



# Perturbation attack on modern CPUs, from the fault model to the exploitation

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September, 24<sup>th</sup> 2020



# My thesis

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## Evaluation of hardware attacks against System-On-Chip


- Jessy CLÉDIÈRE (Director)
- Guillaume BOUFFARD (Supervisor)



Focus on the perturbation of modern CPUs


# Modern CPU ?

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


Exynos 9820 SoC (Samsung)

# Modern CPU ?



Exynos 9820 SoC (Samsung)



Exynos M4 core

# Targets

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**BCM2837**  
(Raspberry Pi 3 model B)



**Intel Core i3-6100T**  
(Custom motherboard)



**BMC2711b0**  
(Raspberry Pi 4)



Linux based OS (Raspbian Buster/Debian 9)

## Fault injection mediums

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
Device	EMFI	LFI
BCM2837 (RPi3)	✓	✗
Intel Core i3	✓	✗
BCM2711b0 (RPi4)	⌚	✓

# Characterization method

## Tested program

```
trigger_up();  
orr r5, r5;  
... # several times  
orr r5, r5;  
trigger_down();
```


## Analysis paths



## Initial values

Register	Value
r0	0xffffe0001
r1	0xffffd0002
r2	0xffffb0004
r3	0xffff70008
r4	0xfffef0010
r5	0xfffd0020
r6	0xfffb0040
r7	0xff7f0080
r8	0xfeff0100
r9	0xfdff0200

# Characterization (BCM2837)



Positions of the probe over the chip leading to faults.


## Fault models

- Register corruption
  - Bit reset
  - Instruction dependent value
- Instruction corruption
  - Operands corruption
  - Opcode corruption

## Hypothesis

Fault targets cache

# Characterization (Intel Core i3)



Positions of the probe over the die leading to faults.


## Fault models

- Register corruption
  - Bit reset
  - System values
- Instruction corruption
  - Operands corruption
  - Opcode corruption

## Hypothesis

Fault targets cache

# Characterization (Intel Core i3)



Positions of the probe over the die leading to reboots.


## Fault models

- Register corruption
  - Bit reset
  - System values
- Instruction corruption
  - Operands corruption
  - Opcode corruption

## Hypothesis

Fault targets cache

# Characterization (BCM2711b0)



Positions of the laser spot over the die leading to faults.


## Fault models

- Register corruption
  - Bit set
  - Bit reset
- Instruction corruption
  - Operands corruption
  - Opcode corruption

Not an hypothesis

We mainly target the cache

# Fault model exploitability



Characterization

Analysis

Exploitation



## Exploitation

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### DFA on AES (BCM2837)


- target MixColumns 9<sup>th</sup> round entry
- 1 useful cipher every 294 injection (0.34%)
- 1 useful cipher every 10 minutes
- 2 to 8 ciphers needed for the attack
- Up to 3 hours of fault injections

### Forced authentication (On going)

- target password verification functions from PAM library
- use-case with sudo program
- 2 library dynamic loads and 12 functions involved in total


# Exploitation - OpenSSL AES

## Fault probability regarding the delay of injection




## Exploitation - OpenSSL AES

Number of faulted ciphers with a specific number of faulted diagonals regarding the delay of injection




## Exploitation - OpenSSL AES

Number of faulted ciphers with a specific number of faulted diagonals regarding the delay of injection



# Exploitation - Forced authentication

## Default sudo behavior





## Exploitation - Forced authentication


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**sudo source code**

```
/* Initialize plugin... */
ok = policy_check(&policy_plugin, argc, argv, env_add,
                  &command_info, &argv_out, &user_env_out);
if (ok != 1) { /* Critical if comparison */
    if (ok == -2)
        usage(1);
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* Execute command as root... */
```

# Exploitation - Forced authentication


Traces acquired on BCM2711b0 (Laser Fault Injection)



hash comparison based on `strncmp()` function


# Exploitation - Forced authentication

## Target program execution flow




# Exploitation - Forced authentication

## Target program execution flow




# Exploitation - Forced authentication

## Target program execution flow




# Exploitation - Forced authentication

## Target program execution flow



# Exploitation - Forced authentication

## Target program execution flow





## Conclusion

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- Classical fault injection mediums (EMFI, Laser) are:
  - efficient on modern CPUs
  - characterizable and understandable
- Modern CPUs have shown sensitive to faults elements, in particular the cache memory
- Modern CPUs asynchronous behavior and high frequencies does not protect against timing precision demanding attacks like DFA



## Future works

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- Achieve a forced authentication on the targets
- Link side-channel activity with chip activity
- Realize tests on in production chips (embedded in smartphones for instance)
- Determine how the cache is faulted and design an adapted countermeasure

# Questions?

