ENERGY NORTHWEST

P.O. Box 968 ■ Richland, Washington 99352-0968

January 20, 2004
GO2-04-009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: **COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397**
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2001-003-00

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2001-003-00 for the Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The enclosed report discusses items of reportability and corrective actions taken.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Ms. CL Perino at (509) 377-2075.

Respectfully,

RL Webring
Vice President, Nuclear Generation
Mail Drop PE04

Enclosure

cc: BS Mallet – NRC RIV
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NRC Sr. Resident Inspector – 988C (2)
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IE22

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Columbia Generating Station	05000397	1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Inoperable High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System due to Low System Pressure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
5	21	2001	2001	- 003 -	00	1	20	2004	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	3	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	000	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
		20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
		20.2203 (a)(1)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	Other
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	x 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
		20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
R Brownlee	509-377-2085

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 1247 on May 21, 2001, Columbia Generating Station was in Mode 3 when the HPCS pump (HPCS-P-1) and the HPCS System were declared inoperable due to low pressure in the HPCS water leg pump discharge piping. Operations was in the process of transferring water from the condensate storage tanks to the suppression pool when the suction path to HPCS-P-1 was isolated. HPCS-P-1 was immediately secured. HPCS System discharge pressure subsequently dropped to the low-pressure alarm setpoint, requiring Operations to declare HPCS-P-1 inoperable. After filling and venting the HPCS System, HPCS-P-1 and the HPCS System were declared operable at 1322 on May 21, 2001.

This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D) because HPCS is a single train safety system that was unable to perform its required safety function for approximately 35 minutes. The plant remained in compliance with technical specifications, and was in a condition where both low pressure coolant injection and low pressure core spray were capable of providing flow to the reactor pressure vessel. Although this event occurred over two years ago, Energy Northwest did not discover that the event should have been reported as a single train safety system failure until November 20, 2003.

NARRATIVE *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* ***(17)***

Event Description

On May 21, 2001, with the plant in Mode 3, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System [BG] was being used to transfer water from the condensate storage tanks (CSTs) [KA] to the suppression pool as part of planned outage water management activities. An expected HPCS pump suction switchover from the CSTs to the suppression pool occurred due to high suppression pool level. When HPCS-V-15 (HPCS pump suction from the suppression pool) reached its full open position, an operator attempted to override the switchover by taking the HPCS-V-15 control switch to close. HPCS-V-1 (HPCS pump suction from the CST) was closing when the operator then attempted to open HPCS-V-1 by taking the HPCS-V-1 control switch to open. HPCS-V-15 fully closed, as expected. However, HPCS-V-1 continued to travel from the intermediate to the closed position, isolating the HPCS-P-1 suction path. HPCS-P-1 was immediately secured by the operator. With the suppression pool test return valve (HPCS-V-23) throttled open for the water transfer, HPCS system discharge pressure dropped rapidly to the low-pressure alarm setpoint, at which time HPCS-P-1 and the HPCS System were declared inoperable. HPCS-P-1 control power fuses were also removed.

Immediate Corrective Action

HPCS-V-1 was opened to reestablish a suction flow path for HPCS-P-1. The HPCS System was filled and vented, and the system was declared operable approximately 35 minutes after declaring HPCS-P-1 inoperable.

Cause of Event

The primary cause of this event was inadequate procedural guidance for overriding the expected HPCS pump suction switchover from the CSTs to the suppression pool. Plant procedures did not warn the operators of the potential loss of the HPCS pump suction path if the operators did not first verify the suction switchover was complete (HPCS-V-15 open and HPCS-V-1 closed), prior to closing HPCS-V-15, and opening HPCS-V-1. A contributing cause to this event was that the pre-job brief performed by the operators was not thorough in that it did not recognize the suction switchover logic.

Additional Corrective Action

A HPCS operating procedure was modified to ensure that the suppression pool high-level HPCS suction switchover is complete, prior to overriding the switchover by re-positioning HPCS-V-15 and HPCS-V-1.

Assessment of Safety Consequences

There is minimal safety significance associated with this event. The plant remained in compliance with technical specifications, and was in a condition where both low-pressure coolant injection [BO] and low-pressure core spray [BM] were capable of providing flow to the reactor pressure vessel during the 35 minutes the HPCS System was inoperable.

Similar Events

On October 7, 2003, with the plant in Mode 1, a depressurization of the HPCS System occurred while the HPCS System water leg piping was isolated during an unscheduled maintenance activity to replace the power frame on the water leg pump. System pressure unexpectedly decreased to below the low-pressure alarm point requiring plant operators to declare the HPCS System inoperable. After performing a system fill and vent procedure, the HPCS System was declared operable. This event is documented in LER 2003-010-00.