

Chapter 9

Mixed Strategies In Theory And Tennis

We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighted average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis.

Definition: A mixed strategy p_i is a randomization over its pure strategies $p_i(s_i)$ is the probability that p_i assigns to the pure strategy s_i .

- $p_i(s_i)$ could be zero. $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0)$.
- $p_i(s_i)$ could be one. A pure strategy.

Payoffs From Mixed Strategy

The expected payoffs of the mixed strategy p_i is the weighted average of the expected payoffs of each of the pure strategies in the mix.

Lesson: If a mixed strategy is a best response then each of the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be a best responses. In particular, each must yield the same expected payoff.

Definition: A mixed strategy profile $(p_1^*, p_2^*, \dots, p_n^*)$ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if for each i , p_i^* is a best response to p_{-i} .

Lesson: If $p_i^*(s_i) > 0$, then s_i^* is a best response to p_{-i}^* .