

Rafael Flores Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer rafael.flores@luminant.com P O Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043

T 254 897 5590 **C** 817 559 0403 **F** 254 897 6652

CP-201301345 Log # TXX-13172 REF. # 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

December 18, 2013

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-446 LICENSEE

EVENT REPORT 446/13-002-00, UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIP DUE TO RELAY ACTUATION

Dear Sir or Madam:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 446/13-002-00, "Unit 2 Reactor Trip Due to Relay Actuation," for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 2.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.

Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Tamera Ervin-Walker at (254) 897-6902.

Sincerely,

Luminant Generation Company LLC

Rafael Flores

Ву: ____

Thomas P. McCool

Vice President, Station Support

c - Marc L. Dapas, Region IVBalwant K. Singal, NRRResident Inspectors, Comanche Peak

IE22 NRR

NDC FOR				IIICI EAD DEC	III ATO	DV COMM	ICCION								
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)						APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:10/31/2013									
(10-2010) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)								Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the							
									information collection. 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE						
			oloar P	ower Plant	∕CDN	DD\ I Init	· n								
4. TITLE	IICHE I	tan iyu	Clear	OWEL FIAIR	(OF IV	FF) Unit		05000446 1 OF 4							
4. TITLE Unit 2 Reactor Trip Due to Relay Actuation															
	VENT DA			LER NUMBER		7. RE	PORT D	ATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED							
монтн	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NA				T NUMBER		
				NUMBER	NO.		J	,							
11	01	2013	13	002	00	12	18	2013	FACILITY NAI	ME 		05000	TNUMBER		
9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)															
			_	2201(b)		20.2203(a	a)(3)(i)		_)(2)(i)(C)	<u> </u>	73(a)(2)(vii))		
	1		=	2201(d)	닏	20.2203(a							(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
				2203(a)(1) 2203(a)(2)(i)	H	20.2203(a 50.36(c)(1						73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 73(a)(2)(ix)(A)			
10 PO\	NER LEV	'FI		2203(a)(2)(ii)	\exists	50.36(c)(1)(2)(iv)(A)		73(a)(2)(x)	(,		
10.1.01				2203(a)(2)(iii)	∺	50.36(c)(2)(2)(v)(A)		71(a)(4)			
	100		_	2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.46(a)(3	•		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5)						
				2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2	2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) OTHER						
			20.2	2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2	2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	VOL	UNTARY L	.ER		
					12. LI	CENSEE C	ONTAC	FOR T	IIS LER						
FACILITY	NAME									TELEP	HONE NUMB	ER (Include I	Area Code)		
				Hope, Man								<u>97-6370</u>			
041105	LOVOTE									ED IN THIS REI	T	DED	NOTABLE.		
CAUSE	SYSTE	M COM	PONENT	MANU- FACTURER	REPOR' TO E		CAUSI	=	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU- FACTURE		ORTABLE DEPIX		
								MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO							SUBMISSION DATE								
				., approximately			typewriti	en lines)		_	1		1		
			1.0	1 1 001	(aam)		(2.0.1.2			. 1 4 . 400					
										ode 1 at 100	-				
reactor tripped during Solid State Protection System (SSPS) slave relay testing. This test utilizes a															
blocking circuit to verify the operability of the slave relay which trips the main turbine and both															
main feedwater pump turbines, on a Hi-Hi steam generator level or safety injection (SI). While															
positioning the slave relay switch in a testing lineup, the relay actuated. The Unit 2 turbine tripped															
as well as both main feedwater pumps. The trip of both main feedwater pumps started all three															
Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumps. All systems responded as expected. The cause of the Unit 2															
reactor trip was an original design issue with the main turbine test cabinet. The corrective action is															
to add a test signal electrical interlock with the blocking relay to prevent slave relay actuation until															
the block is established for test circuits in Units 1 and 2. All times in this report are approximate and															
CST unless noted otherwise.															

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

NRC FORM 366A

(10-2010)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER				3. PAGE		
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2	05000 - 446	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.				
	Į į	2013	13-002	00	2	OF 4		

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTABLE EVENT

A. REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION:

50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B)."

B. PLANT CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT:

On November 1, 2013, Comanche Peak Unit 2 was in Mode 1, Power Operation, operating at approximately 100% power.

C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

There were no inoperable structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

D. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES:

Procedure OPT-406B-1 performs the surveillance test of the Unit 2 Train A K620 slave relay. The test utilizes a blocking circuit to verify the operability of the slave relay which trips the main turbine and both main feedwater pump turbines, on a HI-HI steam generator level or safety injection (SI). No actuation should occur.

The procedure step 17 turns switch 2-TS-1/K620 to the PUSH TO TEST position. The PUSH TO TEST position establishes the block of the main turbine and feedwater trip signal from auxiliary relay 2-KXA/0620A. Step 18 verifies the block, then step 19 actuates the relay by depressing the switch.

On November 1, 2013 at 2146 CST, the Unit 2 Reactor Operator (utility, licensed) at the CP2-EIPRCV-13 cabinet in the control room was turning switch 2-TS-1/K620 to the PUSH TO TEST position in accordance with procedure OPT-406B-1 step 17 when the unanticipated trip of the main turbine and feedwater pumps occurred followed by automatic actuation of a reactor trip. The control room operators immediately entered procedure EOP-0.0B, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" in response to the reactor trip.

NRC FORM 366A

(10-2010)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

CONTINUATION SHEET

0011111071110	IN OTTEL						
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE		
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2	05000 - 446	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.			
		2013	13-002	00	3 OF 4		

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Operations issued a shift order on 11/05/2013 to not perform slave relay testing involving blocking circuits for the main turbine and main feedwater pumps until further notice. These include all tests utilizing test switches in the main turbine and feedwater pump test cabinets.

E. THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL PERSONNEL ERROR

Operators (utility, licensed) in the Unit 2 Control Room received a Unit 2 steam generator Hi-Hi level trip.

II. COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES

A. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE

Not applicable – There were no component or system failures.

B. FAILURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECTS OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT

Not applicable - There were no component or system failures.

C. SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS

Not applicable – There were no component or system failures.

D. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION

Not applicable - There were no component or system failures.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

A. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED

Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump started as expected as a result of the reactor trip.

B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY

Not applicable - there was no safety system train inoperability that resulted from this event.

NRC FORM 366A

(10-2010)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

CONTINUATION SHEET

	TT OTTLE I				
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	(6. LER NUMBE	R	3. PAGE
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2	05000 - 446	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	
		2013	13-002	00	4 OF 4

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT

This event is bounded by the CPNPP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident analysis which assumes conservative initial conditions which bound the plant operating range and other assumptions which could reduce the capability of safety systems to mitigate the consequences of the transient.

This event is bounded by the analysis of the turbine trip presented in Section 15.2.3 of the CPNPP FSAR. The analysis uses a conservative assumption to demonstrate the capability of pressure relieving devices and to demonstrate core protection margins. The event of November 1, 2013, occurred at 100% reactor power, and all systems and components functioned as designed.

Based on the above, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public were unaffected by this condition and this event has been evaluated to not meet the definition of a safety system functional failure per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The direct cause of the event was an invalid input from switch 2-TS-1/K620 during the rotation to the PUSH TO TEST position that resulted in the unanticipated actuation of auxiliary relay 2-KXA/0620 before blocking the output with relay 2-KT/0080-1.

The cause is that the original design for the 2-KXA/0620A test circuit in CP2-EIPRCV-13 did not include an electrical interlock to address the possibility of the 2-TS-1/K620 L21-L22 contact closing prior to establishing the block of end device actuation.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The interim corrective action is to not perform the test in Mode 1. The long term corrective action is to add a test signal electrical interlock with the blocking relay to prevent slave relay actuation until the block is established for test circuits in Units 1 and 2.

VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

There have been no previous similar reportable events at CPNPP in the last three years.