==Phrack Inc.==

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Issue Five/Part 2

Compiled and Written By

Knight Lightning

Captain Midnight's Sneak Attack

May 12, 1986

"A daring intruder airs the beefs of dish owners"

In the old days, people with complaints against the media had few recourses: A stern letter to the editor, perhaps, or a protesting phone call. "Captain Midnight," an outraged consumer of the space age, took more daring action. In a sneak attack made on Sunday of last week, the self-appointed video avenger broke into an HBO presentation of the movie "The Falcon and the Snowman" with a cryptic message:

Good evening HBO
From Captain Midnight
\$12.95/Month? No Way!
(Showtime/The Movie Channel Beware)

The mysterious dispatch, seen for several minutes in the East and Midwest by hundreds of thousands of subscribers to the pay-cable service, was clearly intended as a rallying cry for the more than 1.5 million owners of home satellite dishes in the U.S. These video free-lancers are angry because many of the TV signals they have been plucking from the sky are done by one tuning into jumble. In January, HBO and Cinemax (both owned by Time Inc.) became the first two cable services to scramble their signals, thus preventing dish owners from watching them without paying a monthly subscription fee. Showtime and the Movie Channel will begin similar scrambling on May 27, and most other satellite-beamed cable channels, including ESPN, MTV, the Disney Channel, Cable News Network and Superstation WTBS, will follow suit before the end of the year. Their actions have set off a heated battle over just who has the right to TV signals bouncing through the skies.

In one blow, Captain Midnight has become a folk hero in that struggle, though his identity remains a mystery. Ordinary home dishes are able only to receive signals, not to send them; thus experts think the pirate signal probably came from a TV station or other commercial facility. Wherever the stunt originated, TV executives were not amused. HBO has lodged a complaint with the FCC, threatened to prosecute the pirate, and made technical adjustments that it claims will prevent any repeat attack.

"He probably thinks this was a prank," says HBO Vice President Dave Pritchard.
"But the fact is someone has interfered with authorized satellite
transmissions." The incident has raised concerns that other satellite-borne
communications, including sensitive data transmitted by business and the
military, could be similarly disrupted. Representatives of the three broadcast
networks insist that a 'hacker' would have difficulty breaking into their
programming. But any satellite signal could theoretically be disrupted,
experts say "Most satellites are built with some safety measures," explains
Karl Savatiel, director of satellite communications for AT&T. "But all
satellites, including military satellites, are vulnerable if a person knows
where the satellite is located, the frequency it uses for satellite
transmissions, and the sender's code."

(This wasn't the full article, just the important part)

Reported by Jim Byers/Los Angeles and Jerome Cramer/Washington.

Typed for PWN's usage by The Seker

News On Captain Midnight

April 28, 1986

"Search for Cable TV Prankster Leads to North Texas"

The search for Captain Midnight, the disgruntled video prankster who briefly commandeered Home Box Office's satellite transmissions over the eastern two-thirds of the country early Sunday, has led federal investigators to North Texas, a Justice Department official said Monday.

John K. Russell, a Justice Department spokesman in Washington, told Knight-Ridder Newspapers that "the perpetrator is believed to be in North Texas." Later he said the search was in Texas "as well as other areas."

Other authorities told Knight-Ridder that investigators in the Dallas field offices of the FBI and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have been focusing on a tip that Sunday's four-minute cable interruption originated in North Texas.

FBI and FCC officials in Dallas could not be reached for comment Monday.

Captain Midnight interrupted a movie broadcast Sunday with a message protesting new fees being charged the owners of satellite dishes for access to HBO. The five line message, superimposed on a test pattern, said:

> "Good evening HBO from Captain Midnight. \$12.95 a month? No way! (Showtime-Movie Channel Beware.) "

In January, HBO began scrambling its broadcasts to prevent owners of satellite dishes from unauthorized interception of the signal as it bounced from a satellite to cable television systems.

HBO told dish owners that they would have to buy a descrambler for \$395 and pay \$12.95 a month.

"While the man on the street may have once thought that Captain Midnight's message was limited to being a prank, it does represent a very serious threat to any company or entity using satellites to transmit information," said Alan Levi, HBO's manager of corporate public relations.

Other:

Alan Levi: [212] 512-1659 (Cooperate affairs)
David Pritchard: [212] 512-1413 (Cooperate affairs)
Tim Larker: [212] 512-5666 (Network scrambler assistant)

New York City FCC: [212] 620-3438 (Federal Communications Commission)

HBO Cooperate Offices: [212] 512-1000

David Lightman:

I have spoken with several people about 'Captain Midnight'. I have spoken to everyone above. This David Pritchard tried to tell me this:

DP = David Pritchard

DL = David Lightman

DL: Where do you think this 'Captain Midnight' is?

DP: Would assume he is in the North Texas region. Possibly 214.

DL: What makes you think this?

DP: We believe this is true due to a tip from a Dallas resident.

DL: How do you know that he was not lying to lead you away from the real

Captain Midnight?

DP: I know he was probably not lying because he left us his mailbox number.

DL: Which is?

DP: I cannot release that information right now.

(This conversation went on for a while. Possibly 10-15 minutes...)

David Lightman earlier had spoken with Alan Levi...

DL: Yes. Do you have any idea who this Captain Midnight might be?

Alan: No, but we are fairly certain it is someone in the 212 area with access to the scrambling offices of HBO. The knowledge necessary for what this guy did could not be gotten very easily without getting it from our departments.

DL: Well, I believe I know who this Captain Midnight is.

Alan: Could you please tell me who you think Captain Midnight is?

DL: No. If it is the person I suspect, I would rather not cause any trouble for them.

Alan: You wouldn't cause much trouble for him.

DL: Isn't what this guy did a federal offense?

Alan: Well, yes it is, but you would be surprised how many people get away with breaking federal laws.

(He actually said that guys!)

DL: Hmm.... What would happen to him?

Alan: We would just let him know that what he did was not a prank. It was very serious. It could possibly change the entire industry and unless he stops transmitting over our satellites, we will ask the Department of Defense to handle it from then on.

DL: Well, I would need to think about it a little more. Can I call you back a little later?

Alan: Could you just give me your number and I will have David Pritchard call you back?

DL: It depends on who else will get my number.

Alan: Just me. I will consider this conversation and all of the conversations that follow to be an anonymous tip.

DL: Sure then. It is (214) 733-5162.

Alan: Thanks. Then I will have David call you if you do not call me back before tomorrow evening.

DL: That would be fine. Thanks.

Alan: Thank you.

Well as you may have guessed, my number (mailbox) was given to the FCC, FBI, and David Pritchard as well as Tim Larker. I got pretty pissed so I called David Pritchard. That was the first conversation I posted. We (Alan Levi, David Pritchard, Tim Larker, the FCC, the FBI, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, and I) now have the country believing that the transmission originated in Dallas. Of course it did, but you may see that changed soon. I plan on another conversation with these intelligent people tomorrow 5:00 PM.

If you do call these guys, please do not mention the Administration, Team Hackers'86, any member of either group or me to them as being the transmitter. You have no proof at all about that. I did not say if we were involved or not. That will be left up to your imagination.

Information and Interviews Provided by David Lightman

Captain Midnight Busted!

June 6, 1986

Captain Midnight probably isn't sleeping too well these days. His name, still publicly unannounced, is probably known by many, including the FBI. He has already been reported to have been fired from his job at an uplink facility, of which there are only around 100 in this country. The facility is east of the Rockies and does not operate after midnight. Also, a newer type of equipment was used of which there are only a few in the country. We expect charges to be filed any day now, possibly just in time for the June 12th congressional

hearings on signal jamming. Penalties could include a one year jail sentence and up to \$50,000 in fines; \$10,000 maximum of which would be for jamming only.

We expect FM America to come to Captain Midnight's rescue financially by raising defense money. All segments of the TVRO industry condemned the signal jamming. It is interesting to note the grins and smiles while discussing the subject, however, FM America knows who "Captain Midnight" is and even interviewed him live on the air on "FM America." Tapes of FM America including Captain Midnight's interview have been turned over to federal investigators.

Several benefits can be realized by Captain Midnight's signal "interruption." Mainly, the fact is now known by everyone that it can be done. There are no secrets either in that a transponder can easily be confused into locking onto another signal and ignoring the correct signal as interference. Also, the signal that controls the satellite's positioning could also be accessed. The overall possibility that our entire "satellite system" in general can be rendered ineffective from the ground is kind of unnerving.

Signal scrambling did not interfere with the HBO signal lockout because a higher wattage beam over-powered it. The networks all use pretty powerful beams which are used 24 hours-a-day so they would be harder to jam. If we had to guess which uplink was used to jam HBO, we would pick one that was already locked into the same satellite, such as one of the superstations. (Hint, Hint!)

Information provided by Handsomest One

Who is Ralph Meola?

May 20, 1986

Ralph Meola is the Head of AT&T Security in New Jersey and theoretically everywhere else as well. He is known to have a computer file on hackers and phreaks, and an investigative team, that rivals John Maxfield's "BoardScan".

How did Meola enter into the public eye? Well, we at Phrack really aren't completely sure but, the general idea is that a friend of Sigmund Fraud (See TelePub'86 in PWN issue III), using social engineering in order to gain information from AT&T, somehow came into contact with Ralph Meola.

Later, Sigmund Fraud was also brought into this and decided to give Ralph Meola a call himself. With Gin Fizz on Sigmund's 3-Way, he got Meola on the phone and said, "Hey! This is Sigmund Fraud!" Typing sounds could be heard in the background and in a few seconds Meola responded with Sigmund Fraud's real name, address, phone numbers, and the names of several BBSes that he was on.

Meola then insisted that Sigmund Fraud give him his account on Stronghold East or at the very least, all of the newuser logon procedures and passwords. Failure to do so would mean big trouble for Sigmund Fraud. Sigmund of course gave Meola the always nice "fuck you!" and hung up on Meola.

Although Sigmund Fraud was (at the time) on Metal Shop Private, Meola didn't know it, or at least he didn't mention it as a BBS that Sigmund was on. This means that Meola has no agents on Metal Shop Private. It is also known that Meola has no agents on Stronghold East. Otherwise he wouldn't have needed the

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password information from Sigmund. It is believed that Meola was on Stronghold East before the MASSIVE purge several months ago.

Information Provided by Sigmund Fraud/Gin Fizz/Slave Driver The assumptions and theories are my own $-\mathrm{KL}$

Slave Driver has since sent Ralph Meola the following letter:

TO: Ralph Meeola

Head AT&T Security

From: Slave Driver

Re: My user.

Hello. I find it rather hard to get in touch with you through normal means, but give me some time.

I was told you have been threatening my users, trying to get access here. That is not good. Ralph, if you want access just ask for it, don't go threatening my users. That was not an intelligent idea, Ralph.

If you are such a big guy [in your mind, and uh, hand] why not give me a call. I'm sure you have my number. I would be very interested in talking to you. So, you decide, Ralph. Either way, we'll talk one day.

Bye Ralph,

Slave Driver

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Issue Five/Part 3

Compiled and Written By

Knight Lightning

Cracking Down On Abuse

This article is from the January issue of MCI World, a monthly newsletter published by MCI for it's employees.

The nationwide attack on telephone fraud got a boost recently when the U.S. Secret Service joined the effort to curb the crime that costs the industry millions in lost revenue annually.

The Secret Service used new jurisdiction over the telephone fraud for the first time to arrest five individuals in raids on four illegal "Call-Sell" operations in New York City last November.

The five suspects are awaiting trial in federal court on charges based on a Secret Service investigation conducted in cooperation with MCI and other members of the long distance telephone industry.

The defendants were charged with violation of a law on Fraud In Connection With Access Devices which carries maximum penalties of 15 years imprisonment and a fine of \$50,000, or twice the value of the fraudulent activity.

Several other investigations are under way and future arrests are expected, according to a Secret Service spokesman.

MCI cooperated in the investigation as a company and through membership in the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA), made up of some 35 telephone industry firms.

"Because it's an industry-wide problem, we have organized to crack down on all kinds of fraud, from the isolated 'hacker' to more organized schemes to use long distance lines illegally," said Everick Bowens, senior manager of MCI security investigations and president of CFCA.

The Secret Service said that in the New York cases, the defendants operated Call-Sell businesses out of their homes and charged "customers" a flat fee for making long distance calls. They used "Blue Boxes" and stolen or compromised authorization codes or credit card numbers to use the long-distance networks of several companies.

Blue Boxes are electronic tone-generating devices used to bypass billing systems and gain access to company networks. They can be assembled from generally available electronic parts or they can be purchased ready-made through illegal sources.

In the New York raids, agents seized unauthorized cods and credit card numbers, four Blue Boxes and more than 20 telephones.

It is estimated that in 1984, fraud in the telecommunications industry totaled \$500 million nationwide, and approximately \$70 million in the New York City area.

CFCA members are primarily inter-exchange carriers, such as MCI, but resale carriers and some Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) are also members, along with representatives of computer services and credit card companies.

Bowens says CFCA is intensifying efforts to stop the spread of fraud. Among other things, CFCA is developing educational packages for carriers and the public to promote widespread understanding of telephone fraud and ways to counter the crime.

"Our aim is jointly to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute any fraudulent use of our long-distance networks," Bowens said.

Authorization codes are obtained by theft from individuals and by "hackers" who randomly try combinations of numbers by telephone or through computer scanning of number combinations until a working code is "hit." Illegally obtained codes are fraudulently used by "boiler room" telemarketing operations, for example, or are passed along for use by individuals.

MCI had developed software to detect illegal entry into its network and it is expected that the spread of dial 1 service, in which authorization codes are not used, will help reduce the incidence of telephone fraud.

Comments from the Bootleg:

You reckon they mean us?????????????

What's wrong with them, can't they take a joke??????????

The Many Faces Of Fraud

The following is an article from the January issue of MCI World, a monthly newsletter published by MCI for it's employees.

This new year will see a stepped up MCI attack on telephone fraud--illegal use of the long distance network through access by stolen authorization codes or electronic devices. The offensive is led by Everick Bowens, senior manager of MCI's security investigations department and president of the industry-wide Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA). Success in curbing this theft of service has earned MCI security investigators a reputation as super sleuths at headquarters and in the divisions.

New teeth were added to the attack on telephone fraud when the U.S. Secret Service was assigned to augment continuing investigative efforts by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.

Because telephone fraud is outright theft from the company, MCI is determined to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute any illicit use of its network. To learn more about how MCI conducts its anti-fraud campaign, MCI World talked with Bowens.

MCI World: Is it true that MCI has systems that can detect fraudulent activity while it is occurring?

Bowens: Yes, our fraud systems detect abnormal usage and hacking. The systems also help us to track down offenders even when we have only the authorization code he or she is abusing. Because we can profile abusers and trace phone calls, it is easier for us to prepare cases for prosecution.

MCI World: Abuses involving computer "hacking" to get authorization codes seem to attract public attention. But there are other types of fraud equally damaging to the telecommunications industry. Would you identify some of these?

Bowens: The primary form of abuse is by "hackers," who use computer programs to derive customers' authorization codes. These codes can be widely disseminated via electronic bulletin boards. Because many of these boards are public, the codes fall into the hands of anyone with access to the boards. We also encounter electronic toll fraud, which involves tone-generating devices that allow offenders to place fraudulent calls.

MCI World: Is one type of fraudulent activity more prevalent than another?

- Bowens: Nationwide, fraud most frequently originates from military posts, college campuses, and prisons--places where there are numbers of people far from home, or who have little else to do but manipulate the telephone. This type of abuse prompts the bulk of our investigations.
- MCI World: Who is most likely to commit fraud? Is there a general profile of the common offender?
- Bowens: Computer crime typically occurs in affluent, metropolitan suburbs and involves juveniles. Electronic fraud also occurs in major metropolitan areas. Other abusers, such as high-pressure tele-marketeers, usually follow the coast lines. California and Florida, for "boiler room" operations in which phone service is used illegally to sell merchandise. However, fraud can't be totally attributed to any specific group at any particular time.
- MCI World: How can you keep up with code abuse and fraud? Don't offenders change frequently?
- Bowens: Interestingly enough, the patterns don't change much. Those who commit fraud form a finite community that doesn't expand a great a great deal over time. Casual offenders, individuals who may take advantage of a "hot" toll free number, will use the number only when it's hot. Once the number no longer works, they're not likely to repeat the offense. On the other hand, repeat offenders are dedicated to getting something for nothing. They're somewhat easier to identify because they commit the same offense over and over.
- MCI World: How does MCI know when it is the target of fraudulent activity?
- Bowens: Our systems generally alert us, or an employee or a customer informs us. People know the MCI name. When they recognize something happening illegally with an authorization code, they'll get in touch with us. People generally feel that a cheat is a cheat, a crook is a crook, and if they have to pay full value for a phone call they see no reason why someone else shouldn't. There also are professional tipsters who go from one company to another offering information for a price. However, we rarely deal with them.
- MCI World: Which MCI people, by the nature of their jobs, are most likely to detect or at least suspect, fraudulent activity?
- Bowens: Our switch technicians have been very instrumental in detecting abuse. They're in a position to identify extensive busy signals on circuits, abnormal calling patterns, and code use. They've identified many hackers just by reviewing their daily call statistics. Employees in our billing department are also good at spotting unusually large bills and abnormal patterns. Though most fraud is detected by the systems we have in place, the human eye continues to be extremely helpful.
- MCI World: In addition to working with internal people to help detect fraudulent activity, you also rely on the expertise of external agencies. Which outside agencies assist you with investigations.
- Bowens: When fraudulent activity involves the theft or illicit use of authorization codes or credit calling cards, MCI and the Secret Service work together to investigate the case. If other activity is involved, such as the use of our service in furtherance of other crime, MCI works with the FBI. When the U.S. Postal Service is manipulated in a fraud case, MCI and postal inspectors investigate together. Additionally, Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) often provide hard evidence in cases that MCI prosecutes.
- MCI World: When you are alerted to suspected fraudulent activity, what steps do you take to open and pursue the case?
- Bowens: Security investigators contact the customer whose code is being abused, advise them of MCI's suspicions, and attempt to confirm them. If the response confirms their suspicion of fraud, they open the case.

Normally, an investigation entails much research into toll records to identify abusers, unusual call patterns and the parties who might be involved in illicit activity. We also interview parties receiving the calls and document their statements. Once we collect sufficient evidence, we decide whether a case should be pursued as a criminal or civil action.

MCI World: How long does it normally take MCI's investigators to "crack" a case?

Bowens: Typically, investigators can crack a case within hours. Identifying fraud suspects is the easy part. Amassing the evidence—dotting all of the legal i's and crossing the t's—is tougher. Gathering evidence may take weeks and large cases involving many parties can take months to solve.

MCI World: With fraudulent activity knowing no geographical restrictions, how do you segment the problem divisionally?

Bowens: The security investigations department acts primarily in an advisory capacity, helping investigators in the divisions with procedural matters. The divisions generally take responsibility for investigating fraudulent activity within their jurisdictions and corporate investigators pursue cases that are large in scope or require specific expertise. Corporate also takes on cases involving offenders operating in more than one division.

MCI World: Can you elaborate on MCI's goals for reducing the level of fraudulent activity?

Bowens: We want to reduce fraud to the lowest possible level. One of MCI's goals is to cut fraud by more than half in 1986. We want to be the industry leader in curbing this illegal activity.

Broadway Hacker Turned Fed Informant?

June 2, 1986

Broadway Hacker recently called Phreakers Quest and left feedback to the sysop of that system (Shawn) saying, "I do believe that some of this information here is illegal." Shawn called Dark Creeper and reported this to him who then later told it to me.

Sometime later, Broadway Hacker called Knight Bandit to voice validate him for The Radio Station. He claimed he was some sort of fed and that KB would be hearing from someone in Bell Security.

The Radio Station is down because Broadway Hacker has sold his computer, his disks, and everything else and is moving to his new job at an unknown destination. When I spoke with him, he went on that he sold his user log, but would not comment on that any further. He wanted me to print that he was a fed and that all of his former users would soon be receiving visits from the FBI. This is exactly what he told Phantom Phreaker and several others which started a mass riot in the phreak world. One result was the takedown of Alliance for fear of its safety. It since has been put back up.

Broadway justified his actions by saying that by telling rodents he was a fed, it would keep them off his board. Later he said that since he is leaving the phreak world and no one knows where he is going, "To hell with the phreak world, let it fall apart and die for all I care." So this fed scare is an attempt to do just that. Was it a joke? Did he mean that really? I don't know. Maybe he did mean it then but now has changed his mind...

No one should be worried about this, everything is ok, and Broadway is not working with the FBI. He now claims that he needed his line free for business calls and all of the above were attempts to get people not to be calling him as he didn't have the time or patience. Use your own judgement.

Broadway Hacker still has his Vic 20 and an old modem and is attempting to get back on boards. He has also stated that the Radio Station BBS will be put back up at the end of the summer. Where it will be run from is unknown although,

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Broadway speculated that when it returns it would be run off of an Amiga.

Information Provided by Broadway Hacker/Dark Creeper/Knight Bandit/Phantom Phreaker

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Issue Five/Part 4

Compiled and Written By

Knight Lightning

Grown-Up Laws Sought For Computer Criminals

By Dave Skidmore (Associated Press)

WASHINGTON-Teen-age computer hackers are giving way to a new generation of people who steal information from computers for profit rather than fun, the head of a House crime panel said Wednesday.

"The hackers were the first generation we saw. Now we have a lot of professionals who are getting into the business of accessing computer data bases," said Rep. William J. Hughes, D-N.J. [609/645-7957 or 202/225-6572], the sponsor of legislation aimed at helping law enforcement authorities better cope with the problem.

Hughes commented as the House subcommittee on crime, which he heads, studied the proposed Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Teen-age computer hobbyists, motivated fun and desire for status among fellow hobbyists, use home computers and the telephone to "hack" into government and industry data bases.

Now, Hughes said, hackers' techniques are being increasingly used by industrial spies who sell trade secrets gleaned from corporate computers and thieves who change bank records to steal millions of dollars.

"Computer crime is probably one of the fastest growing areas of crime. (It's) going to make the old robbery and burglary a little passe with certain professionals," he said.

Hughes' bill, cosponsored by Reps. Bill McCollum, R-Fla [202/225-2176], and Bill Nelson, D-Fla [202/225-3671], creates three new offenses.

- 1. It forbids unauthorized access to a computer and drops a requirement that the government prove information in the computer was used or altered.
- 2. It outlaws "pirate bulletin boards" used by hackers to trade secret computer codes and passwords.
- 3. It makes it a felony punishable by up to five years in prison and a \$250,000 fine to maliciously cause damage in excess of \$1,000 to a computer program or data base.

That section of the bill would apply to so-called "Trojan Horse" programs which, when achieving access to another computer, destroy all the data and programs in that computer.

The legislation is intended to plug loopholes in anti-crime legislation passed by Congress in 1984, Hughes said. It applies to computers used by the federal government or its contractors and bank and loan association computers.

Hughes said he expected his bill and similar legislations sponsored by Sen. Paul S. Trible Jr., R-Va~[804/771-2221~or~202/224-4024], to reach the House and Senate floors sometime in May.

The following is a critical breakdown of the above article.

Blue Buccaneer:

Concerning this law: I always thought it would be more fun to hack for cash, but hey... Anyway, the three new offenses are what I am not to fond of:

- 1) "forbids unauthorized access to a computer" (Gosh, really?) "and drops a requirement that the government prove information in a computer was used or altered" Now what kinda law is that?! The government can just arrest someone and not have to prove anything? COME ON!
- 2) "It outlaws 'pirate BBSes'" When will these people learn the correct terminology? Pirates trade warezzzz, not 'secret passwords and codes'. The point is, that because this is a federal law, it will apply to all states. We aren't talking pussy-laws anymore. Wouldn't it be damn awful if just running the stupid BBS was a crime? Besides that, I thought we had a right to freedom of the press. Again, COME ON!
- 3) "and a \$250,000 fine to maliciously cause damage in excess of \$1000 to a computer program or data base". Excuse me for asking, but can one "maliciously" destroy data? And isn't a quarter of a million dollars a bit much for a teen-ager on a regular allowance? And that much for \$1000 damage? Shit, I wish my insurance company paid like that when I wreck my car. Once again, COME ON!

And then, I guess this is the journalist's fault, but what the hell does that paragraph on Trojan Horses have to do with this shit? I mean really! Do you think Joe Blow in the street is going to go: "Whew, for a minute there I was afraid that new bill might just skip over those Trojan Horse things." I'd kinda assume Trojan Horses were covered under the "maliciously" destroying data rule.

Above written by Blue Buccaneer

Computer Kids, Or Criminals?

Mr. Slippery, age 12, never thought playing on his home computer amounted to much more than harmless fun — until a mysterious call from a stranger one day proved otherwise. "I got a funny phone call from someone offering me money to destroy a bank's records," said Slippery, identified by his hacker alias. "At that point in time, I realized that that's an incredible way to launder money. That if I was real smart, I would move out of the whole thing, because that was an obvious point at organized crime, to me."

Hacking, or using a personal computer to trespass by phone lines into the private computer systems of corporations, foundations, universities and banks, is a new form of organized crime, say experts. In the last year or two, a new, sophisticated breed of hacker has emerged. Their ages vary, from the early hackers who started at 14, and have now entered college, to adults who operate computerized crime networks, but their motives are similar: criminal.

When Mr. Slippery started hacking seven years ago he as an exception among pimply faced, curious kids whose computers were toys for cheap, and typically harmless, thrills. For four years, he lived up to his alias, eventually penetrating top security government computers at the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Security Agency (NSA). Mr. Slippery remained undetected until his last several weeks as a hacker. He was never caught, never convicted. Toward the end, he realized government security agents were following him and decided to put away his phone modem for good.

"After about four years of this, though, I started realizing that an entirely new crowd had sprung up," observes Mr. Slippery, now a 19-year-old ex-hacker. "You now have the 14 year olds who were running around destroying things seeing how much trouble they could cause." Computer crime experts say the hacker problem is getting worse, even though industries are increasingly reluctant to discuss the topic. "The malicious hacker problem is continuing to increase drastically and is getting far more serious," said Donn B. Parker, author of

Fighting Computer Crime and a computer and data security consultant at SRI International, a California-based, non-profit research institute.

"The lowering costs of equipment, the attraction of it for new kids coming into it as a rite of passage, points to increasing vulnerability of American business to the hacker problem." Parker's expertise got him hired as a technical consultant to the movie War Games about two teen-age hackers who penetrate government defense computers. Where there is evidence of serious computer hacker crime is on electronic bulletin board systems (BBSes), where hackers share gathered intelligence. "Phone companies have huge investments in their equipment that is highly vulnerable to the hackers, who have figured out how to beat them, and have used pirate boards for their intelligence purposes, " said SRI International's Parker.

"A large proportion of these kids are, in fact, juvenile delinquents with other arrest records." Recently, a hacker posted this on a local BBS:

I live in Cleveland and the Pheds are fucking everywhere. This guy who goes by the alias Lou Zer got caught and they told him if he narced on like 5 people he would get off with probation so he did that. Now like half the 2300 club has been busted and this kid has a lot of problems in the future. Also I have seen cops that I know of dressed as fucking federal express guys. Try and avoid using them. Also, here's some PBXs to fuck with. They belong to Standard Oil.

--Later, Sir Gallahad

Other BBSs post lists of telephone numbers of Fortune 1000 corporations, banks, credit bureaus, universities, and foundations.

Admittedly, many of the numbers are invalid, say experts. Though there are BBSes that admit members only by invitation and operate as part of a computer underground, others can be accessed by anyone with a computer and a phone modem. Often the boards carry foreboding names like The Sanctuary, Future World, Dark Side, Deathtrap and Speed Demon Elite. Computer crime is sometimes called the perfect crime. Its perpetrators are anonymous hackers using aliases like Phantom Phreaker, Big Brother, Bootleg, Sigmund Fraud, and Scan Man.

John Maxfield is a computer security consultant who lives in a downriver suburb. Maxfield spends most of his working hours scanning BBSs, and is known by computer crime experts as a hacker tracker. His investigative work scanning boards has resulted in more prosecutions of computer hackers than anyone else in the field, say sources familiar with his work. Maxfield, who accepts death threats and other scare tactics as part of the job, says the trick is knowing the enemy. Next to his monstrous, homemade computer system, Maxfield boasts the only file on computer hackers that exists. It contains several thousand aliases used by hackers, many followed by their real names and home phone numbers. All of it is the result of four years of steady hacker-tracking, says Maxfield. "I've achieved what most hackers would dearly love to achieve," said Maxfield. "Hacking the hacker is the ultimate hack."

Maxfield estimates there are currently 50,000 hackers operating in the computer underground and close to 1,000 underground bulletin boards. Of these, he estimates about 200 bulletin boards are "nasty," posting credit card numbers, phone numbers of Fortune 500 corporations, regional phone companies, banks, and even authored tutorials on how to make bombs and explosives. One growing camp of serious hackers is college students, who typically started hacking at 14 and are now into drug trafficking, mainly LSD and cocaine, said Maxfield. This is an example of a recent BBS posting:

WANTED: LSD, of any kind. Leave me mail if you're willing to talk prices, I'll take anything up to \$5 a hit. \$3 is more likely.

--urlord

The BBSs are versatile teaching tools, too. Hackers post detailed tutorials on:

HACKING: Using a personal computer and modem to trespass into the private computer systems of corporations, foundations, universities, and banks.

CARDING: Using valid credit card numbers obtained from discarded carbons, accounts posted at video rental stores, or even by hacking credit

bureau computers.

TRASHING: Sifting through trash to find discarded credit card carbons, receipts, computer passwords, code words, confidential phone company

PHREAKING or FONING: Manipulating phone systems, usually to make long-distance calls at no charge.

Below is an excerpt from a four-part tutorial on credit card fraud posted on an exclusive East Coast BBS for elite advanced hackers:

Carding! By Music Major. Believe it or not, without carding, a damper would be put on the computer users of America (and especially Canada). Can you imagine trying to save enough money to BUY a 2400 baud modem and a 30 meg drive for a BBS? Oh, of course it can be done, but considering that a majority of the active computer users are still in school, and most do not have a steady job, it will take too long, and cost too much for this average person to spend on a BBS. Working at minimum wage at a part-time job, it would take 30 weeks of CONSTANT saving to put up the BBS (with good modem and good drive). Not a pretty thought! When the going gets tough, the tough go carding!

Music Major goes into more detail on later, he warns younger hackers about the possible risks of trying a method he claims he invented: "I have called this method foning for cards. To be convincing, you MUST have a fluent tongue and a semi-deep voice (skip this part if your voice is still cracking--refer back when you get a real voice)."

Maxfield's operation is called BoardScan. He is paid by major corporations and institutions to gather and provide them with pertinent intelligence about the computer underground. Maxfield also relies on reformed hackers. Letters of thanks from VISA and McDonald's decorate a wall in his office along with an autographed photo of Scottie, the engineer on Star Trek's Starship Enterprise.

Often he contacts potential clients about business. "More often I call them and say, I've detected a hacker in your system," said Maxfield. "At that point, they're firmly entrenched. Once the hackers get into your computer, you're in trouble. It's analogous to having roaches or mice in the walls of your house. They don't make their presence known at first. But one day you open the refrigerator door and a handful of roaches drop out."

Prior to tracking hackers, Maxfield worked for 20-odd years in the hardware end of the business, installing and repairing computers and phone systems. When the FBI recruited him a few years back to work undercover as a hacker and phone phreak, Maxfield concluded fighting hacker crime must be his mission in life.

"So I became the hacker I was always afraid I would become," he said. Maxfield believes the hacker problem is growing more serious. He estimates there were just 400 to 500 hackers in 1982. Every two years, he says, the numbers increase by a factor of 10. Another worrisome trend to emerge recently is the presence of adult computer hackers. Some adults in the computer underground pose as Fagans, a character from a Charles Dickens novel who ran a crime ring of young boys, luring young hackers to their underground crime rings.

> Courtesy of Galaxy Girl and Silicon Thief Major Editing by Knight Lightning Written by Lisa Olson (News Staff Writer for Detroit News)

A few notes: It is my assumption that Music Major's Carding Tutorial was from KL actually four posts made on the Carding Subboard on Stronghold East. If this is true then it would mean that at the time or previous to the time of this article Maxfield was on SE. This post was probably taken in before the MASSIVE user purge on Stronghold East.

CONNECTED NODES AS OF 10/05/88 TOTAL NODES = 2491

е	Site	System
CRC		OS CP6
ACDC		
AMULT		
		VMS
TS11	Aarhus Tek Skole (ATS)	IBM VM/SP R4
AU11	Aarhus Tekniske Skole, Denmark	IBM VM/SP R4
AUCHE	Aarhus Univ	VMS
VAX	Abilene Christian Univ	VMS
ABO	Abo Akademi	DEC VMS 4 3
DIA	Acadia U	NOS
AGIP1	AGIP S p.A.	IBM MVS/XA V 2 1.5
ION	Albion College	VMS
ANKTN	Alcan Int Ltd KRDC	VMS
ALKO	Alko Research Lab , Finland	IBM MVS/XA
EGVM	Allegheny Col	VM/SP
JAB51	Altes Energies-U A. Barcelona	DEC VMS
EDOFF	American Physical Soc	UNIX BSD
1	American University	VM/SP HPO
[2	American University	VM/SP
RST	Amherst College Acad Comp Ctr	VMS
AVM1	Anadolu Univ	VM/SP R 5
AVM2	Anadolu University, Eskisehir	IBM VM/SP R5
NRES	Annenberg Res Instit	UNIX
TATE	Appalachian State U	VMS
MT	Argonne Chemical Tech Div	VMS
HM	Argonne Chemistry Division	VMS
EP	Argonne High Energy Physics Div	VMS
ST	Argonne Materials Sci and Tech	VMS
BI	Argonne Nat Lab Admin NBI	UNIX BSD
DM1	Argonne Nat Lab Admin NBI 1	OASYS
DM2	Argonne Nat Lab Admin NBI 2	OASYS
ES1	Argonne Nat Lab EES NBI	OASYS
BI2	Argonne Nat Lab EES NBI	UNIX BSD
ES2 ES3	Argonne Nat Lab EES NBI	OASYS
	Argonne Nat Lab Elea Div	OASYS
L ES	Argonne Nat Lab Ener (Environ	VMS VMS
ESC	Argonne Nat Lab Ener & Environ Argonne National Energy Sfw Ctr	VM/SP
		MVS/SP
S M	Argonne National Lab Argonne National Lab	WVS/SP VM/SP
MS	Argonne National Lab	VM/ SF VMS
v15 V1	Argonne National Lab Cluster VAX	VMS VMS
/ I //C	Argonne National Lab Electron Mic Ctr	VMS VMS
7C 3	Argonne National Lab VAX Gateway	VMS
ΗY	Argonne Physics Division	VMS
NS	Argonne Pulsed Neutron Src Proj	VMS
	Arizona St U Info Ctr	VM/SP
21	Arizona State - U Chem/Phys/Solid State	• =
CAD	Arizona State U	VM/SP
RC	Arizona State U Eng Comp Ctr	VM/HPO
P2	Arizona State U Lib Arts & Sci Res Cmpt 1	
CVAX	Arizona State Univ Acad VAX	VMS
AP31	Assistance Publique	IBM MVS/SP
M	Assoc Computing Machinery	VM/SP
CVAX	Auburn Univ	VMS
N	Austria EARN	VM/SP
ON	Babson Coll	VMS
AX1	Ball State Univ	VMS
LAN	Bar Ilan U Comp Ctr	IBM MVS/SP 1 3.5
LVM	Bar Ilan Univ CC	IBM VM/SP R4
		•

VM/SP VMS

GEN CERN IBM MVS
CRVXP173 CERN P173 Exp
CRUXNMC CERN P173 Experiment DEC VMS
CRUXNMCE CERN P173, Geneva, Switzerland DEC VMS
CRUXNMCD CERN P173, Geneva, Switzerland DEC VMS
CRUXNHD CERN P173, Geneva, Switzerland DEC VMS
CRUXNHD CERN P173, Geneva, Switzerland DEC VMS

./12.txt	Tue Oct 05 05:46:41 2021 9	
CMR001	College militaire royal	CP-6
CODVM1	College of DuPage Comp. Srvs	VM/SP
HLYCRSS1	College of the Holy Cross	VM/SP
HLYCROSS	College of the Holy Cross	VMS
MINES	Colorado Sch Mines	VMS
CSUGREEN	Colorado State U	
CSUGOLD CSU205	Colorado State U Colorado State U	VSOS 2.3
COLOSTAT		V505 2:5
CUCCVX	Columbia U Admin Dept	VMS
CUGSBVAX	Columbia U Bus Sch Futures Ctr	VMS
CUCHEM	Columbia U Chemistry Dept	VMS
CUCHMB	Columbia U Chemistry Dept	VMS
CUCEVX	Columbia U Civil Eng.	VMS
CUCCA	Columbia U Cluster Ctrl A	UNIX BSD
CUCSVM	Columbia U Comp Sci	VM/SP
CUNIXC	Columbia U Ctr Cmptng. Act.	ULTRIX
CUVMC CUVMA	Columbia U Ctr for Comp Activities Columbia U Ctr for Comp Activities	VM/SP VM/SP
CUVMB	Columbia U Ctr for Comp Activities	VM/SP
CUMIN	Columbia U Ctr for Comptng Act	VMS
CUGSBVM	Columbia U Grad Sch Business	VM/SP
CUCCFA	Columbia U Health Sciences	VMS
CUHSDA	Columbia U Health Sciences	VMS
CUMBG	Columbia U Molecular Biophy. Graph	VMS
CUORCA	Columbia U Orthopaedic Res Clust A	VMS
CUORMB	Columbia U Orthopaedic Res Clust A	VMS
CUORMA	Columbia U Orthopaedic Res Micro A	VMS
CUPHYD	Columbia U Physics Dept	VMS
CUSB CUTCV1	Columbia U Stony Brook Exp - CESR Columbia U Teachers Coll	VMS VMS
CUTHRY	Columbia U Theoretical Phys	VMS
CUCISA	Columbia Univ Ctr for Clinical Res	VMS
UTKVX	Computing Center	VMS
CONU1	Concordia U Computing Ctr	NOS
CONU2	Concordia U Computing Ctr	VMS
	Connecticut Coll	ULTRIX
CTSTATEU	Connecticut State Univ Sys	VMS
IRMCNR DKCBS01	Consig Naz Richerche - Roma Copenhagen Business School, DK	IBM VM/SP R3 PRIMOS
DKTC11	Copenhagen Technical College	IBM VM/SP
CRNLION	Cornell Lab of Plasma Stud	ULTRIX
CORNELLA	Cornell U Computer Services	VM/SP/HPO
CORNELLC	Cornell U Computer Services	VM/SP/HPO
CRNLASTR	Cornell U Dept of Astronomy	VMS
CRNLCS	Cornell U Dept of Computer Science	UNIX BSD
CRNLGSM	Cornell U Grad Sch of Mgmt	VMS
CRNLNS	Cornell U Lab of Nuclear Studies	VMS
CRNLIMAP CUMC	Cornell U Mech Eng Cornell U Medical College	VM/SP VM/SP
CORNELLF	Cornell U Production Supercomp Facil	VM/XA/SF
CORNELLD	Cornell U Supercomputer Facil	VM/SP/HPO
CRNLCAM	Cornell Univ CAM	UNIX BSD
CRNLVAX2	Cornell Univ Comp Servs	UNIX BSD
CRNLVAX3	Cornell Univ Comp Servs	ULTRIX
CRNLVAX4	Cornell Univ Comp Servs	ULTRIX
CRNLVAX1	Cornell Univ Comp Srvs	UNIX BSD
CRNLVAX5	Cornell Univ Comp Svcs	VMS MVS/SP
CRNLMVS CRNLDEV	Cornell Univ Computer Srvs Cornell Univ Ctr Theory & Simul in Sci &	-
CRNLCHES	Cornell Univ HESS	VMS
CRNLASSP	Cornell Univ LASSP	UNIX BSD
CRNLNUC	Cornell Univ LNS	SUNOS UNIX
CRNLMSC2	Cornell Univ Materials Sci Ctr	CONVEX UNIX
CRNLMSC3	Cornell Univ Materials Sci Ctr	CONVEX UNIX
CRNLEE	Cornell Univ Sch Elec Eng	UNIX BSD
CRNLTHRY	Cornell Univ Theory Ctr.	UTX/32
FRIHRO21	CRIH de Haute Normandie	MVS
FRIHVG11	CRIH de Villeneuve St. George	VM/SP
FRCRN51	CRN - DIHE, France	DEC VMS

DAL Dalhousie U Comp Cntr
DALAC Dalhousie University UCIS
DALADM Dalhousie University UCIS
DKDHI11 Danish Hydraulic Inst
DKSFI11 Danish Ntl Inst Social Res
DARTCMS1 Dartmouth College Kiewit CC - CMS1
DAVIDSON Davidson Coll
DEPAUL De Paul Univ
DEPAULO De Paul Univ VMS MVS/SP IBM VM/SP IBM VM/SP R3 VM/SP

Node

Jun Demo Node

Junposium Junpos Node

Junposium Junposium Junpos Node

Junposium Jun DEPAULO De Paul Univ
DECUSA DECUS Symposium Demo Node
DECUSB DECUS Symposium Demo Node
DECUSC DECUS Symposium Demo Node

VMS VMS

VMS UNIX VM/SP

DHHDESY3 DESY MVS/SP
DFVLROP1 Deutsche FVLR Oberpfaffenhofen IBM VM/SP HPO
DHDDKFZ1 Deutsches Krebsforschungszentr IBM VM/SP HPO R4 2
DFNGATE DFN Gateway at GMD DA, Germany IBM VM/SP R4
DFVLRBS1 DFVLR Braunschweig IBM VM/SP HPO
DFVLRGO1 DFVLR Goettingen IBM VM/SP HPO
DFVLRKP1 DFVLR Koeln-Porz IBM VM/SP HPO
DFVLRLA1 DFVLR Lampoldshausen, Germany IBM VM/IS

EMUVM1 Emory U Comp Ctr - VM1 EMUVM2 Emory U Comp Ctr - VM1
EMORYU1 Emory U Comp Ctr UNIX1
EMORY UNIX BSD EMORY Emory U Math and CS
EMRYCC Emory Univ Comp Ctr VMS VAX BERKELEY UNIX VMS

VMS

VM/SP

DHDEMBL EMBL Heidelberg, Germany

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EMORYU2	Emory Univ Comptng Ctr	UNIX
EMRCAN	1 2	VMS
HPEENR51	ENR, Petten, Netherlands	VAX VMS
HROEUR5		VMS 4
ESOC	ESA ESOC, Darmstadt, Germany	IBM VM/SP HPO R5 0
	ESA Europ Space Res Tech Ctr	VM/SP 4 2
IFRESA10	- , - <u>-</u>	IBM VM/SP R4
FRESA10 DGAESO51	- ,	IBM VM/SP R3 1 VMS
ESASTSP		VM/SP HPO4 2
	ESTP, Paris, France	VM/SP
	ETH und Uni Zuerich IBT	IBM VM/SP HPO 5 0
CZHETH1B	ETH Zuerich Bibliotek	IBM VM/SP HPO 5 0
CZHETH1C	ETH Zuerich IKB	IBM VM/SP HPO 5 0
CZHETH1A		IBM VM/SP HPO 4 2
ROSEDALE		VMS
DHDEMBL5	1	VMS
ITSOGS ERENJ	Exp. Geophys. Observ. Trieste Exxon Res & Eng Co	IBM VM/SP R4 VM/SP
EREVAX	_	VM/ SP VMS
	F.U.P.L. de Lille, France	IBM VM/SP R4
	Fac. Econ e Comm Firenze	IBM VM/SP R5
DAAFHT1	Fachhochschule Aalen Fachhochschule Heilbronn	VM/SP
		IBM VM/SP R3
	Fachhochschule Karlsruhe	IBM VM/SP R4
	Fachhochschule Technik Mannheim	IBM VM/SP R4 0
	Fachhochschule Wiesbaden	IBM VM/SP R3
	Facultes U Notre Dame de la Paix Namur Be Facultes U Notre Dame Namur	IVM/SP R5 VM/SP R5
IRMFA000		IBM VM/SP R4 2
	FAW Ulm, Germany	VM/SP R4 5
	FBD - Schulen Gemein GMBH	IBM VM/SP R3
FDACFSAN		VM/SP
FNALA	Fermi Natl Accelerator Lab	VMS
FNALDBG	FERMI Natl Accelerator Lab Fermilab	VMS
FNAL FNALB	Fermilab	VMS
FNALB FNALBSN		VMS VMS
FNALBSN FNALB0	Fermilab	VMS VMS
FNALC	Fermilab	VMS
FNALCDF	Fermilab	VMS
FNALNET	Fermilab	VMS
FNALVM	Fermilab	VM/SP
FNMFE	Fermilab	VMS
FNALG	Fermilab	VMS
FNALJ	Fermilab Fermilab	VMS
FNALF FNALE	Fermilab Fermilab	VMS VMS
FNALMDTF		VMS
FNAL01	Fermilab	VMS
FNAL03	Fermilab	VMS
FNAL05	Fermilab	VMS
FNAL17	Fermilab	VMS
FNAL26	Fermilab	VMS
FNAL27	Fermilab Fermilab	VMS
FNACP FNBIT	Fermilab	VMS VMS
FNALH	Fermilab	VMS
FNALI	Fermilab	VMS
FNALK	Fermilab	VMS
FNCCF	Fermilab	VM
FNALAD	FERMILAB Ntl Lab	VMS
DHAFEU51		VMS
DHAFEU61	Fern-Uni Hagen (Informatik)	UNIX BSD
DHAFEU11 DHAFEU52	Fernuniversitaet Hagen Feruniversitaet Hagen	IBM VM/SP R4 DEC VMS 4 7
FINFUN	Finnish S Comp Ctr Espoo	DEC VMS 4 7 DEC VMS 4 1
TRFIRAT	Firat Univ	VM/SP R 3
FSUSFS	Fl St U Spr-comp Frnt-end Sys	NOS
FSURAI	FL State U Rsrch Instrtnl Sys	NOS

VMS VMS

Hampshire College

BATATA Hebrew U Molecular Ctr

HUJIPRMA Hebrew U Mount Scopus Comp Ctr HUJIPRMB Hebrew U Mount Scopus Comp Ctr HUJIVM1 Hebrew University FINGATE Helsinki U Tech

FINHUTA Helsinki U Tech

IBM VM/SP R4

FINHUT Helsinki Univ of Tech
FINHUTCS Helsinki University of Techn
FINHUTEE Helsinki University of Techn
FINHUTIT Helsinki University of Techn
UNIX 4 3 BSD
FINHUTIT Helsinki University of Techn
UNIX 4 3 BSD
JPNHIROA Hiroshima Univ
UM/HPO
DDATHD21 Hoch TH Darmstadt
DDOHRZ11 Hoch U Dortmund
DHDIHEP5 Hochenergiephysik

IBM VM/SP R3

UNIX BSD 4 2

UNIX BSD 4 2 PRIMOS PRIMOS VM/CMS UNIX

IBM VM/SP R4

IBT DKTBT SELIUI51 IDA Linkoping, Sweden SELIUIDA IDA Linkoping, Sweden

BBRIBM11 IEC, La Hulpe, Belgium AWIIEZ11 IEZ Numerischer Rechner, Wien IBM VM/SP R4
DHVIFW1 IFW, Univ Hannover, Germany IBM VM/SP R5
IITVAX Illinois Inst Tech/ACC VMS

FRINA11 INA-PG

INDST Indiana State Univ
IUBACS Indiana U Bloomington ACS
IUP Indiana U of Penn
IUBVM Indiana Univ Bloomington VM
IUCF Indiana Univ Cyclotron Facil
IUBUS Indiana Univ Sch of Business
INSTEPS Indiana Univ Stwde Teah Elec Prod Sys

INDYVAX Indiana/Purdue U INDYCMS Indiana/Purdue U IUIS Indiana/Purdue U
FRINED51 INED INDYMED Indiana/Purdue U

IRMEMU INFN - EMU, Roma, Italy IPIVAXIN INFN - Pisa IPIINFN INFN Pisa

DEC MICROVMS

DEC VMS V4 5

IBM VM/SP R3 IBM VM/SP R4

VM/SP DEC VMS IBM VM/IS VER 1 5 DEC VMS DEC VMS

VM/SP HPO R4 2

IBM VM/IS VM/SP VMS

HONEYWELL CP-6 C00 VM/XA SF RELEASE 2

VM/SP VM/SP VMS VM/SP VM/SP MVS/XA DEC VMS

IBM VM/SP R4 DEC VMS IBM VM/SP R4

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IRMLNF	INFN/LNF	DEC VMS 4 4
ITIVAX	Information Technology Inst	VMS
ILNPL	INPL, Israel	DEC VMS
FRINRA11	INRA - CTIG	IBM VM/SP R4
FRINRA72 FRIRTS71	INRA - CTIS INRETS	BULL MULTICS BULL MULTICS
FREIBA51	INSEAD	DEC VMS
FRCCRM51	INSERM, Villejuif, France	DEC VMS
FRIAP51	Inst d'Astrophysique Paris	VMS
PTIFM	Inst de Fisica e Matematica	DEC VMS
IMISIAM	Inst Fisica Cosmica Milano	VM/SP
IASSNS IASSUN	Inst for Advan Study Inst for Advan Study	VMS UNIX BSD
DBNMEB1	Inst fuer Med Statistik / Med Einrichtung	
AWIIMC11	Inst Med Computwiss Uni Wien	IBM VM/SP HPO R4 2
IRMISS	Instit Superiore di Sanita	VM/SP
EBRIEC01	Institut d'Estudis Catalans	38 CPF
DHDIHEP1 FRILL51	Institut fuer Hochenergiephysi Institut Laue-Langevin	IBM VM/SP R4 VMS
FRPSTR01	Institut Pasteur	AOS/VS
FRINT51		VMS
FRCPN11	IN2P3 Ctr de Calcul	VM/SP
IONAACAD	Iona College Comp Ctr	VM/SP
IONA	Iona College Music Sys	VM/SP VMS
ALISUVAX ISUMVS	Iowa S U Ames Lab Dept Energy Iowa State U Comp Ctr	MVS/SP
ISUCARD	Iowa State U Ctr. Agricul. & Rural Dev	VM/SP
ISUEVAX	Iowa State U Eng. VAX Cluster	VMS
ISUVAX	Iowa State VAX Cluster	VMS
DMZNAT51	IPH KCH KPH Uni Mainz, Germany	DEC VMS 4 6
DGAIPP5N IRIS	IPP (MPI f. Plasmaphysik) IRIS	VMS UNIX
IRUCCVAX	IRUCCVAX	VMS
FRISIO11	ISIO - MIAGE	VM/IS
IRMISRDS	ISRDS CNR Roma, Italy	IBM VM/SP R5
TRIUVM11		IBM VM/SP R3
ITHACA ICUNIX	Ithaca College Ithaca College	VMS ULTRIX
FRIUTO11	IUT Orsay	IBM VM
JAXLAB	Jackson Lab	UNIX BSD
JMUVAX1	James Madison Univ VAX1	VMS
JPNJAERI	Japan Atomic Energy Res Inst	VM/SP
JCSVAX1 ILJCT	Jersey City St Co Jerusalem Col Tech	VMS DEC VMS
JHUNIX	JHU HCF	UNIX
JHUVM	JHU HCF	VM/SP
JHUVMS	JHU HCF	VMS
JHHMVS	JHU HCF	MVS/XA
JHHVM JHUHYG2	JHU Hosp Info Sys Dept JHU School of Public Health	VM/SP ULTRIX
JNETDEMO	JNETDEMO, RAI, Netherlands	VMS 4 6
ALIJKU21	Johannes Kepler U Linz	IBM MVS/SP 1 3.8
JCUVAX	John Carroll Univ	VMS
JCVAXA	John Carroll Univ	VMS
JVNCC JVNCD	John Von Neumann Ctr John Von Neumann Ctr	VMS VMS
JVNC	John Von Neumann Ctr	VMS
JHUHYG	Johns Hopkins U	VM/SP
JHUP	Johns Hopkins U High En Phys	VMS
JHUIGF	Johns Hopkins Univ - IGF	VMS
APLVM JILA	Johns Hopkins Univ App Phys Lab Joint Inst for Lab Astrophysics	VM/SP VMS
FINJYU	Jyvaskyla Univ , Finland	DEC VMS 4 4
JPNKIT	Kanazawa Inst. of Tech.	VM/SP
KSUVAX1	Kansas St U Comp Sci Dept	UNIX BSD
KSUVM	Kansas State U CC	VM/SP
HRDKSW5	Kapteijn Sterrenwacht Roden Kath U Leuven	VMS 4 3 VM/SP R4
	Kath Univ Leuven	UNIX
BLEKUL21		MVS/XA 2 2.0

MCO Medical College of Ohio MEDCOLWI Medical College of Wisconsin

VMS VM/SP VM/SP

MUN Memorial U. of NF
MERIT Merit Comp Net
MIAMIU Miami U Academic Comp Service

```
NAS
             Nat'l Acad of Sci PC/Netwrk
                                                                           PC DOS
             Nat'l Acad of Sci VM/SP
NASVM
                                                                           VM/SP
TWNCTUCS Nat'l Chiao-Tung Univ
NCARIO Nat'l Ctr for Atmosph Res
                                                                           VM/SP HPO
            Nat'l Instit of Environ Health Sci
NIEHSC Nat'l Instit of Environ Health Sci
NIEHSD Nat'l Instit of Environ Health Sci
NRAO Nat'l Radio Astronomy Observ.
TWNCTU01 National Chia-Tung Univ
                                                                          VMS
NIHCUDEC National Institutes of Health (DEC-10) TOPS-10
NIHCU National Institutes of Health (IBM 370) MVS/XA
NIHCULSU National Institutes of Health (LSU)
NIHCUSV1 National Institutes of Health (Server 1) VM/SP
NIHCUTST National Institutes of Health (Test/Dev) MVS/XA
NIHDCRT National Institutes of Health DCRT
                                                                           3PLUS
NIHKLMB National Institutes of Health, NIDDK/LMB VMS
 TSSNRC00 National Res Council
                                                                            TSS/370
NRCNET National Research Council
                                                                            VAX/VMS
NRCCAD National Research Council
MVSNRC00 National Research Council
ICNUCEVM National U Comp Ctr - Pisa
ICNUCEVS National U Comp Ctr - Pisa
NUSVM National Univ of Singapore
NUSEEV National Univ of Singapore
NUSDISCS National Univ of Singapore
NUS3090 National Univ of Singapore
NUS3090 National Univ of Singapore
NRCCAD
              National Research Council
                                                                            VAX/VMS
                                                                           MVS/XA
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                           IBM MVS
                                                                      IBM MVS
VM HPO 4.2
                                                                          VMS
                                                                          VMS
                                                                        VM HPO 4.2
ILNCRD Natl Cncl Res Dev MSD
ILNITE Natl Inst for Test and Eval
NRCVM01 Natl Res Cncl Canada Comp Ctr
                                                                          DEC VMS
                                                                          DEC VMS
                                                                          VM/SP
NAVPGS Naval Postgrad Sch
GUNBRF NBRF/ Georgetown Univ Med Ctr
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                          VMS
CMEAMRF NBS Adv. Mfg. Res Fac.
                                                                          VMS
NBS NBS Consolidated Scie Comp Sys
NBSENH NBS Ex. Networks Host
                                                                          NOS
NBSENH NBS Ex. Networks Host
NBSMICF NBS Mgmt. Info. Comp. Fac.
MSMFVM NBS Molecular Structure Model Fac
                                                                          VMS
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                           VM
NCSUPHYS NC State Univ
                                                                           VMS
NCSUMAEV NCSI Mech & Aerospace Eng
                                                                           VMS
NCSUMAE NCSU Mech & Aerospace Eng
NCSUMAE NCSU Mech & Aerospace Eng
NCSUCE NCSU Civil Eng
NCSUVAX NCSU Computing Center
NCSUVM NCSU Computing Center
NCSUECE NCSU Elec & Comp Eng
NCSUIE NCSU Industrial Eng
NCSUMTE NCSU Materials Eng
NDSUVM1 ND Higher Ed Computer Net
NDSUVAX ND Higher Ed Computer Net
NEWIS Nevis Lab, Columbia U
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VM/SP4
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                           UNIX
NEVIS Nevis Lab, Columbia U

NJECNVM New Jersey Edu Computer Net

NJECNVS New Jersey Edu Computer Net

NJECNVM1 New Jersey Edu Computer Net
NEVIS Nevis Lab, Columbia U
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                    MVS/SP
                                                                          VM/SP
NJECNVM2 New Jersey Edu Computer Net
                                                                          VM/XA
ORION New Jersey Inst of Tech Conf Ctr
MERCURY New Jersey Inst of Tech Conf Ctr
NMSIMVS1 New Mexico St II Comp Ctr
NMSUMVS1 New Mexico St U Comp Ctr
NMSU New Mexico St U Comp Ctr
NYSPI New York Psych Inst
NYUACF New York U Academic Comp
NYUACF7 New York II Academic
                                                                           SUNOS
                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                           VMS
                                                                           VMS
NYUACF1 New York U Academic Comp
                                                                           VMS
NYUACF6 New York U Academic Comp
NYUCIMSA New York U CIMS
                                                                            VMS
                                                                            VM/SP
NYUCCVM New York U Comp Ctr
                                                                            VM/SP
NYUCMCL1 New York U Courant Math & Comp. Lab
NYUMED New York U Med Ctr
DKNBI51 Niels Bohr Institute, Denmark
JPNNIHOC Nihon U Col of Commerce
UMDNJPW1 NJ Univ Med & Dent
UMDNJVM2 NJ Univ of Med & Dent
                                                                           DEC VMS 4 6
                                                                            VM/SP
                                                                            VSE/SP
                                                                            VM/SP
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MVS/SP

VM/SP

CDC NOS 2 4

VMS

BIOVAX Rutgers Univ Molecular Bio Comp Lab DACTH01 RWTH Aachen, Germany

ZODIAC Rutgers Univ CCIS Vax Clust
RUTVM1 Rutgers Univ CCIS VM1
BIOVAX Rutgers Univ Molecular Bio Comp Lab

CANCER Rutgers Univ CCIS VAX

.,		
RYERSON	Ryerson	VM/SP
DWUUNI21	RZ Uni Wuerzburg, Germany	IBM MVS 3 8
YUBGSS21		IBM MVS/SP 1 3.8
SERVAX		VMS
-		
SER	S Reg Data Ctr Tamiami Campus	OS 1100
SLUVCA	Saint Louis Univ	VMS
SALK	Salk Instit	VMS
SHSUTHOR	Sam Houston State Univ	VMS
SHSU		VMS
	Sam Houston State Univ	VMS
SAMFORD		VM/SP
SDSC	San Diego Supercomputer Ctr	VMS
SCU	Santa Clara Univ	VMS
HASARA11		VM/SP R4
JPNSUT50	·	VM/SP
		•
JPNSUT00	Science U of Tokyo	VM/SP
JPNSUT40	Science U of Tokyo	VM/SP
JPNSUT31	Science U of Tokyo Noda	VMS
JPNSUT10	Science U Tokyo - Japan	VM/SP
JPNSUT20	Science U Tokyo - Japan Kagurazaka	VM/SP
JPNSUT30	Calaras II Talasa Taran Nada	
	Science U Tokyo - Japan, Noda	VM/SP
JPNSUT3A		MUSIC
JPNSUT01	Science Univ of Tokyo	VM/SP
JPNICEPP	Science Univ of Tokyo ICEPP	VM/SP
BMLSCK11		VM/SP R4
IPISNSVA		DEC VMS 4 3
IPISNSIB	±	VM/SP
SENECA	Seneca College	VMS
KRSNUCC1	Seoul Nat'l Univ CC	VM/HPO
SETONVM	Seton Hall U CC	VM/SP
SETONMUS	Seton Hall Univ CC	VM/SP
		•
JPNSNU10	Setsunan Univ	VM/SP
JPNSNU20	Setsunan Univ	VM/SP
SHERCOL1	Sheridan College	VMS
JPNSWU10	Showa Women's Univ	VM/SP
IMISIAM3	SIAM IFC, Milano, Italy	IBM VM/SP HPO 4 0
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IMISIAM2	SIAM IFC, Milano, Italy	IBM VM/SP HPO 4 0
SFU	Simon Fraser U Comp Svcs	MTS
SFUVM	Simon Fraser U Comp Svcs	VM/SP
ITSSISSA	SISSA, Trieste, Italy	UNIX UTX
SKIDMORE	Skidmore College	VMS
SLACASP	SLAC ASP Experiment	VMS
	-	
SLACVM	SLAC Computer Center	VM/SP
SLACESA	SLAC End Station A	VMS
SLACHRS	SLAC High Res Spectrometer	VMS
SLACMAC	SLAC Magnetic Calorimeter	VMS
SLACMKII	SLAC Mark-II Detector	VMS
SLACM2	SLAC Mark-II Detector	VMS
SLACMK3	SLAC Mark-III Detector Exp	VMS
SLACPCR	SLAC PCR	VMS
SLACSLC	SLAC SLC	VMS
SLACSLD	SLAC SLD Detector	VMS
SLACTBF	SLAC TBF	VMS
SLACTWGM	<u> </u>	VMS
SLACUCSD	SLAC TCP/2-Gamma Expt (UCSD)	VMS
SLACTPCS	SLAC TPC/Two-Gamma Experiment	VMS
SLACPHYS	SLAC TPC/Two-Gamma Experiment	VMS
SMITH	Smith College	VMS
SIVM	Smithsonian Instit	VM/SP
TWNSCU10	Soochow Univ	VM/SP
SDSUVM	South Dakota State Univ	VM/HPO SP
SEMASSU	Southeastern Mass Univ	VMS
SIUCVMB	Southern Illinois U - Carbondale	VM/SP
	Southern Illinois Univ Edwardsvl	VM/SP VM/SP
SIUEVM		
SMUVM1	Southern Methodist U ACC	VM/SP
SMSVMA	Southwest Missouri State Univ	VM/SP
SMSVMB	Southwest Missouri State Univ	VM/SP
SMSVAXA	Southwest Missouri State Univ	VMS
SWTEXAS	Southwest Texas State Univ	
		VMS
SWTNYSSA	Southwest Texas State Univ	VMS

VMS

Texas A&M U Learning Tech Ctr

TAMMEACA Texas A&M U ME/CAD

VMS

VMS

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TAMVXRSC	Texas A&M U MML	VMS
TAMVXOCN	Texas A&M U Oceanography Dept	VMS
TAMPHYS TAMCOMP	Texas A&M U Physics Dept Texas A&M Univ Cyclotron Inst	VMS VMS
TAMSIGMA	Texas A&M Univ ECS	VMS
TAMLMSB	Texas A&M Univ LMSB	VMS
TAMTURBO	Texas A&M Univ TURBO	VMS
TCUAVM TCUAMUS	Texas Christian Univ Texas Christian Univ	VM/SP MUSIC/SP
TCUAVMS	Texas Christian Univ	VMS
TCUBVM	Texas Christian Univ	VM/SP
TTACS1	Texas Tech U Acad Comp Srvs	VMS
TTACS2 TTUVM1	Texas Tech U Acad Comp Srvs Texas Tech U Comp Facil	VMS VM/SP
TTUHSCVM		VM/HPO
DTUPEV5A	Th Astrophysik Univ Tuebingen	DEC VMS 4 3
HDETUD1 JPNTOHOK	TH Delft, Netherlands Tohoku Univ	VM/SP VM/SP
JPNTHKVX	Tohoku Univ	VMS
JPNTIU01	Tokyo Intern'tl Univ	VM/SP
JPNTKUVM	Tokyo Keizai U	VM/SP
TOWSONVX TOWSON1	Towson State Univ Towson State Univ	VMS VMS
TOWSON2	Towson State Univ	VMS
TRANSY	Transylvania Univ	MUSIC/SP
TRENT	Trent University	VMS
TSCVM TUCC	Trenton State Co Triangle U Comp Ctr	VM/SP MVS/SP
TUCCVM	Triangle U Comp Ctr	VM/SP
TUNL	Triangle Univ. Nuclear Lab	VMS
TRINCC TRINCC2	Trinity College Trinity College	VMS VMS
TRINITY	Trinity Univ Computing Ctr	VM/SP
TRIUMFCL	TRIUMF Research	VMS 4 5
TRIUMFRG	TRIUMF Research	VMS 4 5
TRIUMFER DB0TUI0	TRIUMF Research - ERICH TU Berlin	VMS 4 5 XEXOX
DB0PTZ1A	TU Berlin	VM/SP
	TU Berlin Informatik SWT	UNIX 4 3 BSD
DBSTU1 DBSNRV0	TU Braunschweig, RZ, Germany TU Braynscgweug, NRV-Gateway	IBM VM/SP R4 SSI XOS
DCZTU1	TU Clausthal	VM/SP
HDETUD53	TU Delft	VMS 4 5
HDETUD52 HDETUD51	TU Delft TU Delft	VMS 4 4
HEITHE5	TU Eindhoven CC, Netherlands	VMS V4 4 VMS 4 5
HEITUE51	TU Eindhoven CC, Netherlands	VMS 4 5
HEITUE1	TU Eindhoven CC, Netherlands	VM/SP
HEIIPO5 DGATUM5P	TU Eindhoven IPO, Netherlands TU Muenchen Physik	VMS 4 5 VMS
DB0TUI66	TUB Informatik ISTI	UNIX 4 2 BSD
TUFTS	Tufts U	VMS
TULIPS TCSVM	Tufts Univ Tulane U Comp Svcs - VM	VMS VM/SP
TCSMUSA	Tulane U Comp Svcs Music A	MUSIC
TCSMVS	Tulane U Comp Svcs MVS	MVS/SP
AKRON	U Akron	MVS/XA 2 1.7
AKRONVM AKRONVAX	U Akron U Akron	VM/SP HPO 5 ULTRIX
UABCMC	U Alabama B'ham - CMC	VMS
UABTUCC	U Alabama Birmingham	MVS/SP
UABCVSR UA1VM	U Alabama Birmingham U Alabama Comp Ctr	VM/IS VM/SP HPO
UALTAMTS	U Alberta Comp Svcs MTS	MTS
UALTAVM	U Alberta Comp Svcs VM	VM/SP
EMDUAM11 EB0UB012	U Autonoma Madrid Ctr Calc U Barcelona Ctr Calculo	VM/SP VM/SP
DBNVB12	U Bonn Chemische Inst	IBM VM/SP R3 1
DBNUAMA1	U Bonn Inst Mathematik	IBM VM/SP R4
DBNRHRZ1	U Bonn Reg Hochschul	IBM VM/SP R5

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DBNRHRZ2	U Bonn Reg Hochschulrechenzent	MVS/SP
UCIPPRO	U CA Irvine, Publ Policy Rsrch	VM/SP
UCSFBCL UCSFC255	U CA San Fran Biochem Lab U CA San Fran Clin Lab	
UCSFCCB	U CA San Fran Comp Ctr	
UCSFCGL	U CA San Fran Comp Grap Lab	
UCSFVIVO UCSFMIS	U CA San Fran Infect Lab U CA San Fran Med Info Sci	
UCSFNMR	U CA San Fran Nuc Mag Reson Lab	
UNCAACTC	U Calgary A C.T. Centre	MULTICS
UCDASVM1	U Calgary Dept Admin Servs	VM/SP
UCBEAR UCBDOROT	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBERNIE	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBEROS	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBBACH	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBAMBER UCBARPA	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBDEAN	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBDEGAS	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBBERYL	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBBIZET UCBBRAHM	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBBUDDY	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBCAD	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBCALDE	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBCARTA UCBCEVAX	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBCORAL	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBCMSA	U Calif Berkeley	VM/SP HPO
UCBCOGSC	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBCORY	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBDALI UCBEAST	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBESVAX	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBDAVIN	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBEULER	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBFRANN UCBGARNE	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBHOLDE	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBIC	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBICW	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBINGRE	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBJASON UCBJASPE	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBJI	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBKEPLE	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBKIM	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBLAPIS UCBLILAC	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBMATIS	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBMAXWE	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBMEDEA	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBMERLI UCBMIRO	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBMONET	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBNEWTO	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBOKEEF	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBOZ	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBPEARL UCBQAL	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD MV 8000 AOS
UCBRENOI	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBROSE	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBSEYMO	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBSHADO UCBSIM	U Calif Berkeley U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD UNIX BSD
UCBSRC	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBSYLVI	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBTOPAZ	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD
UCBTULIP	U Calif Berkeley	UNIX BSD

VM/SP

UNLASVAX U Nebr-Lincoln Alls & Coll UNLVAX4 U Nebr-Lincoln CALMIT Lab UNLCDC2 U Nebr-Lincoln Comp Res Ctr UNLVAX1 U Nebr-Lincoln Comp Res Ctr VMS VMS UNLVAX3 U Nebr-Lincoln Eng. Coll VMS UNLPDVAX U Nebr-Lincoln Print & Dup
UNLTCVAX U Nebr-Lincoln Teach. Coll VMS VMS UNLADVAX U Nebr-Lincoln VP Acad. Affairs VMS UNLVM U Nebraska Comp Svcs VM/SP/HPO UNLCDC3 U Nebraska Lincoln Comp Ctr NOS UNBMVS1 U New Brunswick MVS/XA UNBVM1 U New Brunswick
UNMB U New Mexico Comp Ctr
UNFVM U North Florida Comp S VM/SP 5 UNFVM U North Florida Comp Svcs IRISHMVS U Notre Dame Comp Ctr VM/SP MVS/SP UNDHEP U Notre Dame High Ener Phys IRISHVM U Notre Dame PC Lab VMS VM/SP

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Tue Oct 05 05:46:41 2021
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   ./12.txt
  IRISHVM2 U Notre Dame PC Lab
                                                                                                                             VM/SP
  NDRADLAB U Notre Dame Physics Dept
ALASKA U of Alaska Comp Net
                                                                                                                             VMS
                                                                                                                            VMS
                                                                                                                           VMS
  BANUIA51 U of Antwerp
 ARIZVM1 U of Arizona CCIT IBM
ARIZJVAX U of Arizona CCIT VAX
ARIZRVAX U of Arizona CCIT VAX
UBCMTSA U of BC Admin System
 ARIZJVAX U of Arizona CCIT VAX VMS
ARIZRVAX U of Arizona CCIT VAX VMS
UBCMTSA U of BC Admin System MTS
UCSFC450 U of California San Francisco ULTRIX 32M
UCSFFFFT U of California San Francisco ULTRIX
UCSFUSE U of California San Francisco UNIX
HGRRUG52 U of Groningen VMS 4 2
                                                                                                                           VMS
  HGRRUG52 U of Groningen
                                                                                                                            VMS 4 2
  UKAG U of KY Agri Data Ctr
CCOL U of Ky Community Colleges
                                                                                                                             VM/SP
                                                                                                                             VM/SP
  HLERUL56 U of Leiden DIOS
HLERUL55 U of Leiden DIOS
                                                                                                                             VMS 4 2
  UC780 U of Maryland ECSVAX U of NC Gen'l
                                                                                                                             VMS
 UC780 U of Maryland VMS

ECSVAX U of NC Gen'l Admin Cent Office - Educat. UNIX BSDrvs

OREGON1 U of O CC VM/SP

UOTELG01 U of Ottawa Elec Eng VMS

UTORDAIS U of T DAIS VMS

UTKVX2 U of Tennessee VMS

UTKVX3 U of Tennessee Computing Center VMS

WATLAGER U of Waterloo, EERC VMS

WISCAGE U of Wis, Inst on Aging VMS

DOLUNI1 U Oldenburg IBM VM/SP Re
  DOLUNI1 U Oldenburg
                                                                                                                           IBM VM/SP R4
  DOSUNI U Osnabrueck
                                                                                                                            CGK BS 3
  UOTTAWA U Ottawa Computer Ctr
                                                                                                                           VM/HPO
 UOTCSI1 U Ottawa Computer Sci Dept
UOTCSI2 U Ottawa Computer Sci Dept
UOTADM01 U Ottawa Faculty of Admin
                                                                                                                           UNIX
                                                                                                                           UNIX
                                                                                                                           VMS
 IPACUC U Palermo
PENNDRLN U Penn DRL Comp Facil
PENNDRLS U Penn DRL Comp Facil
                                                                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                                                                            VM/SP HPO
                                                                                                                            VMS
  PENNLRSM U Penn Matter Lab
  PENNHEP1 U Penn Physics
                                                                                                                            VMS
 PENNHEP1 U Penn Physics
PITTVMS U Pittsburgh Comp Info Sys
PITTUNIX U Pittsburgh Comp Info Sys
EMDUPM11 U Poli Madrid Ctr Calc
UPEI U Prince Edward Island
                                                                                                                            VMS
                                                                                                                          ULTRIX
                                                                                                                   ULTR1x
IBM VM/SP R4
EMDUPM11 U Poli Madrid Ctr Calc
UPEI U Prince Edward Island
UQAM U Quebec Montreal
UREGINA1 U Regina
UREGINA2 U Regina Dept Comp Services
UORCHEM U Rochester Chemistry VAX
UORVM U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORDB2 U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORJVN U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORJVN U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORKV U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORKV U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORKV2 U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORMVS U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORUNIX U Rochester Comp Ctr
UORDBV U Rochester Grad Sch Mngmnt
UORHEP U Rochester High Energy Physics
UOROPT U Rochester Institue of Optics
SASK U Saskatchewan
                                                                                                                             VM/SP
                                                                                                                             VM/SP
                                                                                                                            VMS 4 5
                                                                                                                            UNIX BSD
                                                                                                                            VMS
                                                                                                                            VM/SP
                                                                                                                            VMS
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                                                                                                                            VMS
                                                                                                                            VMS
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                                                                                                                          MVS/SP
                                                                                                                           UNIX BSD
                                                                                                                           VM/SP
                                                                                                                           VMS
                                                                                                                           VMS
                                                                                                                          DEC VMS 4 7
  BAGAMCOK U South Carolina Bus College
UNIVSCVM U South Carolina Comp Svcs
                                                                                                                            VM/SP
                                                                                                                            VM/SP
  KYLARA U Southern Calif
                                                                                                                             VMS
  MIRRIM U Southern Calif
                                                                                                                             VMS
  ZAPHOD U Southern Calif
                                                                                                                             VMS
  GEO U Southern Calif
BMSR U Southern Calif Biomed Simul Res
RAMOTH U Southern Calif Chemistry Dept
JAXOM U Southern Calif Eng Dept
MOUSE U Southern Calif Eng Dept
PERN U Southern Calif Engineering Sch
                                                                                                                             VMS
                                                                                                                             VMS
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                                                                                                                            VMS
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WATMNET U Waterloo MICRONET

UNIX

VM/SP

USCMVSA USC - System MVSA OS/VS2 MVS/2
USU Utah State U VMS
UTORCCIE UTORCCIE VM/SP
UVSOL UVic COMP UNIX SUN OS 3 2
UWAFRODO UW Radiation Oncology VMS

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TWSUVM	Wichita State Univ CC	VM/SP
WLUCP6	Wilfred Laurier Univ	CP-6
	Williams College CC	VMS
	Williams College CC Admin VAX Sys	VMS
WILLIAMS		VMS
DGOWISO1	WISO-RZ Uni Goettingen, Germany	IBM VM/IS R5
WPI	Worcester Poly Tech EE	ULTRIX
IBRDVM1	World Bank	VM/HPO
WSU	Wright State Univ	VMS
AWIWUW11	WU-Wien	IBM VM/SP HPO R4 2
WVNBSC	WVNET - Bluefield St Col	VMS
WVNCC	WVNET - Concord Col	VMS
WVNFSC	WVNET - Fairmont St Col	VMS
WVNGSC WVNNCC	WVNET - Glenville St Col	VMS
WVNNCC	WVNET - Northern Comm. Col	VMS
WVNPCC	WVNET - Parkersburg Comm. Col	VMS
WVNPSC	WVNET - Potomac State Col	VMS
WVNSC	WVNET - Shepherd Col	VMS
WVNSCC	WVNET - Southern Comm Col	VMS
WVNWLSC	WVNET - West Liberty St. Col	VMS
WVNWVIT	WVNET - West VA Instit of Tech	VMS
WVNWVSOM	WVNET - West VA Sch of Osteopathic Med	VMS
WVNWVSC	WVNET - West Virginia St Col	VMS
XAVIER		VMS
	Yale Med Sch - Biomedical Comp Unit	VMS
YALEADS	Yale U Admin Data Svcs	VM/SP/HPO
YALASTRO	Yale U Astronomy Dept	VMS
YALECS	Yale U Comp Sci Dept	UNIX
YALEMVS	Yale U Computer Ctr	MVS/SP
YALEVM	±	VM/SP/HPO
YALEVMS		VMS
	Yale U HEP2	VMS
	Yale U Physics Lab	VMS
	Yale Univ Med Sch	VMS
	Yildiz Univ	VM/SP R3
	York U Admin Stud Environ Sci	VMS
YUSOL	York U Comp Sci Fac Sci	VMS
YUYETTI	York U Comp Sci Research	UNIX BSD
YULIBRA	York U Computing Services	VMS
YUVULCAN	York U Glendon Coll	VMS
YORKVM1	York University	VM/SP
YORKVM2	York University	VM/SP
YUGEMINI	York University	VMS
YUVENUS	York University	VMS
YSUA	Youngstown State Univ	MVS/SP
YSUB	Youngstown State Univ ZDV U Tuebingen	VM/SP
DTUZDV5A		VMS
DK0ZA1	Zentralarch Sozialfors Koeln Zurich U	VM/SP IBM VM/SP
CZHRZU1A CZHRZU2B		IBM MVS/SP
CAHRAUAB	PENDING NODES AS OF 10/05	
	TOTAL NODES = 3	,, 55
	101111 1.0220 0	

Node	Site	System		
MHC	Mount Holyoke Coll	ULTRIX		
RADFORD	Radford Univ	AOS/VS		
WWU	Western Washington Univ	BERKELEY UNIX		

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 $\star-=+^{\circ}$ Phrack World News $^{+=-\star}$

Issue Five/Part 5

Compiled and Written By

Knight Lightning

Daniel Zigmond: Real Reporter or Freelance FED?

May 20, 1986

This article in no way endorses one view over the other, but will try to look at evidence and facts pertaining to both of the above statements.

Daniel Zigmond; Wants to write an article on hackers and phreaks, our general social atmosphere, and our side of the story. He IS a contributing editor on the staff of Amiga World Magazine and he has lived at 6735 Forest Glen Road, Squrill Hill, Penn. and had the phone numbers (412)422-1979/7515 for at least 3 years. Reportedly he has accounts on ARPAnet, Private Sector, and Byte Magazine BBS.

He has been on several conferences and been talking to several phreaks across the nation. To name a few: Blue Buccaneer, Cap/N/Crax, Compu-Phreak, Dark Cavalier, Dead Lord, Final Impulse, Holophax Phreaker, Knight Lightning, Ninja NYC, Scan Man, Sigmund Fraud, Slave Driver, The Bootleg, The Clashmaster, The Infiltrator, The Firelord, The Seker, and TUC.

He tapes all his conversations and has tried to get people to call other phreaks on 3-ways in attempts to gain their phone numbers. He did however make some attempts to help Sigmund Fraud after his near bust (see story in this issue).

There are a few extremely odd things about Mr. Zigmond.

1. He wants everyone to send him their codes, extenders, PBXs, diverters, etc. Even if they no longer work. When asked why, he answered that he needed something to show his boss so he wouldn't be turned down because of what would seem to be a b.s. article.

Why doesn't he just make things up? After all he said that the stuff didn't have to be good. His reply to that was that his boss might check a few. Well if they were dead codes or PBXs or whatever then he would be up the creek anyway.

Ok, forgetting about that for a moment, Zigmond also asked that people photocopy their notebooks and send those copies to him and that he would pay the postage and for the photocopies. This of course means he gets your address and at the very least your township and such (that is if you don't leave a return address) from the postmark.

 He has refused to give out a phone number to reach him at work or at Amiga World. Furthermore, he doesn't plan to have the article in Amiga World, but rather, he has stated that it would be sold to the Washington Post.

Now I talked with people at the Washington Post and they know nothing about this. I spoke with people in several different areas and turned a blank. They didn't even know who Zigmond was.

This leaves 2 possibilities. He either never really had any intention of submitting this article to them or was just sort of running with the mouth in search of glory and attention.

3. A PBX that Sigmund Fraud had found while hacking in a UNIX was given to

Zigmond. It had never been used before, with the exception of a single conference to test it out, and within a week of giving it to Zigmond it was gone.

4. Another biggie is that Zigmond claims that by the time he submits this article in August 1986 (to wherever) that if he gets \$900 for it, he would break even. He is saying this from his phone bills and other expenses on the article.

Now only breaking even after all that time, work, and effort seems a bit worthless to me, why would he do it? You know, they say that fed informants get paid very well, not that I am suggesting that Zigmond is a fed informant.

Some other stuff that may be interesting to know is that Zigmond insists that he will be getting accounts to Metal Shop Private and Stronghold East when Taran King and Slave Driver have given very strong "no"s. He goes around telling this to people. His phone answering machine gives you less than ten seconds to leave a message, this is perhaps to prevent hacking, but nevertheless annoying.

Now please everyone take this file in the way it was intended. This is not saying that Daniel Zigmond is helping the feds, he may be completely interested and wanting to learn about our society. From this I gather that he will learn that in the phreak community we try to protect each other from getting busted and that a reporter like him could literally destroy the phreak world if he was working with the feds and left unquestioned and unchecked.

This article is a warning to all who may contact Zigmond to use your own good judgement in dealing with him. I'm sure that once he answers the questions raised in this article then everything will be alright.

The only other thing I wanted to say is that in general reporters have hurt the phreak/hack world tremendously in the past. They bring too much attention to the phreaks and bring us into the public eye. As a result there has been much more legislation creating news laws against us. Some examples are evident in this very issue of PWN. Blue Buccaneer points out all sorts of things in the new hacking laws article. Remember the new laws about sysops being responsible for the boards? Did you see how that was used in the Teltec busts? It getting incredibly dangerous out there friends, lets try not to make it any worse.

:Knight Lightning

Defeat Richard Proctor In 4 Easy Steps!

June 10, 1986

Who is this new investigator Atlanta? What makes him today's newest and possibly greatest threat to the phreak world? The following information concerns an MCI investigator named Richard Proctor, alias; John Proctor.

Richard Proctor, who also introduces himself to others as John Proctor, is one of the various MCI investigators that now lurk the nation. He is in charge of most of MCI's security/investigation divisions, and is in charge of running the southeast, east coast, and northeast MCI Investigations. He has also been involved with phreaks in the midwest and southwest.

I am not sure of the extent of his "jurisdiction," but all users of MCI should be careful no matter where they are located. Holophax Phreaker and The Infiltrator can personally tell you how he runs the MCI Investigations as they have been under investigation twice to date. Holophax Phreaker is currently still under investigation by Proctor and even by his own local Bell Operating Company (BOC).

The first thing most investigators would do when they find an access code has been abused is to wait until it has a large bill to act upon it (which may never happen). This is because it is unprofitable to the long distance service to try to find and prosecute a person who has made less than \$500.00 worth of calls (depending on the LD service).

Richard Proctor is a very different case. As soon as he finds an access code is being abused, he will take immediate action. The following is the series of events which will take place once Proctor discovers an abused account.

In the following steps, "you" are the phreaker in question that was making the calls (heaven forbid). The steps listed are for both "you" and the person(s) receiving the illegally made phone calls.

- Step 1: Proctor will personally call *EVERY* destination number on the account and ask for information on who called them on the date(s) the call(s) were made. If it is a bulletin board, he will contact the sysop by voice or if there is no voice number available, he will send one or more investigators from the nearest MCI Investigations Department to question the sysop. He will ask them for information pertaining to the phreaker. Hopefully, your amnesiac friends will somehow forget all about you and be able to tell Proctor nothing.
- Step 2: Proctor waits a couple of days, then he again contacts the person(s) that received calls and says that he has found you and that you have told him that the people "you" had been speaking with also made those calls and that the Proctor will bust the person(s) who were called unless they would like to pay for the calls. (If this part pertains to you, that is if you were the one who received calls and Proctor or any agent said this then, at this point you should contact an attorney as this is telephone harassment, a federal crime committed over an interstate communications carrier, and you could sue MCI or whichever company it involved).
- Step 3: If some of the person(s) called by you weren't as amnesiac as you would have liked when Proctor spoke to them and then Proctor calls you or your parents, then you should deny everything that Proctor accuses you of, no matter how many people he says turned you in. Proctor will be lying (one hopes) so deny everything.
- Step 4: Proctor will call you again in a couple of days and tell you that you have one last chance to turn yourself in. When you say no again, Proctor will try to scare you by telling you that MCI is going to make an example of you and prosecute to the fullest extent. If Proctor does this, then you know he has no evidence on you or at most, circumstantial evidence.

You might get a couple of calls after that. Keep denying it and make sure you drop out of phreaking for approximately $1\ 1/2\ -\ 2$ months. If you get a call from your local phone company then drop out for at least 6 months to a year. They will most likely put a pen register or a DNR on your line.

Proctor has PhDs in Psychology and Criminal Psychology so be very careful! He can't do anything to you if you follow the above guidelines unless he had a trace put on the account you were using. If that is the case, then he will show up at your door arrest you. Your best bet is to stay away from it entirely. Proctor's home phone is unlisted (of course), but his office number can be obtained from any MCI operator.

Information Provided by Holophax Phreaker and The Infiltrator

Quick Notes

Stronghold East is now running on a new Apple //e thanks to their friends at AMEX. They formally ran SE off of a Franklin Ace. May 3, 1986 Most recently the hard drive at SE crashed and until they acquire the new ProDos Apple net, they will be running Phlash-Net written by Phlash Gordon.

Rumor has it that the Apple Wizard was busted for dealing and using coke.

Administration of the state of

A guy named the CPTN was busted in Nevada for something pertaining to the Captain Midnight incident. He was also busted for carding and was caught with illegally obtained modems.

Info by Death Angel.

A member of the Underworld Elite, run by Night Stalker, got busted for calling the White House and making a bomb threat. The Secret Service came to his house and they knew he used illegal extenders to make the calls. This user decided to give them the number and his passwords to the Underworld Elite. He was deleted.

Info by Night Stalker, 5/11/86...The Underworld (216)356-9464

Telenet Bob was busted. The full story appeared in the April issue of 2600 Magazine. Nineteen year old from New Jersey. Name Robert Davenport. \$500 fine, \$890 restitution to AT&T. Info by Sally Ride:::Space Cadet

Bad Boy In Black has given up BBSing and Phreaking (for the most part) so you probably won't be hearing from him again. He claims he has gotten bored of BBSing and have had little time since the summer is rolling around. Therefore, he decided to give it up all together. Info by [bad boy in black] 5/11/86

Shooting Shark has also left the phreak world for the more or less same reasons plus the fact that he is going to college. Info by Shooting Shark.

In Texas, some cop was running a bbs called the Tunnel. No one was busted, but names and handles of those posting illegal codes were collected. The cop has received several death threats.

The Slayer was busted on April 25, 1986. Reportedly he was visited by agents from Metrophone, MCI, New Jersey Bell, and the FBI. His bust concerned Metro abuse. The Godfather, in Rhode Island, was also linked to this bust as well and as of now has quite the phreak world, but no further information is available on that. Most recently it has been discovered that the Slayer has been hired as a TSPS operator.

More news on The Sprinter here; after all was said and done, Sprinter plea bargained (as expected) and plead guilty to the charges. He spent 14 days in jail, has a \$2000 fine, 2 years probation, 200 hours community service, and of course those lawyer costs. He at this point has not accepted a job with MicroSoft.

Info by Jester Sluggo.

It has been reported that The Mentor and Crustaceo Mutoid are now writing for a newsletter in California called The Underground Informer.

The Arabian Knight was busted for conferencing.

The Guardian Demon (215) was apparently busted for Metrophone abuse, but formal charges have not been brought forth.

Jester Sluggo has officially retired from all board calling and is now into straight hacking. He will maintain his contacts in the phreak world. Sysops are asked to remove his accounts.

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Introduction

Welcome to Phrack Inc. VI! We have been somewhat delayed in our release due to problems with my home life (see PWN in this issue for details) but here we go! Right now, Metal Shop Private is down, but when I return to real life, it should re-emerge with a new BBS program and hopefully will be better than ever. Now, with the release of Telecomputist Newsletter, we have the capabilities to have Phrack Inc. printed out.

If you feel you'd like to subscribe to something like this, it would be operated in this manner: being one of our positive points, it will be free to an extent. You, the subscriber, will be paying for postage and if necessary, envelopes as well as P.O. Box rental, but none of this should amount to much. If you are interested in getting this, please contact any member of the Metal Shop Family or Phantom Phreaker of The Alliance with your opinions on this. If we get enough support, we'll get this rolling. Later on.

TARAN KING
Sysop of Metal Shop Private

This issue of Phrack Inc. includes the following philes:
 Title by Author (amount in K)

- 1 Index by Taran King (1k)
- 2 Pro-Phile on Groups by Knight Lightning (14k)
- 3 The Technical Revolution by Dr. Crash (4k)
- 4 Fun with Lighters by The Leftist (2k)
- 5 Nasty Unix Tricks by Shooting Shark (4k)
- 6 Smoke Bombs by Alpine Kracker (2k)
- 7 Cellular Telephones by High Evolutionary (5k)
- 8 Wide Area Networks by Jester Sluggo (10k)
- 9-13 Phrack World News by Knight Lightning (16,15,15,16,15K)

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Phrack Pro-Phile 3

Featuring: User Groups and Clubs

Written By Knight Lightning and Taran King

On June 10, 1986

Welcome to issue 3 of Phrack Pro-Phile. The information herein was originally supposed to appear as a special issue of PWN, but instead was made this issue's Phrack Pro-Phile. Taran King and I have collected much information about the different clubs and groups of today and yesterday and compiled in the form that you will now see.

Extasyy Elite: The story of Extasyy Elite is a sad one for the group was literally destroyed by its own members. The Poltergeist turned in all of Extasyy after he got busted for carding. This led the authorities to The Mentor who had stolen 30 Apple //es. Mentor's bust almost led to The Protestor, but luckily, The Mentor was able to warn Protestor in time. (See Phrack World News Issue III).

The membership of the club included:

Bit Blitz Crustaceo Mutoid The Mentor The Protestor

Cisban Evil Priest Kleptic Wizard The Poltergeist

Crustaceo Mutoid later joined the Racketeers, but now he and The Mentor write for a California newsletter called the Underground Informer.

Extasyy hung out on Hack Net BBS and FWSO, a bbs in Colorado.

Fargo 4A: This group was started on a conference consisting of Bioc Agent 003, TUC, Big Brother, Quasi-Moto, Video Warhead, and the Wizard of Arpanet. What they did was get several Directory Assistants on the conference, and each person assumed a role of some sort of telco agent. Now they told the DA's that all their calls were going to be re-routed to a different location. They got some of the DA's to believe them, and some of them were almost laid off because of this conference. By the way, Fargo is in North Dakota, that's where the first DA was from.

> It is believed that Wizard of ARPAnet was busted by John Maxfield and that BIOC completely retired from the phreak world. This group was unofficially disbanded, but several of the members are still active.

> > -----

Five-O: A reasonably new IBM kracking group, which was formally the Imperial Warlords. Currently they are re-kracking software and claiming it to be original by themselves. They are known for placing insulting messages towards certain people inside their re-kracked software.

IBM Syndicate: This group was formed around April 6, 1986. Its charter members included; Dark Creaper (916), Brew Associates (215), Major Havoc (301), and one other whose handle remains unknown to me at the current time. They were a new phreak/hack/pirategroup. Unfortunately, this group (like so many others) died within its first month.

Icub (International Computer Underground Bandits):

This is a hack/phreak group who's main emphasis is on phreaking. It is based in Memphis, Tennessee. It has 10 members in it, and the only semi-active member left is Doc Holiday. Not much else is really known about this group except that it is inactive and there have not been any announced plans to revive it.

LOD/H: Legion Of Doom/Hackers

These two groups are very closely intertwined. They both were formed on Plovernet. The founding member was Lex Luthor. Through the years, there have been LOD/H bulletin boards such as Blottoland, LOD, FOD, etc. Today there is Catch 22 and a new LOD bbs, supposedly being run by King Blotto. The current member list of the group is as follows:

Legion Of Hackers

Blue Archer

Gary Seven Kerrang Khan Lex Luthor Master Of Impact

Silver Spy (Sysop of Catch 22)

The Marauder
The Videosmith

Legion Of Doom

Phucked Agent 04 Compu-Phreak

LOD/H is known for being one of the oldest and most knowledgeable of all groups. In the past they have written many extensive g-philes about various topics. (Please forgive any mistakes in the member list since this list was provided by Lex Luthor approximately $1\ 1/2\ -\ 2$ months ago).

Metal Communications: A very large group that has written many files throughout its existence. Some of the boards in its menagerie include Speed Demon Elite, Metal AE, Metal Works AE, Metalland I and several others. The membership of Metal Communications includes:

Cobalt 60/Crimson Pirate/Dr. Local/Red Pirate/Shadow Lord/The Angel Of Destiny
The Apothecary/The Byte/The Byte Byter/The Dark Wizard/The Duke/The Dutchman
The Man In Black/The Prophet/The Pink Panther/The Voice Over/The Radical Rocker
The Warlock Lord/White Knight

Red Pirate, Crimson Pirate, and Dr. Local are the group's main ware distributors.

A subsidiary of Metal Communications is the Neon Knights whose membership includes:

Baby Demon/Jolly*Roger/The Blade aka Killer Kurt/The Master of Reality The Metallian/The Outland/Zandar Zan

PAG/PAP: Phreaks Against Geeks/Phreaks Against Phreaks Against Geeks

PAG: This group was formed by TWCB Inc. as a joke on a conference in December, 1985. The charter members were TWCB, Inc. taRfruS, Blue Adept, The Clashmaster and a few others. Later, Catcher in the Rye and the Slovak wanted to join.

PAP: In resistance to PAG, Boston Stangler and Micro Man formed PAP. Several others sided with them but were never formal members.

All of this nonsense was really started on the Dartmouth system and was mainly a feud between phreaks in the Boston (617) area until TWCB got involved.

The Administration: This group was sort of in two parts; The Administration and Team Hackers '86. The membership of these groups include:

Adolph Hitler.....Team Hackers '86

Alpha Centauri

Author Unknown.....Team Hackers '86 British Bloke......Team Hackers '86

Dark Priest

David Lightman (214)......Administration Leader/

Team Hackers '86

Dr. Pepper

Hewlett Hackard

Major Havock.....Team Hackers '86

Mane Phrame Mark Twain

Phoneline Phantom 1 - *Not* a member of Phoneline Phantoms.

Red Baron

Renegade Rebel

Sasha Kinski.....Team Hackers '86

The President Walter Mitty

The group did disband temporarily for reasons dealing with security, but now is back together. For other news about this group see the current PWN.

The Nihilist Order: This group was really a loosely connected bunch of friends and phreaks and not a true club. It is based in Fremont and Sunnyvale, California. It was started by TRASk and The Highwayman. The membership includes:

BelGarion/Ogre Ogre/The Animator/The Highwayman/TRASk

All of the members of the group have been busted or been involved in busts in the past few months. The Highwayman bit it in the Phoenix Phortress Sting Operation, and the others all got caught on a carding scam. Although BelGarion was later released with no record.

One of the boards in the Nihilist Order's network is the Shattered World Elite, which is sysoped by TRASk. The group is currently inactive.

The P.H.I.R.M.: A somewhat new group that recently has been accused (without proof) of being fed invested.

> Not much is really known about this group as they would disclose very little information. Some of the boards that are now P.H.I.R.M operated include Thieve's Underworld, sysoped by Jack The Ripper, World's Grave Elite sysoped by Sir Gamelord, and SATCOM IV.

The P.H.I.R.M. reportedly will be releasing a newsletter.

The membership of the P.H.I.R.M. supposedly includes:

Archangel Blade Runner Sir Gamelord Jack The Ripper

The Stingray

It is rumored that Blade Runner is the same person as Archangel and/or The Stingray.

______ TPM (The Punk Mafia): This group when last checked had eight members. The

following is a complete listing.

Arthur Dent Creative Chaos Erik Bloodaxe Gin Fizz Ninja NYC Peter Gunn

Rudolph Smith (703) The Godfather (703)

The group will be going through a rebirth this summer. Their main goals include burglary, fraud, hacking, and phreaking. Most recently The Godfather retired and Ninja NYC came very close to being busted. See Phrack World News Issue V.

The Racketeers: The new Apple pirating group was assembled by Apple Rebel. The

membership now includes:

Apple Rebel/Crustaceo Mutoid/Hot Rod/The Micron/The Warezird

Tribunal Of Knowledge: This group was formed very recently by Blue Buccaneer and High Evolutionary with one purpose in mind: to get together to trade knowledge and information and to discuss this information until all the members had a good working knowledge of it. The final result would be g-philes written by the group about the topic. On the whole it was a good idea.

The complete membership includes:

High Evolutionary

Blue Buccaneer Chef Boy R Dee
Cyclone II High Evolutions
Night Stalker Paradox
Professor Pixel Slave Driver
The Inspect to The Seker The Inspectre The Seker

The Wild Phreak

2300 Club: Based in Cleveland, Ohio. The 2300 Club is now being compared and treated as miniature mafia by local authorities. This is mainly for crimes including the blowing up of cars. Two of the members were caught for fraudulent use of a credit card and one has been arrested for car theft. Which of the members that refers to, I don't know, but the membership of the 2300 Club included:

> Dr. Gorey Dr. No Eagle Eyes Judge Dredd King Blotto Mr. Modem Prince Squid Spectreman The Formatter

2600 Club/New 2600 Club: Both groups are no longer in existence. Originally started as a local group of friends in St. Louis, Missouri, it gained members quickly, too quickly, and as the membership grew, the unity and productivity of the group lessened until the group(s) finally broke up. However many of the members of 2600 Club now write (or have in the past) for Phrack Inc. Among them are:

Cheap Shades/Data Line/Dr. Crash/Forest Ranger/Gin Fizz/Jester Sluggo Knight Lightning/Monty Python/Phantom Phreaker/Taran King/The Clashmaster

2600 Club had no relation to 2600 Magazine.

Warelords: There are 13 members in the Warelords and they are based in California, Maryland, Tennessee, Washington D.C., and Wyoming. Billibuster, a member of the group, said that the Warelords are a phreaking and carding group that also writes programs and sells them. He claims that they are not pirates. The group isn't very active.

Other groups:

Catholics Anonymous: A pirate group

Elite Phreakers and Hackers Club: From World of Cryton

Feds R Us: Joke by King Blotto

High Mountain Hackers

Imperial Warlords: See Five-O

Inner Circle: The Cracker (Author of "Out of The Inner Circle")

Kaos Inc.

Knights of Shadow: Sir Knight MPG: Midwestern Pirates Guild

NASA Elite: Captain Kid

Neon Knights: See Metal Communications

Phlash: A relatively new Amiga kracking group.

Phoneline Phantoms: The Colonel, The Duke, The Executioner, and The Sprinter.

./2.txt Tue Oct 05 05:46:41 2021

Phreak Hack Delinquents: Metro Man and the Reaper (212)

Project Genesis: Sigmund Fraud

RDTF: Red Dawn Text-Files, Saltheart Foamfollower (SE) and Brain Gadget (Ca.)

Shadow Brotherhood

65C02 Elite (612): Wizard of ARPAnet and The Count. BBSes: Irongate, North

Pole, The Guild, and The Graveyard.

The Dange Gang: Maxwell's Demon

Triple Entente

2601 Club: Formed by taRfruS to combat 2600 Club.

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The Techno-Revolution

by

Doctor Crash

Hacking. It is a full time hobby, taking countless hours per week to learn, experiment, and execute the art of penetrating multi-user computers. Why do hackers spend a good portion of their time hacking? Some might say it is scientific curiosity, others that it is for mental stimulation. But the true roots of hacker motives run much deeper than that. In this file I will describe the underlying motives of the aware hackers, make known the connections between Hacking, Phreaking, Carding, and Anarchy, and make known the "techno-revolution" which is laying seeds in the mind of every hacker.

To fully explain the true motives behind hacking, we must first take a quick look into the past. In the 1960's, a group of MIT student built the first modern computer system. This wild, rebellious group of young men were the first to bear the name "hackers". The systems that they developed were intended to be used to solve world problems and to benefit all of mankind.

As we can see, this has not been the case. The computer system has been solely in the hands of big businesses and the government. The wonderful device meant to enrich life has become a weapon which dehumanizes people. To the government and large businesses, people are no more than disk space, and the government doesn't use computers to arrange aid for the poor, but to control nuclear death weapons. The average American can only have access to a small microcomputer which is worth only a fraction of what they pay for it. The businesses keep the true state of the art equipment away from the people behind a steel wall of incredibly high prices and bureaucracy. It is because of this state of affairs that hacking was born.

Hackers realize that the businesses aren't the only ones who are entitled to modern technology. They tap into online systems and use them to their own advantage. Of course, the government doesn't want the monopoly of technology broken, so they have outlawed hacking and arrest anyone who is caught. Even worse than the government is the security departments of businesses and companies. They act as their own "private armies" and their ruthless tactics are overlooked by the government, as it also serves their needs.

Hacking is a major facet of the fight against the computer monopoly. One of the ways hackers accomplish their means has developed into an art in itself: Phone Phreaking. It is essential that every Hacker also be a Phreak, because it is necessary to utilize the technology of the phone company to access computers far from where they live. The phone company is another example of technology abused and kept from people with high prices.

Hackers often find that their existing equipment, due to the monopoly tactics of computer companies, is inefficient for their purposes. Due to the inexorbitantly high prices, it is impossible to legally purchase the necessary equipment. This need has given still another segment of the fight: Credit Carding. Carding is a way of obtaining the necessary goods without paying for them. It is again due to the companies stupidity that Carding is so easy, and shows that the world's businesses are in the hands of those with considerably less technical know-how than we, the hackers.

There is one last method of this war against computer abusers. This is a less subtle, less electronic method, but much more direct and gets the message across. I am speaking of what is called Anarchy. Anarchy as we know it does not refer to the true meaning of the word (no ruling body), but to the process of physically destroying buildings and governmental establishments. This is a very drastic, yet vital part of this "techno-revolution."

must also increase computer Crashing. I know that crashing a computer seems a waste, but when there is no other way to subvert a business, their system must be shut down.

As I stated above, this is only on the motives. If you need a tutorial on how to perform any of the above stated methods, please read a file on it. And whatever you do, continue the fight. Whether you know it or not, if you are a hacker, you are a revolutionary. Don't worry, you're on the right side.

If you have a question or comment about this file or the "technorevolution" just leave mail for me on the Metal Shop AE (314)256-7284, or any other BBS I may happen to be on.

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"How To Have Fun With a Bic <or generic> Lighter"

by The Leftist


First off, let me say, that I am not responsible for any personal damage done by the use of the information in this file.

Shower of sparks from nowhere:

This trick is done usually with an empty lighter. Disassemble the top, being careful not to loose the flint, and the spring, which are under the striker wheel. Throw away everything else, unless there is still some fluid in the lighter, which can be used for some of the other things in this file. Save the flint and spring.

Ok, now take the spring, and pull on the end a little, and stretch the spring out a little longer than the flint. Next, take the flint, and kind of wrap the end of the spring around it. It should look sort of like fig. A. Next, the fun part. Take the spring, and hold it by the end that doesn't have flint on it, and heat the flint till it glows. Don't worry, the heat won't burn your fingers. Then, throw it flint first at victim, pavement, or whatever.

Fig. A



What to do with leftover lighter casing:

Light one of the striker wheel supports, and lay it upside down in a corner and run like hell! This will blow pretty good. You can also take the casing and wrap it loosely in a paper towel, light the towel, step back, and shoot it with a BB gun. Fun. Experiment, but don't ever puncture the lighter, while you're holding it, that would be foolish.

Any questions or comments? Contact me on the 2400 Baud Exchange 404-925-9657.

The Leftist.

~ * v

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Unix Nasties

By Shooting Shark

Written on April 3, 1986

Summary: Methods of sabotaging your favorite Unix system.

Preface: I do not advocate utilizing ANY of the methods I put forth in this file. Unix is a cool operating system, perhaps one of the best systems ever designed in many respects. If you have access to a Unix system, you should LEARN UNIX AND LEARN C, because that is where the money is in the computer world. However, Unix is a relatively insecure operating system which is easy to fuck up. This file explains a few ways of doing so.

Crash The System

Unix has no built-in provision for the maximum amount of disk space allowed per user. Thus, one user can grab all the disk space on the system and effectively prevent anyone else from writing to the disk. A simple way of grabbing all the disk space is to create subdirectory after subdirectory until it is no longer possible. Here are a few ways of doing it.

1> Create a file with the following lines:

mkdir subdir cd subdir source /u1/mydir/crash

> Call it crash. The last line ("source /u1/mydir/crash") should be altered so that it will look for the file in your directory. If your directory is /u3/students/jeff, the last line should say "source /u3/students/jeff/crash". After you write the above file, type:

% source crash

and wait...within a few minutes the program will abort because it won't have any more room on the disk. Neither will anyone else.

2> Here's a more elegant way of doing the same thing. Create this "endless loop" shellscript:

while : ; do mkdir subdir cd subdir done

> and then "source" the file. If you are in the "sh" shell (if you are, you will probably have a "\$" prompt) you can type "while : ; do" from the \$ prompt. You will then get a > prompt. Type the next three lines and sit

- 3> If you'd like to set the process in motion and hang up, and the file is called crash, type:
- % nohup source crash &

and log off. This will start it as a background process, allowing you to log off. However, log off QUICKLY, since if you used the first example for your crash file, it will also eat up background processes like crazy which will also fuck up the system to some extent. Which brings us to...

Slow Down The System Immensely

There are many ways of doing this, the method being creating a sufficiently large number of background processes. Here's one specific example. Create a file called "slow1" with the following lines:

w &

source slow1

create a file called "slow2" with:

source slow1 &
source slow2

and execute slow2 with

% slow2 or

% slow2 &

This will create 25 background processes, each one running 25 background processes. The system will hardly move after you've got each one running.

Messing Up A Directory

Many file-handling commands use "-" options. Create a file with a "-" at the beginning of its name by doing this:

cat > -filename

[now type a few lines, maybe something rude like "ha ha you can't delete this file".] Type a ^D (control-d) to end input. You now have a file called -filename in your directory. It will be VERY difficult to remove this file. If you were to try rm (remove) -filename or mv (rename) -filename, the rm or mv program would interpret -filename as an option, not a file, and would give you an error message telling you that -filename was not a valid option...thus, the file stays there obnoxiously.

Create a couple of hundred files with "-" as the first characters in their names...it will be a royal pain for the person who is blessed with these new files, and they will probably just have to get a new login.

Conclusion

The use of any of these techniques is quite irresponsible, and if anyone did this to my Unix system, I'd be quite pissed. That is why I strongly recommend that you never use these tricks.

So Long, Shooting Shark

"Some people have a bad attitude, and I say, if they want to act tough, beat 'em up!" - Blue Oyster Cult

For more information on UNIX sabotage and cracking, see the following articles:

Ritchie, Dennis M. [he wrote Unix] "On the Security of UNIX." Programmers Manual for UNIX System III Volume II. Supplementary Documents.

Filipski, Alan and Hanko, James. "Making UNIX Secure." BYTE Magazine, April 1986, pp 113-128.

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/ /=-=-=-\ < Smoke Bomb > >-----< < by > > Alpine <

\-=-=-=/

< Kracker >

Ingredients-

Saltpetre (Potassium Nitrate)
Sugar
Alcohol (100% is best, but plain rubbing alcohol will work)
Gunpowder (or some ground-up rocket engines)
Matches (Get a box of 50 packs -they can be very useful.)
Coffee can

Cigarette

Instructions:

Combine the sugar and saltpetre in a 3:1 ratio (Sugar:saltpetre) and heat over a low flame until the mixture has thoroughly melted together. (It will look like sticky white lumps when ready) You need to stir this continually while heating, and remove it from the flame at the very first sign of smoke. I had a batch go off in my face once, and the workroom was filled with smoke for a good half hour. It is easier and safer to work with smaller batches.

Now, dump all of this "smoke powder" into a coffee can, add some match heads, moisten it with a little alcohol, and add gunpowder until all the smoke powder is coated. Now tape a cigarette between the match heads in an unopened book. Imbed the book into the mixture.

Light the but, and walk casually away to find a nice alibi within 5 minutes.

Notes:

You should be able to find some Saltpeter in a local drug store.

All of the gunpowder, match heads, and alcohol is simply to insure good ignition. You can omit them, but if you have them, mix them in for reliability's sake. For the fuse, you can either use the one listed, or either some canon fuse, or a rocket igniter and an electrical system.

A quarter pound of this stuff is supposed to fill a city block. I'm not sure if that is accurate, but it sure fills a public bathroom nicely.



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Cellular Telephones
[Written By The High Evolutionary]

I assume that most of us know many of the technical aspects of Cellular Phreaking therefore this file is intended for general information as to how these unique devices operate.

Cellular is likely to be successful because it provides dramatic improvements over the historic automobile phones. For years, mobile radio-telephone service was an extremely limited proposition. There were only forty-four radio channels available, and a maximum of about thirty were assigned to any one area. That meant if all thirty channels were occupied-one conversation per channel-and you were the thirty-first mobile phone user who wished to make a call, you would have to wait thirty minutes or more, even in a city the size of New York. As you can imagine, mobile radio-telephone service like that could not become very popular. Even with the limited number of channels, long delays in making calls during busy periods, and often poor quality transmission, there were big waiting lists for mobile service. But with a fully equipped cellular radio-telephone system, it is possible to make 5000 times as many calls simultaneously in the same metropolitan area, opening up the service to anyone that can pay the hefty prices.

That is because cellular radio-telephones systems are technically quite different from traditional mobile telephones. First, the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) has allocated far more channels to cellular, 666 in all. Second, those 666 channels are broadcast from many different locations. In the old mobile telephone systems, there was one powerful radio station with a large antenna that served an entire city. In the new system, a geographical area is honeycombed with many cells, hence the name 'Cellular'. Each cell has its own low-powered radio transmitter and receiver. As a car with a cellular telephone or a person carrying a portable moves from one cell to the next, the call is transferred automatically. You're unlikely to notice when this transfer takes place, even though your phone is suddenly switched to a different radio station and to another channel while you are talking.

Because the cellular signal is low-powered, it doesn't go very far. This permits the same channel you are talking on to be used for calls in other parts of the same metropolitan area without interference. This would mean cellular radio-telephone systems can serve a very large number of customers in an area because there are more channels than before-and the larger number of channels are reused.

Unlike local telephone service, which is provided by a monopoly, there is competition in cellular. Two classes of companies are allowed to offer cellular telephone service in every market. One cellular system can be owned by a telephone company, the other by someone else. The two-company rule was adopted by the FCC so that AT&T, which developed cellular, could not monopolize the whole thing.

Cellular Telephones come in two basic versions, as car phones and portable phones, with a briefcase hybrid. Car phones are by far the most common, because they are much cheaper. But most believe that, ultimately, portables will be the most popular. Washington Post Company president Richard Simmons, whose company is a partner in several cellular systems, even predicts that by the early 1990's "There will be phones roughly the size of a calculators that you carry around in your pocket. They will cost no more than five hundred dollars. They will emancipate people from the necessity of locating a phone to make calls. The bad news is, you will never be able to get away from the phone, and we'll call it progress."

Car telephones include a small transmitter-receiver unit that is usually mounted in the trunk, an antenna and a control head that includes the handset. In most cellular systems, the telephone touchpad is located on the handset. Many domestic and foreign manufacturers make cellular car phones, but so far only Motorola makes portables, the DYNA T-A-C 8000X and 8000S. Motorola's portables look like a slightly enlarged, somewhat chunky telephone handset, with a stubby antenna at one end.

Portables are less powerful than car units, so they can't be used with some cellular systems. The portable's other limitation is battery life. A portable can listen for calls for about eight hours, but it can only transmit for only thirty minutes. After that time it must be charged for a minimum of an hour.

The following American cities have cellular telephone service or soon will get it:

New York Denver Los Angeles Seattle Chicago Milwaukee Philadelphia Tampa Detroit Cincinnati Boston Kansas City San Francisco Buffalo Washington Phoenix San Jose Dallas Indianapolis Houston New Orleans St. Louis Portland Miami Pittsburgh Cleveland San Diego Atlanta Baltimore Minneapolis

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Jester Sluggo presents an insight on Wide-Area Networks Part 2

Part 1 contains information on ARPANET and CSNET. Part 2 contains information on BITNET, MFENET, UUCP and USENET.

It is best if you read both files to better understand each other.

These files will cover general information on wide-area networks, (I.E. ARPANET, CSNET, BITNET, MFENET, UUCP and USENET), but may contain information in relationship with other networks not emphasized in these files. These files

are NOT a hacker's tutorial/quide on these systems.

BITNET

BITNET. In 1981, City University of New York (CUNY) surveyed universities on the East Coast of the U.S. and Canada, inquiring whether there was interest in creating and easy-to-use, economical network for interuniversity communication between scholars. The response was positive. Many shared the CUNY belief in the importance of computer-assisted communication between scholars. The first link of the new network, called BITNET, was established between CUNY and Yale University in May 1981.

The network technology chosen for BITNET was determined by the availability of the RSCS software on the IBM computers at the initial sites. [The name BITNET stands for Because It's Time NETwork.] The RSCS software is simple but effective, and most IBM VM-CMS computer systems have it installed for local communications, supporting file transfer and remote job entry services. The standard BITNET links are leased telephone lines running at 9600 bps. Although all the initial nodes were IBM machines in university computer centers, the network is in no way restricted to such systems. Any computer with an RSCS emulator can be connected to BITNET. Emulators are available for DEC VAX-VMS systems, VAX-UNIX systems, and for Control Data Corp. Cyber systems and others. Today, more than one-third of the computers on BITNET are non-IBM systems.

BITNET is a store-and-forward network with files and messages sent from computer to computer across the network. It provides electronic mail, remote job entry, and file transfer services, and supports and interactive message facility and a limited remote logon facility. Most BITNET sites use the same electronic mail procedures and standards as the ARPANET, and as a result of the installation of electronic mail gateway systems at the University of California at Berkley and at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, most BITNET users can communicate electronically with users on CSNET and the ARPANET.

BITNET has expanded extremely rapidly -- a clear indication that is providing service that people need and want. The simplicity of the connection to the network -- acquiring a 9600-bps leased line to the nearest neighboring computer node and in installing an additional line interface and modem -provides the service at the right price. By the end of 1985 the number of computers connected was expected to exceed 600, at more than 175 institutions of higher education throughout the U.S. BITNET is open without restriction to any college or university. It is not limited to specific academic disciplines, and may be used for any academic purpose. However, use for commercial purposes is prohibited. In special cases, connection of commercial organizations may be sponsored by universities. A particular case is the connection of Boeing Computer Services to BITNET, as part of the NSFnet initiative, to provide remote job entry services to their Cray X-MP/24 to NSF supercomputer grantees who have access to BITNET.

Until recently BITNET had no central management structure, and was coordinated by an executive board consisting of members from the major institutions participating. This worked because most of the computers connected were managed and operated by professional service organizations in university computer centers. However, the growth in the network made it

possible to continue in this ad hoc fashion, and a central support organization was established with support from an IBM grant. The central support organization, called the BITNET network support center (BITNSC), has two parts: A user services organization, the network information center (BITNSC), which provides user support, a name server and a variety of databases, and the development and operations center (BITDOC) to develop and operate the network. A major question facing the members of BITNET is how the funding of this central organization will be continued when the IBM grant expires in 1987.

BITNET, with support from the NSFnet Program, is now examining ways to provide ARPANET-like services to existing BITNET sites. The project, which is similar to the CSNET CYPRESS project, will explore a strategy to provide an optional path to the use of the TCP-IP procedures on existing 9.6-kbps leased lines. The possibility of upgrading these lines to multiple alternate links, providing higher reliability and availability, or to higher speed 56-kbps links is also being studied. The project will offer a higher level of service to BITNET sites choosing this path and also enable a low-cost connection to NSFnet.

MFENET

MFENET. The DOE's magnetic fusion energy research network was established in the mid-1970's to support access to the MFE Cray 1 supercomputer at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The network uses 56-kbs satellite links, and is designed to provide terminal access to the Cray time-sharing system (CTSS), also developed at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The network currently supports access to Cray 1, Cray X-MP/2, Cray 2, and Cyber 205 supercomputers. The network uses special-purpose networking software developed at Livermore, and, in addition to terminal access, provides file transfer, remote output queuing, and electronic mail, and includes some specialized application procedures supporting interactive graphics terminals and local personal computer (PC)-based editing. Access to the network is in general restricted to DOE-funded researchers. Recently the network has been expanded to include the DOE-funded supercomputer at Florida State University. MFENET is funded by DOE and managed by Livermore.

MFENET has been successful in supporting DOE supercomputer users. However, the specialized nature of the communications protocols is now creating difficulties for researchers who need advanced graphics workstations that use the UNIX BSD 4.2 operating system and the TCP-IP protocols on LAN's. For these and other reasons, DOE is examining how best to migrate MFENET to the TCP-IP, and later to the OSI, protocols.

The combination of the CTSS operating system and the MFENET protocols creates an effective interactive computing environment for researchers using Cray supercomputers. For this reason, two of the new NSF national supercomputer centers -- San Diego (SDSC) and Illinois -- have chosen the CTSS operating system. In SDSC's case, the MFENET protocols have also been chosen to support the SDSC Consortium network. In Illinois case, a project to implement the TCP-IP protocols for the CTSS operating system has been funded by the NSFnet program, and these developments will be shared with SDSC (and with DOE) to provide a migration path for the SDSC Consortium network.

UUCP and USENET

UUCP and USENET. The UUCP network was started in the 1970's to provide electronic mail and file transfer between UNIX systems. The network is a host-based store-and-forward network using dialup telephone circuits and operates by having each member site dialup the next UUCP host computer and send and receive files and electronic mail messages. The network uses addresses based on the physical path established by this sequence of dialups connections. UUCP is open to any UNIX system which chooses to participate. There are "informal" electronic mail gateways between UUCP and ARPANET, BITNET, or CSNET, so that users of any of these networks can exchange electronic mail.

USENET is a UNIX news facility based on the UUCP network that provides a news bulletin board service. Neither UUCP nor USENET has a central management; volunteers maintain and distribute the routing tables for the network. Each member site pays its own costs and agrees to carry traffic. Despite this reliance on mutual cooperation and anarchic management style, the network operates and provides a useful, if somewhat unreliable, and low-cost service to its members. Over the years the network has grown into a world-wide network with thousands of computers participating.

OTHERS

Other Wide-Area Networks. Of necessity this file of wide-area networks has been incomplete: Other networks of interest include the Space Plasma Analysis Network (SPAN) — a network of DEC VAX computers using 9.6-kbps links and the DECNET protocols for National Aeronautics and Space Administration's researchers; the planned Numerical and Atmospheric Sciences (NAS) network centered at Ames Research Center — a network that is expected to use existing and planned NASA communications links and the TCP-IP protocols; and the planned high-energy physics network — a network based largely on VAX computers and using the standard X.25 network level protocols plus the so called "coloured books" protocols developed in the United Kingdom. Also, many high-energy physicists, at the Stanford Linear Accelerator, at the Lawrence Berkley Laboratory, and at Fermi Laboratory, among others, have used DECNET to connect their DEC VAX computers together.

/ \ / luggo !!

Please give full credit for references to the following:

Dennis M. Jennings, Lawrence H. Landweber, Ira H. Fuchs, David J. Faber, and W. Richards Adrion.

Any questions, comments or Sluggestions can be emailed to me at Metal Shop, or sent via snailmail to the following address until 12-31-1986:

J. Sluggo
P.O. Box 93
East Grand Forks, MN 56721

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-=+^ Phrack World News ^+=-

Issue Five/Part 1

Compiled and Written By

Knight Lightning

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Where is Taran King?

May 10, 1986

Taran King is generally thought to be a very mellow, easy going person. For the most part this is true. However he also gets into major fights with his dad. When Taran does get pissed he, gets violent. In the past he has punched a hole into his bedroom door and put dents in his refrigerator with his fists.

Most recently his dad found out about his collection of illegal knives, including stilettos, butterflies, and survival knives. They got into an argument about this and eventually into a fight. Taran stormed off to his room. Meanwhile, unknown to him, his dad called the police. They took him to a nearby hospital's adolescent psychiatric ward, supposedly for evaluation. As of June 14, 1986 he has been there for five weeks and the end isn't in sight.

For a while he had no phone of visitor privileges and there was no way of contacting him. This now has changed, but the problems have not been solved.

On May 23, 1986 he was let out on a pass to go see Judas Priest in concert (it was great). He has been let out on pass several times since then as well, mostly on weekends.

As far as Metal Shop Private...

Well on May 12, 1986, the /\/impha and I decided to go to Taran's house to collect the Phrack files and to add a few new modifications to the bbs so that I could control it better remotely. Taran's sister let us in, no problem. Unfortunately, before we were done Taran's dad came home. He immediately spotted my car outside and burst into the house. He was pissed that we were there and made sure we weren't stealing anything (like I am really going to steal from my best friend right?). He assumed that the bbs had crashed and that we were there fixing it. He then decided that he didn't want us to come over every time the board crashed and TOOK IT DOWN!

Metal Shop Private will return when Taran gets out, hopefully sometime in June.

Metal Shop AE

April 27, 1986

Metal Shop AE is now the proud possessor of a full 40 megs of online storage. It also has added an individual password system for greater board security and now has an email messaging service online.

Metal Shop AE is sysoped by Cheap Shades. It is one of the main distribution centers for Phrack Inc. It has the complete Phrack series online as well as almost 1000 other files.

To become a member of Metal Shop AE, contact Cheap Shades, Taran King, or Knight Lightning.

To upload files for distribution in Phrack Inc. be sure to upload them to drive E which will save your file to a non-public viewable drive where it will stay until it is edited for Phrack.

Mark Tabas and Karl Marx Busted

The story goes like this; Mark Tabas was working at a plant in Denver where credit card blanks are manufactured. He decided to take a few. He and Karl Marx then went about finding someone with an embossing machine to print some stuff onto the blanks. They were able to find someone and agreed to meet at a motel to do the work. Everything went well. They were able to print card numbers, names, and expiration dates that they had gotten onto the blanks. To celebrate they ordered a bottle of champagne from room service, and paid for it with one of the cards. At that point the guy with the embosser pulled his badge, Secret Service! Now Mark Tabas and Karl Marx are facing forgery and carding charges along with theft for the blanks.

Information provided by Sally Ride...Space Cadet

(Editor's Note: At the time that this information was gained, Sally Ride commented that it may be a rumor. Any inconsistencies are not his fault) _____

We at Phrack have since uncovered more information about this bust. Apparently a guy named Will Bell, who's handle was Jack Bell, set up Karl Marx and Mark Tabas. Will Bell had the embossing machine and was not a member of the Secret Service. Instead, he was the son of a member of the Secret Service (although maybe he was the son of a member of the FBI). Since he was not a fed, this was not a case of entrapment. It is believed that Will/Jack Bell is originally from the 312 (Chicago) area.

Information Provided by Jester Sluggo and The Sprinter

FBI/Wylon In Action

On May 2, 1986, the homes of Cheap Shades and Kleptic Wizard received visits from Edward P. Nowicki, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This was not a bust in any way. This agent was trying to gain evidence for a telecommunications company known as Wylon, which is mainly based in the Colorado/Wyoming area. Apparently someone or several people had been calling Kleptic Palace AE and Metal Shop AE illegally and Mr. Nowicki wanted to know who had been placing these calls.

As far as Kleptic Palace AE, the calls in question were made on 2/9/86 5:12 AM, 2/9/86 4:33 PM, and 2/10/86 7:30 AM. Although no specific order is mentioned. The times of the calls made to Metal Shop AE are not available. A third place called was the home of TWCB Inc. At the time of these calls Whackoland was still up.

The agent expected all of them to have a caller log on the board but of course neither of their AEs kept caller logs. Not to mention the fact that no one would kept a caller log for three months anyway.

Kleptic Wizard got a message to Taran King which was then sent to me, and within the hour I arrived at Klepto's house where I discovered the FBI still around, so after killing another 45 minutes, I went inside and met with Klepto. Mr. Nowicki had left behind two things, his business card and a list of four suspects that he was specifically trying to bust. Apparently all four had been caught for Wylon abuse in the past.

I recognized the name at the top of the list almost instantly and as a result, saved a fellow phreak from a possible bust. Two of the others are rumored to have been warned as well. However if this is untrue then the other three still may be in great danger as of this writing. All of the suspects live in the Wyoming/Colorado area.

The homes of Cheap Shades and Kleptic Wizard were not searched and their boards were not looked at. The FBI agent even declined an invitation from Kleptic Wizard to see the bbs. This may be because he didn't have a warrant.

Kleptic Wizard and Cheap Shades

Administration Nominations?

May 6, 1986

In late April 1986, The Administration decided to have their yearly membership drive for the group. The phreaks/hackers being voted on for membership included:

Blade Runner/Jester Sluggo/Knight Lightning/Oryan Quest/Phlash Gordon Recent Change/Sally Ride/Slave Driver/Taran King/The Marauder

Many of the above and others had thought that they had been voted into the Administration without even being asked. However this was not the case.

David Lightman stated that the nominations were made public so that the Administration members would know of the vote taking place on Administration $^{\rm RBS}$

1. Once the nominations were voted on, then the $\frac{h}{h}$ the phreaks/hacks would be formally invited.

I now pose an important question. If David Lightman is the only regular board caller of the Administration, then how would the other members know how to

So far the results of the votes have not been made public. Not that it matters that much because The Administration has now more or less completely fallen apart. It would appear that this new membership drive was an attempt to revive the group with new blood. However the group has been revived on its own, since the formers members regrouped again...at least temporarily.

Some Information Provided by David Lightman

Trouble in Texas

June 2, 1986

In the last week of May, David Lightman, decided to do a credimatic check on Blade Runner. To his great surprise, he found that Blade Runner worked for Southwestern Bell Security. He confronted Blade Runner with this information and shortly afterward received a visit from Southwestern Bell Security, who confiscated his terminal programs, his user files, notebooks, and g-phile disks. He claims that his user files and g-philes were scrambled so no one should worry too much.

Later that day, Sir Gamelord, sysop of World's Grave Elite, called David Lightman and said that Blade Runner was on the board and acting really strange. David Lightman told him what happened and they then hung up. The next day Blade Runner is a cosysop of World's Grave Elite as well as Thieve's Underground, sysoped by Jack The Ripper. Now Sir Gamelord denies the incident ever occurred. At this writing, David Lightman is laying low and retiring from the phreak world until things clear up.

Sir Gamelord's side to this story is quite different. Sir Gamelord said that he, Blade Runner, and Jack the Ripper were forming a group called the P.H.I.R.M. (see Phrack Pro-Phile 3 this issue) and that Lightman wanted to be in and to lead the group as a subsidiary of The Administration (like Team Hackers'86). They refused, and took away his cosysop access on their boards. Sir Gamelord says that Lightman is making this whole Southwestern Bell Security story up to get revenge on them.

However, Lightman claims that he was asked to be a member of The P.H.I.R.M., but refused because he didn't have the time. He did however recommend Digital Logic, Ford Prefect, and The Lineman (sysop of the Lost City Of Atlantis).

David Lightman has since received his disks back but will not be around on boards very much. The decision is up to you. I will try to get more information out on boards as soon as possible.

Information provided by David Lightman and Sir $\operatorname{Gamelord}$

Ninja NYC/Sigmund Fraud; Close Calls

Sigmund Fraud, famous for his incredible proficiency at "social engineering" is now laying incredibly low after what is considered the closest call of his

The following must be regarded as pure rumor for the sake of non-incrimination of those involved. You readers know what I mean.

The story goes like this, Sigmund Fraud and a friend (the same one who went to the Telepub'86 meeting in New York, however he has no handle) were able to convince their local Bell company that they were another part of the same company and were able to acquire; Call Forwarding, Call Waiting, Speed Calling, and Three Way Calling on to Sigmud Fraud's personal phone line. Since SF's friend lived in a Cross Bar (X-Bar) area he could not get these services so they decided to get them for Ninja NYC. They told him about it later.

Less than a week later, on the first Thursday of May 1986, Ninja NYC came home to discover 2 telco agents awaiting his return from school. What it boiled down to was that "he" had committed several felonies and to make matters worse, the people at the local Bell company identified Ninja NYC's voice as being the caller, AND HE ISN'T THE ONE WHO MADE THE CALL!!!! What it finally boiled down to was that Ninja NYC had really received a very scary personal warning.

About this same time Sigmund Fraud is getting home and to his great dismay, all of his new found phone features have been turned off!!?! Sometime later (most likely after the telco agents had left) Sigmund gets a call from Ninja NYC. Ninja NYC of course tells him everything that had happened and warned him that he was next. Sigmund immediately called me. We both thought Sigmund was doomed and would be picked up very soon.

However this was not the case. The agents didn't show up and Sigmund had been given a golden opportunity to dump all his illegal items and get his story right. That night I received a call from Slave Driver and Sigmund call me on three-way and we discussed what to do next. The problem was that Sigmund didn't want to get rid of his illegal items. He had boxes, manuals, notebooks, and even a PBX in his room. I told he had 2 choices; Choice A: SF gets rid of his shit somewhere anywhere, and the telcos don't get any more evidence or, Choice B: SF leaves the stuff where it is, the telcos come over and take it and SF gets nailed worse.

When I left the conversation SF was still discussing what he should do. The next day, he was not visited by the telcos, he was not busted, but instead received a call from his local bell company and was given a very strong verbal warning.

Since that time, He has stopped answering his personal phone and believes that line to be monitored. Ninja NYC is almost definitely being monitored and people have been asked not to call him.

Of course that didn't stop Daniel Zigmond from calling him. This was in an attempt to help Sigmund Fraud, but regardless may have done more damage than good.

Information Provided by Sigmund Fraud/Slave Driver/Knight Lightning

Telecomputist; Printed Newsletter

June 8, 1986

From: Forest Ranger and "TeleComputist" staff,

To: You!

I have drafted the idea for a newsletter and I stress the word newsletter. TWCB had promised everyone a 40+, glossy page magazine for an outrageous amount. I do not want to say that we are taking TAP over because we are not, but instead making amends for what TWCB did not do. To show our sincerity we will be offering the first issue free. It will be your basic newsletter with exceptional articles from experienced phone phreaks, computer hackers, and

telecom buffs. Each issue will be a set four pages but since this is the grand opening issue it will be longer (20 pages). For the first free issue please send a postage paid, self addressed envelope to:

TeleComputist Newsletter P.O. Box 2003 Florissant, Mo. 63032

Also, please send subscriptions to the same address. The subscription fee for the newsletter will be twelve dollars a year, fifty cents for back issues. This is a monthly circulation and we encourage letters.

The "TeleComputist" Staff includes:

Forest Ranger/Data Line/Reverend Enge
Ax Murderer/Chris Jones/Knight Lightning/Taran King/Mad Molester

Information Provided by Telecomputist Staff