

# Contents

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<i>List of tables and figures</i>	<i>page ix</i>
<i>Series Editors' Preface</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>xiii</i>

## PART I INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction	3
2 Duverger's propositions	13

## PART II STRATEGIC VOTING

3 On electoral systems	37
4 Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems	69
5 Strategic voting in multimember districts	99
6 Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems	123
7 Some concluding comments on strategic voting	139

## PART III STRATEGIC ENTRY

8 Strategic voting, party labels, and entry	151
9 Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan	173

## PART IV ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL

10 Putting the constituencies together	181
11 Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties	203

<i>Contents</i>	
PART V	
COORDINATION FAILURES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE	
12	Coordination failures and representation 225
13	Coordination failures and dominant parties 238
14	Coordination failures and realignments 251
PART VI	
CONCLUSION	
15	Conclusion 269
APPENDICES	
A	Formulaic structures in 77 democracies, circa 1992 279
B	Notation and proofs for Chapter 6 303
C	Data and sources for Chapter 11 308
	<i>References</i> 312
	<i>Subject Index</i> 329
	<i>Author Index</i> 339