasting, normative, and formative power.⁶³

Assmann's understanding of the relationship of the actual past to a society's cultural memory, therefore is not concerned with the discussion of the historicity of cultural memory. Although Assmann does not dismiss cultural memory as a source for historical inquiry, like ~halbwachs, his primary interest is in exploring the constructive, presentist aspects of memory.

2.3.2 The Continuity Perspective

Critics of ~halbwachs's presentist posture (and, by extension, that of Jan and Aleida Assmann) agree that memory is malleable but argue that there are constraints placed upon memory which mitigate unbounded fictionalization of the remembered past. This so-called "continuity" (or "essentialist") perspective—primarily associated with the American sociologist Barry Schwartz—insists that the "actual" past carries some normative force in the shaping of collective memory.⁶⁴ Critiquing Halbwach's, Schwartz writes:

63. Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 38.

64. Schwartz has made numerous contributions to the field of memory studies. See esp. Barry Schwartz, "The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory," *SF* 61.2 (1982): 374–402; Barry Schwartz, "Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George Washington," *ASR* 56.2 (1991): 221–36; and Barry Schwartz, *Abraham Lincoln*

Unfortunately, this [~halbwachs's presentist] perspective has problems of its own. It promotes the idea that our conception of the past is entirely at the mercy of current conditions, that there is no objectivity in events, nothing in history which transcends the peculiarities of the present.⁶⁵

At the heart of the so-called "continuity" approach is the conviction that while memories are often—perhaps always—conditioned by the present, there is a limit to the amount of distortion acceptable to the remembering community. As Michael Schudson puts it, "The past is in some respects and under some conditions, highly resistant to efforts to make it over."⁶⁶

In fact, I think the conceptual distance between the presentist and continuity perspectives is not as great as some have made it out to be. Neither ~halbwachs nor Assmann assert that there *cannot* be any historical value to cultural/collective memory, nor that such memory cannot be used for historiographical purposes. For example, in ~legendary-topography, ~halbwachs takes seriously that the figure of Jesus *did* exist as an historical person while making it clear that he does not accept the Gospels at face value as historically accurate (he explicitly compares his basic approach toward the historicity of the Gospels as similar to that and the Forge of National Memory (2000); Note also the SBL volume specifically interacting with his work: Tom Thatcher, ed., *Memory and Identity in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity: A Conversation with Barry Schwartz*, SemSt 78 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2014).

65. Schwartz, "The Social Context of Commemoration," 376.

66. Michael Schudson, "The Present in the Past versus the Past in the Present," *Communication* 11.2 (1989): 105–13.

of Ernst Renan). Throughout the work, ~halbwachs does talk about the “actual” past and allows for the possibility that the Gospels do refer, at least partially, to real events. In other words, he does not make the argument that the Gospels were fabricated of whole-cloth and instead takes the position that the “actual past” is irretrievable and unknowable and that historical memory has no obligation to align with the actual past as such. On the other hand, Schwartz and the continuity perspective never argue that memory is *reliable*, but instead that memory ought not be treated as *entirely* arbitrary. In other words, the two perspectives both agree on the central premise that memory is shaped by society in the present, but they each approach the question of memory’s connection to the actual past from opposite ends of the epistemological spectrum.

This difference in perspective, I think, is attributable to the respective fields that Assmann and Schwartz deal with in their own research. As an Egyptologist dealing with literatures from the ancient Near East, Assmann necessarily is reliant on scant documentary evidence that may or may not have any supporting evidence whatsoever. The same can be said of other ancient fields such as biblical studies, Assyriology and Classics. Under these circumstances, the historian *must* approach her sources with an appreciation for the intellectual gap that exists between the historian her source, particularly when not corroborated by an independent alternate source. On the other hand, Schwartz, as an Americanist, is able to marshal a plethora of contemporary sources for reconstructing the collective memory of the antebellum United States. What each scholar is able to assume about his sources speaks to their instincts toward the reliability of those sources. Furthermore, Schwartz deals with a com-

paratively disenchanted society whose historical consciousness more closely resembles our own, while Assmann deals with societies for whom myth and legend are not distinguished from history. Their historical methodologies may be the same, but the *kinds* of sources that each field deals with creates a different set of scholarly instincts for dealing with the idea of memory and its relation to the actual past.

Because this dissertation deals with the way that early Judaism interacted with its own received collective memory (rather than how it created those memories to begin with), I will tend to interact with the topic of collective memory from the perspective of ~halbwachs and Assmann. This is not to say that I am entirely unsympathetic to Schwartz’s critique of a purely presentist approach, only that the particulars of this project preclude the need to discuss the relationship between memory and the “actual” past.

2.4 MEMORY AND ~RWB

Having laid the theoretical foundation of modern memory studies, we may now turn our attention to the particulars of this study, namely, addressing the way that social memory studies can meaningfully augment the scholarly discussion surrounding ~rwb.⁶⁷

At this point it should be fairly obvious how the Hebrew Bible may be convincingly framed as both the product and progenitor of collective and cultural memory during the

67. See also George J. Brooke, “Memory, Cultural Memory and Rewriting Scripture,” in *Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years: Texts, Terms, or Techniques? A Last Dialogue with Geza Vermes*, ed. József Zsengellér, JSJsup 166 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 119–36.

late Persian and Early Hellenistic periods. In Halbwachs's terms, the biblical text represents the common, collective memory of ~2T Judaism which formed the basis for Jewish collective identity as a people of the land which ~yahweh promised to Abraham and into which ~yahweh lead the people of Israel, "with a might hand and an outstretched arm" after their miraculous escape from the land of Egypt and subsequent desert wanderings. Bracketing any discussions of the historicity of these biblical narratives, by the late ~2T period they would have been perceived as the true and central foundation narratives to any number of Jewish groups both in and out of Persian Yehud and Roman Palestine. In Assmann's terms, the biblical texts—and in particular the stories of the patriarchs, Exodus, and Conquest narratives—carried "a lasting, normative, and formative power,"⁶⁸ which can be observed concretely by their preservation both in antiquity (e.g., at ~qumran as well in translation) and into the modern era.

The process of textual interpretation, therefore, provides an analog to the process of remembrance. Just as memories are recalled into and shaped by a set of social frameworks which may be alien to their original context, so too the interpretation of texts and traditions is shaped by the social frameworks of the interpreter. Because any single text or narrative represents only a sliver of the thick nexus of ideas that is collective memory, not only is a text always read into new social circumstances, but it is always read into a new literary context and discursive arena. No two readings of a given text will every be the same. Each reading is affected by the collective memory of the reader(s) which is constantly adapting

68. Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 38.

and in flux as new memories are added and others are forgotten.

~RwB, therefore, can be understood as a set of snapshots revealing the ways that the collective memory of ~2T Judaism was being used within Jewish communities (or, at the very least within some scribal circles) to shape remembering communities's identities. This shaping, however, was not a passive process, but elicited creative, constructive participation to not only "read" the past, but to rewrite it as well. These texts themselves would have contributed to the collective memories of their respective groups. The disparate ways that ~rwb texts were retained or jettisoned from various religious groups in antiquity illustrate the ways that new memories can be added to a group's cultural memory and be adopted as a part of its historical self-understanding. The three texts which I will treat in this dissertation each meet a different outcome. Chronicles—which I have framed (loosely) as a rewriting of Samuel–Kings—was adopted by both Jews and Christians in antiquity as a part of their cultural memory and became a part of both traditions's canon of scripture. The ~ga, on the other hand, seems to have not been retained by any religious community, although, it may have impacted some later traditions. Finally, ~jub was not retained in Jewish circles, but *was* retained within certain segments of early Christianity and eventually became a part of the canon of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

Simply labeling these ~rwb texts as examples of social or cultural memory, however, is rather uncontroversial. Such an assertion hardly requires a dissertation-length study and the task has already been sufficiently accomplished, to my mind, by Brooke.⁶⁹ Thus, this dis-

69. Brooke, "Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years," 119–36.

sertation will attempt to go beyond simply labeling ~rwb texts as exemplars of memory and instead attempt to offer a description of the processes by which ~rwb texts functioned within the collective memory of ~2T Judaism(s). Many of these processes already exist within the scholarly discourse surrounding ~rwb. For example, from the perspective of textual production, the topics of biblical interpretation, inner-biblical exegesis, and scribal culture are not new to the topic of biblical or ~qumran studies. But each can provide valuable insights into the ways that groups of individuals understood and recalled their cultural memory and what in particular they found most valuable about their cultural memories. Approaching ~rwb through the lens of social memory studies attempts to take a step back and address their *function* as the means by which ~2T Judaism experienced its past in its present. Social memory studies, therefore, is not an alternative to more traditional modes of analysis, but a compliment.

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Chapter 3: Genesis Pseudepocryphon

This chapter examines the ~ga through and it will do so by discussing the ~ga at three distinct levels of discourse: structurally at the macro level as an example of ~psy, in terms of keying and framing at the level of narrative discourse, and finally from the perspective of biblical discourse.

3.1 ~GA, FIRST PERSON NARRATIVE, AND ~PSY

One of the most striking features of the ~ga when compared to other ~rbw texts is its pervasive use of the first-person voice to narrate the events of the story. Although the literary unity of the work has been advocated by noted scholars such as Moshe Bernstein, formally, ~ga is made up of what appears to be three discrete narrative units.¹ Each section is presented as a first-person recounting of biblical events by a notable figure from within the biblical story: first Lamech, then Noah, then Abram. Although the beginnings of the Lamech and Abram accounts were lost to damage to the scroll, col. 5.29 seems to offer a superscription for the account of Noah, reconstructed as *[pršgn] ktb mly nwh* “[a copy of] the book of the words of Noah.”

1. Moshe Bernstein, “Divine Titles and Epithets and the Sources in the Genesis Apocryphon,” *JBL* 128 (2009): 291–310.

Based on this superscription, it is reasonable to suppose that the accounts of Lamech and Abram, too, had such superscriptions, although at least two complicating factors should be taken into account. First, while the extant portions of ~ga present themselves as distinct units, both the very beginning and the very end of the scroll have been lost. From a structural standpoint, this fact should elicit caution because it is at the beginning and end of texts where such features as “framing narratives” and other explanatory material is often located. Without definitive evidence of the presence or absence of such features one must be extra cautious when making observations about the rhetorical purpose of the macro-structure of a particular text. Second, although all three accounts are *generally* written in the first-person, none of them are rigorously committed to maintaining the voice. As Loren Stuckenbruck notes, each of the three “documents,” at one point or another, falls into some kind of third-person voice: Lamech in 5.24-25, Noah in 16.14-17.19, and Abram in 21.23-22.34. Stuckenbruck also puts the superscription of the “book of the words of Noah” into this category. This is a good example of how the macro-structure of the work is important for this kind of analysis. By treating the superscription as a contribution of the “author” of a unified ~ga, Stuckenbruck understands the superscription to be “in the third person” and would (apparently) treat each first-person account as an embedded narrative within a larger framing narrative (of which the superscription would be a part). For example, if the beginning of the scroll gave a brief framing narrative, describing a young man who discovered three scrolls in the desert and thus proceeded to provide “a copy of the book of the words of X,” Stuckenbruck would be absolutely correct. However, if one understands the superscription to be

an editorial insertion, it does not make sense to include it as an example of third-person discourse for the same reasons it does not make sense to say that Ps 23 uses third-person discourse by beginning with *mizmôr lā-dāwid*.²

3.1.1 Pseudepigraphy and the Implied Author

Writing in the voice of these early biblical figures formally places ~ga into the literary category of ~psy and so we should take a moment to clearly state the way that I will use the

2. Loren T. Stuckenbruck, “Pseudepigraphy and First Person Discourse in the Dead Sea Documents: From the Aramaic Texts to the Writings of the *Yahad*,” in *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Contemporary Culture: Proceedings of the International Conference held at the Israel Museum, Jerusalem (July 6-8, 2008)*, ed. Adolfo D. Roitman, Lawrence H. Schiffman and Shani Tzoref, STDJ 93 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 295–326; See also Moshe J. Bernstein, “Pseudepigraphy in the Qumran Scrolls: Categories and Functions,” in *Pseudepigraphic Perspectives: The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls: Proceedings of the [Second] International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, 12–14 January, 1997*, ed. Estelle Glickler Chazon, Michael Edward Stone, Avital Pinnick et al., STDJ 31 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 1–26 (15–16. Even supposing a single author for ~ga, as Stuckenbruck and others imply, I am still inclined to consider the superscriptions separately from the former examples because they would exist outside the frame of each embedded narrative.).

“~psy,” “~psa,” and related terms.³

In the simplest terms, ~psa are texts which fictively purport to be written by figures (typically) from the ancient past. For our purposes, I would like to further distinguish between texts which *portray themselves* and texts which were latter *attributed to* ancient fig-

3. The topic of ~psy has received a large amount of very sophisticated attention in recent years. See especially Eva Mroczek, *The Literary Imagination in Jewish Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Eibert Tigchelaar, “Old Testament Pseudepigrapha and the Scriptures,” in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha and the Scriptures*, ed. Eibert Tigchelaar, BETL 270 (2014), 1–18; Annette Yoshiko Reed, “Pseudepigraphy and/as Prophecy: Continuity and Transformation in the Formation and Reception of Early Enochic Writings,” in *Revelation, Literature, and Community in Late Antiquity*, ed. Philippa Townsend and Moulie Vidas, TSAJ (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 25–42; Annette Yoshiko Reed, “The Modern Invention of ‘Old Testament Pseudepigrapha,’” *JTS* 60 (2009): 403–36; Annette Yoshiko Reed, “Pseudepigraphy, Authorship and the Reception of ‘the Bible’ in Late Antiquity,” in *The Reception and Interpretation of the Bible in Late Antiquity: Proceedings of the Montréal Colloquium in Honour of Charles Kannengiesser, 11–13 October 2006*, ed. Lorenzo DiTommaso and Lucian Turcescu, BAC 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 467–90; Hindy Najman, “How Should We Contextualize Pseudepigrapha? Imitation and Emulation in 4 Ezra,” in *Flores Florentino: Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Early Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino Garcia Martinez*, ed. Anthony Hilhorst, Émile Puech and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, JSJsup 122 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 529–36; Hindy Najman, *Seconding Sinai : The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

ures. Bernstein helpfully distinguishes between these two phenomena by labeling the former “authoritative” ~psy and the latter “decorative” ~psy.⁴ While the two phenomena are no doubt related, it is the act of writing in the name of another figure which interests me. Thus, Ps 23, again, although attributed to David, I assume was not *actually* written by him, nor was it written *as if* it had been written by him. Major portions of 1 Enoch, on the other hand (in particular the latter three books, Astronomical Writings [72–82], Dream Visions [83–90], and the Epistle of Enoch [91–107]) were *written as though* they were written by Enoch himself. Less clear-cut examples, however, require a more nuanced definition. For example, Deuteronomy is not generally referred to as among the ~psa (see below), yet, from a literary perspective, it is framed as *had-dəbārîm ’ăšer dibber mōšeh ’el-kol-yîsrā’el* “the words which Moses spoke to all Israel” (Deut 1:1a). Was Moses the author? Many Jews and Christians from antiquity up to (and for some, including) the modern era, of course, believed so. But whether Deuteronomy was *written* as ~psa or just attributed to Moses is difficult to say with certainty. What we *can* say is that there are concrete literary cues within Deuteronomy which suggest Mosaic authorship more strongly than, say Genesis, which was also attributed to Moses in antiquity.

The ancient use of the term ~psa denoted spurious texts which Church leaders be-

4. He also identifies a third form, “convenient” ~psy which is located somewhere between the two. I do not find this category as helpful. Bernstein, “Pseudepigraphy in the Qumran Scrolls,” 3–7.

lieved to be intentionally misleading about their authorship.⁵ The number of (esp. Jewish) ~psgraphical texts discovered within the past century provide good reason to question the assumption that pseudonymous authors's intentions were to deceive their readers.⁶ Thus, I wish to eschew the value judgments of this ancient usage. At the other end of the spectrum, in some scholarly discourse, the term “~psa” has become generalized to encompass any text written in around the turn of the era which did not make it into the canon of rabbinic Judaism or early Christianity. Bernstein observes, for example, that although the first volume of James Charlesworth's two-volume *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* contains formally ~ps-graphic works, the second volume includes many which do not meet the formal definition of ~psa.⁷ This expansive practice, likewise, is not particularly helpful for clarifying the term and so I will attempt to restrict my usage to a more clearly defined set of criteria.

Thus I will use the terms ~psy and ~psa to refer to texts (or practices) which seem to

5. See esp. Hist. Eccl. 6.12.2 where the Bishop of Antioch, Serapion, refers to the * Gospel of Peter* among the a number of works “falsely attributed”: γάρ, ἀδελφοί, καὶ Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποστόλους ἀποδεχόμεθα ὡς Χριστόν, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματι αὐτῶν ψευδεπίγραφα ὡς ἔμπειροι παραιτούμεθα, γινώσκοντες ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ παρελάβομεν. “For we, brothers, accept both Peter and the other apostles as Christ, but we skillfully reject those falsely ascribed writings, knowing that they were not handed down to us.”

6. Mroczek, *The Literary Imagination in Jewish Antiquity*, 53–58; See also Reed, “The Modern Invention of ‘Old Testament Pseudepigrapha’,” 403–36.

7. Bernstein, “Pseudepigraphy in the Qumran Scrolls,” 2; OTP.

actively construct a fictive implied author whose identity would have been well-known and meaningful to its reader and who (typically) would have lived in the distant past.

The term “implied author” also deserves a clear definition; I have adopted that of H. Porter Abbott:

Neither the real *author* nor the *narrator*, the implied author is the idea of the author constructed by the reader as she or he reads the *narrative*. In an *intentional reading*, the implied author is that sensibility and moral intelligence that the reader gradually constructs to infer the intended meanings and effects of the narrative. The implied author might as easily (and with greater justice) be called the “inferred author”⁸

Because the implied author is a construction of the reader, it is frequently not desirable to talk about this construct as a literary feature so much as a heuristic for intentional reading. Part of the advantage of basing the definition of ~psy on the idea of the implied author is that it mitigates any prejudice toward the intention of the author to deceive (maliciously or otherwise) his reader. Thus, the question of “who” the implied author *is* generally misses the point. In the case of ~psy, however, the central formal characteristic of the work seems to be the *intentional construction of a known implied author*. Therefore, one could make the case that what is characteristic about ~psgraphic texts is the intentionality on the part of

8. H. Porter Abbott, *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*, 2 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 235.

the real author to shape the processes by which their readers's construct an implied author. Where Abbott notes that the term "inferred author" may be a better term than "implied author" (the connotation shifts the active role to the reader) when discussing ~psy, "implied" still fits quite well (since we can attribute some intentionality to the real author). The implied author, therefore, provides an important point of contact between the reader and the (real) author.

and further to consider that their readers were aware of and participants in the authorial fiction. In such a case, the implied author would elicit an entirely different set of sensibilities for the reader to "infer the intended meanings and effects of the narrative."⁹

3.1.2 Scripture, ~Psy and Memory Construction

The vast majority of the Hebrew Bible is narrated in the third-person omniscient and is formally anonymous. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization, most notably within the prophetic corpus (such as Isa 6–8), the so-called Nehemiah Memoir (Neh 11–13), and perhaps works such as Deuteronomy and Song of Songs. But for the lion's share of the biblical text, the implied author operates invisibly.

The rhetorical force of this particular authorial voice, as observed by Erhard Blum, is significant for the function of the Hebrew Bible's participation in the collective memory of the communities that claim it as their own. Although the implied author does occasionally engage directly with the reader by offering explanatory observations (for example where the

9. Abbott, *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*, 235.

author inserts phrases like “this is why...” or “...until this day”), for all intents and purposes, the implied author presents as both *reliable* and *authoritative* without a hint of subjectivity. As Blum puts it, “In this sense the narrative does not distinguish the depiction from the depicted.”¹⁰ Put another way, the text does not acknowledge that it *has* an author, it simply *is*. The rhetorical effect of this invisible, omniscient author is to collapse the knowledge gap between the reader and the events narrated by removing the author from view. This move, according to Blum, allows the text to convey “an unmediated truth claim which is not based on the author’s distinguishable critical judgments and convictions.”¹¹ The effectiveness of this implied author, according to Blum, is tied to the pragmatics of the text, that is, tied to the context of the biblical narratives as scripture (though, Blum does not refer to “scripture” *per se*). The implied audience of the biblical narratives by-and-large can be understood as group-insiders for whom the biblical text worked to reinforce group identity. Such “unmediated truth claims” *were* in fact mediated and reinforced by those who (orally or otherwise) transmitted the tradition from one generation to another.¹² In other words, one might say that the

10. Erhard Blum, “Historiography or Poetry? The Nature of the Hebrew Bible Prose Tradition,” in *Memory in the Bible and Antiquity: The Fifth Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium (Durham, September 2004), September 2004*, ed. Stephen C. Barton, Loren T. Stuckenbruck and Benjamin G. Wold, WUNT 212 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 25–45.

11. *Ibid.*, 33.

12. *Ibid.*, 33.

implied author of the biblical text is the community's collective memory.¹³

In contrast to the omniscient implied biblical author, the ~ga frames itself as a collection of first-person accounts which formally fall into the category of ~psy. If we take seriously Blum's characterization of the way that the biblical text may have engaged with the collective memory of Israel based on the formal, narratological features of the text, it stands to reason that the ~ga as first-person ~psy would engage that collective memory in a different way despite the relative similarity of the textual content. The ~psgraphic quality of ~ga shapes the way that the text engages with the remembered past by describing the biblical story through the mouths of important figures. Here "story" refers to the abstract sequence of actions which the narrative describes. The way a story is recounted, on the other hand, is referred to by narratologists as *narrative discourse*. Thus the ~ga's change from third-person omniscient to a ~psgraphical first-person narrative can be understood as a change in *narrative discourse* which, broadly, retains the same *story* as that of the biblical text.

Approaching these questions from the perspective of Social Memory Studies asks us to think about the way that differing social frameworks and cognitive contexts may have

13. Blum writes, "If we assume that the traditional literature was primarily transmitted through oral means, than the narrator who is speaking supplies the material with a personal presence; he is not present as an author who judges and evaluates his sources from a critical distance, but as a 'transmitter' who participates in the tradition itself and is able to lend it credence through his own personality, his standing, and/or his office." Blum, "Historiography or Poetry?" 33.

allowed for or demanded presenting this material in a different form than its *Vorlage*.

One of the difficulties in dealing with ~psy is the apparently divergent ways that the authors and original readers may have understood ~psy as compared to the way that later groups (e.g., Church Fathers, modern scholars) treat it. The crux of the issue, it seems to me, is less to do with whether the author intended to “deceive” his audience, and more to do with whether the readers understood themselves to be reading something “authentic” or were willing participants in an authorial fiction. Yet, even language of “authenticity” or “fiction” presupposes that such terms were a meaningful part of the discourse surrounding “scripture” during the late ~2T period.

3.2 ABRAM IN THE DIASPORA: KEYING AND FRAMING IN ~GA

While retelling portions of Genesis as first-person narrative reorients the way that the story engages with the received tradition and collective memory at the macro-level the narrative of the ~ga is not simply a straight-forward retelling of Genesis from the perspectives of Lamech, Noah, and Abram. Indeed, what is most compelling about ~rwb texts very often is the ways that they depart from the biblical narrative. These departures can come at the level of story by adding, removing, or rearranging events or at the level of narrative discourse by describing events differently or with different emphases. In the case of ~ga, and in particular in the account of Abram in cols. 19–22, the biblical narrative has been recast as a (first-person) Hellenistic novella in a similar vein to other well-known Second Temple Jewish works such as the narrative portions of Daniel (including the Greek additions), Esther, Tobit,

and (arguably) the so-called Joseph novella of Genesis 37 and 39–50.¹⁴

The reading of ~ga 19–20 as a Hellenistic Jewish novella has recently been very thoroughly explicated by Blake Jurgens, who has further argued that the utilization of Hellenistic literary motifs and structures in ~ga altered the overall purpose the the pericope for the purpose of edifying Jews living in the Hellenistic world in the shadow of empire.¹⁵ Although much of Jurgen’s paper is based on long-established observations about the literary influences on ~ga, he makes the important discursive turn toward the audience by claiming that the ~ga was meant to be useful to readers:

By imbuing its story with literary tropes and techniques similar to those found in Dan 1–6, Esther, and other Jewish texts arising out of the Hellenistic period, the author successfully attends to the narrational ambiguities of Gen 12:10–20 through interpretive expansion upon the latent exegetical links of the text while

14. See especially Lawrence Wills work on the Jewish novels and novellas in antiquity: Lawrence Wills, *Ancient Jewish Novels: An Anthology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); as well as his important earlier works: Lawrence Wills, *The Jewish Novel in the Ancient World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Lawrence Wills, *The Jew in the Court of the Foreign King* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1990).

15. Blake A. Jurgens, “A Wandering Aramean in Pharaoh’s Court: The Literary Relationship Between Abram’s Sojourn in Egypt in 1QapGen 19-20 and Jewish Fictional Literature,” *JSJ*, 2018, 1–34, doi:10.1163/15700631-12492196.

concurrently modifying the narrative to appeal to contemporary literary expectations.¹⁶

The process of this transcription, which he terms “fictionalization,” is described by Jurgens in the six distinct narrative units within cols. 19-20 of ~ga which describe Abram and Sarai’s sojourn in Egypt: the decent into Egypt, Abram’s dream vision, the banquet Scene, praise of Sarai’s beauty, Abram’s prayer, and the final court contest. In each section Jurgens notes the ways that the ~ga utilizes literary structures common to its broader Hellenistic milieu to rewrite the events of this story. Jurgens offers a very thorough description of the ways that the ~ga utilizes these literary structures and makes a plausible claim that these changes were meant to engage readers in familiar style. Thinking in terms of social memory, however, we can appreciate the way that the story of Abram and Sarai in Egypt is “remembered into” the social context of Hellenistic Judaism and is fitted into the contemporary social frameworks (read: literary conventions) therein.

While ~halbwachs addressed the fact that memories are shaped by the present, recently Barry Schwartz has attempted to more clearly articulate this process. One of the most important contributions of Schwartz’s work in this area is his conviction that the interactions between the remembered past and the present are not unidirectional. Where ~halbwachs limits his discussion to the describing the ways that memories of the past are shaped by the present, Schwartz sees the past as a potent force in the present as well. In other words, not only does the present influence the way the past is remembered, but the past *itself* (that

16. Jurgens, “A Wandering Aramean in Pharaoh’s Court,” 27.

is, both the remembered and “actual” past) also effects the present.

Schwartz employs two terms, “keying” and “framing,” to describe this additional dimension to the way that the past impacts the present. On the one hand the idea of “keying” can be understood as way of

3.2.1 Setting

One of the primary features of these novellas is their setting. Jurgens notes that, typically, these Jewish novellas are set in the diaspora, which invariably place the Jewish (or, in Tobit and Judith’s case, Israelite) protagonist under the hegemony of a foreign power. In the case of ~ga, although not properly “diaspora,” Abram is a sojourner in a foreign land and is under foreign hegemony. Moreover, from a modern perspective, these stories have a tendency to commit rather egregious factual errors about certain historical particulars such as the names of rulers (Judith 1:1; Dan 4; Tobit) and geographic items (Tobit 5:6). Likewise, ~ga seems to utilize details which almost certainly were inventions of the author (or an earlier tradant) such as referring to “Pharaoh Zoan” (we know of no such figure) and Herqanos, a name popular in the Ptolemaic period, but not attested otherwise as well as referring to the “Karmon River” (probably the Kharma canal), as the one of the seven heads of the Nile river, which it is not.¹⁷ These details, according to Jurgens, are meant to create a sense of verisimilitude and

17. Jurgens, “A Wandering Aramean in Pharaoh’s Court,” 7; See also Daniel A. Machiela, “Some Egyptian Elements in the Genesis Apocryphon: Evidence of a Ptolemaic Social Location?” *AS 8* (2010): 47–69; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Genesis Apocryphon of Qumran Cave 1*, 3 ed.,

authenticity within the narrative. Thus, although the story of Abram's sojourn in Egypt as narrated in the biblical text engages with discourses of the *foundation* of Israel, the narrative of the ~ga seems to be turning the story to engage with the contemporary discourses around the idea of *diaspora*.

3.2.2 Abram in the Court of a Foreign King

3.2.3 Abram the Sage

3.2.4 Abram the Oracle

3.3 INNER-BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION

BO 18a (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 2004), 197–99.

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Chapter 5: The Chronicler's Temple: Social Memory and Magnetism in Chronicles

Scholars of the Hebrew Bible have long observed that the book of Chronicles is a derivative work of Samuel–Kings reflecting the concerns and religious sensibilities of the late Persian or Early Hellenistic Periods. For example, in his classic work on the history of ancient Israel, Julius Wellhausen begins his treatment of the history of traditions within Judaism with a lengthy discussion of the book of Chronicles. In his treatment of the book, Wellhausen argues that the history of Israel as portrayed in Chronicles differs from that portrayed in Samuel–Kings due to the chronological distance of the works and the intervention of the Priestly Code into the theology of ~2T Judaism.¹ Chronicles, according to Wellhausen, provides a clear example of the way that ancient Israel's traditions evolved over time. Just as the legal material of the Hexateuch developed over the centuries, so too the traditions of the

1. Julius Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel*, trans. J. Southerland Black and Allan Menzies, ML 6 (New York: Meridian, 1957), 171–72, trans. of *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels* (Berlin: Reimer, 1883); See also John W. Wright, “From Center to Periphery: 1 Chronicles 23–27 and the Interpretation of Chronicles in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Priests, Prophets and Scribes: Essays on the Formation and Heritage of Second Temple Judaism in Honour of Joseph Blenkinsopp*, ed. Eugene Ulrich et al., JSOTsup 149 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 20–42.

historical books were subject to the changing theologies of later centuries. While the particulars of the relationship of Samuel–Kings to Chronicles and the nuances of priestly influences on the Hebrew Bible remain subject to scholarly debate, the broad consensus remains that 1) Chronicles was written sometime in the late Persian or early Hellenistic periods, 2) it heavily utilized Samuel–Kings as a literary source, and 3) it bears an ideological *Tendenz* influenced by (though not identical to) the final layers of the Pentateuch.²

The scholarly discourse surrounding the formation of the Hebrew Bible has increasingly turned to memory studies as a robust framework for describing the processes by which the biblical traditions were produced and transmitted.³ Wellhausen chose to begin his treat-

2. For a thorough and reasonably recent summary of the *status questionis*, see Gary N. Knoppers, *1 Chronicles 1–9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 12 (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 72–89; See also Sara Japhet, *I & II Chronicles: A Commentary*, OTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993); Sara Japhet, *The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles and Its Place in Biblical Thought*, trans. Anna Barber (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009; repr., Sara Japhet; *The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles and Its Place in Biblical Thought*; 2nd revised ed.; BEATAJ 9 [Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1997]); Roddy Braun, *1 Chronicles*, WBC 14 (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986); and R. J. Coggins, *The First and Second Books of the Chronicles*, CBC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

3. Jacob L. Wright, *David, King of Israel, and Caleb in Biblical Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Joseph Blenkinsopp, *David Remembered: Kingship and National Identity in Ancient Israel* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013); John W. Rogerson, *A Theology of*

ment of the history of traditions with Chronicles because of the relative security with which scholars are able to date Samuel–Kings and the major Pentateuchal strata ~vis-a-vis Chronicles. For the very same reason, Chronicles likewise has played an important role in early applications of memory theory within biblical studies..⁴ While Chronicles is not the *latest* book in the Hebrew Bible, it is uniquely situated at the end of the traditioning process preserved in the Hebrew Bible. In some ways, therefore, Chronicles gets the last word on a certain set of traditions surrounding the monarchic period, in particular those of David, Solomon, and

the Old Testament: Cultural Memory, Communication, and Being Human (Philadelphia: Fortress, 2010); Philip R. Davies, *Memories of Ancient Israel: An Introduction to Biblical History–Ancient and Modern* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2008); Ronald S. Hendel, *Remembering Abraham: Culture, Memory, and History in the Hebrew Bible* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mark S. Smith, “Remembering God: Collective Memory in Israelite Religion,” *CBQ* 64.4 (2002): 631–51.

4. Ehud Ben Zvi, “Chronicles and Social Memory,” *ST* 71 (1): 69–90; Ehud Ben Zvi, “Reading Chronicles and Reshaping the Memory of Manasseh,” in *Chronicling the Chronicler: The Book of Chronicles and Early Second Temple Historiography*, ed. Paul S. Evans and Tyler F. Williams (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 121–40; Ehud Ben Zvi, “Toward a Sense of Balance: Remembering the Catastrophe of Monarchic Judah / (Ideological) Israel and Exile through Reading Chronicles in Late Yehud,” in *Chronicling the Chronicler: The Book of Chronicles and Early Second Temple Historiography*, ed. Paul S. Evans and Tyler F. Williams (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 247–65.

the kings of Judah.

Although it is broadly agreed upon that Chronicles exhibits a hypertextual relationship to Samuel–Kings, treating Chronicles as an exemplar of Rewritten Bible (~rwb) is somewhat less common.⁵ The ambivalence of scholars towards treating Chronicles as ~rwb is rooted, unsurprisingly, in the confusion surrounding the definition of the term (see Chapter 1). Knoppers, for example, takes special care to treat the question of whether Chronicles should be understood as ~rwb in the introduction of his commentary and notes, from the

5. Though, not particularly *uncommon*: Jonathan G. Campbell, “Rewritten Bible: A Terminological Reassessment,” in *Rewritten Bible after Fifty Years: Texts, Terms, or Techniques? A Last Dialogue with Geza Vermes*, ed. József Zsengellér, JSJsup 166 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 49–81; Molly M. Zahn, “Rewritten Scripture,” in *Oxford Handbook of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, ed. Timothy H. Lim and John J. Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 323–36; Moshe J. Bernstein, “Rewritten Bible: A Generic Category Which Has Outlived its Usefulness?” *Text* 22 (2005): 169–96; Alexander considers Chronicles to be a “prototype” of ~rwb, see Philip S. Alexander, “Retelling the Old Testament,” in *It is Written—Scripture Citing Scripture: Essays in Honour of Barnabas Lindars, SSF*, ed. D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 99–121; I have adopted the terminology of hyper-/hypotext from Genette. In this case, to say that Chronicles is a “hypertext” of Samuel–Kings is to say that it is derivative, but not a commentary on Samuel–Kings. See Gérard Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 5.

very beginning, that he will answer the question based on what he understands to be the essential elements of ~rwb.⁶ He writes:

They [~rwb] select from, interpret, comment on, and expand portions of a particular biblical book (or group of books), addressing obscurities, contradictions, and other perceived problems with the source text. Rewritten Bible texts normally emulate the form of the source text and follow it sequentially. The major intention of such works seems to be to provide a coherent interpretive reading of the biblical text.⁷

Knoppers observes that, while Chronicles exhibits most of the specific literary moves which ~rwb is known for (expanding, harmonizing, and augmenting its *Vorlage*), the presence of material which is entirely unique to Chronicles cannot be attributed to a purely exegetical or explanatory impulse. In addition to the narrative additions within Chronicles, the genealogies of 1 Chr 1–9 have no corollary in Samuel–Kings, and can hardly be considered a rewritten form of the Pentateuch.⁸ Thus, while Knoppers affirms that certain portions of Chronicles “may be profitably compared with a number of rewritten Bible texts,”⁹ ultimately he concludes that Chronicles “is more than a paraphrase or literary elaboration of the pri-

6. Knoppers, *1 Chronicles 1–9*, 129–34.

7. *Ibid.*, 130.

8. *Ibid.*, 132.

9. *Ibid.*, 131.

mary history”¹⁰ and thus ~rwb cannot account for Chronicles as a whole, instead suggesting that it should be treated as its own work.¹¹

While Knoppers’ assessment is fair given the definition that he supplies for ~rwb, I have adopted a broader definition of ~rwb that accommodates for Knoppers’ reservations. The rationale for why ~rwb cannot account for the complexity of the whole book of Chronicles, according to Knoppers, is the same basic argument that I have made for why an *exegetically* focused definition of ~rwb is insufficient to account for the complexity even of the literature that scholars *traditionally* consider to be ~rwb. Knoppers’ criticisms, therefore, could just as easily be applied to Josephus’ ~ant or to ~jub (or, I would argue, even to ~ga) and why I have suggested that memory studies may provide a useful model for discussing ~rwb.

This chapter will focus on the ways that social and cultural memory theory can be applied as a model for explaining the processes by which the Chronicler¹² utilized traditions in Samuel–Kings and the way that those traditions shaped and were shaped by the social location of their author(s). In particular, I will focus on the memory of the Temple in Jerusalem and the way that the figure David—as portrayed in Chronicles—functioned to-

10. Knoppers, *1 Chronicles 1–9*, 134.

11. *Ibid.*, 131–34.

12. Throughout this chapter I will refer to “the Chronicler” to refer simply to the the author or authors who are responsible for the book of Chronicles and not, as others have used the term, to refer to the common author of Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah.

gether with the temple as “magnetic” sites of memory within ~2T Judaism.¹³

5.1 DAVID’S CENSUS AND ARAUNAH/ORNAN’S THRESHING FLOOR

The account of David’s census in 2 Samuel and its hypertext in 1 Chronicles provides a clear example of the way that present ideologies play a significant role in the reception of cultural memory by a society and its (re)construction in the social memory. Both 2 Samuel 24 and 1 Chronicles 21 recount the story of David’s census, the punishment that Yahweh inflicts on David for doing so, and David’s penitential offerings at the threshing floor of Araunah/Ornan.

5.1.1 2 Samuel 24

The narrative in 2 Sam 24 begins by stating that Yahweh had become angry with Israel and “incited David against them” (*wayyāseṭ ’eṭ-dāwīd bāhem*). David orders the census and is stricken with remorse (it is not clear in the text why this was a bad thing). Yahweh offers him a choice through the prophet Gad between three years of famine, three months of pursuit, or three days of pestilence. David consents to the pestilence, and, after seeing its destructive force in the form of an angel, pleads with Yahweh to punish him personally, and not to continue harming the people. The prophet Gad instructs David to make offerings to Yahweh where he saw the angel, at the threshing floor of Araunah, the Jebusite. David purchases the threshing floor and Araunah’s livestock, builds an altar to Yahweh, and makes his

13. Ben Zvi, “Chronicles and Social Memory,” 73.

offerings.

The purpose of this pericope within Samuel is not clear and its ostensible connection to 2 Sam 21:1–14 is merely thematic.¹⁴ The internal logic of the narrative is no less problematic: the text offer no explanation for Yahweh’s anger, nor does it explain the connection between the census and the pestilence. While Yahweh’s initial anger can be accounted for theologically (gods do not need reasons to be angry), the connection between the census and the pestilence seems to be built on some tacit correlation between the two. McCarter, following a number of earlier studies, for example, has suggested that the danger in taking a census is found in the connection between the census and ritual failure. Drawing comparisons to Num 1:2–3 and Exod 30:11–14, McCarter notes that censuses in the ancient world were generally performed for military purposes (Num 1:2–3) or to levy funds (Exod 30:11–14). Since the purpose of David’s census seems to be a measurement of military might, it likely would have involved enrolling fighting-aged men in the military (Cf. Num 1:2–3), thereby forcing those enrolled to remain ritually pure in accordance with military standards. The likelihood that not all of the soldiery would be able to maintain this level of purity would have been high and may have been thought to invite divine retribution. On the other hand, while the census instructions in Exod 30:11–14 were not for the purposes of the military, they did require that each person “give a ransom for his life to Yahweh” (*nāṭānû ’iš kōṭer naṣṣô la-yhwh*), “lest a plague come upon them at their registration” (*lōʾ-yihyeh bāhem neḡeṣ*)

14. P. Kyle McCarter, *II Samuel: A New Translation with Translation, Notes, and Commentary*, AB 9 (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 509.

biṣqōd ʾōtām). The explicit connection between registration (*ṣpqd*) and plague (*neḡēṣ*) again passes without explanation, but again, the stipulation that those registered must provide a ransom (a half-shekel to the sanctuary and a half-shekel as “an offering to Yahweh” [*tārû-māh la-yhwh*]) opens the possibility for ritual failure. In both cases (maintaining ritual purity and making ransoms), the near-certain failure of some percentage of the population provides a plausible explanation for the association of people-counting and plague.

At the literary level, then, the function of the pericope could—as with much of the so-called History of David’s Rise (HDR)—be understood as an *apologia* for David’s putative decision to ask for a census (against Joab’s advice) and a subsequent calamity perceived to be caused by it. If the story originated from a time when it was well-known that David had commanded the census, the story provides an explanation for why David made the decision (at Yahweh’s prompting) despite the (apparent) risk of plague that accompanied numbering the people.¹⁵ Furthermore, David’s self-sacrificial posture is put on display through his willingness to take on the punishment personally and by his willingness to purchase Araunah’s threshing floor (at full price) and make the appropriate offerings to Yahweh.

5.1.2 1 Chronicles 21

While the broad strokes of 2 Sam 24 and 1 Chr 21 remain quite similar, a few relatively small differences found in 1 Chr 21 dramatically alter the literary and theological significance of the tale.

15. McCarter, *II Samuel*, 518.

Yahweh or (a) Satan?

The most noticeable change made in the Chronicler's narrative is seen in who incited David to take the census in the first place. While 2 Sam 24 attributes this act to Yahweh, 1 Chr 21 introduces a new figure to the story referred to as *śāṭān*. 1 Chr 21:1 reads:

way-ya'āmōd śāṭān 'al-yiśrā'ēl way-yāseṭ 'eṭ-dāwīd limnôṭ 'eṭ-yiśrā'ēl

[a] *śāṭān* stood up against Israel and he incited David to count Israel.

Scholars remain divided over whether *śāṭān* should be understood as a simple indefinite noun “an adversary,”¹⁶ or whether the absence of the definite article indicates that by the time of the Chronicler, Satan referred to a malevolent spirit which prefigured the more developed, personified “Satan” found in the New Testament.¹⁷ The most common usage of the term *śāṭān* in the Hebrew Bible refers to human adversaries and accusers generally (see, Num 22:22, 32; 1 Sam 29:4, 2 Sam 19:23; 1 Kgs 5:18, 11:14, 23, 25; Ps 38:21, 71:13, 109:4, 6, 20, 29). However, the figure *haś-śāṭān* (with definite article) in both the prologue to Job (chs.

16. Ryan E. Stokes, “The Devil Made David Do it...Or Did He? The Nature, Identity, and Literary Origins of the Satan in 1 Chronicles 21:1,” *JBL* 128 (2009): 91–106; Japhet, *The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles*, 114–17; Japhet, *I & II Chronicles*, 370–90.

17. Christopher A. Rollston, “An Ur-History of the New Testament Devil: The Celestial שָׂטָן (*śāṭān*) in Zechariah and Job,” in *Evil in Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Chris Keith and Loren T. Stuckenbruck, WUNT II (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 1–16.

1–2) and Zech 3:1–2 appears as a celestial figure to whom Yahweh speaks directly.¹⁸ Proponents of reading *śātān* as the personal name of a malevolent spirit argue that the absence of the definite article indicates that the idea of *the śātān* of Job and Zechariah had evolved into a fully personified Satan by the time of the Chronicler.¹⁹ Additionally, while the LXX hails from a slightly later chronological horizon than Chronicles, it is worth noting that the translator used the indefinite substantive *diabolos* to translate *śātān*—the same term used in Job and Zechariah (also, Ps 108:6) *with* a definite article—which gives some indication that, in the mind of the translator, these passages likely referred to the same entity.²⁰

18. This notion is more clear in Job, where *haś-śātān* is described in the heavenly courts and is described as having supernatural powers over the health and prosperity of those on the Earth. On the other hand, the reference in Zechariah is somewhat ambiguous. Zech 3:1 reads: *way-yar'ēnî 'eṭ-yəhōšua' hak-kōhēn hag-gāḏōl 'ōmēḏ liḡnê mal'aḳ yhwē wə-haś-śātān 'ōmēḏ 'al-yāmînô ləšiṭnô*, “And he showed me Joshua, the high priest standing before the angel of Yahweh, and *haś-śātān* was standing on his right (side) to accuse him.” The antecedent of “his” in “his right(side)” is unclear. If “his” refers to the *mal'aḳ* Yahweh, then *haś-śātān* likely refers to some kind of spiritual being. However, it is possible that “his” refers to Joshua, and that *haś-śātān* should be understood as a human adversary.

19. Braun, *1 Chronicles*, 216–17; Coggins, *Chronicles*, 107; Rollston also finds this reading compelling, though, not without difficulties. See, Rollston, “An Ur-History of the New Testament Devil,” 4–5.

20. Elsewhere the LXX renders the nominal forms of *śātān* with the feminine *diabolē* or, in

Critics of this view, however, have pointed to the fact that in other cases in the Hebrew Bible, generic nouns that are treated as personal names or titles often *do* retain the definite article.²¹ Japhet, for example, notes that direct references to the Canaanite deity Ba'al are always accompanied by the definite article. In every instance, the name/title *ba'al* is made grammatically definite whether by adding the definite article, pronominal suffixes, or being in construct with an explicitly definite noun.²² In such a case, *śātān* should simply be understood as an indefinite noun, “an accuser” and may be understood as a human antagonist of David.²³

Regardless of how one understands *śātān* to be functioning, the author of Chronicles plainly understood the mechanisms at work—whether supernatural or interpersonal—differently than the author of 2 Sam 24. Chronicles, therefore, shifts the incitement away from Yahweh and removes any reference to the deity’s anger prior to the census, thereby simplifying the rationale for David’s guilt and Yahweh’s retribution. The resulting narrative removes the problematic “entrapment” of David and absolves Yahweh from seeming so “mer-

the case of 1 Kgs 11:14, simply in transliteration as *satan*. It should be noted, however, that Esther 7:4 and 8:1 render the Hebrew שָׂטָן as the masculine *diabolos* as well.

21. Japhet, *The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles*, 114–17; Japhet, *I & II Chronicles*, 370–90.

22. Japhet, *The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles*, 115; citing GKC §126d.

23. Stokes, “The Devil Made David Do it...Or Did He?” 91–106; Japhet, *The Ideology of the Book of Chronicles*, 114–17; Japhet, *I & II Chronicles*, 370–90.

curial.”²⁴

The Threshing Floor of Araunah/Ornan and the Temple of Solomon

The pericope in 1 Chr 21 likewise ends with a significant deviation from its hypotext preserved in 2 Sam 24. While both accounts describe the angel of Yahweh relenting from his destructive activities at the threshing floor of Araunah (=Ornan in 1 Chr 21) the Jebusite, the significance of the site as the future location of the Temple of Yahweh in Jerusalem is made explicit only in the Chronicler’s account. The Chronicler asserts that the threshing floor of Ornan the Jebusite would become the spot for the construction of the Solomon’s Temple by putting it on the lips of David himself in 1 Chr 22:1, stating :

wayyô’mer dāwîd zeh hû’ bêt yhw̄h hā’ēlōhîm wəzeh-mizbēaḥ lə’ōlāh ləyiśrā’ēl

Then David said, “This is the Temple of Yahweh God, and this altar for burnt offerings is for Israel”

The declaration is fulfilled in 2 Chr 3:1 when Solomon begins to construct the temple:

*wayyāḥel šəlōmōh liḇnôt ’et-bêt-yhw̄h bîrûšālaïm bəhar hammôrîā ’āšer nir’āh lədāwîd
'ābîhû ’āšer hēkîn bimqôm dāwîd bəgōren ’ornān ha-yəḇûsî*

Solomon began to build the temple of Yahweh in Jerusalem on mount Moriah, where Yahweh appeared to David, his father, where David had designated, at the threshing floor of Ornan the Jebusite.

24. Rollston, “An Ur-History of the New Testament Devil,” 4.

The question of whether the author of the account in 2 Sam 24 understood this story to be an etiological account of the founding of the Jerusalem temple or whether this detail was the invention of the Chronicler, however, is not clear from the biblical text. Unlike the book of Chronicles which gives the precise location of the temple of Solomon, Samuel-Kings makes no specific claims about the location of the temple. Mordechai Cogan has argued that this silence is rooted in the desire of Deuteronomistic school to forfend the suggestion that the site of the temple was determined by an historical event, rather than the divine edict.²⁵ Thus Cogan seems to imagine that reference to Araunah's threshing floor must have been removed from the account of the temple's construction in 1 Kgs 6–7 by the Deuteronomistic editor in order to maintain this principle.²⁶ On the other hand, Isaac Kalimi has suggested that the reason for this neglect in 1 Kgs 6–7 can be attributed to the assertion that the location of the temple in Jerusalem (as well as all the other temples in the Hebrew Bible, whose locations are not specified) was so well known that "there was no need to mention them."²⁷ Furthermore, Kalimi suggests that the selection of Araunah's threshing floor

25. Mordechai Cogan, "'The City that I Chose': The Deuteronomistic View of Jerusalem (Hebrew)," *Tarbiz* 55 (1986): 301–9.

26. *Ibid.*, 307.

27. I would, however, make the observation that, depending on how one dates the account in 1 Kng 6–7, it may be the case that an *exilic* author genuinely did not know the precise location of the temple. However, Kalimi also points out that other ANE temple building texts often neglect to specify the precise location of their subjects. On this point, I would also hasten to add

as the future location of the temple was made sufficiently clear by the account of 2 Sam 24 thereby obviating the need to repeat the location in 1 Kings.²⁸ The Chronicler, therefore, merely makes explicit that which the Deuteronomistic Historian meant to imply.

I am not at all convinced by either of the above arguments. Instead, I suspect that the construction account in 1 Kings makes no mention of Araunah's threshing floor because, at the time of its composition, the connection had not been made. The significance of threshing floors as preferred locations for theophanies has been documented elsewhere²⁹ and the fact that 2 Sam 24 recounts a sort of theophany may be enough to account for its mention in the narrative.

Although it is not clear whether the connection was made originally by the Chronicler himself or whether it was an inherited tradition, the rationale for making Ornan's threshing floor the site of the temple likely grew from an uneasiness with the notion that David built and utilized an altar at a secondary location (viz., a place that was not the tabernacle).

that monumental inscriptions should be treated separately, since the location of the inscription, ostensibly, *would be* the location of the temple. Isaac Kalimi, "The Land of Moriah, Mount Moriah, and the Site of Solomon's Temple in Biblical Historiography," *HTR* 83 (1990): 345–62.

28. *Ibid.*, 357.

29. McCarter points to Jdgs 6:37 among other, less clear, examples from the Hebrew Bible. He also notes their significance in the Ugaritic literature (KTU 1 17.5.4ff; 19.1.19ff) McCarter, *II Samuel*, 511–12; See also Jaime L. Waters, *Threshing Floors in Ancient Israel: Their Ritual and Symbolic Significance* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2015).

At the same time, the Chronicler understood that the future location of the temple would be in Jerusalem and had to deal with the fact that David not only made the offerings, but did so at the command of Yahweh. To resolve these tensions, the Chronicler was able to assert that David, indeed, made sacrifices outside the tabernacle, but with his offerings, he laid the groundwork for the construction of the temple.

5.2 CONSTRUCTING THE MEMORY OF THE CHRONICLER'S TEMPLE

Having addressed the particular ways and specific rationales that the Chronicler likely employed while composing 1 Chr 21, we may now turn to the topic of social memory and the ways that this theoretical framework can be utilized to explore the phenomenon of biblical rewriting. While the individual changes and additions made by the Chronicler may, on their own, provide some insight into the ideology of the Chronicler and his position toward a few theological topics, treating the Chronicler's work as social memory attempts to take this a step further. Beyond questioning the intention of the author, social memory theory seeks to explore the ways that received traditions may have functioned at the social level as a part of a community's essential project of identity building and maintenance.³⁰

30. Ben Zvi puts it well: "Everything is supposed to be forgotten except that which is supposed to be remembered by a group. Social, shared remembering within a group involves and requires a social effort by the relevant group, but without such an effort and shared memory, the group itself would cease to exist." Ben Zvi, "Chronicles and Social Memory," 70.

5.2.1 Magnetism

In the context of social memory theory, magnetism refers to the quality of certain core sites of a community's social memory which tend to accumulate additional significances over time as more ideas and sites of memory become "attracted" to it.³¹ The analogy could be extended further by thinking of this magnetism in the context of the interaction of gravitational forces between bodies in space. Larger mnemonic nodes, given their greater "mass," attract smaller bodies to themselves forming orbital systems akin to the way that the planets of our solar system are held in orbit by the sun and how the moon is held by the gravitational forces of Earth. As more nodes attach themselves the relative mass of the core mnemonic node (that is, the larger "central" node) continues to grow in a sort of "positive feedback loop."³² Within the biblical tradition, perhaps the premier example of such a node within the Hebrew Bible is Moses. Ben Zvi writes:

31. I have borrowed this term from Ben Zvi, who has used the term in numerous contexts. See Ben Zvi, "Chronicles and Social Memory," 69–90; also Ehud Ben Zvi, "The Memory of Abraham in Late Persian/Early Hellenistic Yehud/Judah," in *Remembering Biblical Figures in the Late Persian and Early Hellenistic Periods*, ed. Diana V. Edelman and Ehud Ben Zvi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–37.

32. Ibid., 6; Alternatively, this idea could be modeled using graph theory as a scale-free network and treating central mnemonic sites as hubs and peripheral sites as sparse nodes. See, Albert-László Barabási, "Scale-Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond," *Science* 325.5939 (2009): 412–13.

Not only does he bring together Torah/the bestowal of Torah with the Exodus, but he also serves as the foundational prophet, scribe, lawgiver and so on. Even the story of Israel's rejection of YHWH and subsequent punishment and future reconciliation is directly associated with him.³³

Using this model, the book of Deuteronomy functions as one means by which traditions become attached to Moses through the retelling process and the ability of the author to synthesize lesser sites of memory with central ideas and figures creating newer, even more significant and highly connected mnemonic sites.

Both the Jerusalem temple and king David loom large in biblical memory, so it is no surprise that both of these mnemonic sites function magnetically. In the case of David, for example, it is commonly argued that one Elhanan, and not David, was the historical defeater of Goliath the Gittite, as recorded in 2 Sam 21:19b:

wayyak 'elḥānān ben-ya're 'ōrāgīm bêt hallahmî 'ēt golyāt haggittî wə'eš ḥănîtô kim-nôr 'ōrāgīm

Elhanan, son of Ya're-Oregim (the Bethlehemite), killed Goliath the Gittite, the shaft of whose spear was like a weaver's beam.

In this case, it is supposed that the more potent mnemonic site (David) is connected to the well-known slaying of the Philistine giant at the expense of Elhanan. The extended narrative of David and Goliath from 1 Sam 17, likewise bears the signs of magnetism. In fact,

33. Ben Zvi, "Chronicles and Social Memory," 73–74.

the name “Goliath” only occurs twice in the extended narrative, in vv. 4 and 23, which has caused some scholars to question whether the identification of the “giant” with Goliath was, like David, a secondary addition. In every other instance throughout the narrative, the man is referred to simply as “the Philistine.” Thus, it is supposed that the story originally may have been entirely anonymous, and only later were these figures identified with David and Goliath.³⁴ Thus McCarter’s, observation that “[d]eeds of obscure heroes tend to attach themselves to famous heroes,”³⁵ though not rooted in memory theory *per se*, fits our model for “magnetic” figures.

Within the story of David’s census and the threshing floor of Oruna in 1 Chr 21, several mnemonic sites can be understood as exhibiting magnetic qualities. First, although the identity of *śātān* is not clear in the text, later treatments of the story, including in the LXX, treat the character as a malevolent supernatural being. The potency—at least in the interpretation of later periods—of Satan was able to don this particular mischief and take credit for the incitement of David to sin. One might imagine, given *haśśātān*’s subordinate position ~vis-a-vis Yahweh in the prologue to Job, that the two passages were not seen to be in direct conflict with one another, whatever the original intent of the Chronicler might have been.

34. For a fuller account of the textual issues surrounding the main narrative about David and Goliath, see, P. Kyle McCarter, *I Samuel: A New Translation with Translation, Notes, and Commentary*, AB 8 (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 280–309; and Steven L. McKenzie, *King David: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69–77.

35. McCarter, *II Samuel*, 450.

Shifting the incitement of David away from Yahweh can be explained by the ostensible discomfort (or confusion) created by the story in 2 Sam 24, but, supposing *śātān* was imagined by the Chronicler to be a supernatural being, we can account for the Chronicler's choice as an example of magnetism on the part of Satan.

Second, the identification of Ornan's threshing floor with the future site of the Solomonic Temple creates an explicit connection between two very potent mnemonic sites: David and the Temple. The discourse surrounding the fact that it was Solomon and not David who constructed the Temple of Yahweh predates even the DtrH, as indicated by 2 Sam 7, but the degree to which David involves himself in making preparations for the construction of the temple in 1 Chr 22:2–29:22 indicates that DtrH did not get the last word on the matter. While 2 Sam 7 provides an apologia for why it was Solomon, and not David, who built the temple, Chronicles takes it a step further by attributing the planning and preparation of the temple's construction to David, leaving only the most nominal tasks for the temple's "builder," Solomon. The inability of David's mnemonic gravitas to fully absorb the temple's construction illustrates the immutability of certain mnemonic sites, particularly those such as buildings and geographic features, despite the relative significance of David for the continued maintenance of Judean identity continued into the ~2T Period ~vis-a-vis Solomon.

Finally, after identifying the site of the temple of Solomon with Ornan's threshing floor, and drawing the mnemonic sites of the temple and king David even closer together, the Chronicler includes one additional piece of information to the reader in the description of the temple's construction in 2 Chr 3:1:

wayyāḥel šālōmōh libnôt 'et-bêt-yhwh bîrûšālaïm bəhar hammôrîā 'ăšer nir'āh ləḏāwîd
'ābîhû 'ăšer hēkîn bimqôm dāwîd bəgōren 'ornān hayəbûsî

Solomon began to build the temple of Yahweh in Jerusalem *on the mountain of Moriah* where he appeared to David, his father, the place which David designated, on the threshing floor of Ornan, the Jebusite.

Although this is the only reference to the *mountain* of Moriah in the Hebrew Bible, the *land* of Moriah is mentioned only in Gen 22, the Aqeda, as the land to which Abraham was to bring Isaac for sacrifice (on a mountain!).³⁶ The reference to Moriah appears to be another example of the magnetic quality of core events in a community's identity. In the same way that David's sacrificial acts at the threshing floor of Ornan—in the memory of the Chronicler—prefigured and made acceptable the offerings made by David there, so too the near-sacrifice of Isaac, by its geographic association with the foundation of the temple in Jerusalem, becomes a prototype for the sacrificial cult.³⁷

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

Traditional approaches to the book of Chronicles have focused on the sources, interpretive strategies, and ideologies that the Chronicler utilized in the composition of his work. For this

36. Kalimi, "The Land of Moriah," 358–59.

37. In fact, ~vermes makes this point explicit and traces the tradition into early Christianity. See Geza Vermes, *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism: Haggadic Studies*, StPB 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 204–11.

reason, the Chronicler *himself* is credited (or blamed, as the case may be) for the sometimes significant differences between the stories preserved in the DH compared to their reflexes in Chronicles. Even those studies which deal extensively with the ideology of the Chronicler have tended to focus on such ideologies and their impact on the *individual* of the Chronicler. By putting so much weight upon the Chronicler as an individual, however, scholars have—it seems to me—been less open to considering the ways that the Chronicler himself may have been influenced by a body of tradition that—while perhaps rooted in the text of the DH—informed the way that he presented his history. Although the author of Chronicles should be given credit for some creative invention, the Chronicler was a product of his age and was himself influenced by received traditions formed well after the DH was written. The memory approach, on the other hand, focuses on the ways that traditions are transmitted over time, and how their malleability allows them to be reshaped by each successive generation, as well as their potency for affecting the contemporary cultural discourse. In the case of Chronicles, the magnetic quality of David is shown by the way he had become associated with the other core sites of memory and Judahite identity such as the building of the temple, and even (by extension) the Aqedah. While it is not impossible to suppose that the Chronicler himself made these connections, the more plausible reconstruction of the ways that these traditions about David, the temple, and the broader Pentateuchal traditions converged involves a more robust set of social and cultural processes which the memory approach addresses.

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