5

Declared Support

Given their vulnerability to shocks such as illness, unemployment, and drought, many citizens across the world are motivated to fortify their ongoing exchange relationships with politicians who mitigate such risks. This book argues that the purposive actions of citizens are often instrumental to the survival of relational clientelism. As discussed extensively in Chapter 3, ongoing exchange relationships are relatively resilient to challenges faced by electoral clientelism in Part I, but also involve a dual credibility problem that citizens' actions alleviate.

Unlike vote buying and other forms of electoral clientelism, relational clientelism involves contingent benefits that extend beyond election campaigns. Because all promised benefits are not delivered by Election Day, relational clientelism raises especially complex issues regarding the trustworthiness of promises. First, politicians are uncertain whether citizens will follow through on their promises to provide political support – a concern that arises with all forms of clientelism. And second, citizens are uncertain whether politicians will follow through on their promises of assistance after they cast their votes – a concern that arises with relational but not electoral clientelism. Both sides of this dual credibility problem threaten the viability of relational clientelism. The theoretical logic elaborated in Chapter 3 suggests that voter choices can mitigate both credibility issues and thereby help to sustain ongoing exchange relationships, a key point now investigated in the Brazilian context. The present chapter examines how citizens declare support to signal their own credibility, and Chapter 6 investigates how they request benefits to screen politician credibility. Both mechanisms enable citizens to reinforce relational clientelism, and as shown in Part III are observed well beyond Brazil.

In part due to rigorous ballot secrecy, Brazilian politicians are often uncertain about whether to believe citizens' vote promises. During interviews, various candidates expressed concern that such promises are in many cases

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

nothing more than cheap talk. As one councilor explained, "I had more than 5,000 promises to vote for me. But only 10 percent of those promises" actually translate into votes.[1] Some citizens even admit to pledging their votes deceptively behind closed doors to multiple candidates, in an effort to obtain more handouts. The signaling model elaborated in Chapter 3 suggests how citizens in ongoing clientelist relationships can distinguish themselves from these insincere promisers: they can signal the credibility of their vote promises by displaying political paraphernalia on their bodies, on their homes, and at rallies. Such declared support transmits information to politicians and can thus serve clientelist purposes, in addition to providing a means of expressing preferences or advertising on behalf of a favored candidate.

As investigated in this chapter, empirical materials from Brazil are consistent with this theoretical logic. First, public declarations of political support are a widely observed phenomenon, suggesting that many citizens do indeed undertake this action. Second, declared support increases during droughts, which is indicative of how vulnerability motivates citizens to engage in this action. Third, citizens' public declarations of political support are linked to relational clientelism. Two original surveys, as well as interviews with citizens and elites, reveal the widely shared perception that declaring during a campaign often influences benefits received beyond election campaigns. Moreover, regression analyses suggest that citizens who declare support for victorious candidates are indeed more likely to receive benefits during both election and non-election years. And fourth, declarations transmit meaningful information to politicians. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest that citizens overwhelmingly vote and hold perceptions in accordance with their declarations.

Overall, evidence from Brazil is consistent with the argument that declared support is an important mechanism by which voters help to sustain relational clientelism. Through public displays of political paraphernalia, citizens in ongoing exchange relationships alleviate politicians' concerns about whether their vote promises are trustworthy.

5.1 PREVALENCE OF DECLARED SUPPORT

As with legions of citizens around the world, many Brazilians publicly express support for politicians. Especially before local elections, vast numbers of homes are checkered with vibrantly colored political flags. Citizens often wear candidates' stickers or place banners on their homes, reinforcing slogans blaring through loudspeakers on campaign vehicles and bicycles. In many cases, such actions are orthogonal to clientelism; for example, they may exclusively serve to express political preferences or provide free advertising for preferred candidates. But in contexts where citizens are vulnerable to adverse shocks, the need to sustain ongoing exchange relationships with politicians is another important

[1] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 100,000 citizens (December 18, 2008).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

motivation. The present chapter examines this commonly overlooked reason why many citizens publicly declare their political support.

Before examining the link between declarations and relational clientelism, it is important to establish that many Brazilians do indeed engage in this action. Nationally representative surveys provide insight. The 2002 Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB) included a single question asking whether respondents had displayed a candidate's banner or poster at home or work, or placed a candidate's sticker on their cars. During the campaign for that year's federal and state elections, 24.1 percent of respondents declared support in this manner. Declaration varied substantially across regions. In the relatively poor Northeast and North regions, 31.4 and 42.2 percent of respondents declared support, respectively. By contrast, in the wealthier Southeast and South regions, only 18.7 and 23.7 percent declared support, respectively.[2] Similar findings emerged in the 2007 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, which fielded the identical question. During the 2006 campaign for federal and state offices, 22.1 percent of respondents indicated they had declared support. And whereas 28.4 and 35.9 percent of respondents declared support in the Northeast and North regions, just 18.5 and 11.7 percent did so in the Southeast and South regions, respectively.[3] While these two surveys shed light on declaration patterns across Brazil, I do not analyze them further because they lack questions about respondents' experiences with clientelism.[4]

The Rural Clientelism Survey, which does not suffer from this limitation, provides more nuanced insights about declared support in the countryside of Northeast Brazil. During the 2012 municipal campaign, 37.5 percent of respondents reported placing a political flag or banner on their homes.[5] Given strict regulations, only 1.3 percent of respondents had household walls painted with political propaganda.[6] Declared support also extends beyond the household. For instance, 18.7 percent of respondents wore campaign stickers or even political T-shirts, which can no longer be distributed by candidates (see Chapter 2). A quarter of these wearers donned their stickers or shirts on Election Day, often to the polls. Rallies provide another conduit for declaring support through displays of political paraphernalia. Over 22.3 percent of respondents used political flags, banners, or T-shirts to show support while attending a political rally during the 2012 campaign.[7] The level of effort

[2] This question had 2,509 respondents. In the Center-West region, 32.5 percent declared support.

[3] This question had 1,180 respondents. In the Center-West region, 31.5 percent declared support.

[4] To the best of my knowledge, no national survey in Brazil inquires about both declared support and clientelism. For instance, ESEB and LAPOP studies do not inquire about both topics in the same surveys. As discussed later, to gather such national data, I fielded an online survey across Brazil in collaboration with Salvatore Nunnari.

[5] For figures in this paragraph, the number of observations ranges from 3,643 to 3,674.

[6] In 2012, various municipalities forbade campaigns from painting walls for citizens; national law permitted a 4m² painting. In 2015, Law 13165 prohibited all campaigns from using paint.

[7] Approximately 41.3 percent of respondents attended a rally; however, mere rally attendance is not considered a form of declared support.

involved in each form of declaration varies across citizens. For instance, while some interviewees in Bahia report expending time and resources to travel to a campaign office for political paraphernalia, others report home deliveries of flags and banners.[8] Analyses later examine the link between such declaration actions and relational clientelism. Although this chapter focuses primarily on favored access to benefits during non-election years – which by definition cannot involve electoral clientelism – interviewees also did not report direct payments for declared support during campaigns.[9]

If citizens declare support in part to buttress exchange relationships that help them cope with risk, one might expect more declarations when citizens face adverse shocks. This pattern is indeed observed in rural Northeast Brazil. Building on the methodology described in Chapter 4, my joint work with Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, and Marco Gonzalez-Navarro (2018) examines the effect of exogeneous rainfall shocks on declarations. More specifically, we assess whether citizens are more likely to declare support in municipalities experiencing droughts, using standardized precipitation data.[10] As expected, droughts increased declared support: a one standard deviation decrease in rainfall increased the overall prevalence of declarations by 7.1 percentage points (significant at the 1 percent level). More specifically, declaration on citizens' bodies increased 2.3 percentage points, at rallies increased 3.9 percentage points, and on homes increased 6.3 percentage points (significant at the 1–5 percent level). In addition, droughts increased citizens' intensity of declared support, in that many citizens engaged in multiple forms of declaration. One might be concerned that heavy rain influenced these results by making it logistically challenging to declare. Alleviating that concern, we find that rainfall earlier in the year also significantly reduced declarations during the municipal campaign, even when controlling for the amount of rainfall experienced during the campaign period. Thus, droughts motivate Brazilians to declare support, consistent with the argument that citizens facing adverse shocks undertake actions that help sustain relational clientelism.

Beyond rainfall shocks, numerous other contextual characteristics influence the prevalence of declared support in a particular locality. In addition to the regional variation in national surveys described earlier, declaration also varies across neighborhoods and municipalities in the Rural Clientelism Survey. While

[8] Similarly, some citizens who display support incur costs of traveling to rallies of varying distances, while others receive free bus transport to rallies.

[9] Even if such payments existed, the link between declarations and post-election benefits demonstrated in Section 5.3.1 points to relational clientelism. Any direct payments would violate Law 9840, with penalties described in Chapter 2. Although no evidence suggests direct payments, Section 5.3.2 shows that declarers disproportionately receive campaign handouts (a finding consistent with both relational and electoral clientelism).

[10] As discussed in Chapter 4, we employ the CHIRPS satellite database, standardizing municipal rainfall with data from the past quarter century (as municipalities have different climactic conditions).

recognizing such heterogeneity, the present chapter focuses primarily on how – within a given context – citizens' declaration choices are associated with the benefits they later receive. As such, empirical analyses later undertake measures to help control for contextual variation, such as including municipality fixed effects.[11] Section 5.5 returns to the question of how various contextual factors also affect the voter calculus of declared support.

Evidence discussed thus far suggests that declaration is prevalent across Brazil, and increases substantially in the rural Northeast amidst droughts. I now examine the link between declaration and relational clientelism.

5.2 DECLARED SUPPORT AND RELATIONAL CLIENTELISM

The theoretical logic elaborated in Chapter 3 suggests that citizens can help to sustain relational clientelism through declared support, as it signals the credibility of their vote promises. An important first step in testing this logic is to ascertain whether any link between declarations and relational clientelism actually exists. After all, public expressions of political support are common even in countries where contingent exchanges are rare, and many Brazilians undertake such actions without considering any potential contingent benefits. When investigating this link, I consider three alternative hypotheses. First, one might hypothesize that citizens who declare support for a victorious candidate are in fact no more likely to receive benefits than non-declarers. Second, declared supporters might disproportionately receive benefits, but only during electoral campaigns. Such a pattern might just indicate spot-market payments for declaration – with relational clientelism, one would also expect favoritism towards declared supporters involving post-election benefits. And third, one might hypothesize that declared supporters are more likely to receive benefits, but only because declaration is correlated with characteristics associated with the receipt of benefits (e.g., partisanship). As explored, evidence belies these alternative explanations and suggests a robust link between declared support and relational clientelism.

To motivate a deeper analysis of this link, consider a simple comparison of means from the Rural Clientelism Survey. Approximately 11.8 percent of citizens who declared support for a victorious mayoral or councilor candidate during the 2012 municipal campaign received private benefits from elected politicians the following year. By contrast, only 3.9 percent of undeclared citizens received such benefits in 2013. This difference, which is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level), points against the first two alternative hypotheses just outlined – there *is* a link between declarations and handouts, and this link *is* observed with post-election benefits. However, it does not counter the third alternative explanation that this link may be spurious. Alleviating this concern, regressions in Section 5.3 suggest that the link between

[11] In addition, all findings are robust to controlling for declarations by neighbors.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

declared support and post-election benefits persists even when controlling for various factors. Furthermore, they reveal similar patterns for post-election job assistance, municipal benefits, and even emergency water deliveries during a severe drought. Before turning to regressions, I examine qualitative and survey evidence about how citizens perceive declaration to affect benefits received from politicians. In order to illustrate a broader link between declared support and relational clientelism, the discussion focuses on the three areas of vulnerability investigated in Chapter 4: health care, employment, and water.

5.2.1 Health Care

With respect to health care, many Brazilians perceive that declaring support publicly for a candidate during a municipal campaign affects one's access to post-election benefits. While such perceptions need not necessarily reflect reality, they provide useful insights for at least two reasons. First, beliefs and perceptions are important because they can influence citizens' decisions involving clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014, 43–44). And second, perceptions about favoritism towards declared supporters corroborate observed patterns revealed in regression analyses, thereby providing confirmatory evidence. In addition to such favoritism, many Brazilians perceive that elected officials discriminate against citizens who declared support for defeated candidates; however, regressions provide mixed evidence about discrimination. At the outset, it should be underscored that the signaling logic of declared support (elaborated in Chapter 3) does not require any such discrimination.

To explore perceptions about the link between declaration and health care, the Rural Clientelism Survey included hypothetical questions involving fictitious candidates. Our team sequentially showed respondents drawings of three homes – one without a campaign flag, one with a flag for a victorious mayoral candidate, and one with a flag for a defeated mayoral candidate – and asked how easy or difficult it would be for the resident in each home to receive a medical treatment. Respondents overwhelmingly believed that the elected mayor's declared supporter would receive preferential access. Of 3,668 respondents, 78.8 percent believed that receiving a medical treatment would be easier for a citizen who had declared support for the victorious candidate, compared to a citizen who had remained undeclared.[12] Moreover, respondents expected discrimination against the citizen who had declared for a defeated mayoral candidate. Indeed, 78.2 percent of respondents believed it would be tougher for her to obtain a medical treatment than it would be for an undeclared citizen.[13]

[12] Almost 7.8 percent responded there would be no difference, 10.8 percent responded it would be tougher, and 2.6 percent did not know.

[13] Almost 9.7 percent responded there would be no difference, 9.4 percent responded it would be easier, and 2.8 percent did not know.

To examine whether such perceptions extend beyond rural Northeast Brazil, I also conducted an online survey experiment with Salvatore Nunnari in 2016.[14] Over 1,900 subjects in 1,096 municipalities across Brazil were randomly exposed to one of three vignettes, depicting either a declared supporter, declared opposer, or undeclared citizen.[15] Over 43.3 percent of respondents viewing the declared-supporter vignette thought it would be "easy" or "very easy" for the citizen to receive a medical treatment, versus just 35.3 percent of those viewing the undeclared-citizen vignette. This difference is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and suggests perceived favoritism. Whereas this finding is consistent with the Rural Clientelism Survey, the online survey experiment differs in that respondents did not perceive discrimination of declared opposers: 34.9 percent of subjects exposed to that vignette thought that receiving a medical treatment would be "easy" or "very easy." While this figure is significantly less than the declared-supporter vignette, it is statistically indistinguishable from the undeclared-citizen vignette.

The perceptions of favoritism in both surveys were also observed in many of the interviews I conducted in both rural and urban areas of seven municipalities across Bahia state in Northeast Brazil.[16] Numerous citizens indicated that declared supporters of local politicians receive preferential access to medicines and medical treatments that extends beyond campaigns. Some interviewees even provided specific examples of health-related assistance that they had received, attributing them to their own declarations of political support. Examples include medicine, help from politicians to obtain consultations and surgeries in the state capital of Salvador, rides or bus fare to reach those distant medical appointments, and access to ambulances during emergencies. Consistent with the argument that declared support plays a role in risk-mitigating exchange relationships, some citizens discussed prospectively how their declarations would help them cope with illness. For instance, a mason explained that if he needed a costly medical procedure, he would turn to "the politicians he voted for," who would help him "because he declares his vote before voting."[17] Interviews with politicians provide additional evidence; for instance, a councilor paraphrased a famous quote when explaining why declared support sometimes affects health care: "For friends of the king, everything," and for others, "nothing. … Not everyone thinks so, but this,

[14] The survey recruited participants through Facebook advertisements in all Brazilian municipalities with populations up to 250,000 citizens. Municipalities of this size comprise 98.2 percent of Brazil's municipalities and 59.7 percent of the nation's population. See Appendix B for more details.

[15] $N = 1{,}935$. Vignettes employed both text and images. Respondents were asked about the depicted citizen's ease of obtaining medical treatments, employment and water cisterns (discussed later) on a four-point scale: "Very Easy," "Easy," "Hard," and "Very Hard."

[16] See Appendix A for a description of the overall qualitative work, which included 132 formal interviews of both citizens and elites. Interviews in Pernambuco did not focus on declared support ($N = 22$).

[17] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 21, 2008).

practically, is customary."[18] While relational clientelism frequently involves preferential access to the public health care system, numerous interviewees indicated that some politicians also procure private medical assistance for their supporters. For instance, when medicines are unavailable at the public pharmacy, politicians frequently purchase them for their declared supporters at private pharmacies, using their own salaries (especially councilors) or public funds (especially mayors).

A considerable share of interviewees also perceived health care discrimination, a finding consistent with one of the surveys discussed earlier. Among the Bahian citizens whom I asked directly, about half indicated that someone who had declared support for a defeated candidate would be less likely to obtain a medical treatment in the state capital.[19] Interviewees often voiced the word *marcação* ("labeling" or "marking") to describe how politicians identify and disfavor citizens who declared against them. As one example, a councilor explained that politicians can learn how citizens vote through their public declarations of support and then discriminate when providing health care benefits. If a medicine is available at a private pharmacy but not the hospital, he asserted, "and you didn't vote for the mayor, don't even go there, because he won't give it to you."[20] Numerous citizens concurred, even revealing disturbing details about their own or family members' untreated ailments. A voter explained that declared opposers experience the "business of mistreatment, of spite," illustrating with the example of a politician who refused to help his mother obtain a medicine unavailable in the public pharmacy.[21] Some interviewees carped about the "persecution" of declared opposers, who reportedly face greater challenges when trying to obtain specialized appointments and surgeries that could only be performed outside the municipality, or transportation to such health care needs in distant cities. For instance, a teacher complained, using the nickname *jacu* (a bird species) that voters call declared opposers in various parts of Bahia: "He is persecuted by the candidate, secretary, councilor. The *jacu* is persecuted, and therefore is unable to obtain a medical treatment in Salvador."[22] A maid explained that she was unable to get an ultrasound at the local hospital, and when she went to a councilor to ask for help, he responded, "No, you didn't vote for me, you voted for João, so I'm not going to help you, go ask João."[23] Others reported political discrimination in dentistry, usually

[18] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 60,000 citizens (November 4, 2008).

[19] Of forty-three citizens asked this question, twenty-one said less likely, eighteen said no difference, zero said more likely, and four did not know. Unlike the aforementioned survey question, interviews did not employ drawings and indicated the treatment was in Salvador. The interview protocol did not include a comparable question about a declared supporter of a victorious candidate, though the topic was often mentioned by participants.

[20] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 15,000 citizens (January 13, 2009).

[21] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 2, 2008).

[22] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 60,000 citizens (November 3, 2008).

[23] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 14, 2008). The interviewee reported paying out of pocket to receive the ultrasound at a private clinic in another municipality.

regarding the inability to obtain appointments, but with one informant making a more shocking claim: whereas a declared supporter might get a root canal from a public dentist, a declared opponent in the same condition would have his tooth pulled.[24]

While such perceptions were by no means universal, some interviewees in Bahia pointed to potential consequences when indicating that it was better to remain undeclared. With respect to health care, these citizens tended to focus on the perceived risk of losing health care benefits, rather than on potential opportunities for preferential access. For example, a snack shop worker explained that she did not declare support "because then you end up well-known." Declaring for a politician involves risk, she explained, because a citizen "doesn't know who's going to win," and "if he falls sick," the elected politician will refuse help and say, "You didn't vote for me."[25] A vice-mayor provided a harrowing explanation of why political discrimination in emergency situations prevents some citizens from declaring support or even talking about their political preferences:

> "Many 'undecided' people are afraid of saying who they're going to support or vote for, because if you say you're going to vote for someone who loses, the other labels. … I'm going to give another example that is disgraceful, that's even vulgar, that's inhumane, but is true. You voted for me, he voted against me. A car happens to flip and there's one of your relatives and one of his relatives. And the two need to go urgently to Salvador [distant state capital], and the ambulance only transports one. His doesn't go, yours goes first, you understand?"[26]

This account is gravely disturbing, but care must be taken when drawing broader inferences about the severity or prevalence of discrimination against declared opposers. Given that declared support is often observed in Brazil, many citizens clearly perceive the benefits from this action as outweighing the costs, or are motivated to declare in spite of such costs due to non-clientelist considerations (e.g., expressive utility). In addition, nearly half of interviewees denied any modicum of discrimination in health care, such as a farmer who explained that a declared opposer in need of a medical treatment "is attended to the same."[27] Others emphasized limits to its scope. For instance, a councilor insisted that no discrimination exists in emergency situations, but claimed that otherwise it is possible to "push with the belly" (*empurrar com a barriga*) – i.e., postponing or failing to provide an appropriate remedy.[28]

In sum, evidence suggests a perceived link between declared support and relational clientelism in the sphere of health care. More specifically, the Rural Clientelism Survey and many interviews reveal perceptions that declaration

[24] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (September 20, 2008).
[25] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 16, 2008).
[26] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 60,000 citizens (November 5, 2008).
[27] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 15,000 citizens (January 15, 2009).
[28] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 30,000 citizens (December 2, 2008). Explanation of phrase based on Peterson (1998).

actions lead to favoritism and discrimination in the provision of post-election health care benefits, and the online survey experiment across Brazil points to perceived favoritism but not discrimination. Such perceptions motivate some citizens to remain undeclared.

5.2.2 Employment

Just as with health care, many Brazilians also perceive a link between declared support and post-election employment opportunities. First, consider another hypothetical scenario included in the Rural Clientelism Survey. As described earlier, respondents were shown drawings of three fictitious homes: (a) one without a campaign flag, (b) one with a flag for a victorious mayoral candidate, and (c) one with a flag for a defeated mayoral candidate. When asked about the ease of obtaining a job, the preponderance of respondents believed that the declared supporter would receive preferential treatment and that the declared opposer would face discrimination. Of 3,670 respondents, 78.5 percent reported that obtaining employment would be easier for a citizen who had declared support for the victorious candidate, compared to the undeclared citizen.[29] In addition, 87.9 percent of respondents believed it would be tougher for the citizen who declared for the defeated mayoral candidate to obtain a job than it would be for an undeclared citizen.[30]

To explore whether these perceptions were limited to Northeast Brazil, the vignettes were again explored in the online survey experiment conducted across Brazil.[31] Nearly 39.2 percent of respondents randomly assigned to view the declared-supporter vignette thought it would be "easy" or "very easy" for the citizen to obtain employment, versus just 18.2 percent of those viewing the undeclared-citizen vignette. This difference, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, again suggests perceived favoritism. But as with health care, participants in the online survey experiment did not perceive that declared opposers are singled out for discrimination in the sphere of employment (unlike in the Rural Clientelism Survey). Among citizens exposed to the declared-opposer vignette, 20.8 percent thought that obtaining a job would be "easy" or "very easy," which is significantly less than the declared-supporter vignette, but statistically indistinguishable from the undeclared-citizen vignette.

Turning to qualitative evidence, many interviewees in Bahia shared the perception that declared supporters are favored with respect to employment. Of those I asked, nearly three-fourths responded that obtaining a public sector job would be easier for someone who had declared support for a victorious

[29] In addition, 5.9 percent responded there would be no difference, and 13 percent responded it would be tougher (98 citizens did not know and 1 did not answer this question).

[30] In addition, 5 percent responded there would be no difference, and 4.7 percent responded it would be easier (86 citizens did not know and 3 did not answer this question).

[31] $N = 1{,}935$.

candidate, compared to an undeclared citizen.[32] A teacher responded that "it would be easier, definitely," and a hairdresser explained that "of course [a politician] will first help those people who were there with him all the time he needed it, backing his victory."[33] A retired butcher concurred and underscored that declaration boosts a politician's confidence in one's vote choice. A declared supporter would have an easier time receiving municipal employment, he posited, "because if the candidate is certain that I voted for him, he will give me work."[34] Some citizens suggested that politicians would "recognize" the ongoing support provided by declarers when allocating job opportunities. In the words of a homemaker, it is "easier for someone who declared" because a politician says, "You were on my side. I am going to give you work."[35] In a point explored further in Chapter 6, self-selection also plays a role in the link between declared support and employment. Declaration increases some interviewees' comfort with asking for a job, even conferring "the right to demand" employment.[36]

In addition, the majority of interviewees in Bahia perceived that declared opposers face post-election discrimination with respect to employment. Of those I asked, over two-thirds indicated that obtaining a public sector job would be more difficult for someone who had declared support for a defeated candidate than it would be for an undeclared citizen.[37] For example, a mason responded it is "definitely" more difficult for a declared opposer, adding: "Because he declared his vote. … It's hard. Not even I would give work to him."[38] Yet some interviewees drew a clear distinction between temporary contracts and civil service positions. For instance, an athletics instructor argued that obtaining a contract position is "very difficult" for a declared opposer, and even role-played how a politician's staff "persecutes": "I'm not going to give him a job, I'm going to humiliate him, I'll step on him a lot." On the other hand, he emphasized that such discrimination does not exist for permanent positions with competitive exams (*concursos*), as well as for any citizen who remains undeclared because the politician "will not know who he voted for."[39] Some politicians likewise indicated that declared opposers would be cut off from contract work; in the words of one vice-mayor, "If you have a job, you're not going to give it to that person who wasn't with you. Then you have a way

[32] Of thirty-three interviewees asked this question, twenty-four said easier, six said no difference, zero said more difficult, and three did not know.

[33] Author's interviews, municipalities in Bahia with 60,000 and 15,000 citizens (November 3, 2008, and January 12, 2009), respectively.

[34] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 60,000 citizens (November 4, 2008).

[35] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 22, 2008).

[36] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 15, 2008).

[37] Of forty-seven interviewees asked this question, thirty-two said more difficult, ten said no difference, one said easier, and four did not know.

[38] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 18, 2008).

[39] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 60,000 citizens (November 3, 2008).

to retaliate."[40] Citizens who are already employed in the public sector may also risk reprisals if they declare for a candidate who loses: many interviewees thought contract workers would be fired, and a few also considered civil service employees to be at risk. A mayor explained that public employees frequently opt to remain undeclared and silent about their preferences "because they have fear exactly of retaliation going forward."[41] Election winners can punish teachers in permanent positions, explained a party leader, by shuffling them away from their schools, moving them to more distant and less accessible locations, and halving their work schedule and pay from forty to twenty hours a week – and "all of this is political persecution."[42]

Though most interviewees expressed perceptions of such employment discrimination, their views were not uniform. About a fifth of citizens interviewed believed that declared opposers face no such employment discrimination. Furthermore, at least one interviewee indicated that a benefit as valuable as employment would instead be used for persuasion. More specifically, a janitor explained that a declared opposer would have a "greater opportunity to get a job" because politicians follow the logic: "That's already mine, I have to win what I lost."[43]

Despite such heterogeneity, the evidence suggests that citizens tend to perceive both potential benefits and costs of declaring support: the chance of obtaining a job increases if one's candidate is victorious, but declines otherwise. As mentioned earlier, the prevalence of declared support in Brazil indicates that the overall benefits of declaring outweigh the costs for many citizens. But as with health care, some citizens are wary of declaring support for fear of risking job opportunities. For example, a saleswoman explained, "If I don't declare my vote, I think it is easier to obtain work because nobody will know who I voted for," and also noted that many fellow citizens "prefer to keep quiet so that we don't harm ourselves in the future."[44] A homemaker revealed that she didn't declare support because there is a "lot of *marcação*" ("labeling" or "marking").[45] Similarly, a computer technician indicated he wouldn't declare through stickers or other means because "you will burn yourself." To illustrate, he shared how a councilor denied his own request for job assistance during a bout of unemployment: "Gosh, you have to find your candidate … weren't you with him?"[46]

Overall, these findings for employment are broadly similar to the case of health care, in that they both suggest a perceived link between declared support and relational clientelism. As before, many interviewees and the Rural

[40] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 20, 2008).
[41] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 60,000 citizens (November 7, 2008).
[42] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 50,000 citizens (November 12, 2008).
[43] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 3, 2008).
[44] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 21, 2008).
[45] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 15,000 citizens (January 13, 2009).
[46] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 18, 2008).

Clientelism Survey reveal perceptions of both favoritism and discrimination based on declarations, whereas the online survey experiment across Brazil suggests perceived favoritism but not discrimination.

5.2.3 Water

Consistent with findings for health care and employment, many Brazilians also perceive a link between declared support and post-election water provision. To explore this issue, consider another hypothetical scenario in the Rural Clientelism Survey that involves water cisterns, which are large tanks used by many Brazilians to collect and store rainwater. As described earlier, respondents viewed drawings of three fictitious homes corresponding to a declared supporter, a declared opposer, and an undeclared citizen. When asked about the ease of obtaining a water cistern, most respondents believed the declared supporter would be favored and the declared opposer would be disfavored. Of 3,667 respondents, 77.1 percent reported that obtaining a cistern would be easier for a citizen who had declared support for the victorious mayoral candidate, compared to a citizen who had remained undeclared.[47] In addition, 81.6 percent of respondents believed it would be tougher for the citizen who declared for the defeated mayoral candidate to obtain a cistern than it would be for an undeclared citizen.[48]

As before, the breadth of such perceptions was examined in the online survey experiment with over 1,900 participants in 1,096 municipalities across Brazil. Nearly 39.5 percent of respondents viewing the declared-supporter vignette thought it would be "easy" or "very easy" for the citizen to obtain a water cistern, versus just 28.4 percent of those viewing the undeclared-citizen vignette. This difference, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, again suggests perceived favoritism. Similar to the Rural Clientelism Survey, online participants across Brazil perceived that declared opposers would be singled out for discrimination when obtaining a cistern: only 22.9 percent of subjects exposed to this vignette thought that obtaining one would be "easy" or "very easy." This percentage is significantly less than those in both the declared-supporter and undeclared-citizen vignettes.

Qualitative evidence about the link between declared support and water is relatively limited; my interviews in Bahia asked about health care and employment but not water. However, an ex-mayor I later interviewed in Pernambuco provided relevant insights.[49] He emphasized that cisterns and water trucks are channeled to supporters, and pointed to rallies – which involve

[47] In addition, 10 percent responded there would be no difference, while 10.1 percent responded it would be tougher (104 citizens did not know and 4 did not answer this question).

[48] In addition, 8.5 percent responded there would be no difference, while 7.3 percent responded it would be easier (ninety-six citizens did not know and six did not answer this question).

[49] Interview by Gustavo Bobonis, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Simeon Nichter; municipality in Pernambuco with 15,000 citizens (July 26, 2012).

declarations when citizens display political paraphernalia – when explaining why "you know who the people are who back you, who follow you, who vote for you." His further comments about water cisterns suggest why such knowledge can influence whether citizens receive benefits:

"Normally, a politician will seek to benefit more the people on his side. If I am going to make 100 cisterns, I will make 100 cisterns for people who vote for me. … You will always seek to favor the one who is your partisan, who is your voter, who is on your side. It shouldn't be that way, but this is the culture in any municipality in Pernambuco."

Furthermore, consistent with reports from the states of Ceará and Piauí discussed in Chapter 4, the ex-mayor explained that a mayor's water truck would "only supply the people on his side."[50] While this single account cannot be deemed definitive, it sheds light on the ways in which declared support can potentially affect water benefits.

Media reports elsewhere in Northeast Brazil provide additional evidence. An alleged link between declared support and clientelist water delivery surfaced on national television in 2015 as the focus of a prominent, hour-long investigative show.[51] The show claimed that in a small municipality in Paraíba state, the mayor and his staff dispatched water trucks exclusively to supporters on an ongoing basis after the election. The ex-manager of water delivery for the municipality "confirmed the existence of a 'drought list' – with the names of residents who voted for the mayor and have water guaranteed during the dry period." The reporter also interviewed several citizens who claimed they were excluded from water deliveries because they had "declared" their votes – a word used repeatedly in the show. One mechanic complained that he no longer received water deliveries because he had voted against the mayor, explaining his vote choice was known "because every election I put a sticker on my house." Separately, a news magazine in Bahia reported on similar allegations, without describing how citizens expressed support. For instance, it quotes a farmer bemoaning that: "Since the day of the election, water never again arrived at my land. … For over a month, I asked for the municipality's water truck to come, and nothing. They refuse to give water because I supported the opposition candidate."[52] While these allegations are unsubstantiated, they again point to perceived favoritism and discrimination.

With respect to water, this survey and qualitative evidence reveals perceptions that declarations of political support can influence benefits beyond electoral campaigns. More broadly, this section demonstrates that many Brazilians

[50] He contrasted such patterns to Army-controlled water trucks, which he described as not involving clientelism (see discussion of Operação Carro-Pipa later in this chapter and in Chapter 4).

[51] The show, *Repórter Record Investigação*, aired on January 26, 2015, and can be viewed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkoXRoFMazI. The Rural Clientelism Survey preceded this TV show.

[52] "Nem Mandacaru Suporta," *Carta Capital*, April 26, 2013.

perceive a link between declared support and relational clientelism in these three arenas of vulnerability, which serve as examples of a broader range of uninsured risks. Across interviews and both surveys, citizens who declared support for victorious candidates are widely viewed as experiencing favoritism with health care, employment, and water. Perceptions of discrimination are more mixed: while the Rural Clientelism Survey and many interviewees suggest that declared opposers are disfavored relative to non-declarers in all three issue areas, the online experiment finds such patterns only for water.[53] Across all issue areas, however, both surveys find that declared opposers are perceived as being significantly less likely to receive benefits than declared supporters. Another important finding is that although declaration is frequently observed in Brazil, some citizens who perceive risks are motivated to remain undeclared. Given such perceptions, I now further scrutinize the link between declared support and relational clientelism through regression analyses.

5.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DECLARED SUPPORT

Evidence presented thus far suggests that many Brazilians publicly declare support for political candidates, and this phenomenon is widely believed to influence whether citizens receive material benefits from elected politicians. Before testing if declarations transmit meaningful information to politicians, I investigate whether the perceived link between declared support and relational clientelism is observed when analyzing the experiences of survey respondents. Regressions in this section demonstrate this link, but it deserves emphasis that analyses do not establish causality. Efforts are taken to ameliorate concerns about omitted variables bias and reverse causality, but such threats cannot be ruled out. Notwithstanding this limitation, results are consistent with relational clientelism.

5.3.1 Post-Election Benefits

Favoritism during non-campaign periods is a hallmark of relational clientelism, so I first examine whether declared supporters disproportionately receive post-election benefits. Recall from Section 5.2 that respondents in the Rural Clientelism Survey who declared support for a victorious candidate in 2012 were three times more likely than non-declarers to receive private benefits directly from a politician the following year (11.8 versus 3.9 percent). Extending this analysis, the first row in Figure 5.1 summarizes results from a regression, in which the outcome variable is whether a respondent received a private benefit

[53] One conjecture is that the online experiment across Brazil only detects this pattern of discrimination for water because of its particular scarcity during survey implementation. In 2016, Northeast Brazil was experiencing its most severe drought in a century, as highly publicized nationwide. See: "Nordeste Enfrenta Maior Seca em 100 Anos," *Estadão*, January 9, 2017.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press



FIGURE 5.1 Declared support and benefits, rural Northeast Brazil (2013)
Note: Markers correspond to regression coefficients for the two explanatory variables on horizontal axis. These variables are coded 1 if respondent declared support for a victorious (defeated) candidate for mayor or councilor during the 2012 campaign; 0 otherwise. Outcome variables on the vertical axis are coded 1 if citizen experienced the outcome in 2013; 0 otherwise. Circles are shown for regressions with only these two explanatory variables, diamonds include controls, and squares include controls and municipal fixed effects. Thin (thick) whiskers denote 95 (90) percent confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Linear probability models are employed; results are robust using logit specifications. Appendix D reports full regression tables. Appendix B describes controls, which are: age, education, gender, household wealth, turnout, mayoral vote choice, political preferences (dummies for PT, PMDB, PSDB, and DEM parties), frequency of conversations with politicians, association membership, collaborative efforts with neighbors, has piped water, has own cistern, has access to shared cistern, reciprocity, risk aversion, time preference, and public goods contribution. Number of observations for the most inclusive specification is 3,218 (Row 1), 3,247 (Row 2), 3,243 (Row 3), 3,158 (Row 4), and 3,218 (Row 5).
Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

directly from a politician in 2013, and the explanatory variables are whether a respondent had declared for a victorious (defeated) candidate during the 2012 campaign.[54] In the left panel (a), the "No Controls" specification denoted by a filled circle suggests that declared supporters were 7.7 percentage points more likely than non-declarers to receive such help, a finding significant at the 1 percent level.

One might be concerned about bias because the preceding estimate ignores important characteristics correlated with both declarations and benefits. To mitigate this concern, the adjacent "Controls" specification in Figure 5.1a shows robustness when including a broad range of covariates: the point estimate decreases to 7.3 percentage points but remains significant. All regression tables are included in Appendix D, and a detailed description of control variables is provided in Appendix B. These controls include respondents' socioeconomic factors (age, education, gender, and household wealth), political characteristics (turnout, mayoral vote choice, preferences for the PT, PMDB, PSDB, and DEM parties, and frequency of conversations with politicians), horizontal linkages (association membership and collaborative efforts with neighbors), water availability (piped water, own cistern, and access to shared cistern), and behavioral attributes measured by experimental games (reciprocity, risk aversion, time preference, and public goods contribution). Directly below the "No Controls" and "Controls" estimates is another specification that also includes municipal fixed effects ("Controls & Fixed Effects"), addressing any omitted variables that are invariant across respondents in a given municipality. With this most inclusive specification, citizens who declared support for a candidate who won in 2012 were 7.1 percentage points more likely than non-declarers to receive a benefit directly from a politician in 2013 (significant at the 1 percent level).

Consistent with relational clientelism, the Rural Clientelism Survey also reveals favoritism in the sphere of employment. Finding work is especially challenging in rural Brazil, where a single job often helps to sustain an extended family. Although only 0.7 percent of non-declarers reported that a politician helped them obtain work in 2013, the figure was sixfold (4 percent) for citizens who had declared support for a victorious candidate during the prior year's campaign. As shown in Figure 5.1a, the difference is 3.0–3.1 percentage points and significant across all specifications (at the 1 or 5 percent level). Assistance from the municipal government is also important to consider, as politicians may

[54] Analyses in Figure 5.1 employ 2013 questions about whether and for whom respondents declared in 2012. The 2012 wave also inquired whether respondents declared, but not for whom. A more restrictive approach codes respondents as declaring for a victorious (defeated) candidate only if they: (a) indicated that response in the 2013 wave *and* (b) indicated they declared in the 2012 wave. All findings in Figure 5.1 are robust to this coding except Row 2, which becomes significant only in the most inclusive specification at the 10 percent level.

help clients to obtain benefits from municipal offices rather than using their own funds. Again consistent with relational clientelism, declared supporters were over twice as likely as non-declarers to receive benefits from municipal offices in 2013 (8.4 versus 3.9 percent). This difference is 4.2–4.4 percentage points (significant at the 1 percent level), even when including controls and/or municipal fixed effects.

Given that Northeast Brazil had its worst drought in fifty years in 2013 (WMO, 2014), is such favoritism also observed in rural water delivery? Evidence suggests that during this period of heightened vulnerability, declared supporters were more likely to receive water from Operação Carro-Pipa (Operation Water Truck) – by far the principal source of water deliveries in the Rural Clientelism Survey.[55] As discussed in Chapter 4, municipal politicians can influence the implementation of this program, and federal audits reveal imperfect compliance with its regulations (CGU, 2014). For each month, the survey asked respondents about water truck deliveries to their homes. Citizens who had declared for a victorious candidate received Operação Carro-Pipa water deliveries during an average of 1.5 months in 2013, compared to 0.9 months for non-declarers. Furthermore, declared supporters received an average of 11,000 total liters of water through the program in 2013, versus just 6,978 liters for non-declarers.[56] Both differences are significant at the 1 percent level, and regressions in Appendix D show robustness to the inclusion of controls and municipal fixed effects.[57] In the most inclusive specifications, declared supporters received 0.44 additional months of water-truck deliveries – and 2,590 more liters of overall water – than non-declarers (with p values of 0.02 and 0.08, respectively).[58] These analyses again point towards relational clientelism by revealing post-electoral favoritism towards declared supporters.

While the Rural Clientelism Survey thus provides strong evidence of favoritism, it offers only mixed evidence of discrimination. In the same specifications just analyzed, Figure 5.1b and Appendix D show that citizens who declared for a defeated candidate were no less likely than non-declarers to receive each form of post-electoral assistance. Nevertheless, they were significantly less likely to be recipients than declared supporters. Whereas analyses throughout this chapter identify declared opposers as respondents

[55] It provided over three times as many deliveries, and four times as many total liters of water, as municipal governments and local politicians combined in 2013.

[56] As context, the average daily water consumption across *all* Brazilians in 2013 was 166.3 liters per person (SNIS, 2014).

[57] Analyses include all controls used in Figure 5.1, as well as standardized municipal rainfall. Such patterns are not detected with other less common sources of emergency water or in 2012.

[58] When employing the more restrictive coding described in note 54, all specifications regarding deliveries are significant (at the 5–10 percent level), but specifications regarding liters are only significant (at the 10 percent level) without controls and fixed effects. Point estimates are comparable, but precision is reduced as observations fall. The primary reason is that not all household members who took the survey in 2013 were present in 2012.

who declared for *any* defeated candidate in the 2012 election, evidence of discrimination is observed when honing in on a much smaller subset – those who declared for *both* a defeated mayoral candidate and a defeated councilor candidate. These declared opposers were less likely than non-declarers to receive job assistance from politicians, municipal benefits and club goods (not shown).[59] Even without focusing on this subset, the survey also reveals perceptions of discrimination. When asked if they had been denied a municipal benefit in 2013 due to their vote choice, declarers for any defeated candidate were four times more likely to answer affirmatively than non-declarers (12.1 vs 2.6 percent). As shown in the fourth row of Figure 5.1b, the difference between declared opposers and non-declarers is 8.3–9.4 percentage points – and significant at the 1 percent level – across all specifications. Given such mixed evidence, it again deserves emphasis that declared support does not require any discrimination to transmit meaningful information about the credibility of vote promises.[60] This point is clarified by the formal model elaborated in Chapter 3, which shows that under reasonable conditions, favoritism is sufficient for declared support to serve as an effective signaling mechanism.

As with most of the literature on clientelism, analyses discussed thus far focus on private benefits. Club goods also warrant investigation, given that collective benefits in some contexts are also distributed in contingent exchange for political support (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).[61] In the Rural Clientelism Survey, less than one percent of respondents reported receiving a club good from a politician in 2013. Over three-fourths of these benefits involved the provision of community water (e.g., filling neighborhood ponds), while the remainder involved roads, education and health. As shown in the bottom row of Figure 5.1, declared support is not associated with receiving club goods from a politician; point estimates are virtually zero across all specifications. Other analyses suggest that declared supporters were slightly more likely than non-declarers to receive club goods from municipal offices in 2013, but that finding is not robust and only significant at the 10 percent level (not shown).[62] Unlike for private benefits, such evidence does not strongly point to favoritism (or discrimination) with club goods, though further analysis is warranted.

[59] This subset accounts for about a tenth of all declared opposers. No discrimination is observed with private benefits from politicians or water.

[60] In some contexts, discrimination may be inhibited by limited information. Even when politicians observe declarations of their supporters in ongoing exchange relationships, they may lack the capacity to observe if other citizens declare for competitors or remain undeclared.

[61] Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007, 11–12) explain that discretion affects whether club goods – which are enjoyed by all citizens in a group or boundary – are programmatic or clientelist.

[62] The survey does not facilitate analyses of club goods using other outcome variables just examined. Other analyses suggest that club goods are not more likely to be distributed to respondents in neighborhoods where more citizens declared for the victorious candidate (not shown).

Are patterns of declared support limited to rural Northeast Brazil? The online survey that I conducted with Salvatore Nunnari across one-fifth of Brazil's municipalities suggests otherwise. We asked respondents if they had publicly declared support for a candidate during the 2012 municipal campaign, and about post-election benefits received between January 2013 and June 2016.[63] At the outset, it should be noted that unlike the Rural Clientelism Survey, participants in the online survey were not randomly selected from a sampling frame (see Appendix B), though their characteristics are fairly representative of Brazil with respect to gender, age, and geographic region. Respondents were asked far fewer questions; for example, the survey did not inquire about employment assistance, water deliveries, or club goods. And because the online survey asks about declaration actions undertaken several years earlier, results are more subject to recall issues.[64] These points notwithstanding, the online survey also offers some advantages. Beyond its national scope, the survey also asks about post-election benefits distributed over a longer time frame than the Rural Clientelism Survey (3.5 years versus 1 year). It is thus able to detect relational clientelism during nearly a full term in office, which likely amplifies the magnitude of effects. Most important, the online survey helps to triangulate results: the broad consistency of findings across the two surveys and qualitative evidence suggests a robust link between declared support and relational clientelism in Brazil.

Similar to the Rural Clientelism Survey, declared supporters in the online survey were significantly more likely to report receiving post-election benefits from politicians. Over 27.2 percent of respondents who declared for a victorious candidate in 2012 reported receiving benefits from politicians in 2013–2016, versus just 11.2 percent of non-declarers. The first row of Figure 5.2a summarizes regression analyses, which show a difference of 15.8 to 18.1 percentage points – and significance at the 1 percent level even with the inclusion of various covariates and/or state fixed effects.[65] All regression tables are shown in Appendix D, and Appendix B provides a description of control variables in the online survey, which include: respondents' socioeconomic factors (age, education, gender, and income), political characteristics (turnout, mayoral vote choice, preferences for the PT, PMDB, PSDB, or DEM parties), risk aversion, and screeners for attentiveness.[66] In line with the Rural Clientelism Survey,

[63] This timing spans mayors' inauguration until the start of the following mayoral campaign; hence, benefits are post-electoral with respect to declarations in the 2012 municipal election. Unlike analyses of the Rural Clientelism Survey, the post-electoral period in the online survey overlaps with federal and state elections in October 2014.

[64] This survey was fielded around the 2016 municipal election, so the present analysis of post-election benefits examines declarations during the 2012 municipal campaign. The next section about campaign handouts examines declarations in the 2012 and 2016 campaigns.

[65] State fixed effects are used as most municipalities in the online survey have one observation.

[66] Two screeners were included to control for the effects of participants' attentiveness in the online survey (following Berinsky et al., 2014).



FIGURE 5.2 Declared support and benefits, Brazil (2012–2016)
Note: Markers correspond to regression coefficients for the two explanatory variables on horizontal axis. These variables are coded 1 if respondent declared support for a victorious (defeated) candidate for mayor or councilor during the 2012 campaign; 0 otherwise. Outcome variables listed on vertical axis are coded 1 if a citizen experienced outcome between January 2013 and June 2016, 0 otherwise. Circles shown for regressions with only these two explanatory variables: diamonds include controls, and squares include controls and state fixed effects. Thin (thick) whiskers denote 95 (90) percent confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at state level. Linear probability models are employed; results are robust using logit specifications. Appendix D reports full regression results. Appendix B describes controls, which are: age, education, gender, income, turnout, mayoral vote choice, political preferences (dummies for PT, PMDB, PSDB, and DEM parties), risk aversion, and screeners for attentiveness. Number of observations for the most inclusive specification is 1,466 (Row 1), 1,470 (Row 2), and 1,493 (Row 3).
Source: Author's analysis of the Online Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Simeon Nichter and Salvatore Nunnari.

declared supporters were also over twice as likely as non-declarers to receive post-election benefits from municipal offices (34.3 versus 15.4 percent). The second row of Figure 5.2a reports that citizens who declared for a victorious candidate during the 2012 municipal election were 15.5–20.1 percentage points

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

more likely than non-declarers to receive such benefits in 2013–2016. This association remains significant at the 1 percent level across all specifications.

As with the Rural Clientelism Survey, the online survey thus reveals substantial favoritism, but provides only mixed evidence of discrimination. The first two rows of Figure 5.2b show that in "No Controls" specifications, citizens who declared for a defeated candidate were 9.3 (7.4) percentage points less likely than non-declarers to receive post-election benefits from politicians (municipal offices). However, these findings of discrimination are not robust: point estimates fall and are statistically indistinguishable from zero with the inclusion of controls and/or fixed effects. Some specifications point towards perceptions of discrimination, a finding again comparable to the Rural Clientelism Survey. As shown in the third row of Figure 5.2b, citizens who declared for a defeated candidate in 2012 were 3.8–5.5 percentage points more likely than non-declarers to report that they had been denied a post-election benefit due to their vote choice. This association is significant at the 10 percent level when including controls but not fixed effects.[67]

In sum, quantitative analyses using both original surveys suggest a robust link between declared support and relational clientelism, thereby corroborating many perceptions in Section 5.2. Citizens who publicly pledged allegiance to a victorious candidate during a municipal campaign were more likely than non-declarers to receive several forms of post-election benefits. Findings thus point substantially towards favoritism, though evidence of discrimination is mixed. The next section, which analyzes handouts distributed during campaigns, provides additional evidence consistent with a link between declared support and relational clientelism.

5.3.2 Campaign Handouts

Are declarers favored with material benefits during electoral campaigns? This pattern would be expected if declaration plays a role in relational clientelism, because ongoing exchange relationships persist during both election and non-election periods. Analyses in the present section suggest that citizens who publicly declare their political allegiance are indeed more likely to receive campaign handouts from politicians. Observe that campaign handouts precede the 2012 election; thus, no distinction is made between declared supporters and declared opposers, and analyses do not examine discrimination.[68] Findings

[67] The p values are 0.053, 0.082, and 0.143 in the "No Controls," "Controls," and "Controls and Fixed Effects" specifications, respectively. Citizens who declared for a victorious candidate were no more or less likely than non-declarers to report discrimination; "No Controls" is significant at the 10 percent level, but more inclusive specifications are insignificant (coefficients are positive).

[68] This section does not discuss club goods, as only three respondents reported their receipt as campaign handouts. The 2012 wave did not include a comparable question about benefits from the municipality. Water deliveries are not associated with declarations, during the campaign.

in this section corroborate the argument that declared support and relational clientelism are linked, but it should be emphasized that they provide only collateral evidence. Whereas the preceding section focused on post-election benefits – which by definition do not involve electoral clientelism – the present focus on campaign handouts could plausibly involve electoral and/or relational clientelism. As emphasized in Chapter 1, a campaign handout may comprise electoral or relational clientelism, depending on whether a citizen's receipt of contingent benefits extends beyond campaigns. For example, although interviews did not reveal evidence of spot-market payments to citizens for placing campaign posters on their own homes, quantitative analyses presented here cannot rule out this possibility. As before, these analyses also cannot entirely rule out omitted variables bias or reverse causality, though they do show robustness to a wide range of control variables and fixed effects.

Notwithstanding such limitations, the Rural Clientelism Survey provides considerable evidence that declarers are favored with campaign handouts. In the overall sample, 6.2 percent of respondents received benefits from politicians during the 2012 campaign. This aggregate figure masks considerable variation: under 4.7 percent of non-declarers received handouts, compared to over 7.8 percent of citizens who declared support for any candidate during that campaign. As shown in the first row of Figure 5.3 – in the "No Controls" specification – this unadjusted difference of 3.2 percentage points (with rounding) is significant at the 1 percent level.[69] This association continues to be significant when including control variables described in Appendix B, as well as municipal fixed effects.[70] The point estimate falls to 3.0 and 2.5 percentage points in the "Controls" and "Controls & Fixed Effects" specifications, respectively (see Appendix D). Similar patterns are observed when examining the value of campaign handouts, as estimated by recipients in the 2012 wave (not shown). On average, declarers received 23.4 percent more reais of campaign handouts than non-declarers (significant at the 5 percent level).[71]

The survey also suggests that citizens who engage in multiple forms of declared support are more likely to receive campaign handouts. Such effort provides an especially meaningful signal of whether vote promises are credible. Recall from Chapter 3 that declarations provide a more informative signal when the cost of declaring increases. Citizens who employ a single type of declaration may choose their cheapest method, which often varies across individuals.[72] But employing multiple ways increases declaration costs. To explore

[69] Given this section analyzes only one outcome variable, the vertical axis in Figure 5.3 provides alternative specifications of the independent variable.

[70] Not all questions were repeated across survey rounds, so analyses of the 2012 wave include most but not all of the control variables as analyses of the 2013 wave.

[71] Specification includes controls and fixed effects as in Figure 5.3. Values are logged and winsorized at 95 percent (given outliers). When regression includes only recipients, the estimate is similar but imprecisely estimated.

[72] For example, costs depend on how far a citizen must travel to campaign offices or rallies, opportunity costs, transportation options, and if candidates deliver or affix declarations.



FIGURE 5.3 Declared support and campaign handouts, rural Northeast Brazil (2012)
Note: Markers correspond to regression coefficients for explanatory variables on the vertical axis. In the top row, "Any Declaration" is coded 1 if the respondent declared support for any candidate during the 2012 campaign; 0 otherwise. Variables in the bottom three rows are included together in another specification; they are coded 1 if the respondent declared support using the number of methods listed; 0 otherwise. The three methods are displaying political paraphernalia on one's body, on one's house, or at a rally. The outcome variable is coded 1 if respondent reported receiving a private benefit from a politician during the 2012 campaign; 0 otherwise. Circles shown for bivariate regressions, diamonds include controls, and squares include controls and municipal fixed effects. Thin (thick) whiskers denote 95 (90) percent confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Linear probability models are employed; results are robust using logit specifications. Appendix D reports full regression tables. Appendix B describes controls, which are: age, education, gender, household wealth, turnout, mayoral vote choice, political preferences (dummies for PT, PMDB, PSDB, and DEM parties), frequency of conversations with politicians, association membership, has piped water, has own cistern, has access to shared cistern, reciprocity, risk aversion, and time preference. Number of observations for the most inclusive specifications in all rows is 2,725.
Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the effects of more extensive declaration, the 2012 wave included separate questions about whether respondents had displayed political paraphernalia on their bodies, on their homes, or at rallies during that year's campaign.[73] As demonstrated by the most inclusive specifications in Figure 5.3, citizens undertaking two of these declaration methods were 4.7 percentage points more likely – and those undertaking three declaration methods were 5.7 percentage points more likely – to be recipients than non-declarers. Both findings are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.[74] By contrast, citizens using just one declaration method were no more likely than non-declarers to receive a campaign handout.[75] Similar patterns are observed when examining the value of campaign handouts (not shown). Citizens undertaking two declaration methods received 44.8 percent more – and those undertaking three declaration methods received 66.2 percent more – reais of benefits than non-declarers (significant at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively). In contrast, the effect of 5.4 percent for one declaration method is statistically insignificant.[76] Beyond revealing insights about effects on the extensive margin, the granular questions also confirm the robustness of the broader link between declared support and handouts: all specifications in the first row of Figure 5.3 remain statistically significant when using any of the three declaration methods in lieu of the "Any Declaration" variable (not shown).[77] The granular questions also demonstrate that the link is not merely due to any distribution of benefits at rallies; furthermore, the relationship between declared support and campaign handouts is virtually unchanged if rallies are excluded altogether as a form of declaration.[78]

[73] These granular questions were not repeated in the 2013 wave. Post-electoral analyses in the preceding section did not analyze these granular questions, as they do not differentiate between declarations for winners and losers. The questions asked about respondents' displays on their bodies (with campaign stickers or T-shirts), on their homes (with flags, banners or painted walls), and at rallies (with flags, banners or T-shirts).

[74] For all analyses in this paragraph, coefficients for two and three methods are statistically indistinguishable from each other, but are each significantly different than estimates for one method.

[75] About 4.7 percent of non-declarers received handouts, which is statistically indistinguishable from the corresponding percentage for those declaring in just one manner (5.1, 5.3, and 6.3 percent for citizens who declared exclusively on bodies, at rallies and on homes, respectively).

[76] When regressions include only recipients, extensive declaration is also linked to higher valued benefits.

[77] When including only one declaration method in a specification with controls and fixed effects, the effect is 2.5, 3.4, and 4.5 percentage points for declarations on homes, on bodies, and at rallies, respectively. These coefficients do not isolate effects of each declaration type, as citizens often declare with multiple types. Mere rally attendance without displays is *not* considered declaration, and has no effect on handouts.

[78] When excluding rallies from the "Any Declaration" dummy, the point estimate in the first row is nearly identical and remains significant at the 1 percent level. Analyses also show that citizens who attend but do not display paraphrenalia at rallies are no more likely than non-declarers to receive campaign handouts (not shown).



FIGURE 5.4 Declared support and campaign handouts, Brazil (2012 and 2016)
Note: Outcome variables listed on vertical axis; coded 1 if citizen received a private benefit during the 2012 (2016) municipal campaign. Markers correspond to regression coefficients for the explanatory variable, coded 1 if the respondent reported declaring support for any candidate during the contemporaneous campaign, 0 otherwise. Explanatory variable for the top (bottom) row is whether the respondent declared in 2012 (2016). Circles are shown for bivariate regressions; diamonds include controls, and squares include controls and state fixed effects. Thin (thick) whiskers denote 95 (90) percent confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at state level. Linear probability models are employed; results are robust using logit specifications. Appendix D reports full regression tables. Appendix B describes controls, which are: age, education, gender, income, turnout, mayoral vote choice, political preferences (dummies for PT, PMDB, PSDB, and DEM parties), risk aversion, and screeners for attentiveness. Number of observations for the most inclusive specification is 1,451 (Row 1) and 1,447 (Row 2).
Source: Author's analysis of the Online Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Simeon Nichter and Salvatore Nunnari.

Just as with the Rural Clientelism Survey, the online survey across Brazil also suggests that campaign handouts disproportionately flow to declarers. The first row of Figure 5.4 examines both declarations and pre-election benefits from politicians during the 2012 municipal campaign (regression tables are in Appendix D). Citizens who declared support for any candidate were 13.3 percentage points more likely than non-declarers to receive a campaign handout (significant at the 1 percent level). Indeed, over 21 percent of declarers reported

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receiving campaign handouts, compared to just 7.7 percent of non-declarers. This association continues to be significant when including all control variables described in the prior section, as well as state fixed effects.[79] Point estimates are 12.9 and 12.0 percentage points in the "Controls" and "Controls & Fixed Effects" specifications, respectively. The second row of Figure 5.4 examines declarations and pre-election benefits that occurred during the next municipal campaign, in 2016. Similarly, declarers were over 13.9 percentage points more likely than non-declarers to receive a campaign handout (21.2 versus 7.2 percent). Again, this association remains comparable in magnitude and significant at the 1 percent level in more inclusive specifications. Point estimates are 11.7 and 10.3 percentage points in the "Controls" and "Controls & Fixed Effects" specifications, respectively. The online survey did not include granular questions about specific forms of declaration or the value of handouts.

In sum, both the face-to-face survey in rural Northeast Brazil and the online survey across Brazil suggest that declarers disproportionately receive campaign handouts. These findings dovetail with the preceding section's key result – declared supporters experience favoritism with *post-election* benefits – which offered a more specific test of relational clientelism. When considered holistically, quantitative analyses thus suggest a robust link between declared support and relational clientelism, broadly consistent with interviews in Section 5.2. Notwithstanding this substantial evidence, it is important to emphasize that the regressions do not establish causality. As discussed in Chapter 1, some endogeneity is expected with relational clientelism because it involves a mutually reinforcing cycle: declared support reinforces established exchange relationships (which may originate from various sources).[80]

So far, this chapter has shown a strong empirical link between declared support and relational clientelism. Chapter 3 provided theoretical underpinnings to explain this link, based on a signaling model in Appendix C. To what extent is evidence consistent with this mechanism? The next section explores whether declarations indeed transmit meaningful information about the trustworthiness of citizens' vote promises.

5.4 DECLARED SUPPORT AND SIGNALING

Especially given the degree of ballot secrecy in Brazil documented in Chapter 2, it is important to investigate whether declarations convey meaningful information. Consistent with the theoretical logic elaborated in Chapter 3, evidence

[79] Control variables are fully described in Appendix B. Analysis employs state fixed effects as most municipalities in the sample have only one observation.

[80] In turn, citizens who continue to receive benefits extending beyond campaigns are more likely to declare support in future elections. For example, consider respondents in the online survey who indicated they declared support during the 2016 municipal campaign. In this subset, 24.2 percent said they had received a benefit from a politician during the preceding four years, versus just 9.1 percent of non-declarers (significant at the 1 percent level).

suggests that declared support enables many Brazilians to signal the credibility of their vote promises. Local politicians expressed confidence that declared support is informative, and both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that citizens overwhelmingly vote and hold preferences in accordance with their declarations.

Various politicians discussed how declared support provides information about how citizens vote. A councilor in Bahia argued that "the vote is only secret" when ballots are cast, "but nothing in this country works secretly." He then explained why many citizens' vote choices are known by politicians: "They put on a t-shirt, they put propaganda on their homes, they go out with a flag, they really declare. A good share."[81] Another politician remarked that when a voter publicly declares, a candidate "rests assured" about his or her support. [82] In Pernambuco, a councilor explained that when a person declares support with a flag or sticker on his home, he is 95 percent certain that he will vote for him.[83] Another councilor similarly indicated that observing such a declaration would provide "much more certainty" that someone will vote for him: "only 10 percent, or perhaps less" will not do so.[84] A few politicians, however, suggested some forms of declaration are less informative than others. For instance, one noted that political stickers are easily removed and can be swapped when visiting different places.[85]

Numerous citizens also expressed the belief that declared support would convey information about vote choices to politicians. An interviewee explained that the local politician he would turn to for medical assistance "knows that he voted for him … because he declares his vote before voting."[86] Likewise, a carpenter indicated that his vote choice was known because his son had put a candidate's poster on the front door. He noted that a candidate observes such posters when passing by, and thus "sees who will vote for her and who won't. Whoever isn't going to vote for her, won't put up a poster on the door."[87] In another municipality, a citizen explained that "during the campaign, there are people monitoring all the streets," which enables politicians to "know who you vote for, who you don't vote for, if you have a sticker, if you don't."[88] In the words of a housekeeper, a politician "has confidence the person using his sticker will vote for him."[89]

[81] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 30,000 citizens (December 1, 2008).
[82] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 30,000 citizens (December 3, 2008).
[83] Interview by Gustavo Bobonis, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter; municipality in Pernambuco with 20,000 citizens (July 12, 2012).
[84] Interview by Gustavo Bobonis, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter; municipality in Pernambuco with 15,000 citizens (July 25, 2012).
[85] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 30,000 citizens (December 1, 2008, Interview 2).
[86] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 21, 2008).
[87] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 80,000 citizens (November 17, 2008).
[88] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 2, 2008).
[89] Author's interview, municipality in Bahia with 10,000 citizens (October 14, 2008).

Survey evidence also suggests that declared support conveys meaningful information about whether citizens will vote for a given candidate. Both surveys discussed earlier asked respondents if they had publicly expressed support for any candidate, and then directly asked if they had voted for that candidate. In the Rural Clientelism Survey in Northeast Brazil, 92.6 percent of declarers indicated that they voted as they had declared. Furthermore, the quality of the signal appears to improve as declaration intensifies. While 90.0 percent of respondents declaring with a single method reported voting as they had declared, comparable figures were 93.8 percent and 95.7 percent for those declaring with two and three methods, respectively.[90] In the online survey across Brazil, 88.4 percent of respondents who had declared for a candidate reported that they had also voted for that same candidate.[91] The remainder of this section focuses on the Rural Clientelism Survey, which provides richer evidence about declarations and citizen credibility.

One might be concerned that this consistency is merely an artifact of self-reporting. For instance, citizens who report declarations might be inclined to say they voted for that candidate to avoid cognitive dissonance or due to clientelism. While such concerns cannot be entirely eliminated, a second approach is to compare for whom respondents say they voted – and for whom respondents say they declared support during that campaign – in different survey waves. Figure 5.5 employs this approach by using vote choices reported in the 2012 wave and declaration reported in the 2013 wave. As shown, the vast majority of citizens who publicly expressed support for a mayoral candidate (through displays of political paraphernalia on their bodies, on their homes or at rallies) also reported voting for the same candidate. Of citizens who had declared support for the victorious mayoral candidate, 92.5 percent also voted him or her. And of citizens who had declared support for a defeated candidate, 89.3 percent also voted for that candidate.

A third approach that does not involve self-reported declaration also finds similar patterns. When visiting respondents' homes after the 2012 election, enumerators noted whether they observed any declarations of support for political candidates. Overall, 16.5 percent of respondents' homes had at least one form of declaration: 9.0 percent had flags, 8.3 percent had stickers, 5.4 percent had signs, and 0.7 percent had painted declarations. Among homes with declarations observed for the elected mayor, 89.7 percent of respondents reported that they voted for him or her. And among homes with declarations observed for a defeated candidate, 80 percent of respondents reported they voted for that candidate. It should be noted that this alternative measure has some important drawbacks; for example, declaration may reflect the actions

[90] This calculation includes the following activities: (1) wearing campaign stickers or T-shirts, (2) placing political flags or banners on one's home, (3) painting one's home with a candidate's name, and (4) waving flags or wearing campaign T-shirts at a rally.

[91] $N = 836$. Of these declarers, 7.2 percent said they had not voted for that candidate, and 4.2 percent said they did not know.



FIGURE 5.5 Declared support and voting for mayor, rural Northeast Brazil (2012)
Note: Respondents are divided into three subgroups (each represented by a bar): (a) respondents who declared during the 2012 campaign for the victorious mayoral candidate, (b) respondents who declared for a defeated mayoral candidate, and (c) respondents who did not declare for a mayoral candidate. The breakdown of each bar shows the share of each subgroup that: reported voting for the victorious candidate, voting for a defeated candidate, or not voting in the 2012 mayoral election. Vote choices from 2012 survey; declaration from 2013 survey. Excludes null and blank votes, which represent less than one percent of votes for all subgroups.
Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

and preferences of household members other than the respondent, and enumerators visited homes weeks after the 2012 election when many declarations had already been removed. Notwithstanding limitations of each approach, evidence suggests that the vast majority of survey respondents reported voting in accordance with their declaration actions.

Given that the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 focuses specifically on citizens who promise to vote for a clientelist politician, it deserves emphasis that findings are similar when honing in on such respondents. Over a quarter of respondents said they had communicated their intended vote choices to politicians or their representatives during campaign visits to their homes. When asked directly, nearly 96.5 percent of declarers in this subset reported that they had voted for their declared mayoral candidate, a figure that climbs to 99.1 percent among those undertaking at least three declaration methods. Applying the second approach to this subset, 92.5 (97.7) percent of citizens who reported declaring support for the victorious (defeated) candidate also reported in a different wave that they had voted for him or her. And following the

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third approach, 95.1 (77.2) percent of respondents with enumerator-observed declarations for the victorious (defeated) candidate on their homes reported voting for him or her. Results are thus broadly consistent with this subset of respondents who had conveyed their vote choices to politicians.

Such patterns are also observed when using measures other than reported voting behavior. Just after the 2012 election, the Rural Clientelism Survey asked respondents to assess four characteristics of the mayor-elect, and subsequently those of the runner-up, as "very good," "good," "bad," or "very bad." These perceptions were strongly associated with declared support, even as reported in a different wave.[92] Only a small minority of declarers suggested the candidate they had publicly supported was weaker than the competitor on any measure. More specifically, the share ranking their declared candidate lower was 5.4 percent for competence, 5.9 percent for honesty, 12.3 percent for experience, and 14.6 percent for accessibility.[93] Regression analyses also reveal a strong association between declared support and perceived attributes of candidates. In comparison to non-declarers, Figure 5.6 shows that declarers for the mayor-elect ranked him or her higher across all attributes – and ranked the defeated candidate lower on all attributes. Moreover, declarers for the defeated candidate ranked him or her higher across all attributes – and ranked the mayor-elect lower on all attributes – than did non-declarers. All findings in Figure 5.6 are significant at the 1 percent level of significance, even when including controls and municipal fixed effects (regression tables are in Appendix D). For example, consider the four-point composite measure for each candidate, which averages a respondent's ratings for competence, honesty, experience, and accessibility. In the most inclusive specification, declarers for the mayor-elect ranked that candidate 0.24 points higher – and ranked the defeated candidate 0.31 points lower – than did non-declarers. Moreover, declarers for the defeated candidate ranked that candidate 0.45 points higher – and ranked the mayor-elect 0.50 points lower – than did non-declarers. All findings in Figure 5.6 are also significant (at the 1 percent level) when using declaration observed by enumerators instead of self-reported declaration.

As with voting, findings are robust when honing in on citizens who communicated their intended vote choices to politicians and their representatives during home visits. Among this subset, few declarers suggested that the candidate they publicly supported was weaker on any attribute than the competitor – only 3.5 percent for competence, 8 percent for honesty, 8.2 percent for experience, and 14.5 percent for accessibility.[94] And when conducting

[92] As discussed, only the 2013 wave asked respondents whether they had declared for victorious or defeated candidates.

[93] Analysis includes municipalities with two candidates. Declarers most often rated their own candidates most favorably (56.4, 48.5, 54.8, and 55.1 percent, respectively), but many rated the candidates equivalently (38.3, 45.6, 32.9, and 30.4 percent, respectively).

[94] Most often, respondents ranked their own candidate the highest, but 27.4–40 percent ranked both candidates equally (depending on the attribute).



FIGURE 5.6 Declared support and perceptions of mayoral candidates, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012–2013

Note: Markers correspond to OLS regression coefficients for explanatory variables on horizontal axis; coded 1 if the citizen declared for victorious (defeated) mayoral candidates in 2012; 0 if undeclared. Outcome variables on the left axis are four perceived characteristics of the mayor-elect, and of the runner-up candidate, scored by respondents in 2012 on a four-point scale: "very good," "good," "bad," or "very bad" (greater values are better assessments). "Composite" averages these scores. Circles are regressions with municipal fixed effects; squares are those with controls and municipal fixed effects. All regressions include municipal fixed effects to compare across identical politicians. Perceptions from 2012 wave; declarations from 2013 wave. Thin (thick) whiskers denote 95 (90) percent confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Appendix D reports full regression tables. Appendix B describes controls, which are: age, education, gender, household wealth, turnout, mayoral satisfaction (from 2011 baseline), political preferences (dummies for PT, PMDB, PSDB, and DEM parties), frequency of conversations with politicians, association membership, collaborative efforts with neighbors, has piped water, has own cistern, has access to shared cistern, reciprocity, risk aversion, time preference, and public goods contribution. Number of observations for the most inclusive specification in rows 1–10 (respectively) is: 1,066; 1,375; 1,255; 1,397; 1,459; 1,067; 1,362; 1,191; 1,367; and 1,438.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

analyses in Figure 5.6 using only data from respondents who communicated their intended vote choices, findings are comparable, with 18 of the 20 most inclusive specifications significant at the 5 percent level or higher.[95] Employing

[95] Of 20 specifications, $p < 0.01$ for thirteen specifications, $p < 0.05$ for five specifications, and $p < 0.10$ for one specification.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316998014.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the composite measure, citizens who reported declaring for the mayor-elect ranked him or her 0.22 points higher (on a four-point scale) – and ranked the defeated candidate 0.37 points lower – than did non-declarers. Moreover, declarers for the runner-up ranked that candidate 0.43 points higher – and ranked the mayor-elect 0.65 points lower – than did undeclared citizens. Furthermore, all results in Figure 5.6 are significant (at the 1 percent level) among this subset when using enumerator-observed instead of self-reported declaration.

Altogether, these findings about voting and perceptions are broadly consistent with the theoretical logic of declared support. Despite rigorous ballot secrecy in Brazil, this mechanism provides a highly informative signal about whether citizens will provide political support. After all, citizens overwhelmingly vote and hold perceptions in accordance with their declarations.

5.5 VOTER CALCULUS OF DECLARED SUPPORT

As explored thus far, evidence from Brazil corroborates the signaling logic of declared support, which provides an important mechanism by which citizens help to sustain relational clientelism. Recall that in addition to elaborating a signaling model, Chapter 3 briefly discussed a complementary model by Nichter and Nunnari (2017) that examines how numerous factors influence citizens' declaration choices. Given that the latter model provides further predictions about the voter calculus of declared support, it warrants investigation whether it offers additional insights into the behavior of Brazilians. For example, the complementary model suggests how and why various factors, such as politicians' monitoring ability and likelihood of electoral victory, can influence citizens' propensity to declare for a clientelist candidate. Furthermore, it examines how citizens weigh this decision vis-á-vis two alternative options: remaining undeclared and declaring for a programmatic candidate who does not provide contingent benefits. In Nichter and Nunnari (2017), we test the model's predictions experimentally in Brazil, so as to isolate the effects of particular contextual characteristics while holding all others constant.

The experiment, which was conducted as part of the Online Clientelism Survey, included 1,259 participants from 1,061 municipalities across Brazil.[96] It examined subjects' willingness to declare support for two fictitious mayoral candidates (*A* and *B*), using lottery tickets as clientelist rewards and to induce preferences about candidates. Participants increased their chance of winning an iPhone by earning more lottery tickets, based on their declaration actions and the election outcome. As clientelist inducements, citizens received additional lottery tickets if they declared for clientelist candidate *A* who subsequently won the election; the case of competitive clientelism was also examined. Subjects were randomly assigned to have different preferences about the

[96] See Appendix B for details about the broader Online Clientelism Survey, which also included additional participants in more municipalities.

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candidates, induced through the number of iPhone lottery tickets received from each candidate's victory (regardless of declaration decisions). Participants made declaration choices in a set of randomly ordered elections, which each correspond to different treatments with distinct contextual characteristics. Before making a choice in a given election, the subject viewed a vignette with information including clientelist inducements, declaration costs, the probability of each candidate's victory, and the probability declarations are observed. After choosing whether – and for whom – to declare in an election, the subject was informed about which candidate won and any clientelist rewards earned; the computer selected the election winner based on odds resulting from the subject's declaration choice.[97] As a benchmark, one of the treatments was a baseline scenario involving clientelism. Each of the other treatments changed only one aspect of this baseline; thus, causal effects are identified by comparing differences in declarations between a given treatment and the baseline.

Experimental results corroborated most predictions in Nichter and Nunnari (2017), suggesting that the model provides meaningful insights into the voter calculus of declared support. The first treatment examined how participants' declarations changed in response to post-election contingent benefits. As predicted, fewer participants declared for the clientelist candidate when she eliminated benefits, whereas more participants chose to remain undeclared and to declare for the non-clientelist candidate. The second treatment investigated electoral competition, a contextual factor that is commonly understood to influence clientelist exchanges (e.g., Corstrange, 2018; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In accordance with predictions, a greater share of participants declared for the clientelist candidate when she was highly likely to win the election, while fewer opted to remain undeclared and to declare for the non-clientelist candidate. The third treatment explored social costs, given that declarations for a particular candidate may be discouraged (or encouraged) in a given neighborhood (Huckfeldt, 1979; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992). As expected, when declaring for the clientelist candidate involved social costs, fewer subjects choose to declare for her, and more subjects chose to declare for the non-clientelist candidate. However, a predicted increase in non-declarations was not observed in the experiment. The fourth treatment examined the ability of the clientelist candidate to monitor citizens' actions, which often requires substantial resources and organizational infrastructure (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2005). In line with the model, fewer participants declared for the clientelist candidate when her ability to monitor declarations decreased. But an expected increase in non-declarations and declarations for the non-clientelist candidate was not observed experimentally (though signs conformed with this prediction). Given that elites in various contexts employ negative inducements

[97] Candidates had equal odds of victory if the participant remained undeclared. If the participant declared for a given candidate, that candidate's probability of victory increased by an indicated amount. Formal predictions are identical if declarations have no election influence.

(Mares and Young, 2016, 2018), a fifth treatment investigated the effect of using punishments instead of rewards. As predicted, when the clientelist candidate punished citizens who declared for her competitor, more participants declared for the clientelist candidate, and fewer declared for the other candidate. However, non-declarations did not increase as anticipated.[98] In the sixth treatment, the clientelist candidate combined the use of positive and negative inducements. As predicted, more subjects declared for her, and fewer opted to remain undeclared; but contrary to expectations, declarations for the non-clientelist candidate did not decrease.[99] Since clientelism is often a competitive rather than monopolistic phenomenon (Corstange, 2016; Kitschelt, 2013), the seventh treatment examined the impact on citizens' declarations when not only candidate *A*, but also candidate *B*, distributed post-election benefits to her own declared supporters. All three findings comport with theoretical predictions: non-declarations and declarations for *A* decreased, while declarations for *B* increased. Summing up, experimental results were consistent with sixteen of the complementary model's twenty-one unconditional predictions.[100]

Overall, these results suggest that beyond vulnerability, various characteristics of the political environment shape citizens' propensity to declare support. As argued in this book, such declarations alleviate concerns about citizens' trustworthiness in the context of long-term exchange relationships, and thereby help to ensure the survival of relational clientelism.

5.6 SUMMARY

Substantial vulnerability spurs many citizens to buttress the stability of their ongoing exchange relationships with politicians. This chapter examined how declared support enables many Brazilians to mitigate a key challenge facing relational clientelism. Electronic voting and other factors discussed in Chapter 2 inhibit politicians from monitoring vote choices, exacerbating their concerns about whether clients will follow through on promises to provide political support. Through the mechanism of declared support, citizens are able to allay politicians' concerns about opportunistic defection by displaying political paraphernalia on their bodies, on their homes, and at rallies. The signaling model in Chapter 3 suggests that by declaring support, citizens can transmit meaningful information about whether their vote promises are credible. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence in the present chapter corroborates this theoretical logic.

[98] In order to isolate the effect of introducing punishments, analyses compare these results from those in the first treatment, in which *A* distributes no rewards.

[99] Analyses compare these results to the prior treatment, in which *A* only employs punishments.

[100] Nichter and Nunnari (2017) also examine two other factors, expressive utility and election influence, with predictions conditional on which candidate the subject is assigned to prefer. For those factors, results have the predicted signs but are only significant in some instances; statistical precision is lost when splitting the sample by preferences.

Many Brazilians publicly declare their political support through displays of campaign paraphernalia. These declarations are not only prevalent, but also increase during droughts, consistent with the argument that vulnerability motivates citizens to undertake actions that reinforce relational clientelism. Although citizens have multifaceted reasons for declaring support, substantial evidence points to a robust link between this phenomenon and relational clientelism. Two original surveys and many interviews with citizens and elites reveal widespread perceptions that declaring for a victorious candidate can increase citizens' receipt of post-election benefits. In concordance with these perceptions, regression analyses suggest that declared supporters of elected politicians are indeed more likely to receive benefits that extend beyond campaigns. In line with the signaling model, declared support transmits a highly informative signal of whether citizens in ongoing exchange relationships will follow through on their vote promises. Evidence suggests that citizens overwhelmingly vote and hold perceptions in accordance with their declarations.

Thus, declared support is an important mechanism by which citizens in ongoing exchange relationships can alleviate politicians' concerns about their trustworthiness. But another credibility problem also threatens the viability of relational clientelism. How can citizens assess whether an entrusted politician will actually follow through on promises of assistance during adverse shocks? The next chapter investigates another mechanism – requesting benefits – by which citizens glean information about politicians' trustworthiness and thereby further enhance the survival of relational clientelism.