Cyberwarfare Defense Plan:   
Identifying Cyber Threats and Applying the Cyber Kill Chain to Protect The Western Interconnection

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The interconnection power grid of the U.S Western (also called Western Interconnection) is a wide-area synchronous grid and one of the two major alternating currents (AC) power grids in the North American power transmission grid (mark yellow on the map). If this system is hit with a large-scale attack this will bring significant damage to North America (including the United States and Canada). According to our intelligence, the threat is from Russia, which is well-funded, well-equipped, and capable of a large-scale attack. They plan to install malicious software within the grid’s computer network to, at some point, disrupt power to 11 states. Therefore, we analyze this threat and create a cyber-defense plan to ensure the security and safety of the Western Interconnection power grid computer network.

Map

Description automatically generated

Images retrieved from (2)

# Supply Chain Security Management Issues

Describes three supply chain security management issues that we introduce: the use of the internet of things (IoT) and smart grid technologies; the lack of training for phishing attacks; and the vulnerabilities that exist in legacy systems (a combination attack).

One concern is the use of the internet of things (IoT) and smart grid technologies to connect to power meters and appliances, which could allow “an attacker to take over thousands (if not millions) of unprotected devices, preventing power from being delivered to end users”. According to (3), a hypothetical attack targeted power generators of Eastern Interconnection developed by Lloyd’s of London. In this scenario, the disruption of just nine transformers (10 percent of targeted generators) could cause widespread outages. The result causes a blackout covering fifteen states and the District of Columbia, leaving ninety-three million people without power. Estimates economic costs are $243 billion US dollars and a small rise in death rates as health and safety systems fail.

According to (4), another threat is the use of malware dropped on electric companies’ networks using spear phishing attacks that tricked employees into downloading from mock emails. These methods have been successful in attacks on Ukraine’s power grid: In 2015 Black Energy malware and KillDisk malware destroyed part of Ukraine’s power grid.

The most dangerous cyberattack as we can imagine up to now is a combination attack. In 2017, A combination attack (known as “NotPetya”) using a power grid attack, a malware attack (known as “Petya”), and a security vulnerability (EternalBlue exploit) cost an estimated $10 billion. “NotPetya” access and crippled the computers of utility companies, banks, airports, government agencies in Ukraine, and some multinational corporations (FedEx, Merck, Maersk, and other corporations). According to Kenneth Geer, a veteran cybersecurity expert and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who advises NATO's Tallinn cyber center, the “NotPetya” attack was the most damaging attack in history and close to cyber war, and the cost far exceeded a missile fired from the Donbas into Kyiv.

**Network Defense Strategies**

There are many network defense and emergency response vendors available but a few stand out as the leaders (5) (6) (7). Crowdstrike ([https://www.crowdstrike.com](https://www.crowdstrike.com/)) offers a complete line of products that offer protection for an entire enterprise. Cisco Secure IPS (<https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/ngips/index.html>) offers both hardware and software to protect and analyze threats. Cisco also obtained Snort, an open-source intrusion prevention system, in 2013. Another hardware and software vendor is Palo Alto (<https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/network-security/advanced-threat-prevention>) with their Network Threat Protection product. Juniper (<https://www.juniper.net/us/en/products/security/srx-series.html>) offers its SRX line of firewall equipment with cloud and local-based threat detection and analytics. AlienVault USM (<https://cybersecurity.att.com/products/usm-anywhere/how-it-works>) owned by AT&T provides options for many environments including virtual environments. Cynet XDR and 360 (<https://www.cynet.com/platform/>) offer software solutions for detection, correlation, and investigation. Last, but not least, Proofpoint Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) (<https://www.proofpoint.com/us/products/advanced-threat-protection>) is another option to assist in protecting against cyber threats.

**Identifies and Describes Malware Threats:**

Possible malware that could affect the Western Interconnection power grid computer network: NotPetya (malware), Stuxnet (worm), and Flame (malware)

This malware can be installed on the system by:


* Social entering: for example, a USB attack is a method that tricks company staff by plugging an anonymous USB into the computer system. Or Human Interface Device spoofing (HID) is the method that tricks company staff plug malware-infected hardware into their system. E.g., a designed keyboard that can grant remote access to hackers was designed to trick an employee’s computer into thinking it’s a regular keyboard.
* Phishing: Spear phishing is the method that tricks company staff into running a malware-infected attachment. (1)
* Other methods can also be used, but they may require time and money in developing sophisticated tools: zero-day attacks, advanced malware, and strategic web compromises


Hackers can encrypt data in computers and databases. Viruses can also spread to other computers within the network or send collected information to hackers. Hackers then can leverage this initial access to gain access to sensitive company information stored on its internal system. Further cyber-attacks can occur when enough sensitive information is collected (1).

# Cyber Kill Changes in the Western Interconnection

* Reconnaissance: Russia acknowledges the USA and its allies as a threat to them. In the situation that war (physical or cyber) happens, they can turn off the power supply of 11 states in the West.
* Weaponize: The weapon in this scenario is malicious software that will be installed (or may already happen) within the grid’s computer network
* Delivery: The method most likely is social engineering (spear phishing, USB attack, or HID). The attack may happen with help of an insider.
* Exploit: There are a couple of initial steps that hackers can use: Malware-infected USB may drop into the computer network area and accidentally plug into the Western Interconnection computer system. Another method is spear-phishing to trick company executives into running a malware-infected attachment. Hackers then can leverage this initial access to gain access to sensitive information that store in the internal system.
* Install: Most likely hackers will compromise computers on the Western Interconnection network, infecting them with malware. Remote access to internal systems should be established. That is the fastest way they get access to mass data, collect, and transfer the data of the server. The sensitive information will then be used against the Western Interconnection computer system.
* Command and Control:  Control should be maintained until hackers get what they want.
* Act on Objective: The Objective would be to gain access to, disrupt, or control the Western Interconnection computer system. E.g., hackers can turn off the power of 11 states.

**Cyber Kill Chain Diagram**





**Adversary Modeling**

There are many ways to model an adversary. Invincea models an adversary by assigning the following attributes:

1. Adversary Type (AT)
2. Campaign Objective (CO)
3. Campaign Vehicle (CV)
4. Campaign Weapon (CW)
5. Payload delivery (PD)
6. Payload Capabilities (PC)

The adversary type (AT) is defined as one of the following: Script kiddy, Hacktivist, hacking collective, Insider threat, Cyber terrorist, Commercial hacking (IP theft, customer data, etc.), Cyber-crime, National-state intelligence agency, or Nation-state cyber warfare.

The campaign objective (CO) is defined as one or more of the following: Account take-over, Botnet farming, Identity fraud, Data control for extortion, Wire fraud, DDOS, Click-fraud, Data record theft, Intellectual property theft, Intelligence collection, Data munging, Data destruction, System destruction, or Corporate shaming/political agenda.

The campaign vehicle (CV) is defined as one of the following: Spear-phish with link/attachment, Compromised legitimate website, Malicious website, Malvertising, Social Engineering, Insider threat, Remote login, Physical media (USB/DVD), or Supply chain............

The campaign weapon (CW) is defined as one or more of the following: IE, Firefox, Chrome exploit, Adobe Flash exploit, Oracle Java exploit, Microsoft Silverlight exploit, Microsoft Office exploits, Adobe Reader exploit, User-installed malware, or Social engineered remote access.

The payload delivery (PD) is defined as one or more of the following: Executable file – pre-assembled, Executable file – just-in-time assembly on-host, Process hijacking/ROP, Scripting, or DLL injection/side-loading.

The payload capabilities (PC) are defined as one or more of the following: Backdoor for remote access, Privilege escalation, Keystroke logging, Screen capture, Browser data munging, Ransomware, Adware, click-jacking, Network mapping, Lateral movement, Command and control, DDOS, Data discovery, Data archiving, Data exfiltration, Data corruption, Data destruction, System wiping or Patching known vulnerabilities.

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