

444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247

LIC-13-0051 April 29, 2013

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2013-005, Revision 0, for the Fort Calhoun

Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2013-005, Revision 0, dated April 29, 2013. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(D). There are no new commitments being made in this letter.

If you should have any questions, please contact Terrence W. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance, at (402) 533-6263.

Sincerely,

Louis P. Cortopassi

Site Vice President and CNO

LPC/epm/rjr

Attachment

A. T. Howell, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV

J. M. Sebrosky, NRC Project Manager

L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager

J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Commission (Large Management and the state of digits/characters for each block) Control Room HVAC Modification Not Properly Evaluated	NRC FOR	RM 366			U.S. NUC	LEAR R	EGULATO	RY COMM	ISSION	PPRO	VED BY OMB: N	O. 3150-0104	E	XPIRES	: 10/31/2013		
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(10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER				3. PAGE		
Fort Callegue Station	05000285	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	·	OF	_	
Fort Calhoun Station		2013	- 005 -	0	2	OF	5	


NARRATIVE

BACKGROUND

Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is a two-loop reactor coolant system of Combustion Engineering (CE) design.

Below is a simplified diagram of the control room ventilation.

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION FILTERED AIR MAKEUP MODE



Filtered air mode for CR HVAC consists of: Filtered Air Makeup Fan (VA-63A or VA-63B) takes a suction on the Control Room via PCV-6682 and outside through VA-65 via PCV-6680A(B)-1.

These two paths provide 1000 cfm of filtered air and 1000 cfm of air drawn from the Control Room which combines at the suction of VA-63A(B).

This 2000 cfm passes through filter unit VA-64A(B) to the suction of VA-46A(B) which is circulating 18,000 cfm.

NRC FORM 366A

(10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	3. PAGE				
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NARRATIVE

Applicable Technical Specifications:

2.8.2 Refueling Operations – Containment

2.8.2(4) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS)

Applicability

Applies to operation of the CRVS during CORE ALTERATIONS and REFUELING OPERATIONS inside containment.

Specification

The CRVS shall be IN OPERATION and in the Filtered Air mode.

2.8.3 Refueling Operations - Spent Fuel Pool

2.8.3(5) Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS)

Applicability

Applies to operation of the CRVS during REFUELING OPERATIONS in the spent fuel pool area. The provisions of Specification 2.0.1 for Limiting Conditions for Operation are not applicable.

Objective

To minimize the consequences of a fuel handling accident to the control room staff.

Specification

- (1) The CRVS shall be IN OPERATION and in the Filtered Air mode.
- (2) A spent fuel pool area radiation monitor shall be IN OPERATION.

2.12 Control Room Ventilation System

2.12.1 Control Room Air Filtration System - Operating

Applicability

Applies to the operational status of the control room air filtration system when the reactor coolant temperature Tcold >210°F.

Objective

To assure operability of equipment required to filter control room air following a Design Basis Accident.

Specification

Two control room air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE.

2.12 Control Room Ventilation System

2.12.2 Control Room Air Conditioning System

Applicability

Applies to the operational status of the control room air conditioning system when the reactor coolant temperature Tcold >210°F.

Objective

To assure operability of equipment required to maintain air temperature within the control room following a Design Basis Accident.

Specification

Two control room air conditioning trains shall be OPERABLE.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

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NARRATIVE

Fort Calhoun Station was licensed prior to the General Design Criteria and Standard Review Plan. The station was designed in accordance with the 70 draft General Design Criteria published for comment in the Federal Register (32 FR 10213) on July 11, 1967. Criterion 2 of the 70 draft General Design Criteria, which discusses tornadoes and appears in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), is provided below.

CRITERION 2 - PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards that will enable the facility to withstand, without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice and other local site effects. The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) Appropriate consideration for the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been recorded for the site and the surrounding area and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design.

USAR Section 9.10.2.4, Revision 22, Control Room Air Conditioning System, contains the following system discussion.

The control room air conditioning system consists of two, air cooled split system package air conditioning units, each rated at 100 percent of the system design capacity, and supply and return ductwork. The system is designed for normal operation at 18,000 cubic feet per minute total air volume with 1000 CFM of outside ventilating air makeup. The air cooled condensers for each Freon refrigeration unit is located on the auxiliary building roof above Room 69. The air condenser units are protected from tornado winds [360 mph] with a windscreen. Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.3 was used to design the air cooled condensers windscreen. The SRP criteria was met, therefore, no tornado missile shielding for the air cooled condensers is required.

The control room HVAC is an essential auxiliary support system and hence, is part of the plant's engineered safeguards, as defined in Section 6.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On February 27, 2013, while reviewing a response to an NRC 0350 question, an issue was identified where the modification which moved the control room air conditioners condensers from inside the control room to the auxiliary building roof should have obtained prior NRC approval. The condensers are located in close proximity to one another and are protected by a grating that is not rated to withstand a tornado missile. Therefore, it is possible that both the A and B trains could be struck and rendered inoperable by the same missile. The review determined that prior NRC approval had not been obtained for the modification and the condition was entered in to the station's corrective action program (CR 2013-04266). At the time of discovery, the unit was shutdown with fuel removed.

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.

NRC FORM 366A

(10-2010)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

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Fort Callbour Station	05000285	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	_	OF	-
Fort Calhoun Station		2013	- 005 -	0	5		ວ

NARRATIVE

This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D): Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and 10 CFR 5073(a)(2)(vii)(D): Any event where a single cause or condition caused two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

CONCLUSION

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

A causal analysis is in progress. The results of the analysis will be published in a supplement to this LER.