[CSED211] Introduction to Computer Software Systems

Lab 4: Attack Lab

Hyeongmin Oh




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
Today's Agenda

- Background
- Buffer Overflow
 - Vulnerability
 - Protection
- Attack Lab
- Quiz

x86-64 Linux Memory Layout

- Each program has its own address space
- Text and shared libraries
 - Executable machine instructions
 - Read-only
- Stack
 - Stores information about active subroutines of a program





Procedure Control Flow


- Use stack to support procedure call and return
- Procedure call: call label
 - Push the return address on the stack
 - Return address: The address of the next instruction right after call
 - Jump to label
- Procedure return: ret
 - Pop the address from stack
 - Jump to the address

Procedure Data Flow

- Passing arguments
 - First six arguments: Registers (%rdi → %rsi → %rdx → %rcx → %r8 → %r9)
 - From seventh argument: Stack
- Passing the return value: %rax register


Stack Frame

- Dedicated stack area for each procedure
- Management
 - Space allocated when entering the procedure
 - decrease %rsp
 - Deallocated when return
 - increase %rsp



x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

- Current (callee) stack frame
 - Local variables
 - Temporary space
- Caller stack frame
 - Return address
 - Pushed by call instruction



Byte Ordering

- Intel x86 use little endian
 - The least significant byte has the lowest address

```
int j;
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
   dw.c[j] = 0xf0 + j;

printf("Long 0 == [0x%lx]\n", dw.l[0]);</pre>
```

```
Long 0 == [0xf7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0]
```

```
c[0] c[1] c[2] c[3] c[4] c[5] c[6] c[7]

0xf0 0xf1 0xf2 0xf3 0xf4 0xf5 0xf6 0xf7

1[0]

0xf0 0xf1 0xf2 0xf3 0xf4 0xf5 0xf6 0xf7

LSB MSB
```


Push return address to stack and jump to echo

o return address is stored in little endian format

```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
             sub
                    $24,%rsp
                                                                 little endian
4006e3:
             add
                    $24,%rsp
4006e7:
             retq
                                                 %rsp 1 f6 06 40 00 00 00 00 00
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
             sub
                    $8,%rsp
                                                            Stack Frame for
                                                             call echo()
4006f1: callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f6:
                    $8,%rsp __
             add
4006fa:
             reta
                                                                Memory
```


At the beginning of procedure, stack frame is allocated

```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
              sub
                     $24,%rsp
4006e3:
              add
                     $24,%rsp
4006e7:
              retq
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
              sub
                     $8,%rsp
              callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f1:
4006f6:
                     $8,%rsp
              add
4006fa:
              retq
```




At the end of procedure, stack frame is shrinked

```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
                    $24,%rsp
             sub
4006e3:
             add
                    $24,%rsp
4006e7:
             retq
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
             sub
                    $8,%rsp
             callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f1:
4006f6:
                    $8,%rsp
             add
4006fa:
             retq
```



Pop return address from stack and jump to return address


```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
                     $24,%rsp
              sub
4006e3:
             add
                     $24,%rsp
4006e7:
              retq
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
              sub
                     $8,%rsp
             callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f1:
4006f6:
                     $8,%rsp
              add
4006fa:
              retq
```



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Buffer Overflow




Buffer Overflow


```
/* Echo Line */
void echo() {
    char buf[4]; /* Buffer is too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}

void call_echo() {
    echo();
}
```


- Unix function gets() has security vulnerability
 - Problem: No limit on the input length
 - Input can exceed buffer and corrupt return address



```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
             48 83 ec 18
                                        $24,%rsp
                                 sub
4006d3:
            48 89 e7
                                        %rsp,%rdi
                                 mov
                                       400680 <gets>
4006d6: e8 a5 ff ff ff
                                 callq
4006db:
         48 89 e7
                                        %rsp,%rdi
                                 mov
4006de:
         e8 3d fe ff ff
                                 callq
                                       400520 <puts@plt>
         48 83 c4 18
4006e3:
                                 add
                                        $24,%rsp
4006e7:
             с3
                                 retq
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
             48 83 ec 08
                                        $8,%rsp
                                 sub
4006ec: b8 00 00 00 00
                                        $0,%eax
                                 mov
4006f1: e8 d9 ff ff ff
                                        4006cf <echo>
                                 callq
4006f6:
            48 83 c4 08
                                 add
                                        $8,%rsp
4006fa:
             c3
                                 reta
```




```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
              48 83 ec 18
                                           $24,%rsp
                                    sub
4006d3:
              48 89 e7
                                           %rsp,%rdi
                                    mov
              e8 a5 ff ff ff
4006d6:
                                           400680 <gets>
                                    callq
4006db:
             48 89 e7
                                           %rsp,%rdi
                                   mov
              e8 3d fe ff ff
4006de:
                                    callq
                                           400520 <puts@plt>
              48 83 c4 18
4006e3:
                                    add
                                           $24,%rsp
4006e7:
              с3
                                    retq
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
              48 83 ec 08
                                           $8,%rsp
                                    sub
4006ec:
              ъ8 00 00 00 00
                                           $0,%eax
                                    mov
4006f1:
              e8 d9 ff ff ff
                                           4006cf <echo>
                                    callq
              48 83 c4 08
4006f6:
                                    add
                                           $8,%rsp
4006fa:
              с3
                                    reta
```



```
00000000004006cf <echo>:
4006cf:
             48 83 ec 18
                                          $24,%rsp
                                  sub
             48 89 e7
4006d3:
                                          %rsp,%rdi
                                  mov
4006d6:
                                         400680 <gets>
             e8 a5 ff ff ff
                                  callq
             48 89 e7
4006db:
                                          %rsp,%rdi
                                  mov
4006de:
             e8 3d fe ff ff
                                  callq
                                         400520 <puts@plt>
             48 83 c4 18
4006e3:
                                  add
                                          $24,%rsp
4006e7:
             с3
                                  retq
00000000004006e8 <call echo>:
4006e8:
             48 83 ec 08
                                         $8,%rsp
                                  sub
4006ec:
             ъ8 00 00 00 00
                                          $0,%eax
                                  mov
4006f1:
             e8 d9 ff ff ff
                                          4006cf <echo>
                                  callq
4006f6:
             48 83 c4 08
                                  add
                                          $8,%rsp
4006fa:
             c3
                                  reta
```

```
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
%rsp↑
       38 39 30 31 32 33 34 35
       36 37 38 39 30 31 32 33
       00 06 40 00 00 00 00 00
           Stack Frame for
           call echo()
              Memory
```

\$./bufdemo
Type a string:
012345678901234567890123



Code Injection Attacks


```
void P() {
   Q();
   • 
   • 
   }
}
```

```
Return Addr. A
```

int Q() {
 char buf[64];
 gets(buf);
 .
 .
 return val;
}

Overwrite the return address A
with the address of buffer (B)
+ fill the buffer with byte representation
of executable code

gets():



Code Injection Attacks

```
void P() {
    Q();
int Q() {
```


Return Addr. A

char buf[64]; gets(buf); return val;

Overwrite the return address A with the address of buffer (B) + fill the buffer with byte representation of executable code

gets():

When Q executes ret, will jump to the exploit code



Stack after Call to gets ()

Hint: Code Injection Attack

- You can use gcc and objdump to generate byte representation of exploit code
 - Check Appendix B in writeup


```
[dhgudals1227@programming2 target7]$ vim exploit_code.s
[dhgudals1227@programming2 target7]$ cat exploit_code.s
mov $0x1, %rdi; ret
[dhgudals1227@programming2 target7]$ gcc -c exploit_code.s
[dhgudals1227@programming2 target7]$ objdump -d exploit_code.o > exploit_code.d
[dhgudals1227@programming2 target7]$ cat exploit_code.d

000000000000000000 <.text>:
    0: 48 c7 c7 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%rdi
    7: c3 retq
```

• You can use gdb to obtain start address of exploit code (B)

Hint: Code Injection Attack String

- Focus on a location of %rsp after procedure return
 - %rsp is pointing just beyond the return address (modified to B)
- Set target function address just beyond exploit code address
 - ret instruction in exploit code will jump to target function
 - We can jump into target function after running exploit code



Protection Scheme Against Code Injection Attacks

Three protection scheme can effectively prevent code injection attacks

ASLR, NX, Stack Canary

ASLR


○ Randomize stack offset → make B unpredictable

NX

- Mark stack as a non-executable region
- Prevent exploit code execution residing in stack

Stack Canary

- Memory corruption detection scheme
- Put a canary just beyond the buffer
- Before the procedure return, check canary value is changed or not



Protection Scheme Against Code Injection Attacks

- Three protection scheme can effectively prevent code injection attacks
 - ASLR, NX, Stack Canary

ASLR


Randomize stack offset → make B unpredictable

NX

- Mark stack as a non-executable region
- Prevent exploit code execution residing in stack

Stack Canary

- Memory corruption detection scheme
- Put a canary just beyond the buffer
- Before the procedure return, check canary value is changed or not



Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) Attacks

- A more advanced attack technique that can bypass ASLR and NX
 - Cannot bypass stack canary
- Observation
 - Code positions are fixed from run to run
 - Code is executable

- Key Idea
 - Combine original code fragments to build exploit code
 - Each code fragment is called gadget

Gadget Example#1

```
long ab_plus_c(long a, long b, long c) {
   return a * b + c;
}
```

```
0000000004004d0 <ab_plus_c>:
    4004d0:    48 0f af fe imul %rsi,%rdi
    4004d4:    48 8d 04 17 lea (%rdi,%rdx,1),%rax
    4004d8:    c3 retq
```

```
%rax ← %rdi + %rdx
Gadget Address = 0x4004d4
```

- Use the tail end of existing functions
 - Need ret to chain gadgets


Gadget Example#2

```
void setval(unsigned *p) {
    *p = 3347663060u;
}
```

- Use the tail end of existing functions
 - Need ret to chain gadgets

ROP Execution

- Trigger with ret instruction
 - Will start executing Gadget 1
 - ∘ ret → pop %rip
- ret in each gadget will start next gadget




Hint: ROP Attack String

- The attack string is composed of three parts
 - Padding to trigger buffer overflow
 - Address of gadgets
 - Do some computations using sequence of existing code fragments
 - Address of target function

Padding				
Address of Gadget #1				
Address of Gadget #2				
•				
Address of Gadget #N-1				
Address of Gadget #N				
Address of Target Function				

Crafting an ROP Attack String




```
int echo() {
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    .
    .
    return ret
}
```

Attack: Makes echo() return %rdi+%rdx

Gadget: %rax ← %rdi + %rdx (+ ret)

Crafting an ROP Attack String



```
int echo() {
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    .
    .
    return ret
}
```

Attack: Makes echo() return %rdi+%rdx

Gadget: %rax ← %rdi + %rdx (+ ret)

Attack String (HEX)

```
30 31 ... 38 39 30 ... 39 30 ... 33 d4 04 40 00 00 00 00
```

Multiple gadgets can corrupt stack upwards

Today's Agenda

- Background
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 - Protection
- Attack Lab
- Quiz

Attack Lab: Assignment

- Goal: Gain hands-on experience about buffer overflow attacks
- There are five problems in this lab
 - Three problems are related to code injection attack (CI)
 - Two problems are related to return oriented programming (ROP)
- Due: 11/6 (Wed) 23:59
 - Late submission will not be accepted
- Submit your lab report in pdf
 - Report name: [student id].pdf (e.g., 2023xxxx.pdf)
 - Your report should not exceed 10 pages

Attack Lab: Evaluation

- Score evaluation: Quiz (10%) + Lab report (90%)
 - Lab report evaluation criteria

Phase	Program	Level	Method	Function	Points
1	CTARGET	1	CI	touch1	10
2	CTARGET	2	CI	touch2	25
3	CTARGET	3	CI	touch3	25
4	RTARGET	2	ROP	touch2	35
5	RTARGET	3	ROP	touch3	5

CI: Code injection

ROP: Return-oriented programming


- Phase 5 takes only 5% of report score, which will not be critical in overall score
 - If Phase 5 is challenging to you, just leave it (Do not cheat!)

• Connect to the programming server with ssh command

```
    $ ssh -p 2022 -L 15213:127.0.0.1:15213
    [YourServerID]@programming2.postech.ac.kr
    -p: SSH port number to connect server
    -L: Port tunneling
```

If you are using Xshell, you can use bomblab port forwarding setup

- After login, go to http://127.0.0.1:15213 to download your target,
 - You can access the web server only when the SSH session is alive
 - 。Enter your information, student ID (학번) and email address



- Upload your target to programming server
 - \circ \$ scp -P 2022 [path to targetk.tar] [povis ID]@programming2.postech.ac.kr:./
- Extract targetk.tar file and enter the directory
 - \$ tar -xvf targetk.tar && cd targetk

```
[dhgudals1227@programming2 ~]$ tar -xvf targetk.tar && cd targetk
targetk/README.txt
targetk/ctarget
targetk/rtarget
targetk/farm.c
targetk/cookie.txt
targetk/hex2raw
[dhgudals1227@programming2 targetk]$ 1s
README.txt cookie.txt ctarget farm.c hex2raw rtarget
```

```
[dhgudals1227@programming2 targetk]$ ls README.txt cookie.txt ctarget farm.c hex2raw rtarget
```

- ctarget: Program vulnerable to code injection attacks
- rtarget: Program vulnerable to ROP attacks
- hex2raw: Tool that can generate raw attack string from .txt file

- Mission: For each problem, design exploit string that can call touch() function
 - Change execution flow of program by triggering buffer overflow

```
[dhgudals1227@programming2 targetk]$ cat ctarget1.txt | ./hex2raw | ./ctarget Cookie: 0x754e7ddd

Type string: Touch1!: You called touch1()

Valid solution for level 1 with target ctarget

PASS: Sent exploit string to server to be validated.

NICE JOB!
```

• If exploit is failed, target program will terminate normally (No score penalty)

```
[dhgudals1227@programming2 targetk]$ cat ctarget1.txt | ./hex2raw | ./ctarget Cookie: 0x754e7ddd Type string: No exploit. Getbuf returned 0x1 Normal return
```

- Your progress will be automatically uploaded at:
 - http://127.0.0.1:15213/scoreboard
 - You must work on the programming server to properly update scoreboard
 - The score will not be updated if you work in other machines
 - We will evaluate only the problems recorded as solved in the scoreboard for grading your problem

Attack Lab Scoreboard

Here is the latest information that we have received from your targets.

Last updated: Mon Oct 7 03:15:05 2024 (updated every 20 secs)

#	Target	Date	Score	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	Phase 5
1	3	Mon Oct 7 00:30:49 2024	100	10	25	25	35	5

Attack Lab: Tips

- You can get useful information from assembly
 - address of function, size of stack frame, etc.

```
[dhgudals1227@programming2 targetk]$ objdump -d ctarget ctarget.s
[dhgudals1227@programming2 targetk]$ cat ctarget.s

ctarget: file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .init:
...
```

Attack Lab: Lab Report Guideline

- Please let me know your target ID (ex. target 7 → target ID: 7)
- For each problem, please provide
 - 1. Screenshot of your attack string
 - 2. How did you come up with that solution
 - Screenshot of important informations and the way you found it (linux command)
 - function address, stack frame size, start address of exploit code, etc.
 - In ROP, attach screenshots of useful gadgets you found (with their meaning)
 - What was your intention for designing that solution
 - 3. How your attack string is processed and successfully exploits target
 - Explain detailed control flow and important updates of register value

Cheating Policy

- You can refer
 - Attack lab writeup, lab slides, lecture slides
 - Internet sources that doesn't involve answers or codes about attack lab
- You should not refer
 - ChatGPT
 - Code and report from a senior who has already taken this course
 - Blogs or github repository that contain solution codes
 - Every other references that violate POSTECHIAN's Honor

Quiz

• Go to the PLMS, and start the quiz!

[CSED211] Introduction to Computer Software Systems

Lab 4: Attack Lab

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2024.10.17