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10 CFR 50.73

August 4, 2014

PG&E Letter DCL-14-069

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2

Supplemental Licensee Event Report 1-2014-003-01, Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generators, Tornado Missiles

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) submits the enclosed Supplemental Licensee Event Report (LER) for an unanalyzed condition that affected the Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators. PG&E is submitting this LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A).

This supplement corrects a typographical error made in the original LER (Form 366, Block 11) by changing reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A). Additionally, PG&E's evaluation of the extent of condition regarding this issue is still in progress. Therefore, a supplemental LER will be submitted following completion of the evaluation with an expected submittal date of November 3, 2014.

PG&E will implement corrective actions in accordance with the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Corrective Action Program. PG&E makes no new or revised regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this report.

This event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,

Barry S. Allen

j8l3/50592094 Enclosure

cc\enc:

Peter J. Bamford, NRR Project Manager

Marc L. Dapas, NRC Region IV Administrator

Thomas R. Hipschman, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

INPO

Diablo Distribution

NRC FORM 366



APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017

(01-2014)



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

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Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit 1

2. DOCKET NUMBER

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4.	TITLE

Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generators, Tornado Missiles

5. I	EVENT [ATE	6.	LER NUMBE	R	7. R	EPORT	DATE	8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2					DOCKET	NUMBER 323		
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9. OP	ERATING	MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 ('S OF 10 C	FR §	FR §: (Check all that apply)						
			20.2	201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)			[50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)					
5			20.2	201(d)		20.2	203(a)(3)(ii)	\	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.7	'3(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
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			20.2	2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.7	'3(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A					
					12. LI	CENSEE	CONTAC	CT FOR T	HIS L	LER								
	licensee contact Joe Loya, Supervisor, Regulatory Services					TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 805-545-4486												
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 6, 2014, at 09:06 PST, with Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 1 in Mode 5 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, DCPP concluded the Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) radiator ventilation exhaust plenums were not sufficiently analyzed for tornado missiles. Additionally, DCPP identified that the EDGs engine exhaust pipes were not protected from tornado missiles. DCPP staff performed an operability assessment and concluded the EDGs remained operable. On March 6, 2014, at 16:33 PST, DCPP made an 8-hour, nonemergency report to the NRC (reference NRC Event Notification Number 49879) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), "Unanalyzed Condition."

The cause was determined to be due to a misunderstanding of the DCPP tornado missile protection licensing basis. DCPP incorrectly extended the NRC approval of limited tornado protection exceptions to the emergency diesel generator ventilation system redesign and modification.

Corrective actions included retraining and regualifying all employees who perform 10 CFR 50.59 screens and evaluations to ensure future changes to the facility are appropriately evaluated. In addition, DCPP has commissioned a Licensing Basis Verification Project to ensure the Current Licensing Basis is clear and to correct deficient 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. DCPP is evaluating tornado missile risk using a probabilistic technique and will be pursuing a change to the tornado missile licensing basis via license amendment request.

APPROVED BY OMB: NO.3150-0104

EXPIRES: 01/31/2017

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington ,DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocullects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1.FACILITY NAME	2.DOCKET	6	. LER NUMBE	3. PAGE		
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1	05000 275	YEAR	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO.		0.05.4	
		2014	- 003	- 01	2 OF 4	

NARRATIVE

I. Plant Conditions

Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 1 was in Mode 5 for refueling, and Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent reactor power, with normal operating reactor coolant temperature and pressure.

II. Problem Description

A. Background

DCPP Units 1 and 2 each have three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) [DG] that provide vital backup power to three electrical buses [BU] to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident (DBA) whenever normal or offsite power sources [EK] are unavailable. DCPP EDGs are designed to function so that a single failure of any EDG will not jeopardize the capability of the remaining EDGs to start and provide power to operate the shutdown systems required to mitigate any DBA condition.

The DCPP EDGs are cooled using engine-driven fans [FAN] that provide cooling air to the diesel generator radiators [HX]. The radiator fan draws air through the radiator, maintaining jacket water temperature and, in turn, maintaining lubricating oil temperature. Jacket water to the aftercooler also cools combustion air. The radiator fan also draws ambient air through the engine compartment to cool the equipment housed within it. Inability to maintain adequate radiator air flow due to postulated tornado missile deformation of the radiator exhaust vent plenum will result in higher component temperatures in the engine compartments, derating of the engine due to increased combustion air temperature, higher lubricating oil temperatures, and high cylinder jacket temperatures. This could result in a failure of the emergency diesel generator ventilation system (EDGVS) to perform its support function.

The EDGs exhaust system is designed to direct engine exhaust to the atmosphere. The exhaust system consists of an exhaust silencer and exhaust piping. Deformation of the EDG exhaust system due to postulated tornado missiles would increase engine exhaust back pressure and impair the EDGs' operation. This could result in a failure of the EDGs to perform their safety function.

B. Event Description

On March 6, 2014, at 09:06 PST, as part of the Licensing Basis Verification Project (LBVP), DCPP identified an unanalyzed condition where the EDG exhaust plenums and exhaust piping were not adequately protected from tornado missiles. This is a nonconforming condition with DCPP licensing basis requirements. On March 6, 2014, at 16:33 PST, DCPP reported this unanalyzed condition to the NRC Event Notification Number 49879.

C. Status of Inoperable Structure, Systems, or Components That Contributed to the Event

This issue did not impact any plant equipment as no weather patterns capable of producing a tornado were forecast. DCPP has no recorded evidence of an onsite tornado.

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D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

None.

E. Method of Discovery

LBVP identified an incorrect methodology was used to determine tornado wind loading on the EDGVS plenum. Subsequent questions from the NRC resident inspector prompted an evaluation of the DCPP licensing basis for tornado missiles. This evaluation identified that the licensing basis requirements for EDGVS and exhaust pipes require protection from tornado missiles.

F. Operator Actions

Operators verified that the EDGs were operable and no weather patterns capable of producing a tornado were forecast. Operators established shift orders that incorporated the following compensatory measures:

- 1. Monitor the National Weather Service for a Tornado Watch on a three-hour periodicity.
- 2. Upon receipt of a Tornado Watch, remove or secure potential missile sources that are more severe than the design basis missiles.
- 3. Implement the DCPP "Hot Weather Plan" upon receipt of a Tornado Watch notification.

G. Safety System Responses

None.

III. Cause of the Problem

PG&E has determined that the failure to include missile impactive loading in the 1995 redesign and modification of the EDGVS plenum was due to a misunderstanding of the DCPP tornado missile protection licensing basis. DCPP incorrectly extended the NRC approval of limited tornado protection exceptions to the EDGVS redesign and modification.

IV. Assessment of Safety Consequences

DCPP performed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and documented the results in a formal calculation (PRA Calculation SDP 14-01). With such low tornado frequencies at the site, it was concluded that tornado missile-initiated scenarios were insignificant contributors to the overall core damage frequency. The incremental core damage probability (ICDP) was less than the acceptance criteria of 1E-06. Since the risk contribution of the as-found condition was below the low risk significance guidance, this condition is of very low safety significance. Therefore, this condition has negligible impact the health and safety of the public.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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V. Corrective Actions

- 1. DCPP has retrained and requalified all employees who perform 10 CFR 50.59 screens and evaluations to ensure future changes to the facility are appropriately evaluated against licensing basis requirements.
- 2. DCPP has commissioned a LBVP to ensure the Current Licensing Basis is clear and to identify deficient 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations.
- 3. DCPP is evaluating tornado missile risk using a probabilistic technique and will be pursuing a change to the tornado missile licensing basis via license amendment request.

VI. Additional Information

PG&E is currently evaluating the extent of condition regarding this issue and will submit a supplemental LER with an expected due date of November 3, 2014.

A. Failed Components

None.

B. Previous Similar Events

PG&E Letter DCL-14-010, "Licensee Event Report 1-2013-009-00, Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators," dated February 11, 2014, is similar to this event.

A. Industry Reports

None.