# Appendix D

## Regression Tables for Declared Support

TABLE D.1 *Declared support and post-election benefits, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.1, rows 1 and 2*

| | Benefit from politician | | | Benefit from municipality | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Declared for winner | 0.077*** | 0.073*** | 0.071*** | 0.042** | 0.044** | 0.044** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Declared for loser | 0.007 | 0.003 | −0.000 | 0.015 | 0.005 | −0.016 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Voted for mayor | | −0.010 | −0.008 | | −0.012 | −0.003 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.005 | 0.005 | | 0.042*** | 0.041*** |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.142*** | 0.132*** | | 0.028 | 0.025 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Association member | | −0.003 | −0.002 | | 0.005 | 0.010 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Neighborhood collaboration | | 0.009 | 0.006 | | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PT supporter | | −0.001 | 0.006 | | −0.007 | 0.013 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.045*** | −0.042** | | −0.043*** | −0.029** |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.035 | 0.015 | | −0.007 | −0.026 |
| | | (0.07) | (0.07) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.030** | −0.034+ | | −0.046*** | −0.047** |
| | | (0.01) | (0.02) | | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Wealth | | 0.002 | −0.004 | | 0.005+ | 0.007** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education | | −0.001 | −0.001 | | 0.002+ | 0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | | 0.010 | 0.010 | | 0.008 | 0.006 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Age | | −0.000 | −0.000 | | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | 0.052 | 0.064 | | 0.094+ | 0.101* |
| | | (0.05) | (0.05) | | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Risk aversion | | −0.003 | −0.003 | | 0.005 | 0.004 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Public goods | | 0.005 | 0.003 | | 0.012*** | 0.006* |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Time preference | | −0.003* | −0.003* | | −0.002 | −0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Has piped water | | −0.026* | −0.018 | | −0.001 | 0.011 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Has own cistern | | 0.004 | 0.004 | | 0.015+ | 0.014 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Access to cistern | | −0.006 | −0.014 | | 0.001 | −0.002 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.039*** | 0.049* | 0.060** | 0.040*** | −0.076** | −0.054* |
| | (0.00) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.00) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Municipal fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3714 | 3218 | 3218 | 3749 | 3247 | 3247 |
| $R^2$ | 0.014 | 0.049 | 0.075 | 0.005 | 0.026 | 0.113 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.2 *Declared support and post-election benefits, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.1, rows 3 and 4*

| | Politician helped get job | | | No benefit due to vote choice | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Declared for winner | 0.031** | 0.030** | 0.030* | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Declared for loser | 0.009 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.094*** | 0.089*** | 0.083*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Voted for mayor | | 0.002 | 0.002 | | −0.027*** | −0.027*** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Voted in 2012 | | −0.004 | −0.003 | | 0.013 | 0.010 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.029* | 0.029* | | 0.021 | 0.020 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Association member | | −0.001 | 0.000 | | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Neighborhood collaboration | | 0.006 | 0.003 | | 0.006 | −0.005 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PT supporter | | 0.001 | −0.000 | | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.013* | −0.011 | | 0.053 | 0.047 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| PMDB supporter | | −0.019** | −0.021** | | −0.022 | −0.018 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.015** | −0.015* | | 0.157 | 0.131 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Wealth | | −0.001 | −0.001 | | −0.002 | −0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education | | 0.002* | 0.002* | | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | | −0.001 | −0.000 | | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Age | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | −0.000 | −0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | 0.016 | 0.020 | | 0.024 | 0.030 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Risk aversion | | 0.004* | 0.003* | | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Public goods | | −0.001 | −0.002 | | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Time preference | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Has piped water | | −0.006 | −0.006 | | −0.000 | −0.004 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Has own cistern | | 0.008* | 0.008* | | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Access to cistern | | −0.001 | −0.001 | | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.007*** | −0.022+ | −0.022+ | 0.026*** | 0.016 | 0.020 |
| | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Municipal fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3742 | 3243 | 3243 | 3647 | 3158 | 3158 |
| $R^2$ | 0.010 | 0.027 | 0.045 | 0.018 | 0.033 | 0.063 |

*Note:* $+ p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, $*** p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.3 *Declared support and post-election benefits, rural Northeast Brazil,*
*2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.1, row 5*

| | Club good from politician | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Declared for winner | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| Declared for loser | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Voted for mayor | | −0.006 | −0.005 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.00) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.010 | 0.009 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Association member | | 0.002 | 0.007+ |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Neighborhood collaboration | | 0.015* | 0.014* |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PT supporter | | 0.008 | 0.010 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.009* | −0.007 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| PMDB supporter | | −0.012*** | −0.021** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.003 | −0.010 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| Wealth | | 0.003** | 0.002* |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education | | −0.001* | −0.001+ |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | | −0.003 | −0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Age | | −0.000 | −0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | −0.015 | −0.013 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Risk aversion | | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Public goods | | −0.000 | −0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Time preference | | −0.000 | −0.001 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Has piped water | | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Has own cistern | | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Access to cistern | | −0.004 | −0.007+ |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Constant | 0.007*** | 0.016 | 0.016 |
| | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Municipal fixed effects | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3714 | 3218 | 3218 |
| $R^2$ | 0.000 | 0.013 | 0.029 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust
standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis,
Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.4 *Declared support and post-election water delivery, rural Northeast Brazil, 2013*

| | Months with water delivery | | | Total liters of water delivered | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Declared for winner | 0.578** | 0.481* | 0.444* | 3382.6* | 2894.4+ | 2589.9+ |
| | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (1422.1) | (1531.9) | (1478.1) |
| Declared for loser | 0.377 | 0.383 | 0.275 | 1895.7 | 2160.2 | 1320.8 |
| | (0.25) | (0.28) | (0.26) | (1972.5) | (2184.4) | (2087.5) |
| Rainfall in municipality | −1.999*** | −1.866*** | | −15778.3*** | −14826.5*** | |
| | (0.44) | (0.46) | | (3512.2) | (3733.2) | |
| Has piped water | −0.861*** | −0.983*** | −1.031*** | −7047.6*** | −7785.7*** | −7779.1*** |
| | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.20) | (871.9) | (1100.2) | (1522.0) |
| Voted for mayor | | 0.104 | 0.065 | | 694.8 | 316.4 |
| | | (0.14) | (0.14) | | (1168.6) | (1135.5) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.015 | 0.074 | | 100.2 | 657.7 |
| | | (0.19) | (0.17) | | (1592.6) | (1406.9) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.233 | 0.297 | | 1501.1 | 1851.3 |
| | | (0.28) | (0.27) | | (2168.9) | (2045.0) |
| Association member | | 0.292+ | 0.011 | | 1736.9 | −231.6 |
| | | (0.17) | (0.17) | | (1350.0) | (1346.1) |
| Neighborhood collaboration | | 0.374+ | 0.195 | | 2765.9+ | 1335.4 |
| | | (0.21) | (0.19) | | (1652.2) | (1495.6) |
| PT supporter | | 0.505+ | 0.199 | | 3767.9 | 1478.9 |
| | | (0.30) | (0.30) | | (2414.0) | (2404.4) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.168 | −0.387 | | −1436.1 | −3454.7 |
| | | (0.60) | (0.59) | | (4712.7) | (4610.5) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.152 | 0.234 | | −1055.0 | −146.4 |
| | | (0.63) | (0.51) | | (4421.3) | (3629.8) |
| DEM supporter | | 0.208 | 0.311 | | 9794.1 | 10742.4 |
| | | (0.49) | (0.47) | | (9786.0) | (8495.1) |
| Wealth | | 0.015 | 0.038 | | 78.2 | 234.3 |
| | | (0.05) | (0.05) | | (402.2) | (440.3) |
| Education | | −0.015 | −0.017 | | −106.8 | −142.2 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (136.3) | (126.1) |
| Female | | −0.121 | −0.111 | | −1002.2 | −874.4 |
| | | (0.08) | (0.08) | | (638.2) | (624.9) |
| Age | | −0.002 | −0.006 | | −15.6 | −40.7 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (32.3) | (30.7) |
| Reciprocity | | −0.347 | −0.085 | | −4013.8 | −1930.0 |
| | | (0.57) | (0.54) | | (4485.3) | (4273.2) |
| Risk aversion | | −0.042 | −0.054 | | −177.2 | −246.8 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (329.0) | (317.2) |
| Public goods | | −0.049 | 0.001 | | −384.7 | −31.8 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (355.9) | (357.1) |
| Time preference | | 0.063** | 0.039+ | | 481.9* | 308.0+ |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (187.3) | (178.65) |
| Has own cistern | | −0.141 | −0.186 | | −1141.2 | −1629.1 |
| | | (0.19) | (0.21) | | (1555.2) | (1660.1) |
| Access to cistern | | 0.523* | 0.441+ | | 5164.4** | 4485.3* |
| | | (0.24) | (0.25) | | (1967.1) | (2032.7) |
| Constant | 0.944*** | 0.939** | 1.266*** | 7768.4*** | 7538.5** | 10069.1*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.35) | (0.35) | (753.1) | (2885.4) | (2837.9) |
| Municipal fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3160 | 2822 | 2967 | 3147 | 2809 | 2954 |
| $R^2$ | 0.031 | 0.053 | 0.121 | 0.028 | 0.050 | 0.114 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS specifications with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Data are reported by respondents and reflect deliveries from *Operação Carro-Pipa* (Operation Water Truck), which was by far the principal source of water deliveries in the Rural Clientelism Survey. Given outliers, liters of water delivery are Winsorized at the 95 percent level. Rainfall control variable is standardized using historical municipal data, as described in Chapter 4.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.5 *Declared support and post-election benefits, Brazil, online survey, 2016 – Regressions in Figure 5.2, rows 1 and 2*

| | Benefit from politician | | | Benefit from municipality | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Declared for winner | 0.181*** | 0.166*** | 0.158*** | 0.201*** | 0.165*** | 0.155*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Declared for loser | −0.093** | −0.059 | −0.061 | −0.074* | −0.041 | −0.043 |
| | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| Voted for mayor | | 0.045* | 0.046* | | 0.070* | 0.075* |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.043 | 0.032 | | −0.012 | −0.020 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Age | | −0.003*** | −0.003** | | −0.003** | −0.003** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Income | | −0.000 | 0.002 | | −0.005 | −0.002 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Education | | −0.014* | −0.015* | | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Female | | −0.025 | −0.017 | | −0.019 | −0.011 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.030 | 0.006 | | −0.011 | 0.012 |
| | | (0.07) | (0.07) | | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| PSDB supporter | | 0.015 | 0.022 | | 0.054 | 0.062 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| PMDB supporter | | −0.006 | 0.008 | | −0.019 | −0.009 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| PT supporter | | −0.005 | −0.005 | | 0.055 | 0.056 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Rural | | 0.055+ | 0.050+ | | 0.028 | 0.027 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Risk aversion | | −0.004 | −0.004 | | −0.015+ | −0.015 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Screener | | 0.010 | 0.010 | | 0.015 | 0.014 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.120*** | 0.228*** | 0.222*** | 0.165*** | 0.282*** | 0.275*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.01) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| State fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 1837 | 1466 | 1466 | 1843 | 1470 | 1470 |
| $R^2$ | 0.053 | 0.087 | 0.109 | 0.051 | 0.069 | 0.088 |

*Note:* $+ p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at state level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Online Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Simeon Nichter and Salvatore Nunnari.

TABLE D.6 *Declared support and post-election benefits, Brazil, online survey, 2016 – Regressions in Figure 5.2, row 3*

| | Denied benefit due to vote choice | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Declared for winner | 0.046+ | 0.030 | 0.027 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Declared for loser | 0.055+ | 0.051+ | 0.038 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Voted for mayor | | −0.034 | −0.037+ |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.065* | 0.069** |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Age | | −0.002** | −0.001* |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Income | | −0.015** | −0.015** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education | | 0.009 | 0.008 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Female | | −0.043* | −0.035* |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.061 | −0.058 |
| | | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.023 | −0.016 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.066+ | 0.064+ |
| | | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| PT supporter | | 0.024 | 0.023 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Rural | | 0.045 | 0.048 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Risk aversion | | −0.012+ | −0.010+ |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Screener | | −0.017+ | −0.016 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.145*** | 0.279*** | 0.251*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| State fixed effects | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 1884 | 1493 | 1493 |
| $R^2$ | 0.008 | 0.038 | 0.074 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at state level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Online Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Simeon Nichter and Salvatore Nunnari.

TABLE D.7 *Declared support and campaign handouts, rural Northeast Brazil,*
*2012 – Regressions in Figure 5.3*

| | Received campaign handout | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Any declaration | 0.032*** | 0.030** | 0.025* | | | |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | | |
| 1 declaration method | | | | 0.014 | 0.011 | 0.006 |
| | | | | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| 2 declaration methods | | | | 0.049** | 0.050** | 0.047** |
| | | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| 3 declaration methods | | | | 0.061** | 0.061** | 0.057** |
| | | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Voted for mayor | | −0.023+ | −0.022+ | | −0.021+ | −0.019 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.031 | 0.039+ | | 0.028 | 0.035 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.044** | 0.046** | | 0.040** | 0.043** |
| | | (0.01) | (0.02) | | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Association member | | −0.014 | −0.009 | | −0.015 | −0.009 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PT supporter | | −0.028* | −0.019+ | | −0.030** | −0.022* |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| PSDB supporter | | 0.122 | 0.120 | | 0.119 | 0.116 |
| | | (0.08) | (0.08) | | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| PMDB supporter | | −0.018 | −0.036 | | −0.019 | −0.038 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| DEM supporter | | 0.012 | 0.011 | | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| | | (0.05) | (0.04) | | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| Wealth | | −0.007* | −0.010** | | −0.007* | −0.011** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education | | −0.002 | −0.002 | | −0.002 | −0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | | 0.008 | 0.006 | | 0.009 | 0.006 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Age | | −0.001* | −0.001+ | | −0.000 | −0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | −0.063 | −0.039 | | −0.064 | −0.042 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Risk aversion | | 0.003 | 0.002 | | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Time preference | | 0.001 | 0.002 | | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Piped water | | −0.012 | −0.002 | | −0.011 | −0.000 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.02) | | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Own cistern | | 0.010 | 0.010 | | 0.008 | 0.010 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Access to cistern | | 0.010 | −0.008 | | 0.009 | −0.008 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.047*** | 0.047 | 0.040 | 0.047*** | 0.045 | 0.036 |
| | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Municipal fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3167 | 2725 | 2725 | 3167 | 2725 | 2725 |
| $R^2$ | 0.004 | 0.023 | 0.070 | 0.008 | 0.027 | 0.074 |

*Note:* $+ p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.8 *Declared support and campaign handouts, Brazil, online survey, 2012 – Regressions in Figure 5.4, rows 1 and 2*

| | Received campaign handout in 2012 | | | Received campaign handout in 2016 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Declared support in 2012 | 0.133*** | 0.129*** | 0.120*** | | | |
| | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | | | |
| Declared support in 2016 | | | | 0.139*** | 0.117*** | 0.103*** |
| | | | | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Voted for mayor in 2012 | | 0.064** | 0.065** | | 0.079*** | 0.083*** |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Voted in 2012 | | 0.005 | −0.005 | | 0.009 | 0.003 |
| | | (0.02) | (0.02) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Age | | −0.003*** | −0.003*** | | −0.002** | −0.002* |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Income | | 0.002 | 0.006 | | −0.005 | −0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Education | | −0.016** | −0.017*** | | −0.013* | −0.015** |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| Female | | −0.003 | 0.007 | | −0.039 | −0.030 |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| DEM supporter | | 0.012 | 0.031 | | 0.048 | 0.076 |
| | | (0.05) | (0.05) | | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| PSDB supporter | | 0.048 | 0.060 | | −0.001 | 0.013 |
| | | (0.04) | (0.04) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.032 | 0.048* | | 0.039 | 0.052 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.02) | | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| PT supporter | | 0.008 | 0.004 | | −0.005 | −0.004 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.02) | | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Rural | | 0.015 | 0.009 | | 0.018 | 0.016 |
| | | (0.03) | (0.03) | | (0.03) | (0.02) |
| Risk aversion | | −0.015** | −0.016*** | | −0.009 | −0.009 |
| | | (0.00) | (0.00) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Screener | | −0.005 | −0.003 | | 0.019+ | 0.018+ |
| | | (0.01) | (0.01) | | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.077*** | 0.242*** | 0.241*** | 0.072*** | 0.220*** | 0.207*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| State fixed effects | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 1769 | 1451 | 1451 | 1789 | 1447 | 1447 |
| $R^2$ | 0.037 | 0.081 | 0.110 | 0.040 | 0.076 | 0.109 |

*Note:* $+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$. Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered at state level. Results are robust using logit specifications.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Online Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Simeon Nichter and Salvatore Nunnari.

TABLE D.9 *Declared support and perceptions of victorious mayoral candidate, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012–2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.6, rows 1–3*

| | Perceptions of victorious mayoral candidate | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Composite | | Competence | | Honesty | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Declared for winner | 0.239*** | 0.236*** | 0.303*** | 0.291*** | 0.203*** | 0.209*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Declared for loser | −0.441*** | −0.502*** | −0.397** | −0.495*** | −0.329* | −0.414** |
| | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.14) |
| Satisfaction w/ mayor | | 0.026 | | 0.057+ | | 0.015 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.03) | | (0.03) |
| Voted in 2012 | | −0.076 | | −0.043 | | 0.011 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.08) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.018 | | 0.120** | | −0.017 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| Association member | | 0.028 | | 0.028 | | 0.029 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| PT supporter | | 0.056 | | 0.075 | | 0.005 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) | | (0.06) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.140 | | −0.377 | | −0.235 |
| | | (0.22) | | (0.24) | | (0.26) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.123 | | 0.090 | | 0.048 |
| | | (0.10) | | (0.09) | | (0.08) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.013 | | 0.082 | | 0.077 |
| | | (0.13) | | (0.21) | | (0.13) |
| Wealth | | 0.008 | | 0.004 | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Education | | 0.007 | | 0.004 | | −0.002 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.01) |
| Female | | −0.009 | | −0.016 | | 0.003 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.03) | | (0.03) |
| Age | | 0.002 | | −0.002 | | −0.000 |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | 0.105 | | −0.047 | | 0.149 |
| | | (0.16) | | (0.17) | | (0.15) |
| Risk aversion | | 0.003 | | −0.005 | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Time preference | | 0.012+ | | 0.014* | | 0.004 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Piped water | | −0.009 | | −0.021 | | −0.042 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.05) |
| Own cistern | | 0.021 | | −0.005 | | −0.028 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.05) |
| Access to cistern | | −0.048 | | −0.008 | | −0.099 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.06) | | (0.06) |
| Constant | 2.845*** | 2.678*** | 2.954*** | 2.821*** | 2.923*** | 2.905*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.13) | (0.02) | (0.15) | (0.02) | (0.15) |
| Municipal fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1213 | 1066 | 1570 | 1375 | 1435 | 1255 |
| $R^2$ | 0.181 | 0.225 | 0.142 | 0.189 | 0.103 | 0.134 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS specification with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. All specifications include municipal fixed effects to compare across same politician.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.10 *Declared support and perceptions of victorious mayoral candidate, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012–2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.6, rows 4 and 5*

| | Perceptions of victorious mayoral candidate | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Experience | | Accessibility | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Declared for winner | 0.204*** | 0.202*** | 0.362*** | 0.372*** |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Declared for loser | −0.654*** | −0.717*** | −0.344* | −0.376* |
| | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Satisfaction w/ mayor | | 0.055+ | | 0.005 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.03) |
| Voted in 2012 | | −0.047 | | −0.075 |
| | | (0.07) | | (0.11) |
| Talks with politicians | | −0.004 | | −0.003 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.05) |
| Association member | | −0.011 | | 0.061 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.05) |
| PT supporter | | 0.058 | | 0.153* |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.07) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.087 | | 0.017 |
| | | (0.23) | | (0.18) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.190+ | | 0.189 |
| | | (0.11) | | (0.14) |
| DEM supporter | | −0.052 | | 0.042 |
| | | (0.13) | | (0.19) |
| Wealth | | 0.010 | | 0.009 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Education | | 0.009+ | | 0.004 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Female | | 0.004 | | −0.085* |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.03) |
| Age | | 0.000 | | 0.005*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | 0.280+ | | −0.194 |
| | | (0.15) | | (0.24) |
| Risk aversion | | −0.011 | | −0.017 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Time preference | | 0.017* | | −0.002 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Piped water | | −0.075 | | 0.021 |
| | | (0.07) | | (0.08) |
| Own cistern | | −0.008 | | 0.041 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.06) |
| Access to cistern | | 0.007 | | −0.058 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.07) |
| Constant | 2.914*** | 2.716*** | 2.380*** | 2.269*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.14) | (0.02) | (0.16) |
| Municipal fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1591 | 1397 | 1671 | 1459 |
| $R^2$ | 0.106 | 0.144 | 0.181 | 0.217 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS specification with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. All specifications include municipal fixed effects to compare across same politician.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.11 *Declared support and perceptions of defeated mayoral candidate, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012–2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.6, rows 6 - 8*

| | Perceptions of defeated mayoral candidate | | | | | |
| | Composite | | Competence | | Honesty | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Declared for winner | −0.355*** | −0.312*** | −0.387*** | −0.345*** | −0.308*** | −0.265** |
| | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Declared for loser | 0.435*** | 0.453*** | 0.386*** | 0.429*** | 0.368** | 0.415*** |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.10) |
| Satisfaction w/ mayor | | 0.059+ | | 0.063+ | | 0.058+ |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.04) | | (0.03) |
| Voted in 2012 | | −0.085 | | −0.098 | | 0.014 |
| | | (0.07) | | (0.09) | | (0.09) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.046 | | 0.003 | | −0.015 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.06) | | (0.06) |
| Association member | | −0.011 | | −0.012 | | −0.056 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| PT supporter | | 0.065 | | 0.063 | | 0.086 |
| | | (0.07) | | (0.08) | | (0.08) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.072 | | −0.302 | | −0.264 |
| | | (0.24) | | (0.24) | | (0.26) |
| PMDB supporter | | 0.036 | | −0.028 | | 0.143 |
| | | (0.13) | | (0.16) | | (0.16) |
| DEM supporter | | 0.163 | | 0.201 | | 0.023 |
| | | (0.14) | | (0.16) | | (0.15) |
| Wealth | | 0.005 | | 0.014 | | 0.005 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.02) | | (0.02) |
| Education | | 0.008 | | 0.013* | | 0.009 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Female | | 0.011 | | 0.019 | | 0.016 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| Age | | 0.007*** | | 0.008*** | | 0.008*** |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | −0.039 | | −0.131 | | −0.328 |
| | | (0.25) | | (0.24) | | (0.30) |
| Risk aversion | | 0.007 | | 0.005 | | 0.005 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Time preference | | −0.003 | | 0.002 | | −0.008 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Piped water | | −0.066 | | −0.102 | | 0.037 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.07) |
| Own cistern | | 0.056 | | 0.021 | | 0.091 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.06) | | (0.06) |
| Access to cistern | | 0.034 | | −0.009 | | 0.075 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.07) | | (0.06) |
| Constant | 2.612*** | 2.170*** | 2.671*** | 2.182*** | 2.691*** | 2.149*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.15) | (0.02) | (0.17) | (0.02) | (0.17) |
| Municipal fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1214 | 1067 | 1555 | 1362 | 1364 | 1191 |
| $R^2$ | 0.185 | 0.229 | 0.162 | 0.198 | 0.115 | 0.156 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS specification with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. All specifications include municipal fixed effects to compare across same politician.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.

TABLE D.12 *Declared support and perceptions of defeated mayoral candidate, rural Northeast Brazil, 2012–2013 – Regressions in Figure 5.6, rows 9 and 10*

| | Perceptions of victorious mayoral candidate | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Experience | | Accessibility | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Declared for winner | −0.276*** | −0.242** | −0.387*** | −0.398*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Declared for loser | 0.341*** | 0.383*** | 0.553*** | 0.566*** |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Satisfaction w/ mayor | | 0.068* | | 0.044 |
| | | (0.03) | | (0.03) |
| Voted in 2012 | | −0.200* | | −0.079 |
| | | (0.08) | | (0.09) |
| Talks with politicians | | 0.013 | | 0.103+ |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.06) |
| Association member | | 0.046 | | −0.008 |
| | | (0.05) | | (0.05) |
| PT supporter | | 0.015 | | −0.008 |
| | | (0.07) | | (0.07) |
| PSDB supporter | | −0.089 | | 0.009 |
| | | (0.27) | | (0.16) |
| PMDB supporter | | −0.058 | | 0.054 |
| | | (0.13) | | (0.14) |
| DEM supporter | | 0.234 | | 0.239 |
| | | (0.16) | | (0.22) |
| Wealth | | 0.017 | | 0.000 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.02) |
| Education | | 0.004 | | 0.003 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Female | | 0.048 | | −0.059 |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.04) |
| Age | | 0.005*** | | 0.003+ |
| | | (0.00) | | (0.00) |
| Reciprocity | | 0.153 | | −0.085 |
| | | (0.24) | | (0.28) |
| Risk aversion | | 0.010 | | −0.000 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Time preference | | −0.014+ | | −0.001 |
| | | (0.01) | | (0.01) |
| Piped water | | −0.025 | | 0.005 |
| | | (0.07) | | (0.07) |
| Own cistern | | 0.043 | | 0.049 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.06) |
| Access to cistern | | −0.007 | | 0.002 |
| | | (0.06) | | (0.06) |
| Constant | 2.690*** | 2.447*** | 2.289*** | 2.116*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.16) | (0.02) | (0.18) |
| Municipal fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1555 | 1367 | 1644 | 1438 |
| $R^2$ | 0.150 | 0.188 | 0.192 | 0.221 |

*Note:* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS specification with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level. All specifications include municipal fixed effects to compare across same politician.
*Source:* Author's analysis of the Rural Clientelism Survey. Data collected by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter.