

## SPENDING TO WIN

Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many. Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others? Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities. Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, *Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies* demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography. Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations. Identical institutions have wide-ranging policy effects depending on the context in which they operate. No single institution is a panacea for the pressing issues facing many democracies today, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or representation.

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*Political Institutions, Economic Geography,  
and Government Subsidies*

STEPHANIE J. RICKARD

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