Spring 2011

INTA 8803:

Strategy and Arms Control

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School of International Affairs Office: Habersham 216

Hours: MWF 2-3 PM (office)

*Goals, Requirements, and Expectations of INTA 8803:*

As suggested by the course title, the goals of this course are two-fold. The first is to explore military strategy, doctrine and tactics. The second is to understand the state of arms control policy and scholarship. This is a heavily analytical course; critical thinking is required equipment.2 My intent is not to teach you or measure your ability to commit ‘facts’ to memory by rote. While there are dates and actors that will be of significance, of far more importance will be your ability to take the concepts and theories we discuss in class and use them to analyze issues confronting societies and the policy responses mounted by political leaders.

Be warned, the reading load for this class is not light! We will average over 150 pages a week, but some weeks will top 200. We will be making use of a number of excellent textbooks as well as range of popular and academic readings.3 By the end of the course, your understanding of military strategy and arms control will be significantly more sophisticated and nuanced. Light bulbs will go off. Mysteries will be revealed and resolved. You might even enter a higher plane of consciousness.

This assumes, of course, that you study. I have **high** expectations in this regard. I have checked the requirements for a degree in International Affairs and this class is not required to graduate. It follows, since you are enrolled in this class, that you have an abiding interest in International Relations and seek to learn as much as you can about it. This course has been structured under the assumption that every student in this class wants to be here. Accordingly, I have expectations regarding your desire to commit time and energy to this course. Among other things, this means showing up for class. Course attendance, however, will not be enforced. I expect that you, as adults, are responsible for your decisions. While this means you have the freedom to skip class without immediate consequence, it also means that stories of woe at the end of semester will have very little audience with me (i.e. extra credit will not be forthcoming). Similarly, claiming that you ‘don’t get it’ before the course final when I have not seen you in office hours or heard questions from you in class will find little sympathy.

Given that this course is structured similarly to a graduate seminar, participation is critical for the success of the class and the value you derive from it. This is a discussion-based class. That, however, does not absolve you of your obligations to prepare for class. That means you need to **complete the assigned reading before the class date to which it is attached**. Let me say this again. If chapter 6 is listed next to January 26, that means you need to read chapter 6 ***by*** that date, ***not*** on that date.

The course texts require intensive, sustained focus and engagement; this is not light reading to be done while you watch television or wait for the latest YouTube video to download. International Relations is not supposed to be easy. If it were, we would have figured it all out a long time ago. The fact that so many problems and issues today can be traced to international political behavior clearly proves that we have not. Underestimate this course, and its subject, at your own (grade) peril.

*Objectives for Students:*

Appreciate the origins and significance of military strategy.

Understand the current state of debate (academic and policy) of arms control

Develop analytical skills

*Course Texts:*

von Clauswitz, Carl (1976). On War (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Biddle, Stephen. (2004). Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Paret, Peter, ed. (1986). Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chivers, C.J. (2010). The Gun. Simon & Schuster.

Cirincione, Joseph; Jon B. Wolfsthal; Miriam Rajkumar. (2005). Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, Revised Edition. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Additionally, useful websites include: the UN Institute for Disarmament Research

(http://www.unidir.ch/), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (<http://www.sipri.org>), the Institute for International Strategic Studies (http://www.iiss.org/), the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/), the International Atomic Energy Agency

(http://www.iaea.org/DataCenter/index.html) and the Center for Defense Information (www.cdi.org).

*Course grading:*

Participation (questions/discussion): 20 percent

Film Quiz: 5 percent

End of term presentations: 20 percent

25 page analytical paper (April 19): 40 percent

Final exam (May 3: 2:50-5:40 PM): 15 percent

Grade Scale: 100-90 (A) | 89-80 (B) | 79-70 (C) | 69-60 (D) | 59-0 (F).

Grading Policy: Grade inflation is a documented problem in U.S. higher education. While no single class will change the phenomenon to any significant degree, this course will be graded to the original conceptualization of the letter grades. As such, an A represents excellent work, a B marks good or above average work, a C indicates average work, a D represents below average, and F indicates unacceptably subpar work. This does not mean that the average or median of the class will be a C. The descriptors are meant to signal the assessed level of understanding of the course material demonstrated by the student rather than a measure against the performance of other students.

Participation: As a discussion-based class, participation by students is absolutely critical to success! The more you engage, the greater value the class will have for everyone.

Exams: The nature of the course and the reading material makes exams problematic as a metric for evaluating student development. Accordingly, exams play a very small role in the course grade.

Analytical paper: The analytical paper comprises a very large portion of the course grade. It is critically important you dedicate significant effort to the paper over the course of the semester. Attempting to write the paper at the last minute is a tremendously risky proposition. This point cannot be emphasized strongly enough. Given the somewhat unusual grading structure of the course, it is important that you not underestimate the analytical paper is you hope to do well. To this end, I am willing to look over one rough draft of the paper, but the draft must be submitted to me by April 10.

The paper represents an opportunity for you to explore in depth an issue of strategy or arms control in a way we cannot cover in class. The subject of the paper is completely up to you. You may decide you want to explore how strategies differ between large and small countries, or the relationship between academic research on arms control and arms control policy. You may choose to write the paper as a policy briefing for major policy-makers, or you may choose a more academic route.

Citations are required both for academic sources and popular media. This is an in depth research and analysis project; to do well, you must demonstrate a significant level of knowledge and understanding about your chosen topic as well as high quality analysis regarding the sources of security construction as well as the effects. Given the fluid nature of the paper, generalized advice on structure would not be useful. However, you will also be graded on the quality of your writing (syntax, subject verb agreement, appropriate use of transitions, etc) as well as how you structure it (argument and narrative flow, clear signposting, etc). If you are concerned about your writing, or just want to improve it (a most admirable desire), I highly recommend you contact the fine people at the GT Communications Center (COMMLAB) (http://www.lcc.gatech.edu/writingcomm/commcenter/).

**You must discuss your paper ideas as well as present a written proposal (topic, possible sources, etc) to me in my office by March 10. Failure to do so will result in a 5% automatic markdown on your paper.** When you discuss your paper ideas with me, you need to bring them in the form of a question, i.e. starting with why or how. For example, do not simply come to office hours with the claim that you are interested in French strategy. You must come with specific why/how questions about French strategy. **Do not** wait until March 10 to meet with me. I will not schedule additional office hours on this day nor will I be available for appointments. If the line to meet with me on March 10 precludes you from seeing me that day, you will still lose the 5%.

Papers must be submitted using the Assignments feature on T-Square. Hard copies will not be accepted. Be aware that these papers will be analyzed using a plagiarism detection service.

End of term presentation: At the end of the semester, each student will have an opportunity to present the fruits of their work on the analytical paper to the class. While formal attire is not required, professionalism in manner and presentation are critical. The audio-visual aspect of the presentation should be in PowerPoint or similar format. Each student will have 15 minutes for their presentation with an additional 5 minutes for Q&A, which should provide ample opportunity both the presentation as well as any follow-up questions from the audience. A basic grading rubric will be distributed closer to the presentation weeks.

Miscellaneous: Students are required to take exams and submit assignments at the scheduled time. Students with excused absences will be able to take a make-up, but are responsible for arranging the time. All work for the semester should be kept until final grades are processed. Grades will be posted to TSquare.

*Policy on letters of recommendation:*

You must have taken at least two courses with me before I will consider writing a letter of recommendation for you. I will only write letters for students that have performed well in class, which means usually an A or better in both classes, although I would be open to writing a letter for an individual who shows improvement from the first to second class (e.g. B or B+ in the first class to A in second class). Since a recommendation relies on personal knowledge, it would be in your interest to distinguish yourself in class. If I don’t know you, I cannot comment on anything besides your course performance. Trust me when I tell you that a letter soley comprised of“Jim/Jane did well in two courses, receiving an A in both,” hardly makes for a compelling recommendation.

*Laptops in class:*

I am aware that students no longer use chalk on cave walls to take notes, and that laptops are ubiquitous in the modern classroom. I have no problem with using laptops to take notes. It even makes sense to have your notes in a format where you can easily search for particular dates or terms. What I have a serious problem with is the use of your laptop to check email, browse the web, or catch up on Facebook, Twitter, Fritter, or whatever the latest social networking is called. Do not do it. If I see you reading your screen (i.e. not paying attention to whomever is speaking) I will give you a warning. The next time, the laptop will be banned from class. International Relations is a serious matter, I expect you to respect it and the class. Express your digital self before or after class.

*Cheating and plagiarism:*

Don’t do it. I have a zero tolerance with respect to these activities. Cheating and plagiarism demean the efforts of others who put in blood, sweat, and tears to do well in the class. I will not allow the above board work of honest students to be undermined by those who seek shortcuts. Cheating includes, but is not limited to, receiving unauthorized assistance on exams and asking another student to respond to clicker questions in your absence. The Georgia Tech Honor Code is available online:

http://www.honor.gatech.edu/plugins/content/index.php?id=9. If caught cheating, you will be dealt with according to the GT Academic Honor Code.

*Students with Disabilities:*

Georgia Tech is committed to providing reasonable accommodation for all students with disabilities through the ADAPTS program (http://www.adapts.gatech.edu/). Any student in this course who has a disability that may prevent them from fully demonstrating their abilities should contact me as soon as possible to discuss accommodations necessary to ensure full participation and facilitate their educational opportunities. Students with disabilities must be registered with the ADAPTS-Disability Services Program prior to receiving accommodations in this course. The ADAPTS-Disability Services Program is located in Smithgall Student Services Building, phone 404-894-2564 or TDD only 404-894-1664.

*Religious Observance:*

It is the policy of the University to excuse absences of students that result from religious observances and to provide without penalty for the rescheduling of examinations and additional required class work that may fall on religious holidays. Please see me immediately if you will need to miss class at any point during this semester.

*Add/Drop:*

Please consult the GT academic calendar to make sure you observe add/drop deadlines (http://www.registrar.gatech.edu/home/calendar.php)

*Course Schedule*

Key: | Marks an important date, usually exam dates or assignment deadlines.

*Strategy*

W e e k 1 : T h e N a t u r e a n d C a u s e s o f W a r

January 11 | Syllabus and Introduction

January 13|

Howard, M. (1983). The Causes of War. (23-35)

Clausewitz, Book 1 (75-123)

W e e k I I : W h a t i s S t r a t e g y ?

January 18 |

Clauswitz, Book 3 (177-222), Book 8, Chapters 1-8 (577-616)

January 20 |

Betts, R. K. (2000). Is Strategy an Illusion? International Security, 25(2), 5-50.

Reiter, Dan, and Curtis Meek. “Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903-1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test.” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (1999): 363-87.

W e e k I I I : A s s e s s i n g S u c c e s s

January 25 |

Clauswitz, Book 4 (248-257), Book 7 (566-573)

Kagan, Frederick. (2006). “Measuring Success.” Armed Forces Journal.

Glaser, Charles L. “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refiningthe Spiral and Deterrence Models.” World Politics 44, no. 4 (1992): 497-538.

January 27 |

Mandel, Robert. The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006. Chapters 1, 2, 4 (1-52, 75-96)

Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Myers Marissa Edson. “Body Counts And "Success" In the Vietnam and Korean Wars.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 25, no. 3 (1995): 377-95.

W e e k I V : W W I e r a

February 1 |

Makers of Modern Strategy. Chapter 11, 18 (296-325, 510-526)

Van Evera, Stephen. “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War.” International Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 58-107.

Sagan, Scott D. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability.” International Security 11, no. 2 (1986): 151-75.

February 3 |

Makers of Modern Strategy, Chapter 19 (527-597)

Week V: WWII

February 8 |

Makers of Modern Strategy. Chapters 21, 23 & 24 (624-647, 677-734)

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy (Second Edition) (1991) Chapter 17 (238-278)

February 10 |

Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. (1965). Chapters 1-5 (1-106) Online at http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8\_cont.htm

W e e k V I : M o d e r n W a r f a r e

February 15 |

Biddle, Chapters 1-4, 6 (1-77, 108-131)

February 17 |

Makers of Modern Strategy. Chapters 25&26 (735-814)

Petraeus, D. H., and James F. Amos. Fm 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Chapters 1, 4-5, 7

Phillips, Rufus. Why Vietnam Matters. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press (2008): 305-314.

Lynn-Jones, Sean M. “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics.” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (1995): 660 - 91.

*Arms Control*

W e e k V I I :

February 22 |

Chivers, Chapters 1-4 (1-142)

February 24 |

Chivers, Chapters 7-8 (263-414)

W e e k V I I I : A r m s C o n t r o l D e b a t e s & H i s t o r y

March 1 | (181)

Cirincione et al, Chapter 1 (3-25)

Kaldor, Mary. “Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control”

Grey, Colin S. House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (2001). Chapters 1-2, 7 (1-69, 179-214)

Betts, Richard K. “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe.” International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 5-43. March 3 |

A Future Arms Control Agenda (1999). Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available at:

http://books.sipri.org/product\_info?c\_product\_id=153. Chapters 1, 2, 6, 12, 15

W e e k I X : C o n v e n t i o n a l

March 8 |

Boutwell, Jeffrey and Michael T. Klare. “A Scourge of Small Arms.” Scientific American (2000).

Renner, Michael. “Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament.” Worldwatch Paper 137 (October 1997). (47-62)

Waiss, Taya. “A Demand-Side Approach to Fighting Small Arms Proliferation.” African Security Review (2003): 5-16

Boutwell, Jeffrey and Michael Klare. “Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War.” Arms Control Today (1998).

Rutherford, Kenneth R. “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines.” World Politics 53 (2000): 74-114.

March 10 | Paper Meeting Deadline

Parker, Christopher S. “New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States.” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 119-47.

Suchman, Mark C., and Dana P. Eyre. “Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation.” Sociological Forum 7, no. 1 (1992):137-61.

Bitzinger, Richard A. “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation

Challenge.” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 170-98.

Mistry, Dinshaw. Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security

Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control. Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 2003. Chapters 1&3 (3-14, 41-73)

Week X

March 15 | Film

March 17 | Film; Film Quiz (T-Square) due by end of day (5 PM)

W e e k X I

March 22 | SPRING BREAK: No Class!

March 24 | SPRING BREAK: No Class!

W e e k X I I : N u c l e a r

March 29 |

Larson, Jeffrey A., and James J. Wirtz, eds. Arms Control and Cooperative Security. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009. Chapter 2 (21-38)

Schell, Jonathan. “The Folly of Arms Control.” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 5 (2000): 22-46.

Bohlen, Avis. “The Rise and Fall of Arms Control.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 45, no. 3 (2003): 7-34.

Thayer, Bradley A. “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.” Security Studies 4, no. 3 (1995): 463 - 519.

Hall, Brian. "Overkill Is Not Dead." New York Times, March 15 1998.

Cirincione et al, Chapters 14 and 15 (279-314)

March 31 |

Fields, Jeffrey, and Jason S. Enia. “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime -- Returning to a Multidimensional Evaluation.” The Nonproliferation Review 16, no. 2 (2009): 173-196.

Sagan, Scott D. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54-86.

Ganguly, Sumit. “India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program.” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 148-77.

Ahmed, Samina. “Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices.” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 178-204.

W e e k X I I I : C h e m i c a l a n d B i o l o g i c a l I

April 5 |

Chyba, Christopher, and Alex Greninger. “Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 46, no. 2 (2004): 143 - 62.

Cirincione at al, Chapter 4 (57-82), skim the state specific chapters for information on capabilities

Biological Weapons Convention

Block, Steven M. “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons.” American Scientist 89, no. 1 (2001): 28-38.

Kadlec, Robert P., Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis. “Biological Weapons Control: Prospects and Implications for the Future.” JAMA 278, no. 5 (1997): 351-56.

April 7 |

Ward, Kenneth D. “The BWC Protocol: Mandate for Failure.” The Nonproliferation Review 11, no. 2 (2004): 183-99.

Harris, Elisa D., and John D. Steinbruner. “Scientific Openness and National Security after 9-11.” Chemical and Biological Conventions Bulletin 67 (2005): 1-6.

Kelle, Alexander, Kathryn Nixdorff, and Malcolm Dando. Controlling Biochemical Weapons: Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Chapters 3&8 (35-67, 156-171)

Dando, Malcolm. The New Biological Weapons : Threat, Proliferation, and Control. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001. Chapters 1, 9&10 (1-15, 133-162)

Week XIV: C h e m i c a l a n d B i o l o g i c a l I I

April 12 |

Chemical Weapons Convention, Articles I-XVI (1-43)

Kenyon, Ian R. “Chemical Weapons in the Twentieth Century: Their Use and Their Control,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 48, June 2000, pp. 1-15.

Price, Richard. “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo.” International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995): 73-103.

Kelle, Alexander, Kathryn Nixdorff, and Malcolm Dando. Controlling Biochemical Weapons: Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century. Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Chapters 2 (10-34)

April 14 |

Hart, John and Peter Clevestig. “Reducing Security Threats from Chemical and Biological Materials.” in SIPRI Yearbook 2010. Chapter 10

Sagan, Scott D. “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks.” International Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 85-115.

Pearson, Graham S. “Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence.” The Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1993): 145-62.

Week XV

April 19 | Analytical Paper Due; PRESENTATIONS

April 21 | PRESENTATIONS

Week XVI

March 26 | PRESENTATIONS

April 28 | Last Day of Classes! PRESENTATIONS

F i n a l E x a m :

May 3: 2:50-5:40 PM