7

Citizen Strategies in Comparative Context

Over the past few decades, the standard of living in many countries has increased markedly. But despite rising incomes, an expanding middle class, and improved health indicators, most of the world's population remains vulnerable to unemployment, illness, droughts, and other adverse shocks. Many nations continue to introduce or expand programs to mitigate citizens' vulnerability, yet social safety nets remain incomplete in most of the world. Social insurance fails to protect against the full range of risks facing citizens, and a substantial share of the population in many countries is excluded from coverage (e.g., informal and self-employed workers). Given this pronounced insecurity, many citizens depend on ongoing exchange relationships with politicians to cope with risks.

As demonstrated in this book, vulnerability motivates many citizens to help sustain such patterns of relational clientelism in Brazil, a context where various challenges threaten diverse forms of contingent exchanges. Brazilians undertake at least two actions that underpin the survival of ongoing exchange relationships – they *declare support* to signal the credibility of their vote promises, and they *request benefits* to screen the credibility of politicians' promises of assistance. Evidence in the present chapter suggests that these mechanisms extend beyond the case of Brazil. While clientelism is commonly observed in much of the world, its survival is under continual assault by a panoply of factors, including structural changes, institutional reforms, legal enforcement and partisan strategies. Even though relational clientelism is relatively resilient to many of these factors, its viability is threatened by the dual credibility problem elaborated in Chapter 3. The two mechanisms that enable many Brazilians to alleviate these credibility problems and thereby fortify relational clientelism – declared support and requesting benefits – are similarly observed in numerous other countries where contingent exchanges also face challenges. More specifically, this chapter presents evidence of both citizen actions in Argentina and Mexico, as well as cross-national evidence

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of citizen requests in Africa and Latin America. In addition, it discusses more limited evidence of these mechanisms in Ghana, India, Lebanon, and Yemen. While this comparative chapter provides less extensive analyses than the preceding chapters focused on Brazil, it nevertheless offers considerable evidence that the book's central argument travels to other contexts.

7.1 MEXICO

The case of Mexico provides a relatively rich array of evidence to investigate the mechanisms elaborated in Part II. Before examining declared support and requesting benefits, I briefly discuss clientelism and some challenges it faces in Mexico, and document substantial vulnerability that can motivate citizens to sustain ongoing exchange relationships with politicians.

7.1.1 Clientelism and its Challenges

Clientelism has long persisted in Mexico's evolving political arena.[1] Prominent studies emphasize its important role, along with broader forms of distributive politics, in sustaining the PRI's dominance during most of the twentieth century (e.g., Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). During and after the country's pivotal 2000 election, national surveys have suggested the continued existence of clientelist exchanges (Cornelius, 2003; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2009). For example, the 2012 Mexico Panel Study found that 63 percent of respondents believed that politicians often buy votes in their communities, with 7.7 percent reporting that they had themselves received clientelist offers during that year's presidential campaign. Estimates using a list experiment, which as discussed later mitigates social desirability bias, suggest even higher rates: 22.1 percent reported receiving offers in a survey wave just before the 2012 election. The PRI continues to have the most extensive clientelist network across Mexico, and while it is by no means the only party to offer contingent benefits, national surveys suggest that it does so more frequently than the PAN and PRD combined. Accusations of clientelism commanded substantial attention during the 2012 presidential campaign, as second-place finisher Andrés Manuel López Obrador claimed that vote buying and other violations clinched Enrique Peña Nieto's victory. Although the national electoral tribunal (TEPJF) deemed such allegations to be unfounded – and researchers contend it is highly unlikely that the PRI bought off enough voters to account for Peña Nieto's margin of victory (Greene, 2012; Simpser, 2012) – most observers concur that clientelism is alive and well in Mexico.

Despite the persistence of clientelism in Mexico, the phenomenon has encountered major challenges over the years. In fact, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012,

[1] This paragraph is adapted from Nichter and Palmer-Rubin (2015).

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165, 190–192) argue that various factors, including the 1995–1996 peso crisis and growing voter disaffection with the PRI, led to the "partial dismantling of clientelism." Whereas the PRI once used benefits from social programs such as Pronasol to reward its supporters, the party shifted towards non-discretionary social policy in the late 1990s (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012, 36, 165). Moreover, the PAN made a broad strategic decision to favor programmatic over clientelist policies (Hagopian, forthcoming), and while in power took strides to insulate social programs from political interference (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012, 36, 165).[2] A key example is Prospera (formerly Progresa and Oportunidades), a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program that reaches over a quarter of Mexico's population (6.8 million families in 2016).[3] De la O (2015, ch. 1) explains that this CCT program is not only insulated from political interference, but also undercuts clientelism by raising incomes of the poor, informing citizens about their entitlements, and decreasing brokers' discretion. As such, both partisan strategies and anti-poverty programs pose important challenges to clientelism in Mexico.

Another challenge is increased legal scrutiny by Mexico's independent electoral governance body. The recently renamed Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), founded in 1990 and granted autonomy from the executive after 1994 reforms, held both power and resources to reduce partisan malfeasance during elections (Eisenstadt, 2003, 33; Magaloni, 2010, 762).[4] During the 2012 presidential elections, IFE and other agencies investigated López Obrador's allegations of vote buying and other infractions by Peña Nieto.[5] However, after an extensive investigation, the national electoral tribunal (TEPJF) unanimously refused to annul the 2012 election due to inconclusive evidence of the alleged violations. Despite this outcome, greater legal scrutiny likely increases the potential costs of clientelism during elections.

Heightened ballot secrecy is another challenge for clientelism. In the 1980s and 1990s, it became far tougher for the PRI to violate the secret ballot as the opposition grew strong enough to install party representatives in many precincts (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012, 59). Whereas monitors observed ballot secrecy violations in 38.6 percent of all precincts in 1994 (cf. Fox, 2007, 122), about 97 percent of surveyed voters reported voting in secret during the 2000 presidential election (cf. Schedler, 2004, 62). IFE took many actions to promote the secret ballot, such as enclosing voting booths with curtains emblazoned with the statement, "Your vote is free and secret," and launching advertisements to increase awareness of voting secrecy (IRI, 2000, 36, 80). As discussed in Chapter 2, ballot secrecy facilitates opportunistic defection with some forms of clientelism. Indeed, a 2006 campaign slogan urged voters to

[2] See also Hagopian (2014, 142–144).

[3] Figure from Prospera's official web site, www.gob.mx/prospera.

[4] As a result of reforms under Peña Nieto, IFE transformed into the National Electoral Institute (INE) in 2014.

[5] "Pide IFE a Soriana Datos de Tarjetas," *El Universal*, July 5, 2012.

"take the dough and vote for PAN" (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016, 24). Given the substantial difficulty of monitoring how Mexicans vote, Larreguy et al. (2016) argue that the PRI and PAN are often motivated to use turnout buying instead of vote buying.

In sum, clientelism persists in Mexico, but faces various challenges, including partisan strategies, anti-poverty programs, increased legal scrutiny, and heightened ballot secrecy.

7.1.2 Vulnerability

In the context of such challenges facing clientelism, many Mexicans have a pressing motivation to ensure the survival of ongoing exchange relationships with politicians – their substantial vulnerability. Analogously to Chapter 4's discussion of Brazil, the present section documents the vulnerability that many Mexicans face in the spheres of employment, health, and water.

First, consider vulnerability in the arena of employment. Despite an expanding middle class, Mexico is the only OECD country without national unemployment insurance (OECD, 2015, 328), an issue the nation is attempting to rectify with proposed reforms. Exacerbating vulnerability, a third of salaried employees lack a contract, and over half of their positions provide no benefits (de la Fuente et al., 2015, 23). Furthermore, employment is especially precarious for the 60 percent of Mexican workers in the informal sector (Olaberría and Dugain, 2015, 15). Although Mexico offers some employment assistance – e.g., Programa de Empleo Temporal (PET) provided temporary employment at roughly the minimum wage to 1.1 million citizens in 2011 – such social programs typically fail to cover many vulnerable citizens (de la Fuente et al., 2015, 18–19). Job losses are one reason why many Mexicans are vulnerable to broader economic shocks; during the nation's peso crisis, the poverty rate (at $2.50 per capita) increased from 20 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 1996 (Birdsall et al., 2014, 133). A lack of employment motivates some citizens to turn to clientelism in Mexico (Schedler, 2002, 18), where jobs have historically been doled out to loyal supporters (Cornelius, 2003, 48; Greene, 2007, 99–101; Grindle, 2012, 170–171, 190).

Notwithstanding substantial improvements in recent years, health care is another domain of vulnerability for many Mexicans. Until the national introduction of Seguro Popular in 2003, health insurance in Mexico was primarily limited to salaried employees in the formal sector (Knaul et al., 2012, 1266). Seguro Popular provides health insurance to formerly excluded citizens, and by 2012 had reached nearly universal coverage.[6] Despite various successes of the program, many Mexicans remain vulnerable to health shocks. Issues with health care access and quality often drive the poor to pay with their own funds.[7] For instance, approximately one-third of prescriptions issued under

[6] Knaul et al., 2012, 1267.
[7] Knaul et al., 2012, 1271–1272.

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Seguro Popular cannot be filled – often due to a lack of medicine – so the poor must frequently turn to private pharmacies using their own funds (Nigenda et al., 2015, 224; Olaberría and Dugain, 2015, 34). Out-of-pocket spending continues to account for about half of Mexico's health care expenditures and is a leading reason why families fall into poverty (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera, 2013, 15; Olaberría and Dugain, 2015, 33). Unmet health needs motivate even some otherwise reluctant citizens to turn to clientelism in Mexico (Schedler, 2002, 18), a country where politicians have historically used medicine as a type of handout distributed to voters (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012, 289).

In addition to unemployment and illness, water issues also compound the vulnerability of many Mexicans. In 2012, Mexico experienced its most severe drought in seventy-one years, with millions of citizens lacking adequate food or water despite massive governmental relief efforts.[8] One factor complicating distribution: approximately 18.8 percent of poor Mexicans lacked piped water in 2012 (de la Fuente et al., 2015, 12).[9] Citizens who work in agriculture are especially prone to drought, as three-fourths of the country's cultivated land is rain-fed (de la Fuente et al., 2015, 26). Another key concern is water quality; Mexico confirmed over 45,000 cases of cholera in 1991–2001, followed by another minor outbreak in 2013 (CDC, 2014). Partially due to problematic water quality and access, Mexicans consume the most bottled water per capita in the world, with expenditures on this product averaging $11 per month and accounting for over 10 percent of some families' income.[10] To cope with vulnerability stemming from water problems, many Mexicans rely on relationships with local politicians and their operatives, who frequently dispatch water trucks or pay water bills on behalf of clients in exchange for political support (de Alba and Gamboa, 2014, 126,137; Townsend and Eyles, 2004, 81–82).

Given that Mexico fails to provide an adequate welfare state to mitigate the vulnerability of much of its population, this book suggests that many citizens in ongoing exchange relationships will undertake actions to help ensure the survival of relational clientelism. Consistent with this argument, the next two sections reveal that the key citizen actions examined in Part II – declared support and requesting benefits – are also linked to clientelism in Mexico.

7.1.3 Declared Support

My collaborative work with Brian Palmer-Rubin (Nichter and Palmer-Rubin, 2015) demonstrates that citizens who declared support were

[8] "Mexico Withers Under Worst Drought in 71 Years," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 9, 2012.

[9] "Poor" defined as earning under $4 a day.

[10] "Mexicans Struggle to Kick Bottled-Water Habit," *New York Times*, July 17, 2012; "Latin America's Other Water Infrastructure," Inter-American Development Bank, November 10, 2011.

significantly more likely to experience clientelism during Mexico's 2012 presidential campaign.[11] This evidence is congruous with the mechanism of declared support elaborated in Chapter 3, as well as the overall argument of this book. Because ongoing exchange relationships provide benefits that are not exclusively limited to campaigns, a preferable test would examine whether declarers are more likely to receive both campaign handouts and post-election benefits (as conducted for Brazil). However, all quantitative analyses in this comparative chapter only consider campaign handouts, given the dearth of surveys that inquire about post-election benefits as well as declared support or citizen requests.

To provide broader context about declared support in Mexico, parties' expenditures on print advertisements (e.g., posters and billboards), rallies, and other campaign activities increased markedly in 2012, as an unintended consequence of IFE's new restrictions on mass media advertising. For example, a plastics producer association reported a 30 percent increase in the amount of plastics used in campaign advertisements between the 2006 and 2012 presidential campaign.[12] Most relevant for the present analysis, many Mexicans displayed such political advertising on their homes. This phenomenon was directly observed by enumerators in the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, who coded whether they observed advertisements for any political party or organization on respondents' residences. Such advertisements were visible on 16.7 percent of respondents' homes. The most common advertisements were for the PRI (8.2 percent of respondents), followed by the PAN (3.3 percent), and the PRD (2.8 percent).

If declared support is linked to clientelism as argued in Chapter 3, we would expect citizens with political advertisements on their homes (declarers) to be more likely to experience clientelism than citizens without such advertisements (non-declarers). Even before controlling for important factors, Figure 7.1 suggests that declarers had a greater tendency to be offered – and to actually receive – campaign handouts. When asked directly whether they had been offered benefits, 9.4 percent of declarers answered affirmatively, versus just 5.2 percent of non-declarers ($p = 0.057$). Use of a list experiment, which as described in Section 6.3 offers an unobtrusive measure of whether respondents actually received handouts, reveals an even starker difference. Applying this methodology, almost 57 percent of declarers reported receiving handouts, compared to just 16 percent of non-declarers (difference significant at the 5 percent level).

While these differences are consistent with the mechanism of declared support examined in Chapter 3, they do not control for important factors that may be correlated with both declaration and clientelism (e.g., partisanship).

[11] This section on declared support in Mexico is adapted from Nichter and Palmer-Rubin (2015).

[12] "Más de 2 mil Toneladas de Propaganda Electoral Invadirán a México," *Vanguardia*, March 6, 2012.



FIGURE 7.1 Mexico: Declared support and clientelism during campaign (2012)
Note: "Declarer" includes respondents with a political advertisement on home during Wave 1 or 2 (as observed by enumerator). Level of clientelism in Wave 2 shown with 95 percent confidence intervals. Direct question asked about offers of campaign handouts. List experiment asked about receipt of campaign handouts. $N = 128$ for declarer, 795 for non-declarer (includes respondents participating in both Waves 1 and 2).
Source: Adapted from Nichter and Palmer-Rubin (2015). Data from 2012 Mexico Panel Study.

To address this issue, Nichter and Palmer-Rubin (2015) conducted logistic regressions of the direct clientelism question, which include political and socioeconomic controls, as well as municipal fixed effects.[13] Respondents with political advertisements on their homes were 8.3 percentage points more likely to report clientelist offers than their counterparts without advertisements (significant at the 5 percent level).[14] In addition, we included controls to the list experiment measure by using Blair and Imai's (2012) item count regression method.[15] This approach suggests that declarers are 35.8 percentage points more likely to receive handouts than non-declarers ($p = 0.065$). Altogether, these results suggest that declarers were more likely to be offered and to receive clientelist benefits during Mexico's 2012 campaign.

[13] For consistency with our study, all analyses in the present chapter employ logistic regressions.
[14] As shown in Nichter and Palmer-Rubin (2015), omitting municipal fixed effects decreases the point estimate to 4 percentage points (significant at the 5 percent level).
[15] This method predicts each covariate's effect on the likelihood of responding affirmatively to the list experiment's sensitive item, as if it were measured for each respondent independently.

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To test the robustness of this relationship, we also conducted matching using Sekhon's (2011) genetic search algorithm. Although this method does not offer a rigorous test of causality, it strives to improve inference given the lack of a counterfactual through the construction of an artificial comparison group. Genetic matching pairs our treatment units ("declarers") with control units ("non-declarers") who are comparable on a set of observable characteristics. In line with the earlier analyses, this approach also finds a significant difference in clientelist offers between declarers and non-declarers (at the 5 percent level).[16]

Overall, this evidence suggests a link between declared support and clientelism in Mexico. While these analyses of campaign handouts cannot distinguish between relational and electoral clientelism (e.g., spot-market payments for declarations), observed patterns of declared support corroborate the mechanism elaborated in Chapter 3.

7.1.4 Requesting Benefits

A second mechanism by which citizens help to sustain relational clientelism – requesting benefits – is also observed in Mexico. First, consider anthropologist Hector Tejera's (2000) study of Mexico City during the 1997 elections. In line with my central premise, Tejera notes that Mexico often fails to meet the basic needs of poor voters, who frequently rely on clientelist relationships and demand assistance from politicians (69–70). Many voters requested help from local politicians during the 1997 campaign, ranging from water cistern maintenance to construction materials (60–62). Although citizens requested benefits from all parties, Tejera argues that the PRI had a particular focus on collecting and fulfilling requests of its core supporters (60, 68). According to the campaign report of the PRI's mayoral candidate in Mexico City, his campaign received 270,000 citizen requests and resolved 27.5 percent of them. When reporting these figures, Tejera (2000, 61) cautions that they are likely inflated to emphasize responsiveness; an analysis of a subsample of the requests suggests that just 8.5 percent were actually resolved before the election. Regardless of the precise figures, Tejera's study underscores the importance of citizen requests in a Mexican election.

More broadly, a national study of Mexico's 2000 elections by FLACSO/IFE provides further evidence about the role of citizen requests.[17] Many citizens reportedly initiated requests from politicians in 2000 – especially for assistance with employment, construction, and personal favors – and about a third of requests were fulfilled.[18] Poor citizens disproportionately requested help,

[16] These analyses were conducted using the direct clientelism measure.

[17] The study was conducted by FLACSO (Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences) and funded by IFE. It surveyed 1,200 citizens and conducted qualitative research.

[18] "El Precio de los Votos," Francisco Ortiz Pardo, *El Universal*, May 12, 2002.

and requests were predominantly directed towards the PRI.[19] An interesting observation by del Pozo and Aparicio (2001, 36) is that although a substantial share of respondents perceived that *others* demanded benefits in exchange for their political support, very few respondents admitted to doing so themselves. Schedler (2002, 10–11) provides additional insights from interviews conducted as part of the FLACSO/IFE study. He finds that citizens often request help from politicians, in part because the state fails to meet their needs. As one interviewee explains, because "of the needs that exist in the region, everybody asks for help" (11). In addition, Schedler (2002) finds that substantial evidence of clientelism coexists with anti-clientelist attitudes among many voters. All in all, these studies point to citizen requests in the context of clientelist exchanges in Mexico.

Survey data enable further investigation into the link between citizen requests and clientelism. Whereas the 2012 Mexico Panel Study discussed earlier does not inquire about citizen requests, the 2010 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey captures information about requests (but not declared support).[20] More specifically, the survey asked respondents whether they had "sought assistance from or presented a request" from municipal officials during the last year. LAPOP's question about respondents' experience with clientelism, which asks whether politicians offered them handouts, would preferably have asked whether respondents *received* benefits. Nevertheless, the survey provides a unique opportunity to explore whether a link exists between citizen requests and clientelism in Mexico.

In the LAPOP survey, Mexicans who requested help from municipal officials were over twice as likely as non-requesters to experience clientelism (28.9 versus 14.2 percent).[21] Figure 7.2 summarizes the results of logistic regressions examining this relationship in Mexico as well as other cases discussed later; regression tables are provided in Appendix F. As shown in the bottom row, this difference remains significant at the 1 percent level when including various controls and/or state fixed effects. In the "Controls" and "Controls & fixed effects" specifications, citizens who request help from municipal officials are 13.8 and 12.1 percentage points more likely to experience clientelism, respectively. While such analyses in this chapter do not imply causality, they reveal a strong association between citizen requests and clientelism, similar to findings for Brazil in Chapter 6.

Altogether, evidence from Mexico is broadly consistent with the two mechanisms elaborated in Chapter 3, though available information does not facilitate testing the logic as thoroughly as for the case of Brazil. Clientelism in Mexico endures, but faces substantial challenges such as partisan strategies, anti-poverty programs, increased legal scrutiny and heightened ballot secrecy.

[19] "El Precio de los Votos."

[20] This survey included 1,562 citizens in 27 states and the Federal District.

[21] $N = 1,547$.

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

FIGURE 7.2 Citizen requests and clientelism during campaigns (2005–2010)
Note: Markers correspond to regression coefficients for a variable coded 1 if the citizen requested assistance from municipal officials in past year; 0 otherwise. Outcome variable coded 1 if the respondent reported that candidates or political parties "sometimes" or "often" offered them benefits during campaigns; 0 otherwise. Circles shown for bivariate regressions, diamonds with controls, and squares with controls and fixed effects (country for Africa and Latin America, province for Argentina, and state for Brazil and Mexico). Point estimates are marginal effects from logistic regressions; robust standard errors are employed. Thin whiskers on confidence intervals indicate 95 percent level; thicker lines indicate 90 percent level. Control variables are: Machine supporter, turnout, income, age, education, gender, and urban. Appendix F reports regression tables. Observations in bivariate specifications: Africa, 23,936; Latin America, 36,784; Argentina, 1,332; Brazil, 2,338; Mexico, 1,547.
Source: LAPOP AmericasBarometer (2010) and Afrobarometer Round 3 surveys (2005–2006). Estimates for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are from author's own analysis. Estimates for Africa and Latin America are adapted from Nichter and Peress (2016). Coding of machine parties based on Kitschelt (2013) dataset.

Nevertheless, many citizens have an important motivation to sustain ongoing exchange relationships – given the nation's inadequate welfare state, many Mexicans remain vulnerable to shocks including unemployment, illness, and drought. Amidst these factors, evidence from Mexico reveals patterns consistent

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with two mechanisms that citizens employ to bolster relational clientelism in Brazil. In the context of Mexico, citizens who declare support, as well as those who request benefits, are significantly more likely to experience clientelism.

7.2 ARGENTINA

The case of Argentina also offers considerable evidence consistent with the mechanisms of declared support and requesting benefits. As with the previous case, before examining these citizen actions, I first briefly discuss clientelism and some challenges it faces in Argentina, and then document vulnerability that can motivate citizens to sustain relational clientelism.

7.2.1 Clientelism and Its Challenges

In recent years, many studies have investigated the important role of clientelism in Argentina, so many, in fact, that it ranks as the most studied country in the latest wave of research on the topic (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014, 18). As Steven Levitsky (2003b) argues, the Peronist party transformed from a labor-based party to a clientelist party in the early 1990s, and providing sustenance to its lower-class base helped shore up support for Menem's neoliberal reforms. The Peronist party delivered social assistance, often clientelist in nature (Levitsky, 2003a, 8–9; 2003b, 187–188), through vast networks of *unidades básicas* (UBs, or "base units") and brokers. Javier Auyero (2000a, 14, 27) emphasizes that ongoing clientelist relationships – which he calls "Peronist problem-solving networks" – have helped many poor Argentines cope with substantial adversity. For instance, UBs serve as "centers from which food and medicine are distributed, and brokers can be approached for small favors all year around" (Auyero 2000a, 83). Although both the Peronist and Radical parties distribute contingent benefits, the Peronist party continues to be Argentina's dominant clientelist party: by a large margin, it distributes the most handouts and has the most operatives of any party in the nation (Calvo and Murillo, 2013; Stokes, 2005, 322).

Even though substantial clientelism persists in many parts of Argentina, it encounters numerous challenges. As in Brazil, rising incomes and declining poverty are sources of headwinds for contingent exchanges. According to a World Bank study, Argentina experienced strong economic growth after the 2001–2002 crisis (notwithstanding its recent deceleration), and this growth was more pro-poor than that of most countries in the region (Cord et al., 2015, 57). As many families' incomes increased, urban poverty (per-capita income below $4 per day) declined from 31.0 percent in 2004 to 10.8 percent in 2012.[22] This poverty decline was mostly due to an improving labor market,[23] with

[22] Cord et al., 2015, 53.
[23] Cord et al., 2015, 59.

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real wages increasing 46 percent between 2003 and 2012 along with aggregate employment growth (Beccaria et al., 2015, 685). Research on Argentina emphasizes effects of standard-of-living improvements on contingent exchanges; for example, Cleary and Stokes (2006, 160–164) argue that rising income has "undermined clientelism" in the nation, partially because the diminishing marginal utility of income decreases the value of handouts to recipients.

Another related challenge for clientelism involves the rise of the middle class. Over the past decade, the middle class grew faster in Argentina than any other country in Latin America,[24] and by 2011 it accounted for over half the nation's population (Cord et al., 2015, 53). Weitz-Shapiro (2012, 2014) argues that some Argentine mayors refrain from distributing contingent benefits because middle-class citizens frequently punish clientelist candidates by voting against them. She suggests that this "audience cost" of clientelism is most severe in contexts with high levels of political competition and a large middle class (2012, 572; 2014, 5, 53). Consistent with her broader argument, Calvo and Murillo (2012, 153) discuss how some middle-class voters abandon the Peronist party due to its clientelist activities, raising the example of the 2009 midterm elections. Given the substantial level of political competition in many (but by no means all) provinces and municipalities (Gervasoni, 2014, 54–57; Szwarcberg, 2015, 8), Argentina's growing middle class likely hinders clientelism in some parts of the country.

Changes in voting technology pose yet another challenge to clientelist strategies that involve monitoring vote choices, most prominently vote buying. To see why, consider that some researchers contend that Argentina's voting procedures have enabled parties to observe citizens' vote choices.[25] For example, Stokes (2005, 318) and Stokes et al. (2013, 100–104) emphasize that monitoring is facilitated by Argentina's lack of an Australian ballot, because citizens can be shepherded to the polls with ballots provided to them by party operatives (see also Weitz-Shapiro, 2014, 18–19).[26] However, enacted and proposed electoral reforms threaten to undercut such monitoring by introducing different forms of the Australian ballot. The provinces of Córdoba and Santa Fe already employ a unified paper ballot, while Salta province and the capital city of Buenos Aires employ electronic voting.[27] In addition, monitoring could be further thwarted if the overall nation adopts the proposed "Single Electronic Ballot." During his

[24] "Latin America's Middle Class Grows, but in Some Regions More than Others," Pew Research Center, July 20, 2015.

[25] By contrast, Zarazaga (2014, 25) argues that ballot secrecy is strong in Argentina, so monitoring is "unlikely" to secure voter compliance. None of the 120 brokers he interviewed indicated they observed vote choices, even though they readily admitted to various other infractions (2014, 38).

[26] Note that citizens can still use ballots typically available in the voting booth, weakening this monitoring mechanism.

[27] A broader shift towards electronic voting has been underway for some time (Alvarez et al., 2013, 120–121), and more provinces were slated to use this methodology in 2017. See "En 2017 Habrá Boleta Electrónica sólo en 8 Provincias," *Clarín*, August 31, 2016.

presidential campaign, Mauricio Macri had pledged to extend across Argentina this form of electronic voting, which he had already implemented in Buenos Aires as mayor in 2015. A key official involved with President Macri's proposed electoral reform, Adrián Pérez of the Ministry of the Interior claimed that the Single Electronic Ballot would even put an end to clientelism.[28] This reform was approved by the Chamber of Deputies and remained a stated priority of the Macri administration; however, it was blocked by the Senate in late 2016 so a unified paper ballot may be implemented as a temporary measure.[29] Regardless of the reform's outcome at the national level, the shifts noted at the subnational level suggest that changes in voting technology already pose a challenge for clientelism in Argentina.

Overall, clientelism encounters important challenges in Argentina, stemming from sources such as rising income, a growing middle class, and changes in voting technology.

7.2.2 Vulnerability

Amidst such challenges, many citizens in Argentina have a pressing motivation to reinforce ongoing exchange relationships. Just as in Brazil and Mexico, the state fails to shield much of its population from various life risks, so many Argentines rely on politicians to mitigate their vulnerability. This section documents three key arenas of vulnerability: unemployment, illness, and water.

A major source of vulnerability is job loss, the primary reason families enter poverty in Argentina (Beccaria et al., 2013, 575). While various programs have aimed to help poor unemployed Argentines – such as Plan Trabajar, Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, and Argentina Trabaja – these efforts have often involved the clientelist distribution of benefits. Poor Argentines who become unemployed often grow increasingly reliant on relationships with politicians for survival (Auyero, 2000a, 60–62), and Peronist networks frequently provided jobs as well as other benefits to the poor in the 1990s (Levitsky, 2003b, 140). In more recent work on clientelism, Stokes et al. (2013, 104–105) discuss citizens' employment requests, and Zarazaga (2014, 26–27) reports that 59 percent of interviewed brokers distribute temporary employment or workfare programs. These benefits are "ideally suited" for clientelism, Zarazaga (2014, 27) notes, because operatives influence whether clients receive and keep their jobs (see also Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Vulnerability to unemployment is often closely related to other sources of income shocks. For instance, the 2001–2002 crisis cut real incomes by at least a fifth in over 60 percent of households, disproportionately afflicting the poor (Cord et al., 2015, 54). This income

[28] "La Ley y la Trampa de la Reforma Electoral," *Clarín*, November 13, 2016.

[29] "El Peronismo Frenó en el Senado la Reforma Electoral del Gobierno," *La Nacion*, November 25, 2016; "Macri Analiza Utilizar la Boleta Única de Papel en las Elecciones 2017," *La Nacion*, December 2, 2016.

shock thrust many families into penury, with the poverty rate (at per-capita income of $2.50 per day) increasing from 14 percent in 2000 to 30 percent in 2002 (Birdsall et al., 2014, 133). Overall, unemployment and other sources of income shocks are a major source of vulnerability for many Argentines, who not uncommonly turn to politicians for jobs.

Illness is another source of vulnerability for many Argentines. On the one hand, the nation's recent health care improvements are impressive: it continues to expand health care coverage through Plan Sumar (which replaced predecessor Plan Nacer in 2012), and Argentina's health expenditures per capita are the highest in Latin America (Dmytraczenko and Almeida, 2015, 33).[30] But even though the country's health care reforms have substantially cut out-of-pocket expenditures on health care,[31] many citizens become impoverished each year due to medical expenses (Wagstaff et al., 2015, 1709). One indicator of vulnerability to health shocks is that nearly a tenth of Argentine households had catastrophic health expenditures in 2005 (Dmytraczenko and Almeida, 2015, 125).[32] When facing illness, poor Argentines often turn to party operatives who provide ongoing "problem-solving networks" (Auyero, 1999, 2000a; see also Levitsky, 2003b, 140). For instance, Auyero (2000b, 63, 67) reports that 11 percent of citizens surveyed in his field site turned to a Peronist grassroots committee or a broker for help with medicine, and provides the example of a broker who used his hospital contacts and own health insurance to procure medicine during emergencies. More recent work also suggests that citizens rely on clientelism during health shocks: Zarazaga (2014, 34) ranks health care as one of the most important benefits provided by brokers, and Stokes et al. (2013, 102, 104–105) include several mentions of voter requests for medicines during times of need. Overall, many Argentines remain vulnerable to illness, and often depend on politicians and their operatives for help when they become sick.

Many Argentines are also vulnerable to shortages of clean drinking water. Despite infrastructure investments, piped connections are by no means universal: 83 percent of households had service to the drinking water network in 2012, a figure reaching as low as 72 percent in Misiones province.[33] Argentina experienced its worst drought in many decades in 2009, which not only decimated agricultural production and livestock on which many poor families depend,[34] but also left many families scrambling for drinking water. A community in Córdoba province, for instance, struggled to supply water to over a thousand families during that drought through the use of just two

[30] Plan Sumar provides health care to the uninsured; initially to women and children, with an expansion to include men in 2015.

[31] Dmytraczenko and Almeida, 2015, 33.

[32] "Catastrophic" defined as at least 25 percent of nonfood consumption spent on out-of-pocket health care expenditures.

[33] Data from 2010 INDEC Census and Consejo Federal de Entidades de Servicios Sanitarios.

[34] "In Parched Argentina, Worries Over Economy Grow," *New York Times*, February 20, 2009.

available water trucks.[35] And even when water is available, its quality remains a crucial issue. The National Ombudsman's Office found that a lack of clean drinking water (along with pollutants and poor sanitation) threatens the health of many Argentine children,[36] and researchers point to a link between poor water quality and a rise in infectious diarrhea in specified areas of Argentina (Rajal et al., 2010, 359–360). When clean drinking water is lacking, many poor Argentines rely on clientelism. For instance, Auyero discusses how clients demand help from Peronist councilors and other brokers at any time of day, including when there is a "lack of drinkable water in the block and hence the need to bring in the municipal water truck" (Auyero, 2000a, 125, 168; see also Auyero, 2000b, 66). More recently, Zarazaga (2014, 29) similarly finds a link between water and clientelism, and Landini (2013, 120) finds that Argentine peasants expect mayors and councilors to deliver water to their wells during droughts, through direct clientelist assistance rather than by way of "institutionalized" channels. In sum, water is an important source of vulnerability for many Argentines, who often rely on clientelism when water shortages arise.

In sum, clientelism persists in Argentina but encounters substantial challenges. Many Argentines have an important motivation to sustain clientelist linkages: the state fails to protect them from various shocks including unemployment, illness and water shortages. This book suggests that such vulnerability provides a powerful motivation for citizens to undertake actions that help sustain ongoing exchange relationships. While evidence on relational clientelism in Argentina is more limited than in the case of Brazil, findings explored next are consistent with this argument and with the two mechanisms elaborated in Chapter 3 – declared support and requesting benefits.

7.2.3 Requesting Benefits

My collaborative research with Michael Peress (Nichter and Peress, 2016) suggests that citizen requests in Argentina are both prevalent and linked to clientelism.[37] Even studies that focus on elite strategies of clientelism in Argentina mention how often citizens request benefits. For example, Stokes et al. (2013, 105–106) point out that most clientelist exchanges are initiated by citizen requests. More specifically, their survey of approximately 800 Argentine councilors and other brokers included the following two questions:[38]

[35] "La Sequía Arrasa Argentina," *El Pais*, November 16, 2009.

[36] "Proyecto: Los Efectos de la Contaminación Ambiental en la Niñez. Una Cuestión de Derechos," Presentation by Ombudsman Nacional, Defensor del Pueblo, October 14, 2010.

[37] This section on requesting benefits in Argentina is adapted from our article in *Comparative Political Studies* (Nichter and Peress, 2016).

[38] City councilors comprise 300 of the 800 brokers in their survey (Stokes et al., 2013, 261, 268).

(1) "Out of every 10 voters that you have ever helped, how many asked for help directly?"
(2) "Out of every 10 voters that you have ever helped, to how many have you extended help without them asking for it?"

Based on responses to both questions, Stokes et al. (2013, 105) report: "More brokers identify requests as originating with voters than the other way around." The authors do not investigate requests further, but they do note that brokers respond to requests in a clientelist manner, as they "mete out their time and assistance preferentially" (106).

Qualitative evidence also reveals the prevalence of citizen requests in the context of Argentine clientelism. Weitz-Shapiro explains that mayors often receive many citizen requests each day – with one mayor spending an estimated 80 percent of his time receiving requests – and these demands are fulfilled through clientelism in some municipalities (2014, 30–31, 38). Similarly, Szwarcberg (2015, 58) discusses how citizens ask clientelist brokers for medicine and other assistance, as does Auyero (2000a, 94) who explains that citizens "contact a broker when problems arise or when a special favor is needed (a food package, some medicine, a driver's license, the water truck, getting a friend out of jail, etc.)." Particularly telling is that one-third of Rodrigo Zarazaga's 120 interviews of brokers were interrupted by clients requesting help.[39] One of his interviewees conveyed the intense pressure to respond to citizen requests:

"I know I always have to have something ... food handouts, because at any time they knock on the door of my house. I know that when they bang on the door they come hungry, so I have to have food to give. When you don't have a response they go with another. It is a lot of pressure one feels to respond."[40]

Qualitative studies demonstrate the ongoing nature of citizen requests, which become even more prevalent during campaigns. For instance, Landini (2012, 210) reports that farmers are particularly keen to request help from politicians at that time, and a broker nicknamed *El Tigre* (Tiger) bemoaned to Zarazaga about the spike in demands during campaigns:

"Now the elections make me crazy. They know I have a lot of resources. Everyone comes and requests and I fulfill. There is a funeral and they come looking for me. They need money, El Tigre. They need zinc sheets, El Tigre. They need food handouts, El Tigre. Everything is El Tigre."[41]

Overall, this evidence suggests that citizens frequently demand benefits in the context of clientelism in Argentina.

Survey data also point to a link between citizen requests and the distribution of clientelist handouts in Argentina. The survey developed and analyzed by Stokes (2005), which focuses on campaign handouts but not citizen requests,

[39] Personal communication, September 25, 2013.
[40] Unpublished interview by Rodrigo Zarazaga, Conurbano, Argentina, December 7, 2010.
[41] Unpublished interview by Rodrigo Zarazaga, Conurbano, Argentina, June 27, 2009.



FIGURE 7.3 Argentina: citizen strategies and campaign handouts (2001)
Note: Outcome Variable: "Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign?"; coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. In (a), markers correspond to regression coefficients for a "Citizen request" variable coded 1 if citizen turned to a broker or local party patron for help in the past year; 0 otherwise. In (b), they correspond to a "Declared support" variable coded 1 if the citizen attended a rally; 0 otherwise. Circles shown for bivariate regressions, diamonds with controls, and squares with controls and fixed effects for the four study locations. Point estimates are marginal effects from logistic regressions. Whiskers indicate 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. Control variables are: rally attendance (a), requested help (b), opinion of Peronist party, income, education, housing quality, log population, age, gender, party activist, Radical sympathizer, and ballot type. Appendix F reports regression tables. Observations in bivariate specifications are 1,860 and 1,747, respectively.
Source: Data from Stokes (2005). Estimates for (a) are adapted from Nichter and Peress (2016). Estimates for (b) are from the author's own analysis.

includes a question about whether respondents had turned to local political patrons or brokers for help in the past year. Citizens who made such requests were nearly three times as likely to receive handouts than non-requesters (16.1 versus 5.7 percent).

The left panel of Figure 7.3 shows that this difference between requesters and non-requesters remains statistically significant, albeit smaller in magnitude, when controlling for other factors. This figure summarizes the logistic regressions reported in Appendix F, which adapt analyses by Nichter and Peress (2016). Even with the inclusion of various controls and/or provincial fixed effects, respondents who requested help were 4.5–4.8 percentage points more likely to receive benefits (significant at the 5 percent level). This magnitude is substantial, given that the baseline probability of receiving a campaign handout is just 7.4 percent. The patterns do not merely reflect constituency service; consistent with clientelism, citizens who indicate support for the Peronist

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party – the predominant distributor of clientelist benefits in Argentina – are significantly more likely to receive handouts. As examined more thoroughly in Nichter and Peress (2016), this association is robust to multiple measures of Peronist support: whether respondents identified the party as their favorite without prompting, their evaluation of the party on a four-point scale, and whether they voted for the Peronist candidate in previous elections.[42] Given that respondents reported their support for the Peronist party concurrently with reporting the receipt of handouts, endogeneity is an important issue. To mitigate this concern, we show that strong supporters are the most likely to receive handouts, and also show robustness to an alternate approach that is arguably better insulated from potential endogeneity.[43]

This link between citizen requests and clientelism is also observed in Argentine data from the 2010 LAPOP survey. Whereas Section 7.1.4 employed Mexican data in the same year's LAPOP survey, the present section analyzes data on 1,410 Argentines.[44] Recall that the survey asks whether respondents had "sought assistance from or presented a request" from municipal officials during the last year, and inquires whether respondents had been offered handouts from politicians. Argentines who requested help in this manner were over twice as likely to experience clientelism (35.7 versus 14.6 percent).[45] As shown in Figure 7.2, this difference remains significant (at the 1 percent level) in regressions with various controls and provincial fixed effects. Citizens who asked for help were 21.9 and 20.2 percentage points more likely to experience clientelism in the "Controls" and "Controls & fixed effects" specifications, respectively.

Overall, in line with this book's argument and the mechanism examined in Chapter 3, qualitative evidence as well as analyses of two prominent surveys suggest a strong link between citizen requests and clientelism in Argentina.

7.2.4 Declared Support

Evidence from Argentina is also consistent with the mechanism of declared support, another action by which citizens can help to sustain relational clientelism. Several studies of clientelism in Argentina – which do not investigate the role of citizens quantitatively or formally – emphasize the role of rallies in conveying political support. To be sure, not all citizens who attend rallies are revealing such support; for this reason, analyses of Brazil in Chapter 5 only consider attendance to be a form of declaration if

[42] Results are robust to including only requests of local political patrons, or alternatively including only requests of brokers.

[43] This alternate approach uses a logistic regression to determine the predicted probability that each respondent supports the Peronist party, based on only socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic variables.

[44] Survey conducted in twenty-one provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.

[45] $N = 1,332$.

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a citizen also reports displaying political paraphernalia while at the rally.[46] This point notwithstanding, Javier Auyero's (2000a) prominent qualitative study discusses rally attendance in the context of "problem-solving networks," long-term relationships in which the poor receive assistance from councilors and other political brokers. Many of Auyero's observations are consistent with the logic of declared support presented in this book, though he explains that factors other than self-interest also motivate citizens (2000, 12–13, 158). For instance, Auyero explains that rallies provide "an opportunity to declare one's intentions" (99). By attending a rally, citizens show that they are loyal and willing to offer political support, which in turn demonstrates that they are "deserving" of employment opportunities (163). Furthermore, Auyero cites an interviewee who suggests that receiving benefits from her councilor is contingent on rally attendance: "If I do not go to her rally, then, when I need something, she won't give it to me" (Auyero, 1999, 309–310).

Other work on Argentine clientelism similarly provides evidence about rallies that is consistent with declared support. Mariela Szwarcberg (2014, 2015) primarily focuses on how rally turnout provides information to party leaders about their brokers, but her work also suggests why clientelist payoffs motivate some citizens to attend rallies. She explains that voters understand that they will be rewarded for participation in political activities (if they are patient), and also realize that future benefits may be jeopardized if they do not participate (2015, 66–67). Szwarcberg also demonstrates one way that candidates monitor whether citizens attend rallies: 46 percent of candidates – and 61.2 percent of Peronist candidates – take attendance at rallies, some even using Excel spreadsheets (2015, 33, 63).[47] Also consistent with my argument that citizens' declarations transmit information, Brusco et al.'s (2004, 76) study on vote buying in Argentina posits that rally attendance enables operatives to "make good guesses" about citizens' vote choices. Additionally, they explain that operatives can observe whether citizens "make public pronouncements in favor of the party" (2004, 76). It deserves emphasis that none of these studies elaborate a mechanism by which declarations help to sustain ongoing clientelist relationships, nor do they employ regressions or formal analysis to examine citizen actions. Nevertheless, they provide evidence consistent with the mechanism of declared support presented in Chapter 3.

Survey data also suggest a link between declared support and clientelism in Argentina. The Stokes (2005) survey discussed in the preceding section includes a previously unanalyzed question about whether respondents attended a rally for a candidate. While this question does not hone in on whether a respondent displayed political paraphernalia at the rally – unlike the Rural Clientelism

[46] Furthermore, recall that findings about declared support in Chapter 5 are robust to the exclusion of rallies altogether as a form of declaration.

[47] These figures are based on Szwarcberg's coding of 137 councilor candidates in Buenos Aires and Córdoba in 2005–2006.

Survey analyzed in Chapter 5 – it nevertheless provides suggestive evidence regarding declared support. Argentines who attended a rally were over three times more likely than non-attendees to receive campaign handouts (24.7 versus 6.8 percent).[48] As shown in the right panel of Figure 7.3, the relationship between this citizen action and clientelism holds when using logistic regressions to control for other factors that may influence results. The specifications, which are fully reported in Appendix F, add a rally attendance variable to analyses in Stokes (2005). Respondents who attended a rally were 6.0 and 9.0 percentage points more likely to receive a campaign handout in the "Controls" and "Controls & fixed effects" specifications, respectively.[49] In addition, another survey by Stokes in 2003 provides information about the link between rally attendance and help received outside of electoral campaigns, a period when relational clientelism continues. Over 22.3 percent of citizens who attended rallies during the 2003 presidential campaign reported receiving help outside of campaigns over the past four years, compared to just 8.3 percent of citizens who had not attended rallies.[50] In short, both surveys by Stokes suggest that citizens who attended rallies disproportionately receive benefits.

As with Mexico, evidence from Argentina is broadly consistent with the argument of this book, though further research would be required to test mechanisms as thoroughly as in the case of Brazil. A rich literature documents the prevalence of clientelism in Argentina, yet the phenomenon encounters various challenges such as rising income, a growing middle class, and changes in voting technology. Many Argentines are motivated to sustain ongoing exchange relationships because the state fails to protect them from various shocks, such as unemployment, sickness, and drought. Empirical materials in this section have underscored this vulnerability and provided evidence consistent with the two key mechanisms elaborated in Chapter 3 – declared support and requesting benefits. In accordance with predictions, both citizen actions are significantly associated with clientelism in the Argentine case.

7.3 OTHER COUNTRIES

As explored in Chapter 1, clientelism faces major global challenges but endures in most of the world. One important reason is that the majority of countries inadequately protect their citizens from life risks, motivating many individuals to undertake actions that reinforce ongoing exchange relationships. The present section reveals that the mechanisms investigated in this book are observed in various parts of the world, though evidence is more limited than for the cases of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina examined thus far.

Cross-national surveys reveal the remarkable prevalence of clientelism around the world. For instance, nearly 18 percent of Africans and 12 percent

[48] $N = 1,747$.
[49] These findings are significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively.
[50] Author's analysis of Stokes's (2003) survey, which does not ask about citizen requests.

of Latin Americans surveyed "sometimes" or "always" received offers of handouts in exchange for their votes. Yet as argued in Chapter 1, four broad categories of challenges threaten the existence of clientelism: structural changes (e.g., rising income), institutional reforms (e.g., the secret ballot), heightened legal enforcement, and partisan strategies against clientelism. While the particular combination of threats to clientelism tends to vary across countries, a considerable share of the world's population has an important motivation for sustaining ongoing exchange relationships – their continued vulnerability.

7.3.1 Vulnerability of Citizens

Substantial vulnerability persists in most of the world, even where incomes are rising. In many countries, social insurance fails to cover significant portions of the population, either because programs simply do not exist, they exclude major groups of citizens, or they are poorly implemented (ILO, 2015, 73). For instance, less than a third of the world's workers in 2013 were legally covered by unemployment benefits (ILO, 2015, 79),[51] a devastating blow to many of the world's 204 million people who were unemployed in 2015 (UN, 2015, 17). Furthermore, nearly half of workers across the globe – and three-quarters of workers in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia – are categorized by the ILO as having "vulnerable employment" because they are either self-employed or work for their family's firm, and are thus less likely to have social insurance (ILO, 2015, 28; UN, 2015, 19). Of course, this vulnerability extends far beyond employment. Many nations provide insufficient basic health care to their populations, with poor and rural citizens especially likely to suffer from both incomplete access to services and low-quality care (WHO, 2015, 45). In low- and middle-income countries, residents are often unable to obtain generic medicines in public health clinics, partially explaining why in such contexts between 50 and 80 percent of all medicine expenditures are out-of-pocket (WHO, 2015, 56). Water scarcity is another problem that afflicts much of the world and exacerbates the vulnerability of the poor (UN, 2016, 14). Although 42 percent of the global population now has piped drinking water to their premises (UN, 2015, 58), billions of people continue to lack access to water deemed safe for consumption (UN, 2016, 19). In short, vulnerability afflicts much of the world's population, which as argued in this book provides a pressing motivation for citizens to undertake actions that sustain ongoing exchange relationships.

7.3.2 Requesting Benefits

Given this substantial vulnerability across the world, do individuals in other countries also engage in the mechanisms elaborated in this book? Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that many citizens do indeed request benefits and declare support and that these actions are linked to clientelism.

[51] Unemployment protection as defined by the ILO as "periodic cash benefits."

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With respect to requests, for example, research on Ghana emphasizes both their prevalence and their relationship to clientelism. For instance, Members of Parliament (MPs) interviewed by Staffan Lindberg (2010, 123) ranked requests for clientelist benefits as the most common types of demands received from citizens. Requests most frequently involved financial assistance for bills, school fees, food, funerals, weddings, starting a business or farm, and roofing sheets; though less frequent, employment requests were also considered important (2010, 123). Similarly, Asante et al. (2011, 17) observed Ghanaian MPs receiving requests for private benefits, with each MP fielding such demands from about twenty citizens each day. Some MPs even avoid returning to their home districts during recesses to limit interactions with their constituencies, for fear of being inundated with requests (17, 20). In the words of one MP interviewed, one would have to "carry huge sums of money to meet the [personal] demands of constituents" (17). In Lindberg's (2010, 133) discussion of various nuances of clientelism in Ghana, he emphasizes that MPs strive to be reelected and their behavior is "largely demand-driven, defined by the accountability pressures they face at the micro-level," which primarily involve requests for private assistance. He notes that fulfilling clients' requests is a more advantageous political strategy in rural areas, as young urban residents are more likely to make requests of multiple candidates without providing political support (124). While these studies emphasize a link between requests and clientelism, they do not test to what extent benefits are contingent on political support. Nevertheless, they point to the importance of requests in a context with substantial clientelism.

Citizens in India also frequently request help from politicians and party operatives (e.g., Berenschot, 2010, 886–887; Jensenius, 2013, 56–58). A recent study by Jennifer Bussell (n.d., 24, 29) reports that many politicians in three Indian states receive hundreds or even thousands of visits from citizens each day – many involving requests for private assistance – and they spend 24 to 35 percent of their time in meetings with these constituents. Fulfilling these requests involves both clientelism, in which the receipt of benefits is contingent on providing political support, as well as non-partisan constituency service. With respect to clientelism, Berenschot describes citizens requesting help from their councilor in the Gujarat state, who "rewards loyal supporters" as part of his budget (2010, 893). More broadly, he emphasizes that politicians often provide water, jobs, and medical assistance in exchange for political support, in many cases responding to citizen demands (Berenschot, 2010, 893–896). It should be emphasized that not all requests involve clientelism; for example, Bussell (n.d., 5, 36) argues that many requests directed at higher-level politicians involve constituency service, though she notes some evidence regarding *local* politicians may be consistent with contingent exchanges. Overall, evidence from India suggests that citizen requests are prevalent, and elite responsiveness to some (but not all) of these demands involves clientelism.

In addition to this evidence from Ghana and India, cross-national survey data also suggest a link between citizen requests and clientelism. Two prominent surveys include questions about both clientelism and requests (but not declared support): the 2010 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, which includes 43,990 respondents in 26 countries, and the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey, which includes 25,397 respondents in 18 countries.[52] A drawback already discussed about LAPOP also extends to Afrobarometer: both surveys only ask if campaign handouts were offered, not if they were received.

Just as with the Argentine and Mexican LAPOP data analyzed earlier, overall, LAPOP data from across the Americas also reveals a strong link between requests and clientelism, in line with analyses in Chapter 6. Over 13.3 percent of LAPOP respondents reported that they had "sought assistance from or presented a request" from municipal officials during the last year. Once again, requesters were about twice as likely as non-requesters to experience clientelism (20.0 versus 11.0 percent). Analyses in Nichter and Peress (2016), which are summarized in Figure 7.2, show that this difference remains significant at the 1 percent level when including a broad range of control variables and country fixed effects. In the most inclusive specification, requesting help is associated with a 9.4 percentage point increase in the probability of experiencing clientelism. Appendix F reports full regression results.

Similar results are observed using data from eighteen African countries (Nichter and Peress, 2016). Afrobarometer inquires whether respondents contacted political party officials for "help to solve a problem or to give them your views," with a follow-up question about whether the primary reason for this contact was a "personal problem." African respondents who contacted party officials about personal problems disproportionately received clientelist offers. Whereas 26.7 percent of requesters experienced clientelism, only 17.6 percent of non-requesters did. Figure 7.2 demonstrates that the difference between requesters and non-requesters remains significant (at the 1 percent level) when including various controls and country fixed effects. In the most inclusive specification, requesting help is associated with an 11.5 percentage point increase in the probability of experiencing clientelism. Overall, cross-national data from both Africa and Latin America point to a robust association between requests and clientelism, again indicative of the mechanism in Chapter 3.

Moreover, evidence suggests this link does not simply reflect constituency service, in which politicians deliver benefits citizens without regard to political criteria. Instead, both Afrobarometer and LAPOP data show that citizens who support clientelist parties disproportionately receive contingent offers. In Nichter and Peress (2016), we adapt the core vs. swing test of Stokes et al. (2013), which uses as a proxy for supporters whether respondents identify with any political party. To examine whether citizens who identify

[52] Canada and the United States are excluded from LAPOP analyses. Afrobarometer's Round 3 survey was fielded in 2005 and 2006.

with *clientelist* parties are more likely to receive benefits, data are employed from Kitschelt's (2013) expert survey about clientelist activities by parties in eighty-eight nations.[53] In particular, we coded whether respondents identified with a party that experts described as engaging in "moderate" or "major" clientelist efforts.[54] In both Africa and Latin America, citizens who identify with a clientelist party have a higher likelihood of experiencing clientelism (at the 1 percent significance level). This finding suggests a political logic of benefits flowing to machine supporters, which is congruent with relational clientelism.

In sum, both qualitative and quantitative evidence from various countries across the world suggest a link between citizen requests and clientelism, consistent with the key theoretical mechanism elaborated in Chapter 3.

7.3.3 Declared Support

Compared to the previous section on citizen requests, evidence about a link between declared support and clientelism is more limited outside of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.[55] Nevertheless, research from Lebanon, Yemen, and Ghana provides suggestive evidence outside of Latin America that is broadly consistent with the role of declarations examined in Chapter 3.

In Lebanon, Melani Cammett (2011, 2014) examines the distribution of social assistance by sectarian political parties. While the role of citizens in clientelism is not her primary focus, Cammett reveals that Lebanese citizens who demonstrate their commitment to a party through various actions are more likely to receive benefits, and those who do so more extensively receive a greater value of benefits (2011, 75, 84–87; 2014, 128–129). She creates an index of forms of citizen participation that demonstrate partisan commitment (e.g., voting, party membership, and volunteering), which specifically includes citizens "signaling their political preferences" by displaying posters, symbols and other party materials at home (2011, 75, 95; 2014, 118). Regressions using a national survey reveal that citizens who engage in more of these actions receive more social assistance such as food, health care, and education (2011, 84–87; 2014, 128–129). While Cammett's analysis reflects actions broader than declared support, her findings are consistent with the mechanism elaborated in the present book.

In Lebanon and Yemen, Daniel Corstange (2016) also reveals patterns consistent with declared support. As part of his broader argument that intra-ethnic competition affects how elites distribute patronage, Corstange suggests

53 Survey fielded in 2008–2009 in all democratic polities with at least two million citizens.

54 Analysis employs the subset of nations in Kitschelt's survey (81 percent of LAPOP countries and 67 percent of Afrobarometer countries). Results are also consistent when a party identifier variable is used, which includes all countries in Afrobarometer and LAPOP (except for Canada and the United States).

55 For example, to the best of my knowledge, no cross-national survey includes questions about both declared support and clientelism.

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that many voters engage in "public sycophancy" – displays of political iconography – to demonstrate how intensely they are committed to leaders (10, 198–203). In line with the signaling model in the present book, Corstange reasons that public sycophancy sends a costly signal because "it imposes opportunity, psychological, and social costs on clients which are easier for committed supporters to bear than for the uncommitted" (200). To investigate the link between these displays and patronage, he analyzed a survey question about whether a respondent believed connections or merit is more important to obtain a government job. Regressions suggest that citizens who answered "connections" were significantly more likely to display political posters and flags than those who answered "merit" (219). This pattern is only observed in constituencies dominated by a single leader, consistent with his argument that voters compete for patronage in politically dominated communities (16, 219). Overall, findings in Corstange (2016) suggest that declarations may influence patronage in both Lebanon and Yemen.

In addition, recent work on Ghana identifies patterns consistent with declared support. Kristin Michelitch (2013, 109–111) briefly reports that many Ghanaians believe that public expressions of partisan support – including rally attendance and the use of flags, posters, shirts, hats, or even hair weavings – will enhance their ability to obtain future benefits from elected officials. Moreover, they perceive that "the *more they show party loyalty* in these very public ways, the *more likely they will be able to access* favorable services and goods if their party obtains power" (2013, 110, italics in original). Post-election benefits may include funds for medical expenses, weddings, funerals, and even employment offers; in addition, Ghanaians who engage in these public displays also tend to receive small handouts before the election (110–111). Michelitch (2011, 36) mentions that displays are observed by parties' dense network of operatives, and thereby facilitate clientelism even as Ghana strengthens ballot secrecy. Once again, these observations are consistent with the logic of declared support presented in Chapter 3.

In sum, clientelism faces major challenges across the world, but pervasive vulnerability provides an important motivation for citizens to reinforce relational clientelism. This brief discussion of several countries, as well an analysis of cross-national data, provide suggestive evidence of declared support and requesting benefits in the broader global context.

7.4 SUMMARY

As explored in this chapter, citizens play an important role in clientelism far beyond Brazil. In many countries, clientelism confronts serious threats to its existence, such as rising income, institutional reforms, heightened legal enforcement, and partisan strategies. Yet clientelism endures, in part because many citizens are motivated to help sustain ongoing exchange relationships that

mitigate their vulnerability. Evidence from Argentina and Mexico documents various challenges threatening clientelism, as well as the substantial vulnerability facing many citizens. While data limitations inhibit analyses of post-election benefits in countries other than Brazil, a strong link is observed in both countries between clientelism and the two key mechanisms explored in this book. Citizens who declare support publicly for candidates – and those who ask politicians and their representatives for benefits – are more likely to experience clientelism in Argentina and Mexico. Similar findings are observed for one or both mechanisms in Ghana, India, Lebanon, and Yemen, and cross-national data from Africa and Latin America reveal a robust association between requesting benefits and clientelism. To be sure, evidence from these countries is suggestive rather than dispositive, but it nevertheless corroborates the more thorough testing of mechanisms in Part II using empirical materials from Brazil. When considered holistically, such patterns across the world add credence to the book's argument that citizens undertake both actions – declared support and requesting benefits – and thereby often play an important role in sustaining relational clientelism.