An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism

The Case of Peru

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The distribution of goods during campaigns is usually perceived as electoral clientelism, a strategy of electoral mobilization that involves a politician offering private benefits (e.g. money, goods) to individuals during campaigns contingent on their electoral support.[1] In Peru, providing such goods is considered crucial to effective campaigning. As one campaign manager said, "You need to know how to invest. You have to hand out construction materials, cement, calves, beer. It is an investment. If you don't deliver, you are done: someone else will come and give away more."[2] However, as they lack stable organizations, politicians realize that these handouts cannot guarantee voters' support at the polls: "People receive handouts, but they do not commit. 'Let him spend his money,' they say."[3] Another politician put it even more directly: "All the candidates give away goods. … If they offer you something, you accept. But you vote for whichever candidate you prefer."[4]

This indiscriminate distribution of goods is puzzling given prevailing theories that see electoral clientelism as a direct exchange of goods for votes. As the preceding quotes suggest, politicians face a commitment problem: if ballots are cast secretly, they cannot directly observe if voters have maintained the clientelistic bargain. Conventional approaches hold that, in the absence of traditional bonds of deference, electoral clientelism requires well-organized political machines with local agents who build trust, target distribution, or are at least perceived by voters as capable of circumventing ballot secrecy to ensure they vote as promised.[5] This logic would seem to rule out electoral clientelism without a dense and institutionalized grassroots infrastructure.

Yet, electoral clientelism persists in Peru's democracy even though parties remain inchoate after their collapse twenty years ago.[6] Political brokers lack long-term partisan affiliations, and the state is not used as a substitute for a political machine as it was during the 1990s under President Alberto Fujimori. Indeed, despite the absence of organized political parties in many countries, electoral clientelism continues to be

a widespread phenomenon across Latin America. As Table 1 indicates, reports that politicians have offered material benefits during campaigns are actually more common in countries with loosely organized parties, such as Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru, than in the region as a whole.

Table 1

	Have been offered a material benefit in exchange for their vote sometimes or often
Dominican Republic	22.2%
Argentina	18.0%
Panama	17.8%
Belize	17.1%
Bolivia	16.7%
Mexico	16.7%
Paraguay	16.2%
Colombia	15.2%
Guatemala	13.7%
Brazil	13.4%
Peru	11.9%
Average	**11.8%**
Venezuela	11.6%
El Salvador	10.1%
Costa Rica	8.5%
Ecuador	8.3%
Suriname	7.3%
Nicaragua	6.4%
Jamaica	6.0%
Guyana	5.9%
Uruguay	5.6%
Chile	5.5%
Trinidad & Tobago	5.3%

Source: LAPOP 2010.

Why, then, do candidates employ clientelistic strategies in countries like Peru where political machines are absent and they cannot ensure voters' compliance in the polling booth? I argue that existing theory cannot explain this puzzle because it focuses exclusively on clientelism's direct effect on vote choices. Instead, I propose a new "informational" theory that highlights the previously ignored indirect effects of clientelism. Building upon and further developing ideas from Kramon and Szwarcberg, I propose that clientelistic investments have informational value, especially early in the campaign, by signaling candidates' electoral viability.[7] At this point in the election, rather than buying votes, politicians are paying off voters to turn out at campaign events. With

large rallies, candidates demonstrate strong electoral potential to the media, donors, activists, and voters. In this way, this subtype of electoral clientelism—"campaign clientelism"—is consequential for influencing vote choices.

By stressing the informational value of campaign clientelism, my theory seeks to illuminate processes that compensate for the lack of conventional information during campaigns and facilitate strategic coordination among actors. Indeed, my approach is particularly well suited for explaining electoral clientelism in contexts with low political information where there is considerable uncertainty about candidates. As has been documented elsewhere, lower levels of information reduce the importance of substantive predispositions on vote choice and emphasize expectations of electoral chances.[8] Informational deficits are particularly prevalent in countries with weakly institutionalized parties.[9] Legislative and local elections tend also to have more informational deficits than presidential ones.

My approach makes several theoretical contributions to the study of electoral clientelism. First, in contrast to existing approaches, my theory does not assume that enduring political organization is required for electoral clientelism and, thus, provides a potential explanation for the use of such a strategy where parties are weakly rooted in society. Second, my theory takes campaign dynamics seriously. The informational approach portrays electoral clientelism as a complex game that takes place throughout the campaign and not just on or near election day. Third, my approach engages with other strands of the party literature and sheds new light on existing debates by integrating important insights about political competition and strategic behavior. Finally, my research confirms the importance of in-depth qualitative research for understanding a complex phenomenon such as clientelism.[10]

This study utilizes a mixed methods research strategy to capture the dynamics of clientelism within Peruvian elections. On the one hand, nationally representative surveys provide country-level estimates of the prevalence of different types of behaviors and attitudes. On the other hand, qualitative observations are crucial for understanding the political context for electoral clientelism and examining the causal mechanisms behind these transactions. Qualitative research includes: 185 interviews with Peruvian politicians, journalists, citizens, and academics conducted between 2009 and 2012; eighteen focus groups with citizens from poor neighborhoods and rural villages conducted in 2011; and on-site observation of subnational campaigns (2010) in the departments of Piura and Cusco.[11]

Electoral Clientelism Revisited

Why do politicians invest in clientelism during electoral campaigns? In particular, why would they do so when they lack the appropriate organizational apparatus to guarantee voter compliance? While political clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives, the existing literature cannot explain this empirical puzzle.

Many studies of clientelism address long-term clientelistic relationships that endure beyond electoral cycles by employing a range of frameworks, including socioeconomic modernization theory, historical institutionalism, and political economy approaches.[12] Yet, because these works examine persistent clientelistic linkages, they do not even consider how and why politicians would invest in electoral clientelism in contexts where such relations are more ephemeral. In contrast, many contemporary researchers study clientelism in the short run, paying closer attention to its electoral rationale and micro-foundations while trying to predict which voters it targets.[13] Although they disagree on the specific mechanisms that sustain clientelistic exchanges and their models make different predictions about which voters clientelistic parties target, all of these scholars assume that electoral clientelism requires an extensive organization—the machine—to function.

In this literature, the machine is the organizational foundation of electoral clientelism. Machines are headed by political bosses who command a hierarchy of organized brokers (locally embedded agents). Brokers serve as local patrons, organizing and mobilizing voters (clients) through regularly distributed benefits. The literature commonly portrays these machines as centered around partisans.[14] However, machines can also be candidate-based, as is the case in Japan, where most Liberal Democratic Party politicians maintain personal support organizations.[15] Yet, even in this case, the theoretical emphasis is on iterated interactions between patron and client that constitute a machine.[16] In other words, the literature proposes that electoral clientelism can only work in a long-term perspective.

An influential theory in comparative politics is that politicians enforce the clientelistic exchange by monitoring vote choices.[17] From this perspective, machines keep voters from reneging on the clientelistic bargain by monitoring individuals' votes, rewarding support, and punishing defection in a scheme of "perverse accountability."[18] To monitor individual voters, machines use a variety of practices to violate ballot secrecy on election day or at least give the impression to voters that they can do so.[19] Machines can also use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to infer how voters actually voted.[20] In other words, voters comply only if vote buying is externally enforced by a network of political agents that monitors voters' actions and credibly threatens to sanction them if they fail to comply. This means that clientelism requires dense organizational networks.[21]

Effectively monitoring individual voting behavior when the ballot is secret, however, has been questioned as being unrealistic.[22] Consequently, in recent years scholars have favored "softer" theories for how patrons keep track of clients. For instance, some have pointed out that monitoring groups of voters by analyzing aggregated voting results and opinion polls is more efficient and less costly than monitoring and rewarding individual voters.[23] Other scholars argue that monitoring turnout—that is, whether individuals who had received clientelistic benefits actually vote—is more feasible and thus should be considered as a more rational clientelistic strategy when the secret ballot is used.[24]

Other authors suggest that networks play a crucial role in electoral clientelism beyond monitoring. For example, reviving insights from older generations, some

scholars posit that voters comply with the clientelistic exchange due to feelings of personal obligation generated by the receipt of material benefits or services.[25] From this perspective, networks of local brokers provide parties with perfect information about voters' levels of reciprocity.[26] Others emphasize the importance of networks as selection mechanisms to recruit the "right" type of voter whose expectations are positively affected by resources and problem solving.[27] Thus, these scholars still assume that politicians require an enduring grassroots organization in order to make electoral clientelism work.

In sum, conventional approaches do not solve the puzzle of widespread distribution of benefits during campaigns in organizationally fluid political contexts. This is a practical concern, as electoral clientelism proliferates in developing democracies without the support of organized political machines.[28] In multiple cases, including Peru, local brokers are "free agents" who frequently switch between parties and candidates, even during a single campaign. How can electoral clientelism work in these contexts, which are far from meeting the organizational requirements posited by conventional explanations?

Existing approaches cannot elucidate this puzzle for several reasons. First, they result from studying cases of electoral clientelism within contexts of strong local partisan organizations, as in Mexico and Argentina.[29] As a result, the conclusions are biased in favor of the conventional wisdom. Second, paradoxically, political scientists disregard the importance of campaigning when theorizing about electoral clientelism. This limitation is, in part, a consequence of a third shortcoming: most scholars conceptualize electoral clientelism in a very narrow way, treating campaigns as one-shot deals.

Several scholars see "vote buying," a subtype of electoral clientelism that consists of exchanging benefits for votes, as synonymous with electoral clientelism.[30] Most definitions of vote buying emphasize that those clientelistic exchanges "are not only ex ante in that benefits are distributed prior to voting, but also that exchanges occur on or soon before Election Day."[31] Thus, scholars often interpret any data about the distribution of material benefits during campaigns as attempted vote buying.

Moreover, even when examining electoral participation more broadly and distinguishing other subtypes of electoral clientelism besides vote buying, scholars do not take into account clientelistic strategies employed during the campaign. For instance, "turnout buying" is defined as a special case of electoral clientelism in which payments are made to voters to turn out at the polls—that is, on election day.[32] With scholars limiting their theories to only what happens close to election day, they miss the broader picture and the electoral rationale of clientelistic strategies, especially in countries without organized machines, such as Peru.

In recent years, scholars have begun exploring new avenues for addressing and overcoming the shortcomings of conventional approaches. For instance, Kramon develops a novel explanation that stresses the informational effects of electoral clientelism.[33] He argues that in Kenya, congressional candidates hand out material goods while campaigning to establish themselves as good potential patrons who

collect resources and willingly share them. From this perspective, vote buying is a self-enforced exchange.

Kramon's insights and experimental evidence are undoubtedly an important contribution to the clientelism literature. Nevertheless, the author does not fully develop the theoretical potential of his findings. For example, he does not distinguish between vote buying and campaign clientelism, even though his evidence shows that many people receive cash or food at campaign events.[34] Furthermore, Kramon does not pay much attention to the potential indirect effects that electoral clientelism can have on vote choice by signaling candidates' electoral strength.

Similarly, expanding her previous research, Szwarcberg argues that rallies remain important in the era of mass media because they provide information to different members within and outside the partisan machine.[35] For instance, rallies provide party bosses with information to monitor brokers' reliability.[36] Building upon research on dominant parties, Szwarcberg also argues that rallies allow the opposition to assess the electoral strength of the incumbent by publicly displaying its capacity to mobilize voters. In this way, rallies contribute to strategic coordination.[37]

Szwarcberg's new piece significantly advances our understanding about the informational value that rallies have for political competition. As I will discuss later, my theory expands her contribution by looking at the importance of informational effects of buying turnout for the rallies. However, her theoretical model still considers only the informational value of clientelistic mobilization in contexts with organized partisan machines. Thus, she does not fully theorize the indirect effects of campaign-turnout buying.

Going beyond these theoretical refinements, I develop a full-fledged informational theory about the indirect effects of electoral clientelism in weakly organized settings.

An Informational Theory

Information on the relative support of competing candidates is a precondition for voters and elites to behave strategically in reaction to electoral incentives.[38] During elections, elites seek to avoid wasting resources and thus tend to concentrate them on candidates who are expected to fare better. In the same way, strategic voters are unwilling to waste their ballots on hopeless candidates. Therefore, they frequently vote for candidates who are ranked second or lower in their preference ordering but who are better positioned in the polls.

I argue that in contexts with low political organization, the distribution of selective benefits among poorer voters acquires special significance: it serves both to mobilize and persuade voters to support the most promising candidates. By signaling candidates' electoral viability, campaign clientelism indirectly affects vote choices. Politicians engage in campaign clientelism because of the indirect payoffs it can produce, such as raising contributions, recruiting benefit-seeking activists, attracting strategic voters, and persuading clients.

Actors' beliefs about the electoral prospects of candidates are based, among other factors, on the perceived level of public support. Partisan affiliation is thought to be one of the best cues as to candidates' competitiveness.[39] Voters can employ the electoral history heuristic—whether parties have previously gained seats in a given district—to form their expectations.[40] Strategic actors also take cues from other sources of easily observable data, such as poll results and interest group endorsements.[41]

I argue that the distribution of material rewards plays a major role in campaigns because it allows candidates to convey information and signal that they are electorally viable candidates. Directly, handouts signal to voters that a candidate has resources. Indirectly, mobilization, such as turnout at rallies, becomes a proxy for popularity. The better attended the campaign events they organize, the more their reputations as viable candidates will advance. As Kitschelt and Wilkinson contend, "public pledges, or the display of badges, party colors or signs" are more profitable to candidates than private promises of support.[42] Buying attendance at campaign events is therefore electorally appealing for politicians, especially in contexts of low political organization where cues like partisan affiliation may provide little information.

Moreover, campaign clientelism has advantages over other subtypes of electoral clientelism. First, it is relatively cheap, as minor consumer goods and other selective incentives are generally sufficient to buy attendance from poorer voters. By contrast, vote buying can be quite expensive.[43] Second, in contrast to other clientelistic strategies, attendance at rallies cannot be reneged on: "Even when voters can decide not to support the candidate whose rallies they have attended, they, nevertheless, contribute to make these events a success simply by turning out."[44] Thus, monitoring individual turnout is not an issue.

Elites and voters compare the information gathered by observing turnout at campaign events with the knowledge gathered by reviewing recent electoral history, observing the spread of street propaganda, and assessing candidates' appearance in the media, which is in turn influenced by turnout. As scholars have noted, the media tends to focus more on candidates who have promise or who fare better than expected.[45] High turnout at electoral events provides cues about candidates' electoral potential. The media thus transmits and amplifies the importance of high attendance at campaign events.

Politicians frequently employ campaign clientelism from the initial stages of the campaign onward to attract attention to their candidacy and take advantage of bandwagon effects. Increasing the distribution of goods throughout the campaign enables voters to update their beliefs about the electoral chances of the candidates. Turnout also informs donors and benefit-seeking activists about which candidates have electoral potential. In contexts in which financial endorsements are not made public, the quantity and quality of goods being distributed also conveys information about candidates' ability to harness resources. Particularly in later stages of the campaign, the distribution of goods signals to voters which candidates are leading and narrows the set of viable candidates. Other things being equal, these candidates increase their chances of persuading strategic actors of their electoral viability. Even in contexts in which elites fail to coordinate their entry into electoral competition, this dynamic

helps reduce the number of true contenders, although not as much as in a complete information setting.

Additionally, campaign clientelism may also help shape clients' political preferences.[46] By attending political meetings after being offered selective incentives, poor citizens get valuable information *in situ*. Moreover, because clients are opportunistic and will often go to different candidates' rallies to obtain more benefits, they will be exposed to a range of different candidates and platforms. They thus diversify their informational sources.

Campaign Clientelism in Peru

During the 1980s, some Peruvian political parties used clientelism as a long-term strategy to develop political support primarily through the distribution of patronage positions to partisan militants. For instance, the *Partido Aprista Peruano* (APRA) built an extensive partisan machine that utilized social programs targeted to the urban poor[47] while other parties politicized food aid. However, electoral mobilization was increasingly programmatic, and a rift emerged among the urban poor between those who accepted clientelism and others who rejected it in line with radical/leftist mentalities.[48]

Clientelistic linkages radically changed during the tenure of political outsider Alberto Fuijimori (1990–2000). Without an organization and partisans to distribute jobs to, Fujimori relied on state resources less for patronage[49] and more for massively distributing pork, while expanding and institutionalizing clientelistic ties to the poor through social programs.[50] Additionally, electoral clientelism grew considerably given that Fujimori substituted partisan organization with turnout buying to generate attendance at rallies.[51] The authoritarian reconstruction of the state after the 1980s crisis made these strategies feasible.

Since the collapse of its party system in the early 1990s, re-democratized Peru survives without organized parties.[52] Electoral politics is structured around individual candidates, who improvise their own personalistic vehicles or renegotiate their "partisan" affiliation near the start of the campaign. With the partial exception of APRA, parties have few established local committees and linkages with local brokers, and, unlike under Fujimori's regime, the state is not used as a substitute for a machine.

Because elections are highly volatile, politicians have difficulty securing re-election and building even personalistic machines. In the absence of stable political organizations, alliances with local candidates become crucial to campaigning effectively. Media outlets also play an important role in campaigns, in some cases substituting for the lack of organizational infrastructure. Finally, candidates increasingly hire "political operators" (*operadores*) to help them carry out their campaigns. Operadores are semi-professional politicians who perform roles and tasks usually conducted by partisan structures in other contexts. With the exception of APRA's, operadores are "free" agents who switch partisan affiliation at each election. The same happens with *dirigentes* (community leaders) who act as gatekeepers to poor neighborhoods and villages

during campaigns. In most cases, dirigentes perform brokering functions but are not themselves local patrons, as the literature on clientelism often assumes.

Although there are no permanent political organizations, distributing handouts is a fixture of campaigns. Indeed, Peru's estimated level of electoral clientelism is average for Latin America (Table 1). However, the distribution of material benefits takes place from the initial stages of the campaign onward. Respondents in interviews and focus groups mention the importance of this early distribution as part of campaigning among poor sectors.[53] Delivery certainly increases as election day approaches, but it is by no means a one-time event. Thus, the timing of distribution does not match conventional expectations associated with vote buying. Moreover, given that voting in Peru is mandatory and enforced, turnout buying at the polls is virtually nonexistent.

Against conventional expectations, monitoring clients' vote choices in Peru is generally impossible. Politicians not only lack the organizational resources required for monitoring individuals, but voting precincts are not organized territorially, making it impossible to monitor voting behavior through aggregated electoral results.[54] Poor citizens do not fear any reprisal from politicians because they are sure that their vote choice is secret. The participants in a focus group that I conducted in Piura made it clear that they do not believe that politicians can find out how they vote:

Participant 1: If I have decided to accept the gift, he [the candidate] is not going to see my vote.
Participant 2: Because it is already a gift, it's done. He comes and says: "Here is a little gift but give me your vote…", "All right," we say. But as she says, it is a personal decision.
Interviewer: Nobody can tell who you vote for?
Everybody: No! Nobody!
Participant 2: I can say I am going to vote for you but at the end only I know who I'm voting for.[55]

Survey data confirm the limited possibilities for conventional monitoring approaches in the Peruvian case. As Table 2 indicates, there is no significant statistical association between the belief that politicians can find out their vote and how citizens would react if offered a vote buying deal.[56]

Moreover, as Table 3 indicates, voters who are threatened by politicians are not more likely to honor the vote buying deal either. To the contrary, voters who are threatened are actually significantly more likely to defect by accepting the vote buying deal and then voting for a different candidate.

Monitoring individual behavior is further hampered in Peru, given that in many cases politicians and operadores do not know their clients. In fact, 48 percent of respondents who reported having been offered a clientelistic deal during the 2010 and 2011 campaigns specified that it was the first time that they had seen the person who offered them the benefit.[57] In the cases when politicians do know the clients, they have some leverage over them. Incumbents, for example, sometimes ask the beneficiaries of social programs to support them and threaten to take away their

Table 2

What would you do if a candidate offered you a benefit in exchange for your vote?	Do you believe that politicians violate the secret vote?	
	Yes	No
Honor	12.37% (81)	16.22% (170)
Defect	16.49% (108)	15.17% (159)
Reject the offer	65.04% (426)	64.22% (673)
Don't know	4.39% (46)	6.11% (46)
Total	100% (655)	100% (1048)

Source: Ipsos APOYO/JNE, 2010.
Pearson chi2(3) = 6.9066 Pr = 0.075.

Table 3

What would you do if a candidate offered you a benefit in exchange for your vote?	Has a politician threatened you or a family member with being removed from a job, social program, or public service if you/family member refuse to support her candidacy?	
	Yes	No
Honor	15.38% (20)	12.05% (161)
Defect	41.54% (54)	22.16% (296)
Reject the offer	38.46% (50)	61.53% (822)
Don't know	4.62% (6)	4.27% (57)
Total	100% (130)	100% (1336)

Source: IOP 2011.
Pearson chi2(3) = 30.34 Pr=0.00.

social benefits if they do not. This has occurred with poor women enrolled in Glass of Milk, a nutritional program mandated by law in all municipalities. Nonetheless, interviews and focus groups show that even in these cases, given the belief that the vote is secret, citizens turn out at campaign events but vote for their preferred candidate anyway. According to one broker in Piura:

> Mónica [the mayor] went to the Glass of Milk committee to demand support; if not, she threatened to take away the milk. … She confused people; people felt under pressure. They said that they were going to Mónica's rallies, but that they will vote for [another candidate].[58]

Thus, financial inducements and threats are effective as a mobilization tool to assure participation at campaign activities, but they do not necessarily change vote preferences. Vote buying is therefore not a viable clientelistic strategy in Peru.

If Peruvian politicians cannot directly buy votes, why do they distribute goods throughout the campaign? First, Peruvian politicians use minor consumer goods to buy attendance at campaign events and gain access to and campaign in poor neighborhoods and villages. In other words, they engage in campaign clientelism because they lack established local networks.

In a context of low partisan identification, politicians use campaign clientelism to attract poor voters and introduce themselves. During the last electoral campaigns, 35 percent of respondents attended campaign events in which politicians distributed presents to participants.[59] Poorer respondents attended more of these events than wealthier ones and were more likely to say that their main reason for doing so was to receive candidates' gifts.[60] As a focus group participant in Piura explained, providing material incentives in exchange for poor voters' participation at rallies makes sense because most of them are uninterested in politics and otherwise would not attend or listen to candidates' messages:

> When you ask if the politician distributes goods in order to attract people or to assure votes: definitively not to assure a vote. What happens is that bringing these [gifts] is the best option a candidate has, because this is the communication between the politician and the people. He wants to assure that the people listen to his message or project […] He could do it in the media but not everybody listens.[61]

Similarly, another participant at the focus group in Piura acknowledged:

> It is not a good way to campaign […] But, what would have happened if you did not bring your sodas? [Everybody laughs] See, even you think in the same way, you realize. … [More laughs] Because "a full stomach makes one a happy camper."[62] If you come to present a project here, nobody attends … and those who attend [think] "I have already heard that…" and they leave. If you ask for more sandwiches and drinks, we can continue discussing … [Laughs].[63]

Politicians have to provide goods at campaign events because others do so and clients expect it. There is a reinforcing mechanism triggered by competition. As a

candidate who claimed to be ideologically opposed to this practice confessed, "you cannot campaign otherwise ... they wipe you out."[64] Thus, for example, candidates distribute private goods as a sort of condition for accessing regular meetings of local associations, such as peasant communities and soup-kitchen organizations, to introduce themselves and lobby for participants' support. Providing these goods is the "price of admission." In addition to disbursing handouts, candidates also make and sign commitments to, if elected, give collective benefits to communities and associations that supported them during their campaigns.

Without partisan identification or patrons who monitor them, campaign clients are opportunistic. They go to multiple rallies and accept goods from different candidates. Some of them even intentionally start "collecting" t-shirts and other supplies from different groupings.[65] Politicians often complain about this opportunism because frequently the same dirigentes who help them organize one candidate's visit do the same for others. As one focus group participant in Cusco acknowledged:

> [The candidates] always come, and we have to wear the t-shirt they give away and wait for them during the campaign. For example, San Román arrived to Chacabamba with journalists, so they gathered us there to amass a crowd, and they made us cheer in groups "San Román! San Román!" Afterwards Coco Acurio came. Similarly, first we changed t-shirts, and we started cheering because he brought presents such as pencils and erasers, and we also demanded modern irrigation and a health center. He answered "Yes, I will do it, this mill will become the leading one, I personally will be in charge of its implementation." [...] Given that they distributed many gifts, we started cheering "Coco for president! Coco for president!" as we had done with San Román, and they filmed us and the journalists interviewed us.[66]

Attracting poor voters and accessing poor constituencies is important for candidates. However, the most important reason why politicians distribute goods at campaign events is to signal their electoral viability. As one participant at a focus group in Piura explained,

> Definitively, these gifts have taken place only for assuring attendance, to assemble people for the picture [...] goods were handed out as a hook, so everybody will get there.[67]

Results from a nationally representative survey confirm this citizen's intuitions and the causal mechanism highlighted by my theory (Table 4).Voters mentioned the number of attendees at campaign events as one of the two main cues they use to assess candidates' electoral potential in municipal elections. Voters even take the amount of goods distributed at such rallies as an indicator of electoral viability. The only informational cue that trumps campaign mobilization is the candidate's appearance in the media. Media coverage, however, is partly dependent on large rallies. Notice also the relatively low number of respondents who depend on polls to assess electoral viability.

Table 4

How do you know that a candidate in a district municipality will likely win the election? (First Choice)	**Freq.**	**%**
The candidate appears in the media	457	39
The amount of people mobilized at campaign events	246	21
Lots of propaganda	132	11
Polls' results	155	13
The amount of presents distributed	138	12
Other	40	3
Total	1168	100.0

Source: IOP 2012.

Candidates are quite aware that strong attendance at rallies is important, and they are terrified that only a few people will show up. A party activist in Puno complained, "One has to pay five soles to tricycle drivers so they crowd the plaza. If not, it looks empty, and we are going to be criticized."[68] Indeed, nothing is worse for a politician's campaign than an ill-attended rally (*una plaza vacía*). As one former mayor explained to me:

> The rally was pretty important. I was terrified but it is a tradition: the entire town is expecting the best rally. [...] You hand out gas vouchers to assure taxis and motorcycle-taxies participate in your parade. How many vehicles you gather measures your candidate's "success." You organize a caravan with badges and crowd the plaza. You hire a band. I was able to gather a block of people 50 meters wide and 200 meters deep. It was a total success ...[69]

In most of the cases, candidates are not directly controlling the use of clientelistic tactics during campaigns. Instead, *movilizadores,* operadores in charge of organization and street-propaganda activities, are usually responsible for deciding when and how to employ clientelistic strategies in campaigns. As a former mayor of Carabayllo explains, "operadores get paid during campaigns: a certain amount for a rally, a certain amount for painting propaganda. ... They summon you an audience."[70] One journalist has described just how crucial these operadores are for campaigns: "There's a key character in every campaign who is not the presidential candidate: the movilizador. His job is a sort of "mandatory political service," which consists of crowding plazas for speeches."[71]

Operadores master a series of techniques to literally count heads and thus measure the relative success of the event and compare it with those of their opponents. For instance, operadores will place four individuals per meter square and estimate attendance by multiplying the square meters occupied by the rally by four.[72] Similarly, these operadores divide the rally space by district of origin, so they can count how many persons each local base mobilized.[73] The operadores organize rally participants in order to ensure the crowd looks large in media images. The most pragmatic

and systematic enactment of campaign clientelism occurred in Peru during Fujimori's government. These years saw the institutionalization of *portátiles*, portable support groups of poor people mobilized to show public support for a politician in exchange for material rewards. Portátiles spread as one way to conduct politics without organized parties.

Politicians are aware of the volatility of electoral preferences in Peru and consciously use campaign clientelism in order to influence electoral preferences throughout the campaign. During initial stages of the race, crowded campaign events can be crucial in prompting surges in vote intention. For example, one operador interviewed in Piura explained how he generated name recognition for his candidate, a young individual with no political trajectory, by organizing a bingo event with cash prizes during the candidate's first political rally. This operador went house to house handing out bingo cards without telling individuals that he was distributing them for free. The card said that it cost two soles. When around 6,000 people showed up at the first bingo/rally, many participants and political contenders were surprised as they assumed that attendants had actually bought their cards, showing the popularity of the candidate. This operador organized three other events with similar numbers and made a previously unknown candidate widely recognized. He described these practices as an innovation in political marketing.[74]

Because individuals judge a candidate's strength in part by the attendance at campaign events, continued "investment" in campaign clientelism is crucial. In one focus group in Piura, I asked why politicians distributed goods if they could not be sure that the recipients would vote for them. "They get a pay-off, psychologically," a female focus group participant responded. "Because the psychology is where there are lots of people, voters say: 'We have to vote for that candidate.' If they see more cars: 'Oh! She is going to win! Give your vote to her'".[75]

High turnout at rallies also signals candidates' viability to strategic donors. Contributors want to make sure that their investments yield returns, so they try to support the candidates most likely to win. As the campaign advances, local businesses will support the strongest candidates, usually betting on the two or three front runners. Once a candidate achieves momentum, donors will "swarm like flies," as a candidate explained me:

> The principle is: people are going to join whom they believe will win. Then this becomes a snowball. Even contributions are made following this principle. Contributors realize that it is going this way, and they decide to provide more [funds to a front-running candidate].[76]

In turn, voters judge the prospects of candidates by the amount of money they spend displaying propaganda and distributing goods. As a participant in a focus group in Cusco explains:

> People say that candidates who distribute fewer presents do not have enough budget, that they are not being supported. And about those candidates that give away a lot, [they say] that they have many persons who are financially supporting them.[77]

Similarly, in a focus group in Piura, a female participant argued that, "The candidate who gets more money wins because she thrusts the campaign into voters' eyes everywhere: the radio, television, newspapers, houses…"[78]

Turnout at campaign activities also signals to benefit-seeking activists and strategic voters which candidates are in the lead. Activists, including hired brokers, will frequently abandon candidates who do not surge and instead offer their services to the front-runners. Thus, during the last weeks of a campaign, candidates who are in the pool of contenders begin receiving countless volunteers in their headquarters. For instance, the leading movement in Piura's regional elections had to improvise and open two alternative headquarters to accommodate this sudden burst of volunteers. "Older" activists viewed the newcomers with distrust and regarded them as opportunistic.[79]

Consequently, turnout at the campaign events of viable contenders typically comes to a crescendo toward the end of the campaign. Final rallies are particularly important since they represent the last piece of information voters receive to judge the viability of a candidate before casting their votes.[80] According to one political operator in Cusco:

> The election is decided, basically, during the last week. During the last two weeks people say "this one," "no, this one." What does that depend on? On the amount of masses you can mobilize. On the quantity of propaganda you can display. […] Not to organize a final rally would be the greatest political suicide ever because the media would say "this party organized a rally with approximately 2,000 persons, this other one with 500, that with 200." […] Whoever organizes the best final rally wins.[81]

A female participant in a focus group in rural Cusco described the final rallies and their importance in similar terms:

> For the campaign finale each party organizes a feast. They hire a band, the candidates walk around the plaza […] they prepare grills, fried chicken, *chicha*, and arrive carrying the food and drinks as it if were a *cargo* feast. Then the bands play and people dance, they party, and they join the candidate who has more people thinking that he is going to win.

Thus, more goods are distributed as the election day approaches. On election day candidates send trucks to pick up voters from peasant communities and villages, particularly in small rural towns with no media coverage. They openly distribute food, alcohol, and even cash (inside of match boxes). But even in these apparently direct vote-buying attempts there are some very interesting bidding dynamics among front runners who are trying to signal electoral strength to voters. According to one female focus group participant in Cusco:

> Because there are a lot of vehicles, people are wandering around the cars. It is there where the *compañeros* ask them to climb in and give them a matchbox [with money inside]. Then, seeing this, a lot of people struggle to get into a car and as a lot of people gather, they start saying "this party is going to win." And given that in other politicians' cars they do not pay, only two or three persons climb in …[82]

Similarly, an APRA militant in Piura noted that:

> On election day there is a contest about who brings more people to turnout at the polls. The candidates [...] take people to houses where there is food and alcohol. Where you find the best food, the candidate is the strongest.

In conclusion, my evidence shows that electoral clientelism is widespread in Peru not only in the absence of political organization, but, in many ways, because of this absence. It is this lack of organization that allows for the tremendous fluidity and openness of electoral contests, which, in turn, enable candidates to rise through "bought" turnout, and then also force them to continue buying turnout in order not to quickly fall again. Distributing resources is thus a rational solution to the challenges of campaigning without machines, because it helps politicians campaign and signal their electoral viability to strategic actors.

Conclusion

This article began by pointing out the theoretical limitations of conventional approaches to electoral clientelism. Subsequently, I developed an informational approach that provides a more comprehensive explanation by revealing the logic of electoral clientelism even in settings where politicians have low organizational resources. My argument highlights the unfolding dynamics of the campaign itself and stresses the indirect effects of early investments in clientelism. Evidence from Peru supports the informational theory's expectations about how and why campaign clientelism takes place.

My research reaffirms the doubts about the generalizability of conventional approaches to less organized settings. Political organization does not seem to be a requirement for electoral clientelism. The overlooked tactic of campaign clientelism requires little organizational capacity, but profoundly influences the electoral behavior of political actors. Overemphasizing the importance of monitoring and organizational capabilities more generally, therefore, impedes us from fully grasping the political logic of electoral clientelism, particularly for settings in which politics is in flux.

Furthermore, my informational approach complements conventional studies of clientelism in organized contexts. Turnout buying at campaign events also takes place in these contexts: permanent clients (the machine) constitute the canvassing structure that allows politicians to demonstrate their strength.[83] Where strong machines exist, turnout at rallies is indicative of the incumbent's power and creates a public image of invincibility that undermines support for opposition candidates.[84] In addition, my informational theory helps explain an earlier stage in the electoral campaign in these organized settings, namely the competition among various pre-candidates within the machine. Attempts to buy votes or turnout at polls are additional

clientelistic tactics that try to ensure that machine clients continue supporting their patrons at the ballot.

Indeed, campaign clientelism is endemic in Latin America in both organized and unorganized settings. In Mexico and Ecuador, for instance, the term *acarreados* denotes the equivalent of the Peruvian portátil. In Argentina, turnout buying at rallies is a strategy commonly used by *punteros* from the Peronist Party to mobilize not just permanent clients, but also unaffiliated political voters.[85]

A proper understanding of electoral clientelism thus requires assessing informational and vote-buying dynamics. The informational approach implies broadening the time frame of the analysis to the full length of the campaign in order to understand the logic of these seemingly irrational political practices. It also takes competition in campaigns seriously rather than assuming that a single dominant incumbent buys votes or turnout. Campaign clientelism is a strategy of mobilization accessible to most candidates, not just to powerful incumbents.

Furthermore, this informational theory provides a potential explanation for the proliferation of electoral clientelism in competitive regimes beyond Latin America where parties are weak, un-tethered to society, or nonexistent. In particular, the availability of these organizational substitutes may explain why parties are slow to institutionalize in such contexts. For instance, in countries like Kenya, Malawi, or Zambia, candidates may opt to invest in campaign clientelism instead of engaging in party building.[86]

Three broader conclusions emerge from my findings. First, future research on electoral clientelism should take qualitative methods more seriously. While survey research and experimental designs have made important contributions to the study of such an elusive phenomenon, many of these results cannot be adequately interpreted in the absence of in-depth knowledge of the political setting. In particular, much more attention should be given to studying the clients' point of view.[87]

Second, my theory provides an explanation as to why street campaigning did not vanish with the advent of mass media. As in the past, when candidates had to mobilize partisans and sympathizers to the *plazas* to demonstrate electoral strength, my research confirms that visual demonstrations of power still matter. In low information settings, head counting is still a powerful cue to assess power and electoral viability. Moreover, my informational theory contends that street politics and media politics complement each other as the media can amplify the effects of turnout buying. Through campaign clientelism, political marketing meets street politics.

Finally, if electoral clientelism works as the informational theory predicts, it may be less problematic for democratic accountability than some scholars have suggested.[88] In contexts lacking solid political organizations, citizens sell their participation in campaign events, but decide whether to support the buyer with their vote according to their preferences. Indeed, citizens portray themselves as pragmatic voters and not frightened and submissive clients. Thus, although campaign clientelism still raises normative concerns—voters can get misled when public perceptions of electoral prospects are manipulated by turnout buyers—clients are not passive citizens subject to perverse accountability.

NOTES

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1. In contrast to long-term clientelistic relations ("relational clientelism"), electoral clientelism involves short-term exchanges in which benefits are distributed to clients before voting. Simeon Nichter, *Politics and Poverty: Electoral Clientelism in Latin America*, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California, 2010).
2. Interview, Puno, June 12, 2010.
3. Political advisor to Cusco's mayor, May 17, 2010.
4. Fujimorist, Cusco, September 6, 2010.
5. See, for example, Herbert Kitschelt, "Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities," *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (August/September 2000), 845–79, 849–50; Valeria Brusco, Marcelo Nazareno and Susan Stokes, "Vote Buying in Argentina," *Latin American Research Review*, 39 (April 2004), 66–88, 85; Susan Stokes, "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," *The American Political Science Review*, 99 (August 2005), 315–25, 317; Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, "Citizen-politician Linkages: An Introduction," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),1–49, 8–9, 17; Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, and Federico Estévez,"Clientelism and Portafolio Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 182–205, 185.
6. Steven Levitsky and Max Cameron, "Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru," *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45 (September 2003), 1–33; Martín Tanaka, *Democracia Sin Partidos* (Lima: IEP, 2005); Steven Levitsky, "Peru: Challenges of a Democracy without Parties", in Michael Shifter and Jorge Dominguez, 4th ed., *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* (JHU Press, 2013).
7. Eric Kramon, "Vote Buying and the Credibility of Clientelistic Appeals Experimental Evidence from Kenya," Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2011; Mariela Szwarcberg, Making Local Democracy: Political Machines, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Chicago, 2009) and "Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina," Comparative Politics, 45 (October 2012), 88–106.
8. Larry Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
9. Robert Moser, *Unexpected Outcomes* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).
10. Javier Auyero, *Poor People's Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).
11. The semi-structured interviews included questions about the level of political organization at the local level, how campaigns are conducted, and to what extent and why do politicians distribute goods, among other topics. Focus groups included questions about how campaigns are conducted in the participants' neighborhoods, the frequency and ways in which presents are distributed, why politicians distribute goods during campaigns, perceptions about this practice and its influence over poor voters' behavior.
12. For instance, James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1142–58; Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Simona Piattoni, ed., *Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Herbert Kitschelt, "The Demise of Clientelism in Affluent Capitalist Democracies," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 298–321.
13. Stokes; Nichter; Federico Finan and Laura Schechter, "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity," 2009, BREAD Working Paper, No. 214, available at http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/working/214; Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Federico Estévez, and Beatriz Magaloni, "Strategies of Vote Buying: Democracy, Clientelism and Poverty Relief in Mexico," Book manuscript, June 12, 2012, available at http://web.stanford.edu/~magaloni/dox/2012strategiesvotebuying.pdf.
14. For instance, see Stokes.
15. Ethan Scheiner, "Clientelism in Japan," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 276–97, 279.
16. Auyero; Stokes, 318; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 8; Díaz-Cayeros et al., 27.

17. Brusco et al.; Kanchan Chandra, "Counting Heads: a Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 84–109; Stokes; Kitschelt and Wilkinson; Magaloni et al.

18. Stokes.

19. Stokes; Kitschelt and Wilkinson; Chandra, 90.

20. Stokes; Kitschelt and Wilkinson.

21. Brusco et al.; Stokes; Kitschelt and Wilkinson; Magaloni et al.

22. Anirudh Krishna, "Politics in the Middle: Mediating Relationships Between the Citizens and the State in Rural North India," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 141–58.; Simeon Nichter, "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," *American Political Science Review*, 102 (February 2008); Eric Kramon, "Vote Buying and the Credibility of Clientelistic Appeals Experimental Evidence from Kenya," Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2011; Rodrigo Zarazaga, "Vote-buying and Asymmetric Information: A Model with Applications to Argentina," Paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA , 2011.

23. Kitschelt and Wilkinson; Scheiner.

24. Jac Heckelman, "Bribing Voters Without Verification," *The Social Science Journal*, 35 (1998), 435–43; Nichter, 2008; Frederic Schaffer and Andreas Schedler, "What Is Vote Buying?" in Frederic C. Schaffer, ed., *Elections for Sale* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 17–30, 25.

25. Finan and Schechter; Chappell Lawson and Kenneth Greene, "Reciprocity and Self-Enforcing Clientelism," Unpublished manuscript, November 2010.

26. Finan and Schechter, 6.

27. Auyero; Ernesto Calvo and María-Victoria Murillo, "When Parties Meet Voters: Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile," Paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Phoenix, AZ, 2008; Zarazaga.

28. Nicolas van de Walle, "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 50–67; Krishna; Kramon.

29. For example, Brusco et al.; Stokes; Nichter; Magaloni et al.; Díaz-Cayeros et al.; Lawson and Greene.

30. For example, Stokes; Frederic Schaffer, ed., *Elections for Sale* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007); Shaffer and Schedler.

31. Nichter, 2010, 25.

32. Heckelman; Nichter. An exception to this literature is Szwarcberg, who analyzes turnout buying at rallies: Mariela Szwarcberg, *Making Local Democracy: Political Machines, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina*, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Chicago, 2009) and "Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina," *Comparative Politics*, 45 (October 2012), 88–106.

33. Kramon.

34. Kramon, 10.

35. Mariela Szwarcberg,"Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America," *Party Politics* (March 2012), 1–18.

36. Szwarcberg, "Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America."

37. Szwarcberg,"Political Parties and Rallies in Latin America," 6.

38. Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 79.

39. Robert Moser and Ethan Scheiner, "Strategic Voting in Established and New Democracies," *Electoral Studies*, 28 (March 2009),51–61, 53.

40. Ignacio Lago, "Rational Expectations or Heuristics?" *Party Politics*, 14 (January 2008), 31–49.

41. Richard McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook, "Elections with Limited Information," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 36 (June 1985), 55–85.

42. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 15.

43. For instance, a typical legislative candidate in an urban area of Taiwan distributes up to 3 million USD in cash. Frederic Schaffer, "Why Study Vote Buying?" in Schaffer, ed., 1–30.

44. Szwarcberg, "Making Local Democracy," 14.

45. Bartels, 32–35.

46. Paula Muñoz, *Campaign Clientelism in Peru: An Informational Theory*, Ph.D. Dissertation (The University of Texas at Austin, 2013).

47. Carol Graham, *Peru's APRA* (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992).

48. Susan C. Stokes, *Cultures in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

49. Other partisan clientelistic linkages broke down with the collapse of the party system.

50. Jelke Boesten, *Intersecting Inequalities* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); Stéphanie Rousseau, *Women's Citizenship in Peru* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
51. Catherine M. Conaghan, *Fujimori's Peru* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 164–66.
52. Levitsky and Cameron; Tanaka; Levitsky.
53. Certainly, an electoral system that favors campaigning based on personal traits incentivizes candidates to display clientelistic strategies.
54. Within each electoral district, the distribution of voters in booths in Peru is organized according to the date the Identity Card was issued or revalidated. For this reason, voters living within the same house usually end up voting in different schools and, within them, in different booths. This makes it impossible to know how different neighborhoods or communities voted within a district and thus to engage in group monitoring.
55. Focus Group, Females, Asentamiento Humano El Indio, Piura, July 10, 2011.
56. Regression analyses not reported confirm these bivariate findings.
57. Instituto de Opinión Pública - Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú (IOP-PUCP), Run-Off Post-Electoral Survey, June–July, 2011.
58. Interview, Piura, November 23, 2010.
59. Instituto de Opinión Pública - Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú (IOP-PUCP), Political Representation and Conflict Survey, 2012.
60. The other options in this closed question were: to get to know the candidate and/or her proposals; to receive what they were distributing and listen to the candidate's proposals; to show my support for that candidate.
61. Focus Group, Males, Asentamiento Humano Los Polvorines, Piura, July 11, 2011.
62. Translation of the Spanish saying "barrigallena, corazón contento."
63. Focus Group, Males, Asentamiento Humano Los Polvorines, Piura, July 11, 2011.
64. Interview, Piura, July 21, 2010.
65. Focus groups, Males, rural Cusco, August 15, 2011, and Females, Asentamiento Humano El Indio Piura, July 10, 2011.
66. Focus Group, Males, rural Cusco, August 18, 2011.
67. Focus Group, Males, Asentamiento Humano Los Polvorines, Piura, July 11, 2011.
68. Interview, Fujimorismo militant, Puno, June 10, 2010.
69. Interview with former mayor of Oxapampa-Junín, Lima, October 10, 2009.
70. Interview, Lima, March 2, 2010.
71. "Los hombres de la portátil," *La República*, Apr. 2, 2006.
72. Interview, operador, *Unidos Construyendo*, Piura, July 23, 2010.
73. This allows operadores to assess how well the candidate is doing in different neighborhoods or districts. It is thus a sort of political thermometer.
74. Interview, Piura, July 21, 2010.
75. Focus Group, Females, Asentamiento Humano Indio, Piura, July 10, 2011.
76. *Unidos Construyendo* candidate, Piura, July 11, 2011.
77. Focus group, Females, Sucsu-Auccaylle Community, Cusco, September 4, 2011.
78. Focus Group, Females, Asentamiento Humano El Indio, Piura, July 10, 2011.
79. Observation notes and interviews with Unidos Construyendo's activists, October 2 and November 31, 2010.
80. In Peru, electoral laws prohibit the reporting of poll results during the last week of the campaign as well as any sort of political propaganda or rallies three days before the election day. Thus, the final rally is the last legal campaign activity allowed.
81. Cusco, August 31, 2010.
82. Focus group, Females, rural Cusco, August 15, 2011.
83. Raymond Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts," *The Journal of Politics*, 34 (May 1972), 365–98.
84. Szwarcberg, "Political Parties and Rallies" and Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy* (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9.
85. Szwarcberg, "Making Local Democracy," 137–38.
86. See, for example, Kramon on Kenya and Richard Banégas, "Clientelismo Electoral y Subjetivación Política en África," *Desacatos*, 36 (May-August 2011), 33–48, on Benin.
87. Auyero.
88. Stokes.