
# **Authentication Lesson Introduction**

- Understand the importance of authentication
- Learn how authentication can be implemented
- Understand threats to authentication

## What is Authentication?




## What is Authentication?

- OS (TCB) needs to know who makes a request for a protected resource
- A process that makes the request does it on behalf of a certain user, subject or principal
- •Authentication helps us answer the question: on whose behalf the requesting process runs?
- Includes claims about an identity and verification of the claimed identity of the user who wants to gain access to system and resource



## **Authentication Goals**



User/principal associated with an identity should be able to successfully authenticate itself

User/principal not associated with the identity should not be able to authenticate itself

# **How is Authentication Implemented?**

#### Three basic methods:



Something a user knows




Something a user has



Something a user is

# **How is Authentication Implemented?**



with some templates ("standard answer") it has stored

#### denial-of-service

attempts to disable a user authentication service by flooding the service with numerous authentication attempts

#### host attacks

directed at the user file at the host where passwords, token passcodes, or biometric templates are stored

#### eavesdropping

adversary attempts to learn the password by some sort of attack that involves the physical proximity of user and adversary

## Authentication Security Issues

#### replay

adversary repeats a previously captured user response

through some ways copy your login information and paste it back.

#### trojan horse

an application or physical device masquerades as an authentic application or device for the purpose of capturing a user password, passcode, or biometric

#### client attacks

adversary attempts
to achieve user
authentication
without access to the
remote host or the
intervening
communications
path

pop-up window: "I need your username" and password again". Look legitimate to the users, but it was someone else trying

to get information from you.

attempting to be you

# **Threat Modeling of the Password Method**

- Guessing the password for a given user allows impersonation
- •Impersonating a real login program
- Keylogging to steal a password

# **Implementing Password Authentication**

How do we check the password supplied with a user id?

Method 1 - store a list of passwords, one for each user in the system file.

- The file is readable only by the root/admin account
- What if the permissions are set incorrectly?
- Why should admin know the passwords?
- If security is breached, the passwords are exposed to an attacker.

# **Implementing Authentication**

How do we check the password supplied with a user id?


Method 2 - do not store passwords, but store something that is derived from them

- Use a one-way hash function and store the result
- The password file is readable only for root/admin


## **Hash Functions**



## **Hash Functions & Threats**




- We assume a one-way property for hash functions
- If we know common passwords,
   we can determine their hash
- For dictionary and offline attacks,
   we have the hash values and
   plenty of time to test for matches



Publicly available software can do 10<sup>8</sup>
 MD5 hashes/sec on a GPU

 Six random upper case/lower case/digits then 62<sup>6</sup> possible passwords, about 10 minutes


 Eight random characters increases it to about six days



Passwords are not really random


To reduce the work required for a brute force attack:

- Try the popular passwords first
- Create a rainbow table




What if two users pick the same password?

- Add a random salt before hashing
- Store the salt with the hashed value
- Check by using the salt with the typed password




# Use of Hashed Passwords

- prevents duplicate passwords from being visible in the password file.
- greatly increases the difficulty of offline dictionary attacks. For a salt of length b bits, the number of possible passwords is increased by a factor of 2<sup>b</sup>.
- becomes nearly impossible to find out whether a person with passwords on two or more systems has used the same password on all of them.



(a) Loading a new password



(b) Verifying a password

# **Improved Password Implementations**

- much stronger hash/salt schemes available for Unix
- recommended hash function is based on MD5
  - •salt of up to 48-bits
  - password length is unlimited
  - produces 128-bit hash
  - uses an inner loop with 1000 iterations to achieve slowdown
- OpenBSD uses Blowfish block cipher based hash algorithm called Bcrypt

## **Problems with Passwords**

 As password length and complexity increases, usability suffers

- Phishing and social engineering users do not authenticate who is asking for a password.
- Once a password is stolen, it can be used many times
  - This is why there are policies that say passwords be changed frequently
- Humans have a hard time remembering lots of passwords.
   Usable passwords are easy to guess.

### **Problems with Passwords**

### Sys Administrators:

- Never store passwords in the clear
- Store only hashed values generated with a random salt and limit access to them
- Avoid general purpose fast hash functions

#### **Users:**

Use password managers

## **Other Authentication Methods**

Something you have:



Tokens, smart cards

- You must have them
- May require additional hardware (e.g., readers)
- How does it implement authentication (challenge/response)
- Cost and misplaced trust (RSA SecureID master key breach)

## **Other Authentication Methods**

**Something You Are:** 




#### Various biometrics

- Fingerprints (finger swipes)
- Keystroke dynamics
- Voice
- Retina scans

#### Do you get the same biometric measurement each time?

- Probability distribution or a range for feature values
- False positives and negatives

# **Implementing Biometric Authentication**



## **Candidates for Biometric IDs**

- Fingerprints
- Retinal/iris scans
- DNA
- "Blue-ink" signature
- Voice recognition
- Face recognition
- Gait recognition



Public domain image from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fingerprint Arch.jp.




Public domain image from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Retinal\_scan\_securimetrics.jpg




Public domain image from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CBP\_chemist\_reads\_a\_DNA\_profile.jpg





Ear Ear Travis Isaacs/Flickr, CC BY 2.0

You heard it here: The shape of your ear is just as distinguishing as your fingerprints; no two ears, even on the same person, are alike. Startup Descartes Biometrics has come up with an app that can identify smartphone users by <a href="the way they press their phone to their ear and cheek">their phone to their ear and cheek</a>—though its less-than-consistent recognition means that perhaps this particular app isn't yet ready for prime time.



Follow Your Heart Helge V. Keitel/Flickr, CC BY 2.0

They say the heart always knows the truth, so it shouldn't be surprising that someone's come up with a way to prove your identity based on it. The Nymi is an in-development wristband that takes an electrocardiogram (ECG)—measuring the electrical signal generated by your heart's activity—and uses it to authenticate your identity. You can then use the Nymi as a secure token for unlocking access to other devices, such as smartphones and computers. To date, identifying people by ECG is less proven than fingerprints or iris/retina recognition, but given the burgeoning popularity of smart devices that measure your heart rate, it could end up being a convenient method of authentication.






#### Butt Biometrics Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology

I suppose you could say there's just *one* 'but' about this biometric authentication method—and <a href="it's your posterior">it's your posterior</a>. Turns out your keister—or, more specifically, the way you sit—can be used to identify you. One team of researchers has created a prototype of a car seat that can tell who's sitting in it. It's not only great for making sure that only you (or, presumably, your family) can start your car, but also potentially handy for ensuring that your seat, mirrors, and other preferences are automatically adjusted for you.



#### The Eye (Movements) Have It Dreamstime

Authentication via parts of the eye, like the retina or iris, has been around for a while, but <u>an Israeli company wants to use the unique movements of your eyes to identify you</u>. It seems that we move our eyes in predictable patterns when doing certain tasks, such as following an icon across a screen. The advantages of the system are that it's tough to fool, since it requires a real-time response to a stimulus, rather than a static factor like a fingerprint, and it's fairly easy to implement. The downside, I imagine, is that it requires eye contact (which may not be easy when you're driving, for instance) and is probably a little slower than using something like a fingerprint.



The Nose Knows Eden, Janine and Jim/Flickr. CC BY 2.0

Not only is your olfactory organ good for smelling, but <u>British researchers have established</u> that it's also a handy way to tell you apart from your neighbor. Like your ears, your nose is distinct—probably belonging to one of six common nose types—and is unlikely to be mistaken for anybody else's. It's also easy to recognize, though changing your nose is hardly as tough as changing, say, your eyes. Hollywood can vouch for that.



You're So Vein West Midlands Police/Flickr. CC BY-SA 2.0

While your fingerprints may be the biometric standby these days, there are some issues with relying on them too heavily. For one, they're <u>fairly easy to copy</u>. Second, if someone is truly invested in breaking into your accounts, that may provide enticement to (*gulp*) remove a finger. Vein matching, on the other hand, can also use a finger or a palm, but provides a few additional benefits—most notably that the veins must be from a living person in order to work, and that they're <u>very hard to fake</u>.




The Sniff Test GM/Flickr. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

When that grade school bully taunted "Smell ya later," he probably didn't realize that he was predicting another potential biometric method. That's right, your distinct body odor—and we're making no judgments here—can be used to identify you. Researchers at the Polytechnical University of Madrid <a href="https://have.studied.now.scents.differ.among.people">heteroamong.people</a> and built an artificial nose, which they say can differentiate between two people by their smell, like a bloodhound. The U.S. Army <a href="https://initiation.org/">https://initiation.org/</a> interested in similar technology, which it would like to use to help suss out potential threats. It's still early days, though: the artificial nose can filter out smells like hand cream or changes in odor caused by diet and disease, but the Madrid team's technology still has failure rate of around 10 percent.

## **Other Authentication Methods**


#### **Multi-factor authentication**



- Uses more than one method
- Type password but also send a code via SMS
  - It goes to your phone (something you have)
  - Gmail implements this
- ATM card and a PIN
- Other things like your location
- Attacker must defeat both to compromise authentication

## **Other Authentication Methods**

**Authentication over a network:** 



- Do we always have a trusted path to the OS we need to authenticate to?
  - **■** Remote services
- Network authentication introduces new problems
- Need crypto to secure network communication
- Other attacks (man-in-the-middle)

# **Authentication Lesson Summary**

- Authenitcation is a key requirement for securing access to resources
- All methods present a number of tradeoffs that need to be balanced
- Understand how various types of authentication is implemented
- Security mindset requires that we do careful threat modeling