

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

July 11, 2011 NOC-AE-11002698 File No.: G25

10 CFR 50.73 STI: 32898356

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

South Texas Project
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-498
Licensee Event Report 1-2011-001
Technical Specification Requirement Not Met Regarding Unborated Water Sources

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) submits the attached Unit 1 Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-2011-001 regarding the identification of valves which were not secured in the closed position, contrary to the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.4.1.4.2.b. and 3.9.1.

This condition is considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

This event did not have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

There are no commitments contained in this LER. Corrective actions will be implemented in accordance with the STP Corrective Action Program.

If there are any questions on this submittal, please contact either J. R. Morris at (361) 972-8652 or me at (361) 972-7158.

. W. Peter

Plant General Manager

JRM

Attachment: LER 1-2011-001

IEDA

CC:

(paper copy)

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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO, 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Festimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection														
(10-2010)						Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden								
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to lnfocollects.resource@nrc.gov , and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information						
(See reverse for required number of								and Regulatory Affairs. NEOB-10202. (3150-1104), Office of Management and Budget. Washington. DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may						
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Technic	cal Spec	ecifica	ation 3	3.4.1.4.2 r	regarding unbo	orated wa	ater sour	ces. A	Ithough th	ne valves we	re not secu	red closed	as required	
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unborated water sources and replaced with more generic language. However, the impact of using the RHT as a fill source was not adequately addressed with respect to compliance with the new TS requirements, and thus the surveillance procedure used														
to ensure compliance did not address all unborated water sources.														
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The corrective action will be to revise the plant surveillance procedure used to ensure compliance with TS 3.4.1.4.2 and TS 3.9.1 to reflect the additional valves that must be secured in the closed position to comply with the TS. This corrective action														
will be implemented in accordance with the STP Corrective Action Program.														
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There v	vere nc	per:	sonne ^l	l injuries	, no offsite rad	iological	releases	, and	no damaç	ge to safety-re	elated equir	pment ass	ociated	
There were no personnel injuries, no offsite radiological releases, and no damage to safety-related equipment associated with this event. This event did not have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.														

NRC FORM 366A	LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION	•	ER) u.s. N	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE	
South Texas Unit 1	05000498	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV. NO	2 OF 4	
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I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

B. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

South Texas Project (STP) Unit 1 was in Mode 5, with Reactor Coolant System loops not filled, as part of refueling outage 1RE16.

C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

No structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.

D. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT

On April 30, 2011, STP Unit 1 was in refueling outage 1RE16, with the unit in Mode 5, Reactor Coolant System loops not filled. In support of a planned evolution to transfer water from the Boron Recycle System (BRS) 1B Recycle Holdup Tank (RHT) to the Volume Control Tank, a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) assigned to review atypical plant conditions during the outage identified a potential unborated water source that was not included in the plant surveillance procedure used to confirm compliance with Technical Specifications 3.4.1.4.2 regarding unborated water sources.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.1.4.2 (Reactor Coolant System – Cold Shutdown – Loops not Filled) requires in Mode 5 that "Each valve or mechanical joint used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position." Note that a similar requirement in TS 3.9.1 (Refueling Operations – Boron Concentration) applies during Mode 6. The associated surveillance procedure was focused on systems directly coupled to the Chemical and Volume Control System, such as Reactor Makeup Water (RMW), where an opened valve can reduce the RCS boron concentration by the addition of unborated water. The SRO review revealed that transferring water from the RHT to refill the RCS loops indirectly exposed the RCS to unborated water via Demineralized Water (DW) connected to the BRS. The surveillance procedure did not ensure that the connecting valves between the RHT and the DW system were secured closed. Although the valves were not secured closed as required by TS, the valves were closed and no dilution occurred.

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY

The non-compliance with Technical Specifications was discovered during Senior Reactor Operator review of planned refueling outage activities.

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II. EVENT-DRIVEN INFORMATION

A. SAFETY SYSTEMS THAT RESPONDED N/A

B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM INOPERABILITY
 N/A

C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT

The STP at-power risk model cannot be used to obtain either core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF) data for this event (there is no PRA evaluation of boron dilution during shutdown). However, since the valves of concern in the potential unborated water path were not opened, and no dilution occurred, the potential impact to CDF and LERF from this event is negligible and the event is considered to be of low safety significance.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

In 1997, STP procedures were revised to allow using water from the RHT to refill the RCS loops in addition to using the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) or the Boric Acid Tanks (BATs). Prior to this, only the RWST or BATs were used for RCS refill. This change allowed clean, hydrazine-treated, borated water from the RHT to be used as a water source to refill the RCS during a refueling outage. In 2003, Technical Specifications 3.4.1.4.2 and 3.9.1 were revised to remove references to specific valves that were required to be secured to protect against dilution and replaced with the more generic language discussed in Section I.D above. However, the potential consequences of using the RHT as a fill source was not adequately addressed with respect to compliance with the revised TS requirements, and thus the surveillance procedure used to ensure compliance did not address all potential unborated water sources.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The surveillance procedure used to ensure compliance with TS 3.4.1.4.2 and 3.9.1 requirements will be revised to reflect the additional valves that must be secured in the closed position to comply with the TS. (Targeted due date September 30, 2011).

Tracking and implementation of this action will be controlled in accordance with the STP Corrective Action Program.

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V. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

There have been no similar reportable events at STP within the last three years.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION N/A