


University of Luxembourg

Multilingual. Personalised. Connected.

# AI for Software Vulnerabilities and Android Malware Detection

## Prof. Dr. Jacques Klein

### NLPAICS, Lancaster, UK, July 2024




**SNT**

**Who am I?**



UNIVERSITY OF  
LUXEMBOURG

# Where is Luxembourg?



# Where is Luxembourg?



# Where is Luxembourg?




Where is  
Luxembourg?



# The University of Luxembourg

The University of Luxembourg is a research university with a distinctly **international**, **multilingual** and **interdisciplinary** character.

The University's ambition is to provide the **highest quality research** and teaching in its chosen fields and to generate a positive scientific, educational, social, cultural and societal impact in Luxembourg and the Greater Region.



## Ranked 25<sup>th</sup> Young University

worldwide and #4 worldwide for its "international outlook" in the Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings 2023



**7000**  
students

**1000+**  
PhDs

**300**  
faculty members

**130**  
nationalities

**60%**  
international  
students

# The University of Luxembourg

## Research Focus Areas

- Computer Science & ICT Security
- Finance and Financial Innovation
- Education
- Materials Science
- Contemporary and Digital History
- Interdisciplinary theme: Health and Systems Biomedicine
- Interdisciplinary theme: Data Modelling and Simulation

## 3 Faculties



## 4 Interdisciplinary Centres



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


## 4 Interdisciplinary Centres



# Our vision

A leading international **research and innovation centre** in secure, reliable and trustworthy ICT systems and services. We play an instrumental role in Luxembourg by boosting R&D investments leading to economic growth and highly qualified talent.



# Key Figures

## PEOPLE



**500+**  
Workforce



**65+**  
Nationalities



**31%**  
Alumni who stay  
in Luxembourg



**50%**  
Doctoral  
Candidates on  
Industrial Projects

## PARTNERSHIPS & INNOVATION



**65+**  
Partners



**8M**  
Partners annual  
contribution in Euros



**70%**  
External project funding



**6**  
Spin-offs





SNT

# Trustworthy Software Engineering TruX Research Group



Prof. Tegawendé F.  
BISSYANDE



Prof. Jacques  
KLEIN


# TruX People

## Professors

- Tegawendé F. BISSYANDE (head)
- Jacques KLEIN (co-head)

## Visitors & Interns

1. Hocine REBATCHI
2. Yonghui LIU
3. Mohammad ANSARI



## Research Associates

1. Abdoul Kader KABORE

## Assistant

- Fiona LEVASSEUR


## Coming Soon

## PhD Students

1. Fatou Ndiaye MBODJI (Apr. 2021)
2. Yinghua LI (Apr. 2021)
3. Tiezhu SUN (Apr. 2021)
4. Xunzhu TANG (Oct. 2021)
5. Damien FRANCOIS (Nov. 2021)
6. Weiguo PIAN (Jan 2022)
7. Alioune DIALLO (Feb. 2022)
8. Christian OUEDRAOGO (Apr. 2022)
9. Aicha WAR (May 2022)
10. Yewei SONG (Jun. 2022)
11. Despoina GIARIMPAMPA (Sep. 2022)
12. Marco ALECCI (Oct. 2022)
13. Fred PHILIPPY (Mar. 2023)
14. Jules WAX (Mar. 2023)
15. Moustapha DIOUF (Apr. 2023)
16. Micheline MOUMOULA (Oct. 2023)
17. Pedro RUIZ JIMÉNEZ (Nov. 2023)
18. Omar EL BACHYR (Feb. 2024)
19. Prateek RAJPUT (Mar. 2024)
20. Albérick DJIRE (Mar. 2024)
21. Maimouna Tamah DIAO (Apr. 2024)
22. Maimouna OUATTARA (May 2024)
23. Aziz BONKOUNGOU (Jul. 2024)
24. Serge Lionel NIKIEMA (Jul. 2024)


# Trustworthy Software Engineering

- Vulnerability detection, Android app Analysis (e.g., Data Leaks)
- GDPR compliance
- Malware Detection, Piggybacking Detection




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
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# Trustworthy Software Engineering

- Vulnerability detection, Android app Analysis (e.g., Data Leaks)
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- Malware Detection, Piggybacking Detection





# AI for Software Vulnerabilities & Android Malware Detection

To save time, let's skip the motivation slides ;)



I assume that we all agree that detecting malware and/or vulnerabilities is essential.

A

## Malware Detection



G

The need for a large set of Apps  
and a ground truth

E

Performance Assessment  
Issues

N

App Code Representation

D

An app as a  
Image

BERT-Based  
class  
representation

A

Full App-level  
representation

## Vulnerability Detection

Code is Spatial

WYSiWiM: Representing code as  
images

CodeGRID: Representing code  
as grids

Vulnerability Prediction with  
WYSiWiM and CodeGRID

A

## Malware Detection



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Vulnerability Prediction with  
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# Part I

## AI for Android Malware Detection



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# Part I-A

## Need for a large set of Apps



# AndroZoo

## A repository of Android Apps



[MSR 2016] AndroZoo: Collecting Millions of Android Apps for the Research Community


# AndroZoo: A Retrospective



AndroZoo is currently the biggest dataset of Android apps, with 24 million entries. It was created in 2016 at the University of Luxembourg.



Constantly growing



# AndroZoo: A Retrospective



App  $\neq$  Apk

24 million apks, but 8 708 304 apps (average of 2.74 apks for each app)

**Table 1: Top 10 apps by number of APKs**

Package Name	#APKs
com.chrome.canary	1986
org.mozilla.fenix	1811
wp.wpbeta	910
dating.app.chat.flirt.wgbcv	826
com.blackforestapppaid.blackforest	822
com.brave.browser_nightly	787
com.topwar.gp	728
com.opodo.reisen	688
com.edreams.travel	679
com.styleseat.promobile	675

**Table 2: Lifespan of apps in ANDROZOO**

#Years	#Apps	#Years	#Apps	#Years	#Apps
10	9347	6	37 099	2	315 206
9	20 072	5	84 931	1	432 536
8	20 171	4	108 962	0	2 732 016
7	37 378	3	186 800		

# AndroZoo: A Retrospective



From November 2021 to November 2023:  
365 604 948 download requests from 692 different users => 4 PiB of data sent



**Table 4: Download Statistics from 11-2021 to 11-2023**

	<b>Day</b>	<b>Month</b>
<b>Average Number of HTTP requests</b>	502 083	15 393 045
<b>Average Download Volume</b>	5.8 TB	170 TB
<b>Highest Number of HTTP requests</b>	7 815 246	40 345 028
<b>Highest Download Volume</b>	31 TB	587 TB
<b>Highest Number of Active Users</b>	43	130

# AndroZoo: A Retrospective



AndroZoo is currently used by more than 2000 users worldwide.



# AndroZoo: A Glimpse into the Future




We started collecting metadata since 2020, and we are now releasing them in AndroZoo together with the apps.

EXAMPLE

## A few examples:

- Description
- Number of Downloads
- Ratings
- Permissions
- Upload Date
- Privacy Policy Link
- .... many others ....



# AndroZoo for Malware Detection



=> Each App send to VirusTotal

# A bit of Statistics

On 21,570,017 apks (from Google Play) sent to VirusTotal

Flagged by at least	# Apks	%
1 AV	1,787,482	8.29%
5 AVs	251,068	1.16%
10 AVs	85,782	0.4%
20 AVs	11,593	0.05%

# VirusTotal Limitations (among others)


- Disagreements among Antivirus products
  - [DIMVA2016] On the Lack of Consensus in Anti-Virus Decisions: Metrics and Insights on Building Ground Truths of Android Malware
  - [MSR2017] Euphony: Harmonious Unification of Cacophonous Anti-Virus Vendor Labels for Android Malware
- Malware / Adware
  - [SANER2017] Should You Consider Adware as Malware in Your Study?

**SNT**

**Part I-B**

**On the difficulty of Assessing  
Machine- learning- based Android  
Malware Detection Approaches**

# Classical ML-based Android malware detection




Building Blocks of Machine Learning-based Android malware detection

Outstanding malware detection score of existing approaches

F1 score = 0.99

# Machine Learning to detect Android Malware: main Outcomes


- Be careful about TIME! We don't know the future yet...



[1] Are Your Training Datasets Yet Relevant? - An Investigation into the Importance of Timeline in Machine Learning-Based Malware Detection

# Machine Learning to detect Android Malware: main Outcomes


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# Machine Learning to detect Android Malware: main Outcomes

- Be careful about TIME! We don't know the future yet...



[1] Are Your Training Datasets Yet Relevant? - An Investigation into the Importance of Timeline in Machine Learning-Based Malware Detection

# Machine Learning to detect Android Malware: main Outcomes

Ten-fold cross validation is not appropriated to assess machine learning-based malware detectors (paper at EMSE [2])

- Very good results “in the lab”
- Very poor results “in the wild”


[EMSE2014] Empirical Assessment of Machine Learning-Based Malware Detectors for Android:  
Measuring the Gap between In-the-Lab and In-the-Wild Validation Scenarios

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# Part I-C

## App Code Representation

# Classical ML-based Android malware detection



Building Blocks of Machine Learning-based Android malware detection

# Issues with Robustness: The discriminatory power of DREBIN's features set

# of features	F1-score
1 230 854	0.98
1	<b>0.80</b>

Flagged by 8 AV engines

DREBIN


Changing the name of  
one activity in the app

DREBIN

## Findings:

- A single feature can offer a surprisingly high detection rate.
- DREBIN's most relevant features contain id-features.

# Classical ML-based Android malware detection




Building Blocks of Machine Learning-based Android malware detection



# Part I-C-1

## DexRay: An app as an Image

# Approach



Process of image generation from dalvik bytecode. ①: bytecode bytes' vectorisation; ②: Mapping bytes to pixels

# Effectiveness of DexRay

## Dataset and experimental setup

- 96 994 benign + 61 809 malware = 158 803 apps
- Apps with compilation dates from 2019 and 2020
- Dataset split: 80% training, 10% validation, and 10% test
- Experiments are repeated 10 times

## Performance of DexRay against SotA malware detection approaches


	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1-score
DexRay	0.97	0.97	0.95	0.96
Drebin	0.97	0.97	0.94	0.96
R2-D2	0.97	0.96	0.97	0.97
Ding et al.-Model 1	0.94	-	0.93	-
Ding et al.-Model 2	0.95	-	0.94	-
DexRay (Temporally Consistent)	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.98

## Findings:

- DexRay yields performance metrics that are comparable to the state of the art.
- Its simplicity has not hindered its performance when compared to similar works presenting sophisticated configurations.

# Possibility to localise malicious code

We assess the sufficiency of this part of the image




Apply a mask

Results

## Findings:


- The first half of the vector images is highly sufficient to detect malware, while the second half is almost never sufficient.
- The sufficiency of the first pixels in the images generally decreases when their size decreases.




Sufficiency for malware images:  
High (resp low) sufficiency is represented by white (resp black) colour

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Results



## Findings:



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# Summary

27 DL-based features extraction for malware detection: DexRay

## Approach




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
**Sufficiency:** A part of the image is sufficient for the detection if DexRay predicts the malware app as malware when only this part of the image is kept, and the rest is masked

We assess the sufficiency of this part of the image



### Findings:

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

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30 DL-based features extraction for malware detection: DexRay

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
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## Part I-C-2


### DexBERT: Class level Representation

# DexBERT: Effective, Task-Agnostic and Fine-Grained Representation Learning of Android Bytecode



DexBERT class embedding


# DexBERT: Effective, Task-Agnostic and Fine-Grained Representation Learning of Android Bytecode



Three embedding aggregation methods and fine-tuning of downstream tasks.  
(Addition is working the best)

# DexBERT: Effective, Task-Agnostic and Fine-Grained Representation Learning of Android Bytecode

## Pre-Training



Pre-training on 158 000 apps (556 millions tokens)

# DexBERT: Evaluation

Performance of Malicious Code  
localization on the MYST Dataset

Approach	F1 Score	Precision	Recall
MKLDroid	0.2488	0.1434	0.9400
smali2vec	0.9916	0.9880	0.9954
DexBERT-m	0.5749	0.4034	<b>1.0000</b>
DexBERT	<b>0.9981</b>	<b>0.9983</b>	0.9979

2000 apps for fine-tuning and 1000 for  
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Performance of Component Type Classification

Method	Activity	Service	BroadcastReceiver	ContentProvider	Average
BERT	0.8272	0.7642	0.5673	0.9091	0.7669
CodeBERT	0.917	0.5381	0.8756	0.8468	0.7943
DexBERT(woPT)	0.7402	0.5850	0.7660	0.8947	0.7465
DexBERT	<b>0.9780</b>	<b>0.9117</b>	<b>0.9600</b>	<b>0.9756</b>	<b>0.9563</b>

1000 real-world APKs (3406 components).

75% for training and 25% for testing.

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CodeBERT	0.917	0.5381	0.8756	0.8468	0.7943
DexBERT(woPT)	0.7402	0.5850	0.7660	0.8947	0.7465
DexBERT	<b>0.9780</b>	<b>0.9117</b>	<b>0.9600</b>	<b>0.9756</b>	<b>0.9563</b>

1000 real-world APKs (3406 components).

75% for training and 25% for testing.

Performance of App Defect Detection

Project # of classes	AnkiDroid	BankDroid	BoardGame	Chess	ConnectBot	Andlytics	FBreader	K9Mail	Wikipedia	Yaaic	Average Score	Weighted Average AUC Score
smali2vec	0.7914	0.7967	<b>0.8887</b>	0.8481	<b>0.9516</b>	0.834	0.8932	0.7655	<b>0.8922</b>	<b>0.9371</b>	0.8598	0.8399
DexBERT	<b>0.9572</b>	<b>0.9363</b>	0.7691	<b>0.9125</b>	0.8517	<b>0.9248</b>	<b>0.9378</b>	<b>0.8674</b>	0.8587	0.8764	<b>0.8892</b>	<b>0.9032</b>

92K smali classes labeled with Checkmarkx


**SNT**

# Part I-C-3

## Full App-level Representation




# DetectBERT: Towards Full App-Level Representation Learning to Detect Android Malware



[NLDB2024]: LaFiCMIL: Rethinking Large File Classification from the Perspective of Correlated Multiple Instance Learning

# DetectBERT: Towards Full App-Level Representation Learning to Detect Android Malware



# DetectBERT: Evaluation

**Table 2: Performance comparison with existing state-of-the-art approaches.**

Model	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1 Score
Drebin	0.97	0.97	0.94	0.96
DexRay	0.97	0.97	0.95	0.96
<b>DetectBERT</b>	<b>0.97</b>	<b>0.98</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>0.97</b>

**Table 3: Temporal consistency performance comparison with state-of-the-art approaches.**

Model	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1 Score
Drebin	0.96	0.95	0.98	0.97
DexRay	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.98
<b>DetectBERT</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>0.99</b>

158 803 apks  
(96 994 benign 61 809 malware)  
80% training, 10% validation, 10% test

# Perspectives

Ground truth quality

Enhanced app representation

Malicious code localisation

Explainability

Artifacts availability and  
reproducibility

A

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E

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D

A



## Malware Detection

The need for a large set of Apps  
and a ground truth

Performance Assessment  
Issues

App Code Representation

An app as a  
Image

BERT-Based  
class  
representation

Full App-level  
representation

A

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E

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D

A

## Malware Detection



The need for a large set of Apps  
and a ground truth

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App Code Representation

An app as a  
Image

BERT-Based  
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Full App-level  
representation

## Vulnerability Detection

Code is Spatial

WYSiWiM: Representing code as  
images

CodeGRID: Representing code  
as grids

Vulnerability Prediction with  
WYSiWiM and CodeGRID

**SNT**


# Part II Vulnerability Detection

**SNT**

# Part II-A Code is Spatial




# Code representation for ML



- NLP-based representations are effective
- but doesn't exploit the full richness of the code


# Code representation for ML

- Code is also about structure



Other signals may remain unexploited

# Code is also spatial



- Every single character can be positioned using  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  coordinates.

# The spatial nature of the code matters

```
1 int robert_age = 32;  
2 int annalouise_age = 25;  
3 int bob_age = 250;  
4 int dorothy_age = 56;
```

(a) Standard Coding Style.

```
1 int robert_age = 32;  
2 int annalouise_age = 25;  
3 int bob_age = 250;  
4 int dorothy_age = 56;
```

(b) Grid Alignment.

The shared suffix and the 250 outlier are obscured on the left and jump on the right.

- New code representations using code spatiality as a new signal
- Leverage **computer vision** techniques to perform SE tasks

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# Part II-B


## WYSiWiM:

### Representing code as images



# WYSiWiM


- The naive exploitation of code spatiality
- WYSiWiM: What You See is What it Means!



# WYSiWiM: four visualization variants

```
public int example(int x, float y) {  
    if (x > y) {  
        x = 5;  
        return x;  
    }  
  
    string bla = "bla";  
  
    while(true) {  
        do_stuff();  
    }  
  
    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)  
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);  
    for(int i:bla)  
        print('a');  
    return y;  
}
```

a) Plain Text



# WYSiWiM: four visualization variants

```
public int example(int x, float y) {
    if (x > y) {
        x = 5;
        return x;
    }

    string bla = "bla";
    while(true) {
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    }

    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);
    for(int i:bla)
        print("a");
    return y;
}
```


a) Plain Text

```
public int example(int x, float y) {
    if (x > y) {
        x = 5;
        return x;
    }

    string bla = "bla";
    while(true) {
        do_stuff();
    }

    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);
    for(int i:bla)
        print("a");
    return y;
}
```

b) Color Syntax Highlighting



# WYSiWiM: four visualization variants

```
public int example(int x, float y) {  
    if (x > y) {  
        x = 5;  
        return x;  
    }  
  
    string bla = "bla";  
  
    while(true) {  
        do_stuff();  
    }  
  
    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)  
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);  
    for(int i:bla)  
        print('a');  
    return y;  
}
```

```
public int example(int x, float y) {  
    if (x > y) {  
        x = 5;  
        return x;  
    }  
  
    string bla = "bla";  
  
    while(true) {  
        do_stuff();  
    }  
  
    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)  
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);  
    for(int i:bla)  
        print('a');  
    return y;  
}
```

a) Plain Text

b) Color Syntax Highlighting

c) Geometric Syntax Highlighting

```
] ┌── example (└── x, └── y){  
⊕(x>y){  
x=5;  
⊗ X;  
}  
string bla = "bla";  
○ (⊕){  
do_stuff ();  
}  
● (└── i=0;i<5;i++)  
▲ .do_stuff (y,bla);  
● (└── i:bla)  
print ('a');  
⊗ y;  
}
```

- Mapping and replacing some keywords with geometric form

# WYSiWiM: four visualization variants

```
public int example(int x, float y) {
    if (x > y) {
        x = 5;
        return x;
    }

    string bla = "bla";
    while(true) {
        do_stuff();
    }

    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);
    for(int i:bla)
        print('a');
    return y;
}
```

```
public int example(int x, float y) {
    if (x > y) {
        x = 5;
        return x;
    }

    string bla = "bla";
    while(true) {
        do_stuff();
    }

    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);
    for(int i:bla)
        print('a');
    return y;
}
```

```
] ┌── example (└─ x, └─ y)
⊕(x>y)
x=5;
❶ X;
}
string bla = "bla";
while(true) {
    do_stuff();
}


for(int i = ❷ 0; i< 5; i++)
    this.do_stuff(y, bla);
for(int i:bla)
    print('a');
❸ y;
}
```

a) Plain Text

b) Color Syntax Highlighting

c) Geometric Syntax Highlighting

d) AST in Condensed Format



# WYSiWiM: four visualization variants

```
public int example(int x, float y) {
    if (x > y) {
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    string bla = "bla";
    while(true) {
        do_stuff();
    }

    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);
    for(int i:bla)
        print('a');
    return y;
}
```

```
public int example(int x, float y) {
    if (x > y) {
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        return x;
    }

    string bla = "bla";
    while(true) {
        do_stuff();
    }

    for(int i = 0; i< 5; i++)
        this.do_stuff(y, bla);
    for(int i:bla)
        print('a');
    return y;
}
```


```
] ┌── example (└─ x, └─ y)
⊕(x>y)
x=5;
❶ X;
}
string bla = "bla";
while(true) {
    do_stuff();
}

for(int i = ❷ 0; i< 5; i++)
    this.do_stuff(y, bla);
for(int i:bla)
    print('a');
❸ y;
}
```

a) Plain Text

b) Color Syntax Highlighting


c) Geometric Syntax Highlighting



d) AST in Condensed Format

# WYSIWIM (limitations)

- Code as images: a naive approach:
  - Relying on image pixels: too noisy
    - Impossible to fit a single character in one pixel
    - May be difficult to learn, even with best computer vision techniques



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# Part II-B

## CodeGRID:


### Representing code as Grids



## CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS


Code

```
1  class HelloWorld {  
2      // Hello World Program  
3      public static void main(String[] args) {  
4          System.out.println("hello World");  
5      }  
6  }
```




With “Color Vectorizer”

## CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS




## CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS



## Tokens extraction

- All code elements, including whitespaces, tabulations and line breaks
- Preserving code spatiality

## CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS




## Tokens coordinates retrieval

- Place in a 2D reference the location of each token
  - Y: Line number
  - X: Location of the token's first character in the line

→ if  $x_{t_1} = 0$ ,  $x_{t_2} = x_{t_1} + \text{len}(t_1)$

# CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS




# CODEGRID: Three Tokens Vectorizing Methods

- Color Vectorizer
  - Rely on TF-IDF<sup>1</sup> to map each token with a color
- Word2Vec Vectorizer
- Code2Vec Vectorizer
  - Reuse of a Code2Vec<sup>2</sup> pretrained model


<sup>1</sup> Term Frequency–Inverse Document frequency; measures the relevance of a token

<sup>2</sup> Code2Vec is a NN model that capture the semantic meanings of code tokens

# CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS



# CODEGRID: REPRESENTING CODE AS GRIDS



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# Part II-C

## Vulnerability Prediction with WYSiWiM and CodeGRID



# Experimental Setup

- Dataset
  - Labelled samples (vulnerable or non-vulnerable)


Dataset	# of samples	
	Total	Used in Testing
The KB Project <sup>1</sup>	1,240	248
SySeVR <sup>2</sup> dataset (based on NVD and SARD data)	420,627	84,126

<sup>1</sup> Collaborative knowledge database of vulnerabilities affecting open-source software

<sup>2</sup> Dataset by Zhen et al (2018)

# Experimental Setup


- Learning to predict vulnerable code snippets



Resnet is a CNN architecture characterized by residual connections that allow training much deeper neural networks by addressing the vanishing gradient problem. (Kaiming He et al. 2015)


# Experimental Setup

- Learning to predict vulnerable code snippets: Model training



# Experimental Setup

- Learning to predict vulnerable code snippets: Inference/Testing



# Experimental Results

- Performance

Approach	Variants	Accuracy	Precision	F1 score
WYSiWiM	PLAIN TEXT	88.8	88.8	88.8
	COLOR Syntax Highlighting	90.9	90.9	90.9
	GEOMETRIC syntax highlighting	62.1	62.2	62.0

WYSiWiM + “Color Syntax Highlighting” outperforms the other visualization methods.

# Experimental Results

- Performance

Approach	Variants	Accuracy	Precision	F1 score
CODEGRID	Word2Vec	96.2	93.8	90.7
	Code2Vec	98.4	94.9	92.9
	Color	93.8	90.7	92.2

CODEGRID + “Code2Vec” outperforms the other variants.

# Experimental Results

- Performance

Approach	Variants	Accuracy	Precision	F1 score
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CODEGRID	Word2Vec	96.2	93.8	90.7
	Code2Vec	98.4	94.9	92.9
	Color	93.8	90.7	92.2
SySeVR <sup>1</sup>	-	98.0	90.8	92.6
Checkmarx <sup>2</sup>	-	72.9	30.9	36.1

CODEGRID + “Code2Vec” outperforms the SySeVR and Checkmarx

<sup>1</sup>A Framework for Using Deep Learning to Detect Software Vulnerabilities (Zhen et al.)

<sup>2</sup>Checkmarx: a commercial tool

# Summary

- Code's layout is a strong signal.

# Summary

- Code's layout is a strong signal.
- WYSiWiM
  - Rely on simple “screenshot”
  - Achieve near SOTA performances in vulnerability prediction with Resnet50
  - *Accepted at ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM), 2021*

# Summary

- Code's layout is a strong signal.
- WYSiWiM
- CODEGRID
  - More rational exploitation of code spatiality
  - Complements existing code representations (CodeGRID + Code2Vec)
  - Outperforms SySeVR and Checkmarx in vulnerability prediction
  - *Accepted at the 32nd ACM/SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis (ISSTA), 2023*

# Ongoing Works

## Just-in-Time Detection of Silent Security Patches

- This paper is about patch representation.
- **Key idea:** leverage large language models (LLMs) to augment patch information with generated code change explanations

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## Malware Detection



The need for a large set of Apps  
and a ground truth

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App Code Representation

An app as a  
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BERT-Based  
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Full App-level  
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## Vulnerability Detection

Code is Spatial

WYSiWiM: Representing code as  
images

CodeGRID: Representing code  
as grids

Vulnerability Prediction with  
WYSiWiM and CodeGRID