#### Cashina hat


Player I can put \$0, \$1, or \$3 in a hat The hat is passed to player 2 Player 2 can either "match" (ie add the same amount)
or take the cash

payoffs player 1 
$$\begin{cases} 0 \rightarrow 0 \\ 1 \rightarrow double \text{ if match, } -1 \text{ if not} \\ 3 \rightarrow \text{"", } -3 \text{""} \end{cases}$$

« Toy version of lender and borrower »

#### Sequential Move Game

player 2 knows player 1s Choice before 2 chooses player I knows that this will be the case



### moral hazard

exagent has incentives to do things that are bad for the principal >>

example | kept the size of loan/project small to I reduce the temptation to cheat

Solutions

- · limits / restrictions on money
- · break loan up
- · change contract to give insentives not to shirk >>

[ Incentive design " a smaller share of a larger pie " can be bigger than a large share of a small pie.


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< Incentive contracts: Baseball Managers >> Piece rates Collateral Kesubtract house from run away payoffs: colowers payoffs to borrower at some tree points, yet makes the borrower better of lowers your payoffs (if you do not repay) > better off Changes the choices of others in a way that helps you Commitment strategy 1066

«getting rid of choices can make me better off »

OPTIONS COMMITMENT CHANGES BEHAVIOR OF OTHER THE OTHER PLAYERS MUST

K-Backward Induction



Lion game

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