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July 22, 2011

PG&E Letter DCL-11-083

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 10 CFR 50.73

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
<u>Licensee Event Report 1-2011-005-00</u>
<u>Emergency Diesel Generator Actuations Upon Loss of 230 kV Startup Due to</u>
Electrical Maintenance Testing Activities

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) regarding the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 emergency diesel generator actuations after 230 kV startup power was lost due to maintenance activities. This LER is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).

There are no new or revised regulatory commitments in this report.

These events did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely,

James R. Becker

dnpo/50405004/50405010

**Enclosure** 

cc/enc:

Elmo E. Collins, NRC Region IV

Michael S. Peck, NRC Senior Resident Inspector James T. Polickoski, NRR Project Manager

Alan B. Wang, NRR Project Manager

**INPO** 

**Diablo Distribution** 

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							request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information of the process of the process of the NEO Section of the Process of the NEO Section of the Neo Sect											
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NRC FORM 366A

10-2010)

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION **CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE		
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1	05000 275	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.		OF	5
	05000 275	2011 - 005 - 00			2 OF		3

#### NARRATIVE

#### I. PLANT CONDITIONS

When the events occurred, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at approximately 100 percent power.

#### II. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

#### A. BACKGROUND

The Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) electrical systems are designed to ensure an adequate supply of electrical power to all essential auxiliary equipment during normal operation and under accident conditions. Nonvital 4.16 kV alternating current (AC) auxiliary buses are energized by either of the offsite power sources. Vital AC buses [EA][BU] have an additional available source: onsite power delivered by diesel generators. The electrical systems are designed so that failure of any one electrical device will not prevent operation of the minimum required engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment.

General Design Criteria (GDC) 17 states, in part,

"An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents."

DCPP offsite power is supplied by two systems that are physically and electrically separated and independent of each other: a 230 kV system and a 500 kV system. This satisfies requirements established by General Design Criteria (GDC) 17. The 230 kV system provides startup power and is immediately available following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained. To make power available to the vital 4.16 kV buses, the 230 kV system provides power to Startup Transformer (SUT)[EA][XFMR] 1-1 (230 kV to 12 kV), energizing the 12 kV bus which then feeds SUT 1-2 (12 kV to 4.16 kV). The 500 kV system provides for transmission of the plant's power output, and is also available as a delayed access source of offsite power after the main generator is disconnected.

To produce onsite power, each unit has three emergency diesel generators (EDGs)[EK][DG] which supply power to the 4.16 kV vital AC buses when power is unavailable or when a degraded voltage condition exists. After EDGs have started, they will supply power to their respective vital bus if the buses are deenergized. If the vital buses are not deenergized, the EDGs will continue to run in standby mode, ready to provide power if required. The EDGs will also start in standby mode on loss of startup power availability.

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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

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#### NARRATIVE

#### **B. EVENT DESCRIPTION**

At the time of the events, the Unit 2 Sixteenth Refueling Outage (2R16) was ongoing and scheduled 230 kV system testing was being performed on the 230 kV electrical protection equipment. On May 26, 2011, at 0226 PDT, and again on May 27, 2011, at 1212 PDT, while personnel were performing testing on Unit 2 to verify functionality of the 230 kV electrical protection equipment, Unit 1 lost 230 kV startup power.

The isolation of the offsite standby power source, and subsequent loss of power to startup feeder breakers for the 4.16 kV operating buses, caused all Unit 1 EDGs to start in standby mode. For both events, all Unit 1 EDGs started as designed, and were shutdown and returned to auto with no problems observed.

SUTs 1-1 and 1-2 were returned to service and Unit 1 startup power was declared operable on May 26, 2011, at 1710 PDT for the first event, and on May 27, 2011, at 1337 PDT for the second event.

Startup power on Unit 2 was cleared due to the maintenance activities being performed; therefore, it was unaffected by the events.

On May 26, 2011, at 0957 PDT, and on May 27, 2011, at 1712 PDT, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) made 8 hour nonemergency reports (Reference NRC Event Notification 46894 and 46900) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

C. STATUS OF INOPERABLE STRUCTURE, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

There were no inoperable structures, systems, or components that contributed to the event. All systems functioned as designed.

#### D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED

No other systems or secondary functions were affected.

#### E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY

The event was immediately known to licensed plant operators by alarms and indications received in the control room.

#### F. OPERATOR ACTIONS

Plant operators performed required surveillances, secured the Unit 1 EDGs, and proceeded to restore the availability of startup power to Unit 1.

#### G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES

All Unit 1 EDGs started as designed with no problems observed.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTINUATION SHEET

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#### **NARRATIVE**

#### III. CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM

#### A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE

PG&E preliminarily concluded that human performance deficiencies during testing activities associated with the 230 kV electrical protection equipment caused the loss of 230 kV startup power. The event on May 26, 2011, appears to have been caused by personnel attaching test equipment to terminals associated with the incorrect 230 kV protection system circuit (incorrect current transformer). The event on May 27, 2011, was caused by personnel attaching test equipment to terminals associated with a 230 kV protection system relay on the incorrect unit.

#### **B. CAUSE**

The cause will be provided in a supplemental report following the completion of a root cause evaluation (RCE).

#### IV. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

At DCPP, the 230 kV startup system is the only offsite power system which is designed to be immediately available to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents; therefore, this event could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of the offsite electric power system. However, the Class 1E onsite EDGs remained available and would have provided power following a loss of offsite power.

The voltage on operating 12 kV buses was not affected by the isolation of 230 kV startup power, and the EDGs were not required since all vital buses were energized by Unit 1 auxiliary power (the Unit 1 main generator). As a result, no vital loads were affected by this event.

The increased conditional core damage probability for this event was assessed and found to be less than 4E-07.

This event had no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

#### V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

#### A. IMMEDIATE CORRECTION ACTIONS

For the May 26, 2011 event, PG&E performed troubleshooting to verify that the circuit was configured per the approved design; no issues were noted. The day and nightshift employees that perform this work were briefed on the event and on the station human performance tools that prevent such occurrences. Shortly after, with direct management oversight, the current circuit loop functional test was re-performed successfully.

For the May 27, 2011 event, PG&E re-performed the pre-job breif, focusing on roles and responsibilities, and installed barriers on all inservice relays that were not part of the testing. Management provided direct oversight, and independent verification was used for all restoration actions of the procedure.

#### B. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE (CAPRs)

CAPRs will be detailed in a supplemental report following the completion of a RCE.

#### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366A (10-2010) **CONTINUATION SHEET** 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 1 NUMBER NO. 05000 275 5 OF 5 005 00 2011

#### NARRATIVE

#### VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

#### A. FAILED COMPONENTS

All components functioned as designed.

### **B. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS**

A previous event occurred during 2R16 when personnel were modifying a panel that houses 230 kV electrical protection equipment. During modification, there was a similar loss of 230 kV startup power and EDG actuation on Unit 1 (See ML11820377, Licensee Event Report submitted on June 30, 2011). This event is also being reviewed as part of the RCE scope.