



Technocratic attitudes and voting behaviour ten years after the Eurozone crisis: Evidence from the 2019 EP elections

Lea Heyne^{*}, Marina Costa Lobo

Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9, 1600-189, Lisboa, Portugal

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ABSTRACT

The onset of the Great Recession raised the profile of technocracy, or government by experts, as a contrasting model to democracy. Yet, there is little research on how attitudes towards technocracy may impact European citizens' political behaviour. Moreover, the consistency of technocracy supporters' political attitudes, especially towards the EU, is questionable. This paper uses new survey panel data collected before and after the European parliament elections in May 2019 in six countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). We investigate how citizens' technocratic attitudes affect their voting behaviour in the European elections. We find evidence that citizens with technocratic attitudes are less likely to support mainstream parties, and tend to either abstain or, if they vote, to give their vote to anti-system parties, especially from the populist right. In addition, by distinguishing technocracy supporters according to their partisanship, we conclude that technocracy is a thin ideology that can be combined with different patterns of political support: while many technocracy supporters have no party identification or support non-mainstream parties and show dissatisfaction with democracy and the EU, another subgroup of technocracy supporters identifies with a mainstream political party and show above average political support and support for the EU.

1. Introduction

Over the past decade, the Eurozone crisis had a fundamental impact on European democracies. Especially in the periphery of Europe, countries have been hit by a deep economic recession and an ensuing political and democratic crisis (Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017). As the crisis developed, technocratic governance became more widespread across the worst-hit countries. Full technocratic governments took office both in Italy and in Greece (Pastorella 2016). Simultaneously, the countries which needed to agree to financial bailouts, i.e., Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, also ceded control of their economic policy to supranational technocratic bodies, namely the troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and the IMF) (Lobo and McManus 2020). In line with the growing dissatisfaction with the political system and the increasing critique of the (mal) functioning of representative party democracy, technocracy has been discussed as an alternative (Bertsou and Caramani 2020b). As a result, citizens in the countries worst hit by the crisis have not only experienced technocratic governance, but have also seen a debate on the merits of party democracy and its alternatives, one of which could be “rule by

experts”.

This paper addresses the relationship between European citizens and technocracy after the Eurozone crisis, and aims to deepen our understanding of what exactly support for technocracy means. To date, there is no clear evidence as to what technocracy supporters believe and how they behave, or if they even constitute a distinct group with unique features. To address this puzzle, we aim to answer two strongly related questions: first, how do technocracy supporters behave in European elections? And second, how consistent are the political attitudes of technocracy supporters, especially towards the EU? Despite the anecdotal evidence, there is little research on whether and how attitudes towards technocracy impact political behaviour. Recent findings however imply that a preference for an alternative type of expertise-led government could be driving support for new, and challenger parties which have emerged since the Eurozone crisis (Lavezzolo and Ramiro 2018). Moreover, interpreting technocracy as a thin ideology and drawing on new research on technocratic attitudes (Bertsou and Caramani 2020b), we also explore diverging patterns of political support amongst technocracy supporters.

Using new survey data collected in Spring 2019) in six countries

^{*} Corresponding author.

E-mail address: lea.heyne@ics.ulisboa.pt (L. Heyne).

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(Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), we take a two-step approach: first, we explore the effect of technocratic attitudes on citizens' electoral behaviour in the May 2019 European Parliament elections, using a representative online panel dataset collected shortly after those elections. Second, we analyse how technocracy supporters vary in their patterns of political support and EU support, depending on their partisanship. In what follows, we first define the concept of technocracy, to then discuss the depth and dimensions of technocratic attitudes and survey the literature on the consequences of technocratic attitudes towards voting behaviour. Next, we present our hypotheses on the relationship between support for technocracy, voting behaviour and political support. We then introduce our dataset, and empirically test the hypotheses. In the conclusions, we discuss the implications of these findings for the role of technocracy in post-crisis Europe.

2. Technocracy, the European Union and the Eurocrisis

Technocracy, according to Centeno (1993), can be defined as “a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of instrumentally rational techniques”, where legitimacy is based on “the appeal of scientific knowledge and a rejection of ‘politics’ as inefficient and possibly corruptive”. Similarly, Bertsou and Caramani (2020a) see technocracy as “a form of power, legitimacy, representation and decision-making that stresses the role of expertise, skill and unattached interest, rather than popular selection.” They attribute three dimensions to technocracy: elitism, anti-politics and expertise. While technocracy is clearly an elitist concept, it does not include the political class selected through parties and elections, but rather the “knowledge” class, selected through expertise, intellect, know-how, and academic credentials. The anti-politics dimension of technocracy refers to the critique of the perceived short-term nature and partisanship, the sectional interests and ideologies of party democracy, which is seen as non-efficient and overly responsive to short-term demands. Expertise, on the other hand, is a way to find the “right” solution to any problem.

Political theory has mostly framed technocracy as an ideology that is harmful, or at least opposed to, democracy (Shapiro 2005; Fischer 2009; Gilley 2017; Sánchez-Cuenca 2017), although some claim it can be compatible with democracy (Radaelli 1999) and even solve issues of efficacy and accountability (Rauh 2016; Dommert and Temple 2019; van der Veer and Reinoud, 2020). In practice, technocracy often does exist in a democratic context, as a “a form of representation and source of legitimate power [...] that can take various grades, from advisory positions for experts to the appointment of technocratic prime ministers or ministers to the executive, or even entire cabinets” (Bertsou and Caramani 2020b). Still, Caramani (2017) sees technocracy and populism as the two main current challenges to representative democracy. Clearly, most research to date has focused on populism, while technocracy has received considerably less consideration (Bertsou and Caramani 2020b).

Yet, the Eurozone crisis has brought more attention to the notion of technocracy, and especially to its risk for democratic institutions. On the one hand, the financial crisis quickly morphed into a political crisis, directly triggering the appointment of technocratic leaders in several European executives, replacing elected politicians (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). And on the other hand, crisis politics have empowered technocratic institutions within the European multilevel democracy, where technocracy occurs simultaneously with democratically elected governments. This “systemic technocracy” (Lobo and McManus 2020) means that non-elected and apolitical agencies displace representative political institutions in decision-making processes, hence depoliticising them. Not only the EU and the “Eurocrats”, but also international institutions like the IMF have gained power to impose conditionality on countries, often linked to financial loans, thus limiting their room for manoeuvre. Bertsou and Caramani (2020a) speak of a “technocratization”, where constraints set on politics by technocratic actors eliminate the choice element between alternative programmes in representative

democracy. Sánchez-Cuenca (2017) posits that “technocratic elements of the EU have expanded during the crisis, from efficiency-enhancing policies to issue with distributional consequences”, thus sharpening the differences between debtor and creditor countries. Hence, the great recession has clearly strengthened the profile of technocracy in Europe and raised scholarly interest.

3. Citizens' technocratic attitudes: consequences and consistency

In addition to the amplified theoretical interest in technocracy as a contrasting model to democracy, technocratic decision-making has also become a more common subject of empirical research. Causes and consequences of the emergence (or installation) of technocratic governments across Europe have been studied increasingly over the past years (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Pastorella 2016; Brunclik and Parfizek 2018; Wratil and Pastorella 2018; Pinto et al., 2018). Scholars have also started to investigate the effects that such technocratic governments have on citizens' attitudes (Merler 2019; Tucker and Zilinsky 2020), as well as what causes citizens to support technocratic decision-making more generally (Font et al., 2015; Bertsou and Pastorella 2017; Lobo and McManus 2020). But despite this increasing interest in technocracy, it remains a relatively understudied topic, especially from the perspective of attitudes and political behaviour, partly due to the paucity of available comparative data. So far, only Lindstam (2014) as well as Lavezzolo and Ramiro (2018) have explored the relationship between technocratic attitudes and voting behaviour. This paper aims at contributing to this emerging literature by analysing the relationship between support for technocracy, political attitudes, and voting behaviour in the context of the European Union, to shed light on an unresolved question: are technocracy supporters a distinct group with unique features, and if yes, what are their patterns of political attitudes and behaviour?

This question addresses a puzzle that has become apparent in the recent literature (i.e. Bertsou and Caramani 2020a; 2020b): the multidimensionality as well as the consistency - or lack thereof - of citizens' technocratic attitudes. Following Caramani (2017), we believe that like populism, technocracy can be treated as a thin-centred ideology. Mudde (2004) famously claims that “as a thin-centred ideology, populism can be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies [...]”. Transposing this idea to the concept of technocracy, we assume that technocracy can be attached to or paired with different (thick) political ideologies. Technocracy is sometimes seen as a right-leaning ideology due to its focus on elitism and efficiency and its rejection of popular participation (Nava et al., 2020), but just like populism, it can - and has been - incorporated by many different political movements. As Caramani (2020) points out, socialist planned economies, fascist corporatist states as well as many neo-liberal institutions are all examples of applied technocracy. Bickerton and Accetti (2017) speak of technocracy as “policy without politics”. As described above, the European Union is generally seen as a technocratic institution, but technocratic discourses are also used by eurosceptical actors from very different political backgrounds, such as “techno-populist parties” like *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (Five Star Movement) and *Podemos* (Bickerton and Accetti 2018). The same logic can also be applied to the individual level: if technocracy is used by parties and political movements with very different ideological backgrounds, then it can also be paired with diverse political attitudes amongst citizens.

Interpreting technocracy as a thin-centred ideology could also explain existing findings on technocratic attitudes amongst citizens, which so far have often been inconclusive, especially when it comes to the European Union. On the one hand, there is evidence that support for the EU is also associated with more support for technocratic decision-making (Bertsou and Pastorella 2017; Lobo and McManus, 2020). This makes sense given that the EU is generally perceived as technocratic, and criticised for its democratic deficit (Follesdal and Hix 2006;

Kratochvíl and Sychra 2019). At the same time, authors such as Tucker and Zilinsky (2020) argue that while technocratic institutions might lack input and procedural legitimacy, they can also gain legitimacy through faster outputs, such as economic reforms. As such, technocratic attitudes may increase support for the EU due to its expertise and output capacity (Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2013), and even foster support for democracy. Domett and Temple (2019) find that relying on expert opinions can improve citizens' satisfaction with parties in the UK. In a similar vein, research has shown that EU-led technocracy can also increase perceptions of democratic output performance (Merler 2019), especially in the economic sphere.

On the other hand, technocracy represents a fundamental critique of representative democracy, and the belief that politics and the political class are ineffective. Already Putnam (1977) assumed that technocracy supporters are apolitical, "sceptical and even hostile towards politicians and political institutions" and reject openness, equality and political conflict as well as ideology (ibid., 390ff.). Technocracy as a concept might be elitist, but is also very critical of the current (elected) political elites, who are seen as inefficient. Indeed, Bertou and Caramani (2020b) find that technocratic attitudes often overlap with populist ones, which share a similar focus on anti-politics, and, somewhat surprisingly, expertise. This points to recent research linking technocracy and populism as two different, but often overlapping critiques to representative party democracy (Bickerton and Accetti 2017, 2018; Caramani 2017). It also points to the literature on "stealth democracy", which resembles technocracy in many ways - the notion that decisions should be made "efficiently, objectively and without commotion or disagreement" by "empathetic, non-self-interested decision makers" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, p. 143). Citizens who support stealth democracy have been described as disaffected, disillusioned with politics, suspicious of parties and elected politicians, and essentially populist in orientation (Webb 2013; Font et al., 2015). VanderMolen (2017) finds that support for stealth democracy is mostly caused by dissatisfaction with current democratic politics, and not by actual preferences for a procedural replacement. As such, technocratic attitudes, just as populist attitudes, often seem to be a product of political disaffection and an expression of opposition to the status quo rather than actual support for an alternative, expert-driven political system. This could be aggravated especially in the European periphery, where citizens have faced a lack of responsiveness as well as policy alternatives of their governments due to technocratic EMU interventions, which is often seen as a cause for dissatisfaction and democratic discontent (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso, 2017), as well as declining levels of support for the EU.

4. Hypotheses

As we can see from this literature review, there is no clear evidence as to how consistent technocratic attitudes are, and how uniform technocracy supporters' electoral choices and political attitudes are. To address this puzzle, we want to understand (1) how technocracy supporters behave in European elections, and (2) how consistent the political attitudes of technocracy supporters are, especially their attitudes towards the EU. Following the literature cited above, we established that technocracy can be seen as ideologically thin, and thus easily paired with diverse political and ideological content. We believe that the same holds true for technocratic attitudes, which can be combined with different patterns of political support, and embraced by citizens with different political backgrounds.

First, we address the relationship between technocratic attitudes and electoral behaviour. So far, only Lindstam (2014) as well as Lavezzolo and Ramiro (2018) have explored this topic, and we build on their findings as well as the literature review above to formulate our hypotheses. Our main assumption is that citizens with technocratic attitudes are less likely to engage with the political status quo in elections, either because they would prefer an alternative expert-driven system, or simply because they are anti-politics. There are several reasons to

believe this: As Nava et al. (2020) argue, technocracy has an affinity to market capitalism, elitism and efficiency, and clearly goes against the idea of popular participation. Hence, technocracy supporters *could be more prone to abstain from elections* altogether, either because they are interested in output rather than input legitimacy or are strongly critical of politicians and party-based democracy. Empirically, Lindstam (2014) finds a positive effect of technocratic attitudes on abstention in a comparative setting using WVS data.

But what about those technocracy supporters who do decide to participate in elections? Bertou and Caramani (2020b) believe that technocracy supporters should generally find "no clear political movement, party or leader that speaks to their concerns". Generally, if we follow the notion that technocracy is driven by anti-politics, anti-establishment feelings and a strong suspicion of political and party elites, technocracy supporters should be *less likely to vote for established mainstream parties*. This is particularly relevant after the Eurozone crisis, which had a strong delegitimizing effect on mainstream parties and incumbents, especially in bailout countries.

As a result of rejecting party politics and party elites, technocracy supporters could, on the other hand, be *more likely to vote for anti-system parties and new parties* that have not been in government and can play the role as outsiders to the political establishment. Indeed, Bertou and Caramani (2020b) claim that while some technocracy supporters may remain committed to the political establishment, their "frustration with the workings of current politics means that they may also shy away from established politicians and be drawn to anti-establishment parties." Empirically, results point in a similar direction: Lavezzolo and Ramiro (2018) use an index of technocratic attitudes to explain political support for new and challenger parties in Spain, *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos*, and find that, contingent on ideology, this index does explain support for *Ciudadanos*, although not for *Podemos*. Bickerton and Accetti (2018) even believe that parties such as M5S and *Podemos* are "techno-populist": they focus on a binary between good people and bad elite, are generally anti-pluralist and anti-compromise, support a technocratic conception of politics as problem-solving, and believe in finding a common sense or collective intelligence through technology. According to this interpretation, technocracy supporters could well be attracted by populist parties, as the two ideologies share their critique to representative democracy. Moreover, the Eurozone crisis has impacted party systems especially in the European periphery, bringing new challenger parties from the left and from the right into the electoral arena. These parties could well attract technocracy-supporting voters with anti-establishment agendas, "new" solutions, and the promise of efficiency. In sum, when it comes to linking support for technocracy and voting behaviour, we assume the following:

H1. In elections, citizens with technocratic attitudes are more likely to abstain or to vote for anti-system parties, and less likely to vote for mainstream parties.

Moving from electoral behaviour to the nature of support for technocracy, our next hypothesis deals with the consistency of technocratic attitudes: we want to know more about how deep-rooted technocratic values and how uniform the political attitudes of technocracy supporters are. As described earlier, there are different lines of interpretation of technocratic attitudes to be found in the literature - on the one hand, technocracy as a primarily elitist and expertise-focused ideology, and on the other hand, technocracy as a strong anti-politics sentiment. In line with the interpretation of technology as a "thin ideology" similar to populism, we believe that people can support *technocracy for different reasons*: some might actually want decision-making based on expertise, output legitimacy, and elitism, while others simply distrust political and party elites and reject the (representative) democratic status quo. Moreover, technocracy as an ideology - or simply as a strategy or a label - can be combined with many different political contents, and diverse political parties can use technocratic discourses for their political goals and, in turn, attract technocracy supporters.

As previously discussed, empirical research on technocratic attitudes is not always conclusive: while there is some evidence that technocracy supporters tend to be critical of representative democratic institutions and elected politicians (Bertsou and Pastorella 2017), other research points to technocracy as a possible means to enhance democratic legitimacy (Merler, 2019; van der Veer and Reinoud, 2020). The European Union is another good example of the potential ambivalence of technocratic attitudes: on the one hand, the EU is a clearly technocratic institution, and we would generally expect technocracy supporters to be in favour of expertise-driven supranational governance (Lobo and McManus 2020). On the other hand, the EU is also very much part of the political status quo, and EU politics are mostly determined by (nationally) elected politicians and parties - the political elite, which technocracy supporters reject. Following these theoretical and empirical considerations leads us to our second hypothesis about the consistency of technocratic attitudes:

H2. Support for technocracy can be paired with different political attitudes: some technocracy supporters reject the political status quo, others embrace it.

While we only have a single item to measure support for technocracy that does not allow us to distinguish different dimensions of technocracy as proposed by Bertsou and Caramani (2020b) (see section 4 for details), we instead model different types of technocracy supporters by combining technocratic attitudes with party identification. Given that technocratic attitudes seem to have a strong link to voting behaviour, as we just established, we suggest that distinguishing technocracy supporters according to their partisanship will allow us to understand differences in their patterns of political support. In the following sections, we describe in more detail how we use party identification as a distinction between types of technocracy supporters.

5. Data & analysis

We use a new dataset of survey data collected for the ERC MAPLE project in six EU countries right after the May 2019 European Parliament elections: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This sample of countries has characteristics which make them particularly representative of the EU member-states, and relevant for our hypotheses: we have included all four (major) countries which have experienced bank bailouts that were managed externally by technocrats as a result of the Eurozone crisis: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.¹ While technocracy has gained salience all over Europe in the last decade, we would expect this salience to be even stronger in those countries. This is especially the case for Greece, which in addition to the bailout also experienced a full technocratic government. Germany and Belgium, on the other hand, showed relatively good economic performances in the Eurozone crisis, and citizens in those countries have not directly been affected by (external) technocratic decision-making. They serve as a control group to understand the relevance of technocratic attitudes in Eurozone creditor countries.

The survey is a representative two-wave panel online survey (pre- and post-election) with a sample of 1000 respondents per country. For this analysis, given that we are interested in vote recall, we use the post-electoral wave of the panel dataset, which is fielded right after the EP elections from June to August 2019. For details on the dataset and sample see table A1 in the appendix. While nonprobability online surveys are not as established as probabilistic face-to-face surveys and tend to differ in their marginal distributions, they have been shown to yield

very reliable results especially when it comes to causal inferences and explanatory models such as vote choice (Dassonneville et al., 2020), which is what we do in this paper.

Our first dependent variable to test hypothesis H1 is a categorical variable which contrasts the possible choices of respondents at the vote booth: those who voted for mainstream parties are coded as "0". Following Hobolt and Tilley (2016), we define mainstream parties - contrary to challenger parties - as parties that have been in government during the past 30 years (for detailed party codings, see table A3 in the Appendix). Those who abstained or voted blank in the 2019 European Parliament elections are coded as "1". Then, we split all new and/or radical challenger parties (non-mainstream parties which have never been part of the national government in the past 30 years) into two categories, based on their ideology. Thus, a vote for radical or populist right parties is coded as "3", and a vote for radical or populist left parties is coded as "4".

Our main independent variable measures attitudes towards technocracy and is formulated in the following way: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected experts, rather than politicians?". It has a 5-point answer scale ("strongly disagree", "somewhat disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "somewhat agree", "strongly agree"). Whereas ideally it would have been possible to include different measures of technocracy (Bertsou and Caramani 2020b), it has also been shown that indexes have problems of internal consistency and that this measure of technocracy performs better than others in eliciting "technocratic attitudes" (Lavezzolo and Ramiro 2018). Given that we only have a single item to measure support for technocracy that does not allow us to distinguish different dimensions of technocracy, we instead model different types of technocracy supporters by combining technocratic attitudes with party identification. As we established in the previous section, technocratic attitudes seem to have a strong link to voting behaviour, so we suggest that distinguishing technocracy supporters according to their partisanship will allow us to understand differences in their patterns of political support. Hence, in order to test the second hypothesis, we created three types of technocracy supporters, depending on their party identification, and for consistency also using wave 2 which was fielded post-EP elections. We created another categorical variable with all those respondents who support technocracy (those who "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree" on the statement), separating them according to their party identification: technocracy supporters with a mainstream party identification (0), technocracy supporters without a party identification (1), and technocracy supporters with a non-mainstream party identification (2). In these models, our independent variables are political support items: satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with EU policies (both on a 5-point scale).

All our models include sociodemographic measures, namely gender, age, and education. As political controls, we include a major political anchor, namely ideology, as well a five-point scale measure of economic perceptions. For a list of descriptive statistics, see table A2 in the appendix. We apply country-specific multinomial logistic regression models, using different dependent variables according to the hypotheses being tested. Additionally, we perform extensive robustness tests with data from the EVS (2008), which contains a similar item on technocratic attitudes,² and is available for the same countries. These analyses confirm all our initial findings. Given that this data is from 2008, and that the EVS is a traditional face-to-face probability survey, these

¹ Italy is not included in our sample because it did not have a full bank bailout during the Eurocrisis, which was the primary country selection criterion for this project. It would certainly have been an interesting case due to its history with technocracy, but having Greece in our sample provides very similar insights.

² The exact phrasing of the item in the EVS 2008 is: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country."

robustness tests ensure that our results hold also in a non-online survey setting, and in a pre-Eurocrisis political situation.

6. Results

6.1. The technocratic vote in European elections

Table 1 shows the effect of technocratic attitudes on citizens voting behaviour in the May 2019 European Parliament elections. In a multinomial model, we predict respondents' electoral behaviour with their support for technocracy, controlling for sociodemographics as well as ideology and economic perceptions in six countries.³ The baseline category of the dependent variable is vote for a mainstream party - this refers to centrist parties from the left or the right (as well as in some countries liberal and green parties) which have been in government in the last 30 years (see table A3 in the appendix for the coding of each party). The other categories are abstention or blank vote, vote for a radical or populist right party, and vote for a radical or populist left party. The coefficients displayed are relative risk ratios (RRR),⁴ meaning that values higher than 1 indicate a positive "effect" of the predictor, and values below 1 indicate a negative "effect". First, we can observe that in each country the sociodemographic variables behave predictably, with younger and less educated electors more likely to abstain and - albeit to a lesser extent - more likely to vote for a radical left or right party than to vote for a mainstream party. Ideology has mixed effects on abstention, with right-leaning citizens more likely to abstain in Belgium, and left-leaning citizens more likely to abstain in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Right-wing ideology, as expected, strongly increases the likelihood to vote for the radical right, and strongly decreases the likelihood to vote for the radical left in all countries. Lastly, a positive view of the economic situation significantly decreases respondents likelihood of abstaining or voting for a radical party compared to a mainstream party in all countries (with the exception of Belgium and Spain for abstention and Portugal for radical right vote, which are not significant).

But most importantly, when it comes to our variable of interest, we can see that support for technocracy significantly affects voting behaviour too: in all countries (except Spain where the effect is not significant), supporting technocracy increases the likelihood to abstain or to vote blank, compared to voting for a mainstream party: the RRRs indicate that, holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in support for technocracy makes it (depending on the country) around 1.2 times more likely to fall in the group of abstentionists rather than the group of mainstream party voters. Moreover, supporting technocracy also increases the likelihood to choose a radical or populist right party over a mainstream party in five countries (Ireland does not have one); a one-unit increase in technocracy support making it between 1.1 and 1.8 times more likely to fall in this category. In the case of Belgium and Germany, technocracy support also significantly increases the likelihood

to vote for a radical or populist left party instead of a mainstream party, with an increase of 1.2 per unit.

These results confirm our first hypothesis H1 - rather than voting for mainstream (pro-European and centrist) parties, technocracy supporters are more likely to abstain or to vote blank. They also are more likely to vote for anti-system parties - radical and populist right parties in all countries that have them, and even the radical left in Belgium and Germany. Hence, technocratic voting behaviour in European elections seems to follow a pattern where instead of voting for a mainstream party, those who support technocracy tend to abstain or to vote blank. If they vote, they tend to choose a radical or populist right party if there is one - *AfD* in Germany, *Vlaams Belang* or *Parti Populiste* in Belgium, *Greek Solution*, *Independent Greeks*, or *Golden Dawn* in Greece, as well as *Chega* in Portugal and *Vox* in Spain. In Belgium and Germany, technocracy supporters are also more likely to vote for a radical left party, the *Belgian Workers Party* and *Die Linke*. The fact that technocracy supporters in the four bailout countries are not more prone to vote for a radical left party might point to the fact that technocracy is a more politicized issue in these countries due to the recent Eurocrisis, with left-wing parties taking a strong stance against EU-imposed technocracy and austerity politics (cf. Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017).

Robustness tests using the European Values Study (EVS) data (table A4 in the appendix), which has a very similar item on support for technocracy, show that also in 2008, technocracy supporters were more likely to abstain from voting than vote for a mainstream party, although effects are only significant in Germany, Ireland and Spain, and had a tendency to vote for the radical right in Belgium, and for the radical left in Germany and Portugal. The effects of technocratic attitudes are less strong and less clear in 2008 - a possible interpretation is that the rejection of mainstream parties in favour of abstention or anti-system parties in 2019 is partly a result of the financial and political crisis that hit Europe between these two time points, decreasing the legitimacy of centrist, incumbent parties. However, given that the data sources are different, we cannot test this assumption causally. Moreover, the comparability of the two surveys is limited, because the EVS only has an item on vote intention in national parliamentary elections, while we look at the vote recall for the European Parliament elections in our data. Yet, the EVS results do point in a similar direction, and certainly do not contradict our findings.

6.2. Technocracy supporters and the consistency of political attitudes

In the second part of our analysis, we aim to deepen the understanding of the previous results and further contribute to the debate on the consistency of technocracy supporters' political attitudes, and the ideological depth of technocracy. We test our second hypothesis which posits that support for technocracy can be paired with very different political ideals and attitudes. Given its greater stability compared to recorded vote call, we use party identification to distinguish types of technocracy supporters. In line with our previous analysis, we split all those respondents who support technocracy (those who "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree" on the statement) into three subgroups according to their party identification: technocracy supporters with a mainstream party identification, technocracy supporters with a non-mainstream party identification, and technocracy supporters without a party identification. Despite the fact that above we have shown that having technocratic attitudes implies less likelihood to vote for a mainstream party, there is indeed still a sizeable sub-sample of respondents in each of the surveyed countries who support technocracy and also identify with a mainstream party. Following previous analyses by Bertou and Pastorella (2017) as well as Lobo and McManus (2020) that link technocratic attitudes to political support, we then predict types of technocracy supporters with political support as well as EU

³ We also tested the same models while additionally controlling for political support variables, following Lavezzolo and Ramiro (2018). Including these indicators in the models, while decreasing significance in some countries, does not affect our results in terms of effect size and direction. However, given that a strong trade-off relationship between political support and support for technocracy is theoretically and empirically confirmed in the literature Bertou and Pastorella (2017), we feel that including both as predictors in the same model is not justified, and risks multicollinearity. Hence, we instead explore the relationship between technocratic attitudes and political support in an additional analysis in the following section.

⁴ The RRR indicates how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group compared to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group changes with the variable in question. An RRR >1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group increases as the variable increases. An RRR <1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group decreases as the variable increases.

Table 1

The impact of technocratic attitudes on voting behaviour.

DV: Vote recall	Belgium	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain
Mainstream party	(Baseline outcome)					
Abstain/blank						
Support for technocracy	1.179+ (1.67)	1.257** (2.90)	1.272** (3.11)	1.272** (3.01)	1.261** (3.10)	1.144 (1.50)
Gender (male)	1.221 (0.92)	1.075 (0.41)	0.999 (-0.01)	1.036 (0.19)	0.618** (-2.67)	1.134 (0.65)
Age	0.975*** (-3.98)	0.960*** (-6.50)	0.969*** (-5.12)	0.946*** (-9.01)	0.956*** (-7.10)	0.953*** (-6.90)
Education	0.742*** (-4.44)	0.758*** (-4.15)	0.807*** (-4.45)	0.813*** (-4.13)	0.783*** (-4.67)	0.834** (-3.23)
Ideology (right)	1.120** (2.63)	1.018 (0.36)	0.829*** (-4.94)	0.919+ (-1.89)	0.865*** (-3.98)	1.052 (1.47)
Econ. Perceptions	0.871 (-1.21)	0.779* (-2.35)	0.707*** (-4.05)	0.618*** (-4.72)	0.686*** (-3.79)	0.888 (-1.12)
Radical/populist right						
Support for technocracy	1.161+ (1.67)	1.371** (2.68)	1.247* (2.00)		1.873+ (1.95)	1.368+ (1.68)
Gender (male)	1.478 (1.64)	2.461*** (3.35)	3.015*** (3.59)		3.057 (1.35)	2.173* (2.43)
Age	0.992 (-1.17)	1.005 (0.58)	0.977* (-2.35)		0.966 (-1.49)	0.988 (-1.05)
Education	0.757*** (-3.86)	0.917 (-1.07)	0.827* (-2.48)		0.877 (-0.61)	1.057 (0.66)
Ideology (right)	1.693*** (9.59)	1.946*** (8.20)	1.369*** (4.75)		1.045 (0.35)	1.597*** (7.11)
Econ. perceptions	0.676** (-3.26)	0.447*** (-5.52)	0.655** (-3.21)		1.104 (0.27)	0.714* (-2.07)
Radical/populist left						
Support for technocracy	1.211+ (1.69)	1.231+ (1.66)	1.116 (1.08)	1.006 (0.06)	1.084 (0.84)	1.199 (1.62)
Gender (male)	1.539+ (1.67)	1.672+ (1.70)	1.442 (1.49)	1.120 (0.43)	0.985 (-0.06)	1.247 (0.91)
Age	0.983* (-2.23)	0.998 (-0.18)	0.995 (-0.60)	0.986+ (-1.71)	0.978** (-2.71)	0.994 (-0.71)
Education	0.896 (-1.49)	0.826+ (-1.81)	0.991 (-0.15)	0.785*** (-3.45)	1.118+ (1.78)	1.064 (0.98)
Ideology (right)	0.809*** (-4.08)	0.581*** (-6.65)	0.689*** (-6.97)	0.759*** (-4.35)	0.594*** (-9.26)	0.733*** (-5.68)
Econ. perceptions	0.579*** (-3.90)	0.698+ (-1.87)	0.672*** (-3.43)	0.619*** (-3.52)	0.773+ (-1.82)	0.781+ (-1.81)
Observations	738	805	819	705	766	662
Pseudo R ²	0.150	0.166	0.116	0.130	0.140	0.133

Multinomial regression models. Coefficients are relative risk ratios; t statistics in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. MAPLE online survey data, second wave (June 2019).

support. Table 2 shows results of a multinomial model where technocracy supporters with a mainstream party identification are the baseline category, reporting relative risk ratios for all six countries.⁵

First of all, we can see that satisfaction with democracy and with the EU significantly decreases the likelihood of having no party identification or a non-mainstream party identification amongst technocracy supporters across all six countries. As we can see from the RRRs, holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in SWD or EU support reduces by a factor of 0.5–0.7 technocracy supporters' likelihood to fall into the groups of no party ID or a non-mainstream party ID, relative to the baseline group of a mainstream party ID. Clearly, supporting democracy and the EU is much more common amongst those technocracy supporters that identify with a mainstream political party. This implies that amongst those supporting technocracy while also identifying with a mainstream party, wanting expertise-based decision-making is not in opposition to supporting democracy, and the EU is perceived as a technocratic institution. The opposite holds true for technocracy

supporters with a non-mainstream party identification, and for technocracy supporters with no party identification at all, who display lower satisfaction with democracy as well as lower satisfaction with EU policies. This implies that for this group, support for technocracy is mainly an expression of political disaffection, and a rejection of the status quo - not only national, but also European political institutions. After all, EU politics are eventually dominated by representatives of national party politics as well, and the Eurocrisis has certainly caused a surge in anti-EU attitudes, especially in bailout countries. Technocracy supporters with a mainstream party identification on the other hand are supportive of the political status quo and the EU. These results confirm our hypothesis H2: technocracy as a thin ideology can be paired with different patterns of political support. Technocracy supporters are thus not a homogenous group - some of them do not seem to reject the political establishment, as they support democracy and the European Union and identify with mainstream parties. Others however clearly fit into the profile of anti-politics sentiment, with low levels of political support and no attachment to mainstream political parties.

Other than that, our control variables show significant effects as well: interestingly, right-wing ideology predicts technocracy supporters with no party ID or a non-mainstream party ID in the two Northern European countries (although the effects are only significant in Belgium), while

⁵ Note that the number of observations per country is lower in this analysis than in the previous one, which is due to the fact that the sample is now reduced to only those respondents who indicated that they support technocracy, while all other respondents are excluded.

Table 2

The impact of political support on types of technocracy supporters.

DV: Technocracy supporters	Belgium	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain
Mainstream party ID	(Baseline outcome)					
No party ID						
Satisfaction with democracy	0.727* (-2.45)	0.606*** (-3.52)	0.761+ (-1.82)	0.791* (-2.04)	0.732** (-2.82)	0.768* (-1.97)
Satisfaction with the EU	0.755* (-2.03)	0.762+ (-1.81)	0.816 (-1.22)	0.680** (-2.63)	0.745* (-2.15)	0.889 (-0.75)
Ideology (right)	1.146** (2.93)	1.011 (0.17)	0.923 (-1.56)	0.944 (-0.95)	0.893* (-2.40)	0.994 (-0.13)
Gender (male)	0.793 (-0.92)	1.127 (0.43)	1.726* (2.07)	0.638+ (-1.75)	0.906 (-0.40)	0.948 (-0.19)
Age	0.989 (-1.42)	0.977* (-2.36)	0.969*** (-3.33)	0.985+ (-1.78)	0.963*** (-4.40)	0.967*** (-3.35)
Education	0.957 (-0.63)	0.805* (-2.18)	0.961 (-0.61)	0.944 (-0.80)	0.842* (-2.53)	0.863+ (-1.69)
Non-mainstream party ID						
Satisfaction with democracy	0.764+ (-1.93)	0.546*** (-4.04)	0.698+ (-1.95)	0.649** (-2.81)	0.749* (-2.45)	0.617*** (-5.15)
Satisfaction with the EU	0.546*** (-3.92)	0.552*** (-3.62)	0.666* (-2.06)	0.624* (-2.41)	0.750* (-2.01)	0.900 (-0.93)
Ideology (right)	1.285*** (4.96)	1.057 (0.77)	0.973 (-0.45)	0.789** (-2.86)	0.689*** (-6.81)	0.978 (-0.65)
Gender (male)	1.705* (1.97)	1.117 (0.38)	1.582 (1.47)	1.078 (0.21)	0.692 (-1.36)	1.273 (1.19)
Age	0.988 (-1.47)	0.985 (-1.50)	0.969** (-2.78)	0.978+ (-1.94)	0.970** (-3.28)	0.999 (-0.08)
Education	0.955 (-0.59)	0.940 (-0.66)	0.943 (-0.75)	0.843+ (-1.74)	0.982 (-0.27)	1.026 (0.42)
Observations	414	355	340	356	439	513
Pseudo R ²	0.090	0.115	0.062	0.068	0.113	0.059

Multinomial regression models. Coefficients are relative risk ratios; t statistics in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. MAPLE online survey data, second wave (June 2019).

the same is true for left-wing ideology in bailout countries (significant in Ireland and Portugal). When it comes to sociodemographics, being younger and with low education generally increases the likelihood to have none or a non-mainstream rather than a mainstream party ID amongst technocracy supporters. Gender has only few and mixed effects, with men being less likely to have a mainstream party ID in Belgium and Greece, but more likely in Ireland.

Table A5 in the appendix shows the same model with the EVS 2008 as a robustness test. The results are overall very consistent with what we found using our data - while effect sizes are sometimes smaller, and significance is less strong, they all go in the same direction: satisfaction with democracy and the EU increase the likelihood of technocracy supporters to identify with a mainstream party. This lends support to our findings as well as to the representativeness of our online survey data.

7. Conclusions

This article aims to understand what technocracy supporters believe and how they behave, or if they even constitute a distinct group with unique features. We explore how technocratic attitudes impact European citizens' voting behaviour ten years after the Eurozone crisis, as well as to shed light on the consistency of political attitudes amongst technocracy supporters. Using a novel panel data set from six European countries, we first analyse how the relationship between support for technocracy and electoral behaviour in the May 2019 EP elections. Following the extant research, we posit that citizens with technocratic attitudes would be less likely to engage with the political status quo, either because they would prefer an alternative expert driven system, or simply because they are anti-politics. Indeed, we find evidence that technocracy supporters tend to rather abstain or vote blank than support mainstream parties. They are also more likely to cast their vote for (often new) anti-system parties, especially from the populist and radical right. In sum, technocracy supporters are clearly expressing dissatisfaction

with the pro-European political mainstream, and, in the absence of a technocratic party, seem to be attracted by populist, radical right, and in some cases also radical left discourses. These findings confirm previous research by [Lavezzolo and Ramiro \(2018\)](#), who find that stealth democrats in Spain have a tendency to vote for new parties from the right over mainstream parties, and that this effect is driven by the technocratic dimensions of stealth democratic attitudes. It also corroborates the notion brought forward by [Bertsou and Caramani \(2020b\)](#) that technocratic attitudes and populist attitudes are closely related in their rejection of representative party democracy.

Moreover, we model types of technocracy supporters based on their partisanship. By separating respondents according to their party identification, we find that we can distinguish at least two diverse patterns of political support amongst technocracy supporters: those with a mainstream party identification who show above-average political support and support for the EU; and those who identify either with a non-mainstream party or none at all, who show below-average political support and EU support. For this group, technocratic attitudes seem to be part of political disaffection and distrust. Such an interpretation is in line with the notion of technocracy being a thin ideology which can be combined with diverse political content, and embraced by different citizens for different reasons. While some technocracy supporters favour the political status quo and support the European Union - an ultimately technocratic institution - other technocracy supporters reject the EU as much as they reject national representative democracy. Our results find support in robustness tests with EVS 2008 data.

What do these findings imply for the role of technocracy in a post-crisis Europe? First, they show that technocratic attitudes are not only widespread, but also have a tangible impact on Europeans' electoral behaviour, where they drive abstention as well as the vote of anti-system over mainstream parties. Interestingly, this is the case not just in countries hit by the Eurozone crisis, but also in non-bailout countries. And secondly, these findings support the notion that technocracy is

indeed a thin ideology, and that technocratic attitudes might neither be particularly deep-rooted nor particularly consistent across different groups of technocracy supporters. This is in line with [Bertsou and Caramani \(2020b\)](#), who point to the puzzle of citizens simultaneously wanting more popular involvement and more independent expertise over elected politicians. Also [VanderMolen \(2017\)](#) finds that respondents often hold conflicting views by supporting populist and technocratic ideas at the same time, and that while citizens prefer un-elected experts at first sight, this often does not hold when presented with clear choice and real-world scenarios, where “expert process preferences appear to be inconsistent and weak”. Similarly to populist attitudes, technocratic preferences seem to be rather a result of rejecting the democratic status quo, perceived as “both nonresponsive and irresponsible” ([Bertsou and Caramani 2020b](#)), and less about a strong and consistent desire for an alternative, expertise-driven political system. This is both worrying and reassuring at the same time: worrying because it (again) reveals a strong and systematic pattern of dissatisfaction with representative democracy amongst European citizens. And reassuring because this dissatisfaction has not (yet) led to consistent and

deep-reaching desire for the establishment of a technocratic alternative to representative democracy. Certainly, our findings imply that more research about the origins, meaning and depths of technocratic attitudes and behaviour is needed.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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Appendix

Table A1
MAPLE online survey characteristics.

Country	Wave	Sample size	Recontacts	Field dates	Response rate
Belgium	Wave 1	3076	605	15.02.-26.04.2019	52.0
	Wave 2	1006		30.05.-09.08.2019	51.0
Germany	Wave 1	2568	618	15.02.-26.04.2019	44.0
	Wave 2	1008		30.05.-09.08.2019	46.0
Greece	Wave 1	1507	433	15.02.-26.04.2019	42.0
	Wave 2	1008		30.05.-09.08.2019	46.0
Ireland	Wave 1	1514	459	15.02.-26.04.2019	62.0
	Wave 2	1006		30.05.-09.08.2019	60.0
Portugal	Wave 1	2049	572	15.02.-26.04.2019	45.0
	Wave 2	1016		30.05.-09.08.2019	47.0
Spain	Wave 1	2026	564	15.02.-26.04.2019	48.0
	Wave 2	1002		30.05.-09.08.2019	45.0

Table A2:
Descriptive statistics (MAPLE online survey, wave 2).

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Belgium					
Gender (1 = male)	1006	0.483101	0.4999629	0	1
Age (years)	1006	47.59443	16.95691	18	93
Education (groups)	1006	4.357853	1.820604	1	9
Economy got worse/better	971	2.559217	0.9861646	1	5
Satisfaction with EU policies	976	2.498975	1.028815	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	984	2.60874	1.081785	1	5
Trust in nat. parliament	991	4.026236	2.520485	0	10
Ideology (right)	905	5.478453	2.77589	0	10
Support for technocracy	932	3.468884	1.114352	1	5
Germany					
Gender (1 = male)	1008	0.481151	0.4998926	0	1
Age (years)	1008	49.22024	14.73915	18	93
Education (groups)	1008	4.561508	1.524441	2	9
Economy got worse/better	996	2.700803	0.8709951	1	5
Satisfaction with EU policies	987	2.649443	1.07842	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	995	2.946734	1.197825	1	5
Trust in nat. parliament	981	4.427115	3.026758	0	10
Ideology (right)	946	4.909091	1.991033	0	10
Support for technocracy	938	3.304904	1.144239	1	5
Greece					
Gender (1 = male)	1008	0.486111	0.5000552	0	1
Age (years)	1006	45.47614	14.8278	18	95
Education (groups)	1008	4.354167	1.984188	1	9
Economy got worse/better	1002	3.010978	1.093473	1	5
Satisfaction with EU policies	986	2.477688	0.9376551	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	1003	2.535394	1.042746	1	5
Trust in nat. parliament	999	3.194194	2.706099	0	10

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Table A2: (continued)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Ideology (right)	944	4.787076	2.533383	0	10
Support for technocracy	959	3.106361	1.19984	1	5
Ireland					
Gender (1 = male)	1006	0.491054	0.5001686	0	1
Age (years)	1003	43.3669	16.16053	18	88
Education (groups)	1006	4.835984	1.813695	1	9
Economy got worse/better	998	3.142285	0.9667468	1	5
Satisfaction with EU policies	958	3.082463	0.9775352	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	991	3.171544	1.18272	1	5
Trust in nat. parliament	954	4.279874	2.880676	0	10
Ideology (right)	861	5.110337	2.148152	0	10
Support for technocracy	961	3.304891	1.184829	1	5
Portugal					
Gender (1 = male)	1016	0.472441	0.4994858	0	1
Age (years)	1015	47.11823	14.98078	18	87
Education (groups)	1016	3.804134	1.80203	1	9
Economy got worse/better	1007	3.251241	0.9518403	1	5
Satisfaction with EU policies	999	2.787788	0.9710287	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	1010	2.80198	1.163705	1	5
Trust in nat. parliament	1009	4.021804	2.699486	0	10
Ideology (right)	896	4.469866	2.540221	0	10
Support for technocracy	993	3.384693	1.19181	1	5
Spain					
Gender (1 = male)	1002	0.487026	0.5000812	0	1
Age (years)	1002	46.05489	14.84546	18	87
Education (groups)	1002	3.754491	1.817773	1	9
Economy got worse/better	991	2.976791	0.9462666	1	5
Satisfaction with EU policies	963	2.737279	1.028963	1	5
Satisfaction with democracy	985	2.747208	1.203	1	5
Trust in nat. parliament	978	3.906953	2.991036	0	10
Ideology (right)	943	4.348887	2.886056	0	10
Support for technocracy	972	3.680041	1.100273	1	5

Table A3

Party families, May 2019 EP elections.

Party family	Belgium	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain
Centre left	PS*, S.PA*	SPD*	PASOK*, KINAL*, DIMAR*, To Potami*	Social democrats*, Labour*	PS*	PSOE*
Centre right	CD&V*, CDH*	CDU/CSU*, Freie Wähler*	ND*, Recreate Greece*	Fine Gael*, Fianna Fáil* Renua Ireland*	PSD*, CDS-PP*, Aliança*	PP*
Liberal	MR*, OPEN VLD*, DéFI*	FDP*	EK*	–	PDR, IL	Ciudadanos
Green	GROEN*, Ecolo*	Die Grünen*, ÖDP, Tierschutzpartei, Piraten	OP	Green Party*	PAN, PEV, MPT	PACMA
Radical/ populist left	PVDA/PTB	Die Linke	SYRIZA**, MERA, KKE, LAE	Sinn Féin, Solidarity, (Indep. 4 Change, United left alliance)	BE, PCP, PCTP, LIVRE	Podemos, IU
Radical/ populist right	VB, PP	AfD, NPD	EL, ANEL, DE, XA	–	Chega	Vox

* = Mainstream party (centre left, centre right, as well as liberal and green parties if they have been in government in the past 30 years). Own coding, party families based on [Hobolt and Tilley \(2016\)](#), [Volkens et al. \(2019\)](#), [Polk et al. \(2017\)](#), [Zulianello and Mattia \(2019\)](#), [Rooduijn et al. \(2019\)](#). Italics = party not present/very small in the sample. ** = Syriza being radical left, but also incumbent in 2019 is a difficult case. We decided to code them as a mainstream party, given that they have been the main governing party since 2015.

Table A4

Robustness test – technocratic voting behaviour in the EVS 2008.

Vote intention	Belgium	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain
Mainstream party	(Baseline outcome)					
Abstain/blank						
Support for technocracy	0.771 (-1.38)	1.446*** (4.41)	0.902 (-0.76)	1.254+ (1.79)	1.088 (0.60)	1.043+ (1.88)
Ideology (right)	0.944 (-0.73)	0.839*** (-3.76)	0.802*** (-4.04)	0.813* (-2.24)	0.776*** (-4.17)	0.934 (-1.39)
Gender (male)	0.827 (-0.62)	1.063 (0.41)	0.747 (-1.30)	2.437* (2.41)	0.773 (-1.20)	1.137 (0.66)
Age	1.009 (0.99)	1.001 (0.14)	0.973*** (-3.74)	0.944*** (-4.08)	0.983* (-2.44)	0.978*** (-3.57)
Education	0.957 (-0.56)	0.746*** (-5.12)	1.140* (2.08)	0.728** (-3.06)	0.928 (-1.19)	0.917+ (-1.80)
Radical/populist right						
Support for technocracy						

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Table A4 (continued)

Vote intention	Belgium	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain
	1.289*	0.943				
	(2.17)	(-0.19)				
Ideology (right)	1.054	2.597***				
	(1.08)	(5.72)				
Gender (male)	1.332	1.300				
	(1.57)	(0.49)				
Age	0.995	0.952**				
	(-0.82)	(-3.15)				
Education	1.215***	0.615**				
	(3.95)	(-2.59)				
Radical/populist left						
Support for technocracy	0.940	1.249*	0.840	1.028	1.411+	0.812
	(-0.39)	(2.31)	(-1.35)	(0.13)	(1.71)	(-1.29)
Ideology (right)	1.046	0.417***	0.511***	0.723**	0.410***	0.476***
	(0.68)	(-13.43)	(-11.11)	(-2.93)	(-8.43)	(-6.68)
Gender (male)	1.163	1.573*	0.935	1.329	0.973	1.526
	(0.59)	(2.51)	(-0.32)	(0.67)	(-0.09)	(1.36)
Age	0.983*	1.016**	0.977***	0.922***	0.988	0.990
	(-2.23)	(2.93)	(-3.36)	(-4.36)	(-1.12)	(-0.93)
Education	0.893+	0.956	1.191**	0.830	1.074	1.150+
	(-1.65)	(-0.68)	(3.01)	(-1.51)	(0.83)	(1.86)
Observations	1275	1316	852	449	539	785
Pseudo R ²	0.024	0.160	0.190	0.148	0.126	0.091

Multinomial regression models. Coefficients are relative risk ratios; t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Data source: European Values Study (EVS) 2008.

Table A5

Robustness test – types of technocracy supporters in the EVS 2008.

Technocracy supporters	Belgium	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Portugal	Spain
Mainstream party ID	(Baseline outcome)					
No party ID						
Satisfaction with democracy	0.976	0.452***	0.828	0.762	0.853	1.074
	(-0.10)	(-5.50)	(-0.73)	(-1.06)	(-1.08)	(0.47)
Confidence in the EU	0.757	0.690**	0.558*	0.748	0.805	0.704*
	(-1.25)	(-3.06)	(-2.31)	(-1.12)	(-1.44)	(-2.27)
Ideology (right)	1.008	0.858**	0.964	1.003	0.841**	0.964
	(0.10)	(-2.89)	(-0.38)	(0.03)	(-2.61)	(-0.58)
Gender (male)	0.674	0.925	0.567	0.994	0.777	0.841
	(-1.22)	(-0.42)	(-1.42)	(-0.02)	(-1.17)	(-0.74)
Age	1.008	0.994	0.988	0.987	0.989	0.992
	(0.83)	(-1.01)	(-1.04)	(-1.03)	(-1.61)	(-1.13)
Education	1.025	0.949	1.056	0.863	1.099	1.055
	(0.28)	(-0.76)	(0.53)	(-1.54)	(1.64)	(0.95)
Non-mainstream party ID						
Satisfaction with democracy	0.977	0.305***	0.860	0.518	0.491**	0.557***
	(-0.16)	(-7.67)	(-0.62)	(-1.58)	(-3.20)	(-3.59)
Confidence in the EU	0.905	0.678**	0.742	0.653	0.860	1.075
	(-0.79)	(-3.07)	(-1.17)	(-1.06)	(-0.70)	(0.43)
Ideology (right)	1.033	0.646***	0.681***	0.846	0.419***	0.647***
	(0.65)	(-7.48)	(-3.64)	(-1.08)	(-7.67)	(-5.88)
Gender (male)	1.234	1.505*	1.483	2.002	1.281	1.437
	(1.17)	(2.10)	(0.92)	(1.21)	(0.76)	(1.43)
Age	0.993	1.011+	0.976*	0.940**	0.972**	0.992
	(-1.24)	(1.72)	(-2.02)	(-2.67)	(-2.66)	(-1.05)
Education	1.084	0.857*	1.113	0.663**	1.136	1.110+
	(1.62)	(-2.10)	(1.03)	(-2.59)	(1.45)	(1.67)
Observations	815	879	188	241	447	560
Pseudo R ²	0.011	0.117	0.113	0.076	0.127	0.074

Multinomial regression models. Coefficients are relative risk ratios; t statistics in parentheses. + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Data source: European Values Study (EVS) 2008.

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