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NLS2011022 February 28, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Licensee Event Report No. 2010-005-00

Cooper Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46

Dear Sir or Madam:

The purpose of this correspondence is to forward Licensee Event Report 2010-005-00.

Sincerely,

Demetrius L. Willis

General Manager of Plant Operations

/bk

Attachment

Regional Administrator w/attachment

USNRC - Region IV

NPG Distribution w/attachment

Cooper Project Manager w/attachment

USNRC - NRR Project Directorate IV-1

Senior Resident Inspector w/attachment

**USNRC - CNS** 

SORC Chairman w/attachment

INPO Records Center w/attachment

SRAB Administrator w/attachment

CNS Records w/attachment

NRC FORM 366	II S NUCLEAR REGU	I ATORY COMMISSION A	PROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRE	ES 10/31/2013	
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013  Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 80 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to					
1. FACILITY NAME	<del></del>		pond to, the information collection.  DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE	
Cooper Nuclear	Station		05000298	1 of 4	
4. TITLE Steam Exclusion Barrier Door Blocked Open Results in Loss of Safety Function					
5. EVENT DATE	6. LER NUMBER	7. REPORT DATE	8. OTHER FACILITIES		
MONTH DAY YEAR	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO.	MONTH DAY YEAR	FACILITY NAME	05000	
11 09 2010	2010 - 005 - 00	02 28 2011	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000	
9. OPERATING MODE  1  10. POWER LEVEL  100	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED  20.2201(b)  20.2201(d)  20.2203(a)(1)  20.2203(a)(2)(ii)  20.2203(a)(2)(iii)  20.2203(a)(2)(iii)  20.2203(a)(2)(iv)  20.2203(a)(2)(v)  20.2203(a)(2)(v)	PURSUANT TO THE REQU 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	that apply) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5) OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
FACILITY NAME	12. L	CENSEE CONTACT FOR T	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area C		
David W. Van Der	Kamp, Licensing Manager		(402) 825-2904	4	
CAUSE SYSTEM C	13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR OMPONENT MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE CAUSE TO EPIX		MANU- REPORTABLE ACTURER TO EPIX	
	14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EX ete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE			NTH DAY YEAR 05 01 2011	
On November 9, 2010, a steam exclusion barrier (SEB) door in the control room corridor at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was blocked open with a ladder to facilitate preventive maintenance. With this SEB door obstructed, steam from a postulated high energy line break could propagate into the control room and affect operability of systems, structures, or components necessary to safely shut down, cool down, and maintain cold shutdown conditions of the plant. During the time frame the door was blocked open for the work evolution, there were no Technical Specification required actions taken and no compensatory measures implemented.  This event is currently under investigation. CNS will provide a supplement to this Licensee Event Report.					

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### 17. NARRATIVE

# **PLANT STATUS**

Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent power at the time of the event.

# **BACKGROUND**

A high energy line break (HELB) is a postulated design basis event outside of primary containment [EIIS: NH]. In the event of a postulated HELB, the plant is designed to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures. Some boundary doors [EIIS: DR] at CNS are categorized, based on a HELB analysis, as providing a steam exclusion barrier (SEB). These doors are controlled to ensure safety-related equipment is protected from a harsh environment in the event of a postulated HELB.

SEB doors are designed and assumed to be closed to mitigate the effects of a postulated line break and provide a barrier function to prevent harsh environmental conditions from entering the adjacent area. With the exception of normal passage, SEB doors are maintained in a closed configuration during Modes 1, 2 and 3. These doors may be impaired in order to facilitate maintenance, system line-ups, system draining, etc., if the door is returned to its normal configuration when the activity is completed. Compensatory measures may be required in specific cases if a door is required to be left open or obstructed in support of maintenance.

Door H300 is located in the control room corridor at CNS. It is categorized as an SEB door, fire door, and control room envelope (CRE) boundary door.

## EVENT DESCRIPTION

On November 9, 2010, CNS Door H300 was blocked open to facilitate preventive maintenance. A ladder was positioned in the travel path of the door to prevent it from closing. Door H300 is a fire door, CRE boundary, and SEB door. With Door H300 obstructed, steam from a postulated turbine building HELB (i.e., main steam line rupture) could propagate into the control room and affect operability of systems, structures, or components necessary to safely shut down, cool down, and maintain cold shutdown conditions of the plant. Additionally, operability of the control room envelope filtration system [EIIS: JH] was affected. During the time the door was blocked open for the work evolution, there were no compensatory measures implemented to protect equipment credited for safe shutdown in the event of a postulated HELB and no Technical Specification required actions were taken.

#### NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (10-2010) **CONTINUATION SHEET** 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET **6. LER NUMBER** 3. PAGE REV YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 05000298 NO. Cooper Nuclear Station 3 of 4 2010 00 005

### 17. NARRATIVE

On December 28, 2010, this condition was identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Senior Resident Inspector and discussed with CNS Operation's shift staff.

This event is currently under investigation. CNS will provide additional event details, the safety significance, root cause, corrective action(s) to prevent recurrence, and extent of condition in a supplement to this Licensee Event Report (LER).

## **BASIS FOR REPORT**

CNS determined this event is reportable per the following 10 CFR 50.73 criteria as an LER due 60 days from the discovery date, December 28, 2010:

50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) – An operation or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) – An unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

50.73(a)(2)(v) – An event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) remove residual heat; (C) control the release of radioactive material; or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.

50.73(a)(2)(vii) – An event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to: (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) remove residual heat; (C) control the release of radioactive material; or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.

50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) – Any event or condition that as a result of a single cause could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for two or more trains or channels in different systems that are needed to: (1) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (2) remove residual heat; (3) control the release of radioactive material; or (4) mitigate the consequences of an accident.

# PREVIOUS EVENTS

LER 2010-004 – On August 19, 2010, an SEB door was propped open during planned maintenance on emergency diesel generator (EDG) [EIIS: DG] 2. If a postulated HELB were to occur in the turbine building, steam could have entered the EDG1 room through the propped open door. The EDG rooms were not analyzed for a HELB environment; therefore, the plant was in an unanalyzed condition with the SEB door propped open. Additionally, having both EDGs inoperable created a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the EDGs. The root cause of the

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event was that impairment of the door for maintenance activities was evaluated using procedural guidance based upon a probabilistic risk assessment rather than performing an operability evaluation.

ATTACHMENT 3	LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS©⁴
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ATTACHMENT 3 LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS@4

Correspondence Number: NLS2011022

The following table identifies those actions committed to by Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by NPPD. They are described for information only and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENT	COMMITMENT NUMBER	COMMITTED DATE OR OUTAGE
None		

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