# The Spiderweb of Partnership Tax Structures

EMILY BLACK, Stanford University\*
RYAN HESS, Oklahoma State University\*
REBECCA LESTER, Stanford University †
JACOB GOLDIN, University of Chicago
DANIEL E. HO, Stanford University
MANSHEEJ PAUL, Stanford University
ANNETTE PORTZ, Internal Revenue Service

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Using an interdisciplinary approach combining expertise in computer science and business taxation, we examine the complex tax structure of pass-through businesses, focusing on partnership entities. Partnerships control more than \$30 trillion in assets, vastly outnumber U.S. public firms, and are responsible for three times the amount of U.S. tax non-compliance as corporations. However, the prior literature provides extremely little evidence explaining the pervasive use of such entities and which specific characteristics enable the lightly taxed nature of partnership business income. Using administrative U.S. tax data, we first create graphical organizational structures by tracing income through millions of partnership entities. We show that 85 percent of partnership groups are simple structures composed of one single partnership owned directly by individual taxpayers. In contrast, the most complex structures resemble "webs," characterized by multiple tiers of ownership and clusters of overlapping partners. Second, we harness the power of machine learning models to study partnership non-compliance. We demonstrate that network characteristics are informative for predicting non-compliance. Finally, we show that more flexible machine learning models—random forest classifiers—significantly outperform simpler statistical methods. These models reveal important nonlinear relationships between firm characteristics and noncompliance, sharply contrasting with linear models predominantly used in the corporate space. Thus, beyond adding to the nascent literature explaining the prevalent use of partnerships, we provide new insights about how to correctly specify models that explain the under-reporting of U.S. business tax.

**Keywords:** Private firms, partnerships, tax noncompliance, machine learning

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<sup>\*</sup>Both authors contributed equally to this work.

<sup>†</sup>Supervisor and corresponding author; rlester@stanford.edu. Mailing address: 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305.

## 1 Introduction

Partnerships are an increasingly important component of the U.S. economy, rising from 28% of U.S. business entities in 2003 to 40% by 2020; see Figure 1 (IRS 2021). A number of factors have contributed to this rapid rise, including favorable tax treatment and the flexibility that partnerships offer for owners in allocating business profits, expenses, and various tax attributes. At the same time, audit rates for partnerships have plummeted. These facts, in conjunction with the disproportionate use of partnerships by the highest income taxpayers, have resulted in sustained concern about the role of partnerships in facilitating tax avoidance and evasion (Versprille 2020, Iacurci 2021, Burns 2022). However, despite the importance of partnerships and the policy interest in understanding their role in tax planning, some of even the most basic descriptive facts about partnerships remain largely unknown. In this paper, we use confidential, anonymized IRS administrative records to i) provide descriptive evidence about the prevalence and complexity of U.S. partnership organizations, and ii) study to what extent the unique organizational flexibility afforded by partnerships is predictive of tax non-compliance.

Prior work examining tax avoidance focuses primarily on the corporate sector, with the literature including hundreds of studies on this topic (reviewed in Hanlon et al. 2010, Wilde et al. 2018). In contrast, academic work studying partnerships comprises only a small fraction of the business tax literature, even though pass-through business non-compliance is estimated to be three times as large as corporate non-compliance.<sup>1</sup> One explanation for the lack of evidence on partnerships relates to the lack of data: most partnerships are private and thus not subject to the same disclosure requirements as publicly-traded corporate entities. Furthermore, the majority do not voluntarily produce financial statements that permit measurement of firms' tax choices (Allee et al. 2009; Lisowsky et al.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Pass-through business income, which captures non-compliance by both S corporations and partnerships, is estimated to be \$110 billion for the tax years 2011-2013; see Figure 1 of Publication 1415 (Rev. 9-2019), "Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2011-2013."

2020). A second explanation for the lack of evidence relates to complexity; partnership structures can include multiple entities across many different tiers and types of owners. Understanding how partnership businesses are organized and the role of tax planning in these businesses requires a complete picture of the chain of entities and owners.

In this paper, we use an interdisciplinary approach that combines computer science expertise with business tax knowledge to study the organizational structures of U.S. partnerships. To identify which business entities are connected to a partnership, either directly or indirectly, we map the network of ownership relations between business entities and their individual owners, tracing income through millions of partnership entities and multiple tiers of ownership. This analysis produces a graph of each partnership organization, which we define as a business group consisting of at least one partnership and all connected owners. The analysis yields what we believe to be the first comprehensive dataset of Partnership-Related Businesses (PRBs) in the United States.

From the data, we report several novel descriptive facts about PRBs and their organizational structures. We find that the vast majority of partnerships – approximately 85% – are directly owned by individuals; see examples in Figure 2. We call these organizations "simple" partnerships. Among this group of simple partnerships, most (72% of simple partnerships and 61% of all partnerships) are owned by exactly two individuals. The average simple partnership reports approximately \$356,000 of sales and \$27,000 of ordinary income.

The remaining 15% of partnerships employ a wide range of structures, such as the ones depicted in Figures 3 through 6. The most complicated structures resemble "spiderwebs" with groups of related entities and clusters of overlapping partners. We refer to this group of partnerships as "complex" PRBs. The average complex partnership reports approximately \$1.5 million of sales and \$86,000 of ordinary income. We observe differing patterns of reported income among complex organizations as compared to the simple partnerships. For example, while operating income predictably

increases with number of partners in a simple partnership, we observe a non-monotonic relation between operating income and partner count among complex PRBs. These patterns are consistent with the use of such complex structures for shifting profits and losses among group members to minimize overall tax obligations.

Having provided new descriptive insights about the use of partnerships in contemporary U.S. business structures, we next study the extent to which partnership organizational characteristics are predictive of partnership tax avoidance. We posit that these complex organizational structures are a distinct feature of partnerships and a central mechanism contributing to the lightly taxed nature of these firms. For example, partnership complexity can complicate efforts in "determining the relationships and allocations of income and losses" reported to partners (GAO 2014). To test and quantify the role of organizational characteristics in partnership tax avoidance, we distill characteristics of each PRB structure into specific measures ("features"), such as the number of partners, the tiers of ownership, and the length of ownership chains.

Drawing on outcomes from the near-universe of IRS partnership audits between 2013 and 2015, we show that inclusion of these features into machine learning algorithms can help predict which audits are likely to detect non-compliance. Specifically, we observe two key results. First, incorporating PRB network characteristics increases model performance; for example, we find that the R-squared more than triples when using an OLS model. This is a substantial gain, given the high resource demands of complex partnership tax audits and the potential government tax revenue at stake. Second, there are substantial performance gains for predicting non-compliance when using flexible non-linear models; for example, we observe a 50% increase in model accuracy when using a machine learning random forest model as compared to simpler linear models, regardless of whether network characteristics are incorporated.

Our work contributes to the literature in several ways. Despite the widespread use of partnerships

and popularity among businesses and high net worth individuals, the literature includes relatively little information about these companies. Cooper et al. 2016 examine partnerships and S corporations and document that income earned through the partnership sector is relatively low-taxed, with estimated effective tax rates of 15.9 percent. Their work and other papers provide some evidence that the lightly taxed nature of partnership income is attributed to tax rate differences between the corporate and non-corporate sectors, higher levels of preferentially taxed investment income reported within partnership structures, and ownership by tax-exempt and foreign individuals (Smith et al. 2021, Kopczuk et al. 2020, Cooper et al. 2016). However, beyond this work, there is extremely little evidence. Thus, the first contribution of our paper is providing new descriptive evidence about the amount, type, and use of partnership structures in the United States. Specifically, our graphical depictions of partnership organizations provide visual evidence of complex structures used by these private companies.

Second, we construct measures of partnership complexity from the network structures and demonstrate that these novel measures help explain the relatively low levels of taxation on income earned through this sector. Thus, we further contrast tax planning decisions of partnership businesses from the hundreds of studies on corporate avoidance, where corporate structures are often tiered and characterized by several layers under a single parent entity. In doing so, we also extend work on the corporate side that studies the use of flow through businesses in a publicly-traded corporate structure (Agarwal et al. 2021) given that our study includes all partnerships. Evidence about the broader population of private partnerships is important given that differing reporting incentives can influence different tax planning decisions.

Third, by using machine learning systems in this context, we shed light on the nature of the relationships between partnership characteristics and tax non-compliance. Specifically, we document important non-linearities in the partnership space. The fact that random forest models substantially outperform linear models calls into question the use of linear OLS analyses as a tool for understanding non-compliance for these businesses.

Finally, the paper offers policy relevant evidence. The complexity of partnership structures makes them an apt vehicle for business tax planning. Thus, addressing non-compliance within this sector is critical for addressing questions of tax under-reporting; indeed, the Biden administration intends that the \$80 billion recently promised to the IRS to be used for "enforcement activity aimed at highwealth taxpayers, large corporations, and partnerships" (CBO 2021). We provide evidence useful for enhancing tax policies and IRS tax administration capabilities for these businesses.

#### 2 Data

## 2.1 Sample Construction

We first identify all partnerships in the IRS data for 2013 through 2015 (10.9 million entities). We compare this number to the total number of partnerships reported in the IRS 2013-2015 Data Book and confirm that our initial dataset contains the near universe of firms. We obtain data about each partnership, including income and expense items reported on Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income. Also using Schedule K-1s from the partnership return, which provide partner-level information, we obtain data on each partner's ownership percentage, capital account balance, and distributive portion of each partnership line item. Finally, we obtain information about whether each partner is an individual, C corporation, S corporation, or trust.

We impose two sample restrictions necessary for creating partnership organizational structures. First, we retain only those partnerships that report any activity during the tax year. That is, we drop any partnerships for which there are no income or loss amounts reported on the partnership tax return, as we require non-zero income to estimate ownership percentages. We also drop any

partnership for which the ownership percentages do not sum to 100%. This latter step ensures that we account for all owners and all income. While necessary, this step substantially reduces the sample size, primarily due to an extremely large network structure (greater than 2 million nodes) that we cannot otherwise unpack without de-anonymized data. The resulting sample includes over 7.0 million partnership firm-years. Table 1a provides the sample selection.

### 2.2 Creation of Organizational Structures

We next create visualizations of partnership organizations using graphical imaging software (Python NetworkX), which permits analysis of the structure and activity of complex networks. We start by graphing one node for each partnership entity. We then graph the owners of each partnership as additional nodes and connect the nodes with lines or "edges." If the owner nodes are tax-paying entities (i.e., individuals or corporations), we consider these nodes to be the boundary of the partnership and do not graph any further lines of ownership. However, if the owner nodes are flow-through entities, such as S corporations or additional partnerships, we also graph nodes for those entities. We then look through the entities to further graph those entities' ownership. We iteratively progress through the ownership chain until we arrive at the final taxpaying entity for each partnership. This process produces network graphs for each partnership organization that depicts overlapping and common ownership when present.

We classify a partnership organization as either "simple" or "complex" based on both the number of partnerships and the type of partners included in each distinct business group. We define simple partnership organizations as a single partnership wholly owned by individual taxpayers. Figure 2 provides examples of three simple partnership structures. Orange triangles represent the partnership entities; blue circles indicate the individual owners, where each circle is sized proportionately to the amount of partnership income reported to that partner. The arrow indicates ownership and points

to the partner directly owning each entity. Panel A presents a partnership with two owners; Panels B and C present partnerships with four and eight owners, respectively. Table 1a shows that we classify approximately 6.0 million, or 85 percent, of firm-year observations as simple partnerships.

Complex partnerships include all other partnership organizations. For example, we categorize any business group with multiple partnership entities as complex partnerships, even if all partners are individuals. Figure 3a provides an example of this type of complex organization. We also categorize business groups with one partnership entity but a mix of partner types as a complex partnership. Figure 3b provides an example of this group, with the green node denoting partners that are a C corporation, S corporation, or trust. The most complex organizational groups include both multiple partnerships and multiple partner types. Approximately 1.0 million partnerships in our data are included in over 600,000 complex partnership organizations.

Table 1b shows the count of the organizations by "Simple" and "Complex." The vast majority of simple partnership observations in our sample (4.3 million firm-years) have two individual partners, representing 72% of simple partnership observations and 61% of all partnerships. The frequency of simple partnerships declines as the number of partners increases, with approximately 600 firm-years reporting over 50 partners. We observe similar patterns among the complex partnership organizations: most complex organizations include partnerships with only two owners, and the count of partnerships again declines with the number of partners. Table 1c provides further details about complex partnerships. Over half of complex partnership observations contain only one partnership entity (n=381,000), meaning that these business groups are categorized as complex due to having a mix of partner types (e.g., individuals, corporations, etc.). The remaining complex partnerships include multiple entities and a mix of partner types.

# 3 Descriptive Characteristics of Partnerships

## 3.1 Industry Affiliation

This section presents new descriptive evidence about the types of businesses using partnership structures and the amount of income reported by these firms. We start by presenting information about the industry affiliation of firms included in our sample in Table 2a. We present sample counts by two-digit NAICS codes self-reported on the partnership tax return. Columns (1) and (2) show that almost half the sample (47.7 percent) is in the Real Estate industry. We do not observe similar concentrations in any other industries, with the next largest counts in Professional Services (7.8 percent), Retail Trade (5.9 percent), Agriculture and Forestry (5.7 percent), and Construction (5.0 percent).

We observe this disproportionately large real estate presence for both simple and complex partnerships in Columns (3)-(4) and Columns (5)-(6), respectively, with a slightly higher proportion among complex partnerships (52.6 percent) as compared to simple partnerships (46.8 percent). Complex partnerships also have a higher proportion of firms in the Finance and Insurance industry as compared to simple partnerships (9.3 percent versus 3.9 percent). This difference likely relates, in part, to the use of complex partnerships by the private equity industry.

#### 3.2 Type of Income Reported

Partnerships allow for different allocations of income depending on the type and nature of income earned. This flexibility in allocating income may be particularly helpful for real estate and investment partnerships, which generate certain types of "passive" income subject to special tax rules. To shed light on the types and amounts of income reported in partnerships, we next present average levels of income by size of the organization (based on the number of partners) in Table 2b.

Columns (1)-(3) present information for simple partnerships; Columns (4)-(6) provide information for complex organizations.

We first report Total Income in Columns (1) and (4) for simple and complex partnerships, respectively. Total Income is equal to Ordinary Business Income from the U.S. partnership tax return (Schedule K, Line 1) plus Investment income (Schedule K, Lines 5-9). Simple partnerships with two individual partners report average income of \$62,000. Income generally increases with the number of partners; among the biggest simple partnerships (with 30-50 partners), average income ranges from \$1.5 to \$17.9 million. Complex organizations in Column (4) have higher levels of average total income; for example, organizations with two partners report average income of \$114,000. As with simple partnerships, income is increasing in the number of partners, although the largest partnerships report *lower* average levels of income when comparing to Column (1) (\$2.8 million versus \$17.9 million).

Column (2) reports Operating Income for simple partnerships. We again observe amounts monotonically increasing with the number of partners, and the levels appear larger than Investment Income in Column (3). Investment Income in Column (3) varies less and generally remains in the range of \$30,000-\$40,000, except in the largest partnerships.

Columns (5) and (6) repeat the analysis for complex partnerships. While we observe similar patterns for Operating Income in Column (5), we note two differences as compared to simple partnerships. First, levels of Investment and Operating Income appear more similar for these organizations. Furthermore, we observe less variation in the levels of Investment Income across partnership groups, with amounts not exceeding \$150,000 even among the largest organizations. One explanation is that complex structures facilitate special income allocations that minimize income and/or optimize

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ordinary Business Income is equal to a partnership's Revenues, less Deductions, all of which are considered to be derived in the course of an operating business. The other line items include Rental Real Estate income (Line 2), Other gross rental income (Line 3), Interest Income (Line 5), Dividends and equivalents (Line 6), Royalties (Line 7), Net short-term capital gain (Line 8), and Net long-term capital gain (Line 9).

tax losses across related parties.

#### 3.3 Financial and Network Characteristics

Table 2c provides additional descriptive statistics using financial measures and network characteristics distilled from the organizational structures described in Section 2. Columns (1) and (2) present information for the full sample; Columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) present information for subsamples of simple and complex partnerships, respectively.

Partnerships report \$522,000 of average gross receipts (*SALES*). Average compensation paid to employees and owners includes \$65,000 of *SALARY AND WAGE* and \$12,500 of *GUARANTEED PAY-MENTS*, respectively.<sup>3</sup> *FOREIGN TAX* is the amount of foreign tax paid by the partnership and reflects the multinational presence of a company; the amount is low (\$193), largely because most partnerships report no value for this line item. Sample firms have external debt financing based on mean *INTEREST EXP* of \$5,500, and they own fixed assets based on average *DEPRECIATION* of \$10,600. *ORDINARY INCOME* is \$36,000, and average income attributable to *RENTAL* activities is \$13,500. Other investment income earned from *DIVIDENDS*, long-term capital gains (*LTCG*), and gains from the sale of assets used in business (*SEC 1231*) equal \$1,400, \$4,700, and \$27,300, respectively.

The next items relate to partnership organizational structures. *IN DEG* measures the number of Schedule K-1s a partnership is issued, meaning that the partnership owns another partnership. The average *IN DEG* of 0.05 means that most partnerships do not own another partnership, reflecting that most partnerships having a simple structure. *OUT DEG* measures the number of Schedule K-1s issued to partners; the value of 2.72 means the average partnership has 2.72 direct owners. We count the type of entities within the organizational structure, including the number of *TAXABLE PARTNERS* (C corporations and individuals), *PARTNERSHIPS*, *S CORPS*, *TRUSTS*; average values are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Guaranteed payments are compensatory amounts paid to partners, whereas salaries and wages include compensation paid to non-owner employees. The guaranteed payment is in addition to the proportionate share of income or loss that a partner earns each year by virtue of his/her partnership stake.

3.02, 1.42, 0.08, and 0.09, respectively. Finally, we report the average degree of separation (*DoS*), which is defined as the maximum path between a partnership entity to a tax-paying entity within an organization; that is, DoS is a measure of the length of the ownership chain for a partnership. The average distance between a partnership and its ultimate owner is 1.16 links, meaning that the average partnership is directly owned by tax-paying entities (again reflecting that we classify most partnerships as simple).

A comparison of the values across simple and complex organizations reveals that complex partnerships report higher mean and variance across each of the financial measures. For example, complex organizations report four times the amount of *SALES*. Consistent with the use of complex structures for investment purposes, these organizations report almost six times the dollar value of *LTCG* and ten times the amount of *DIVIDENDS*. By construction, *IN DEG*, *S CORPS*, and *TRUSTS* are equal to zero for simple structures, and the values for *OUT DEG* and *TAXABLE PARTNERS* are equal. In contrast, complex structures have 3.6 direct partners but many more indirect partners based on the average value of 5.6 for *TAXABLE PARTNERS*. The average *DoS* is 2.1 links.

We provide additional graphical evidence about partnership structures in Figure 4, which depicts three complex organizations that each contain four partnerships. Panel A shows an organization with two DoS; Panel B (C) presents organizations with three (four) DoS. For example, in Panel A, each of the four partnerships is owned by a combination of individuals and another partnership in the group. Thus, the longest path to the ultimate owners for each of these partnerships is two, given that income is reported first to another partnership and then to the individual partner.

Figure 5 provides additional figures that permit a comparison of structures based on the number of partnerships and the DoS within these entities. The organizations in Panel A and B each contain 9 partnerships. Despite having the same number of partnerships, the structures have very different DoS: the structure in Panel A has two DoS, meaning that two blue nodes directly or indirectly own all

nine partnerships, whereas the structure in Panel B has five DoS. The structure in Panel B includes twelve individual owners (blue nodes) and one entity owner (small green node). Panels C and D (E and F) depict additional structures that contain 14 partnerships (19 partnerships) and show increasingly complex web-like organizations characterized by a large number of partnership entities and greater DoS between the entities and the taxpayer. Figure 6 shows two of the most complex structures that include 20 partnership entities, with two (eight) DoS in Panel A (B).

A comparison of the simple structures in Figure 2 to the most complex structures in Figure 6 demonstrates vastly different use of the partnership entity form. Why these more complex structures exist and the economic factors motivating such structures are large and open questions. Section 4 uses characteristics of these structures to study tax non-compliance.

#### 3.4 Size Distribution

Table 2d presents additional information about the relative size and activity of partnerships. We use the total amount of *SALES* as a proxy for size and report the count of observations based on differing size bins. Column (1) shows that over 4.1 million partnerships (60 percent) report no gross receipts, likely due to instead generating income required to be separately reported on Schedule K. Even among those firms reporting positive *SALES*, almost all (1.2 million observations) report amounts less than \$100,000. Few observations (n=7,800) report sales over \$50.0 million. Similar patterns hold for simple and complex partnerships, although a higher proportion of complex partnerships report \$0 of gross receipts (70.6 percent in Column (6) as compared to 56.5 percent in Column 4). We observe relatively higher proportions of complex partnerships in the higher income bins, although the counts are still low.

Table 2e reports a similar summary based on Schedule K income (excluding Ordinary Income from Line 1 of Schedule K). Across the full sample, as well as the subsample of simple and complex

partnerships, we observe that approximately three-quarters of the partnerships report either \$0 or less than \$100,000 of income on Schedule K.

In summary, this section provides new information about the amount, type, and complexity of U.S. partnerships based on descriptive statistics and visualizations of partnership network structures. While most partnerships are simple in nature and report relatively small amounts of income, we find that, even among simple partnerships, some organizations have a large number of partners and amount of reported operating income. The figures depicting complex partnerships suggest some extremely complicated ownership chains, possibly contributing to the differing amounts and types of income reported by those organizations.

# 4 Organizational Complexity and Partnership Tax Avoidance

This section provides empirical evidence about the extent to which network characteristics are predictive of tax non-compliance. We approach this question in three steps. First, we estimate the relation between non-compliance and firm financial characteristics in the partnership sector using OLS. Second, we add in partnership network characteristics to measure the extent to which these provide incremental predictive value. Third, we study whether model performance is improved using more flexible machine learning models. We discuss these three steps in each of the sections below.

## 4.1 Predicting Partnership Non-compliance with Firm Financial Characteristics

#### 4.1.1 Research Design

We first estimate the relation between partnership non-compliance and firm financial characteristics using a linear (OLS) model. Specifically, we estimate the following OLS model:

$$Pr(Assessment)_{it} = \beta_1 IncDed_{it} + \beta_2 Audit_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where  $Pr(Assessment)_{it}$  is an indicator equal to one if firm i in tax year t was assessed an amount of tax due, conditional upon audit. Amounts are obtained from the IRS audit outcomes database. We use audit assessments as a measure of non-compliance for two reasons. First, it is the most direct measure of non-compliance (Mills 1998). Second, alternative measures from the corporate literature, such as effective tax rates (ETRs), are not easily transferable to partnership businesses, primarily because it is difficult to calculate the amount of tax paid solely attributable to partnership transactions at the partner level. We include  $IncDed_{it}$ , which are firm financial measures obtained from income and deduction tax return line items described in Section 3. These include measures that the prior corporate literature has shown are predictive of non-compliance (firm size, leverage, tangibility, and geographic presence). While these characteristics are based on corporate tax models and thus may not necessarily be predictive in the partnership setting, we start with this model given that we are unaware of any other existing models for partnership entities.

In addition to firm financial characteristics, we also include  $Audit_{it}$ , which are measures related to the IRS tax audit conducted. Specifically, we include the rank of the IRS agent conducting the audit ( $AGENT\ RANK$ ) to control for audit experience of the agent. The term  $\epsilon_{it}$  is an additive error term. This first model establishes a baseline for our subsequent tests.

#### 4.1.2 Sample of Audited Partnerships

We focus on the subsample of audited partnerships.<sup>5</sup> Table 1, Panel A shows that this sample includes approximately 16,000 audited partnerships, of which 83.0 percent (or 13,200) are simple partnership organizations.

Table 3a presents information similar to Table 1, Panel A and confirms that the audited subsample

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>For example, for a partnership with only individual owners, it would be necessary to estimate the proportion of tax due on each in individual owner's tax return attributable to partnership income, as compared to wage income, investment income, etc. This approach is particularly complicated for the most complex partnerships that include tiers of entities and owners.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Due to IRS disclosure rules, we are precluded from studying the likelihood of whether a company is selected for audit.

exhibits the same pattern as the overall sample. That is, similarly large proportions of simple and complex organizations have only two partners (85 percent and 47 percent, respectively); furthermore, the number of organizations declines as the number of partners per organization increases.<sup>6</sup> Table 3b shows that half of complex organizations (n=1,415) include two partnerships.

Table 4 presents similar summary statistics for the audited subsample as presented in Table 2 for the full population. We present statistics for the full audited sample, as well as subsamples based on whether an amount was assessed or not. Panel A presents industry statistics. As in Table 2, we observe that the largest concentration of audited firms occurs in the real estate industry. However, the proportion is lower (19 percent) as compared to the full population (47 percent). We again observe that Professional Services, Retail Trade, Agriculture and Forestry, and Construction are some of the larger industries.

Table 4b presents summary statistics about the type of income reported in the simple and complex audited partnerships. Several average amounts are losses, suggesting that audits may relate to the amount, type, or allocation of losses within a partnership group. Table 4, Panels C, D, and E provide additional descriptive evidence about audited firms. We observe a much larger amount of *SALES* within the audited subsample as compared to the population (over \$3.8 million), with a large standard deviation (\$85.0 million). Other financial characteristics are similarly larger than the population, with the exception of *ORDINARY INCOME* and *RENTAL*, both of which reflect losses. We observe relatively fewer firms report \$0 of *SALES* in Panel D, but in Panel E, we continue to find that a large proportion of companies do not have Schedule K income (similar to the full sample).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Throughout the tables, we suppress some data to conform with IRS disclosure requirements. We indicate these items with asterisks.

 $<sup>^{7}</sup>$ While it may seem unusual to audit loss firms, some losses can directly offset a partner's taxable income and thus could generate immediate governmental tax revenue.

#### 4.1.3 Results

We report results from estimating Eq. (1) using OLS in Table 5. In Column (1), we observe that four financial characteristics exhibit a statistically significant relation with the probability of assessment: SALES and GUARANTEED PAYMENTS are negatively related to assessments, whereas ORDINARY INCOME and DEPRECIATION are positively associated. Investment-related items for LTCG and SEC1231 are negatively associated with the likelihood of assessment, whereas AGENT RANK is positively associated. The results suggests that firms with greater business income and more tangible assets are more likely to be assessed (conditional on audit), whereas firms with more investment income are less likely to be assessed. The results also confirm that including firm financial characteristics from prior work can help explain tax non-compliance among partnerships. However, we note that the overall explanatory power of the model is very low; the R-squared is 0.003, suggesting that the use of these characteristics can explain only a tiny portion of the assessment decision.

#### 4.2 Predictive Power of Partnership Network Features

We next augment Eq.(1) to include partnership network measures ( $Network_{it}$ ) discussed previously:  $IN\ DEG$ ,  $OUT\ DEG$ , and DoS. We also include counts of the types of owners:  $TAXABLE\ PARTNERS$  (for individuals and C corporations), PARTNERSHIPS,  $S\ CORPS$ , and TRUSTS. Table 5, Column (2) presents results; we indeed find that inclusion of these characteristics provides incremental explanatory power. The R-squared statistic triples, from 0.003 to 0.011, and three characteristics exhibit a significant relation with the likelihood of assessment:  $IN\ DEG$ ,  $OUT\ DEG$ , and DoS. Interestingly, DoS and  $OUT\ DEG$  are negatively associated with the likelihood of audit, suggesting either that complex organizations are not necessarily less compliant, or that the complexity of organizations is not fully observed or considered during the audit process.

## 4.3 Model Performance

#### 4.3.1 Model Types

While the OLS model suggests that network features may be incrementally predictive of partnership non-compliance, overall the R-squared values are low. One possible explanation is that OLS may not be a sufficiently powerful tool to reliably predict noncompliance in the partnership space. We next turn to machine learning ("ML") approaches to evaluate whether and to what extent the model may be improved through alternative estimation techniques. ML models may be appropriate because they are built, or trained, to predict outcomes on *unseen data*, rather than to describe relationships between inputs and outputs within a known sample. This approach allows machine learning models to learn patterns from one random subset of the audited partnerships, called the training set, and then to test for predictive performance on a disjoint subset of the data, called the test set. We report all ML model performances on the test set.

We train two classes of models, ML logistic regression models and random forest models, to predict a binary output  $\hat{y} \in \{0,1\}$ , where 1 indicates a positive audit assessment, and 0 indicates either no assessment or a negative assessment. We start with ML logistic regression models, which predict audit assessments by attempting to separate partnerships with and without assessments using a linear function. The use of a linear approach is similar to OLS, but differs in three important ways. First, the loss function that the model optimizes to find this linear function is different; OLS minimizes mean squared error to fit its line, whereas logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation. Second, for the ML logistic regression model to generalize well to unseen data, a regularization penalty  $(\ell_2)$  is added to prevent the model's coefficients from over-fitting, or over-specializing to the specific dataset on which the model is trained. Third, the final output generated is different. To optimize the model's performance on the classification task of selecting a binary output (0 or 1) as

compared to a continuous value, the linear function's output is mapped to a sigmoid function to concentrate scores on values closer to either zero or one. The final output is then thresholded to produce a binary value.

Second, we use *random forest models*, which are highly flexible machine learning models capable of mapping nonlinear relationships between input and output. Random forest models are ensembles of decision trees that iteratively separate data based on thresholded feature values in order of highest information gain, relative to the prediction task. The predictions are then aggregated to determine the overall model's prediction. The flexibility of this model permits detection of non-linear and local patterns within the data.

#### 4.3.2 Model Training

To use the models, we first train them on a subset of the sample. To ensure model performance is not dependent upon the specific subset of data that was randomly selected for training, we calculate all model performance over 10 trials. For each trial, we separate the sample into 11,901 observations for training and validation (75%) and 3,968 test (25%) observations. Each trial includes randomly sampled train, validation, and test sets, and we evaluate model performance based on the test set—data that was completely unseen to the model during training and validation.

Within this split, we performed three-fold cross validation to select the best hyperparameters, with a training set of 7,934 (66%) and a validation set of 3,967 (33%). Within each trial, we use the validation set to select the best-performing model across a selection of models trained across a randomized grid of hyperparameters. For each of the models described below, we report the average and standard deviation of test set accuracy for each model over the ten trials as a way to assess performance.

#### 4.3.3 Linear Models

Table 6, Column (1) reports results from the ML logistic regression before including network features. The top of the table reports coefficients, whereas the bottom of the table reports statistics about the model's performance. Specifically, ML models generate a raw score indicative of confidence in the model's decision of predicting tax compliance; for the ML logistic regression, this is the unthresholded output of the model. A raw output score of 0.5 indicates no confidence, whereas scores close to either zero or one indicate high confidence in either a negative or positive outcome, respectively.

We calculate the mean accuracy of the model for the top 10% of the model's most confident predictions, over ten trials with random train-test splits. The test accuracy at the 10% budget is 0.531, which suggests relatively low performance of the ML logistic regression model. Without network features, the model predicts the presence of an adjustment with 69.3% accuracy on the most confident predictions (top 10% of the test set). Inclusion of the network features in Column (2) appear to have a mildly *negative* impact, resulting in slightly lower levels of both test accuracy and model score (0.523 and 0.686, respectively). Figure 7 provides a graph of this performance, where the orange line graphs the model performance excluding network characteristics, and the blue line includes all features. The figure suggests improved performance when including the network characteristics for only a small proportion of the population with high model accuracy (less than 20%).

#### 4.3.4 Random Forest models

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 reports results from the random forest models. Random Forest models do *not* create coefficients that are comparable to OLS or the ML logistic regression. Instead, the model produces a measure of "feature importance," which captures the contribution of each

variable or feature to the overall model accuracy in explaining non-compliance. It is calculated as the average accuracy decrease observed from randomly perturbing a feature value over the dataset; here, we calculate the feature importance from perturbations over five trials for each model.<sup>8</sup> As with the OLS model, we observe that financial characteristics, investment income, and agent experience are important in prediction based on the importance of *SALES*, *ORDINARY INCOME*, *DIVIDENDS*, *LTCG*, and *AGENT RANK*.

The bottom portion of the table reports statistics for model accuracy. For random forest models, the test accuracy is determined based on the percentage of random trees that generate a positive outcome (correct prediction). When calculating accuracy over the top 10% of confident predictions for each model, random forest models lead to a 27 percentage point increase in accuracy, or a 50% increase, as compared to the ML logistic regression model. This is derived from comparing the Test Accuracy of 79.7 percent reported at the bottom of Column (3) to the Test Accuracy of 53.1 percent in Column (1). In addition, the Model F1 scores are much higher for random forest, at 0.887 as compared to 0.693 in Column (1). Both suggest a remarkable difference in performance, meaning that more flexible random forest models are better able to predict the probability of IRS assessment than linear models.

We plot the accuracy of linear and random forest classification baseline models in Figure 8. The blue line plots the accuracy of the logistic regression, and the orange line is the random forest classification. Over the entire distribution, we can see the accuracy increase is approximately 10% based on the average wedge between the two lines. However, we find that the performance increase for using random forest models over ML logistic regression models is greater when looking at the subset of predictions where each model has the most confidence (left side of figure). In the top 5%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>While feature importance is helpful to understand the relative contribution of each measure to the model's prediction, we caveat that deriving feature importance in random forests is largely heuristic and susceptible to errors due to collinearity issues. Nonetheless, we tabulate feature importance as a way to evaluate the relative contribution of each variable.

of predictions, the random forest model can perform with 87% accuracy. This contrasts with the logistic regression model, which remains around 55%. These differences possibly reflect that, while many of the partnerships with and without adjustments are indistinguishable from each other based on the audited data, there exists a subset of partnerships with adjustments that reliably stands out from the rest—but *only* detected in a nonlinear model.

We next study whether the performance is even further improved after including the network characteristics. These network features exhibit relatively small feature importance as seen in Column (4) of Table 6. We observe that the test accuracy increases by 2.2 percentage points, or 2.8%, and the Model F1 score increases to 0.900. The bar chart in Figure 9 graphs the feature importance. This improved performance is also observed in Figure 10, Panel A, where the orange (blue) line plots the model performance without (with) network features. The model with network features consistently outperforms the model without such features.

While this improvement may seem relatively small, the calculation is based on the feature's importance over the entire model rather than in certain areas of the distribution (i.e. regions of high confidence) where the model performs exceptionally well. Consequently, we also examine performance improvement at different points in the distribution, finding sizeable improvements at the very top of the confidence distribution. That is, when focusing on the top 1%-5% most confident predictions, we observe that including network features increases model performance between 5-10%; see Panel B of Figure 10 that provides a zoomed-in graph of the model performance for the top 10% of the population. This graph provides a clearer visualization of the improved performance at the different budget levels, showing that the performance is 7.0 percentage points different at the very top of the distribution (97.0% with features versus 92.5% without). This is a notable improvement in performance and underscores the importance of including such network characteristics when predicting non-compliance.

### 5 Conclusion

Our work provides new evidence about tax planning in partnership entities. To do so, we obtain access to the population of U.S. partnerships for three tax years and graph their network structures. The visual depictions and descriptive statistics about U.S. partnerships adds to the very limited evidence about this large and growing group of contemporary U.S. businesses.

We then use machine learning algorithms to understand non-compliance among partnerships, incorporating network features into our tests. This analysis yields two key findings, the first related to the importance of network characteristics, and the second related to model specification. First, the models show that characteristics of complex partnerships structures are indeed helpful for explaining non-compliance, in both OLS and random forest models. The second is that there is substantial performance improvement from using models that can detect and predict non-linear patterns. The fact that accuracy is so high at the top of the confidence distribution when using random forest models is promising for the use of partnership noncompliance prediction models in practice, as limitations of IRS budgets prevent investigation of all potentially non-compliant partnerships. Instead, the most confident recommendations from such a model could inform audit selection, representing a sample with a higher guarantee of assessment.

Our work has substantial implications for research on business tax avoidance. The fact that random forest models outperform linear techniques at predicting noncompliance is of dual importance for both tax administration and academic research. First, it offers promise for tax administration and enforcement models. Second, it demonstrates the limitations of relying on tools such as OLS to understand the relationship between partnerships, their network structures, and tax planning aims. However, while machine learning algorithms are an incredible predictive tool, they can be difficult to interpret ( Carvalho et al. 2019; Burkart et al. 2021). Thus, we acknowledge that, while machine learning may be helpful for assisting in noncompliance prediction, they may be challenging

for understanding the underlying mechanisms driving tax planning.

Our findings raise many questions for future research. For example, are there other methods of understanding nonlinear relationships between partnership characteristics and tax planning? Would these methods be appropriate for other business entities, such as S corporations? Can efforts in the world of machine learning explainability be harnessed to use machine learning systems both as a method for predicting outcomes such as noncompliance, and for understanding its mechanism as well? We look forward to future research to address these important and unanswered questions.

The evidence from this study will contribute to the literature by providing information about a large sector of U.S. firms that are relatively understudied in the academic literature. Furthermore, the evidence is useful to tax authorities in advancing their capabilities for administering and enforcing U.S. tax law.

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# Appendix A

## Variable Definitions

**Dependent Variable** 

ADJUST [0/1] Indicator equal to one if an IRS audit resulted in an adjustment.

ADJUST Amount of IRS audit adjustment.

Partnership features

DEPRECIATION Depreciation expense reported on Form 1065, line 16c.

DIVIDENDS Ordinary dividends reported on Schedule K, line 6a.

FOREIGN TAX Total foreign taxes paid reported on Form 1065, schedule K, line 21.

GUARANTEED PAYMENTS Guaranteed payments to partners reported on Form 1065, line 10.

INTEREST EXP Interest expense reported on Form 1065, line 15.

LTCG Net long-term capital gains reported on Schedule K, line 9a.

ORDINARY INCOME Ordinary business income reported on Form 1065, line 22 is negative.

RENTAL Net rental real estate income reported on Schedule K, line 2.

SALARY AND WAGE Salaries and wages reported on Form 1065, line 9.

SALES Gross receipts reported on Form 1065, line 1a.

SEC 1231 Net Section 1231 gains reported on Schedule K, line 10.

**Audit features** 

AGENT RANK The promotion level associated with the examining officer conducting

the audit.

**Organization features** 

DoS The maximum number of entities through which income flows before it

is reported to a taxable partner.

IN DEG Number of K-1s received by a partnership entity.

OUT DEG Number of K-1s issued by a partnership entity.

PARTNERSHIPS Number of partnership entities within an organization.

S CORPS Number of S corporations within an organization.

TAXABLE PARTNERS Number of individuals and C corporations within an organization.

TRUSTS Number of trusts within an organization.

## Appendix B

#### **Data Construction**

Network Graph

- Network graphs are constructed for each tax year.
- We exclude a K-1 form if either the payer or the payee has TIN flagged as invalid. Invalid TINs can occur for a variety of reasons, such as the SSN/EIN is not found in corresponding databases or the name control could not be matched.
  - Other TINs identified as invalid are also removed (e.g., 0, 123456789, and 999999999).
- We construct a NetworkX MultiDiGraph from the IRS 1065 K-1 table.
- We add the payer and the payee as nodes on the graph for each queried form. Each node is identified by a (TIN, TIN TYPE) tuple, which is used as the hash for the node.
- Each edge (K-1) is recorded as amended if it is either an amended or a corrected original form. Otherwise it is recorded as original.

Collapse (Payer, Payee)s with two edges into one edge

#### 1. Identical Edges

Two edges are identical if they have the same payer, payee, return type, cycle and entry dates, and amounts.

#### 2. Prioritize Amended Edges

We keep the amended edge for if there are two identical edges and one is amended and one is original.

3. Filing Dates for Ordered Edges We keep the later entry date and cycle date if there are two identical edges.

#### 4. Identical Edges with Different Amounts

We keep the edge with the smaller (larger) reported income/gain (loss) because tax non-compliance strategies generally require taxpayers to minimize (maximize) their income/gains (losses).

Collapse (Payer, Payee)s with more than two edges into one edge

### 1. Identical Edges

Edges are identical if they have the same payer, payee, return type, cycle and entry dates, and amounts.

#### 2. Prioritize Amended Edges

We keep the amended edge for if there are multiple identical edges and one is amended and the remaining are original.

#### 3. Filing Dates for Ordered Edges

We keep the later entry date and cycle date if there are multiple identical edges.

4. Identical Edges with Different Amounts
We keep the edge with the smaller (larger) reported income/gain (loss) because tax
non-compliance strategies generally require taxpayers to minimize (maximize) their
income/gains (losses).

## Directed Graph of Partnerships

• After these data cleaning steps, the MultiDiGraph can be reduced to a DiGraph, and any pair of nodes has at most one edge.

### Ownership

- 1. We remove partnerships reported as being 100 percent owned by a single individual based on capital ownership.
- 2. We calculate profit and loss ownership using the income and loss items reported on schedule K-1s
  - (a) For example, in a two partner partnership, if one partner receives \$100 in income and the other receives \$200 in income, we compute their profit percentages as 33% and 67% respectively.
  - (b) We compute several measures of profit and loss based off combinations of Schedule K-1 line items to account for special allocations.

## **Inactive Partnerships**

• Due to the ownership calculation requirements outlined above, we do not include partnerships with no income/loss activity in our sample. In future analysis, we will examine what portion of these partnership carry significant assets.

## **Publicly Traded Partnerships**

• We do not currently analyze PTPs separately. We plan to identify and separately analyze/drop these partnerships in the future.

#### **Disregarded Entities**

- There are partnerships that issue K-1s to disregarded entities. These partnerships represent an important population in identifying tax non-compliance. However, it is currently not possible to determine what portion of these K-1s are ultimately reported on a taxable entity's return.
- In future analysis, we plan to pull the data from individual Schedule E forms to estimate the portion of unreported disregarded entities.






Figure 1: Growth of Business Structures

Notes: This figure illustrates the number of business returns filed between 2003 and 2020. Partnerships do not include disregarded entities that are not required to file a form 1065 with the IRS. Over this time period, partnership filings have increased the most, both in terms of the number of returns and the rate of increase: partnership (S-corp) returns filed increased by 87.7% (51.5%) at an average annual rate of 3.9% (2.5%). C-corp returns filed decreased by 28.9% at an average annual rate of -1.9%.







Notes: This figure illustrates partnership organization structures and depicts the relationship between the partnership and its partners. All panels show a simple partnership organization, which is a group composed of one partnership entity owned directly by individuals. Panel A presents a simple partnership organization with two owners; Panel B (C) present an organization with four (eight) partners. Blue circles denote individual partners; orange triangles denote the partnership entity; the arrow indicates ownership and points to the direct partner owner. The blue nodes are sized based on the proportion of the organization's total income reported to each partner.

Figure 3: Examples of Complex Partnership Structures

Panel A: Multiple Partnerships



Panel B: Multiple Entity Types




#### Legend



Notes: This figure illustrates partnership organization structures and depicts the relationship between the partnership and its partners. Both panels show a complex partnership organization, which is an organization (i) composed of multiple partnerships and/or (ii) directly owned by partners who are not individuals. Panel A presents a complex partnership organization composed of two partnerships with three distinct individual owners; Panel B presents an organization with one partnership organization directly owned by two individual owners and one entity. Blue circles denote individual partners; green circles indicate entity owners (C corporation, S corporation, and trusts); orange triangles denote the partnership entity. The arrow indicates ownership and points to the direct partner owner. The blue and green nodes are sized based on the proportion of the organization's total income reported to each partner.


Figure 4: Complex Partnership Structures with Contrasting Degrees of Separation




Notes: This figure illustrates partnership organization structures and depicts the relationship between the partnership and its partners, comparing organizations with differing Degrees of Separation. The panels show complex partnership organizations, which are groups (i) composed of multiple partnerships and/or (ii) directly owned by partners who are not individuals. Panel A presents a complex partnership organization with two degrees of separation; Panel B (C) denotes three (four) degrees of separation. Blue circles denote individual partners; green circles indicate entity owners (C corporation, S corporation, and trusts); orange triangles denote the partnership entity. The arrow indicates ownership and points to the direct partner owner. The blue and green nodes are sized based on the proportion of the organization's total income reported to each partner.

Figure 5: Complex Partnership Structures Comparing Degrees of Separation


Panel A: Two DoS




Panel C: Two DoS




Panel E: Two DoS




Panel B: Five DoS



Panel D: Five DoS





Panel F: Five DoS




Notes: This figure illustrates partnership organization structures, comparing organizations with differing numbers of partnerships and degrees of separation. The panels show complex partnership organizations, which are groups (i) composed of multiple partnerships and/or (ii) directly owned by partners who are not individuals. Panels A and B present organizations with 9 partnerships; Panels C and D (E and F) present organizations with 14 (19) partnerships. Panels A, C, and E (B, D, and F) show organizations with two (five) degrees of separation. Blue circles denote individual partners; green circles indicate entity owners (C corporation, S corporation, and trusts); orange triangles denote the partnership entity. The arrow indicates ownership and points to the direct partner owner. The blue and green nodes are sized based on the proportion of the organization's total income reported to each partner.

Figure 6: Examples of Complex Partnership Structures with 20 Partnerships





Panel B: 8 DoS



Notes: This figure illustrates partnership organization structures and depicts the relationship between the partnership and its partners. Both panels show a complex partnership organization, which is an organization (i) composed of multiple partnerships and/or (ii) directly owned by partners who are not individuals. Panel A presents a complex partnership organization composed of 20 partnerships with two Degrees of Separation ("DoS"); Panel B presents an organization composed of 20 partnerships with eight Degrees of Separation ("DoS"). Orange nodes denote the partnership entity; blue nodes denote individual partners; green nodes denote other entity types (C corporation, S corporation, or trust).

Figure 7: ML Logistic Regression Graph






Figure 8: Comparison of ML Models









Figure 10: Random Forest Model Performance

#### Panel A



#### Panel B




Table 1: Sample Composition

#### (a) 2013-2015 Sample Construction

Population from IRS partnership database Drop: Partnerships with insufficient ownership data Including partnerships with no income activity	10,915,532 3,875,554	
All partnerships	7,039,978	
	Full Sample	Audited Sample
Partnerships in simple organizations Partnerships in complex organizations	5,995,314 1,044,664	13,179 2,690
All partnerships	7,039,978	15,869

Sample consists of 7,039,978 partnership organization observations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. We separately identify our sample by simple and complex partnership organizations. Simple partnership organizations are single partnerships wholly owned by individuals; complex partnership organizations include all other structures.

#### (b) Partnership Organizations

Simple Partne	ership Organizations	Complex Partnership Org	anizations
Number of Partners	Number of Organizations	Number of Partners	Number of Organizations
2	4,328,169	2	277,132
3	856,051	3	104,186
4	436,712	4	72,534
5	159,494	5	45,630
6	80,292	6	28,891
7	39,763	7	18,843
8	26,596	8	13,121
9	16,475	9	9,958
10	12,274	10	7,465
11-20	33,569	11-20	26,683
21-30	4,099	21-30	5,385
31-40	820	31-40	1,764
41-50	384	41-50	700
51+	616	51+	1,293

Sample of simple partnership organizations consists of 5,995,314 partnerships from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. Sample of complex partnership organizations consists of 1,044,664 partnerships in 613,585 partnership organizations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation.

Table 1: continued

(c) Complex Partnership Organizations by Number of Partnerships

Number of Partnerships in Organization	Number of Organizations
1	381,876
2	156,557
3	38,283
4	15,108
5	7,619
6	4,375
7	2,658
8	1,691
9	1,276
10	876
11-20	2,652
21-30	389
31-40	111
41-50	48
51+	66

Sample of complex partnership organizations consists of 613,585 partnership organizations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Full Population

## (a) Industry Composition

		All Partnerships		Simple Pa	rtnerships	Complex Partnerships	
NAICS		# Observations	Percent of total	# Observations	Percent of total	# Observations	Percent of total
code	Industry	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
11	Agriculture and Forestry	396,700	5.69	346,405	5.84	50,295	4.84
21	Mining; Oil and Gas	62,445	0.90	44,178	0.74	18,267	1.76
22	Utilities	7,013	0.10	4,837	0.08	2,176	0.21
23	Construction	346,736	4.97	310,638	5.24	36,098	3.48
31-33	Manufacturing	139,469	2.00	121,713	2.05	17,756	1.71
42	Wholesale Trade	141,708	2.03	123,101	2.08	18,607	1.79
44-45	Retail Trade	413,918	5.94	387,248	6.53	26,670	2.57
48-49	Transportation and Warehousing	113,413	1.63	103,500	1.74	9,913	0.95
51	Information	94,845	1.36	81,869	1.38	12,976	1.25
52	Finance and Insurance	328,052	4.71	231,601	3.90	96,451	9.29
53	Real Estate and Rental	3,321,109	47.65	2,775,118	46.79	545,991	52.56
54	Professional Services	540,411	7.75	474,972	8.01	65,439	6.30
55	Management of Companies	43,559	0.62	20,796	0.35	22,763	2.19
56	Administrative; Waste Mgmt.	126,502	1.81	110,649	1.87	15,853	1.53
61	Educational Services	33,883	0.49	31,746	0.54	2,137	0.21
62	Health Care	155,971	2.24	126,904	2.14	29,067	2.80
71	Arts and Entertainment	143,274	2.06	129,707	2.19	13,567	1.31
72	Accommodation and Food	267,342	3.84	231,786	3.91	35,556	3.42
81	Other Services	279,439	4.01	263,375	4.44	16,064	1.55
92	Public Administration	47	0.00	37	0.00	10	0.00
	Other	84,142	0.21	75,134	0.19	9,008	0.30

Sample consists of 7,039,978 partnership organization observations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. Industry is defined by two-digit NAICS codes. The 'other' category includes partnerships whose NAICS codes were listed as zero. We separately identify our sample by simple and complex partnership organizations. Simple partnership organizations are single partnerships wholly owned by individuals; complex partnership organizations include all other structures.

Table 2: continued(b) Income Distribution by Number of Taxable Partners

	Sin	nple Partnership Orga	anizations	Com	<b>Complex Partnership Organizations</b>		
Number of Partners	Total Income (1)	Operating Income (2)	Investment Income (3)	Total Income (4)	Operating Income (5)	Investment Income (6)	
2	62,045	36,037	26,008	114,163	48,990	42,055	
3	46,566	28,252	18,314	118,238	61,741	46,083	
4	220,203	30,773	189,429	140,744	58,878	54,033	
5	78,576	48,590	29,986	132,624	56,607	57,620	
6	96,712	61,217	35,495	152,119	106,551	72,873	
7	116,615	78,355	38,260	168,390	94,337	70,974	
8	110,700	73,282	37,418	184,142	75,062	69,277	
9	150,272	105,550	44,722	187,783	98,377	75,336	
10	167,934	133,777	34,157	176,222	43,160	80,275	
11-20	266,038	224,814	41,224	231,679	116,598	83,774	
21-30	654,098	604,239	49,859	325,976	200,985	109,532	
31-40	1,485,823	1,407,736	78,087	326,745	210,861	96,956	
41-50	2,895,670	2,781,206	114,464	599,024	384,998	131,697	
51+	17,867,571	17,421,852	445,719	2,779,192	2,526,432	141,949	

This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 6.6 million partnership organizations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data. Total Income is the amount of income reported on Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, Sch. K, Lines 1-3 and 5-11. Operating Income includes amounts reported on Line 1; Investment Income includes amounts reported on Lines 2-3 and 5-11. Profitable Partnerships are those reporting total positive income. We separately calculate the amount of profit based on Line 1 ("Operating Income") and based on Lines 3 through 11 ("Investment Income"), excluding guaranteed payments. Amounts shown are averages for all partnerships (top line) and based on the number of taxable partners in the organization.

Table 2: continued

## (c) Descriptive Statistics

	All Partnership	os (n=7,039,978)	Simple Partnerships (n=5,995,314)		Complex Partne	rships (n=1,044,664)
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SALES	521,528.15	12,410,794.12	356,517.18	5,526,852.46	1,468,524.06	29,353,616.34
SALARY AND WAGE	65,176.96	1,418,507.09	47,772.55	778,806.65	165,060.65	3,172,900.55
GUARANTEED PAYMENTS	12,485.39	209,715.57	11,487.54	171,514.69	18,212.05	357,100.68
FOREIGN TAX	193.42	47,654.78	59.32	16,032.33	963.02	117,593.68
INTEREST EXP	5,500.79	246,745.58	3,335.45	61,059.14	17,927.66	623,469.98
DEPRECIATION	10,627.03	804,916.49	6,691.82	148,746.29	33,211.13	2,058,773.90
ORDINARY INCOME	36,036.64	2,063,895.04	27,402.82	1,263,180.50	85,586.03	4,421,047.40
RENTAL	13,478.11	703,516.35	10,484.35	101,017.46	30,659.28	1,810,097.35
DIVIDENDS	1,372.01	144,050.46	553.75	38,506.62	6,067.96	362,356.42
LTCG	4,724.67	506,269.19	2,729.03	271,686.96	16,177.58	1,141,704.56
SEC 1231	27,264.47	46,811,453.00	26,997.89	50,720,176.28	28,794.39	1,863,159.45
IN DEG	0.05	0.40	-	-	0.33	0.99
OUT DEG	2.72	2.60	2.57	1.96	3.58	4.75
PARTNERS	3.02	4.49	2.57	1.96	5.59	10.29
PARTNERSHIPS	1.42	4.46	1.00	-	3.86	11.28
S CORPS	0.08	0.88	-	-	0.56	2.22
TRUSTS	0.09	0.78	-	-	0.63	1.94
DoS	1.16	0.48	1.00	-	2.10	0.70

This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of partnerships from 2013-2015 with sufficient data. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. Amounts shown are averages for all partnerships and based on the number of taxable partners in the organization.

Table 2: continued

## (d) Partnerships by Total Sales

	All Partnerships		Simple Partnerships		Complex Partnerships	
	# Observations (1)	Percent of total (2)	# Observations (3)	Percent of total (4)	# Observations (5)	Percent of total (6)
\$0	4,123,650	58.57%	3,385,720	56.47%	737,930	70.64%
\$1-\$99,999	1,244,242	17.67%	1,163,447	19.41%	80,795	7.73%
\$100,000-\$499,999	888,120	12.62%	816,380	13.62%	71,740	6.87%
\$500,000-\$999,999	300,794	4.27%	262,498	4.38%	38,296	3.67%
\$1,000,000-\$4,999,999	376,068	5.34%	299,492	5.00%	76,576	7.33%
\$5,000,000-\$49,999,999	99,299	1.41%	64,754	1.08%	34,545	3.31%
>=\$50,000,000	7,805	0.11%	3,023	0.05%	4,782	0.46%

This table presents the number of partnerships in our sample by total sales. We separately show partnerships in simple and complex organizations.

# (e) Partnerships by Schedule K income (excluding ordinary income)

	All Partnerships		Simple Partnerships		Complex Partnerships	
	# Observations (1)	Percent of total (2)	# Observations (3)	Percent of total (4)	# Observations (5)	Percent of total (6)
\$0	4,751,180	67.49%	4,137,696	69.02%	613,484	58.73%
\$1-\$99,999	1,828,715	25.98%	1,547,604	25.81%	281,111	26.91%
\$100,000-\$499,999	383,010	5.44%	268,145	4.47%	114,865	11.00%
\$500,000-\$999,999	45,948	0.65%	26,059	0.43%	19,889	1.90%
\$1,000,000-\$4,999,999	27,325	0.39%	14,235	0.24%	13,090	1.25%
\$5,000,000-\$49,999,999	3,682	0.05%	1,550	0.03%	2,132	0.20%
>=\$50,000,000	118	0.00%	25	0.00%	93	0.01%

This table presents the number of partnerships in our sample by total Schedule K items included in our analyses (RENTAL, DIVIDENDS, LTCG, and, SEC 1231). We separately show partnerships in simple and complex organizations.

Table 3: Partnership: Audited Partnerships

#### (a) Partnership Organizations: Audited Sample

Simple Partne	ership Organizations	Complex Partnership Or	ganizations
Number of Partners	Number of Organizations	Number of Partners	Number of Organizations
2	11,233	2	1,271
3	1,240	3	425
4	438	4	271
5	138	5	161
6	46	6	125
7	23	7	84
8	21	8	47
9	*	9	54
10	*	10	43
11-20	27	11-20	140
21-30	*	21-30	39
31-40	0	31-40	14
41-50	0	41-50	*
51+	*	51+	*

Sample of simple partnership organizations consists of 13,179 audited partnerships from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. Sample of complex partnership organizations consists of 2,690 audited partnerships in partnership organizations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. An  $^{*}$  indicates the information is suppressed to conform with IRS disclosure requirements.

Table 3: continued

(b) Complex Partnership Organizations by Number of Partnerships: Audited Sample

Complex Partnership Organizations						
Number of Partnerships in Organization	Number of Organizations					
1	1,415					
2	464					
3	341					
4	137					
5	98					
6	49					
7	39					
8	20					
9	20					
10	23					
11-20	67					
21-30	*					
31-40	*					
41-50	*					
51+	*					

Sample of complex partnership organizations consists of 2,690 partnership organizations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. An  $^{*}$  indicates the information is suppressed to conform with IRS disclosure requirements.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Audited Population

## (a) Industry Composition

		All Parti	nerships	Positive Adjustment		No Positive	Adjustment
NAICS		# Observations	Percent of total	# Observations	Percent of total	# Observations	Percent of total
code	Industry	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
11	Agriculture and Forestry	2,225	14.11	942.00	11.68	1,283.00	16.66
21	Mining; Oil and Gas	101	0.64	43.00	0.53	58.00	0.75
22	Utilities	42	0.27	7.00	0.09	35.00	0.45
23	Construction	1,118	7.09	553.00	6.86	565.00	7.34
31-33	Manufacturing	796	5.05	289.00	3.58	507.00	6.58
42	Wholesale Trade	699	4.43	305.00	3.78	394.00	5.12
44-45	Retail Trade	1,291	8.19	729.00	9.04	562.00	7.30
48-49	Transportation and Warehousing	598	3.79	345.00	4.28	253.00	3.29
51	Information	292	1.85	109.00	1.35	183.00	2.38
52	Finance and Insurance	641	4.07	309.00	3.83	332.00	4.31
53	Real Estate and Rental and Leasing	3,060	19.41	1,540.00	19.10	1,520.00	19.74
54	Professional Services	1,285	8.15	753.00	9.34	532.00	6.91
55	Management of Companies	278	1.76	174.00	2.16	104.00	1.35
56	Administrative; Waste Mgmt.	365	2.32	241.00	2.99	124.00	1.61
61	Educational Services	69	0.44	32.00	0.40	37.00	0.48
62	Health Care and Social Assistance	487	3.09	284.00	3.52	203.00	2.64
71	Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation	392	2.49	200.00	2.48	192.00	2.49
72	Accommodation and Food Services	1,240	7.87	706.00	8.75	534.00	6.93
81	Other Services	751	4.76	482.00	5.98	269.00	3.49
92	Public Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Other	139	0.22	88.00	0.26	51.00	0.18

Sample consists of 15,869 audited partnership observations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. Industry is defined by two-digit NAICS codes. The 'other' category includes partnerships whose NAICS codes were listed as zero. We separately identify our sample by simple (8,131 observations) and complex partnerships (7,738 observations). Simple partnership organizations are single partnerships wholly owned by individuals; complex partnership organizations include all other structures.

Table 4: continued(b) Income Distribution by Number of Taxable Partners

	Sin	nple Partnership Orga	nnizations	Complex Partnership Organizations			
Number of Partners	Total Income (1)	Operating Income (2)	Investment Income (3)	Total Income (4)	Operating Income (5)	Investment Income (6)	
2	(180,220)	(181,176)	956	(1,211,583)	(984,157)	194,294	
3	(331,755)	(306,838)	(24,917)	1,697,446	1,220,759	70,998	
4	(98,182)	(77,733)	(20,450)	(566,116)	(359,296)	(139,628)	
5	(3,455,782)	(309,617)	(3,146,165)	118,299	36,643	104,303	
6	399,585	223,828	175,757	188,660	20,622	246,385	
7	(527,451)	(604,630)	77,179	992,300	790,293	(78,403)	
8	714,225	(273,931)	988,156	(51,282)	(125,947)	114,200	
9	*	*	*	(1,668,611)	(1,640,903)	294,930	
10	*	*	*	(639,488)	(651,238)	100,933	
11-20	(390,755)	(301,994)	(88,761)	2,598,438	995,231	805,052	
21-30	*	*	*	1,092,330	598,853	157,841	
31-40	-	-	-	(3,628,899)	(402,256)	(2,422,132)	
41-50	-	-	-	*	*	*	
51+	*	*	*	*	*	*	

Sample consists of 15,869 audited partnership observations from 2013-2015 with sufficient data from the IRS for estimation. Total Income is the amount of income reported on Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, Sch. K, Lines 1-3 and 5-11. Operating Income includes amounts reported on Line 1; Investment Income includes amounts reported on Lines 2-3 and 5-11. Profitable Partnerships are those reporting total positive income. We separately calculate the amount of profit based on Line 1 ("Operating Income") and based on Lines 3 through 11 ("Investment Income"), excluding guaranteed payments. Amounts shown are averages for all partnerships (top line) and based on the number of taxable partners in the organization. An \* indicates the information is suppressed to conform with IRS disclosure requirements.

Table 4: continued
(c) *Descriptive Statistics* 

	Audited Partnerships		Positive A	Adjustment	No Positive Adjustment	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SALES	3,885,171.73	85,008,350.83	2,830,639.07	35,257,130.03	4,993,262.32	116,237,955.63
SALARY AND WAGE	397,284.53	6,290,611.41	316,323.20	3,756,325.96	482,357.75	8,143,257.12
GUARANTEED PAYMENTS	34,407.65	862,621.87	19,249.15	261,380.62	50,336.02	1,205,711.64
FOREIGN TAX	943.92	77,909.68	309.11	16,097.59	1,610.96	110,340.18
INTEREST EXP	48,482.10	725,269.90	47,502.01	903,903.04	49,511.97	469,264.78
DEPRECIATION	233,930.46	8,614,348.84	273,556.65	11,454,646.32	192,291.73	3,782,416.48
ORDINARY INCOME	(202,814.42)	18,121,856.70	(233,900.28)	18,747,717.12	(170,149.76)	17,439,967.02
RENTAL	(5,915.61)	677,944.19	(998.16)	484,122.08	(11,082.81)	834,403.74
DIVIDENDS	3,861.70	201,954.65	4,103.59	268,566.20	3,607.52	88,609.34
LTCG	15,431.49	2,030,368.04	(15,540.55)	2,085,994.17	47,976.55	1,969,700.62
SEC 1231	110,117.79	5,340,627.64	35,234.23	872,983.72	188,804.56	7,594,755.87
AGENT RANK	12.12	0.98	12.17	0.92	12.08	1.03
IN DEG	0.11	0.61	0.10	0.56	0.12	0.67
OUT DEG	2.29	2.18	2.19	1.09	2.39	2.91
PARTNERS	2.64	3.71	2.48	3.09	2.81	4.26
PARTNERSHIPS	1.41	2.13	1.35	2.13	1.47	2.13
S CORPS	0.08	0.61	0.07	0.69	0.10	0.52
TRUSTS	0.05	0.54	0.03	0.33	0.07	0.70
DOS	1.19	0.53	1.15	0.46	1.24	0.59

This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of audited partnerships from 2013-2015 with sufficient data. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. Amounts shown are averages for all partnerships and based on the number of taxable partners in the organization.

Table 4: continued

## (d) Partnerships by Total Sales

	All Partnerships		Positive A	djustment	No Positive Adjustment	
	# Observations (1)	Percent of total (2)	# Observations (3)	Percent of total (4)	# Observations (5)	Percent of total (6)
\$0	6,170	38.88%	2,910	35.79%	3,260	42.13%
\$1-\$99,999	2,416	15.22%	1,429	17.57%	987	12.76%
\$100,000-\$499,999	2,654	16.72%	1,679	20.65%	975	12.60%
\$500,000-\$999,999	1,222	7.70%	668	8.22%	554	7.16%
\$1,000,000-\$4,999,999	2,162	13.62%	984	12.10%	1,178	15.22%
\$5,000,000-\$49,999,999	1,102	6.94%	394	4.85%	708	9.15%
>=\$50,000,000	143	0.90%	67	0.82%	76	0.98%

This table presents the number of partnerships in our sample by total sales. We separately show partnerships in simple and complex organizations.

# (e) Partnerships by Schedule K income (excluding ordinary income)

	All Partnerships		Positive A	djustment	No Positive Adjustment	
	# Observations (1)	Percent of total (2)	# Observations (3)	Percent of total (4)	# Observations (5)	Percent of total (6)
\$0	13,410	84.50%	7,073	86.99%	6,337	81.89%
\$1-\$99,999	1,408	8.87%	617	7.59%	791	10.22%
\$100,000-\$499,999	648	4.08%	296	3.64%	352	4.55%
\$500,000-\$999,999	172	1.08%	67	0.82%	105	1.36%
\$1,000,000-\$4,999,999	163	1.03%	57	0.70%	106	1.37%
\$5,000,000-\$49,999,999	*	*	*	*	*	*
>=\$50,000,000	*	*	*	*	*	*

This table presents the number of audited partnerships in our sample by total Schedule K items included in our analyses (RENTAL, DIVIDENDS, LTCG, and, SEC 1231). We separately show partnerships in simple and complex organizations. An \* indicates the information is suppressed to conform with IRS disclosure requirements.

Table 5: Determinants of Audit Adjustment

		(1)	(2)		
		OLS		OLS	
	AD	JUSTt	AD	JUSTt	
	coefficient	standard error	coefficient	standard error	
SALES	-0.0142	0.0070	-0.0158	0.0070	
SALARY AND WAGE	-0.0050	0.0060	0.0001	0.0060	
GUARANTEED PAYMENTS	-0.0083	0.0040	-0.0016	0.0040	
FOREIGN TAX	-0.0044	0.0040	-0.0040	0.0040	
INTEREST EXP	-0.0002	0.0040	0.0024	0.0040	
DEPRECIATION	0.0112	0.0060	0.0118	0.0060	
ORDINARY INCOME	0.0142	0.0070	0.0137	0.0070	
RENTAL	0.0014	0.0040	0.0019	0.0040	
DIVIDENDS	-0.0075	0.0060	-0.0038	0.0060	
LTCG	-0.0139	0.0060	-0.0107	0.0060	
SEC 1231	-0.0075	0.0040	-0.0060	0.0040	
AGENT RANK	0.0237	0.0040	0.0193	0.0040	
IN DEG			0.0119	0.0050	
OUT DEG			-0.0230	0.0080	
PARTNERS			0.0021	0.0060	
PARTNERSHIPS			0.0058	0.0100	
S CORPS			-0.0005	0.0050	
TRUSTS			-0.0071	0.0050	
DOS			-0.0457	0.0060	
Observations	15,869		15,869		
Adjusted R2	0.003		0.011		

This table presents the prediction models for audit adjustment using an OLS model. Standard errors are reported in the column next to the coefficients. All variables are defined in Appendix A.

Table 6: Determinants of Audit Adjustment

	(	1)	(2)		
	Log	istic	Randon	n Forest	
	ADJUST [0/1]t	ADJUST [0/1]t	ADJUST [0/1]t	ADJUST [0/1]t	
	Coefficients		Feature Ir	nportance	
SALES	-0.1479	-0.1301	0.0140	0.0145	
SALARY AND WAGE	0.0156	0.0365	0.0015	0.0061	
GUARANTEED PAYMENTS	-0.1320	-0.0696	0.0038	0.0020	
FOREIGN TAX	-0.3012	-0.2474	0.0132	0.0000	
INTEREST EXP	0.0077	0.0177	0.0105	0.0076	
DEPRECIATION	0.0935	0.0918	0.0057	0.0068	
ORDINARY INCOME	0.0867	0.0764	0.0148	0.0865	
RENTAL	0.0341	0.0370	0.0127	0.0100	
DIVIDENDS	-0.0894	-0.0487	0.0164	0.0002	
LTCG	-0.2116	-0.1629	0.0148	0.0001	
SEC 1231	-0.1678	-0.1143	0.0114	0.0020	
AGENT RANK	0.0980	0.0813	0.0144	0.0070	
IN DEG		0.0435		0.0003	
OUT DEG		-0.1594		0.0014	
PARTNERS		0.0105		0.0015	
PARTNERSHIPS		0.1005		0.0011	
S CORPS		0.0170		0.0007	
TRUSTS		-0.0205		0.0000	
DOS		-0.2034		0.0027	
Training set observations	11,901	11,901	11,901	11,901	
Test set observations	3,968	3,968	3,968	3,968	
K-fold cross validation training	7,934	7,934	7,934	7,934	
K-fold cross validation test	3,967	3,967	3,967	3,967	
Training Accuracy at 10% budget	0.546	0.535	0.988	0.997	
Test Accuracy at 10% budget	0.531	0.523	0.797	0.819	
Generalization Error	0.015	0.013	0.191	0.177	
Model F1 score at 10% budget	0.693	0.686	0.887	0.900	

This table presents the prediction models for audit adjustment. We present a logistic Ridge regression and a Random Forest model. We use a 75%/25% split for our training and test sets. Partnership features have been standardized. We report model accuracy for the training and test set.