12

How Election Timing Matters in Presidential Democracy – And How It Does Not

In Chapter 11, we saw that the effective number of presidential candidates (N_P) has a logical connection to effective number of vote-earning parties in the assembly (N_V). Based on previously established relationships, that means N_P also is connected to the effective number of seat-winning parties (N_S) and from there all the way back to the Seat Product. Nonetheless, the ranges around the predicted values of N_V and N_S are wider in presidential countries. Could one reason be that N_V and N_S are affected by the typical cycle of presidential popularity? This is certainly what classic notions of presidential "coattails" would imply – presidents, when popular, help their parties. Yet the Seat Product Model sees party-system outcomes as derived from institutions. Where can presidents (and presidential candidates) and their typical cycles of popularity fit in?

Presidents are elected on new hopes and tend to enjoy a "honeymoon period." If assembly elections take place during the honeymoon, then the president's party, often the largest, receives an extra boost in votes and seats. These hopes often go sour, so that presidents frequently end their term less popular than in the beginning. Shugart and Carey (1992) called the late part of the term the *counter-honeymoon.* If new assembly elections take place during the counter-honeymoon, then the president's party could suffer, and an unusually small presidential party may result in the effective number of parties being above the normal. If so, then the range of fluctuation in N_V and N_S could widen, compared to parliamentary systems. We will now test this hunch for the effective number of parties in assembly politics (both N_S and N_V).

Figure 12.1 shows how the timing of an assembly election relative to the presidential election affects the accuracy of the Seat Product Model. The vertical axis is the ratio of a given election's observed effective number of parties to the value predicted given its Seat Product (MS). The left panel is for N_S, while the right panel is for N_V. In both panels, the horizontal axis is something we call Elapsed time (E), defined as the share of the total time between presidential elections that has elapsed when the assembly election is held. If the elections occur on the same day, i.e., concurrent, E=0. The closer the assembly election



FIGURE 12.1 The effect of elapsed time between presidential elections on the ratio of observed effective number of parties to predicted value; seats (N_S, left panel) and votes (N_V, right panel)

date is to the *next* presidential election (but still before it), the more E approaches 1.0. As in Chapter 11, different symbols differentiate pure presidential from semipresidential systems; in the panel for N_V there is a further differentiation, using light gray x symbols, of the concurrent elections (all of which are pure presidential). The reasons for such differentiation – and for showing it only in the panel for N_V – will be explained later.

In both panels of Figure 12.1, curves show the estimated values from a regression in which the ratio of observed to predicted effective number is the output variable, and E is the input. More specifically, we enter E in quadratic form, i.e., E and its square. The reason for this formulation will become clear later in the chapter; the regression output is in the chapter appendix.[1] The dashed curves show the 95 percent confidence intervals of the regression.

The data and regression plots show a few things of interest to us in this chapter. First of all, through much of the range of a presidential term, an assembly election results in a value of either N_S or N_V that tends to be close to the SPM prediction. This can be seen by following the position of the horizontal line plotted for a ratio of 1.00, and whether this is within the regression's

[1] Concurrent elections are included in both regressions; details are in the appendix.

95 percent confidence intervals or not. Usually it is, and this justifies our repeated claim that *the SPM remains our best guess* for what either N_S or N_V will be in a presidential democracy, in the absence of other information. However, we sometimes have other information, and it is a further institutional variation, as shown in Figure 12.1: the elapsed time between presidential elections when the assembly election occurs.

Both panels show a "smiley" pattern, whereby the regression estimate dips near the midterm, and rises at either end. The upturn in the ratio, where observed N is higher than the SPM prediction, takes us significantly above 1.0 near the end of the president's term, especially in the case of N_V. The upturn in the honeymoon (low nonzero values of E) is just barely significant for N_V, but not at all for N_S. The concurrent elections are shown with a different symbol in the N_V plot and the regression lines are visually cut short of E=0 in order to emphasize that there is a break in the pattern for very early honeymoon elections, as distinct from concurrent elections, in the case of N_V. On the other hand, for N_S, there is no such distinction: statistically and visually, early honeymoon and concurrent elections are just as likely to have values of N_S that are statistically indistinguishable from the Seat Product prediction, on average.[2]

The most striking result demonstrated by these graphs is that it is the greatest values of E at which N_V (and less so, N_S) increases most, relative to the SPM. Thus it is during the counter-honeymoon, which we might define as E>0.75, that we are most likely to see inflated values of N_V. Why might this be? And how does this result call into question more common ways of understanding the impact of timing of elections on party systems in presidential systems? These will be the topics of the remainder of this chapter.

HOW THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY'S LUCK CHANGES OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM

In the preceding section, we surmised that the observed variation in how well the Seat Product Model predicts the effective number of parties (votes or seats) is driven by relative boost and bust of the presidential party as the presidential term unfolds. This can be tested more directly.

Consider a quantity called the Presidential Vote Ratio (R_P), defined as the vote share of the president's party divided by the president's own vote share. We use the vote share of the president elected at the same time as the assembly, if

[2] The mean ratios observed for concurrent elections are 0.943 for N_S and 1.02 for N_V. For all nonconcurrent elections with E<0.4, the ratios are, respectively, 1.053 and 1.274; the difference for N_S is not significant (p=.187), while the difference for N_V is (p=.025). If we use earlier cutoffs on the set of "honeymoon" elections with which to compare to concurrent (e.g., 0.33 or 0.25), the pattern remains the same but the number of honeymoon elections in the comparison set becomes very small.



FIGURE 12.2 Relationship of elapsed time (E) between presidential elections on the presidential vote ratio (R_P)

elections are concurrent (E=0), or the incumbent president for nonconcurrent elections (i.e., any $0<E<1$).

This ratio, R_P, is plotted against elapsed time in the president's term (E) in Figure 12.2. It shows a strong relationship. In the case of concurrent elections, plotted with light gray 'x' symbols, the tendency is for $R_P<1$. The observed mean when elections are concurrent is R_P=0.908, with a 95 percent confidence ratio of 0.876 to 0.940. In other words, leading presidential candidates tend to be more popular than their parties when elections are concurrent. Indeed, we can see a relative few data points above the line at R_P=1, in contrast to the large cluster of points just below this line.

The regression trend line, shown as a dark gray diagonal, is for nonconcurrent elections only. It shows a clear break in the pattern. That is, there is no continuous effect of timing on R_P from concurrent to early honeymoon elections; in fact, there is a sharp jump. If the assembly election is held after the winner of the presidency is known, we tend to have R_P >1 (even though a few individual elections defy the trend). The purely empirical regression result for nonconcurrent elections is:

$$R_P = 1.20\text{–}0.725E. \tag{12.1}$$

To illustrate the effect, let us suppose that an assembly election is held one month following the election of a president to a five-year (sixty-month) term, for which E=0.0167. This is approximately the case in France, where a honeymoon electoral cycle has had a powerful effect on presidential support in the assembly (Dupoirier and Sauger 2010) since it was adopted in 2002 (Samuels and Shugart 2010: 175-179). From Equation 12.1, if E=0.0167, we expect R_P=1.188. If a hypothetical president had been elected with 35 percent of the (first-round) vote, we expect the president's party to win around 41.6 percent of the vote, on average, in this honeymoon election. Now suppose the election is at this same president's midterm (E=0.5). We expect R_P=0.8375, which for our president who received 35 percent of the vote would translate into only 29.3 percent for the party. The midterm penalty, well known from most US presidential terms, is a real, generalizable phenomenon.[3]

Finally, suppose there is a counter-honeymoon election, again with our hypothetical president who won 35 percent of the vote. If E=.75, we get an estimated R_P=0.656, which would imply only 23.0 percent of the assembly vote for the presidential party. The party tends to perform substantially worse relative to the president's own vote share, the later the election is held. As we see in Figure 12.2, this is not just a broad regression trend; every data point at $E \geq 0.75$ is below the line, R_P=1. Moreover, there is no different pattern for pure and semipresidential systems. Across regimes with politically significant presidents (as defined in the appendix to Chapter 11), the impact of the timing of elections is an important factor in affecting the fate of the presidential party.

The timing of elections, or what Shugart (1995) referred to as the electoral cycle, is not generally considered part of the electoral system. However, we have seen in both Figures 12.1 and 12.2 that the timing matters for the effective number of parties, and for the performance of the president's own party. It is not that such an effect has gone unnoticed. Rather, it is the way in which it has been treated that deserves a corrective. In standard works since Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) and Cox (1997), the concept of relative timing has been examined through a very different variable, called *proximity*. This variable is held to affect how much the effective number of presidential candidates (N_P), entered in many common works as an input variable, impacts N_V. Already in Chapter 11, we showed that a different way of conceptualizing how N_P and N_V are related held promise, even allowing us to offer a model of the impact of the assembly electoral system on N_P (Equation 11.1). Now we turn to an analysis of how presidential votes constellations are related to those for assembly votes, with a specific focus on the counter-honeymoon elections.

[3] Due to the many US elections at E=0.5, it might be worth knowing if the overall effect depicted is substantially different without the US data points. It is not; dropping all US elections, we get R_P=1.17 – 0.703E. The difference is trivial.

Near the end of the chapter we offer a discussion of our conception of elapsed time, E, in contrast to the notion of *proximity* found in standard approaches.

Counter-Honeymoon Elections and the Relationship of N_P and N_V

We expect assembly elections that occur very late in a presidential term to experience greater fragmentation of the assembly party system. Our reasoning is that, as the next presidential election approaches, parties are jockeying for advantage in potential executive coalitions for the next term.[4] The counter-honeymoon logic is that parties that may later join forces behind a joint presidential candidacy emphasize their vote-earning potential in an assembly election that is no longer shaped by the now-distant prior presidential election.

The counter-honeymoon assembly election thus functions as almost a "primary" (Shugart and Carey 1992) in which the parties prepare the ground for launching or endorsing presidential candidates in an election that is coming up soon after. The implication is that it is those elections latest in a presidential term that should have the greatest ratio of N_V/N_P, where N_P is the effective number of presidential candidates when the sitting president was elected.

We explore this idea in Figure 12.3. This graph returns to the theme of Figure 11.2 in Chapter 11, where we compared N_P to N_V. The difference is that, instead of putting the two effective numbers on distinct axes, we now plot their ratio on the vertical axis and plot elapsed time, E, on the horizontal. This format allows us to see if an especially high N_V, relative to N_P, tends to occur in counter-honeymoon elections. We should expect such a high ratio if we are correct that the counter-honeymoon serves as a de facto primary in which multiple parties compete for the assembly, but many of them abstain from presenting their own candidate for the presidential contest.

The pattern is exactly as expected.[5] The plotted regression output (with its 95 percent confidence intervals) shows a sharp uptick on the ratio, N_V/N_P, when assembly elections are later than the midterm of the president. For the entire first half of time between presidential elections, the ratio is not significantly different from 1.0,[6] even though the estimated curve is similar to

[4] The logic articulated here is similar to that in Shugart and Carey (1992: 264–265), where the counter-honeymoon format is depicted as "quasi-parliamentary" because of "the primacy of the assembly elections and the parties represented in the assembly."

[5] Notwithstanding some anomalously high ratios in concurrent elections. All cases of $N_V/N_P>2.5$ come from Brazil, whose patterns of N_V and N_P were discussed in Chapter 11.

[6] Despite our expressed reservations about using a future event in our estimations, perhaps some readers might wonder what would happen if we used N_P in the *next* election instead of the prior one. The answer is that it matters not at all. Regression results or a data plot would be almost identical. Thus the pattern of high N_V/N_P ratio in counter-honeymoon elections is not a result of unusually low N_P in earlier elections in our sample. It is a feature of the counter-honeymoon timing. Furthermore, it is not likely that counter-honeymoon elections tend to exhibit a sort of



FIGURE 12.3 Effect of *Elapsed time* (E) on the ratio of the effective number of vote-earning assembly parties (N_V) to the effective number of presidential candidates (N_P)

the "smiley" pattern that we saw in Figure 12.1. For the regression output, see the chapter appendix.

The various patterns shown in this chapter suggest that for cases of concurrent or early-term elections and up till around midterm, the Seat Product Model is as accurate, on average, for presidential systems as it is for parliamentary. However, counter-honeymoon elections are different. They tend to feature higher than expected N_V (and to a lesser extent, N_S), and significantly higher ratio of N_P to N_V. The pattern likely results from parties' being relatively less concerned with the balance of partisan forces in the assembly than in demonstrating their strength for the upcoming presidential contest, when the latter will come shortly after an assembly election. Thus the counter-honeymoon pattern lessens the constraints of the Seat Product, as parties prepare to make their case to the electorate for the upcoming presidential contest.

THE NOTION OF "PROXIMITY"

What is counter-honeymoon for one presidential period is of course preparatory stage for the next period. While parties and voters usually

anticipatory coattail effect of the main contenders in the upcoming presidential election, as suggested by Stoll (2015). If this were the case, we might expect the N_V/N_P ratio to decline in the counter-honeymoon, because assembly voting would be dominated by the parties of the known leading contenders.

TABLE 12.1 *Asymmetry between assembly elections in late counter-honeymoon and early honeymoon*

	E=0.75	**E=0.25**	**Difference**	**E=0.99**	**E=0.01**	**Difference**
Act. N_S/Exp. N_S (Fig. 12.1)	1.12	0.85	0.27	1.47	0.94	0.53
Act. N_V/Exp. N_V (Fig. 12.1)	1.30	1.10	0.20	1.89	1.48	0.41
N_V/N_P (Fig. 12.4)	1.67	1.07	0.60	2.50	1.34	1.16

know the date of election, they do not know the outcome of the election to come, and this affects their decisions. Assembly elections in late counter-honeymoon – and, to a lesser degree, in the early honeymoon – lead to a larger effective number of parties than near midterm (or at concurrent elections). Thus a sort of a peak appears at elapsed time E=1 of the first period (which is E=0 for the next). At first glance this peak may look symmetric, which might be an appealing simplification. But at a closer look symmetry does not hold up.

As shown in Table 12.1, the quadratic fits in the onset of counter-honeymoon (E=0.75) are higher than in the end of honeymoon (E=0.25) for N_S and N_V (both normalized with respect to values expected from the *MS* model), as well as for N_V normalized with respect to N_P (see Figures 12.1 and 12.3). The contrast is boosted when we compare the quadratic fit extrapolations to immediately before and immediately after presidential elections (E=0.99 and E=0.01).

The existence of asymmetry makes sense, because the information available differs x months before and x months after the election. At both times the *date* of elections is known, leading to increased effective number of parties, compared to the quieter midterm. This accounts for the existence of the peak. But before the presidential election, parties and voters do not know its *outcome* – and maybe do not even know who might run. After the election they know who was elected president, with what percent of votes. Thus they behave in a different way in assembly elections before and after presidential election. This accounts for the asymmetry of the peak around the presidential election.

Why belabor what is so obvious? The future rarely is a mirror image of the past. We are compelled to do so because in the study of elections in presidential democracies a concept of "proximity" has emerged under which, indeed, x months before and x months after the presidential elections party system characteristics are supposed to be identical. This concept starts by correctly observing a peak in the number of parties around the time of presidential election, but then overdoes it by incorrectly assuming that the peak is symmetric, so that one can take the average of data x months before and x months after the election. This focus on mere "proximity" to presidential election (be it before or after) would correspond to presuming that all the differences shown in Table 12.1 are zero This conflation of "before" and "after" blurs data and hence limits predictive power. We consider it less than useful.

Yet, this concept has gained some currency, and so it has to be addressed. *Proximity* can be defined as:

$$\text{Proximity} = 2|(t_L - t_F)/(t_S - t_F) - ½|,$$

where t_L is the date of legislative election, and t_F and t_S are the dates of first and second presidential elections, respectively. Its actual introduction (Cox 1997: 210) used more cumbersome subscripts, but to the same effect:

> [The] formula expresses the time elapsed between the preceding presidential election and the legislative election . . . as a fraction of the presidential term . . . Subtracting ½ from this *elapsed time*, and then taking the absolute value, shows how far away from the midterm the legislative election was held. (Cox 1997: 210, our emphasis)

Cox presents the logic of his formula as follows:

> The least proximal legislative elections are those held at midterm. This particular formula gives a proximity value of zero to these elections, which equates them with the *totally isolated* elections of nonpresidential systems. The most proximal nonconcurrent elections are those held *just before or just after* a presidential election. The formula above gives them a proximity value that approaches one, *the same value given to concurrent elections*. (Cox 1997: 210–211, our emphasis)

We object to the concept of proximity for two reasons. One is the reason stated at the start of this section, that x months before and x months after an event like a presidential election are not the same. The second is that there is scant evidence that a midterm election is "totally isolated" from a presidential election. The quadratic fits in Figures 12.1 indicate perennial influence, alternately boosting and depressing the number of assembly parties. In fact, the only way to isolate an assembly election from a presidential election is not to have the latter – as in a parliamentary system. A common empirical approach to explaining the effective number of parties, as used by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), Cox (1997), Clark and Golder (2006), and others,[7] does indeed take midterm elections in presidential systems to be identical to elections in parliamentary systems.[8]

A well-established effect of timing of elections in the US and other presidential systems is that when assembly elections are at the midterm, there

[7] Other examples include Hicken and Stoll (2011); Mozaffar et al. (2003); Golder (2006); and Elgie et al. (2014).

[8] For parliamentary systems, these scholars enter a zero for *proximity* and interact it with a nonsensical value of N_P=0. For an extended critique see Li and Shugart (2016).

is a strong tendency for a decline in electoral support for the party of the incumbent president (Campbell 1960; Hinckley 1967; Tufte 1975; Kernell 1977; Erickson 1988; Shugart 1995). If timing of elections (whether measured by *proximity* or by our preferred *elapsed time*) is to have impact on the effective number of parties, it presumably works primarily through its effect on the size of the president's party.[9]

We already saw (Figure 12.2) that there is indeed a linear decline of the president's vote ratio (R_P) in nonconcurrent elections, because the president's party obtains lower vote totals as elections are held later in the incumbent president's term.[10] It is this decline that produces the pattern seen in Figure 12.1, wherein counter-honeymoon elections tend to have higher values of the effective number of parties than we would predict from their assembly Seat Product. By contrast, at the midterm, there is a tendency for N_V to dip, presumably because far from being isolated, such elections are "referendums" on the incumbent president. The president's support is slipping, although not as much as it likely will later still in the term.

For these reasons, we find greater predictive power in the continuous concept of elapsed time throughout the president's term, for which the counter-honeymoon elections take the highest values, and concurrent the lowest. Elections at the midterm, intuitively, take a value of one half in our measure. The standard approaches instead interact their notion of *proximity*, in which it

[9] In justifying an identical concept of *proximity* in their study, Clark and Golder (2006: 695) say: "The further apart in time these elections are held, the harder it is to imagine that presidential elections will significantly influence the behavior of voters and party elites in legislative elections." This claim is implausible: midterm decline is itself a product of voters and other actors responding to the outcome of the preceding presidential election – specifically, to the incumbent office-holder. Our linear decline in R_P strongly implies that behavior continues throughout the term to be conditioned by the outcome of the last presidential election, and how far back in time it was. Nonetheless, despite their claim, Clark and Golder estimate a regression in which midterm N_V can be higher than it would be if there were no presidential election at all, because they include a multiplicative interaction of N_P and *proximity*. Cox's regressions do not have this problem because he leaves out the constitutive terms of his interactions. So at least his result (midterm N_V no different from an otherwise identical parliamentary system) is consistent with his theory, whether or not it is plausible. Clark and Golder justify the inclusion of the constitutive terms solely on statistical practice, not on theory, and thus end up with results inconsistent with their theory, given that N_P, *proximity*, and their interaction are all found to be significant in the regression sample that contains their fully pooled results over the 1945–2000 period. (Thus the sample most similar to that which we use here, and in Chapters 7 and 8.)

[10] In introducing the concept, Cox (1997: 210) says that his approach to the impact of presidential variables, including proximity, "follows Shugart and Carey in general conception but differs in the details of implementation." However, he offers no apparent theoretical argument for why proximity should affect the number of assembly parties; Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart (1995) were concerned with the impact of timing on support for the president's party, not on the effective number.

is the midterms that have the zero value, with N_P. (See Li and Shugart, 2016, for further discussion.)

The notion in those works that employ the concept of *proximity* is that, the closer the dates of elections to each branch are to one another (regardless of which comes first), the more the presidential contest "influences" the assembly election. What they mean is that if there are several contenders for the presidency, there also will be more for the assembly; however, if presidential competition is confined to just two serious candidates, then the number of serious parties for the assembly likewise is held to a low level. This effect is, they say, minimized for elections farther in time from either the past or future presidential election, reaching zero at the midterm. This standard approach is not fruitful, partly because N_P itself turns out to be explained by the assembly electoral system, as we saw in Chapter 11, but also because of the inaccurate assumptions about how timing works, as reviewed in this section.

In this section, we have explained why the common notion of "proximity" employed by many works in the literature has key logical flaws. We already demonstrated earlier in the chapter how a continuous measure of elapsed time is superior. We also demonstrated the value of using a quadratic fit, because there is evidence of significantly greater fragmentation of the party system, relative to the Seat Product baseline, for elections late in a presidential term.

CONCLUSIONS: ARE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS SPECIAL AND IF SO, HOW?

In one way, of course presidential systems are "special" – unlike parliamentary systems they have a separately elected presidency that serves executive functions. The executive is not simply the leadership of the party or coalition of parties that has earned sufficient assembly seats to govern. Yet in previous chapters, we have seen scant evidence of any systematic differences in the effects of presidentialism on the relationships examined. More scatter can be observed, but not a pattern requiring a different model or one with additional inputs (see Chapters 7, 8, and 10).

Now we are concluding the second of our two chapters focused specifically on presidential systems. We found in Chapter 11 that we could estimate the effective number of candidates in presidential elections from the assembly electoral system – a remarkable result that no other scholars have even considered, as best we can tell. In this chapter, we undertook an in-depth investigation of how the timing of elections to the two elected branches in presidential systems shapes party-system variables in the assembly.

In this chapter, we found that "elapsed time" does affect the number of parties in the assembly. Most significantly, the counter-honeymoon period (as defined by Shugart and Carey 1992) at the end of the president's term results in an effective number of assembly parties greater than expected from the Seat Product. This increase results from the late-term pressures that tend to push down the vote share of the president's party, relative to the president's own support when elected.

In the process of analyzing the impact of timing, we debunk the *proximity* approach to the presidential cycle and its impact on assembly parties. The latter assumes that election of a given president has exactly similar consequences for the assembly later on and prior to the presidential election. Since this approach has had some currency, it had to be addressed.

In sum, the effective number of assembly parties is predicted well, on average, by the Seat Product, *except for likely increase during counter-honeymoon elections*. These are the elections in which, along with waning support for the president's party, other parties are attempting to differentiate themselves with an eye towards the presentation of candidates for the *upcoming* presidential contest. Some of them subsequently may withdraw from the presidential coalition and form alliances with others. These incentives for parties – separate contests for assembly but alliances for presidency – tend to produce higher numbers of parties than foreseen by the Seat Product Model ratios of N_V to N_P.

If the Seat Product for the assembly election (Chapters 7 and 8) predicts the effective number of parties well in presidential systems, with the provisos we offer in this chapter about election timing, then this is good news for design of electoral systems in such democracies. We do not need to know just how many presidential candidates run, and their relative vote shares (i.e., the information summarized in N_P) in order to have a reasonably good idea what the assembly party rules should look like so as to produce a desired average pattern.

The applicability of the Seat Product in presidential systems turns the conventional wisdom on its head: most scholars and other observers assume that presidential competition shapes assembly parties and the outcomes of elections. We find that it is possible to give explanatory precedence to the assembly electoral rules: they shape competition for the presidency, and their timing impacts how constraining those rules are.

Appendix to Chapter 12

This appendix reports the regression results that are graphed and discussed in Chapter 12. Table 12.A1 shows three regressions, each with a different output variable. In Regression One, the quantity of interest is the effective number of seat-winning parties (N_S) normalized to the expectation from the Seat Product Model. In Regression Two it is the effective number of vote-earning parties (N_V), similarly normalized. In Regression Three it is the ratio of the effective number of presidential candidates (N_P) to N_V.

TABLE 12.A1 *Regressions for party system outcomes according to elapsed time in the presidential term*

	(1) $N_S/(MS)^{1/6}$	(2) $N_V/[(MS)^{1/4}+1]^{2/3}$	(3) N_V/N_P
Nonconcurrent		0.428**	
		(0.206)	
		[0.00600 – 0.850]	
Elapsed time (E)	–0.696	–2.307**	–1.916**
	(0.450)	(1.008)	(0.678)
	[–1.632 – 0.240]	[–4.372 – –0.241]	[–3.331 – –0.501]
Elapsed time, squared	1.234**	2.723**	3.100***
	(0.592)	(1.041)	(0.875)
	[0.00288 – 2.466]	[0.591 – 4.856	[1.276 – 4.925]
Constant	0.950***	1.020***	1.359***
	(0.107)	(0.125)	(0.200)
	[0.727 – 1.173]	[0.763 – 1.276]	[0.942 – 1.777]
Observations	120	135	112
R-squared	0.112	0.135	0.161

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
95 percent confidence intervals in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

TABLE 12.A2 *Regressions for the impact of elapsed time in the presidential term on the presidential vote ratio*

	(1) **Presidential vote ratio (R_P)**
Nonconcurrent	0.296***
	(0.0932)
	[0.103 – 0.490]
Elapsed time	–0.725***
	(0.129)
	[–0.992 – –0.458]
Constant	0.908***
	(0.0220)
	[0.863 – 0.954]
Observations	118
R-squared	0.351

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
95 percent confidence intervals in brackets.
*** p<0.01

All three regressions include both concurrent and nonconcurrent elections. Only Regression Two has an indicator (dummy) variable to set concurrent apart from the rest. This is because including such an indicator in the other two did not affect the results (and the indicator itself was insignificant). The indicator is for nonconcurrent elections, rather than for concurrent, so that it captures the expected increase in the outcome variable in early honeymoon elections, relative to concurrent, and thus leaves the constant term to capture the value for concurrent elections (for which the *nonconcurrent* indicator and *elapsed time* variables are both zero).

In Table 12.A2, we report the regression output for the impact of election timing on Presidential vote ratio (R_P), calculated as the votes for the president's party, divided by the votes the president obtained in the concurrent presidential election, or the preceding one if nonconcurrent. The input variables are the indicator for nonconcurrent elections and the elapsed time (E).