



**ENERGY  
NORTHWEST**

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March 13, 2013  
GO2-13-042

10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2012-004-02**

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Supplemental Licensee Event Report No. 2012-004-02 for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The enclosed report discusses items of reportability concerning a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications that occurred when performing work on a breaker that supplied a critical bus from one of Columbia's credited offsite power sources. This discrepant condition was discovered on August 22, 2012.

There are no commitments being made to the NRC herein. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Z.K. Dunham at (509) 377-4735.

Respectfully,

*For* W.G. Hettel  
Vice President, Operations

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2012-004-02

cc: NRC Region IV Administrator  
NRC NRR Project Manager  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector/988C  
A.J. Rapacz – BPA/1399  
W.A. Horin – Winston & Strawn

IEZZ  
NRR

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**(See reverse for required number of  
digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to [infocollects\\_resource@nrc.gov](mailto:infocollects_resource@nrc.gov), and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

**1. FACILITY NAME**

Columbia Generating Station

**2. DOCKET NUMBER**

05000397

**3. PAGE**

1 OF 3

**4. TITLE**

Failure to meet Technical Specifications completion time for offsite power

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
8	22	2012	2012 - 04 - 02			03	18	2013	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										050000

**9. OPERATING MODE**

1

**11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)**

- |   |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)         | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)             | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)  | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)         | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)            | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)      | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)                | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)   | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)   | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)  | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)           | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)                  | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)  | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)  | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)              | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)  | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)   | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)  | <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)  | Specify in Abstract below<br>or in NRC Form 366A |

**10. POWER LEVEL**

100

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER****FACILITY NAME**

Lisa Williams, Licensing Supervisor

**TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)**

(509) 377-8148

**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

**14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED**☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)☒ NO**15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE**

MONTH

DAY

YEAR

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On August 22, 2012, it was discovered that during maintenance on breaker E-CB-S/1, required Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 Condition A was not entered. The breaker provides power to an essential bus from one of the credited offsite power sources. While E-CB-S/1 was out of service, Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) would not have been able to meet acceptance criteria in a surveillance procedure used to satisfy Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.1. Therefore, per SR 3.0.1, failure to meet the surveillance requirement indicates that Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 was not met. The breaker was inoperable for approximately 30 hours, resulting in the failure to meet the Required Actions described in Condition A and F within the specified Completion Times. The apparent cause was determined to be conflicting information between the associated TS Bases and the surveillance procedure. The contributing cause was determined to be inadequate process for operability determinations when equipment is removed from service for maintenance activities or due to equipment failure.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
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		2012 - 04 - 02			

**NARRATIVE****Plant Condition**

Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of this event and that contributed to this event.

**Description of Event**

On August 22, 2012, it was discovered that during maintenance on breaker E-CB-S/1 [BKR], required Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement (TSAS) 3.8.1 Condition A was not entered. The breaker provides power to the Division 1 critical electrical bus E-SM-7 [BU] from the credited offsite source, E-TR-S [XFMR]. It was discovered that while E-CB-S/1 was out of service, Columbia would not have been able to satisfy acceptance criteria in the associated surveillance procedure used to satisfy Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.1. Therefore, per SR 3.0.1, failure to meet the surveillance requirement indicates that Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1 was not met. The breaker was inoperable for approximately 30 hours, resulting in the failure to meet the Required Actions described in TS 3.8.1 Condition A and F, within the specified Completion Times.

**Immediate Corrective Actions**

Night orders were initiated notifying operations personnel of the issue and the appropriate measures to take going forward when planning work with the associated breakers. Specifically, any work which impacts the ability of E-TR-S to supply power to the critical electrical bus for Division 1 or Division 2 will require entry into TS 3.8.1 Condition A.

**Causes**

The apparent cause was determined to be conflicting information between TS Bases 3.8.1 and the surveillance procedure. The contributing cause was determined to be an inadequate process for operability determinations when equipment is removed from service for maintenance activities or due to equipment failure.

**Further Corrective Actions**

The following corrective actions are planned or have been completed:

- Develop methodology to be used by operations when making operability determinations for equipment removed from service.
- Enhance procedures concerning operability determinations for equipment removed from service.
- Initiate training requests to train operators on methodology to be used when making operability determinations for equipment removed from service.
- Revise associated operations procedures based on TS Bases requirements.
- Develop a formal position for offsite power requirements.
- Conduct a focused self-assessment to ensure the adequacy of TS Bases and implementation of TS SRs.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
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**NARRATIVE**

**Assessment of Safety Consequences**

There were no actual safety consequences as a result of this condition. Critical electrical buses E-SM-7 and E-SM-8 [BU] are normally energized from Normal Auxiliary transformer, E-TR-N1 [XFMR], when the main generator [GEN] is operating.

**Similar Events**

A search was performed for each time E-CB-S/1 was taken out of service in the past three years. The associated work orders (WO) and control room logs were reviewed to determine whether the duration the breaker was out of service exceeded the Completion Times of TS 3.8.1 Conditions A and F. On two occasions separate from the event being reported in this LER, E-CB-S/1 was taken out of service and the TS allowed outage time was exceeded. These two other events occurred on 11/22/2010 and 8/31/2011. A search was also performed on E-CB-1/7, E-CB-7/1, E-CB-3/8 and E-CB-8/3 being taken out of service from 2009-2012. There were 5 occurrences where SR was not completed. A similar search was performed on E-CB-S/3 as it performs the same function as E-CB-S/1, but on Division 2. On 3/28/2011 E-CB-S/3 was taken out of service and the TS allowed outage time was exceeded.

**Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) Information**

EIIS information is denoted as [XX], [XXX], or [XXXX] throughout the narrative.