The Rightward Shift and Electoral Decline of Social Democratic Parties Under Increasing Inequality

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Online Appendix

A1a List of Countries and Elections (Aggregate Level)

Country	Start and End Date	Number of Elections
Australia	1966 – 2016	20
Austria	1966 – 2019	17
Belgium	1965 – 2014	16
Canada	1965 – 2015	16
Denmark	1966 – 2019	20
Finland	1966 – 2019	15
France	1967 – 2017	13
Germany	1965 – 2017	15
Greece	1974 – 2015	17
Ireland	1965 – 2016	15
Israel	1965 – 2015	15
Italy	1968 – 2018	14
Luxembourg	1968 – 2013	10
Netherlands	1967 – 2017	16
New Zealand	1966 – 2017	18
Norway	1965 – 2017	14
Portugal	1975 – 2015	15
Spain	1977 – 2019	14
Sweden	1968 – 2018	16
Switzerland	1967 – 2015	13
United Kingdom	1966 – 2017	14
United States	1968 – 2016	13

A1b List of Countries and Elections (Individual Level)

Country	Elections	Number of Elections
Australia	1996, 2004, 2007, 2013	4
Austria	2008, 2013, 2017	3
Belgium	1999, 2003	2
Canada	1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015	5
Denmark	1998, 2001, 2007	3
Finland	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015	4
France	2002, 2007, 2012, 2017	4
Germany	1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	6
Greece	2009, 2012, 2015, 2015	4
Ireland	2002, 2007, 2011, 2016	4
Israel	1996, 2003, 2006, 2013	4
Italy	2006, 2018	2
Netherlands	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010	4
New Zealand	1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017	6
Norway	1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017	6
Portugal	2002, 2005, 2009, 2015	4
Spain	1996, 2000, 2004, 2008	4
Sweden	1998, 2002, 2006, 2014	4
Switzerland	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011	4
United Kingdom	1997, 2005, 2015	3
United States	1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016	5

A2 List of Social Democratic Parties

Country	Social Democrat Party/Bloc	Abbreviation
Australia	Australian Labor Party	ALP
Austria	Austrian Social Democratic Party	SPÖ
Belgium	Belgian Socialist Party > Flemish/Francophone Socialist Party	BSP > sp.a/PS
Canada	New Democratic Party	NDP
Denmark	Social Democratic Party	SD
Finland	Finnish Social Democrats	SSDP
France	Socialist Party	PS
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK
Ireland	Labour Party	Labour
Israel	Israeli Labor Party	HaAvoda
Italy	Italian Communist Party > Democrats of the Left > Democratic Party	PCI > PDS > PD
Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	LSAP
Netherlands	Labour Party	PvdA
New Zealand	New Zealand Labour Party	Labour
Norway	Norwegian Labour Party	DnA
Portugal	Socialist Party	PS
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE
Sweden	Social Democratic Labour Party	SAP
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	SPS/PSS
United Kingdom	Labour Party	Labour
United States	Democratic Party	Democrats

A3 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
SD Voted	123,123	0.3001876	0.4583413	0	1
Age	156,720	48.91115	17.31708	16	115
Female	157,805	0.483318	0.4997232	0	1
Education	154,500	2.344939	1.171671	0	4
Income	131,656	2.949679	1.38637	1	5
Rural	125,406	0.2340717	0.4234189	0	1
Union	140,502	0.2357974	0.4244976	0	1
Political Ideology	133,675	5.191734	2.326184	0	10
SD Vote	336	31.02506	11.26148	4.573	56.668
SD Economic Position	335	-1.306501	3.274177	-10.51697	9.319901
SD Culture Position	336	-4.451149	3.730954	-14.59629	5.21253
Gini t-1	288	29.05144	4.111755	20.27872	38.15172
Government Spending t-1	304	44.07261	8.074082	23.12152	68.54779
GDP Growth t-1	325	2.679351	2.764199	-9.169651	25.48517
Unemployment t-1	326	6.356359	4.342868	0	26.5
Union Density	330	40.71785	19.70553	8.5	97.17
Turnout	336	77.84857	12.47364	42.2	95.8
SD Vote e-1	332	31.73524	11.21227	4.573	57.71
Incumbent	336	0.3541667	0.4789733	0	1
Disproportionality	336	5.52204	4.791182	0.41833	24.61331
Left Competitors e-1 (log)	333	1.584439	1.127834	-0.8915981	3.710641
Radical Right Competitors e-1 (log)	333	0.7828231	1.11647	-0.0833816	3.363842
Income Quintile 1	131,656	0.1995048	0.3996296	0	1
Pro-Redistribution	42,556	0.6245888	0.4842346	0	1
CR Economic Position	329	3.644283	3.452184	-8.381349	13.18232
Globalization t-1	301	75.55262	9.698405	50.02024	91.01247
Palma Ratio t-1	257	2.270377	0.7478547	1.008223	5.525486

A4 Coding Policy Variables

Economic and socio-cultural policy positions were constructed using the state-market (economic) and (progressive-conservative) society dimensions, which comprise the following components from MARPOR (Volkens et al. 2020):

Economic (State-Market) Dimension			
Left-Wing		**Right-Wing**	
per403	Market Regulation	per401	Free Market Economy
per404	Economic Planning	per402	Incentives: Positive
per405	Corporatism/Mixed Economy	per407	Protectionism: Negative
per406	Protectionism: Positive	per414	Economic Orthodoxy
per409	Keynesian Demand Management	per505	Welfare State Limitation
per412	Controlled Economy		
per413	Nationalisation		
per415	Marxist Analysis		
per416	Anti-Growth Economy: Positive		
per504	Welfare State Expansion		
Society (Progressive-Conservative) Dimension			
Left-Wing		**Right-Wing**	
per105	Military: Negative	per104	Military: Positive
per106	Peace	per109	Internationalism: Negative
per107	Internationalism: Positive	per110	European Community/Union: Negative
per108	European Community/Union: Positive	per601	National Way of Life: Positive
per501	Environmental Protection	per603	Traditional Morality: Positive
per503	Equality: Positive	per605	Law and Order: Positive
per602	National Way of Life: Negative	per608	Multiculturalism: Negative
per604	Traditional Morality: Negative		
per607	Multiculturalism: Positive		
per705	Underprivileged Minority Groups		

A5 Mainstream Right Economic Position Variable Robustness Check

Following Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019) and Benedetto et al. (2020), the economic position of the mainstream right party is added to each of the models at the aggregate-level, as these parties are typically the strongest competitors to attaining office. The *CR economic position* is taken from the most leftist positioned mainstream right party in an election, as some party systems have multiple mainstream center-right parties. We see that the more economically right-wing the closest mainstream competitor is to the mainstream center-left party, the greater vote share Social Democrats receive. However, the variable is not statistically significant, and the main results all hold (see Table A5).

Table A5: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (with *CR Economic Position*

	Model 4	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
SD Economic Position	0.059	2.199*	-0.288
	(0.171)	(0.821)	(0.259)
SD Culture Position	-0.009	0.011	-0.103
	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.156)
Gini t-1	0.195	0.107	0.231
	(0.253)	(0.241)	(0.268)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		-0.075*	
		(0.029)	
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.075*
			(0.031)
Government Spending t-1	0.135	0.116	0.133
	(0.141)	(0.134)	(0.142)
GDP Growth t-1	-0.016	-0.036	-0.046
	(0.168)	(0.158)	(0.155)
Unemployment t-1	-0.660*	-0.626**	-0.642**
	(0.240)	(0.217)	(0.224)
Union Density	-0.078	-0.109	-0.090
	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Turnout	0.081	0.105	0.120
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.089)
SD Vote e-1	0.392***	0.392***	0.383***
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Incumbent	-0.674	-0.718	-0.620
	(0.806)	(0.824)	(0.755)
Disproportionality	-0.262*	-0.216	-0.246
	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.119)
Left Competitors e-1	-0.983	-1.061	-0.959
	(0.801)	(0.807)	(0.821)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	0.393	0.492	0.315
	(0.571)	(0.537)	(0.560)
CR Economic Position	0.158	0.147	0.172
	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Constant	6.908	9.371	3.208
	(12.501)	(11.916)	(13.366)
R^2 *within*	0.50	0.51	0.51
R^2 *adjusted*	0.80	0.80	0.80
N	274	274	274

Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A6 Globalization Index Variable Robustness Check

I control for the level of globalization, as it has been linked to the decline of Social Democrats working-class base (Gingrich 2017; Häusermann et al. 2013). A lagged *globalization* index is obtained from the KOF database, which combines 43 relevant socio-economic and political variables (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019). It was originally left out of the estimations due to its measurement not being available until the 1970s. When added at the aggregate level, Model 7 shows a negative but non-significant effect, and the main results hold (see Table A6).

Table A6: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (with *Globalization*)

	Model 7	**Model 8**	**Model 9**
SD Economic Position	0.072	2.225**	-0.253
	(0.191)	(0.709)	(0.278)
SD Culture Position	-0.032	-0.002	-0.117
	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.145)
Gini t-1	0.024	-0.068	0.023
	(0.287)	(0.271)	(0.288)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		-0.075**	
		(0.026)	
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.073*
			(0.032)
Government Spending t-1	0.259	0.240	0.246
	(0.128)	(0.119)	(0.121)
GDP Growth t-1	0.033	0.011	-0.009
	(0.153)	(0.141)	(0.137)
Unemployment t-1	-0.689*	-0.638**	-0.670**
	(0.246)	(0.223)	(0.234)
Union Density	-0.103	-0.133	-0.112
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Turnout	0.058	0.083	0.099
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.112)
SD Vote e-1	0.330***	0.344***	0.323***
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.061)
Incumbent	-0.326	-0.377	-0.284
	(0.753)	(0.756)	(0.705)
Disproportionality	-0.278*	-0.236*	-0.268*
	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.109)
Left Competitors e-1	-0.754	-0.725	-0.684
	(0.839)	(0.840)	(0.879)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	-0.138	-0.032	-0.216
	(0.721)	(0.677)	(0.740)
Globalization t-1	-0.144	-0.156	-0.126
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.147)
Constant	23.923	26.639	20.039
	(16.986)	(15.912)	(17.592)
R^2 *within*	0.48	0.49	0.49
R^2 *adjusted*	0.80	0.80	0.80
N	262	262	262

Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A7a Excluding Decade Fixed Effects Robustness Check

Three alternative model specifications are undertaken at the aggregate-level. Including a lagged dependent variable (*SD vote e-1*) with fixed effects can potentially introduce bias and inconsistent estimations (Nickell 1981). Therefore, the aggregate-level estimations are re-run excluding: 1) decade fixed effects; 2) all fixed effects; 3) the lagged dependent variable. The main results hold for all three specifications, except the policy interaction does not retain statistical significance without the inclusion of any fixed effects. However, it still displays a similar negative effect (see Tables A7a–A7c).

Table A7a: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (no decade fixed effects

	Model 10	**Model 11**	**Model 12**
SD Economic Position	0.228	2.436*	-0.087
	(0.150)	(0.888)	(0.237)
SD Culture Position	-0.095	-0.067	-0.185
	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.153)
Gini t-1	-0.062	-0.163	-0.027
	(0.281)	(0.258)	(0.291)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		-0.077*	
		(0.031)	
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.072*
			(0.034)
Government Spending t-1	0.064	0.035	0.060
	(0.132)	(0.119)	(0.129)
GDP Growth t-1	-0.044	-0.074	-0.073
	(0.184)	(0.169)	(0.177)
Unemployment t-1	-0.543	-0.506*	-0.533*
	(0.263)	(0.234)	(0.247)
Union Density	-0.022	-0.050	-0.037
	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.082)
Turnout	0.153	0.182*	0.189*
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.083)
SD Vote e-1	0.434***	0.445***	0.425***
	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.060)
Incumbent	-0.847	-0.925	-0.778
	(0.851)	(0.867)	(0.790)
Disproportionality	-0.325**	-0.286**	-0.309**
	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.100)
Left Competitors e-1	-1.364	-1.390	-1.336
	(0.751)	(0.759)	(0.776)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	-0.194	-0.085	-0.268
	(0.646)	(0.596)	(0.631)
Constant	13.539	15.936	10.454
	(13.556)	(12.577)	(14.121)
Decade fixed effects	NO	NO	NO
R^2 *within*	0.45	0.46	0.46
R^2 *adjusted*	0.79	0.79	0.79
N	280	280	280

Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A7b Aggregate-level Excluding Any Fixed Effects Robustness Check

Table A7b: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (no fixed effects)

	Model 13	**Model 14**	**Model 15**
SD Economic Position	0.206	2.029**	0.033
	(0.121)	(0.777)	(0.259)
SD Culture Position	-0.060	-0.028	-0.110
	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.133)
Gini t-1	0.141	0.087	0.152
	(0.174)	(0.157)	(0.177)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		-0.064*	
		(0.027)	
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.038
			(0.041)
Government Spending t-1	-0.099	-0.112	-0.103
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.075)
GDP Growth t-1	-0.156	-0.153	-0.164
	(0.237)	(0.235)	(0.236)
Unemployment t-1	-0.234	-0.225	-0.241
	(0.163)	(0.147)	(0.166)
Union Density	0.009	0.003	0.007
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Turnout	0.059	0.061	0.063
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.037)
SD Vote e-1	0.824***	0.836***	0.823***
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Incumbent	-1.619*	-1.761*	-1.619*
	(0.825)	(0.842)	(0.811)
Disproportionality	-0.064	-0.049	-0.044
	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Left Competitors e-1	-0.270	-0.296	-0.258
	(0.343)	(0.341)	(0.351)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	-0.156	0.056	-0.131
	(0.423)	(0.402)	(0.420)
Constant	3.782	5.524	3.267
	(7.687)	(7.230)	(7.728)
Decade fixed effects	NO	NO	NO
Fixed effects	NO	NO	NO
R^2 *within*	0.38	0.39	0.38
R^2 *adjusted*	0.79	0.79	0.79
N	280	280	280

Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A7c Excluding Lagged Dependent Variable Robustness Check

Table A7c: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (no *SD Vote e-1*)

	Model 16	**Model 17**	**Model 18**
SD Economic Position	0.103	1.962*	-0.285
	(0.221)	(0.811)	(0.303)
SD Culture Position	0.029	0.050	-0.083
	(0.152)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Gini t-1	-0.089	-0.163	-0.049
	(0.311)	(0.314)	(0.329)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		-0.064*	
		(0.030)	
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.086*
			(0.034)
Government Spending t-1	0.180	0.168	0.174
	(0.163)	(0.154)	(0.163)
GDP Growth t-1	-0.026	-0.045	-0.067
	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.123)
Unemployment t-1	-0.711*	-0.680*	-0.684*
	(0.280)	(0.262)	(0.260)
Union Density	-0.138	-0.163	-0.150
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.097)
Turnout	0.110	0.131	0.156
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.124)
Incumbent	1.274	1.252	1.300
	(0.630)	(0.657)	(0.627)
Disproportionality	-0.336*	-0.297*	-0.317*
	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.130)
Left Competitors e-1	-1.980*	-1.990*	-1.928*
	(0.921)	(0.927)	(0.903)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	-0.394	-0.295	-0.465
	(0.763)	(0.732)	(0.717)
Constant	28.071	29.559	23.553
	(16.806)	(16.452)	(16.762)
R^2 *within*	0.41	0.42	0.43
R^2 *adjusted*	0.77	0.77	0.77
N	280	280	280

Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A8 Alternative Inequality Measure (Palma Ratio) Robustness Check

The *Palma Ratio* is utilized as an alternative measure of income inequality. The Palma Ratio is a newer income inequality measurement that addresses the Gini's over-sensitivity to changes in the middle of the distribution and insensitivity to changes at the top and bottom. This is accomplished through a ratio calculation of the national income share of the top 10 percent divided by the bottom 40 percent and is available from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Unfortunately, it is only available as pre-tax income and only for Europe beyond 1980, while this article's temporal range begins in 1965. Nevertheless, I have added it to each of the main models as the measure of inequality in section 5. Palma Ratio correlates highly with Gini (r=0.72) and the results largely mirror the effects with the Gini (see Table A8).

Table A8: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (with *Palma Ratio*)

	Model 19	**Model 20**	**Model 21**
SD Economic Position	0.126	0.774*	-0.221
	(0.212)	(0.302)	(0.315)
SD Culture Position	-0.024	-0.015	-0.120
	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.145)
Palma Ratio t-1	0.909	0.696	0.903
	(1.545)	(1.461)	(1.433)
SD Economic Position # Palma Ratio t-1		-0.305*	
		(0.122)	
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.078*
			(0.035)
Government Spending t-1	0.164	0.167	0.151
	(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.125)
GDP Growth t-1	-0.006	0.001	-0.042
	(0.161)	(0.159)	(0.141)
Unemployment t-1	-0.704**	-0.663**	-0.677**
	(0.243)	(0.232)	(0.227)
Union Density	-0.006	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.089)
Turnout	0.119	0.136	0.170
	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.086)
SD Vote e-1	0.348***	0.363***	0.334***
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Incumbent	-1.016	-1.083	-0.872
	(0.790)	(0.806)	(0.742)
Disproportionality	-0.255	-0.242*	-0.247
	(0.123)	(0.115)	(0.130)
Left Competitors e-1	-0.651	-0.546	-0.617
	(0.966)	(0.995)	(0.989)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	-0.038	-0.027	-0.087
	(0.680)	(0.681)	(0.700)
Constant	6.569	4.786	3.535
	(7.964)	(8.174)	(8.625)
R^2 *within*	0.51	0.52	0.52
R^2 *adjusted*	0.80	0.80	0.80
N	247	247	247

Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A9 Country Outliers Robustness Check

To ensure that the results are not driven by the inclusion of any one country, a jackknife analysis is undertaken at both the aggregate and individual level for each main interaction. The results of these additional analyses indicate that the estimated interactions are stable and not driven by a single outlier country in the dataset. The estimations are very stable at the aggregate level for both the *SD economic position* x *gini t-1* interaction and the *SD economic position* x *SD culture position* interaction (Figures A9a and A9b). Only Greece is somewhat of an outlier and Portugal a slight outlier for both interactions, although both regressions excluding each country remain statistically significant. The interactions are not as stable at the individual level, likely owing to a much smaller number of elections for each country, varying from two to six, as compared to 10 and 20 at the aggregate level. Figure 9c displays the *SD economic position* x *gini t-1* interaction. We can see that the most notable outliers (Finland, Israel, and New Zealand) somewhat suppress the results and when excluded the negative effect is much stronger. Figure 9d below reveals that the party positions interaction contains more countries that display a variance when excluded one at a time. However, the coefficient is never more than .004 points lower than the mean of .0185 and remains statistically significant for reach regression.

Figure A9a: Aggregate-level Jackknife Estimates for Model 2 Interaction



Note: Estimates from 22 different regression models, replicating Model 2 in Table 1 excluding 1 country at a time. Excluded country is indicated on the y-axis. Estimates and 90% confidence intervals are plotted.

Figure A9b: Aggregate-level Jackknife Estimates for Model 3 Interaction



Note: Estimates from 22 different regression models, replicating Model 3 in Table 1 excluding 1 country at a time. Excluded country is indicated on the y-axis. Estimates and 90% confidence intervals are plotted.

Figure A9c: Individual-level Jackknife Estimates for Model 2 Interaction



Note: Estimates from 21 different regression models, replicating Model 2 in Table 2 excluding 1 country at a time. Excluded country is indicated on the y-axis. Estimates and 90% confidence intervals are plotted.

Figure A9d: Individual -level Jackknife Estimates for Model 3 Interaction



Note: Estimates from 21 different regression models, replicating Model 3 in Table 2 excluding 1 country at a time. Excluded country is indicated on the y-axis. Estimates and 90% confidence intervals are plotted.

A10 Year Fixed Effects Clustered by Country Robustness Check

The individual-level analysis is re-run with country fixed effects clustered by year instead of the reverse. Once again, we see the same results (see Table A9).

Table A10: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Social Democratic Vote (clustered by Country)

	Model 5	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**
Age	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.032	-0.032	-0.033	-0.032
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Education	-0.141***	-0.141***	-0.141***	-0.141***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income	-0.023***	-0.024***	-0.022**	-0.027***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Rural	-0.179***	-0.180***	-0.175***	-0.179***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Union	0.369***	0.371***	0.371***	0.370***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Political Ideology	-0.322***	-0.322***	-0.322***	-0.321***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
SD Economic Position	0.023**	0.234***	-0.045***	0.031**
	(0.008)	(0.054)	(0.012)	(0.010)
SD Economic Position # Income				-0.003
				(0.002)
SD Culture Position	0.040***	0.043***	0.015	0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position			-0.020***	
			(0.003)	
Gini t-1	-0.029	-0.023	0.004	-0.030
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1		-0.007***		
		(0.002)		
GDP Growth t-1	0.047***	0.061***	0.058***	0.047***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployment t-1	-0.022**	-0.018*	-0.046***	-0.022**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Union Density	-0.015**	-0.022***	-0.019***	-0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Turnout	0.030***	0.030***	0.031***	0.030***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Disproportionality	0.041***	0.059***	0.069***	0.041***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left Competitors e-1	-0.195***	-0.269***	-0.285***	-0.196***
	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	-0.088**	-0.023	0.022	-0.087**
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Constant	-0.037	-0.135	-1.036	0.001
	(0.798)	(0.820)	(0.837)	(0.798)
Variance	0.466**	0.619**	0.629**	0.466**
	(0.155)	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.155)
Log Likelihood	-38857.18	-38849.03	-38827.44	-38856.38

AIC	77794.36	77780.06	77736.87	77794.76
BIC	78162.44	78157.34	78114.16	78172.04
Year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	73,281	73,281	73,281	73,281

Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A11 Redistribution Preferences

Rueda and Stegmueller (2019: 187), demonstrate using European Social Survey data, that the poor are "uniformly in favour of redistribution and therefore more likely to vote for redistributive parties." Rueda (2018) also finds that individuals with high redistribution preferences are 70 percent more likely to vote for leftist parties. As a robustness check I also run separate analyses to determine if Social Democratic voters and lower income earners support redistribution. Modules 4 and 5 of the CSES include for the first time a question measuring redistribution by asking respondents the extent they agree that: "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels." It is available for 17 different countries included in this study and 42,556 respondents. I recoded the 5-point question into a binary variable measuring if someone is pro-redistribution or not.

Firstly, T-tests were performed comparing Social Democratic voters with the voters of other parties. Social Democratic voters are significantly more likely to be pro-redistributive (66.1% to 60%) and people who are pro-redistribution are significantly more likely to vote Social Democratic over other parties (31.2 to 25.9%). Secondly, we compare people in the bottom income quintile with everyone else. Low-income earners are significantly more pro-redistribution (69.6% to 60.5%) and low-income earners who are pro-redistribution are significantly more likely to vote Social Democratic (22.4% to 16.3%).

Next, I replicate Model 1 at the individual level with the addition of *pro-redistribution*. Since our redistribution sample only runs from 2011 to 2018 but includes 17 countries, observations are clustered at the country-level. Table A11 presents the results. We can see that people who support redistribution are significantly more likely to vote Social Democratic at ($p<0.001$), even when controlling for left–right *political ideology* and the variable has nearly the same effect as *political ideology*. Lastly, I then run the same regression, except I swap *SD voted* with *pro redistribution* as the dependent variable. Table A11 shows that Social Democratic voters and low-income earners are significantly more likely to support redistribution at ($p<0.001$), and when low *income* is coded as a binary variable, it displays the strongest effect of any demographic variable.

Table A11: Individual-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (left) and Pro-Redistribution (right)

	SD Voted	**Pro Redistribution**
SD Voted		0.215***
		(0.038)
Age	0.004***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.028	-0.069*
	(0.032)	(0.031)
Education	-0.064***	-0.143***
	(0.017)	(0.016)
Income (5 categories)	-0.027*	
	(0.013)	
Income Quintile 1 (binary)		0.483***
		(0.044)
Rural	-0.065	-0.107**
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Union	0.278***	0.236***

	(0.041)	(0.040)
Political Ideology	-0.236***	-0.277***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Pro Redistribution	0.215***	
	(0.038)	
SD Economic Position	0.220**	-0.056
	(0.068)	(0.083)
SD Culture Position	0.221***	0.084*
	(0.038)	(0.043)
Gini t-1	0.005	-0.008
	(0.085)	(0.104)
GDP Growth t-1	0.258***	0.227***
	(0.048)	(0.054)
Unemployment t-1	-0.029	-0.009
	(0.044)	(0.054)
Union Density	0.020	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.019)
Turnout	-0.064***	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.022)
Disproportionality	0.017	-0.027
	(0.034)	(0.041)
Left Competitors e-1	0.176	0.503
	(0.257)	(0.315)
Radical Right Competitors e-1	0.004	-0.121
	(0.103)	(0.124)
Constant	4.974	0.909
	(3.938)	(4.826)
Variance	0.229*	0.350**
	(0.093)	(0.134)
Log Likelihood	-11611.11	-12472.77
AIC	23274.22	24997.54
BIC	23482.17	25205.49
Year fixed effects	YES	YES
N	21,983	21,983

Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

A12 Income Inequality Disaggregated by Country Over Time

Income inequality (Gini index) over time disaggregated by country. Calculated from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2020).

Figure A12: Income Inequality by Country, 1965–2019



A13 Mean Social Democrat Party Positions Over Time

Average Social Democrat economic and socio-cultural positions (left–right) over time, with trend lines. Calculated from MARPOR (Volkens et al. 2020).

Figure A13a: Average SD Economic Position, 1965–2019



Figure A13b: Average SD Culture Position, 1965–2019



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