

444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247

LIC-12-0118 August 10, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2012-004, Revision 1, for the Fort Calhoun

Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2012-004, Revision 1, dated August 10, 2012. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A,B,C,D).

No commitments are being made in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

D. J. Bannister

Vice President and CNO

DJB /sds

Attachment

E. E. Collins, Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV

L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager

J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

INPO Records Center

NDC EOE	M 366			II S NIIC	I EAD DI	EGIII ATO	DV COMM	AP NOISSI	PPRO'	VED BY OMB: N	IO 3150	0-0104	F	XPIRE	S: 1	0/31/2013	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)									APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station							2. I	2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE 05000285 1 OF				OF	2				
4. TITLE				Inadequ	ıate An	alysis of	Drift Aff	ects Safe	ety F	Related Equi	ipmer	nt					
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER					ER	*				8. OTHER FACILIT				IES INVOLVED			
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NRC FORM 366A

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE			
Fort Callegue Station	05000385	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	•	OF	c	
Fort Calhoun Station	05000285	2012	- 004 -	1	2		2	

NARRATIVE

EVENT DESCRIPTION

While investigating operating experience from another station it was determined that Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is subject to similar conditions. The operating experience involved setpoint drift of safety-related pressure switches beyond what had been accounted for in the station's safety analyses.

Engineering performed an equipment database search to determine where the switches in question were installed at FCS. Several switches that input into specific Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safeguards Actuation Circuitry (ESF) loops were in the affected population. Specifically these pressure switches provide safety-related signals for high containment pressure to the RPS and ESF. The impact of the potential drift was evaluated and it was determined that neither RPS nor the engineered safeguard circuitry may actuate at the required containment pressure of 5 psig. A preliminary evaluation determined that the actuation may occur at a slightly higher value than the required pressure. Other systems are currently being evaluated for the condition.

On May 2, 2012, an eight (8)-hour report was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) to the NRC Headquarters Operation Office (HOO) at 1802 CDT (Event Number (EN) 47892) as an unanalyzed condition. This LER is amending the reporting criteria for this issue as reported in LER 2012-004-0. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A,B,C,D).

CONCLUSION

The cause analysis is being revised and the results will be provided in a supplement to this report.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Corrective actions will be determined following the revision of the cause analysis.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The cause analysis is being revised. The safety significance of this event will be provided in a supplement to this LER following completion of the analysis.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

No events of a similar nature have been identified.