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INTRODUCTION

International organizations in a new era of populist nationalism

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Abstract
This article introduces the special issue on International Organizations in a New Era of Populist Nationalism. The special issue aims to clarify the stakes for and the politics of international organizations in a time of rising populist nationalism around the world. In this introductory essay, we attempt to disentangle the rise of populism and a resurgence of nationalism as distinct processes and concepts. While neither force is new, we observe significant variation across countries in the type of level of nationalist and populist objections to international institutions. We develop a typology for thinking about how and when populism, nationalism, or their combination might have different effects on international cooperation and organizations. Finally, we review the specific article contributions to the special issue and how they fit with the themes developed in this essay. The final section concludes with questions and ideas for future research on the topic that will enhance our understanding of the complex challenges – and potential opportunities – for international cooperation and organizations in the years ahead.

Keywords Globalization · International relations · International economic order and integration · International organizations · Political economy

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1 Introduction

Around the world, populism and nationalism are on the rise. Everywhere one looks, it seems, the tide is shifting away from globalization and global governance toward

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economic nationalism and a rising backlash against international organizations. Recent economic and political developments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Eurozone have raised serious challenges to globalization and the multilateral economic and security institutions that have been the bedrock of the liberal international order since World War II. President Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, as well as his attacks on NATO and his push for extensive protectionist trade policies and immigration restrictions have cast doubts on American participation in global governance. In Europe, Brexit, the refugee crisis, and the lingering effects of the Eurozone financial crisis threaten to fracture the European Union, to trigger the breakup of the United Kingdom, and to re-divide Europe along new economic and geopolitical lines.

This surge in populist nationalism has not been limited to the United States and the UK. Turkey, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Brazil, and other countries have also seen a rise in anti-globalization attitudes and the ascendancy of parties and politicians advocating populist, nationalist, and authoritarian ideas as centerpieces of their platforms and policies. This has led to challenges to other multilateral and regional political and economic institutions. In Africa, similar trends have led to calls for halting participation in the International Criminal Court (ICC). Of late, it is difficult to find an international or regional institution that has not been heavily criticized or threatened by a member state's leaders.

This rise of populist nationalism presents a challenge to international institutions. These challenges, however, are not new. Nationalism has always been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, a central challenge to any international arrangement or institution that constrains national sovereignty for the purposes of global governance and the pursuit of mutual gains between states. Populism also has a long history, but it has historically been less present than nationalism in debates over international institutions. What appears to be new today is the combination of the two together in so many places at once: a simultaneous populist demand for a redistribution of gains combined with a nationalist move to reclaim sovereignty from international arrangements. Another new aspect of this populist-nationalist awakening is its location. This rising populism/nationalism has been most prevalent in the very countries that founded and have been at the core of global leadership: the United States and Western Europe. Of course, similar dynamics reigned during the interwar era, but they had not been a feature in the developed democracies at the heart of the post-WWII era until the last decade. Rather, from 1945 to the early twenty-first century, nationalist and populist objections to global governance arrangements were primarily a developing country and authoritarian regime phenomenon. Now, threats in core "powerful states" and the global hegemon – the United States – have cast doubts on the future of international institutions that have been the foundation of the global economy and the liberal international order for over seven decades.

This special issue of the *Review of International Organizations* brings together a set of scholars and research articles that aim to clarify the stakes for and the politics of international organizations in this new era of rising populist nationalism. In this introductory essay, we try to disentangle what we see as two distinct, yet related processes: the rise of populism and a resurgence of nationalism. Much of the current discussion of the international implications of these movements has blurred the two concepts, or in some cases confused them. We argue that neither force is new – they

have deep histories within countries (populism), in international relations (nationalism), and in combination. And while the locus of these movements has expanded to the developed world, we see significant variation across countries in the type of level of nationalist and populist objections to international institutions.

In the remainder of this essay we first discuss both populist and nationalist movements, noting that the former are rarely internationally focused, while the latter are almost always internationally focused. We suggest this distinction should help us hone our theoretical and empirical focus as scholars attempt to unravel the causes and consequences of the surge of anti-internationalist sentiment around the globe. We then develop a typology for thinking about how and when populism, nationalism, or their combination might have different effects on international cooperation and international organizations. Finally, we review the specific article contributions to this special issue and how they fit with the themes developed in this essay. The final section concludes with ideas for future research on the topic. Inevitably, this introduction and the research articles in the Special Issue raise more questions than they answer. Nonetheless, our hope is that these pieces help pave the way for new research on the topic that will enhance our understanding of the complex challenges – and potential opportunities – for international cooperation and organizations in the years ahead.

2 Populist-nationalism in hard times: Old wine and old bottles?

Populism as a political movement has its origins in the mid-nineteenth century. Some politicians took up the populist mantle in the United States in response to growing immigration in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. These movements were heavily nativist – opposed in particular to immigration from Ireland and Germany. The core idea of the movement was to keep the American national identity as free from outside influence as possible. A parallel populist movement sprouted in the United States in the later part of the nineteenth century and centered on the agricultural sector's call for economic redistribution. This agrarian populism was less concerned about threats from "outsiders" and focused instead on the wealthy, upper-class Americans which they felt had used capitalist tools to create a sizable income gap between Americans.

Both strands of populism – nativist and redistributionist – have two tendencies relevant to a discussion of international relations. First, all populists attempt to rally a core group of supporters against another out-group. For the nativist populist strand, that is commonly immigrants and other "outsiders" of the nation. For redistributionist populists, that group is the wealthy or those considered to be economically privileged. Second, all populist movements tend to be anti-elite. We return to discuss elitism momentarily, but we wish to emphasize the first component of populism and draw out the nativist and non-nativist distinction. Indeed, we would argue for keeping the two strands of populism, nativist and redistributionist, analytically and conceptually distinct. Nativism is always anti-immigrant, which nearly always implies an anti-internationalist stance, mapping closely onto nationalistic concerns about sovereignty.

Populists from the redistributionist perspective may or may not be anti-internationalist. In the US, the emphasis for agrarian populists historically and supporters of former U.S. Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders and left-wing populism today was and is on income distribution issues. For redistributionist populists, elites

have rigged the game to reap the rewards. The changing of institutions may include international arrangements – Sanders was a critic of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and popular Democratic U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio has long been opposed to free trade and international trade agreements – but this strain of populism can lack the anti-globalism of the nativists. Indeed, as we argue below, populist leaders in the developing world often criticize international institutions, but rarely, if ever, call for their destruction. Rather, they argue against the rules (made by elites in wealthy countries) that do not offer enough benefits to their country and/or their domestic constituents.

Thus, we argue strongly for the importance of treating populism as an independent and distinct concept from nationalism. Not all populists are nationalists, and not all nationalists are populists. Treating these -isms as distinct, as we argue below, sheds light on the implications of the populist-nationalist turn in domestic politics for international organizations. Before we engage in this exercise, however, we first discuss how we conceptualize populism and nationalism on their own, as well as how these ideologies vary across countries.

3 Conceptualizing populism

One difficulty evident in the current literature is defining exactly what populism is. This is not a new dilemma for scholars. Indeed, there are a host of different definitions in use, emphasizing a range of different traits (Collier 2001; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013), and this is a problem tracing back to the classic volume by Ionescu and Gellner (1969). More recent work also defines or describes populism in a variety of different ways. Fukuyama (2018), for example, argues that populists build connections with a certain segment of the population to help disenfranchise another. Similarly, Pirro et al. (2018) contend that populists are those that support the "pure" part of the nation while attacking elites. Rupnik (2016) notes populists are defined by their emphasis on the will of the people over the rule of law. These definitions highlight important aspects of populism, yet each (like many others) defines populists primarily by their tactics rather than by their beliefs or preferences. This does not help distinguish various political movements from one another, either across or within countries. For example, Fukuyama (2018) notes a key aspect of defining a populist movement is its desire for policies that are popular in the short-run but detrimental in the long-run. Unfortunately, that description could be made of a large number of political parties over space and time.

For the purposes of our argument and this volume, we build on the definition of Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, see also Mudde 2004), who define populism as "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus the 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people" (150).[1] One key advantage is that this definition moves away from tactics, allows variation in types of populist movements, and leaves the issue of nativism as neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for classification as a populist group. A second, and perhaps more important advantage, is that this broad definition encompasses both left-

[1] For similar definitions, see Urbinati (2018), Laclau (2005), and Stavrakakis and Katsembekis (2014).

and right-wing populism. Left-wing populists, such as Bernie Sanders in the US and Syriza (Greece) and Podemos (Spain) in Europe, tend to emphasize redistributive policies while avoiding nativist/xenophobic stances. In contrast, right-wing populists, such as Viktor Orban in Hungary or Donald Trump in the US, tend to link their critiques of elites and with the international sources of the elites' power.

This formulation of populism encompasses a range of political movements whose beliefs are: a) exclusionary and openly hostile towards a particular group in society (e.g., immigrants, wealthy) and b) anti-elite (whether those elite are local or international). Thus, in our view, neither xenophobia or nationalism is a prerequisite for populist parties or movements. While the "elites" against which populists organize and position themselves are – at least in the cases of the US and EU countries in recent years – broadly supportive of international organizations and globalization, they need not be, nor do the populists opposing them necessarily need to be strongly opposed to IOs or economic openness.

Why is this conceptualization important for the study of populism and nationalism in the context of international organizations? Largely because populist movements do not necessarily imply a rejection of international cooperation generally, or membership and participation in specific international organizations. For populists of the nativist variant, cooperation will surely be rare and on their own terms: the metric is something similar to relative gains position – if cooperation makes the country stronger relative to other states, it can be accepted even if the populist party or leader has little interest in the broader mutual gains of international cooperation. This is certainly the Trump administration position vis-à-vis most international treaties (NAFTA/USMCA) and organizations (the UN, World Bank, NATO, etc.), and it also seems to nicely characterize the position of some political supporters of Trump, such as soybean farmers in the rural Midwest, who favor protectionism and fair trade but are now bemoaning the loss of TPP and the negative impact of the Trump administration's trade war with China. Similarly, in the UK, while Brexiteers claim to want a clean break from the EU, an interesting counterfactual for some portion of the Brexiteers would be whether their position had softened with better prospects for more favorable membership terms. Indeed, as the deadline for Brexit nears, it is not difficult to find instances of vocal Brexiteers claiming that their preferred outcome is really something similar to the close-but-not-members arrangements of Switzerland or Norway, rather than the more extreme "clean break" view of the most strident supporters of Brexit in the British Conservative Party.[2] This heterogeneity in the reasons for supporting populist nationalist parties or movements is also evident in Germany, where some supporters of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party are former supporters of the Social Democrats, while others have defected from the Christian Democrats. Thus, it seems that some voters are increasingly supporting right-wing parties mainly for economic reasons, while others are more motivated by nationalist and anti-foreigner sentiments.

For the redistributionist populists, the international cooperation calculation is different than that of nationalists, focusing mainly on the question of who within society benefits from international cooperation, rather than the question of how to permanently extricate the country from the fetters of global governance. Cooperation that impinges

[2] https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-lawmakers/hard-brexit-faction-in-mays-party-demands-clean-break-from-eu-idUSKCN1G50PX

on sovereignty but that is either neutral for distributional politics or has no clear influence (e.g., intelligence cooperation) would not be eschewed by the redistributionists. Of course, if elites are unlikely to distribute gains widely or appropriate institutions do not exist to fairly distribute those gains, one could imagine these populists to reject cooperation. Indeed, Milner's work on interests, institutions, and information (Milner 1997; without reference to populists) suggest how this could be the case for any domestic group as they consider whether to support international cooperation.

Thus, one could imagine a set of populist-redistributionist-inspired actors calling for international governance and cooperation to assist in redistribution. Indeed, a powerful global movement in the 1970s is illustrative of this approach: the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO was inspired by OPEC's oil embargo during the 1973 October War. That incident demonstrated to developing countries that coordination of resistance to the demands of wealthy states could pay dividends. The NIEO involved "a series of specific demands and considerations" by developing states who hoped to change the nature of the international economic system (Cox 1979: 259). One of the intellectual fathers of the field of IPE, Charles Kindleberger (1975), once described the NIEO movement as "World Populism". He noted the parallels between the nineteenth century domestic movements and the twentieth century's international version: "The claim is made today that developed countries are an urban area which has pushed its rural dependency abroad. City/country clash has evolved into developed/less developed confrontation" (Kindleberger 1975: 4). Notable in his writing on the movement, however, is his recognition of the goals of NIEO members to form more OPEC-like cartels, increasing international cooperation through institutions to set prices and therefore increase their own economic surplus. Indeed, he called for "OECD countries to stay clear of the morass…of participating in international agreements" in order to regulate commodity markets.

One political scientist, Robert Johnson (1983: 41), also suggested that "there are striking parallels between the new populism of the developing countries, reflected in their demands for a new international economic order (NIEO), and the older agrarian populism of 19th century America" (Johnson 1983). For Johnson, the American and international populist movements grew from a common cause: asymmetric interdependence between agricultural and industrial sectors. As American farmers suffered under land ownership and exchange rate policies, developing countries in the post-colonial era served as natural resource exporters (periphery) for manufacturing interests (core) and were not given an appropriate share of profits nor governance rights. Crucially, however, Johnson (1983: 53) notes that rather than rejecting international cooperation and institutions, "developing countries have argued for fuller and more effective participation in both the decision making and the benefits of international organizations." For the redistributionist-populist, international cooperation (with one another) and voice in international institutions were part and parcel to a strategy of promoting more even development.

Beyond the NIEO, more recently the developing countries' rejection of the Washington Consensus, and its attendant institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, was also informed by redistributionist concerns (as well as sovereignty issues). A key critique in the developing world of Washington Consensus goals was the influence of these policies on populist-friendly programs. Indeed, the most vocal opponents of the Washington Consensus policy agenda – "stabilize, privatize, and liberalize" (Rodrik

2006) – throughout the last several decades have been socialist and left-wing populist leaders (e.g., Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia) in Latin America. On the other hand, other populist leaders in the region (e.g., Lula da Silva in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori in Peru) embraced all or much of the Washington Consensus during their tenure in office.

One final note on populism. First, in contrast to the large literature in comparative politics on populism (De Cleen 2017; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018), we spend little time here discussing the anti-elite nature of populist movements. Although this aspect of populism is vitally important for understanding the domestic motivations and implications of populist leaders and parties, we argue it is less important for understanding the impact of populism at the international level. This is because, for most individuals in most nations, questions of international governance are inevitably seen as an elite-driven enterprise. Consequently, both nativist and non-nativist strands of populism adhere to anti-elitist rhetoric. For nativists, the elites can be domestic or international elites, while for the non-nativists, the target will more commonly (though not exclusively) be the latter. In either case, however, the anti-elite position of populist leaders and parties is a constant. Whether or not that anti-elitism manifests itself in the form of hostility to international organizations and international cooperation, then, depends on the degree to which a particular populist movement also embraces nativism and nationalism.

4 Conceptualizing nationalism

As with populism, there are a wide variety of definitions of nationalism. The classic minimalist definition is from Gellner (1983): "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1). Greenfeld takes a broader view, defining nationalism as "an umbrella term covering national identity, national consciousness, and nationality" (Greenfeld 1992, 3). For some scholars, nationalism can be non-oppositional (Hymans 2001; Hymans 2006), "producing national pride without loathing or fear of an external 'other'" (Mylonas and Kuo (2017, 3). For others, however, nationalism creates an "us vs. them" dynamic, with the delineation of a national/state-based in-group inevitably creating an "other" against which members of the nation are identified (Mylonas and Kuo 2017; Tajfel 1982; Brown 2000; Brewer 2001).

How exactly, then, does nationalism relate to populism and international organizations? In our view, the combination of populist views on redistribution and opposition to elites is most threatening to international cooperation when it is combined with nationalist or nativist opposition to economic openness, immigration, and/or the sacrifice of national sovereignty. Since many of the most prominent international organizations are explicitly designed to facilitate international economic integration, this combination presents the greatest challenge to IOs. For nativist populists, "the people" must be protected not only from enemies and elites within the state, but also (and often, primarily) from those without, who are often defined as the central enemies of the nation.[3] Indeed, as Rodrik

[3] See, e.g., https://www.economist.com/special-report/2011/11/12/beyond-the-fringe & https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-defiant-as-conservative-critique-grows/

(2018) notes, this distinction is one of the key hallmarks distinguishing right-wing populism from left-wing populism. For left-wing populists, the main "enemies of the people" are the wealthy and large corporations domestically; in contrast, for right-wing populists, the enemies come from beyond the border: immigrants, refugees, international bureaucrats, and IOs themselves.

Of course, nationalism as a bulwark against the infringement of sovereignty is not only a tool of nativist populists. Indeed, classic theorists of regional integration – both functionalist and neofunctionalist – wrestled with how to tame nationalist opposition against integration projects (Haas 1958; Mitrany 1943). Hoffmann's (1966: 901) critique of neofunctionalism suggested it underappreciated the forces of nationalism: "among the men who see in 'national sovereignty' the Nemesis of mankind, those who put their hopes in the development of regional superstates are illogical, those who put their hopes in the establishment of a world state are Utopian, those who put their hopes in the growth of functional political communities more inclusive than the nation-state are too optimistic." In short, nationalism and the sovereignty shield as protection against integration and international intrusion into domestic politics has a long history.

What is new about the recent emergence of populist, nationalist parties with strong hostility to international cooperation and institutions? We argue there are two key differences. First, a major difference from the earlier decades of the postwar era is geography. No longer is the backlash against international institutions limited to the global south, as it largely was in the latter decades of the twentieth century. This is, undoubtedly, due largely to the fact that the Great Recession and the migration crisis both hit the industrialized countries hardest (in contrast to the crises of the 1980s and 1990s, which centered primarily in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe), stoking anti-globalization sentiments there most profoundly.

Second, the populist dimension of these recent movements has shifted to become more openly nativist. Indeed, of all the political backlashes to globalization in the last decade, perhaps the most visible and salient – in both the United States and Europe, in particular – has been rising antipathy to immigration. In the US, the Trump administration has made building a wall on the Mexican border to keep out Latin American migrants and refugees the centerpiece of its political and policy agenda. In Europe, the refugee crisis has placed free movement – both into and within the European Union – at the center of domestic and European political debates. A full exploration of why hostility to immigration has become a centerpiece of contemporary populist nationalism is beyond the scope of this article. Our prior, however, is that increased hostility to immigration is driven largely by the return of migration as a key aspect of economic globalization in the last decade. The challenges and political controversies about globalization in the first three decades of the post-Bretton Woods era were mostly about the winners and losers from cross-border trade and finance. As a result, the domestic and international political cleavages centered mainly on the distributional consequences of trade and financial crises and demands for redistributive policies to compensate the "losers" from globalization. In contrast, events of the last decade, such as the European refugee crisis and rising intra-EU immigration within the single market, have brought concerns about the migration dimension of globalization back to the fore of political debates.

Of course, a key exception to this is the American case, where the Trump administration's focus on the nonexistent Southern border crisis runs directly at odds with

actual immigration patterns: net migration from Mexico is now negative, and border apprehensions are the lowest they have been in decades. Thus, rising hostility on the American right to "illegal immigration" and fears about the "caravan" arriving from Central and South America constitute a surge in nativism and xenophobia disconnected from the material economic realities on the ground. In any case, it is clear from both the European and American experiences in the last decade that cross-border migration has once again joined trade and finance as a key dimension of political debate about the future of globalization and international cooperation.

5 Populism, nationalism, and international organizations

How does this discussion of populism, nationalism, and their intersection help us think about research on international institutions and global governance? We argue that it helps to clarify the theoretical and empirical scope of what we are seeking to explain when we discuss the backlash against international institutions. Some of this backlash mirrors traditional nationalist sovereignty concerns over decreased autonomy and independence. For example, the rising unpopularity of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa, especially South Africa, can be read as a classic case of sovereignty protection against an encroaching international institution (Mills and Bloomfield 2018). This type of backlash is not new, is not clearly linked to either rising populism or a surge in nationalism, and is fairly common across space and time in international relations.

However, other instances of the recent backlash against international institutions contain a combination of the nationalist and populist trends outlined in the previous section. The pro-Brexit narrative, for example, is more than an issue of traditional sovereignty preservation; it also contains significant nativist tones, yet less in terms of either traditional international or domestic populist redistribution. In contrast, the anti-EU and anti-ECB rhetoric in Greece, Italy, and other Eurozone crisis countries has focused more on populist re-distributional issues. Thus, to lump together these three cases (South Africa, Great Britain, and Greece) in an attempt to assess the origins and influence of populist nationalism obscures important differences that should be important to theory.

We are certainly not the first to note the differing arguments of the European left and right with regard to Europe (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2009), and recent scholarship highlights how attitudes toward European integration are complex and multifaceted (e.g., Schneider 2019; De Vries 2018; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Yet, outside the context of Euroskeptic parties, there is little to suggest that the heterogeneity of anti-institutionalist sentiment is important. The very presence of variation in the anti-institutionalist sentiment across space and time suggests different causes, different solutions, and a number of questions. For example, why do some anti-institutional parties and leaders limit their rhetoric only to arguments about the preservation of national sovereignty? Why not also turn to more xenophobic, nativist rhetoric, as has been the case in Hungary and Poland? Why do some movements prioritize re-distributional issues, as in the case of Greece, while others do not?

We believe it is possible to think about a typology to classify the type of the backlash against international institutions across nationalist and populist dimensions (Fig. 1). Beginning in the lower right cell, we have cases where neither populism nor

nationalism are resurgent. In such cases, we expect a high degree of cosmopolitanism – that is, strong support for international cooperation and integration. Moving up, we have cases where nationalist/nativist sentiments are strong but not matched with populism; these are the aforementioned cases, as with South Africa and the ICC, where countries are protective of sovereignty but not opposed to international organization and cooperation per se. Here, we expect governments to engage in efforts to renegotiate the terms of their international commitments, in order to minimize sovereignty costs. But, in the absence of strong anti-elitism or anti-establishment sentiment, governments are not likely to fully abdicate membership in IOs, nor is the basis of their objection a concern about elitism. For example, Moravcsik's (2000) argument of how established democracies may avoid strong commitments to emerging human rights regimes is a clear example of this dynamic.

Moving to the lower left cell, we find country cases where nationalist/nativist sentiments are weak, but populism is strong. In these instances, we expect parties and political leaders to be critical of the policies and rules of international organizations, but not fundamentally opposed to membership on sovereignty or xenophobic grounds. Consequently, we expect populist, non-nationalist governments to object to rules and the content or substance of international treaties and policies, but again, not to go so far as to withdraw from international institutions. We would place a movement like the NIEO in this portion of the table.

Finally, in the top left cell, we have cases of populist nationalism, where governments are strongly opposed to elites/establishments *and* most jealous of national sovereignty/opposed to international integration and foreigners. It is in these cases, where the key dimensions of populism fuse together with strong nativist sentiments, where the backlash against international institutions should be most likely. Here, we expect governments to be most stridently opposed to international organizations, both on the grounds that they impinge on national sovereignty and expose the country to the dangers of foreign influence, and because they represent the preferences of globalized elites – the very people most likely to be identified by populist nationalist leaders as the "enemy." Brexit is the most prominent case here today, along with President Trump's broaching of the previously unthinkable possibility that the US might withdrawal from core institutions such as NATO and the WTO. As Inken von Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulas highlight in their paper in this special issue, however, withdrawal from IOs is far from a rare event in international relations.

Of course, it is also helpful to think about these two dimensions as a continuum: although we draw lines to create discrete categories here along each continuum, any particular political movement could be placed in this two-dimensional space further or nearer the dividing lines. Thus, a movement like the NIEO does possess some nationalistic sentiment, yet is not as strongly nationalistic as current movements in Central Europe, the U.K., and the U.S. Moreover, we have implicitly chosen the movement or political party as our level of analysis. It is difficult to characterize entire states' views on these issues in sweeping terms that would be applicable to all relevant actors or individual voters in democratic countries.

While this typology is preliminary, we believe it offers a useful way to begin to think about the complex and heterogeneous relationship, across space and time, between resurgent populism and nationalism at the domestic level in recent years and international cooperation and global governance. Although the articles in this issue do not

explicitly adopt this framework, each focus on key aspects of this relationship. In the next section, we introduce each article individually and highlight the key themes they develop.

6 Contributions of the special issue

The articles in this special issue provide new theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence that help us better understand the domestic and international political economy of the surge in populist nationalism and its implications for the governance, policies, and impact of IOs. Although the individual articles differ in their theoretical approaches and specific empirical analyses, there is a clear and central unifying theme: rising populism and nationalism has altered the domestic political foundations upon which the liberal international order has rested since World War II. Shifts in both public opinion and the interests of and balance of power between different types of firms have major implications for domestic support or opposition to economic openness and international cooperation. At the same time, the articles in the special issue highlight both the populist and nationalist dimensions that we discuss above. Indeed, they show that some voters are motivated primarily by the nationalist, anti-elitism and beliefs that globalization – and the IOs that enable it – have not benefited them, while others are concerned more with the sovereignty costs of IOs.

One way that the domestic political foundations of international cooperation have changed is through shifting public opinion. Two articles in the special issue explore this phenomenon directly. In the first article, "Popular Non-Support for International Organizations: How Extensive and What Does this Represent?" David Bearce and Brittany Joliff Scott investigate popular non-support for international organizations. Using survey data from the International Social Survey Programme's National Identity module, fielded across multiple countries in 1995, 2003, and 2013, they find that, within most countries, citizen attitudes about IOs have become less positive over time. Bearce and Joliff Scott argue that citizens tend to lump together many different things that appear as "international," including trade, financial flows, and international organizations. Consequently, citizens' attitudes to international organizations are less about the IOs themselves, or particular policy outputs of those IOs, but rather maps closely onto voters' preferences for international economic openness more broadly.

Using a composite measure of IO attitudes drawn from the most recent wave (2013) of the ISSP's National Identity module, Bearce and Joliff Scott find that education is positively associated with a more favorable attitude about IOs, and that this education effect is stronger than any other material variable, stronger than political partisanship, and stronger than nationalism in explaining IO attitudes. They also find that this observed difference in IO attitudes between more and less skilled individuals increases in countries with more immigrants, decreases in countries with greater trade protection, and also decreases in countries experiencing greater investment inflows. These results strongly suggest that domestic political support for international organizations is closely linked to domestic political debates about economic globalization, with support for IOs and support for openness driven primarily by individuals' position as distributional "winners" or "losers" from international trade and financial integration. Bearce and Joliff Scott's findings provide support for the received wisdom by which

individuals gravitate to the nationalist-populist quadrant of Fig. 1. Their findings also reinforce existing work on the correlation between education/skills and views on engagement in international-focused process such as trade (cf. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). We would argue this is why populism and nationalism can be hard to disentangle empirically and, as we previously suggested, why they are often treated as two sides of the same coin.

In the second article, "Euroscepticism and Government Accountability in the European Union," Christina Schneider delves further into individuals' attitudes to IOs, specifically attitudes toward European integration. Using the results of a conjoint survey experiment with over 2500 citizens in Germany, Schneider analyzes how pro-European and anti-European voters' attitudes influences how voters hold the government accountable for EU-level policy decisions. Building on recent important work on the multidimensionality of domestic politics related to European integration (e.g., de Vries and Hobolt 2012), Schneider argues that attitudes toward the EU now constitute a second dimension of politics in Germany, alongside the traditional left-right dimension. However, she argues that this new dimension matters differently for pro- and anti-European voters. Whereas Euroskeptic voters are likely to use their attitudes toward the EU to hold their governments accountable, pro- European voters tend to rely on their specific attitudes toward particular policies to assess the responsiveness of their politicians. Schneider finds that voters do hold politicians accountable for taking positions that reflect voters' own attitudes toward the EU, but the effect is almost entirely driven by Euroskeptic voters. These results suggest that dynamics of public opinion tend to make national politicians more responsive to Euroskeptic voters. This finding supports the argument that European integration is still less important to pro-European supporters of mainstream parties than left-right issues, making mainstream parties disproportionally more responsive to Euroskeptic voters. This, in turns, makes deeper European integration difficult, especially in the current environment. One can imagine similar studies in other industrialized countries, focusing on other IOs, finding similar results, with similar implications. For example, opponents of the UN and trade agreements/institutions in the US tend to be more vocal than supporters of these institutions, and politicians of both main parties have responded accordingly in the last decade.

Again, Schneider's findings illustrate the importance of clearly distinguishing between populism and nationalism as concepts. Her two policy dimensions could be viewed as being highly correlated with our nationalism-populism dimensions. Many pro-European voters may support redistribution and could even hold anti-elitist views – what would typically be described as populist attitudes. Yet, they simultaneously embrace the European integration project as a whole, even if they oppose or question specific policies at a given point in time. Together, the Bearce/Joliff Scott and Schneider articles highlight the individual foundations of how voters harmed by globalization and skeptical of international integration can be powerful domestic forces constraining national politicians' room to engage in international cooperation.

The next two articles in the special issue highlight a second channel linking domestic politics to IO politics and policies: firm-level lobbying. In their article, "The Service Economy: US Trade Coalitions in an Era of Deindustrialization," Leonardo Baccini, Iain Osgood, and Stephen Weymouth (BOW) examine lobbying by service firms on trade policy. They note that services dominate the US economy and are increasingly traded across borders, yet little is known about service firms' trade policy objectives or

lobbying activities. Analyzing reports issued by US Industry Trade Advisory Committees, BOW find that service firms are highly active in the politics of US trade agreements and – relative to goods-producing firms – are almost uniformly supportive of these agreements, a finding in line with the United States' stark comparative advantage in service sectors. Thus, service firms are a key pro-free trade constituency that supports deeper international economic cooperation. BOW conclude that the increase in pro-trade agreement lobbying by service firms is a key factor explaining the durability of open trade and despite tough times for US manufacturing sectors facing hard times and greater international competition. Ultimately, BOW suggest that service producers in the US and other industrialized countries may be a bulwark in defense of the liberal international economic order against rising populist nationalism and protectionism.

Soo Yeon Kim and Gabriele Spilker, in their article, "Global Value Chains and the Political Economy of WTO Disputes," offer a complementary perspective. They investigate how the rise of global value chains (GVCs) in international trade affects the political economy of trade disputes. They argue that, relative to trade in final goods only, GVC-based trade in intermediate goods lends itself to stronger lobbying of the prospective complainant country government and thus results in a higher likelihood of WTO dispute initiation. They test this argument by first examining the political contestation around US anti-dumping cases ongoing in the WTO era that takes place in International Trade Commission (ITC) hearings. While these cases see significant opposition from firms relying on the imports of intermediate goods, most cases end in favor of petitioners supporting the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Kim and Spilker then quantitatively analyze the effect of intermediate goods trade in products that are the subjects of anti-dumping cases on the incidence of a formal WTO dispute. They find a negative result: they do not observe an increased likelihood of going to the WTO in the presence of strong GVC trade. This indicates, they conclude, that pro-trade coalitions face significant international hurdles and resource constraints in the domestic and international politics of trade disputes.

Together, these two articles highlight that public opinion is only one part of the domestic political story about the politics of trade policy and international cooperation. Firm-level lobbying plays at least as important a role. A key takeaway from the BOW and Kim/Spilker papers is that an increasingly large number of firms in the US (and, by extension, in other OECD countries) – by virtue of their participation in global value chains or their position as competitive service exporters – are strongly in favor of trade liberalization and international trade agreements. In the face of rising populist nationalism in the last decade, these firms constitute a coalition of actors that serves as a bulwark protecting economic openness and international cooperation. With reference to our typology, these papers suggest that firms provide a force attempting to move states out of the upper-left quadrant into the more cosmopolitan quadrant. Recent patterns – including the domestic producer backlash against the Trump administration's trade war and the new preferential trade agreements between the EU, Japan, and Canada – suggest that this pro-cooperation coalition of export-oriented firms still exercises substantial political power despite the rise of protectionist and populist forces. In sum, the design of post-war trade agreements to pit domestic exporters against protectionist still provides strong incentives towards openness (Cooper 1971: 410).

While the first four articles in the special issue highlight how domestic interests and public opinion shape the politics of international institutions, the fifth article reverses

the causal arrow, highlighting how international organizations can transform national party politics. In their article, "Take Back Control?" The Effects of Supranational Integration on Party-system Polarization," Nikitas Konstantinidis, Konstantinos Matakos, and Hande Mutlu-Eren (KMM) focus on the European Union and examine how party polarization within member-states has shifted over time as political and economic integration has deepened within the EU. They argue that there is a strategic trade-off for more extreme parties seeking to gain political support: 1) in an attempt to broaden their electoral appeal, they can tap into diffuse support for European integration by proposing party platform positions in line with the EU's policy constraints; 2) alternatively, they "stick to their guns" and appeal to their core supporters by proposing a more Euroskeptic platform that is close to their core ideology. As supranational integration deepens, the permissible policy space between parties shrinks. This creates space for extreme parties to separate themselves with voters by proposing Euroskeptic policies closer to their party ideal points. Empirically, this suggests a distinct pattern: supranational integration should initially lead to party platform convergence, but at deeper levels generates a political backlash in the form of extreme party platform polarization. Empirically, KMM analyze time-series cross-sectional data at both the party and party-system (country) level, finding the expected effects. This evidence, KMM argue, helps to understand the rising political success of populist and nationalist parties in EU member-states in the last decade. It also provides a strong mechanism by which rising sovereignty costs imposed by international organizations, raising nationalistic concerns over sovereignty, creates political space for parties who would adopt the populist mantra. And, while that space may not necessarily be filled by populist parties, because international organizations (as we suggest above), are inherently viewed as an elite project, there are strong probabilities of these parties emerging.

Finally, the concluding article of the special issue, "Hello, Goodbye: When Do States Withdraw From International Organizations," shifts focus from the domestic politics of IOs and populist nationalism to the specific question of when and why states withdraw from IOs. Drawing on an original dataset of more than 400 IGOs since 1945, documenting more than 200 cases of withdrawal, Inken von Borzyskowski and Felicity Vabulas find that nationalism is not the key driver of IGO withdrawals in the past. Instead, they show that other domestic and international political factors – such as preference divergence, contagion, and the IGO's democratic density – are the main factors linked to states' withdrawals from IOs. These findings have important implications for research on the vitality of international organizations, compliance, contested multilateralism, and the liberal world order. In particular, they suggest that the degree to which rising populism and nationalism poses a threat to the survival of the liberal international order and institutionalized international cooperation may be exaggerated.

7 Conclusions and implications

What do the articles in this special issue tell us about populism, nationalism, and the future of international organizations? In our view, they suggest grounds for both cautious pessimism and cautious optimism. On the side of cautious pessimism, we note that IOs may be a scapegoat for broader political economy problems facing voters. As Bearce and

Joliff Scott highlight, the distributional losers from globalization may "blame" IOs for their plight, regardless of whether specific IOs or specific policies are directly responsible. Since, as Schneider illustrates, national politicians have incentives to respond to these voters that are more skeptical of international organizations, this bodes ill for the future of international cooperation. If national politicians cannot find ways to explain the benefits of IOs to their voters – or to implement domestic policies to compensate those harmed distributionally by the aggregate welfare benefits that IOs help to provide through trade and financial liberalization, policy harmonization, and other outputs – then rising populism and nationalism may indeed pose a threat to the future of the liberal order. Moreover, if KMM's findings about party polarization in the EU generalize to other countries and other IOs, these problems are likely to become worse over time, as deeper international cooperation drives political parties to adopt more extreme positions in pursuit of these voters skeptical of globalization and international integration. If this comes to pass, then more cases in the top left quadrant of Fig. 1, where states consider or act on threats to withdraw from IOs, are likely to occur in the future.

On the side of cautious optimism, however, the other articles in the issue suggest that reports of the demise of the liberal order may be exaggerated. As both BOW and Kim and Spilker suggest, pro-openness and pro-cooperation actors – especially, export-oriented service firms and firms dependent on global value chains – constitute an increasingly powerful political voice on both sides of the Atlantic. Inasmuch as these groups, along with the more highly skilled, pro-globalization voters identified by Bearce and Joliff Scott, carry weight in domestic political debates, then politicians may be less amenable to responding to the isolationist and protectionist demands of other constituents. Furthermore, if von Borzyskowski and Vabulas are correct, then rising populist nationalism may not be the decisive factors shaping whether states remain in and continue to support IOs. Instead, if common preferences, common institutions (democracy), and coordinated behavior are decisive, then the future of IOs may be brighter than most currently believe. Indeed, as the rest of the world's leading economies move forward with new trade agreements and the creation of new IOs, one possible lesson

	Populism	**~Populism**
Nationalism	*Withdrawal*	*Renegotiation/Minimize sovereignty costs*
~Nationalism	*Content debates/Rule objections*	*Cosmopolitanism*

Fig. 1 Potential Effects of Populism and Nationalism on International Organizations

is that populist nationalism and the turn away from international cooperation and integration is primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon. Indeed, with the EU, Canada, and Japan recently signing major new trade deals, the remaining eleven members of the TPP forging ahead without the US, and US withdrawals from the Paris and Iran nuclear agreements (so far) failing to trigger similar responses from their former negotiating partners, the future of IOs seems brighter than a focus on Brexit and Donald Trump might suggest. Whether this pattern of new and continued cooperation persists – or whether the forces of populism and nationalism continue to increase and eventually turn the tide against the liberal order – is one of the great questions in international relations today. Time will tell. There are clearly reasons for both optimism and pessimism. For the moment, we remain cautiously optimistic that institutionalized cooperation and globalization will endure and that withdrawal from and collapse of the major IOs in global governance will remain rare events, even as some countries turn inward and individual IOs face serious challenges to their authority and effectiveness.

Ultimately, as we noted at the outset, both this introduction and the articles in this Special Issue raise more questions than answers. Consequently, there is a great need for more work on the complex relationship between rising populist nationalism and a range of outcomes in international relations, including cooperation, institutional design, compliance, and the policy impact of IOs both globally and domestically. At the domestic level, scholars might fruitfully delve more deeply into questions of the domestic politics of international cooperation. How have specific IOs and their policies contributed to the rise of anti-globalization sentiment domestically? To what extent do citizens perceive IOs as the source of the problems fueling populist nationalism? To what extent is populist nationalism driven by material economic concerns and the distributional consequences of membership in IOs? To what extent is it driven by ideas and normative beliefs? Are there implications that flow from this distinction for international cooperation and policymaking in IOs? At the international level, a similarly broad and important range of questions remain in need of deeper study. What is the role of IOs in mediating international conflicts – both between member-states of specific IOs and more broadly in the international system – arising from populist nationalism and anti-globalization sentiment? Have compliance, bargaining, and commitment problems in international cooperation become more severe in the wake of rising populist nationalism? Does anti-globalization sentiment constrain IO autonomy or empower supranational actors? Is rising populist nationalism within powerful member-states a threat or opportunity for the WTO, IMF, World Bank, etc.? Does the apparent pullback of western, industrialized countries from global governance provide an opportunity for an increased role for emerging economies to govern? Finally, are new regional and multilateral organizations emerging in this new era complements or competitors to existing IOs?

The articles in this Special Issue begin the conversation on some, but certainly not all, of these issues, and there is clearly more research to be done. In the end, both the future of the global economy and the international system are sure to be deeply affected by the surge in populist nationalism of the last decade. Yet, in order to understand exactly how, why, and to what extent, there is much more research to be done. Our hope is that readers find this Special Issue to be informative and thought-provoking, but more importantly, that it motivates them to pick up the baton and engage in their own research on what we believe to be one of the most vitally important and interesting topics in political economy today.

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