

Appendix E

Regression Tables for Requesting Benefits

TABLE E.1 Citizen requests and post-election benefits, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 6.2, rows 1 and 2

	Benefit from politician			Benefit from municipality		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Requested assistance	0.398*** (0.03)	0.384*** (0.03)	0.377*** (0.03)	0.109*** (0.02)	0.102*** (0.03)	0.092*** (0.02)
Declared for winner		0.043** (0.02)	0.042** (0.02)		0.036* (0.02)	0.035* (0.02)
Declared for loser		0.003 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)		0.005 (0.02)	−0.015 (0.02)
Voted for mayor		−0.009 (0.01)	−0.009 (0.01)		−0.012 (0.01)	−0.004 (0.01)
Voted in 2012		−0.008 (0.01)	−0.007 (0.01)		0.039*** (0.01)	0.039*** (0.01)
Talks with politicians		0.082*** (0.02)	0.079** (0.02)		0.012 (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)
Association member		−0.007 (0.01)	−0.006 (0.01)		0.004 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Neighborhood collaboration		0.001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)		0.003 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
PT supporter		−0.011 (0.01)	−0.008 (0.01)		−0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
PSDB supporter		−0.036+ (0.02)	−0.037+ (0.02)		−0.042*** (0.01)	−0.028* (0.01)
PMDB supporter		0.033 (0.06)	0.016 (0.06)		−0.008 (0.04)	−0.027 (0.04)
DEM supporter		−0.011 (0.01)	−0.019 (0.01)		−0.041*** (0.01)	−0.044** (0.02)
Wealth		0.001 (0.00)	−0.002 (0.00)		0.005+ (0.00)	0.007** (0.00)
Education		−0.000 (0.00)	−0.000 (0.00)		0.002* (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Female		0.007 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)		0.007 (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Age		−0.000 (0.00)	−0.000 (0.00)		0.000+ (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Reciprocity		0.063 (0.04)	0.068+ (0.04)		0.097+ (0.05)	0.102* (0.05)
Risk aversion		−0.002 (0.00)	−0.002 (0.00)		0.005 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Public goods		0.003 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)		0.011*** (0.00)	0.005+ (0.00)
Time preference		−0.003* (0.00)	−0.003+ (0.00)		−0.002 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)
Has piped water		−0.016+ (0.01)	−0.014 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)
Has own cistern		0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)		0.015+ (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)
Access to cistern		−0.010 (0.01)	−0.014 (0.01)		−0.000 (0.01)	−0.002 (0.01)
Constant	0.018*** (0.00)	0.031 (0.02)	0.039+ (0.02)	0.037*** (0.00)	−0.081*** (0.02)	−0.060** (0.02)
Observations	3693	3195	3195	3727	3223	3223
R ²	0.244	0.271	0.283	0.019	0.043	0.127
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.2 Citizen requests and post-election benefits, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 6.2, row 3 (and club goods)

	Politician helped get job			Club good from politician		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Requested job assistance	0.212* (0.10)	0.153+ (0.09)	0.152 (0.09)			
Requested club good				0.225** (0.07)	0.223** (0.08)	0.221** (0.08)
Declared for winner		0.029** (0.01)	0.028* (0.01)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Declared for loser		0.010 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)		0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Voted for mayor		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		−0.004 (0.00)	−0.003 (0.00)
Voted in 2012		−0.004 (0.01)	−0.004 (0.01)		−0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Talks with politicians		0.028* (0.01)	0.028* (0.01)		0.010 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Association member		−0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)		0.002 (0.00)	0.006 (0.00)
Neighborhood collaboration		0.006 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)		0.014* (0.01)	0.013* (0.01)
PT supporter		0.002 (0.01)	−0.000 (0.01)		0.008 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
PSDB supporter		−0.012* (0.01)	−0.011 (0.01)		−0.006+ (0.00)	−0.004 (0.00)
PMDB supporter		−0.018** (0.01)	−0.020** (0.01)		−0.022* (0.01)	−0.031** (0.01)
DEM supporter		−0.014* (0.01)	−0.015+ (0.01)		−0.000 (0.00)	−0.007 (0.01)
Wealth		−0.000 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)		0.003** (0.00)	0.002+ (0.00)
Education		0.002* (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)		−0.001+ (0.00)	−0.001+ (0.00)
Female		−0.001 (0.00)	−0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Age		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		−0.000 (0.00)	−0.000 (0.00)
Reciprocity		0.014 (0.02)	0.019 (0.02)		−0.019 (0.02)	−0.018 (0.02)
Risk aversion		0.004* (0.00)	0.003* (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Public goods		−0.001 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)
Time preference		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		−0.000 (0.00)	−0.000 (0.00)
Has piped water		−0.007 (0.00)	−0.007 (0.01)		0.001 (0.00)	0.003 (0.01)
Has own cistern		0.008* (0.00)	0.008* (0.00)		0.005+ (0.00)	0.005+ (0.00)
Access to cistern		−0.001 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)		−0.002 (0.00)	−0.004 (0.00)
Constant	0.011*** (0.00)	−0.022+ (0.01)	−0.022+ (0.01)	0.005*** (0.00)	0.009 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Observations	3721	3220	3220	3692	3194	3194
R ²	0.019	0.037	0.056	0.086	0.087	0.100
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.3 *Citizen requests and campaign benefits, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012 – Regressions in Figure 6.2, row 4*

	Received campaign benefit from politician		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Requested help	0.171*** (0.02)	0.162*** (0.02)	0.153*** (0.02)
Any declaration		0.023* (0.01)	0.020* (0.01)
Voted for mayor		-0.020+ (0.01)	-0.019 (0.01)
Voted in 2012		0.014 (0.02)	0.021 (0.02)
Talks with politicians		0.026+ (0.01)	0.032* (0.01)
Association member		-0.008 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
PT supporter		-0.021* (0.01)	-0.018+ (0.01)
PSDB supporter		0.119 (0.07)	0.110 (0.07)
PMDB supporter		-0.032 (0.03)	-0.044 (0.03)
DEM supporter		-0.011 (0.04)	-0.008 (0.03)
Wealth		-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.008* (0.00)
Education		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Female		-0.003 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Age		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Reciprocity		-0.050 (0.04)	-0.031 (0.04)
Risk aversion		0.004 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Time preference		0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Piped water		-0.008 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.02)
Own cistern		0.000 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
Access to cistern		-0.005 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)
Constant	0.024*** (0.00)	0.031 (0.03)	0.026 (0.03)
Observations	3160	2720	2720
R ²	0.087	0.096	0.132
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.4 *Citizen requests and campaign benefits, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012 – Regressions in Figure 6.2, row 5*

	Received campaign benefit from politician		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Requested help	0.432*** (0.10)	0.469*** (0.11)	0.496*** (0.10)
Any declaration		-0.047 (0.08)	-0.041 (0.08)
Voted for mayor		-0.073 (0.09)	-0.124 (0.09)
Voted in 2012		-0.158 (0.14)	-0.126 (0.14)
Talks with politicians		-0.054 (0.12)	-0.053 (0.12)
Association member		0.040 (0.09)	0.033 (0.09)
PT supporter		0.198 (0.13)	0.177 (0.12)
PMDB supporter		0.003 (0.30)	-0.121 (0.31)
PSDB supporter		0.230 (0.57)	0.135 (0.53)
DEM supporter		-0.140 (0.30)	-0.169 (0.32)
Wealth		0.008 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)
Education		0.004 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Female		0.118 (0.08)	0.119 (0.08)
Age		-0.003 (0.00)	-0.004 (0.00)
Reciprocity		0.463 (0.41)	0.460 (0.40)
Risk aversion		0.031 (0.03)	0.030 (0.03)
Time preference		0.000 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Piped water		-0.200+ (0.11)	-0.206+ (0.11)
Own cistern		-0.198 (0.12)	-0.202+ (0.12)
Access to cistern		-0.173 (0.13)	-0.198 (0.12)
Constant	2.378*** (0.04)	1.868*** (0.18)	1.722*** (0.18)
Observations	3616	3085	3085
R ²	0.024	0.081	0.134
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Analyses are OLS regressions with the list experiment count as the outcome variable. Coefficients reflect interactions between each independent variable and the treatment variable. The treatment variable is coded 1 if the respondent was exposed to a fifth item in the list (regarding a campaign benefit); 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.5 *Correlates of post-election benefits by request, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 6.3, row 1*

	Post-election benefit by request			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Declared for winner	0.056*** (0.02)		0.047** (0.02)	0.046** (0.02)
Talks with politicians		0.128*** (0.03)	0.126*** (0.03)	0.119*** (0.03)
Declared for loser			0.009 (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)
Voted for mayor			0.000 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
Voted in 2012			0.005 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Association member			0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Neighborhood collaboration			0.012 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)
PT supporter			0.009 (0.02)	0.017 (0.02)
PSDB supporter			0.009 (0.05)	0.016 (0.05)
PMDB supporter			0.013 (0.05)	0.000 (0.06)
DEM supporter			−0.029** (0.01)	−0.033 (0.02)
Wealth			0.003 (0.00)	−0.002 (0.00)
Education			−0.002+ (0.00)	−0.002* (0.00)
Female			0.010 (0.01)	0.010 (0.01)
Age			−0.000+ (0.00)	−0.001* (0.00)
Reciprocity			0.045 (0.05)	0.054 (0.05)
Risk aversion			−0.001 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)
Public goods			0.005 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Time preference			−0.003+ (0.00)	−0.003* (0.00)
Has piped water			−0.024* (0.01)	−0.016 (0.01)
Has own cistern			0.006 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
Access to cistern			−0.010 (0.01)	−0.016 (0.01)
Constant	0.039*** (0.00)	0.038*** (0.00)	0.045+ (0.02)	0.052* (0.02)
Observations	3722	3724	3225	3225
R ²	0.008	0.021	0.037	0.063
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.6 *Correlates of post-election requests, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 6.3, row 2*

	Post-election request			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Declared for winner	0.091*** (0.02)		0.078*** (0.02)	0.081*** (0.02)
Talks with politicians		0.169*** (0.04)	0.157*** (0.04)	0.143*** (0.04)
Declared for loser			0.001 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Voted for mayor			−0.001 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Voted in 2012			0.033** (0.01)	0.032** (0.01)
Association member			0.011 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Neighborhood collaboration			0.022 (0.01)	0.017 (0.01)
PT supporter			0.026 (0.02)	0.037 (0.02)
PSDB supporter			−0.020 (0.05)	−0.012 (0.05)
PMDB supporter			0.004 (0.06)	−0.007 (0.07)
DEM supporter			−0.048*** (0.01)	−0.037 (0.02)
Wealth			0.002 (0.00)	−0.004 (0.00)
Education			−0.004* (0.00)	−0.004** (0.00)
Female			0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Age			−0.000 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)
Reciprocity			−0.026 (0.06)	−0.010 (0.06)
Risk aversion			−0.001 (0.00)	−0.002 (0.00)
Public goods			0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Time preference			−0.001 (0.00)	−0.001 (0.00)
Has piped water			−0.032* (0.01)	−0.022 (0.02)
Has own cistern			−0.000 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)
Access to cistern			0.012 (0.02)	0.001 (0.02)
Constant	0.066*** (0.01)	0.067*** (0.00)	0.052+ (0.03)	0.063* (0.03)
Observations	3720	3722	3224	3224
R ²	0.012	0.023	0.043	0.073
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.7 *Correlates of pre-election benefits by request, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012 – Regressions in Figure 6.3, row 3*

	Pre-election benefit by request			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Any declaration	0.050*** (0.01)		0.040** (0.01)	0.035* (0.01)
Talks with politicians		0.082*** (0.02)	0.074*** (0.02)	0.062*** (0.02)
Voted for mayor			−0.015 (0.02)	−0.016 (0.02)
Voted in 2012			0.040+ (0.02)	0.052* (0.02)
Association member			−0.023 (0.01)	0.005 (0.02)
PT supporter			−0.050** (0.02)	−0.032+ (0.02)
PSDB supporter			0.060 (0.08)	0.081 (0.08)
PMDB supporter			0.034 (0.06)	0.026 (0.06)
DEM supporter			0.110 (0.10)	0.099 (0.10)
Wealth			−0.000 (0.00)	−0.007 (0.01)
Education			−0.005* (0.00)	−0.005* (0.00)
Female			0.059*** (0.01)	0.058*** (0.01)
Age			−0.000 (0.00)	−0.000 (0.00)
Reciprocity			−0.047 (0.06)	−0.032 (0.06)
Risk aversion			−0.003 (0.00)	−0.004 (0.00)
Time preference			0.006** (0.00)	0.007** (0.00)
Piped water			−0.028+ (0.02)	−0.012 (0.02)
Own cistern			0.047** (0.02)	0.031+ (0.02)
Access to cistern			0.037* (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)
Constant	0.103*** (0.01)	0.113*** (0.01)	0.046 (0.03)	0.035 (0.03)
Observations	3660	3659	3111	3111
R ²	0.006	0.009	0.038	0.082
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.8 *Correlates of pre-election requests, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012 – Regressions in Figure 6.3, row 4*

	Pre-election request			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Any declaration	0.059*** (0.01)		0.036* (0.02)	0.027+ (0.02)
Talks with politicians		0.119*** (0.02)	0.115*** (0.02)	0.104*** (0.02)
Voted for mayor			-0.020 (0.02)	-0.020 (0.02)
Voted in 2012			0.065* (0.03)	0.083** (0.03)
Association member			-0.031+ (0.02)	0.000 (0.02)
PT supporter			-0.044+ (0.02)	-0.009 (0.02)
PSDB supporter			-0.017 (0.08)	0.021 (0.08)
PMDB supporter			0.079 (0.06)	0.050 (0.06)
DEM supporter			0.168 (0.12)	0.143 (0.11)
Wealth			-0.002 (0.01)	-0.012+ (0.01)
Education			-0.008*** (0.00)	-0.009*** (0.00)
Female			0.072*** (0.01)	0.071*** (0.01)
Age			-0.001+ (0.00)	-0.001+ (0.00)
Reciprocity			-0.054 (0.08)	-0.035 (0.08)
Risk aversion			-0.006 (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)
Time preference			0.007* (0.00)	0.009** (0.00)
Piped water			-0.034 (0.02)	-0.006 (0.03)
Own cistern			0.058** (0.02)	0.035 (0.02)
Access to cistern			0.082*** (0.02)	0.033 (0.03)
Constant	0.186*** (0.01)	0.193*** (0.01)	0.136** (0.05)	0.121** (0.04)
Observations	3660	3659	3111	3111
R ²	0.005	0.013	0.047	0.092
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.9 *Perception of councilor in trust game, unfulfilled vs. fulfilled request, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 6.4*

	Amount citizen expects own councilor to return (log reais)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Unfulfilled request	-0.601+ (0.34)	-0.705+ (0.39)	-0.897* (0.37)	-0.585+ (0.34)	-0.701+ (0.39)	-0.909* (0.37)
Log amount sent to councilor	0.702*** (0.09)	0.684*** (0.10)	0.684*** (0.10)	0.700*** (0.09)	0.684*** (0.10)	0.684*** (0.10)
Declared for councilor				1.134** (0.40)	1.286** (0.46)	0.673 (0.41)
Voted for elected councilor		-0.454 (0.40)	-0.456 (0.38)		-0.588 (0.41)	-0.486 (0.38)
Voted for mayor		0.060 (0.41)	0.403 (0.41)		-0.011 (0.40)	0.338 (0.42)
Voted in 2012		0.036 (0.85)	-0.961 (0.80)		0.002 (0.88)	-0.914 (0.80)
Talks with politicians		-0.202 (0.50)	0.224 (0.46)		-0.308 (0.48)	0.147 (0.46)
Association member		-0.543 (0.37)	-0.708 (0.46)		-0.481 (0.36)	-0.643 (0.46)
Neighborhood collaboration		0.228 (0.45)	0.422 (0.45)		0.149 (0.44)	0.390 (0.45)
PT supporter		1.383* (0.59)	1.504* (0.61)		1.285* (0.59)	1.438* (0.61)
PSDB supporter		2.674*** (0.70)	1.338 (0.81)		3.095*** (0.73)	1.664+ (0.85)
PMDB supporter		-0.092 (1.63)	2.341 (2.11)		-0.361 (1.63)	2.132 (2.19)
Wealth		-0.101 (0.11)	-0.141 (0.11)		-0.105 (0.11)	-0.144 (0.11)
Education		-0.016 (0.06)	0.003 (0.05)		-0.035 (0.06)	-0.009 (0.05)
Female		0.225 (0.38)	-0.102 (0.36)		0.185 (0.37)	-0.111 (0.36)
Age		-0.006 (0.02)	0.002 (0.01)		-0.005 (0.02)	0.002 (0.01)
Reciprocity		2.261 (2.08)	4.034* (2.00)		2.767 (2.05)	4.119* (2.01)
Risk aversion		-0.107 (0.15)	-0.069 (0.15)		-0.147 (0.15)	-0.090 (0.15)
Public goods		-0.076 (0.17)	-0.213 (0.17)		-0.069 (0.16)	-0.198 (0.17)
Time preference		0.039 (0.08)	0.066 (0.07)		0.017 (0.07)	0.048 (0.07)
Has piped water		-0.981 (0.68)	-0.635 (0.80)		-0.675 (0.69)	-0.517 (0.81)
Has own cistern		-0.637 (0.46)	0.505 (0.44)		-0.465 (0.47)	0.514 (0.44)
Access to cistern		-0.552 (0.47)	0.306 (0.47)		-0.493 (0.47)	0.287 (0.48)
Constant	-2.045*** (0.23)	-0.583 (1.33)	-0.971 (1.32)	-2.275*** (0.25)	-0.622 (1.35)	-0.976 (1.31)
Observations	1137	988	988	1137	988	988
R ²	0.023	0.082	0.315	0.045	0.108	0.321
Municipal fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE E.10 *Voting for same mayoral candidate/party in 2008 and 2012, unfulfilled vs. fulfilled request, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012 – Regressions in Figure 6.5*

	Voted for same candidate		Voted for same candidate/party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unfulfilled request	-0.243* (0.11)	-0.265* (0.12)	-0.217* (0.09)	-0.200+ (0.10)
Declared support		0.109 (0.11)		0.064 (0.09)
Talks with politicians		0.143 (0.11)		0.232* (0.09)
Association member		-0.058 (0.14)		-0.146 (0.11)
PT supporter		-0.020 (0.16)		0.142 (0.19)
PMDB supporter		0.088 (0.18)		0.116 (0.15)
DEM supporter		0.493** (0.16)		0.583*** (0.15)
Wealth		0.032 (0.03)		-0.002 (0.03)
Education		0.014 (0.01)		0.017 (0.01)
Female		-0.094 (0.10)		-0.107 (0.08)
Age		0.000 (0.00)		-0.003 (0.00)
Reciprocity		0.576 (0.69)		-0.200 (0.53)
Risk aversion		-0.022 (0.04)		0.001 (0.03)
Time preference		0.035+ (0.02)		0.030+ (0.02)
Piped water		0.036 (0.18)		0.048 (0.18)
Own cistern		0.093 (0.22)		0.104 (0.14)
Access to cistern		0.128 (0.19)		0.194 (0.13)
Constant	0.723*** (0.05)	0.366 (0.24)	0.678*** (0.04)	0.462* (0.22)
Observations	113	101	161	146
R ²	0.434	0.597	0.370	0.501
Municipal fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.

Source: Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.