Partisans, Antipartisans, and Nonpartisans

Voting Behavior in Brazil

David J. Samuels and Cesar Zucco

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Conventional wisdom suggests that partisanship has little impact on voter behavior in Brazil; what matters most is pork-barreling, incumbent performance, and candidates' charisma. This book shows that soon after redemocratization in the 1980s, more than half of Brazilian voters expressed either a strong affinity or antipathy for or against a particular political party, in particular, that the contours of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil have been shaped mainly by how people feel about one party – the Workers' Party (PT). Voter behavior in Brazil has largely been structured around sentiment for or against this one party, and not any of Brazil's many others. We show how the PT managed to successfully cultivate widespread partisanship in a difficult environment, and also explain the emergence of anti-PT attitudes. We then reveal how positive and negative forms of partisanship shape voters' attitudes about politics and policy, and how they shape their choices in the ballot booth.

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Acknowledgments

The idea for this book has deep roots for both of us. Samuels' first exposure to Brazil came in 1992, when he lived in Brasília, as a guest of and working as a sort of intern for Workers Party (PT) federal deputy Jaques Wagner, who later went on to serve as Minister of Labor and Chief of Staff under Lula, two terms as governor of Bahia, and Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense under Dilma. The year 1992 was a tumultuous one in Brazilian politics, as the PT led the charge to impeach Fernando Collor, Brazil's first democratically elected president since 1960, and Samuels' engagement with the PT during this period became a lasting interest. Nonetheless, a couple of years later, after reading an early draft of what would become his first published paper (Samuels 1999), his graduate school advisor, Gary Cox, suggested that for the sake of his career he should not write his dissertation on the PT – because "one book on a small opposition party with an uncertain future" (Keck 1992) was enough, at the time. Samuels took that advice, but continued to write about the PT (e.g., Samuels 2004) and by the mid-2000s turned to the question of the rise of petismo in voters' minds (Samuels 2006).

Zucco experienced the connection between the PT and civil society a few years before studying the issue and decades before writing about it, while participating in student government in college in the 1990s. Although his roles were always quite minor, he was introduced to the traditions, lingo, symbolism, and factions of party life, as well as to how different civil society organizations come into a party's fold. He vividly recalls, for instance, visiting unions in order to obtain (extremely modest) contributions for student government elections. Also while in college, he became – at least according to official records – a member of a

(different) party, even though he has only a vague idea about how this might have come to be. The surprise in finding out that for legal purposes he was (and still is) officially a party member was more than enough reason to give him pause about the relevance and importance of partisanship in the lives of Brazilian voters. Results presented in this book helped him overcome some of his initial skepticism.

Ideas laid out by Samuels in his 2006 piece provided the foundation stone for this book but it would still take years of collaboration on article-length projects before the book's central idea would take shape. Samuels and Zucco first met at the 2003 Latin American Studies Association meeting in Dallas, when Zucco was still a graduate student. Zucco experienced sticker shock at the price of the Brazilian churrascaria (steakhouse) in Dallas, consuming in one meal his family's food budget for an entire week. A few years later, Samuels approached Zucco after watching him present his work on the political impact of *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, and they had a chat about the potential impact of partisanship on voting behavior. Zucco's preliminary analysis of survey data on partisanship performed in 2008 – for what eventually become a chapter in an edited volume on party system institutionalization (Zucco 2015) – served as a starting point for a conversation that turned into an effort to explain the evolution of petismo and to test the relative strength of petismo as a form of partisanship. Readers will find elements of those two projects in Chapters 2 and 3. Portions of Chapter 4 have also previously appeared, in Samuels and Zucco, "Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots," *British Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 755–775 (October, 2015).

We presented our research on numerous occasions, starting with a presentation at Harvard University's David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies in November 2010, and we returned to Harvard to present additional work for the conference on "Party-Building in Latin America" in November of 2012. We presented different parts of this project at a workshop at Oxford University in January of 2012 and again in February of 2016. We also presented our research at the *Fundação Getúlio Vargas – São Paulo* in March, 2013; at the *Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro* and the Graduate Program in Political Science at Brazil's Chamber of Deputies in October 2013; at the Inter-American Development Bank in May 2011; at the 2010, 2011, and 2017 American Political Science Association Meetings; at a seminar on "Partisanship and Electoral Behavior" at the *Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina* in May 2015; at MIT in May 2016 and again at the "Political Behavior of Development" conference at MIT in November 2016; and at

the University of Notre Dame in April 2015 and February 2017. We thank participants at all these presentations for their questions and comments.

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1

Introduction

If democracy is unthinkable without strong political parties (Schattschneider 1975), we all have good reason to worry. For decades, parties around the world have appeared to be in decline, with links of representation and accountability between voters and elected officials growing increasingly tenuous. After Brazil redemocratized in the 1980s, scholars quickly classified it as an important case study of partisan and party-system weakness: its political institutions, it was said, promoted individualism and undermined parties as agents of collective representation (Ames 2001), resulting in an "inchoate" party system (Mainwaring 1999). Most observers concluded that the weakness of Brazil's parties boded ill for the health of its nascent democracy (e.g., Lamounier 1989; Mainwaring 1992; Mainwaring & Scully 1995*b*; Weyland 1996; Kinzo 2004; D'Araújo 2009).

Some scholars did see a glass half-full rather than half-empty, noting that Brazil's legislative parties were actually fairly cohesive, and that despite the party system's extreme fragmentation and relative ideological incoherence, democracy appeared to function about as well as in any other country in the region (Figueiredo & Limongi 1999; Melo & Pereira 2013; Montero 2014).

However, Brazil's recent political and economic crises – culminating in the 2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff – has brought renewed attention to party and party-system dysfunction. After the 2014 elections twenty-seven parties held at least one seat each in the lower house of Brazil's legislature (the Chamber of Deputies), and the largest party held only 11% of the seats (Câmara dos Deputados 2016). This is an extraordinary level of fragmentation, especially given Brazil's lack of ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages, as for example in India.

The political crisis that erupted following that year's election was so profound that by the mid-2010s Brazilian voters expressed the lowest level of confidence in political parties of any country in the region (Latinobarómetro 2016*b*). Furthermore, by 2016 72% of Brazilians stated they felt close to none of Brazil's parties, the lowest level since survey firms started asking a partisanship question in 1989 (Datafolha 2016). Disillusionment with parties also damaged popular faith in democracy: by 2016 only 32% of Brazilians agreed that "Democracy is preferable to all other forms of government," a decline of twenty-two points from the previous year and ahead of only Guatemala across Latin America (Latinobarómetro 2016*a*). As of this writing, Brazil's political crisis continues, with judicial investigations revealing no apparent end to corruption.

For millions of Brazilians, the biggest disappointment in recent years has to be the dismal trajectory of Dilma's party, the Workers' Party, or PT for *Partido dos Trabalhadores*. The PT grew out of grassroots social movement and labor union opposition to Brazil's military dictatorship in the late 1970s, and for years it cultivated an image as Brazil's most programmatic party. The pronunciation of PT in Portuguese gave rise to the nickname applied to its partisan supporters: *petistas*, who grew from 0% of voters in 1980 to almost 30% just a generation later.

The PT's reputation as an outsider party changed after its long-time leader, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, first won the presidency in 2002. Winning elections and having to govern pushed the PT to enter broad coalitions and compromise or even abandon many of its long-held policy commitments. Yet political moderation did not hurt the party's performance – instead, that tactic paid huge dividends as the PT picked up hordes of new supporters in the 2000s who credited the party for growing Brazil's economy and for raising millions of Brazilians into the middle class.

However, a deep recession that began in 2013, along with evidence of the PT's involvement in massive corruption scandals under Dilma, deeply corroded the party's popular support. Corruption signaled a betrayal of the PT's core principles, the so-called *modo petista de governar* or "PT way of governing" – in particular of the party's supposed commitment to transparency and honesty in government.[1] The PT had deliberately

[1] The *modo petista de governar* can be boiled down to an effort to transform Brazil by (1) strengthening links between state and society by enhancing participatory opportunities; (2) reducing socioeconomic inequalities; and (3) improving the rule of law. The first element draws attention to problems of representation and accountability deriving from Brazil's party system and its formal institutional structure; the second deals with the tension between formal democratic equality and informal inequalities of opportunity based

created an organization that would bind the party to its principles and maintain strong links to its grassroots supporters, but by 2014 petistas were distancing themselves from the party, having concluded that Brazil's way of doing politics had changed the party far more than the PT had changed Brazil's way of doing politics.

None of Brazil's other parties have benefited from the PT's recent decline. In fact, the recent crisis has seen a decline in support for all major parties, not just the PT. In 1998, the three largest center-right parties – the PMDB, PSDB, and PFL[2] – won exactly 50% of the (lower chamber) vote, but by 2014 they managed only 27%.

The rise of the PT suggests that it is not impossible to build a programmatic party in Brazil – only that it is very difficult to do so. Likewise, the decline of the PT implies that it is also challenging to maintain a programmatic reputation after winning power. To be sure, Dilma was impeached partly because the PT was in a weak position. Although it had won four consecutive presidential elections, the PT's share of the legislative vote had peaked at 18% in 2002, and in 2014 it managed to win only 14%. Clearly, the PT's repeated success in presidential elections did not translate into similar success in legislative elections. In fact, since 2002 the PT had become an extreme example of what Samuels and Shugart (2010) call "separation of purpose" – its presidential candidates actually performed better where the PT's legislative candidates did *worse*.

Fourteen percent of the vote still made the PT the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies after 2014, but too small to shield Dilma from defections of coalition partners or from opposition attacks. Unlike any other impeachment in world history, Dilma was betrayed by a member of her own vice president's party, Chamber of Deputies Speaker Eduardo Cunha. Cunha was no anticorruption crusader. In fact, less than two weeks after Dilma was impeached, Cunha's colleagues sacked him on corruption charges, and he was later jailed. (It is widely believed that Cunha initiated impeachment proceedings against Dilma in a futile effort to avoid the fate he ultimately suffered.) Dilma's replacement Michel Temer epitomized Brazil's discredited political class, and not surprisingly has also been targeted by several corruption investigations.

on race, class, or gender; and the third focuses on the web of "illiberal" practices such as corruption, crime, police brutality, and lack of access to justice for average Brazilians (Magalhães, Barreto, & Trevas 1999).

[2] *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement; *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*, Party of Brazilian Social Democracy; and *Partido da Frente Liberal* or Liberal Front Party, now called the *Democratas* or Democrats.

Regardless of whether one considers Dilma's impeachment a "coup," it is no surprise that the spectacle of a legislature full of corrupt politicians sitting in judgment of Dilma raised questions about the outcome's legitimacy in the eyes of many Brazilian voters. After all, more than 60% of legislators were themselves targets of judicial investigations when they voted to impeach the president (Transparency Brasil 2016). This fact helps explain why so many Brazilians currently hold parties and democracy in such low regard.

Given parties' discredit, why write a book about mass partisan attitudes in contemporary Brazil? As noted, conventional wisdom suggests that partisanship has little impact on voter behavior (Mainwaring 1992; Nadeau 2017). Instead, what matters most are "pork, pageantry, and performance" – candidates' personal qualities, performance in office, and ability to deliver constituent service (Ames 2008).

Such factors do matter – for nonpartisan voters. For those voters who affirm an affinity with a particular party, however, partisan attitudes powerfully shape *perceptions of* candidates' qualities, performance in office, and ability to "bring home the bacon." Generally speaking, this is not a novel claim. In fact, the endogeneity of attitudes and perceptions to partisanship is now conventional wisdom in the study of comparative political behavior (Bartels 2002; Tilley & Hobolt 2011; Healy & Malhotra 2013). However, given the assumption of weak parties in Brazil's electorate, our argument offers a novel way of understanding Brazilian politics.[3]

We show that mass partisan attitudes have played an underappreciated role in shaping Brazilian voters' attitudes and behavior since the 1980s. We explore positive partisanship – a psychological attachment to a favored party – as well as a hidden aspect of Brazilians' political attitudes, "negative" partisanship, the rejection of a disliked party. In particular, we highlight the importance of both positive and negative attitudes about the PT, because *petismo* and *antipetismo* have been the predominant elements of Brazil's party system in the electorate since the 1980s. Partisan attitudes about the PSDB and PMDB are less coherent than petismo, but the main difference is quantitative, not qualitative: the number of PMDB and PSDB partisans has always been fairly small, while petistas and antipetistas have comprised a substantial proportion of the electorate since the 1990s.

To understand the path of Brazilian electoral politics since redemocratization, it is particularly important to understand how the PT's

[3] Ames and his coauthors do suggest that voters' policy attitudes may matter to some degree, in presidential and perhaps gubernatorial elections. The argument we develop implies that for partisans, policy attitudes in Brazil are mostly a function of partisanship.

emergence shaped Brazilians' political attitudes and voting behavior – both for and against. The ongoing political crisis (as of late 2017) renders none of this irrelevant. As we will show, antipetismo is not merely a phenomenon of the Dilma era – indeed, the number of antipetistas has been fairly constant since before Lula's first election as president, and the number of antipetistas was fairly high even when Brazil's economy was performing well. Moreover, the recent decline in the number of petistas may turn out to be temporary – a consequence of the deep crisis that began while Dilma was still in office. Those who were petistas at one point but who now call themselves nonpartisans may, at some point, return to the party's fold.

1.1 PARTISANSHIP AND ANTIPARTISANSHIP

The concept of party strength has three elements (Key 1952), each of which speaks to different aspects of the nature and process of representative government: (1) parties in government, (2) parties as organizations, and (3) parties in the electorate. Debate about the relative strength of Brazil's parties has focused on the first element (e.g., Figueiredo & Limongi 1999). Some important research exists on parties' relative organizational strength, but most of this work focuses on the PT (e.g., Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992; Samuels 2004; Amaral 2010; Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 2010).

As for the third element, the strength of parties in Brazilian voters' minds, relatively little research exists compared to the focus on Brazil's legislative parties, perhaps because observers tend to accept the conventional wisdom that in addition to incumbent presidents' ability to manage the economy, "pageantry and pork" are the most important factors shaping vote choice.[4]

The focus on legislative parties has created an imbalance in terms of what observers regard as important about Brazilian politics. This is particularly unfortunate given that although the aggregate level of party ID in Brazil is not particularly high in comparative perspective, it is also not particularly low (Huber, Kernell, & Leoni 2005; Kitschelt et al. 2010).

[4] However, see e.g., Reis (1988); Balbachevsky (1992); Deheza (1997); Carreirão (2002); Kinzo (2004, 2005); Samuels (2006); Baker, Ames, and Rennó (2006); Carreirão (2007); Venturi (2010); Braga and Kinzo (2007); Veiga (2007); Rennó and Cabello (2010); Braga and Pimentel (2011); Paiva and Tarouco (2011); Veiga (2011); Pereira (2014); Speck and Balbachevsky (2016); Baker et al. (2016); Amaral and Tanaka (2016); Limongi and Cortez (2010).

This suggests that partisanship could be fairly important. And in fact, as we show, both positive and negative partisanship have powerfully shaped the political attitudes and behavior of a wide swath of Brazil's electorate.

Party ID is one of the most important variables in political science, simply because no other variable accounts as well or as consistently for political behavior (Huddy, Sears & Levy 2013, p. 2). Positive partisanship is typically considered a form of social identity – an affective psychological attachment to a larger group. It forms part of an individual's sense of self, and as such it shapes opinions about politics, motivates political engagement, and impacts vote choice (Miller & Shanks 1996; Greene, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen 2013). Levels of partisanship for different parties signal the main lines of political competition in a polity, as people who identify with a party typically vote for (candidates from) that party, while voters with no partisan attachments tend not to vote for (candidates from) just one party.

Of all of Brazil's many parties, only the PT has managed to cultivate a strong psychological attachment among a substantial proportion of Brazil's voters. The party began attracting a wide base of partisan support in the 1980s, and for the next three decades petismo's spread among voters reflected the party's growing importance in Brazilian politics. By the mid-2000s, about 30% of Brazilians claimed to be petistas, a relatively large proportion for any party in any country. Moreover, since the 1990s the PT has also had a disproportionately large share of all partisans. For example, in the 2000s more than half of all Brazilians who identified with any party identified with the PT.

Another reason to highlight the PT's impact on mass political attitudes and behavior in Brazil is that the spread of petismo sparked a reaction in the opposite direction: the emergence of a strong sense of dislike for the PT known as antipetismo. Relatively little is known – in Brazil or elsewhere – about negative partisanship, voters' *rejection* of a particular party. Although early scholars suggested that partisanship could entail both positive and negative attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960), most research has explored only the positive side of partisanship.[5]

The scholarly focus on positive partisanship may derive from the assumption that negative and positive partisan attitudes are flip sides of the same coin (Greene 1999). However, these attitudes do not always

[5] For exceptions, see, e.g., Medeiros and Noël (2013) or Mayer (2017). For recent work on Brazil, see Ribeiro and Borba (2016) or Paiva, Krause, and Lameirão (2016).

TABLE 1.1. *The Four Possible Types of Voters*

		Strong identification with in-group	
		Yes	**No**
Strong antipathy for out-group	**Yes**	Hard-core partisans	Negative partisans *(Pure antipartisans)*
	No	Positive partisans	Nonpartisans

mirror each other. The latter can in fact emerge autonomously, and can have distinct effects. Table 1.1 identifies the range of possibilities.

First, "hard-core" partisans have both positive and negative attitudes. These partisans not only identify with a party but also strongly reject another. A second group of voters, those on the lower left, may have positive feelings for a particular party, but lack strong negative partisan sentiments. These first two groups of individuals would be functionally equivalent in terms of voting behavior if we were to examine only the positive partisanship question surveys typically ask.

Members of a third group, on the lower right, are nonpartisans – they express neither positive nor negative attitudes toward any political party. Many Brazilians do fall in this box – and for them, pork and pageantry may matter most of all. However, it is crucial to distinguish nonpartisans from members of the fourth group, negative partisans. These voters, whom we also call "pure antipartisans," have strong attitudes against a party, but no positive partisan attachment.

Despite the relative lack of research, examples of negative partisans from around the world are not hard to come by. For example, in Argentina many voters are anti-Peronists but do not identify with any party (Torre 2003), while in the USA some voters dislike the Republicans but do not identify as Democrats (or vice versa). (See Chapter 6 for a broad comparative perspective.)

As we will detail, positive and negative partisan attitudes are not psychological mirror images: many Brazilians identify with a party without feeling negatively about any, while others feel strong antipathy toward a party without developing a positive partisan attachment. This means we stand to gain a great deal in terms of understanding Brazilian politics by distinguishing negative partisans from nonpartisans. Voters who dislike a particular party may not know which candidate or party they like, but by affirming that they "would never vote for" or "strongly dislike" a particular party they have significantly narrowed their choices. Ignoring negative

partisan attitudes means losing a great deal of information about voters' likely behavior, and leaves out a major component of the story scholars seek to tell about the key contours of politics in different countries.

The contours of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil are shaped mainly by how people feel about the PT. At times, almost half of all voters have been either petistas or antipetistas. Moreover, just as most positive partisans in Brazil are petistas, most negative partisans are antipetistas. These facts point to a key caveat to our claim that partisan attitudes have provided more structure to Brazil's party system in the electorate than scholars have perceived: partisanship does matter, but voter behavior in Brazil is largely structured around sentiment for or against the PT, not about other parties.

1.2 TWO PUZZLES

Two puzzles motivate our research. The first is the rise of petismo. We started exploring this question in the early 2000s, shortly after the number of petistas first began to outpace the number of partisans for any other party (Samuels 2006). The rise of petismo is puzzling because existing theories predict that sociological and institutional factors should impede the development of mass partisanship in Brazil. How did the PT upset this prediction?

A second challenge is that existing work on mass partisanship explains something that already exists. In the USA, for example, a sizable literature seeks to explain partisan *realignments*, transformations in what partisanship means to voters and/or in parties' demographic bases (e.g., Mayhew 2002). Likewise, in Europe and elsewhere, scholars have focused on explaining partisan *dealignment* or collapse, a gradual dissipation of partisan support (e.g., Dalton et al. 2002). In either case, partisanship already exists – it is just changing, or disappearing.

In contrast, the rise of petismo is an electoral "alignment" – the initial emergence of party ID where none had existed before. Because partisanship first emerged before the advent of modern social science methods, scholars tend to take its existence among voters for granted. Yet perhaps obviously, to explain the initial emergence of partisanship we cannot rely on the theory of childhood socialization (e.g., Zuckerman et al. 2007), which assumes that partisan identities already exist as sociocultural categories, and that they can be transferred from parent to child. The key puzzle in Brazil is explaining partisanship in "generation zero." In western Europe, generation zero emerged when parties represented relatively

distinct, identifiable, and coherent social categories, a situation that bears no semblance to 1980s Brazil. How do collective partisan identities emerge in the first place in such a context?

Scholarship that might help answer this question has focused on elites' top-down efforts to craft party ID. This literature suggests that partisanship is more likely to develop when parties (1) perform well in office; (2) develop a coherent brand that overlaps with or reinforces existing forms of social identity such as religion or ethnicity; (3) have extensive national and local-level organizations; or are active in (4) ideologically polarized or (5) postconflict environments (e.g., Torcal & Mainwaring 2003; Lupu 2016).

These hypotheses fail to explain the relative success of Brazilian parties at cultivating partisanship. First, both the PT and its main rival the PSDB have performed well in national elections since the 1990s, but the latter never gained many partisans whereas the PT did. Second, *all* of Brazil's main parties have diluted the coherence of their brands since the 1990s, but paradoxically the PT's partisan base continued to grow as it did so – and no party has sought to create a partisan brand that appeals to only one race, ethnicity, or religion. Third, although several parties have extensive organizations, only the PT has cultivated a mass partisan base (Samuels & Zucco 2014).[6] In short, existing research offers no clear explanation for the PT's ability to cultivate mass partisanship through 2013 and other parties' inability to do so.

This brings us to the second puzzle motivating our research: the existence of a relatively large number of negative partisans among Brazilian voters, most of whom are antipetistas. Why do so many Brazilians passionately dislike the PT but refuse to identify with another political party?

Some suggest that the answer to this question lies with anger at the PT's involvement with corruption under Dilma. It is true that by late 2015 Brazilian voters were citing corruption as the country's most important problem (Folha de São Paulo 2015). Why do some Brazilian voters focus blame for corruption on PT and only the PT? Corruption has permeated Brazilian politics for generations. Corruption under Dilma cannot explain antipetismo.

For similar reasons, exploring why so many Brazilians took to the streets to protest Dilma circa 2013 also provides little insight into the roots of antipetismo (cf. Winters & Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Antipetismo predates Dilma by decades, and the number of antipetistas in the

[6] The fourth and fifth conditions are irrelevant for the Brazilian case.

electorate has been large and fairly constant since the 1990s. Moreover, there are many more antipetistas in the electorate than there were protesters in the streets. These facts imply that antipetismo also cannot be explained with reference to Dilma's mismanagement of Brazil's economy. Even when Brazil's economy was booming during Lula's second term (2007–10), the share of antipetistas in the electorate was only slightly smaller than it was in 2014. In short, antipetismo has deeper roots than any anger directed at Dilma.

The fact that most antipetistas are purely negative partisans is also puzzling. Many petistas are "hard-core" partisans: they like the PT, and also affirm that they would never vote for the PT's main competitor, the PSDB. In contrast, relatively few antipetistas have a positive partisan attachment. Specifically, despite what knowledgeable observers might expect, very few antipetistas are *tucanos*, the nickname for PSDB partisans, based on the party's avian mascot, the toucan. That is, most antipetistas have an outgroup that they hate, but no in-group that they like – which means that the answer to the question of where antipetismo comes from cannot rest with a "top-down" effort by party elites to craft (anti-)partisan attitudes. Antipetismo has existed almost as long as the PT has – but apparently not because other party leaders have deliberately sought to capitalize on widespread anti-PT sentiment. Antipetismo appears to have emerged as a reaction to the emergence of the PT and of petismo among Brazilian voters, not because the PT's rivals deliberately cultivated it.

1.3 OUR ARGUMENT

Let us elaborate on the explanation for both the rise of petismo, and of antipetismo. To explain the PT's ability to cultivate mass partisanship, we agree that elites' efforts to develop and disseminate a party brand is important. As per Social Identity Theory (SIT), a coherent brand is essential for instilling the notion in individuals' minds that an in-group exists with which they can identify and in which they can invest emotional and psychological energy.

As the literature suggests, we also agree that developing an extensive party organization is important. However, we add a third element to this story, one that scholars have overlooked: whether parties use their organization to engage individuals who are active in organized civil society. Formal party organization can be extensive, but might also exist only on paper. It could also be extensive but decentralized, making it difficult for central-party elites to coordinate its use. In either of these examples, the

emergence of mass partisanship is unlikely. The key to cultivating mass partisanship lies with what party elites *do* with their party's organization. We highlight the consequences for the emergence of mass partisanship of nationally organized outreach efforts that build and maintain the party's links to individuals in organized civil society. These connections forge the glue that unifies the in-group and solidifies partisan identities in voters' minds.

Petismo spread due to the PT's strategic branding effort, which used the party's local organizational branches for outreach to individuals in organized civil society who were predisposed to like the PT's approach to politics. The PT successfully appealed to the already mobilized – that is, it tended to gain partisans where civil society was already organizationally dense. This suggests that top-down and bottom-up strategies to cultivate partisans are flip sides of the same coin, because a top-down strategy will not bear fruit if it cannot capitalize on the work that a dense civil society has accomplished already, bringing like-minded individuals together to achieve a shared goal.

Given recent events, we must also offer an explanation for the *decline* in petismo among Brazilian voters. Once a party organization is in place and the party has successfully cultivated its brand name, what might cause voters to fall "out of love" with their party? Because events are so recent (and because we lacked a crystal ball in 2010 that would have allowed us to foresee the PT's later decline) we lack survey data to develop a full explanation, and so our argument remains provisional. What we suggest is rooted in the different approaches to understanding the nature of partisanship. The "Michigan school" suggests that partisanship is a form of social identity, an "unmoved mover" that drives political attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 128). Obviously this cannot be true for all voters all of the time, as it cannot explain how voters come to develop a partisan identity in the first place, nor can it explain why voters' attachments sometimes dissipate. Here, the "Rochester school" can help. Fiorina (1977, 1981) argued that partisanship is better thought of as a "running tally," in which individuals continuously update their party's qualities in light of events such as economic crises or scandals. In this view partisanship is caused by evaluations, rather than being a cause of evaluations (Tilley & Hobolt 2011).

Recent research suggests that for most partisans, something of a middle ground exists: partisanship *is* a form of social identity, but the intensity of the attachment can also vary. To the extent that this is true, we have an explanation for both the rise and the decline of petismo. For one, a

middle ground allows partisan attitudes to be heterogeneous. For example, some partisans are "hard core" – they only see their party in a positive light, and view negative information about their party as propaganda or a smear campaign. In contrast to these true believers, other partisans may be more ambivalent. They know they support their party over any other, but they accept, in a sense, that "nobody's perfect" (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen 2013).

Another critical finding that helps explain petismo's decline is that for most partisans, the intensity of their attachment varies in a particular way: partisanship is "bounded," oscillating between identifying with a party and identifying as independent. However, partisans rarely switch allegiances (Zuckerman et al. 2007; Clarke & McCutcheon 2009; Neundorf, Stegmueller, & Scotto 2011). The question is, what factors cause some partisans to question their attachment to their party, and perhaps switch from "petista" to "nonpartisan" in a survey response? Our answer is similar to recent efforts to explain partisan collapse around Latin America: petismo declined because events cast the party in a negative light. Mainly, petistas grew disillusioned with Dilma's and their party's mismanagement of Brazil's economy and with the party's apparent abandonment of the principles that attracted them to its banner in the first place.

Our explanation for the second puzzle, the spread of antipetismo, also relies on elements of SIT. SIT posits that in-group and out-group attachments can emerge symbiotically, but among different people. That is, if a particular form of social identity (e.g., racial, ethnic, or partisan) emerges, those who do not fit in, who view the new group as a threat, or who are deliberately excluded may come to resent the new group. These "outsiders" may or may not have their own "in-group," but for formation of negative attitudes what's pertinent is whether they come to perceive the new form of identity as an "out-group." This logic implies that the emergence of antipetismo – the perception of the PT as an out-group – depends on the emergence of petismo as a form of in-group identity.

This explanation of antipetismo highlights an important irony of Brazilian politics: the PT was a victim of its own success. For thirty years the PT was the most prominent partisan brand name in Brazil. Despite the scandals that have badly damaged its reputation, this remains true: voters still form opinions about the PT and paint its members and elected officials with the same broad strokes, both positively and negatively – something they do not do for politicians from other parties, simply because those parties lack recognizable collective reputations. The downside of a strong partisan reputation, and one that neither politicians nor scholars

anticipated (ourselves included), is that the PT's success gave voters who were predisposed to *dislike* it a clear target.

The origins of positive partisanship lie with parties' conscious and persistent efforts to cultivate organizational links with politically engaged and active citizens, both in opposition and while in government. The origins of negative partisanship, by contrast, may lie with those same parties' successful efforts to cultivate positive partisanship. In the Brazilian context, the PT's branding efforts created both petistas and antipetistas.

1.4 WHAT WE HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH

This book focuses on explaining the one thing that has divided a large plurality of Brazilian voters from each other: their feelings about the PT. In explaining the sources and consequences of this partisan divide, we hope to contribute to the study of Brazilian politics and to the study of the sources and consequences of mass partisanship.

First, we offer a novel and generalizable explanation for the emergence of mass partisanship. Our focus on the connection between party branding efforts, party organizational structure, and party outreach efforts in civil society explains the variation across Brazilian parties and can be applied anywhere.

We also explain why many Brazilian voters have acquired positive and/or negative partisan attitudes even as many others have not. Most Brazilians – like citizens everywhere – are uninterested in politics. Many engage in politics through family, friends, or neighbors, and others find a path to politics through their engagement in civil society organizations. In terms of the cultivation of positive partisan identity, the question is, why do some parties engage in outreach efforts to civil society while others do not? Such variation in party strategy explains patterns in the evolution of positive partisanship among Brazil's major parties.

Following Duverger's (1954) argument about "elite" parties and Panebianco's (1988) hypothesis about the path-dependent consequences of parties' early evolution, we attribute the PT's success, the PMDB's decline, and the PSDB and DEM's failure to cultivate a sizable base of partisans to variation in these parties' organizational culture during their formative years. The PT emerged as an outsider party and sought to transform its key weaknesses – a lack of financial resources and access to political power – into strengths. It emphasized a collective commitment to opposition to dictatorship, expansion of participatory opportunities, and promotion of socioeconomic equality, and it sought support in organized

civil society. Over time it grew more moderate and pragmatic, yet it never explicitly repudiated its core principles of democracy, participation, and equality, and it stuck to its strategy of leveraging its party organization to reach out to individuals in organized civil society.

This story connects the "top-down" efforts of PT leaders with the "bottom-up" emergence of partisan identities among Brazilian voters. Unlike other parties, PT leaders persistently invested in party-building and in developing an organizational culture that leveraged connections to civil society, even after the party won the presidency in 2002. Yet the emergence of petismo also requires the "bottom-up" component as well – the dramatic transformation of Brazilian civil society in recent decades, which saw millions of average citizens come together in an effort to transform their own lives and the lives of their communities. Through mobilization and engagement in social and labor movements, these Brazilians acquired proto-petista political identities. They had an elective affinity for the PT, and the PT deliberately sought them out.

Our book also offers a new explanation for petismo's evolving meaning (cf. Baker et al. 2016). The few Brazilians who called themselves petistas when the party first emerged were ideologically motivated, but the many millions who came to call themselves petistas under Lula were "activist-pragmatists." They believed in the efficacy of political participation, but were more interested in getting things done and in what government could do for them than in scoring ideological points. As we explain in Chapter 4, this change had important implications for petismo's rise and fall.

Our argument about the emergence of negative partisanship is also general. When new groups emerge that pose a perceived threat to individual and/or group interests, negative partisanship can emerge even in the absence of top-down partisan action to cultivate it. This book makes the case for more consistent inclusion of negative partisan attitudes in the study of mass political behavior. For decades, scholars have typically lumped nonpartisans, those who really do not care about parties at all, together with those who lack a positive partisan attachment but who feel powerful antipathy toward a particular party. This is a mistake that brings significant costs for understanding mass political behavior. In Brazil – as in other countries – antipartisans are both numerous and behave quite differently from nonpartisans. Lumping the two groups together means a serious loss of useful information about politics.

The book also considers the important question of what difference – if any – the PT has made for Brazilian politics. Scholars of the PT have focused on its emergence and evolution, and its internecine factional

battles. In this work the party is the dependent variable, with scholars seeking to explain what factors pushed the party to adapt and change on its path to power. As of yet, few have flipped the lens and taken the PT as an independent variable, asking, "What are the consequences of the emergence and evolution of the PT for Brazilian politics and society?" Up through Dilma's impeachment, scholars have paid scant attention to the question of the PT's impact, whether positive or negative. Yet despite its current deep malaise, the PT remains a key example of a leftist governing party in Latin America. To what extent have parties like the PT shaped political, economic, and social outcomes?

We do not pretend to offer a comprehensive answer to this question. In keeping with the book's theme, we focus on the spread of petismo and antipetismo among voters, emphasizing the impact of the PT on Brazil's party system in the electorate. And in this regard, the rise of the PT is the single most important factor shaping mass political behavior in Brazil since redemocratization. The party's growth structured – both for and against – the behavior of up to half of Brazilian voters. Just as students of Argentine politics still explore peronismo and scholars of US politics explore the increasingly polarized partisanship between Democrats and Republicans, anyone who seeks to understand Brazil must understand the impact of petismo and antipetismo on the attitudes and behavior of Brazilian voters.

Finally, we seek to contribute to the comparative study of mass partisanship in Latin America (e.g., Lupu 2015). Brazil is, according to conventional political science wisdom, a hard case for partisanship to take root. We explain how party ID can grow in this difficult institutional and sociological context. In doing so we also shed light on the conditions under which voters are likely to leave their partisan attachments behind. This last question is related to the question of party collapse – a topic of considerable recent interest in Latin America, given events (Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012; Lupu 2016).

Although it is possible that the PT might disappear, we do not count any of Brazil's parties out – especially the PT. Some of the PT's recent decline may be due to Dilma's poor performance in office and the relentless barrage of corruption-related news that focused largely on PT leaders both before and after her impeachment. Yet after Dilma was removed from office, blame for economic performance shifted to the successor government, and scandals continued to engulf politicians from other parties. If the PT makes a credible case that it still represents an alternative for Brazil, many former partisans could return to the fold. Given the party's

organizational density and longstanding links to organized civil society, it is even possible that the PT could mount a comeback, and remain a key player in Brazilian politics for some time to come. Still, even if it does disappear, its three-decade-long rise will remain, intrinsically, a phenomenon that deserves to be better understood.

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The rest of this book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 defines our core terms – partisanship and antipartisanship – in greater depth. We then explore the extent of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil since the 1980s, showing that at times more than half of voters have held positive and/or negative partisan views, and that most of this sentiment revolves around like or dislike of the PT. The next task is to explain the emergence of petismo and antipetismo. We show that this deep political divide among Brazilian voters is not a function of sociological or demographic factors such as class or race, but instead lies with distinct normative views about how politics should work.

To put to rest any suspicion that partisan attitudes in Brazil might be inconsequential, Chapter 3 shows that positive and negative partisanship – particularly petismo and antipetismo, but also for the PSDB and PMDB to some extent – have effects similar to what scholars observe in other countries. We leverage an array of empirical evidence, including Brazilian national election studies and commercial national surveys going back to 1989, original panel surveys from 2010 and 2014, and an original survey experiment. We find that those with positive partisan attachments do not readily switch allegiances and engage in motivated reasoning, rationalizing the image of their party as morally worthy even in the face of contradictory facts. Meanwhile, negative partisans do the same but in reverse, fitting the facts to fit their image of the disliked party as morally unworthy.

Having explained that partisanship and antipartisanship exist and what they mean, Chapter 4 focuses on the rise and – since 2014 – decline of petismo. We argue that voters took one of two pathways to petismo, both of which embodied the party's strategy of "mobilizing the mobilized": one before Lula won the presidency in 2002, and one after. Until 2002 the PT emphasized oppositional politics, and reached out to individuals in civil society by deliberately expanding the party's municipal-level organization. These outreach efforts continued after 2002, but what drew voters to the party's banner after that year was Lula's successful

implementation of several equality-enhancing policies that appeared to put the party's principles into action.

All of this came crashing down around 2014. To explain the PT's reversal of fortune, we focus on the idea that the intensity of partisanship can vary. That is, voters can update their party's qualities, in either direction. In the PT's case, we suggest that such updating is more likely among relatively newer partisans. After 2002, the PT picked up supporters whose attachment to the party was rooted in its performance in office more than in its stated principles. Many of these newer petistas were also new entrants into Brazil's middle classes. Unfortunately for the PT, the recession that began in 2013 eroded these petistas' economic gains, which in turn may have eroded their faith in the party. We note that although corruption allegations around that time certainly didn't help the PT's image, a similar scandal under Lula did not doom the PT. This logically suggests that the government's inability to manage the economy is relatively more important for petismo's decline than corruption.

Chapter 5 turns to the impact of positive and negative partisanship on voting behavior. Relatively little research on Brazilians' voting behavior exists, and what there is focuses on presidential elections. Although much research has explored legislative parties themselves, we know little about how and why voters pick legislative and other down-ticket candidates. Ames (2008) summarizes the conventional wisdom, suggesting that for most voters "pork, pageantry and performance" are key. In this chapter we show that this interpretation is insufficient: up and down the ticket, partisanship shapes many Brazilians' vote choices. Specifically, positive partisan attitudes have powerful effects for PT and PSDB supporters but only weak effects for PMDB supporters, and antipetistas are strongly averse to PT candidates.

The book's last empirical chapter (Chapter 6) brings a comparative perspective to bear, focusing on the potential gains of expanding the study of parties and party systems to fully include the concept of negative partisanship. As our detailed examination of Brazil demonstrated, a country's level of positive partisanship underestimates the level of "coherence" of the party system in the electorate and of individual-level voting behavior, because many supposedly independent voters who lack a positive partisan attachment may in fact hold strongly negative partisan attitudes. Once negative partisanship is taken into account, a different picture of party-system coherence and voting patterns emerges. We use survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to reveal the value-added

from incorporating negative attitudes into a story about partisanship and voting behavior.

Chapter 7 concludes by reflecting on the book's main claim, that the relative coherence of Brazil's "party system in the electorate" in large part reflects voters' attitudes either for or against the PT.

2

Partisanship and Antipartisanship in Brazil

Since the return of democracy in the 1980s, observers have lamented the extreme fragmentation of Brazil's party system and the weakness of parties in Brazilian voters' minds. A new party emerged in the 1980s – the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* – and the number of petistas in the electorate quickly grew from 0% in 1980 to about 30% just one generation later. The PT also enjoyed increasing electoral success: between 1994 and 2014, candidates from the PT and its main rival, the PSDB, finished first or second in every presidential election, and the PT–PSDB rivalry imbued the chaotic party system with something of a bipartisan dynamic.

The PT scrapped for power with Brazil's other parties for more than thirty years. Yet competition among parties does not always reflect mass-level understandings of politics. As noted in Chapter 1, Brazil's political, cultural, and institutional context makes it an unlikely case to expect partisanship to impact voter attitudes and behavior. To what extent can the concept of party ID travel to "unlikely" cases like Brazil?

In this chapter, we first elaborate on the concepts of positive and negative partisanship and explore their spread among Brazilian voters since the 1980s. With evidence from national surveys going back to 1989, we confirm that to the extent that a party system in the electorate has existed in Brazil since redemocratization, it has largely revolved around attitudes about the PT. Not only do petistas and antipetistas comprise a large proportion of the electorate, but most positive partisans in Brazil are petistas and most negative partisans are antipetistas. This is not to say that partisanship for other parties does not matter at all – in fact, as we show in Chapter 3, particularly for those expressing an affinity for the PSDB, partisanship does appear to matter in the same way as petismo. However,

despite the PSDB's prominent role in the party system since the late 1980s, no more than 5% of voters have ever declared themselves *partisans* of the PSDB. For the most part, support for the PSDB – or any other Brazilian party – has been based not on partisanship but on candidates' personal qualities or their performance in office.

We then turn to the question of the sources of partisanship and antipartisanship in Brazil. What are the socioeconomic and/or attitudinal bases of such attitudes? In what ways do petistas and antipetistas differ from each other, from nonpartisans, and from partisans of other parties?

The PT has always claimed to represent Brazil's workers, and that its antagonists come from and serve Brazil's socioeconomic elites. If that were true, then the divide between petistas and antipetistas in particular might boil down to social class or status – to some form of latent sociological cleavage. We show that this interpretation has little traction, as demographic attributes do not and have never clearly divided petistas from antipetistas, or partisans from each other. In fact, for most of the period since redemocratization, petistas and antipetistas have had more in common with each other than with the average nonpartisan, in that both tend to earn more and spend more years in school than average. In recent years, a small socioeconomic gap has opened up between petistas and antipetistas, yet even in 2017 the PT/anti-PT divide cannot be boiled down to a battle between elites and masses.

We also show that petistas and antipetistas somewhat surprisingly do not differ significantly in terms of ideological self-placement on a left–right scale, on views about the government's role in the economy, or on attitudes about abortion and gay rights. Instead, the difference between petistas and antipetistas appears to amount to distinct normative attitudes about how politics should work. Most simply, petistas and antipetistas hold very different views about the value and purpose of democracy, about whether and how citizens should engage in politics, and about the desirability of social change. However, such divides do not exist between petistas and partisans of other parties.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) helps explain how and why Brazilians who differ on these core attitudes come to identify with or dislike the PT. As we explain in greater detail in Chapter 4, petismo emerged as a function of the party's deliberate efforts to reach out to Brazilians who agreed with its stated principles. Like many mass parties before it, the deliberate cultivation of a brand name was part and parcel of an effort to create a distinct subculture – an "electorate of belonging," to use a term from Panebianco's (1988, p. 267) – a group of voters who would support the

party through thick and thin.[1] In contrast, other parties did *not* engage in significant efforts to create a distinct subculture and/or cultivate a brand name, which meant that they attracted relatively few partisans. Yet ironically, the PT's success at cultivating partisanship did create a clear target for Brazilians who liked no party but who held distinct political views – antipetistas, who came to perceive the PT as an out-group, and grew to dislike it intensely.

2.1 DEFINING POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP

In the classic statement in *The American Voter*, Campbell et al. (1960) set out the "Michigan school" approach, defining partisanship as a stable psychological attitude determined early in a person's life – an "unmoved mover" that serves as a fundamental cause of voter behavior, more important than sociodemographic characteristics, candidate qualities, or the impact of current events.

This approach supposes that partisanship is a prepolitical foundation of political behavior, a deep-seated psychological attachment rooted in a person's sense of self (Medeiros & Noël 2013). Although scholars who adopt the Michigan school do not believe that partisanship is completely impervious to change (they concede that shifts in levels of partisanship do occur), they do suggest that for most voters party ID is both relatively stable and a powerful predictor of attitudes and behavior (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002; Johnston 2006; Lewis-Beck 2009).

Recent scholarship seeking to explain both positive and negative partisanship builds on this definition and draws further insight from SIT (e.g., Huddy 2001; Brewer 2007). SIT suggests that humans have natural desires to establish and maintain boundaries between self and others, as well as between groups. People tend to overestimate both similarities and differences, which helps explain why they feel a need to fit in with some individuals while also believing that those who don't fit in are members of out-groups.

Ethnic, religious, and national divides are classic examples of in- and out-groups – as is partisanship. As with other forms of social identity, positive partisanship is a psychological affinity for members of a perceived in-group, providing a sense of membership in a broader community of like-minded individuals (Green et al. 2002; Nicholson 2012). In addition,

[1] Most in-depth research on the PT has focused on the party's origins and evolution as a national organization. See, e.g., Meneguello (1989), Keck (1992), or Ribeiro (2010).

because social groups provide an anchor for personal values (Conover & Feldman 1984), people tend to assume that members of their group share goals and interpret the world similarly, at least with respect to issues that are important to the group's identity. This explains why members of a group are more likely to agree with the prevailing opinion within that group (known as in-group bias) and disagree with members of the other group (known as out-group bias) (Brewer 1991; Hogg 2005).

People tend to feel positively toward members of their own group and negatively toward members of out-groups. Little research has explored negative partisanship, a form of out-group partisan bias. There are several reasons for this. For one, early research assumed that positive and negative partisan attitudes were flip sides of the same coin – for example, that individuals who identify with left-wing parties would dislike right-wing parties, and vice versa (Greene 1999, p. 395). Early proponents of SIT also believed that in-group sympathy was logically prior to out-group antipathy, meaning that positive partisanship would be causally prior to negative partisanship (e.g., Zaller 1992; Brewer 2007; Zhong et al. 2008; Tajfel 2010).

If these notions were true, negative partisanship would be relatively unimportant. However, they are false – and ignoring negative partisanship is a mistake. As Figure 1.1 implies, some people develop *only* negative partisan attitudes, because positive and negative partisan attitudes do not necessarily mirror each other and are not necessarily reciprocally activated – they may have different catalysts (Weisberg 1980). As Medeiros and Noël (2013, p. 1023) suggested, "defining who one is not may not respond to the same determinants and have the same consequences as defining who one is."

Out-group bias can act as a repellent, even if no in-group attraction serves as a magnet. And under certain conditions, negative biases can have greater impact on behavior than positive attitudes, because people often give bad information more weight than good (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson 1997; Ito 1998; Baumeister 2001; Goren, Federico, & Kittilson 2009). Nicholson (2012), for example, found that in-group biases matter more in uncompetitive, low-stakes contexts, whereas negative attitudes become salient in competitive political environments, when individuals confront pressures to agree with their own group as well as disagree with an opposing group. In such situations, an out-group's endorsement of a policy can harden attitudes even more than an in-party's endorsement of the opposite policy (Maggiotto & Piereson 1977; Rose & Mishler 1998; Abramowitz & Webster 2016).

Exploring partisanship means accounting for both positive and negative attitudes. We expect partisans to support "their" party's positions and candidates, and we expect people who dislike a party to do the opposite. Yet because negative and positive partisan attitudes are not necessarily opposites and tap into different and uncorrelated attitudes (Weisberg 1980; Knight 1984; Cacioppo et al. 1997; Medeiros & Noël 2013), we cannot assume that negative partisans will also always have a positive partisan identity. In practical terms, this means that counting both negative and positive partisans should give the contours of Brazil's "party system in the electorate" much greater coherence.

2.2 THE EXTENT OF PARTISANSHIP AND ANTIPARTISANSHIP

Before explaining the sources of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil, we must first discuss their extent. Data come from different sets of public opinion surveys that did not necessarily ask the same exact questions.[2] For this reason we paint a picture with broad strokes, describing the aggregate levels of positive and negative partisanship among Brazilian voters since the 1980s. We are confident that the trends would not change substantially if the surveys came from the same source.

We begin with aggregate levels of positive partisanship, using surveys from Datafolha, a large polling firm. The series starts in 1989, when Datafolha first began fielding national probability-sample surveys asking voters about partisan attachments, and runs through mid-2017. In this case the surveys do always ask the same question, an open-ended "What is your preferred party?"[3] Figure 2.1 provides the total proportion of Brazilian voters who identify with a party as well as the share who identify with the three largest parties: the PT, the PSDB, and PMDB. The Datafolha surveys did not inquire about antipartisanship.

Given the rumored decline of partisanship in many countries around the world (Clarke & Stewart 1998; Dalton et al. 2002), how does Brazil stack up? The figure reveals the key reason scholars have suggested that mass partisanship in Brazil is relatively weak: even at its peak in the early 1990s the aggregate level of partisanship in the electorate (the darker solid line) fell somewhat below the world average (Huber, Kernell, & Leoni 2005; Kitschelt et al. 2010).

Even so, Figure 2.1 paints a fairly clear story of the evolution of Brazil's party system in the electorate since the 1980s. First, Figure 2.1 includes

[2] See Appendices 2.A and 2.B for details.

[3] "*Qual é o seu partido político de preferência?*"



FIGURE 2.1. Party identification in Brazil (1989–2017).
Figure shows overall levels of party identification, as well as identification with the three main parties, computed from Datafolha surveys. Data were first aggregated by quarter for each year. Quarters with missing data were linearly imputed and the figure shows a two-quarter moving average. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

all parties that reached 5% partisan support. Even though several parties have been electorally successful, most do not register anything more than minimal levels of partisan attachments among voters.

A second key fact that the figure reveals is the steady ebb of partisan support for the PMDB. Two factors explain this trend. First, the PMDB is a loosely organized federation of state and local leaders who lead clientelistic electoral machines and who pay little attention to the party's programmatic image. Second, after 1985 the party lost its only unifying principle: opposition to the 1964–85 military regime.

A third key piece of information one can glean from this figure is that the PSDB, which held the presidency from 1995 to 2002 and then served as the main opposition party during the PT governments, has never attracted a large number of partisan supporters. The party emerged as a breakaway faction from the PMDB in 1988. Since then it has been a resource-rich party dominated by experienced politicians from the state

of São Paulo, Brazil's largest and wealthiest (Roma 2002). It remains particularly popular among higher-income and better-educated Brazilians, who comprise a very small proportion of the population (Samuels 2006). Moreover, like the PMDB, the PSDB is a loosely organized federation of regional leaders (Roma 2006) and the party owes its success more to those elites' personal popularity, effectiveness in government, and connections to wealthy business leaders than to any coherent political vision. Partly for these reasons, PSDB leaders never sought to foster widespread affective ties between the party and voters like the PT did, as the party's leaders have acknowledged (Cardoso 2011).

Up through about 2013, the contrast between the PMDB and PSDB on the one hand and the PT on the other was stark. On its founding in 1980 the PT deliberately sought to disseminate a "brand name" among voters (Samuels 1999; Hunter 2010). Figure 2.1 shows that, partly as a result, the PT was the only Brazilian party to successfully cultivate a great number of partisan supporters. At its founding the PT professed that it would be the party of activists, and that it would reach out to average Brazilians who wanted to change society from the bottom up. It advocated greater popular participation at all levels of government, greater socioeconomic equality, and eradication of corruption – and it coupled this branding effort with an organizational expansion strategy that reached out to citizens who were engaged in politics and social activism at the local level. These efforts paid off handsomely for many years. The proportion of Brazilians who call themselves petistas grew from about 5% in 1989 to almost 30% just a generation later. In a country where scholars do not expect mass partisanship to take root and spread in the first place, this was a remarkable achievement.

Partisan support for the PT began to ebb after 2013, as Brazil's economy entered a deep recession and as prominent PT leaders became mired in disturbing corruption scandals. The decline was steep, falling to just about 10% of the electorate, although at the time of this writing (late 2017) the proportion of petistas appeared to rebound, as the last surveys available put the figure around 18% (this does not show up due to the quarterly smoothing of survey data in the figure). No other party benefited from the PT's decline, and even at its lowest point, support for the PT was substantially higher than for the PMDB and PSDB. Still, the decline of petismo raises the question of whether partisanship in Brazil has the same causal force that it does elsewhere. For example, perhaps the Datafolha question does not capture the psychological phenomenon of partisanship, and consequently perhaps Figure 2.1 dramatically

overestimates the number of partisans in the Brazilian electorate. As skeptics imply (e.g., Mainwaring 1999), partisanship in Brazil – even for the PT – may never have been as strong as in older democracies.

We confirm the strength of partisanship in Chapter 3. For now, we turn to the levels of negative partisanship among Brazilian voters. To do so we must first operationalize the concept. While scholars commonly define positive partisans as individuals who express party sympathy or preference, data that analogously identify negative partisans are harder to come by. Long-term series that identify negative partisans like the Datafolha surveys explored in Figure 2.1 simply do not exist.

We identified nine national probability sample surveys taken since 1989 that allow us to examine the extent and evolution of negative partisanship. These surveys asked about partisan antipathy in similar but not identical ways, which makes comparisons over time somewhat problematic.[4] Given the importance of and interest in the topic, we decided to make the best effort to find the most comparable surveys and survey questions, but we acknowledge that such comparisons are imperfect.

These surveys contain three types of questions that could be used to explore negative partisanship: (1) whether the respondent "disliked" a particular party or parties, (2) whether she was "for or against" particular parties, or (3) whether she would "never vote" for a particular party. Previous studies of negative partisanship have relied on similar questions to gauge its attitudinal and/or behavioral aspects, and some recent papers have combined both types of measures (McGregor, Caruana, & Stephenson 2015; Mayer 2017). In our case, even though a few surveys did ask more than one type of question, most did not. All of the available surveys, however, asked some variant of the attitudinal (i.e., "dislike") question, and for that reason we chose it to operationalize negative partisanship.

Specifically, we identify negative partisans as those who fit into the top-right cell of Table 1.1 – those who dislike a party but do not identify with another. As we show in the text that follows, these "pure antipartisans" comprise a relatively large slice of the Brazilian electorate – indeed, larger than the share of partisans for any party except for the PT. Table 2.1 reports aggregate levels of positive and negative partisanship for the seven surveys that contain similar antipartisanship questions. The rows mirror the four cells in Table 1.1. "Hard Core" partisans both identify with a party and dislike another. "Positive-Only" partisans identify with

[4] See Appendix 2.B for details.

TABLE 2.1. *Partisans and Antipartisans in Brazil (1989–2014)*

	1989	1994	1997	2002	2006	2010	2014
Hard-Core Partisans	30.40	40.30	32.72	18.83	29.20	21.74	14.05
Positive-Only Partisans	21.02	14.85	15.51	27.57	20.37	27.48	17.78
Negative Partisans	7.89	12.15	10.33	19.78	12.06	21.34	22.57
Nonpartisans	40.69	32.70	41.44	33.82	38.37	29.44	45.61

The table shows estimates of the share of the electorate that fall in each of the four comprehensive and exclusive categories (i.e., the columns all total 100%). See this chapter's appendices for data sources and coding details.

one party but do not dislike any particular party. "Negative partisans" dislike a party but do not identify with any particular one, and nonpartisans have neither positive nor negative partisan attitudes.

Three pieces of information in this table merit note. First, the aggregate level of partisanship peaked in the late 2000s and then declined, a pattern that matches the trend in Figure 2.1, which relies on a different set of surveys. Second, the number of antipartisans grew in the late 2000s, almost doubling by 2014 after declining a bit after 2002. Third, the results confirm that even though the level of positive partisanship has declined in recent years and that positive partisans have never been a majority, ignoring negative partisans understates the extent of partisan attitudes among Brazil's voters. Taken together, the combination of positive and negative partisans has always encompassed a large proportion of all Brazilian voters, exceeding 60% of the electorate in some years.

Table 2.1 reports aggregate figures in Brazil's electorate, obscuring the relative distribution of positive and negative partisan preferences across parties. Figure 2.1 revealed the relative dominance of the PT in terms of positive partisanship in Brazil. Table 2.2 offers broader evidence of the extent to which the PT has become the focal point of the party system in voters' minds, by including antipetistas. Here, "Hard-Core Petistas" both identify with the PT and dislike a party. "Positive-Only" petistas identify with the PT but do not dislike a party. "Other Partisan Antipetistas" are Hard-Core Partisans for other parties who dislike the PT, and "Pure Antipetistas" have no positive party ID, but dislike the PT.

Comparing Tables 2.2 and Table 2.1 reveals the extent to which petismo and antipetismo have dominated partisanship and antipartisanship since Brazil's redemocratization. By the start of Lula's first term in 2002, about 40% of Brazilians were either petistas or antipetistas. This number held largely steady until 2013, when petismo went into decline. Yet even in 2014, almost 40% of Brazilian voters remained specifically

TABLE 2.2. *Petistas and Antipetistas (1989–2014)*

	1989	1994	1997	2002	2006	2010	2014
Hard-Core Petistas	5.52	11.80	8.75	10.16	13.70	10.30	7.14
Positive-Only Petistas	2.00	3.45	5.43	16.70	10.42	17.35	10.30
Pure Antipetistas	1.04	4.75	5.75	9.12	6.47	10.10	15.59
Other Partisan Antipetistas	4.21	10.30	10.94	4.15	8.99	5.30	5.01
Total	12.76	30.30	30.86	40.14	39.58	43.05	38.04

The table shows estimates of the share of the electorate that fall in each of four exclusive categories. See this chapter's appendices for data sources and coding details.

pro- or anti-PT (only a slight decline from the early 2000s), about two-thirds of all positive partisans for any party (Hard-Core plus Positive-Only) were petistas, and about three-fourths of negative partisans were antipetistas. Particularly in recent years, most antipetistas' attitudes have not been a function of their sympathy or support for another party. They are "pure" antipetistas – their antipathy for the PT is not a form of out-group bias growing out of sympathy for one of the PT's rivals.

This section has revealed an important yet largely unrecognized aspect of mass political attitudes in Brazil. From the early 1990s (or even earlier, although no data exist) through the mid-2010s, a large plurality of Brazilian voters have held either positive or negative partisan attitudes – or both. Among these voters, the PT was, by far, the "most loved" as well as the "most hated." That is, when we talk about positive partisanship in Brazil we are mostly talking about petismo, and when we talk about antipartisanship in Brazil we are largely talking about antipetismo. Even after the PT's recent decline, attitudes for or against the PT continue to dominate whatever partisan sentiments remain among Brazilian voters.[5] In the next section, we explore the question of what differentiates petistas from antipetistas.

2.3 PATHS TO PETISMO AND ANTIPETISMO

Since redemocratization, Brazil's party system in the electorate has revolved mainly around attitudes for or against the PT. Why do some Brazilians become petistas – and others take the opposite path?

[5] The table also indicates that in recent years the share of antipetistas in the electorate has been about the same or even greater than the share of petistas. If antipetistas had a positive party ID, that party would have about the same proportion of partisans as the PT itself – or even more.

At its founding, the PT presented itself as a party that would represent Brazilians who wanted social and economic change – and it claimed that anyone who opposed its approach to politics was either a member of or a servant of Brazil's socioeconomic elite. If the PT's professed self-image and interpretation of Brazilian social dynamics were true, then the petista/antipetista divide might break down along social class lines. Yet as we show in the text that follows, socioeconomic status has never sharply divided petistas from antipetistas. In fact, for most of the period since redemocratization, petistas and antipetistas have had quite a bit in common with each other, far more than either have in common with the average nonpartisan. In recent years, a small socioeconomic gap has opened up between members of the two groups, yet even today the petista/antipetista divide cannot be described as "elites versus masses."

Some differences exist between petistas and antipetistas in terms of other markers of social status, particularly race, as petistas have traditionally been more racially diverse. Still, one should not make too much of this finding because in the end demographic differences between petistas and antipetistas have never translated into significant attitudinal differences on issues that divide partisan opponents in many societies. For example, as we detail in the text that follows, petistas and antipetistas do not differ significantly in terms of ideological self-placement on a left–right scale, on views about the government's role in the economy, or on attitudes about sexuality.

Echoing other forms of partisanship in Latin America such as *aprismo* (for APRA) in Peru, or *peronism* in Argentina, the paths to petismo and antipetismo do not begin with demographic differences and do not follow a conventional story about left–right polarization. Instead, the differences between petistas and antipetistas derive from distinct normative attitudes about how politics should work. The reason some Brazilians develop an affinity for the PT lies with the party's stated view of the nature and purpose of democracy. The PT was founded not only by 'workers' but also by activist Catholics and Brazilians engaged in social activism on a wide range of causes. Their short-term focus was ending the military regime, but they had a longer-term vision that grassroots engagement in politics could be a force for social as well as political change – in particular, for greater socioeconomic equality.

This interpretation of the PT's founding is conventional (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992). Unfortunately we know of no research that has explored the implications of the PT's founding moment for the subsequent development of petismo. We simply suggest that it is reasonable to assume

that the Brazilians who joined the PT early on created not only a partisan organization but also a particular partisan subculture – Panebianco's "electorate of belonging" – that attracted others. Over time, many Brazilians who not only desire social change and believe that democracy can facilitate it also came to believe that the PT was the best vehicle for helping bring such change about.[6]

Regardless of whether they are correct or deluded, such individuals have an elective affinity for the PT. Likewise, many Brazilians hold opposing views about politics, and it is reasonable to assume that such people would be repelled not only by the PT's political platform but also by its organizational subculture. During the PT's early years, for example, many Brazilians were put off by the party's role leading strikes and mass protests, and they associated the PT with *bagunça* and *baderna* – tumult and disorder. Such individuals remain numerous among Brazilian voters. They tend to fear social change, and are more likely to question the value of democracy. As such they are predisposed to dislike the PT.

We have no way to explain why Brazilians differ on these fundamental questions about politics.[7] Regardless, Brazilians predisposed to like the PT should be relatively open to political and social change, and relatively likely to engage in some form sociopolitical activism before "encountering" the PT. This means they are likely to find common ground with individuals who already identify with the PT, and be recruited by them. Their social networks tend to feed the process of politicization and acculturation, enhancing the likelihood that they would come to identify with and feel part of the "in-group" of petistas.

In contrast, we expect Brazilians who dislike the PT's stated goals – popular mobilization to bring about deep social change – to exhibit relatively less enthusiasm for democracy, less engagement in civil-society activism, and greater support for "law and order" approaches to politics. The divide between petistas and antipetistas boils down to different world views about the desirability of political and social change – divergent sets of values about what is right and wrong in politics. These sorts

[6] In Brazil the main difference between partisans (of any party) and antipartisans (of any party) has to do with attitudes toward democracy and interest in politics. What differentiates petistas from partisans of other parties are (1) whether they are recruited by party activists and (2) the ways they engage in politics. See Chapter 4.

[7] One potential explanation lies with the concept of psychological authoritarianism (Stenner 2005). Unfortunately, available surveys do not contain positive and negative partisanship questions as well as the battery of questions that operationalize this concept nontautologically – that is, by measuring the concept itself rather than the attitudinal or behavioral consequences of the concept.

of political divides generate such intense polarization because those on either side believe their opponents are literally not leading a good life.

Using public opinion surveys, we now explore the ways petistas and antipetistas are similar, the ways they differ, and how their similarities and differences have evolved over time. We start by revealing what petismo and antipetismo are *not*, exploring demographic characteristics, left–right ideology, and views about the government's role in the economy and several hot-button social issues. We then turn to evidence supporting our argument that petistas and antipetistas hold different values about the nature and purpose of democracy and the desirability of social change.

Sources of Data

To assess the evolution of petismo and antipetismo, we leverage several sources of public opinion data. We discussed these sources earlier, but we feel it necessary to note that the analysis of petismo that produces Figure 2.2 relies on surveys covering 1989–2016 that use exactly the same question to measure partisanship, while the analysis of the correlates of petismo and antipetismo in the rest of the chapter relies on a different set of surveys that cover the same period but that were sponsored by different organizations, designed without reference to each other, and that employ different questions to measure positive and/or negative partisanship.

2.3.1 Sociodemographic Attributes

Sociodemographic attributes do not "cause" partisanship or antipartisanship, but they set the stage on which other variables can manifest their impact. The PT did, after all, call itself the "workers" party. Does that self-identification mean that petistas are members of a distinct social class from other partisans, and from antipetistas? And are antipetistas – as petistas have long claimed – members of Brazil's socioeconomic elite? To what extent do attributes such as race or class, which are highly correlated in Brazil, divide petistas from antipetistas – and members of both groups from nonpartisans?

The first attribute that might, in principle, divide petistas from antipetistas is social class, which we measure through (self-declared) family income and individual educational levels. We measure family income in multiples of Brazil's minimum wage, which had a value of about US$300/month in late 2016: fewer than two minimum wages per month, between two and five minimum wages, between five and ten minimum wages, and greater than ten minimum wages per month. Educational level

is measured as number of years of schooling. To simplify the presentation, we created four groups: less than eight years of school, between eight and ten years (some high school), eleven years (high school graduate), and anything more than high school. For reference, average monthly household income in 2014 was about 1.5 minimum wages, and 42.5% of Brazilians over age twenty-five held a high school diploma.[8]

Figure 2.2 reports the probability of identifying with the PT by income and educational levels over time. Estimates in both panels were derived from multinomial logit regressions in which the dependent variable included identification with no party (the baseline), the three most important parties in the country at the time, and a residual category of other parties. The regressions also included respondent age and gender as controls.

Each line represents the probability of identifying with the PT by income or education level. The darker solid line represents the highest level of income (Figure 2.2a) or education (Figure 2.2b). The lighter solid line represents the lowest levels, and the dashed lines intermediate levels. The two panels suggest that in the PT's early days, petistas were more likely to be found among relatively wealthier and better-educated Brazilians, and less likely to be found among the poor and poorly educated. However, between 2003 and 2005 the solid lines cross in both panels, so that in more recent years this situation is reversed. Over the 2000s, the PT gained adherents among relatively poorer and less educated Brazilians, but lost some partisan support among the wealthier and better educated. This might be expected, given both the PT's organizational expansion (see Chapter 4) and the positive impact of redistributive social policies under Lula, which convinced many poorer Brazilians that the PT was putting its principles into action.[9]

[8] Data are from the 2014 *Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por Domicílio*, the National Household Survey run by the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE, Brazilian Geography and Statistical Institute). The report on income is available at www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/indicadores/trabalhoerendimento/pnad_continua/default_renda_percapita.shtm, while the report on education is available at http://brasilemsintese.ibge.gov.br/educacao.html.

[9] The decline of petistas among the wealthier groups may be partially an artifact of the fact that because the minimum wage increased considerably after 2002, the de facto threshold for entry into the 10+ group by 2014 became much higher. That is, in earlier periods the highest bracket includes respondents who were considerably less well off relative to the members of the wealthiest group in 2014. If we had finer-grained data on family incomes we might have seen very few petistas in the highest income group in the earlier period.



(a) Income (b) Education

FIGURE 2.2. Probability of identifying with the PT by income and educational levels (1989–2014).

Still, we do not want to exaggerate the degree of change in the PT's demographic base. Figure 2.2 does not suggest any sort of massive partisan realignment, in which the PT became a party of the poor. It does, however, raise the important historical issue of the distinction between petismo and "lulismo," an attachment to the figure of Lula himself. Singer (2009) has argued that among Brazil's poor, Lula's 2006 reelection consolidated lulismo as a psychological phenomenon akin to partisanship. Yet as we have argued elsewhere (Samuels & Zucco 2014*a*), this is wrong. Lulismo is a psychologically thin, personalistic attachment, and poor voters rewarded Lula with reelection because his policies had improved their lives (Zucco 2008).[10]

Let us now turn to the question of whether social class is associated with antipetismo. Perhaps petismo has become less common among the well-off in recent years because of PT social-welfare policies – but antipetismo might have become *more* common among the well-off for the same reason. To what extent do petistas and antipetistas come from different socioeconomic groups? In what follows we use different surveys (as noted earlier) but the same measures of income and education and the same statistical method (multinomial logit) to identify antipetistas and (where appropriate for comparisons) petistas and partisans of other parties.

Figure 2.2 suggests that petistas are found among all social classes, even though petismo has declined among the wealthy and well-educated in recent years. Figure 2.3 shows that although antipetismo has also grown over time among all income and educational groups, antipetistas have been somewhat more likely to be found among higher socioeconomic groups. Nevertheless, the different probabilities across educational and income groups are not large, suggesting that – as with petistas – antipetistas can also be found among all social classes.

These two figures are not ideal for head-to-head comparisons of the demographic characteristics of petistas and antipetistas, simply because they do not compare groups within a single survey for each year. To confirm the extent to which members of the two groups come from similar or distinct socioeconomic groups, Figure 2.4 reports results of linear probability models for each year for which we have survey data. The dependent variable is always a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the

[10] In any case, support for Lula has historically overpredicted petismo because not all Brazilians who liked Lula became petistas, but virtually every Brazilian who liked the PT also liked Lula.



(a) Income (b) Education

FIGURE 2.3. Probability of antipetismo by income and educational levels (1989–2014).



(a) Income



(b) Education

FIGURE 2.4. Income and educational characteristics of partisans and antipartisans (1989–2014).
Figures report the share of members of each group that are "high-income" and "high-education," as defined in the text. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

respondent belongs to the highest income or education group.[11] The independent variables are whether the respondent is a nonpartisan, petista, antipetista, partisan of another party, or antipartisan of another party. This approach allows us to interpret estimates as a simple differences in proportions across the different categories – that is, the results estimate the probability that members of these partisan groups are also members of one of these high-social-status groups.[12]

In each figure, the horizontal dotted line provides the probability that nonpartisans are members of the highest-income or -education group. Note first that through the early 2000s petistas and antipetistas were better educated and had higher income than nonpartisans. The same holds for PSDB supporters, but during these years PMDB supporters tended to resemble nonpartisans on both measures. After 2002, the gap between nonpartisans, petistas, and antipetistas narrowed, partly because nonpartisans' average levels of income and education increased. Only in 2014 did petistas and antipetistas diverge. The latter were more likely to come from the elite, while no difference existed between nonpartisans and petistas. Despite this recent development, the results overall support the conclusion that social class has never clearly divided petistas from antipetistas, as members of both groups have historically tended to have above-average income and education.

Racial Differences?

Even though income and education do not clearly differentiate petistas from antipetistas, race is another possibility. Race is highly but not perfectly correlated with socioeconomic status in Brazil. Although data to explore this question are more limited than for income or education, the evidence does suggest that historically petistas have been relatively less likely to self-identify as white than antipetistas. Figure 2.5 reports the proportion of members of each group that self-report as white (Data on respondents' race were unavailable in earlier surveys). The proportions of petistas who self-identify as white is always lower than for antipetistas, and often by a large margin, particularly after Lula won office in 2002.

[11] Highest income is defined as reporting family income above 7.5 minimum wages in 1989 and 5 minimum wages in all other years, while highest-education group is defined as having completed high school.

[12] We employed robust standard errors in the construction of the confidence intervals, to ensure complete analogy with a difference in proportions test (Samii & Aronow 2012).



FIGURE 2.5. Racial characteristics of partisans and antipartisans (1997–2014). Figures report the share of members of each group that self-reports as white. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

Even though evidence points to differences between the two groups' racial heterogeneity, it is implausible to reduce the political divide between petistas and antipetistas to black versus white. Race has never been a key political divide in Brazil (Hanchard 1999; Telles 2014), and neither petismo nor antipetismo have ever been explicitly about race.

To put a point on it, one cannot find the roots of the PT/anti-PT divide in socioeconomic or demographic cleavages. The PT's origins lie partly in blue-collar industrial and white-collar public-sector unions, but it has also enjoyed support among social activists, intellectuals, and students – Brazilians who earn more than average and have higher than average educational attainment. Likewise, although many antipetistas are perched at the top of the economic pyramid, the data suggest that petistas are only slightly less likely to be found at those heights. Petistas and antipetistas are more likely to resemble each other socioeconomically than they are to resemble members of Brazil's vast underclass.

2.3.2 Left–Right Ideology

The divide between petistas and antipetistas is not explained by conflict between rich and poor, or a divide between blacks and whites. This suggests that the reason Brazilians support or oppose the PT lies with political attitudes. However, somewhat counterintuitively, the issues that typically divide liberals from conservatives in many countries are not those that differentiate petistas from antipetistas.

Observers of Brazil conventionally expect ideology, measured through survey respondents' self-placement on a left–right scale, to be correlated with PT partisanship. However, petistas and antipetistas do not fall as predicted on either side of the liberal–conservative ideological divide.



FIGURE 2.6. Ideological self-placements: partisans and antipartisans (2002–2014).
Figures report the average ideological self-placement of members of each group on a left–right scale. Questions had different wording, and sometimes different scales, across surveys. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

The PT emerged as a leftist party, but as Veiga (2007) and Samuels (2008) noted, its political moderation – which included shedding its most radical factions in the 1990s and Lula committing his eventual government to his predecessor's economic stabilization plan on the eve of the 2002 election – meant that in multivariate analysis, by the mid-2000s leftist ideology no longer predicted petismo among voters. By that time most Brazilians who placed themselves on far left of the ideological spectrum no longer called themselves petistas, while those who stuck with the PT or who the PT attracted tended to be more moderate "activist-pragmatists" for whom getting things done was more important than ideological purity.[13]

Figure 2.6 confirms the continued weakness of the connection between leftism and petismo, and also reveals that antipetistas do not consistently place themselves on the right. In fact, the only group to consistently identify as significantly to the right of nonpartisans over time are PSDB supporters. Only in 2002 did the conventional expectation bear fruit: relative to the other groups, petistas placed themselves on the left while everyone else placed themselves to the right.[14] This gap between petistas and nonpartisans narrowed in 2006, and disappeared completely by 2014. More pertinently, in every year except 2002, the average antipetista's self-placement did not differ, statistically, from the average petista's – and

[13] The relative increase in petismo among lesser educated and lower income Brazilians probably also helped weaken the connection between leftism and petismo. The ideological self-placement survey question requires that respondents know the difference between left and right, and those with less education are less likely to even answer the question. In our analysis nonresponse is coded as centrist.

[14] Earlier surveys that compare petistas and antipetistas along these lines do not exist.



FIGURE 2.7. Attitudes of partisans and antipartisans toward redressing inequality (1997–2014).
Figures report the shares of members in each group that agree with statements against inequality. Questions differed across surveys. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

perhaps more surprisingly, after 2002 antipetistas did not even identify as ideological conservatives.

In Brazilian general population surveys, left–right self-placement questions are notoriously noisy. Yet attitudes about government's proper role in the economy also do not differentiate petistas from antipetistas – or even consistently distinguish petistas from other partisans. Given the PT's history, we might expect its supporters to favor greater government intervention in the economy to reduce inequalities, relative to members of other groups. And if this were true, we might expect antipetistas to hold opposite views – perhaps favoring "limited government" or "free market" solutions to social problems instead.

What we find confounds these expectations. Although the questions explored in Figure 2.7 differed across surveys, we can still paint a picture in broad strokes. In 1997, before the PT had moderated, its supporters were indeed more likely than PSDB supporters and antipetistas to favor the idea that "government should do more to reduce inequality." Yet in 2010 members of all groups favored greater government intervention to reduce inequalities, and in 2014 petistas and antipetistas held similar positions relative to nonpartisans. That year only PSDB partisans clearly opposed such efforts.[15]

2.3.3 Social Liberalism and Conservatism

Attitudes about social issues – which often divide partisans in other countries – also do not divide petistas from antipetistas, and do not

[15] Questions that asked this or similar questions and that permit comparison with antipetistas were not asked in intervening years' surveys.

consistently divide petistas from other partisans. Consider abortion and gay rights. In Brazil, we expect petistas to be more progressive than average on these issues, particularly given the prominence of women's groups and gay rights advocates among the social movements that have made up the party's base. As for antipetistas, it is not clear what we should expect. On the one hand, if they oppose everything the PT stands for then perhaps they would take contrary stands to the PT's liberalism. Yet on the other hand, antipetistas and petistas do share socioeconomic attributes, suggesting they might find common ground on some issues.

Not every survey that asks about positive and negative partisanship also asks about abortion and gay rights. In any case, results in Figure 2.8 reveal no consistent differences between petistas, antipetistas, and partisans of the PMDB and PSDB on these two questions. Petistas are always more liberal about abortion and gay rights than nonpartisans but not always more liberal than other partisans (particularly tucanos), but in four of six cases antipetistas are equally or even more liberal than petistas, and they are never particularly conservative, at least when compared against nonpartisans.

All of the results thus far should be puzzling. One thing we know is that petistas and antipetistas dislike each other. They are certainly not ideological fellow-travelers. Yet as with demographics, political issues that divide partisans in other countries do not split Brazilians into pro- and anti-PT camps.

2.3.4 Attitudes Toward Democracy

Let us now consider the notion that the difference between petistas and antipetistas reflects an attitudinal divide *within* Brazil's upper middle class, based on aspiration for versus resentment of social and political change. There are good reasons to expect petistas to strongly favor democracy. In its early years, the PT was a key and vocal protagonist for ending Brazil's 1964–85 military regime. In addition, the first element of the so-called *modo petista de governar* calls for greater popular participation in politics. Yet what about antipetistas? From evidence above we know they are not particularly conservative on the left–right scale, but we don't have strong expectations about their attitudes toward democracy. Antipetistas dislike the PT – but do they also express broader skepticism about the democratic process itself?

Figure 2.9 exposes an important attitudinal divide between petistas and antipetistas. First, it shows that petistas favor democracy as much



(a) Abortion



(b) Gay Rights

FIGURE 2.8. Attitudes toward abortion and gay rights (1997–2014).
Figure reports share of members of each group reporting favorable positions in questions inquiring about abortion and gay rights. Questions varied from survey to survey. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.



FIGURE 2.9. Support for democracy among partisans and antipartisans (1997–2014).
Figures report the share of each group that agrees that democracy is the best political system. Question wording was not exactly the same across surveys. Respondents who said "Don't Know," who did not answer, or who were indifferent (available only in some surveys) were considered as not agreeing with the statement. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

or more than members of other groups. There seems to be no difference between petistas and PSDB supporters on this question. The figure also reveals that in 1997 – more than a decade after the military had handed power back to civilians and almost twenty years after the PT's founding – antipetistas remained the most skeptical toward democracy. Their attitudes either do not differ from nonpartisans or (as in 2010) express even less support for democracy than nonpartisans.

These results provide a hint about a key divide between petistas and antipetistas, and also show that tucanos and antipetistas are distinct. Unfortunately, available surveys contain few other questions that could provide corroborating evidence for these claims. However, consider the following. A 1997 survey asked respondents for their views about press censorship. As Figure 2.10 reveals, petistas stand out in opposition to censorship. Antipetistas do not differ from other groups – but (along with PMDBistas) they are distinct from petistas.

2.3.5 Political Engagement

Given their distinct views about the value of democracy, it is not surprising that we also find that petistas and antipetistas differ in the ways they engage in politics. In Brazil as well as elsewhere (Samuels 2006), individual political engagement more powerfully predicts partisanship than membership in this or that census category. Politically engaged citizens are more likely to be partisans because they are more likely to come into repeated contact with and be recruited by others who already



FIGURE 2.10. Acceptance of press censorship (1997).
Figures report the share of members of each group who agree the government's right to censor newspapers, TV and radio. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

identify with different parties (Carmines & Stimson 1989; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Dalton et al. 2002).

The same is not necessarily true of negative partisans. Individuals who dislike a particular party may come into contact with others who share their sentiments, but if their predominant sentiment is disgust rather than admiration for a party, they may feel little compulsion to engage with any party's activities. To develop a positive partisan attachment individuals must want to engage with rather than merely reject politics. Engagement with an in-group is less likely to be part of purely negative partisans' lived social experience, compared to positive partisans. This generates the expectation that petistas and antipetistas should exhibit distinct patterns of political engagement. Specifically, we expect petistas to be more engaged in civil-society activism, which is the root that eventually flowers into an in-group partisan attachment.

This hypothesis is unsurprising to anyone who knows the first thing about the PT, which was founded as a grassroots, outsider party that sought to cultivate partisanship among Brazilians who believed that individual engagement in politics could change Brazil from the bottom up (Keck 1992). There is no analogous conventional wisdom about antipetistas. It is possible that antipetistas believe individual engagement in politics could make a difference – after all, millions of antigovernment protesters took to the streets in 2013–14 expressly for that purpose. However, participation in a protest *against* something is not the same as actively working *for* something. The latter requires far greater commitment of time and energy, and a different mode of action. Are the paths to petismo and antipetismo rooted in different modes of political engagement?

Evidence that provides a positive answer to this question comes from survey questions that asked whether respondents were active in



FIGURE 2.11. Political engagement of partisans and antipartisans (1997–2014). Figures report share of members of each group who reported having participated in at least one type of civil society group. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

civil-society organizations (CSOs) such as social movements or neighborhood associations. Because the list of CSOs differed across surveys, we present results showing only whether respondents affirmed that they were involved in at least one such group. Also for this reason, the different levels across surveys are almost meaningless, and the focus should be on the within-survey comparisons of the different groups. Figure 2.11 confirms that in every year petistas were more likely to be engaged in civil-society activism than nonpartisans or antipetistas. In fact, although many have loudly expressed their political views at street protests, antipetistas were more engaged in civil society than nonpartisans (who tend to be uninterested in and disengaged from politics) in only two of the five years.

Additional evidence that petistas and antipetistas have different views about politics and the purpose of democracy comes from a question asked in 2014 about whether street protests should be considered a normal part of politics. This question is particularly pertinent – after all, there were massive anti-Dilma and anti-PT in dozens of Brazilian cities that year. The results are ironic and somewhat paradoxical. As Figure 2.12 indicates, petistas and antipetistas differ markedly in terms of their views of the legitimacy of mass protest. Note as well that PMDB and PSDB partisans resemble antipetistas on this question more than they resemble petistas or nonpartisans. (Perhaps antipetistas would explain the contradiction between their attitudes and their actions in 2014 by claiming that protest was necessary because Brazil's situation was "exceptional" rather than normal.)

The distinct patterns of political engagement between petistas and antipetistas also emerges in Figure 2.13. Organized labor played a crucial role in the PT's formation and growth. Although available surveys have not asked precisely similar questions about unions, they do allow us to



FIGURE 2.12. Protests are "normal" in politics (2014).
Figures report the share of members of each group that agree with the statement that protests are a routine political act, analogous to voting. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

provide broad contrasts. As the figure unsurprisingly reveals, petistas have almost always felt more positively about unions or have been a union member than other partisans or nonpartisans, and they are always significantly different from antipetistas.

The results on political engagement may seem paradoxical given antigovernment and anti-PT protests circa 2014. Yet it is important to remember that despite the size of the protests, only a small fraction of antipetistas actually took to the streets. In any case, protest offers a fleeting feeling of participation in a movement, while development of an in-group partisan attachment requires sustained commitment. This is why the results on political engagement and organized labor provide important clues about the roots of the difference between petistas and antipetistas. Not surprisingly, given their refusal to positively identify with a political party despite the powerful political feelings they hold, antipetistas hold ambivalent attitudes about institutionalized forms of democratic political participation and about democracy itself.

Conclusion: The Roots of the Divide

It may not be possible to fully explain the divergence between petistas and antipetistas. However, we can confidently affirm that the roots of this divide do not lie primarily with demographics or a standard ideological divide between liberals and conservatives. Instead, attitudes about democracy and the desirability of social change appear to play a powerful role. Brazilians who see democracy as a tool for promoting change and who view social activism as a necessary component of any such effort are likely to become petistas – partly because the PT has actively recruited them (see Chapter 4). In contrast, no party has recruited Brazilians who hold opposing views about the value of democracy and of social activism. Such



FIGURE 2.13. Attitudes toward unions (1997–2014).
Figures report share of members of each group that reported opinions favorable to unions, or that reported being a union member. Questions were different across surveys. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

individuals develop only negative partisan attitudes – most often against the party that embodies what they dislike, the PT.

2.4 DISCUSSION

This chapter has explored the breadth and depth of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil since the late 1980s. The evidence is clear: partisanship has been more widespread than observers have believed, with at times over half of voters holding either positive and/or negative attitudes. The evidence also points to the fact that the party system in Brazil's electorate tends to revolve around attitudes for or against the PT. The PT has generated widespread and intense support, but it has also sparked considerable antipathy.

The same cannot be said for any of Brazil's other parties. This makes the divide between petistas and antipetistas into Brazil's only significant partisan cleavage. Yet unlike in other countries, the differences between members of the two groups does not lie with demographic or social class distinctions, and cannot be boiled down to polarization between liberals and conservatives. In fact, petistas and antipetistas tend to resemble each other demographically, and share many political views – about state intervention in the economy or gay marriage, for example.

The divide between petistas and antipetistas may be rooted in authoritarian and antiauthoritarian psychological predispositions, which unfortunately we cannot assess with available data. The PT's roots lie in antiauthoritarian politics, and some individuals have an affinity with such discourse and praxis. Antipetismo emerged as a response to the rise of the PT and its particular way of doing politics, which insisted on promoting social, political, and economic change through mass, grassroots participation. The PT's ability to attract partisan supporters grew with its electoral success – but like an increasingly powerful magnet, its growth also increasingly repulsed Brazilians who rejected its approach, those who viewed democracy ambivalently and/or who opposed the PT's efforts to promote social change. That is, to become an antipetista one must not merely disapprove of the PT's performance in government; one must also reject the party's stated political principles. Antipetismo is not driven by PT corruption or incompetence. It rests on opposition to political, social, and economic change.

The question of the sources of petismo is also relevant for the question of the PT's long-term viability. This is not just a question of what

happens to the PT after Lula's eventual retirement from politics. The corruption scandals of the 2000s and 2010s seriously damaged the party's reputation among supporters and opponents alike. Since its founding, the PT sought to portray itself as "different" from Brazil's other parties, but the compounded effects of scandal and economic crises raises questions about whether the PT will be able to maintain the deep base of partisan supporters. We return to this question in later chapters.

2.A APPENDIX: SURVEY DATA ON PARTISANSHIP

Since 1989, Datafolha has fielded nationally representative surveys that have included the same open-ended party ID question. The wording has always been, "What is your preferred party?" ["Qual é o seu partido político de preferência?"]. The Datafolha surveys also record the respondent's gender, age, education level, and all but a few also recorded family income. While these variables do not exhaust the possible determinants of petismo (and provide no insight into antipetismo) these surveys are useful because they all use the same question wording, response categories, and sampling methodology.

The number of available surveys varies considerably over time, but Datafolha has only marginally altered the response categories in the demographic questions, and their sampling frame. To make the most of all the data available, we decide to pool surveys by year (effectively treating them as a single survey), instead of picking one or a few surveys each year.

Table 2.3 reports all the surveys we used, whether they contained the income variable, and shows how they were combined. Information on gender, age, and education level was available in all surveys.

2.B APPENDIX: SURVEY DATA ON ANTIPARTISANSHIP

In contrast to data on positive partisanship, which is relatively abundant, far fewer surveys have asked questions that allow us to gauge negative partisanship (or antipartisanship). Moreover, the surveys that did inquire did so in several different ways. This is not a tremendous problem when doing comparisons between different groups within the same surveys, but it makes any attempt to make longitudinal comparisons very labor-intensive. When presenting longitudinal figures in this chapter, we made an effort to retain the most comparable surveys and survey questions, but results should be taken with a grain of salt.

TABLE 2.3. *Positive Partisanship Surveys*

	Year	*N*	Income
00196	1989	4893	No
00219	1990	2480	Yes
00274	1991	7018	Yes
00298	1992	3334	Yes
00312		2558	Yes
00333	1993	2607	Yes
00376	1994	16415	No
00461	1995	2921	Yes
00857	1997	13438	No
00870	1998	19797	Yes
00980	1999	12079	Yes
01045	2000	11534	Yes
01599	2001	12126	Yes
01603	2002	2368	Yes
01604		3410	Yes
01692		6030	Yes
02495		3979	Yes
02499	2003	5729	Yes
02500		2951	Yes
02502		12180	Yes
02503	2004	2306	Yes
02508		2558	Yes
02522		4291	Yes
02524	2005	2532	Yes
02525		2124	Yes
02526		2110	Yes
02619		3636	Yes
02531	2006	2651	Yes
02533		3801	Yes
02534		3795	Yes
02535		6000	Yes
02537		6264	Yes
02538		6969	Yes
02544		4319	Yes
02552		2178	Yes
02553	2007	5700	Yes
02557		11741	Yes

	Year	*N*	Income
613393	2008	4044	Yes
613419		2981	Yes
03280	2009	11625	Yes
03281		5129	Yes
613485		4100	Yes
03284	2010	20960	Yes
03286		11784	Yes
03288		11660	Yes
03292		4158	Yes
813519		10905	Yes
813538		3180	Yes
03372	2012	2588	Yes
03925	2013	2517	Yes
03864	2014	12022	Yes

Five-digit codes indicate surveys were obtained from the UNICAMP/CESOP repository, in which case surveys are identified by the acronym DAT followed by the codes provided in the table. Six-digit codes indicate that surveys were obtained directly from Datafolha and refer to the company's internal coding system.

Table 2.4 lists all the surveys we identified that could be used to analyze negative partisanship. We found three general types of question that could be used for the task that inquired whether the respondent disliked parties, whether she would never vote for a party, and whether she was for or against certain parties.[16] Some surveys asked more than one question, but all of them asked some variant of the "like" question, so we chose it for the analysis.[17]

These surveys, of course, also asked positive partisanship questions, in different formats. While we did not use these surveys in this chapter, they were used to construct the the exclusive and comprehensive categories in Chapter 3 that divide the electorate into sympathizers of the PT, PMDB, PSDB, and other parties, nonpartisans and pure antipetistas.

In general, a respondent was coded as an antipetista if she mentioned not liking the PT in any of her choices, which typically happened in the

[16] Five-digit codes are the ones used by the UNICAMP/CESOP repository to identify the surveys.

[17] Shares of respondents saying they would not vote for a party were typically slightly higher than those disliking a party.

TABLE 2.4. *Negative Partisanship Surveys*

Year	Survey	Negative Type	Negative Wording	Positive Wording
1989	IBOPE 00192	Closed and Multiple	E por qual ou quais destes partidos o(a) Sr(a) tem antipatia? [And for which of these parties do you have some antipathy?]	O(a) Sr(a) tem preferência ou simpatia maior por algum destes partidos políticos? [If yes] Qual? [Do you have a preference or greater appreciation for any of these political parties? [If yes] Which?
1994	IBOPE 00339	Open and Multiple	E de qual partido o(a) sr(a) gosta menos? [And which party do you like least?]	De qual partido político o(a) sr(a) gosta mais? [Which political party do you like most?]
1997	FPA 01825	Open and Multiple	E quais são os partidos políticos que você não gosta? [And which of these political parties do you not like?]	Qual é o partido político que você prefere? [Which political party do you prefer?]
2002	ESEB 01838	Closed and Multiple	Agora gostaria de saber com mais detalhes o que o(a) Sr(a) pensa de alguns partidos políticos. Por favor, use uma nota de 0 a 10 para indicar o quanto o(a) Sr(a) gosta do partido que eu vou mencionar. Zero significa que o(a) Sr(a) NÃO gosta do partido e dez que o(a) Sr(a) gosta muito. [Now I'd like to know in greater detail what you think of some political parties. Please, use this scale from 0 to 10 to indicate how much you like each party I'm going to mention. Zero signifies that you do NOT like the party, and 10 that you like it a lot.]	Existe algum partido político que representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [If yes] Qual o partido que melhor representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [Is there a political party that represents the way you think? [If yes] Which party best represents the way you think?]
2006	FPA 02483	Closed and Multiple	E quais são os partidos políticos de que você não gosta? [And which parties do you not like?]	Qual é o partido político que você prefere? [Which political party do you prefer?]
2006	ESEB 02489	Closed and Multiple	Agora gostaria de saber com mais detalhes o que o(a) Sr(a) pensa de alguns partidos políticos. Por favor, use uma nota de 0 a 10 para indicar o quanto o(a) Sr(a) gosta do partido que eu vou mencionar. Zero significa que o(a) Sr(a) NÃO gosta do partido e dez que o(a) Sr(a) gosta muito. [Now I'd like to know in greater detail what you think of some political parties. Please, use this scale from 0 to 10 to indicate how much you like each party I'm going to mention. Zero signifies that you do NOT like the party, and 10 that you like it a lot.]	Existe algum partido político que representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [If yes] Qual o partido que melhor representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [Is there a political party that represents the way you think? [If yes] Which political party best represents the way you think?]
2010	ESEB	Closed and Multiple	Agora gostaria de saber com mais detalhes o que o(a) Sr(a) pensa de alguns partidos políticos. Por favor, use uma nota de 0 a 10 para indicar o quanto o(a) Sr(a) gosta do partido que eu vou mencionar. Zero significa que o(a) Sr(a) NÃO gosta do partido e dez que o(a) Sr(a) gosta muito. [Now I'd like to know in greater detail what you think of some political parties. Please, use this scale from 0 to 10 to indicate how much you like each party I'm going to mention. Zero signifies that you do NOT like the party, and 10 that you like it a lot.]	Existe algum partido político que representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [If yes] Qual o partido que melhor representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [Is there a political party that represents the way you think? [If yes] Which political party best represents the way you think?]

(*continued*)

TABLE 2.4 *(continued)*

Year	Survey	Negative Type	Negative Wording	Positive Wording
2014	ESEB 03928	Closed and Multiple	Agora gostaria de saber com mais detalhes o que o(a) Sr(a) pensa de alguns partidos políticos. Por favor, use uma nota de 0 a 10 para indicar o quanto o(a) Sr(a) gosta do partido que eu vou mencionar. Zero significa que o(a) Sr(a) NÃO gosta do partido e dez que o(a) Sr(a) gosta muito. [Now I'd like to know in greater detail what you think of some political parties. Please, use this scale from 0 to 10 to indicate how much you like each party I'm going to mention. Zero signifies that you do NOT like the party, and 10 that you like it a lot.]	Existe algum partido político que representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [If yes] Qual o partido que melhor representa a maneira como o(a) Sr(a) pensa? [Is there a political party that represents the way you think? [If yes] Which political party best represents the way you think?]
2014	BEPS	Open and Single	Há algum partido do qual o(a) Sr.(a) não goste? [if yes] Qual é este partido? [Is there a party that you do not like? [If yes] Which party?	Atualmente o(a) Sr.(a) simpatiza com algum partido político? [If yes] Com qual partido o(a) Sr.(a). simpatiza? [These days, do you have a particular appreciation for some political party? [If yes] Which party?]

first answer, and very infrequently in subsequent answers. Similarly, we coded as antipartisan all respondents who mentioned disliking any parties. All the ESEB surveys offered the respondents a scale in which to express "dislike" for each party. As the lowest value of the scale (zero) was equated to "completely disliking" a party, we chose to code respondents as antipartisans if they answered zero to any of the parties asked.

In the longitudinal comparisons, we used only one survey for the years in which we have more than one (in 2006 we used the FPA survey while in 2014 the BEPS),[18] but in the next chapter we draw from both surveys, depending on availability of questions on our topics of interest.

[18] The 2014 BEPS underestimates the number of antipartisans relative to the 2014 ESEB because of the type of question used. This, however, affects negative partisanship for the PT relatively less than overall negative partisanship, as the PT is frequently the first party mentioned by most respondents. As such, the 2014 ESEB reported 26.5% of overall antipartisanship and 14.4% of antipetismo, while in the 2014 BEPS these figures were 15.5% and 11.4%, respectively.

3

The Strength of Partisan Attitudes in Brazil

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 revealed that for a large proportion of Brazilian voters, one or both sides of the partisanship coin has mattered. At times more than half of Brazilians have expressed positive and/or negative partisan attitudes – and most of this sentiment has appeared as support for or opposition to the PT.

It is one thing to note that many Brazilians call themselves partisans or antipartisans. Yet how would we know whether such attitudes are "real?" It is possible that self-expressed partisan attitudes could be superficial and thus politically inconsequential. Social Identity Theory suggests that partisan attitudes – whether positive or negative – matter if they are relatively consistent over time and if they shape voters' opinions and voting behavior.

To assess the temporal consistency of partisanship in Brazil, we consider its "boundedness" – the extent to which voters affirm an allegiance to a particular party over time – as assessed through responses in panel surveys. We find that petismo is bounded similarly to partisanship for major parties in other countries, while partisanship for the PSDB and PMDB is more weakly bounded.

We then explore two ways in which positive and negative partisanship shape voters' attitudes. For example, if petismo and antipetismo are in fact powerful psychological attachments, then Brazilians who affirm one or the other attitude should be well primed to either agree or disagree with everything associated with the PT. We leverage two forms of empirical evidence – observational and experimental – to put this notion to the

test. We show that motivated reasoning affects petistas, antipetistas, and *tucanos* similarly: it drives petistas to blindly support their party during good times and bad, just as it corners members of the latter two groups into holding contradictory views about the PT. However, we find that PMDB partisanship only weakly predicts political opinions.

We then explore results of a survey experiment designed to test whether partisans' attitudes about public policies change when they are shown that "their" or "the other" party supports or opposes those policies. The results confirm that petismo and antipetismo have consistent and powerful effects on voter attitudes, while identification with the PSDB has weaker effects.[1] In any case, taken as a whole, the evidence strongly supports the notion that partisan attitudes in Brazil are "real."

3.2 "BOUNDED" PARTISANSHIP IN BRAZIL

No empirical standard exists for determining whether an individual's self-reported partisan identification is real or not. Still, we can derive certain expectations, most pertinently that partisanship is weak if an individual says "I prefer Party A" but then says "I prefer Party B" when asked again in the near future. For partisanship to be real, an individual's attachment to a party must be relatively consistent over time.

How much consistency is enough? The Michigan school, associated with Campbell et al. (1960), implies that partisans must identify with one and only one party over the long term (see also Miller & Shanks 1996; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002). Yet this sets the bar too high: Using long-term panel data from Germany (sixteen years) and the UK (ten years), Zuckerman et al. (2007, p. 44) found that only about 1% of all partisans *always* pick the same party. Instead, they noted that partisanship tends to be "bounded." That is, partisans tend to "pick a side by not picking the other side" – they oscillate between identifying with a party and declaring no partisan affiliation, but rarely switch partisan attachments.

How bounded is partisanship in Brazil? The Brazil Electoral Panel Surveys (BEPS), which we helped implement in 2010 and 2014 (Ames et al. 2010, 2015), allow us to answer this question. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show individuals' responses across adjacent waves within the two panels. Reading down any column reveals the proportion of respondents who gave the

[1] For practical reasons, we did not include the PMDB in the experiment – it proved too expensive to find sufficient numbers of PMDB partisans willing to take internet surveys.

TABLE 3.1. *Bounded Partisanship, Brazil 2010*

			Party at Time t				
			PT	**PSDB**	**PMDB**	**Other Party**	**No Party**
Party at time	$t+1$	**PT**	**0.58**	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.16
		PSDB	0.03	**0.43**	0.10	0.03	0.03
		PMDB	0.01	0.06	**0.40**	0.04	0.03
		Other Party	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.40	0.03
		No Party	0.36	0.33	0.38	0.40	0.75

The table shows declared partisanship of respondents in adjacent waves of the 2010 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study. The text in bold indicates shares of respondents who picked the same party.

same response to a partisanship question in the subsequent wave of the panel versus the proportion who changed their answer. Thus, for example, 58% of petistas in 2010 answered "PT" from one wave to the next, while the proportions of similarly consistent responses were much smaller for other parties.[2]

Although the proportion of petistas who picked the PT in a subsequent wave of either panel is somewhat lower than for partisans in Germany or the UK (Zuckerman et al. 2007, p. 43), in both years nearly all petistas "picked a side by not picking a side." Of those who identified as a petista in one wave of the survey, 94% (in 2010) and 95% (in 2014) picked either the PT or no party in a subsequent wave – a level similar to that in Germany, the UK, Mexico, and the USA (Samuels & Zucco 2011). Overall, petismo is about as well-bounded as partisanship for well-established parties elsewhere.[3]

The same cannot be said about the "boundedness" of PMDB or PSDB partisanship. For these two parties, the probability that an individual would pick "their" party in subsequent waves of either panel was 50% or lower, and in 2010 only 76% and 78% "picked a side by not picking a side." More surprisingly, in 2010 about 10% of PMDB and PSDB partisans switched to the PT from one wave to the next! The 2014 results are slightly stronger for the PSDB: consistency of party ID over waves

[2] See also (Baker et al. 2016) for examination of bounded partisanship in two Brazilian cities.

[3] The Mexico panel was implemented over six months in 2000. The US panel comes from the ANES 2000–2004 panel. The UK and German panels took place over several years, but the "boundedness" of partisanship in those countries is evident over much shorter spans of each country's panel. You do not need a particularly long panel to observe partisan boundedness.

TABLE 3.2. *Bounded Partisanship, Brazil 2014*

		Party at Time t				
		PT	**PSDB**	**PMDB**	**Other Party**	**No Party**
Party at time $t+1$	**PT**	**0.57**	0.04	0.03	0.08	0.07
	PSDB	0.01	**0.50**	0.03	0.05	0.02
	PMDB	0.01	0.05	**0.43**	0.02	0.02
	Other Party	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.43	0.03
	No Party	0.38	0.36	0.47	0.42	0.87

The table shows declared partisanship of respondents in adjacent waves of the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study. The text in bold indicates shares of respondents who picked the same party.

of the panel increased from 43% to 50%, and switches to another party decreased from 24% to 13%. Still, partisanship for the PT appears far more tightly bounded than it is for the PMDB or PSDB.

Evidence suggests that petismo is bounded just like partisan attitudes in less fragmented party systems. In contrast, partisans of Brazil's other major parties tend to switch allegiances more frequently. This finding carries an important implication for the PT's recent decline: although many petistas have turned away from their party, they are unlikely to cross over to another party's camp – and they may eventually return to the fold.

3.3 PARTISANSHIP AND MOTIVATED REASONING

The evidence just presented does not answer the question of the extent to which partisanship – whether positive or negative – actually shapes voters' attitudes. Social Identity Theory suggests that individuals have a primal emotional need to affirm loyalty to an in-group and oppose perceived out-groups. This desire shapes the information individuals seek out, and how they process that information. Specifically, individuals who develop a strong attachment to a group will be willing to expend psychological and emotional energy defending the group's moral worth. A consequence of this is motivated reasoning: individuals' unconscious tendency to interpret information to fit preconceived notions about what is good or right. The need to maintain a stable social identity, once it has taken shape, drives cognition itself, altering perceptions of the relative importance or credibility of the sources of information and the information itself.

To the extent that partisanship – whether positive or negative – is a real form of social identity, we expect individuals who express such attitudes

to engage in motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning implies that when a party takes a particular position, partisanship should override individuals' true attitudes about that policy and/or any factual information about the policy's true effects. Partisan attitudes should shape perceptions of government performance, rather than the other way around.

This means that both partisans and antipartisans should be hypocrites on issues central to Brazilian politics in recent years, such as the state of the economy, approval of government redistributive programs, and perceptions of corruption. For example, when the PSDB is in power, even if the economy is objectively growing petistas should be relatively unwilling to credit the government for good performance. Similarly, when the PT is in power, petistas should be willing to overlook negative economic performance while antipetistas should do the opposite. Likewise, petistas should perceive corruption as a bigger problem when other parties are in power, while antipetistas and *tucanos* should believe that corruption is worse under the PT.

3.3.1 Perceptions of the Economy

Let us begin with perceptions of the economy. Figure 3.1 reports the proportion of different groups who evaluated economic performance in 1997 negatively.[4] That year, Brazil's GDP grew 3.4% – by any objective standard, a robust level. The first panel reports the share of respondents who believed inflation to be worse than three years earlier. The second panel reports the share of respondents who stated that their family's economic situation was bad or very bad, and the last panel reports the share of respondents who believed that Brazil's economy had declined after the *Plano Real*, an economic stabilization program, was implemented in 1994. Because the PSDB's Fernando Henrique Cardoso was president at this time, as expected petistas expressed the most negative view of any group on all three measures of economic performance. PMDB supporters held views similar to those of nonpartisans, while PSDB partisans were least likely to hold negative views of the economy, closely followed by antipetistas.

Further evidence supporting the notion that partisan attitudes encourage motivated reasoning can be seen in Figure 3.2. Here we see that in 2010, petistas and antipetistas viewed the same facts about the state of the economy through different lenses. Antipetistas were much more

[4] Data for others years prior to Lula's presidency were unavailable.



FIGURE 3.1. Negative evaluations of the economy (1997).
The first panel reports the share of respondents who considered the country's economic situation worse than three years before. The center panel reports the share of respondents who considered their family's economic situation as negative. The last panel reports the share of respondents in each category who evaluated the Plano Real as bad. A residual category for "other partisans" is not reported. Data sources are described in the appendix.

likely than members of other groups (including tucanos) to consider the country's economic situation as bad or very bad – an improbable notion given that GDP grew more than 7% that year. The second and third panels consider "pocketbook" assessments. These were more weakly associated with partisanship, but the PT/anti-PT pattern persists, as antipetistas had the gloomiest assessments of their own present and future economic situations.

Brazil's economic downturn, which began in earnest in 2014, simply reversed the pattern of motivated reasoning, mainly for petistas and



FIGURE 3.2. Negative evaluations of the economy (2010).
The first figure reports the share of respondents by type that evaluated the country's current economic situation as bad or very bad. The next panel reports the share of respondents by type who evaluate their personal economic situation as bad or very bad. The last panel reports the share of respondents who consider it unlikely that they will be better off in ten years. A residual category for "other partisans" is not reported. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.



FIGURE 3.3. Negative evaluations of the economy (2014).
The first two panels report the share of respondents by type who evaluated the country's economic situation as bad or very bad, and worse than one year before. The third panel reports the share of respondents who thought that their quality of life was worse than their parents'. The fourth panel reports the share of respondents who evaluate their personal economic situation as bad or very bad, and the last panel reports the share of respondents who believe it unlikely that they will be better off within the next decade. The last question is from the ESEB; others are from the BEPS. A residual category for "other partisans" is not reported. The scale of the last panel differs from that of the first two. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

antipetistas. By that year Brazil's economy was objectively doing poorly, experiencing zero GDP growth. Still, 50% of petistas approved of President Rousseff's management of the economy in the first semester of 2014, compared to only 5% of antipetistas.[5] Moreover, as Figure 3.3 reveals, petistas were more likely than members of other groups to believe Brazil was doing well and better than a year prior, and remained the most optimistic about the future (the fifth panel). In contrast, antipetistas were more likely than members of other groups to think Brazil was doing poorly and worse than a year before, and were the least optimistic about the future. Overall, the contrast between antipetistas and petistas is greater than any differences between petistas and tucanos or PMDBistas.

3.3.2 Perceptions of Government Programs

Positive and negative partisanship shaped perceptions of economic performance under both PSDB and PT presidencies, particularly for petistas and

[5] These data come from Datafolha surveys. This vast difference does not change if we control for respondents' income levels, providing additional support for the hypothesis that partisan attitudes shape perceptions independently of social class.



FIGURE 3.4. Attitudes toward "PT programs" (2014).
All panels report the share of respondents by type that support each program. Data are from BEPS. A residual category for "other partisans" is not reported. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

antipetistas. Let us now consider how positive and negative partisanship shape opinions about an array of government programs associated with the PT. At the simplest level, we expect petistas to support and antipetistas to oppose PT-implemented policies. Tucanos should express attitudes similar to antipetistas, while we have unclear expectations about PMDB partisans' attitudes.

Knowledgeable observers might think that the hypothesis about differences between petistas and antipetistas is unsurprising or even banal. Yet recall that we showed in Chapter 2 that antipetistas are not ideological conservatives, and that when asked an abstract survey question they have exactly the same opinion as petistas about the desirability of government action to reduce inequality. Despite this, Figure 3.4 suggests that motivated reasoning about PT programs supersedes antipetistas' "true" attitudes about redistribution. In every case, petistas and antipetistas hold statistically significantly different opinions. This is true, by contrast, in only three of five cases for the PT vs. the PSDB, and in only two of five cases for the contrast between PT and PMDB supporters. For every redistributive policy associated with the PT government, antipetistas hold the most negative view. These attitudes hold not only for redistributive social-welfare programs such as *Bolsa Família* (a conditional cash transfer program), *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (a low-income housing program), and *Tarifa Social de Energia Elétrica* (an energy subsidy for the poor), but also for racial and socioeconomic affirmative action policies. In short, although antipetistas may not oppose government efforts to reduce inequality in principle, they oppose *PT government* policies that impact the socioeconomic status quo, simply because the programs are associated with the PT.

3.3.3 Perceptions of Corruption

The PT's self-proclaimed *modo petista de governar* or "PT way of governing" ostensibly advocated enhancing government transparency and eliminating political corruption. In the party's early days, many Brazilians believed that the PT was different from other parties not only because it relied on popular mobilization and participation but also because its leaders sought to resist the corrupting influence of money in politics. For this reason, the PT's image suffered a brutal blow during the *mensalão* scandal of 2005. According to two surveys the PT's own think tank fielded, in 1997 Brazilians (even nonpetistas) regarded the PT as the least corrupt party – but by 2006 only "all of the above" beat out the PT for most corrupt party – and even many petistas acknowledged that the party had failed to live up to its own standards (Fundação Perseu Abramo 2006).

These PT-sponsored surveys also allow us to explore why antipetistas say they dislike the PT, as both surveys followed up the negative partisanship question ("Which party would you never vote for?") with an open-ended question that asked respondents why they disliked the party they had mentioned. Table 3.3 reveals antipetistas' first responses, which we recoded to fit a few categories common to both years.[6]

Antipetistas gave different reasons for their antipathy in the two surveys. In 1997, the plurality response was the PT's perceived radicalism (40%), with another 17% citing a general dislike of the party. Yet by 2006 – right after the *mensalão* scandal – almost two-thirds cited either corruption (46%) or disillusionment with the PT (19%) as the reason for their antipathy.

Disillusionment with the PT deepened under Dilma, during the *Lava Jato* scandals, which revealed that politicians from several parties, including the PT, had received massive kickbacks from firms seeking government contracts. We do not doubt that some petistas lost faith with their party because of corruption. However, the evidence regarding "bounded" partisanship in Chapter 2 offers little reason to believe that many petistas suddenly became antipetistas. Moreover, the information in Table 3.3, while interesting, confronts a broader epistemological difficulty, that of the chicken and the egg. Which came first: the antipetismo, or the attitude about corruption? Like attitudes about the economy and redistribution,

[6] The survey does not allow us to explore the responses of positive partisans, as it only asked the "What do you dislike about Party X?" question of antipartisans.

TABLE 3.3. *Antipetistas' Main First Reason for Not Liking the PT (1997 vs. 2006)*

	1997	2006
Ideology/radicalism	40.43	9.19
Corruption/lack of trust	6.12	46.49
Disillusioned with party	11.17	18.92
Its incompetence	9.04	9.73
Just don't like it	17.29	4.32
Other	10.90	11.81
Don't like Lula	3.19	–
Don't know them	1.86	0.54

we suggest that antipetismo came first, and that antipetistas' attitudes about corruption are driven by motivated reasoning.

This hypothesis implies that attitudes about corruption are an effect rather than a cause of positive or negative partisanship. Although corruption is endemic to all of Brazil's political parties, the PT took the lion's share of the blame for corruption in the *Lava Jato* scandals. The fact that the PT was the head of the executive during the period helps explain why – but it is also true that politicians from several other parties were also implicated.

We believe part of the explanation for the ire directed at the PT lies with the importance of the PT's label as both a positive *and* and negative symbol. The PT's strong party label helped it cultivate partisans, but the prominent brand name also helps explain why it attracted such enmity: just as the PT's label attracted supporters, the spread of its brand name also gave people who disagreed with it a clear target. When a politician from the PT is accused of corruption, voters are more likely to associate him or her with the party. The same cannot be said of politicians from other parties – they are held to account as individuals, not as members of a larger group. The PT's unique historical strength in Brazil's party system – its widely recognized party label – is also its Achilles' heel.

Figure 3.5 supports the notion that attitudes about corruption are an effect rather than a cause of positive and/or negative partisanship, showing variation in different groups' views about the importance of corruption since 1989. What stands out in this figure are the similarities between petistas and members of other groups in years in which corruption scandals did not dominate the headlines (1989, 2002, and 2010), and the differences between petistas on the one hand and tucanos and antipetistas on



FIGURE 3.5. Attitudes toward Corruption (1989–2014).
The figure shows shares of members of each group that reported corruption as the main problem in Brazil. Note that the scale of the figures varies because the share of respondents citing corruption as the main problem is extremely low in the two early surveys. A residual category for "other partisans" is not reported for parsimony. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

the other in 2006 and 2014, when the *mensalão* and *Lava Jato* scandals provided endless fodder for TV, newspaper, and social media coverage.

Note here that PMDB supporters' views are inconsistent and puzzling: although they believed corruption to be the most important issue in 2010, when corruption was *not* dominating headlines, they did not differ from petistas in 2014, when it was – and in both years, the PMDB was part of the PT's governing coalition.

As is true in other countries, motivated reasoning makes partisans into hypocrites. The same is true, we find, of antipartisans. These results imply that positive and negative partisan attitudes are prior to and thus shape cognition about policies or political events, particularly for petistas, antipetistas, and tucanos. Partisans and antipartisans filter information to fit their preconceived notions of the world – and they filter out contradictory information. They do so to help maintain their own identity and sense of self.

3.4 EVIDENCE FROM CUEING EXPERIMENTS

Bounded partisanship characterizes petistas – and petistas, tucanos, and antipetistas engage in motivated reasoning. Both findings suggest partisanship is not only a coherent phenomenon but also that both positive and negative partisanship are causally important factors shaping Brazilian voters' attitudes about politics and public policy.

The gold standard for confirming such a supposition comes via an experimental design that varies the presence of the purported causal factor. If positive and negative partisan attitudes are causally important, then

party labels should convey reference-group information to both positive and negative partisans. Individuals who identify with a party and who receive information about that party's position on some issue (a "party cue") should be more likely to agree with their party than partisans of the same party who do not receive that cue. A similar dynamic should work for individuals who dislike a party: if they receive information about that party's position, they should agree *less* with that party than antipartisans who do not receive that cue.

To test and confirm the causal import of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil we implemented a survey experiment with an online convenience sample.[7] The results confirm that both in- and out-group biases strongly shape both positive and negative partisans' political opinions.

3.4.1 Hypotheses

Our experiment focuses on petistas, pure antipetistas, and tucanos. We expect the PT and PSDB party labels to convey in- and/or out-group information to partisans of these parties. Respondents who identify with either party and who receive information about their party's position should agree more with their own party's position when compared against partisans who do not receive such information. Likewise, PT or PSDB partisans who receive information about the *other* party's position should agree more with *their own* party's position when compared to partisans who do not receive that information.

We focus on the PT and PSDB because these two parties have been the main government and opposition parties since 1994. (They are in fact the only two parties to have placed candidates in the second round of all presidential elections since that year.) This means that petistas and tucanos believe that the other party is their party's main competitor for control of government. Given this, we expect both positive and negative cues for these two parties to impact positive partisans' attitudes. That is, partisans of the PT and PSDB should react not only to their own party's label, but also to the other party's. The PT/PSDB rivalry is sufficiently well defined to generate both in-group and out-group biases for partisans of these two parties.

Our experiment also sought to capture the effects of out-group party cues on purely negative partisans, who identify with no party. For a positive partisan we expect a party label to convey information, because

[7] Results with a national probability sample can be found in Samuels and Zucco (2014*b*).

partisanship is a meaningful form of in-group social identity. Yet for a purely negative partisan, it is not obvious why any one party's label should carry information. By way of comparison, consider nonpartisans, voters who neither like nor dislike any particular party. For nonpartisans, party labels should have no effect at all; seeing the label should make no difference for their opinions versus not seeing the label. Positive and negative partisans differ in that the latter do not consider themselves members of an "in-group." Yet negative partisans also differ from *non*-partisans in that they do consider one party an "out-group." Does seeing this particular party's label shift negative partisans' opinions in the same way that it does for positive partisans? Our experiment can answer this question.

Because most negative partisans are antipetistas, to simplify the discussion of negative partisanship we explore the effects of party cues only on members of that group. On seeing the PT's party label, antipetistas should become less likely to agree with the PT's position. Confirming this hypothesis would also support the notion that having an out-group does not necessarily strengthen an in-group bias (e.g., Nicholson 2012) – that is, that out-group bias does not generate positive partisanship.

Nonpartisans are the reference group for the analysis that follows. We expect cues to have no effect on nonpartisans, since party positions should not matter to them. Although this hypothesis might seem trivial, confirming it is essential to confirming our broader claim that party ID is a substantively important phenomenon in Brazil. Finding that nonpartisans react to party cues would undermine our argument that behavioral differences exist among partisans, antipartisans, and nonpartisans.

3.4.2 The Survey Experiment

In previous research we examined the effects of positive partisanship, but never asked a question that would identify negative partisans. This means that in Samuels and Zucco (2014*b*) pure antipartisans are mixed in with nonpartisans. With this in mind, we devised and fielded a new survey experiment that would allow us to compare the effects of positive and negative partisanship.

Design of the Study

We proceeded almost exactly as in Samuels and Zucco (2014*b*), recruiting respondents by broadcasting advertisements on Facebook. A person who clicked on one of our ads would be taken to the website for the project. Facebook ads can target specific demographic groups, which in our case

included Brazilians eighteen years of age or older. To attract clicks, advertisers can use up to 140 characters of text and can include a small .jpg image. Following recommended best practices we broadcast several similar ads that used the following text: "Win an iPad2! University researchers want your opinion. Fill out a ten-minute questionnaire and you're eligible to win an iPad2 (1 in 3,000 chance)."[8] The survey was active between October 28 and November 29, 2015. Facebook had approximately 75 million users in Brazil at this time.

We obtained a total of 4,971 respondents. We then excluded underage respondents and individuals answering from outside of Brazil (801), those who did not answer any of the experimental questions (20) and those who gave inconsistent partisanship answers (8). This left 4,132 observations, sufficient for the statistical power needed for this experimental design (see Table 3.4).[9]

Our survey first asked several sociodemographic questions, and then assessed positive partisanship by asking, "Is there a party that represents how you think?" If the answer was positive, we then presented a list of the ten largest parties in the country, also allowing respondents to write in a party name.[10]

Next we assessed antipartisanship. The question we employed was, "Is there a party that you do not like?" If the answer was positive, we presented the same list as for partisanship.[11] In order to be consistent with our operationalization of "pure" antipartisanship, we considered as antipartisans only those who disliked a party but who did not like a party.

Following the partisanship questions we asked six experimental questions, each of which had two conditions. Each question presented two

[8] For more information on using Facebook to recruit respondents for survey experiments, see Samuels and Zucco (2013).

[9] Our instructions asked Facebook to exclude respondents under the age of eighteen. Facebook's algorithm is imperfect, so we asked an "age" question and simply excluded those who reported an age under eighteen.

[10] We recoded these open responses, but work only with partisans of the PT and PSDB, nonpartisans, and partisans of other parties. This means that we merged all but the main two parties into a catch-all "other" category for analysis. If respondents clicked on "other" but did not provide a name, we coded them as nonpartisans.

[11] About 12% of respondents opted to write messages rather than choose a party they disliked. More than half of this group expressed dislike for all parties, which we coded as "not antipartisan." We reasoned that disliking all parties is more similar to not liking any party than to disliking one party in particular. Those who wrote in either PT or PSDB (but not both) were recoded as either antipetistas or antitucanos. Eleven respondents mentioned both parties; we coded them as not antipartisans, like those who said "all parties."

TABLE 3.4. *Sample Sizes by Treatment Conditions*

		Control	Treatment
Nonpartisans		541	584
Partisans	PT	105	121
	PSDB	61	75
	PMDB	25	19
	Other	172	151
Antipartisans	PT	729	747
	PSDB	95	100
	Other	305	302
Total		2,033	2,099

polar positions on a particular political issue, and asked respondents to pick the position they agreed with most. Respondents in the control group were told only that "some" politicians supported one position while "others" supported the opposing view. Respondents assigned to the treatment condition saw the two main party labels (PT and PSDB) attached to each position.[12] Respondents were randomly assigned to either of the two conditions,[13] and we randomized the order of the two answer options for each item. Table 3.4 shows the numbers of respondents in each condition in each survey by positive and negative partisanship situation.

The Experimental Items

The questions (see Table 3.5 for English translations) covered the following issues: the appropriate level for Brazil's minimum wage; the signing of treaties to protect foreign investors' property rights; regulating exploration of offshore ("pre-salt") oil fields; prohibitions on corporate campaign finance contributions; the age at which a Brazilian can be tried as an adult for criminal offenses; and attribution of responsibility for economic performance. Three questions were identical to those in

[12] This two-condition design, inspired by research in American politics (see, e.g., Cohen 2003; Levendusky 2010; Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen 2013; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus 2013), is a simplified version of the four-condition design we employed in previous work (Samuels & Zucco 2014*b*). In that paper we tested both a "single" and "double" cue design, and found no difference in average effects across the two treatments. This suggests that it does not matter for PT and PSDB partisans whether they see "their" party's label or the "other" party's label, as the cueing effect is the same. Testing only a double cue simplifies presentation of results without sacrificing the key point: that party labels carry causal weight for partisans.

[13] To prevent respondents from learning about the different treatment conditions, we assigned each respondent to the same condition for all six questions.

TABLE 3.5. *Wording of Experimental Items*

Minimum Wage
Politicians from different parties supported different positions in the last February's debates about the minimum wage bill. [Some][Members of the PT] supported the option to increase the minimum wage to R$ 900. [Others][Members of the PSDB] supported the option to increase the minimum wage to R$ 950. With which of these positions do you agree more?

Investment Protection
Politicians from different parties defend different positions about international treaties protecting Direct Foreign Investment in Brazil. [Some][Members of the PSDB] think that Brazil should sign these treaties to generate incentives for foreign investment and create new jobs. [Others][Members of the PT] think that Brazil should not sign treaties like these, to preserve national sovereignty. With which of these positions do you agree more?

Offshore Oil ("Pre-salt") Exploration
Politicians from different parties defend different positions about the way Brazil should use the revenue from any pre-salt offshore oil discoveries. [Some][Members of the PSDB] defend the "concession" model, under which the corporations that extract the oil own the product but pay royalties and taxes to the government. [Others][Members of the PT] defend a "production sharing" model under which the government owns a portion of the oil that different corporations extract. Which model do you prefer?

Responsibility for the Economy
[Some politicians][Members of the PSDB] think that the government is primarily responsible for the performance of the economy. [Others][Members of the PT] believe that in a globalized world, the government's influence over economic performance is limited. With which of these positions to you agree?

Reduction in Age for Trial
Politicians from various parties defend different positions regarding the question of the age at which someone can be tried as an adult in criminal cases. [Some][Members of the PSDB] think that reducing the age from eighteen to sixteen for serious crimes will help reduce violence in our country. [Others][Members of the PT] think that reducing the age will have no such effect. With which of these positions to you agree?

Limit Corporate Campaign Contributions
Politicians from different parties have discussed different positions regarding the question of financing of election campaigns. [Some][Members of the PT] argue that private businesses should be prohibited from making campaign contributions. [Others][Members of the PSDB] think that private businesses should have the right to contribute to political parties. With which of these positions do you agree more?

For each question respondents could choose either statement or "don't know."

Samuels and Zucco (2014*b*); the others explored newly relevant topics. The experiment used no deception: the policy positions attributed to each party correspond to the parties' actual or approximate positions.

We chose topics with varying level of salience. Relatively obscure topics afford the opportunity to examine cueing effects in the absence of deeply held convictions. However, party cues can shape opinions even where voters have strong priors on the issue (Goren, Federico, & Kittilson 2009). Given this, we included a mix of relatively salient and obscure topics. We also chose topics that had varying degrees of baseline support among supporters of the two parties, because our previous research had exposed ceiling effects. That is, if the baseline level of agreement between partisans and their party is already high, the experimental cue would be unlikely to have an effect. Most pertinent in this regard is the minimum wage question, because the parties' positions on this issue do not follow expectations: contradicting its historical position, the center-left PT (which controlled the government at the time) favored a *lower* value for budgetary purposes, while the center-right PSDB favored the higher value for tactical reasons.

Results

Figure 3.6 confirms our hypotheses. For each question, the light-shaded bar provides the proportion of respondents in the control group who agreed with their own party on the issue (the baseline level of agreement), while the dark-shaded bar shows the proportion of respondents who received the party cues who agreed with their party on the issue.

PT partisans who received cues were always more more likely to agree with their party, and this difference was statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better in all six questions.[14] PSDB partisans who received cues were more likely to agree with their party in five of the six questions, and this difference was statistically significant in four of those five. Moreover, for both parties, the treatment effects tend to be larger for questions where there is lower baseline agreement between partisans and their parties; as noted, we attribute this to ceiling effects. Note that baseline levels of agreement between PSDB partisans and their party are higher than for petistas and the PT, which contributes to the slightly smaller treatment effects observed for PSDB partisans.

[14] For all analyses of survey-experimental results, assessments of statistical significance are based on bootstrapped standard errors.



(a) PT Partisans (b) PSDB Partisans

FIGURE 3.6. Effects of party cues on partisans of the PT and the PSDB.
The figures show levels of agreement between partisans and their own party, as well as effects of cues, for partisans of the the PT and the PSDB. Items are ordered by baseline level of agreement with each party, so the ordering differs across panels. The 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for a one-tailed *t*-test of the PT/PSDB conditions relative to the control group are also shown.

The results on the minimum wage question provide the best illustration of the power of cueing effects. As noted, the PT had historically defended a higher minimum wage, but once it entered government it was fiscally constrained to back a smaller increase. The PSDB, leading the opposition, pushed for a larger increase to shame the government, but its stance reversed the position it had advocated when it held the presidency. Note that a very large share of partisans of *both* parties in the control group supported the higher value (only about 10% of petistas agreed with the lower value, and about 70% of tucanos agreed with the higher value). This left relatively little room to assess effects for the PSDB cue on this question – but the cue still had a significantly positive effect. For petistas, even on an issue that they felt very strongly about, the party cue for the "wrong" position on the question nevertheless increased support from about 10% in the control group to about 60% in the treatment group.

The patterns in Figure 3.6 mimic our previous results (Samuels & Zucco 2014*b*) for positive partisans nearly perfectly, even though the political context in Brazil at the time of our two studies (late 2011 vs. late 2015) differed markedly. In fact, results presented here are, if anything, stronger than those in our earlier study, perhaps because of the decline in the number of partisans in the electorate. This might mean that only "hard-core" partisans of each party remained, increasing treatment effects.

Cueing Effects on Negative Partisans

The survey experiment also sheds light on whether party cues shape negative partisans' opinions. Results are shown in Figure 3.7. In the left panel, the effects of antipetismo are clear and substantively meaningful. When shown the party cues, antipetistas moved further away from the PT position in all six experimental items, and the results were statistically significant in all cases. This is especially impressive given antipetistas' low baseline level of agreement with the PT: even when agreement with the PT was already extremely low (as, e.g., with the minimum wage question), the cues still reduced the level of agreement even further.

Results are equally impressive at the other end of the spectrum. For example, the baseline level of agreement with the idea of limiting corporate campaign contributions was high, about 75%. Presumably, antipetistas are disgusted with the fact that the PT has been at the center of several campaign finance corruption scandals. However, when antipetistas learn that the PT *supported* restrictions on campaign contributions, they become much *less* likely to support that position!



(a) Antipetistas (b) Antitucanos

FIGURE 3.7. Effects of party cues on antipartisans.
The figures show the levels of agreement of antipetistas and antitucanos with their respective party of interest. Items are ordered by baseline level of agreement with each party, so the ordering differs across panels. The 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for a one-tailed *t*-test of the treatment condition relative to the control group are also shown.

As with the results for positive partisanship, the evidence is less clear regarding the effect of party cues for "antitucanos." Remember that according to our definition, purely negative partisans have no positive partisan attachment. Individuals who disliked the PSDB but who did not like any other party and who were exposed to the PSDB party cues moved in the expected direction (away from the PSDB's position) on all six items; results were statistically significant in four of these cases. However, the substantive effect of seeing the PSDB cue for antitucanos is smaller than the effect of seeing the PT cue for antipetistas. This difference may be due to the fact that there were far fewer antitucanos than antipetistas (about one-seventh the number).

Cueing Effects on PMDB Partisans

We designed our experiment only to test the impact of PT and PSDB cues. However, we can test for the impact of those two parties' labels as "out-group" cues on partisans of the PMDB. We expect to observe weak and/or inconsistent results, as neither label should act as a consistent in- or out-group cue for PMDBistas.[15] Figure 3.8 presents results, which follow expectations. We acknowledge that the results may be so weak because of the tiny number of PMDBistas in our sample (see Table 3.4). Still, even given the large standard errors, it is worth noting that the effect of both the PT and PSDB cues appear to work in both directions on PMDB partisans, sometimes increasing but other times decreasing agreement with each party's position. For example, PMDB partisans shown the PT cue appear to agree less with the PT on the "pre-salt" question, but appear more likely to agree with the PT on the minimum wage question. We see similar inconsistency for PMDBistas shown the PSDB cue.

3.4.3 Cueing Effects on Nonpartisans

Finally, in Figure 3.9 we explore potential out-group cueing effects on nonpartisans shown the PT and PSDB cues. As with PMDB partisans, we expect the PT and PSDB cues to exert weak effects on nonpartisans. Moreover, we expect to observe no clear pattern for Brazilians who claim to neither like nor dislike any party. For example, the PT label should not consistently serve as an out-group cue while the PSDB label works

[15] The effects of PT and PSDB cues on a residual category of partisans of other parties were, not surprisingly, unclear, because such parties fall across the entire range of the political spectrum. There are simply too few partisans of other parties to explore PT and PSDB cueing effects on each.



(a) Agreement with the PT

(b) Agreement with the PSDB

FIGURE 3.8. Effects of party cues on PMDB partisans' agreement with main parties.
The figures show levels of agreement between PMDB-partisans and the position of the PT and the PSDB. Items are ordered by baseline level of agreement with the PT. The 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for a one-tailed t-test of the treatment condition relative to the control group are also shown.



(a) Agreement with the PT

(b) Agreement with the PSDB

FIGURE 3.9. Effects of party cues on nonpartisans' agreement with main parties.
The Figures show levels of agreement between nonpartisans and the position of the PT and the PSDB. Items are ordered by baseline level of agreement with the PT. The 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for a one-tailed t-test of the treatment condition relative to the control group are also shown.

as an in-group cue. The results generally follow expectations. Although both parties' labels appear to mostly work as out-group cues, the effects push in the opposite direction in at least three cases, and are small and inconsistently statistically significant (only four of twelve cases).

In sum, our survey experiment confirms expectations about the power of party labels to shape voters' attitudes, both positively and negatively. Cues have the strongest effect on petistas and antipetistas, and slightly weaker effects for tucanos. To bring the effects of party cues on partisans versus antipartisans into focus, consider the divergent results on the minimum wage question. The comparison between Figures 3.6a and 3.7a shows that the baseline level of approval of the proposal was similarly low for both petistas and antipetistas. Yet when shown the party cues, support for the PT position was cut in half among antipetistas, but increased fourfold for petistas! In contrast, as expected, the PT and PSDB labels have weak and inconsistent effects on partisans of the PMDB and on nonpartisans.

3.5 CONCLUSION

Partisan attitudes in Brazil matter just as they do for partisans in other countries. Petismo is tightly bounded, particularly compared to the boundedness of partisanship for other parties. And, just as in other democracies, identifying with *or disliking* a party in Brazil induces voters to engage in motivated reasoning. Evidence from a survey experiment also confirms that learning about parties' positions on a variety of political issues shifts both positive and negative partisans' opinions, for both PT and PSDB identifiers as well as for antipetistas.

The experimental results reveal that exposing both partisans and antipartisans to the absolute *least* amount of necessary information – a party acronym – pushes them to adjust their own opinions. When group membership matters, in-group bias pushes individuals to adopt their group's position out of a desire to conform. Out-group bias can have a similar effect: PT and PSDB partisans are just as able to map the policy space after receiving information about the rival party's position as they are on receiving information about their own party's position – and antipetistas only need information about the out-group's position. This is important because in some contexts, out-group cues may be stronger than in-group cues (Nicholson 2012). In many multiparty democracies, it may not be obvious who the main competitors are. Our results suggest that even a modicum of structure in the psychological landscape of a party system can help voters make sense of the policy space.

Partisan attitudes play an important role for a large swath of Brazil's electorate, at least for the PT and PSDB. The PT and PSDB have very different historical trajectories, so our findings suggest that there is more than one way to cultivate partisan attachments in a complicated partisan environment. We must reiterate, however, that one should not make too much of the finding that the PSDB label is almost as coherent as the PT's. It is one thing to note that the PSDB label can shape voter opinion too, but for all practical purposes the importance of the PSDB label pales in comparison to the PT's simply because the former has meaning for a much smaller slice of Brazil's electorate.

Conventional wisdom expects partisanship to be weak in Brazil. The country lacks social cleavages that form the foundations of partisanship in many countries, and Brazil's institutions privilege political individualism and undermine programmatic parties. What's more, its two main parties have converged on the political center and have entered coalitions with a confusing array of parties. Nevertheless, partisanship for the PT and to a lesser extent the PSDB has mattered to the same extent as in countries with far more "pro-party" social and institutional contexts. We also find that antipartisan attitudes directed at the PT exert a powerful effect on voter opinion, giving further coherence to the party system in the electorate.

4

The Rise (and Decline) of Petismo

How does mass partisanship develop where it does not already exist – particularly in countries like Brazil that lack deep socioeconomic or cultural cleavages? And why in some cases does identification with a particular party subsequently weaken? In this chapter we explain the spread of petismo, and examine its recent decline.

As suggested, explaining the rise of petismo is not easy, given Brazil's cultural and institutional context. It might seem easier to explain petismo's decline – after all, the PT was in power during a deep political and economic crises in 2013. However, we just noted in Chapter 3 that because partisanship can be a relatively "sticky" psychological attachment, it can shape perceptions of government performance. If this is true, how then to explain the weakening of partisan attachments?

Petismo's growth from none to about one in four voters in a relatively short time period is a remarkable achievement – for any party, in any country. It is also theoretically puzzling. Scholars believe Brazil is infertile terrain for planting the seeds of partisanship, given its comparatively shallow social cleavages (Mainwaring & Scully 1995*a*). Its political institutions also work against the emergence of mass partisanship: the electoral rules foster high party-system fragmentation and intraparty competition, which enhance the importance of individual candidates' reputations, complicate voters' efforts to understand where parties stand on the issues, and limit the relevance of party labels as "cues" (e.g., Mainwaring 1999; Samuels 1999; Ames 2001).

When social cleavages cannot explain the emergence of mass partisanship from the "bottom up," scholars turn to political elites' efforts from the "top down." At first glance this approach also appears to explain less

rather than more. After all, leaders of all of Brazil's main parties – including the PT – chose to converge on the political center since 2000, diluting the coherence of their programmatic positions. Lupu (2013) predicts that diluting a party's "brand" can lead to a collapse of party ID, but that only makes the PT's success up through 2013 even more puzzling.

To understand the rise of petismo we focus on the PT's organizational strategy, which differed from other parties'. Scholars taking a "top-down" approach to explaining the emergence of partisanship have considered variation in *national-level* party organizations, comparing and contrasting "elite" and "mass" parties, for example. We show that *local*-level party institutions should be included in the story of how parties cultivate affective ties. We also suggest that it is not the extent of de jure local organizational presence that matters, but the way that parties put their local organization to use that does. After all, parties can put local-level party organization to a range of uses – from elite politics in which local party offices are mere legal fictions to mass politics where local offices serve as a base of day-to-day operations for building the party's presence in (and connections to) civil society. Parties that use local organization for the latter purpose are, we hypothesize, more likely to also successfully generate partisan among voters.

Variation in organizational investment strategies explains how only the PT successfully cultivated party ID. All major Brazilian parties have expanded their local organizational presence in recent years, but only the PT used its organizational expansion as part of a top-down strategy to cultivate connections to Brazilians active in organized civil society. And for many years, it succeeded.

Of course, during Dilma's ill-fated second term, party ID for the PT went into steep decline. Partisanship may be "sticky," but the drop in the number of petistas suggests that such affective ties can weaken under pressure. After all, sometimes partisan support collapses to such an extent that a party disappears completely. Given that petismo's decline is recent, it is challenging to bring empirical evidence to bear on the question. However, we do know that in any country, levels of partisan support for different parties ebb and flow depending on economic conditions and on perceptions of government performance.

As suggested in Chapter 1, our explanation of the decline of petismo relies on splitting the difference between different understandings of the nature of partisanship. On the one hand, the "Michigan school" suggests that partisanship is a form of social identity, an "unmoved mover" that shapes attitudes. Of course, this approach cannot explain why

some voters would declare themselves partisans at one time and then declare themselves nonpartisans at another. This is where Fiorina's "Rochester school" offers insights, suggesting that new information can cause individuals to revise the degree to which they feel close to their party.

Research has also shown that not all partisans are created equal. There is substantial heterogeneity in the degree to which partisans are willing to take everything their party does on faith or acknowledge that their party may have flaws (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen 2013). Given this, it should not be surprising that when things are good, partisans would all behave like those who received the "in-group" cue as described Chapter 3. Yet when things are bad, we would expect some partisans to distance themselves from their party.[1]

In short, events can cause the intensity of a partisan attachment to wax and wane. In this light, the timing of petismo's collapse matters. It is important to recall that petismo continued to grow for years after Lula first won election in 2002, long after the PT had cast aside its radical rhetoric. Petismo even continued to grow after the disturbing *mensalão* scandals in 2005, which shook Lula's presidency to its core. This suggests that dilution of the PT's "brand name" following its political moderation and involvement in corruption scandals cannot be the principal cause of petismo's decline after 2013 (cf. Lupu 2016).

Instead, the drop in petismo is more likely due to the fact that although Lula, Dilma, and the PT were given credit for Brazil's decent economic performance through 2013, they were also then blamed for the country's subsequent crisis. It is certainly likely that some petistas abandoned the party because they believed it had renounced its principles, but most who had distanced themselves from the PT had likely done so long before 2013. Only after an economic crisis took hold that affected most Brazilians did petismo enter steep decline.[2]

In the next section, we develop our argument about the sources of mass partisanship. In Section 4.2, we describe the origins and growth of Brazil's parties, focusing on the PT's effort – not replicated by any other Brazilian party – to couple organizational expansion with outreach to organized civil society, and derive specific hypotheses to test our argument. The

[1] This is precisely what we observed in our survey experiments – the number of petistas declined over time, but the partisan cue had the same effect on those who remained petistas in 2011 and 2015.

[2] In any case, those who criticized the PT for incompetence and corruption in 2013 were unlikely to be petistas to begin with.

subsequent two sections (4.3 and 4.4) demonstrate empirically that although all parties benefit in terms of votes from establishing a local organizational presence, only the PT managed to transform local presence into increased party ID – and that it gained more identifiers in places where civil society was more organizationally dense. The final section explores the question of petismo's decline.

4.1 TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP PARTY BUILDING STRATEGIES

Where does mass partisanship come from? There are basically two views. The first is the classic "demand side" social-cleavages approach originated by Lipset and Rokkan to explain the origin of parties and party systems in western Europe. According to this approach, partisanship arises from "lasting divisions between social groups" (Torcal & Mainwaring 2003, p. 57). This is a largely sociological view of parties, party systems, and mass partisanship. It assumes that parties reflect and represent preexisting interests, which emerge "from below."

A second argument pays greater attention to the "supply side" of politics. In this view, sociocultural divides do not automatically translate into partisan cleavages – self-interested, strategic party elites must first politicize them. How do they do so? Politicians face two sets of challenges when attempting to craft partisanship: they must channel extant sociological "demands" into support for a party by creating an appealing party brand, and then they must disseminate that brand widely.

To create a popular and lasting brand name, elites use and manipulate political rhetoric and symbols – all part of an effort to articulate a coherent ideological or programmatic profile. Party leaders have incentives to strategically bundle a set of organizing principles and explanatory metaphors, in order to develop a convincing account for why a political problem exists and how they propose to solve it. To achieve this, party elites craft political discourse and develop coherent electoral platforms and policy proposals (see Torcal & Mainwaring 2003, p. 59).

To disseminate the party brand, elites must confront the fact that, as Carmines and Stimson (1989) emphasized, most voters are fundamentally inertial and do not seek out party attachments if they do not already have one. This means parties face a vexing challenge: how to attract adherents from among the mass of largely indifferent voters. To do so, national party leaders must move beyond creating a brand. Carmines and Stimson suggest that national leaders rely on local-level activists to disseminate the party's principles.

We suggest broadening the notion of what a "top-down" brand-dissemination strategy looks like to include parties' development of a local-level organizational presence. This means more than legally establishing local branches. Some parties may create local branches merely for electoral purposes – principally, to gain the right to run local notables for office. These parties may have an extensive de jure local presence, but their de facto organizational activity may ebb and flow with the electoral calendar. Local organization should reap votes for such parties but not partisan identifiers, because as organizations such parties do not attempt to capture the "hearts and minds" of voters. Instead, their relationship to voters is based on clientelistic exchange, or support for a particularly prominent local leader.

Other parties, meanwhile, use local branches for much more than electoral purposes – to demonstrate an organizational commitment to particular issues and to a particular way of doing politics. Organizational outreach may reap both votes and partisan identifiers if doing so brings the party "closer" to citizens and their day-to-day concerns, by making the party's brand personally relevant to citizens who are active in civil society. This tactic also provides an additional channel by which parties can reach potentially like-minded citizens. By engaging in this sort of outreach outside of election seasons, a party can highlight its distinctiveness, and demonstrate its receptiveness to grassroots concerns. In this way, establishing a local organizational presence may craft mass partisanship from above – but at the grassroots level.

Our argument finds echo in research on other parties, in other contexts. Scholars have demonstrated, for example, that local-level organization helps parties recruit quality candidates (Frendreis, Gibson, & Vertz 1990) and mobilize supporters (Whiteley et al. 1994; Whiteley & Seyd 2003). In addition, as the example of the Argentine Peronists suggests (Levitsky 2003), by investing in local-level organization a party can *perpetuate* existing affective ties long after it abandons its traditional policy positions. To our knowledge, however, no research has shown that parties can leverage local organization to actually help *create* partisan identities.

The connection we draw between local party organization and organized civil society provides the missing link in existing theories of the emergence and evolution of mass partisanship. If we could go back in time and find the appropriate data, it would be no surprise to discover that the European socialist parties that experienced the greatest success were not those that emerged where there were many blue collar workers, or even

those that emerged where unions had organized those workers, but were those that had opened party branches where the unions were well organized, and formally included the unions within the party's local structure. We would expect a similar result for Christian Democratic parties: partisanship would be strongest not just where there were many Catholics, but where parties reached out to both churchgoers and lay groups that were well integrated into local communities (Kalyvas 1996). Parties that create formal links with already organized elements in society should succeed at the polls *and* in crafting partisan identities.

4.2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES IN BRAZIL

Brazil is useful for elaborating the top-down approach to understanding cleavage formation because the relative weakness of preexisting sociocultural and economic divides gives us little reason to expect partisan identification to emerge naturally, without explicit crafting from above by self-interested politicians. Equally importantly, there is considerable variation in both party-building strategy and in terms of levels of partisan support across Brazil's largest parties, all of which have enjoyed electoral success, even though only the PT developed a strong brand name and cultivated a large pool of partisans. This difference, we contend, has less to do with the PT's location in ideological space and more with the way in which it reached out to organized civil society through its local party-building efforts.

4.2.1 Local Presence and Partisanship

Since its formation, the PT sought to cultivate and engage a large and active membership base. National-level organizational consolidation and the development of local party branch offices were both part of this strategy. In particular, in the 1990s and 2000s the PT invested resources in expanding its local organizational reach (Roma 2006; Amaral 2010; Ribeiro 2010). For example, in 1995 the party affirmed at its National Meeting that it needed to increase its "organizational capillarity" by opening additional local branch offices. This effort explicitly sought to increase membership, improve the party's vote totals, and cultivate deeper partisan attachments (Partido dos Trabalhadores 1998, p. 637), goals that were reaffirmed at subsequent national meetings (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2007, p. 104; Ribeiro 2010, p .245).

Determining whether a party has an organizational presence at the municipal level in Brazil is challenging.[3] Of all parties, only the PT keeps historical records of its local-level organizational presence, but even the PT only has records back to 2001, and Brazil's national electoral court (the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*) began compiling official records of parties' local organizational presence only in 2010. Given this problem, we employ an alternative indicator of historical organizational presence: whether a party fielded at least one candidate for city council (*vereador*) in the previous municipal election.

This is a valid indicator because in order to field that candidate, the electoral court must formally recognize that a party has established at least a "provisional" municipal-level branch office (*comissão provisória*) at least one year before the election. In principle, a party could set up a municipal branch and not field a candidate, but given that parties can nominate up to 1.5 candidates per the number of council seats available (between nine and fifty-five, depending on municipal population), fielding a single candidate is an extremely low threshold. Interviews with state- and national-level party officials also confirm that the main reason parties set up local branches is to fulfill the legal requirement to run candidates in municipal elections. Failing to run at least one candidate is evidence of incompetence and invites sanction from the state or national party office.[4]

Table 4.1 presents the percentage of municipalities in which Brazil's three largest parties ran at least one city council candidate in recent elections. All three parties currently have a de jure organizational presence in all but Brazil's smallest municipalities. The table also reveals the PT's more recent organizational expansion, as its main competitors have had a wider local presence for a longer time. (The PT's poor electoral performance in 2016 is no doubt a function not only of Dilma's impeachment but also of the party's difficulty finding candidates in many municipalities to run on its label.)

All three parties have been electorally successful. So why did only the PT manage to cultivate relatively widespread mass partisanship? The answer lies partly with the path-dependent effects of organizational culture (Panebianco's 1988). The PMDB is the successor to the sanctioned opposition party under Brazil's 1964–85 military regime. Yet time

[3] Brazil has about 5,500 municipalities, which are akin to counties in the USA. There is no lower level of government.

[4] Interviews with José Guimarães (PT), Brasília, October 6, 2013, and with Maria de Lourdes Tavares Henriques (PSDB), Rio de Janeiro, January 15, 2013.

TABLE 4.1. *Party Organizational Presence, as a Percent of All Municipalities*

Party	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
PMDB	97.30	98.50	97.80	98.20	97.90	95.90
PSDB	82.20	84.70	88.10	88.90	87.40	87.50
PT	55.50	64.20	96.00	93.90	96.50	80.00

Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*. The table shows the share of municipalities in which each party fielded at least one candidate in municipal council elections.

has proven this affective connection between the PMDB and antiregime activism circumstantial and ephemeral. The military stitched the PMDB out of clientelistic and personalistic political machines that predated the 1964 coup, and with the return to democracy the one thing that united these groups disappeared. As such, since the 1980s the party has returned to its true roots – not as an opposition party, but as a federation of clientelistic state-level electoral machines. Since redemocratization, its connections to organized civil society have withered on the vine, and it has never sought to develop a coherent brand name. All of this explains the gradual decline in partisan identification with the PMDB.

The PSDB emerged as a breakaway faction from the PMDB in 1988, and adopted a structure similar to its parent party. By 1994, it had won control of the federal government, yet its meteoric rise to power generated powerful disincentives to invest in organizational development (Roma 2006). The PSDB was also born a resource-rich party, dominated by experienced office-holders from the state of São Paulo, Brazil's largest and wealthiest.[5] For these two reasons, the PSDB made no effort to emulate the PT's organizational strategy, and it remains a loose association of professional politicians, with relatively few active rank-and-file members and a local presence that – like the PMDB – ebbs and flows with the electoral calendar (Roma 2002, p. 79; Bramatti & Dualibbi 2012).

The PSDB has been a key political player because of the popularity of its leaders, not because it has articulated a programmatic vision for Brazil or because it has cultivated extensive connections to organized civil society, a fact acknowledged by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil's president from 1995–2002 (Cardoso 2011). In some senses the PSDB resembles the British Liberal Party in the early twentieth century, in that it has eschewed cultivating ties to civil society, believing that its leaders'

[5] See Hale (2006) study for a similar argument about variation in organizational investment incentives in Russia.

reputations as efficient and effective would continue to carry the party to victory (McKibbin 1990).

4.2.2 Branding and Partisanship

Samuels (1999) described how the PT developed and consolidated its party label – a deliberate effort to set itself apart from other parties by developing a strong brand name. To limit individualism and promote the party's collective image, the PT threatened to expel elected officials who bucked the party line after an internal vote – and it followed through on this threat on several occasions. Unlike all other Brazilian parties, the PT has also long required its elected officials and political appointees to donate a proportion of their salary to the party (the percentage is determined on a sliding scale). These and other rules dissuade all but the most committed politicians from entering the PT, and helped differentiate it from other parties.

Given Brazil's institutional context, the PT adopted this institutional structure to signal to its heterogeneous base of supporters among social movements, religious groups and labor activists that it would remain a distinct actor over the long run. By enforcing group cohesion and taking measures to promote and protect its label, the PT also created a political identity that could be more easily marketed to a broad spectrum of individuals and groups (Samuels 1999, p. 511).

4.2.3 The PT Way of Building Partisanship

Brazil's three main parties illustrate two distinct approaches to using local party organization. The PMDB and PSDB are elite parties, albeit the former somewhat more decentralized than the latter. Both have extensive local-level organizational presence, but municipal party branches are largely vehicles for local politicians to formalize their candidacies.

The PT uses its local branches like other parties do, to help its candidates win office. Yet its local branches have also served as the party's primary conduit for engaging organized civil society. The targets of the PT's outreach efforts have remained consistent over the years, since the time in which it was an insignificant opposition party: Brazilians already engaged in social activism (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1992). In its early years, the PT explicitly drew upon a Gramscian notion of gaining "hegemony in social movements" (Ribeiro 2012, p. 16). This connection between PT membership and social-movement activism persisted as the party sought out new

petistas. In 2007, for example, the proportion of delegates at the PT's National Conference who were active in an NGO was about 80%. This proportion did not vary with delegates' age, suggesting that the connection between activism and PT membership has remained constant over the years, whether the individual joined the party in 1987 or 2007 (Amaral 2010, p. 99). In short, even after several years in power the PT had maintained its image as open to participation from organized civil society (Amaral 2010, p. 218). We suggest that *petismo* tends to emerge as a byproduct of these outreach efforts.

4.2.4 Hypotheses

If the argument we have advanced thus far were true, we would expect to observe the following. First, all parties should benefit electorally from establishing a local organizational presence. After all, gaining the ability to run candidates in local elections is the primary reason parties open local branches. Second, only the PT should manage to convert local organizational presence into increased partisan identification, owing to the different ways it puts local branches to use. Third, the PT should be particularly effective at cultivating mass partisanship where civil society is organizationally dense. Where civil society is thin on the ground, the PT should resemble the PMDB or the PSDB: establishing a local organizational presence should generate votes, but not partisanship. This last hypothesis is particularly important for our argument, because if the PT were *creating* civil society instead of *engaging* it, we would expect it to be equally effective in fostering party ID everywhere. Our argument expects the PT will be relatively more successful in cultivating partisanship where relatively more people (per capita) are already engaged in civic activism.

4.3 PARTY ORGANIZATION AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

To what extent does establishing a local presence pay off in terms of votes? We consider this hypothesis for Brazil's three largest parties, using differences-in-differences (DiD) estimation of the electoral impact of establishing local organization. This approach compares a party's electoral performance in municipalities where it recently established an organizational presence against those in which it did not, isolating the impact of establishing a local party branch while controlling for the impact of potential alternative explanations.



FIGURE 4.1. Structure of the data for the differences in differences analysis.

4.3.1 Data and Methods

Our dependent variable in this section is each party's proportion of the vote for the lower-chamber national legislative elections, measured at the level of the municipality. Brazil has an open-list proportional representation system in which the country's twenty-seven states function as constituencies of varying district magnitude. However, the national electoral court keeps records of votes for all elections (city council up to president) at the municipal level. Voters have one vote, and can choose individual candidates or the party label.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the temporal structure of our data and analysis. National legislative elections are held every four years. Local elections are held two years after the national elections, also every four years. Because of the staggered electoral calendar, we measure our dependent variable as the change in a party's vote share in national legislative elections from t_{pre} to t_{post}, a span of *eight* years. The former is two years prior to the first local election in the cycle at t_0 and the latter is two years after the local election held at t_1.

The main independent variable is whether or not a party established organizational presence by running at least one city council candidate in municipal elections at t_1, conditional on it not having an organizational presence (i.e., by not running a candidate) at t_0. Since we are interested in the impact of establishing a local organizational presence, municipalities in which a party already had a presence and ran at least one candidate at t_0 provide no useful information, and are excluded from the analysis. Only municipalities in which a party did *not* nominate a single *vereador* candidate at t_0 enter our analysis. Within this sample, we contrast municipalities in which a party ran a candidate at t_1 against those in which it could have, but did not.

We possess municipal-level data for national-level legislative elections going back to 1994, and municipal-level data on whether parties nominated a candidate for city council going back to 1996. We are thus able to examine the effects of local organizational presence on electoral performance in national legislative elections in three eight-year

cycles: 1994–2002, 1998–2006, and 2002–2010.[6] The results from the 1994–2002 cycle are particularly important to include. During this period the PT did not control the national government, allowing us to explore whether or not holding the presidency is responsible for the increase in PT partisanship.

Given the nature of our data, a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach is, again, optimal for attempting to isolate the causal effect of our measure of local organizational presence. This approach combines both before-and-after *and* cross-sectional statistical contrasts, adding a "within-subjects" element that can strengthen the causal interpretation of results (Robinson, McNulty, & Krasno 2009).

DiD designs are typically used in natural experiment settings in which treatments are rarely randomly assigned. However, scholars typically assume that the treatment is *exogenously* assigned to units, by processes unrelated to the treatment itself. Exogeneity is often debatable, but we clearly cannot assume it here. The main threat to this assumption in this study is that a party's decision to open a municipal-level branch and run a candidate is potentially endogenous to certain municipal-level characteristics. If these same characteristics also affect the party's subsequent electoral performance, our causal inferences will be flawed. To minimize the chance that we are observing a spurious association, we first balanced the dataset by matching municipalities in the control and treatment groups on observed covariates (Ho et al. 2007), and later performed a "placebo" analysis as a robustness check.

Matching ensures that we only compare municipalities where a party established a local presence in the period of interest (i.e., the "treatment group") with similar municipalities in which that party did not establish such presence (i.e., the "control group"). To achieve this, we required exact matches on Brazilian region (North, Northeast, Southeast, South, Center-West) and on coarsened versions of each party's past electoral performance in the previous presidential and legislative elections.[7] We also simultaneously performed nearest-neighbor matches on population size, electoral performance in previous elections, level of development (the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index,

[6] At the time of writing (late 2017), insufficient data were available to analyze the 2006–2014 cycle. Although electoral data are available for 2014, we do not yet have access to post-2014 survey data that would allow us to assess partisanship levels across different municipalities.

[7] Following guidelines in Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) to ensure that municipalities are matched only to similar municipalities we created ordinal versions of these continuous variables and required exact matches.

measured at the municipal level), distance to the state capital, civil society density,[8] and on the original (i.e., continuous) values of the coarsened variables mentioned earlier.

We performed this procedure for each party in each of the three election cycles, as the set of municipalities in each condition is both cycle- and party-specific. The stringent requirements of exact matches on several variables means that we are comparing pairs of municipalities that resemble each other in nearly every respect, except for whether or not a party opened a local branch.

After preprocessing the data through matching, the DiD analysis itself is simple: we regress electoral performance in the municipality – measured in vote shares – on two dummy variables and their interaction. The first dummy indicates which period the observation corresponds to, and is coded as zero if it is from t_0 and 1 if the observation is from t_1. The second dummy is an indicator of the treatment, coded as 1 if the party established a local presence (ran a candidate) during the election cycle and 0 if it did not.

In this setup, the intercept of the regression represents a party's performance in the control group at t_0, which we refer to as the baseline performance used to assess the substantive significance of our estimated causal effects. The coefficient on the time dummy captures only the trend in the control group between t_0 and t_1, and the coefficient on the treatment dummy variable captures differences between treatment and control groups at time t_0. Under the assumption that our matching procedure generated two equivalent groups of municipalities, the coefficient on the interaction term is therefore the estimate of the causal effect of opening a branch in a treated municipality at t_1. To simplify the presentation of results, we report only this last coefficient and the baseline vote share in the control group at the start of the cycle, so that the substantive magnitude of the treatment effect can be assessed.

4.3.2 Results

Table 4.2 reveals that in all cycles, all three parties improved their electoral performance in national legislative elections in municipalities

[8] This variable is derived from the census of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2004). These are actual counts of legally registered NGOs in every municipality, from which we dropped organizations in two categories: public notaries and condominium resident associations, which we consider unrelated to our concept of civil society. See Appendix 4.A for details.

TABLE 4.2. *Effect of Establishing a Local Presence on Party Legislative Vote-Share (DiD Estimates by Electoral Cycle)*

	PT			PMDB			PSDB		
	1994–2002	1998–2006	2002–2010	1994–2002	1998–2006	2002–2010	1994–2002	1998–2006	2002–2010
Baseline t_0	3.70	2.26	4.80	9.49	9.97	10.44	4.40	7.17	2.58
	(0.28)	(0.41)	(1.11)	(1.68)	(2.57)	(2.06)	(1.08)	(1.17)	(0.62)
Effect of local presence	2.56	3.82	5.35	6.61	−2.40	5.94	5.12	6.30	3.40
	(0.52)	(0.68)	(1.96)	(2.88)	(4.61)	(3.41)	(1.99)	(2.10)	(1.11)
	<0.01	*<0.00*	*0.01*	*0.02*	*0.60*	*0.08*	*0.01*	*<0.01*	*<0.01*
Placebo (future presence	−0.22	0.87		−2.36	−8.55		0.68	2.10	
	(0.68)	(0.73)		(4.59)	(6.40)		(2.58)	(3.14)	
	0.75	*0.24*		*0.61*	*0.18*		*0.79*	*0.50*	
N	1806	1614	324	348	270	436	578	646	746

Results were obtained after matching municipalities in the control and treatment groups on observed pretreatment covariates, in each cycle, for each party. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and *p*-values in *italics*. Complete results are provided in Samuels and Zucco (2014) and its supplemental materials.

where they established an organizational presence, compared against those where they did not. (The one exception is the PMDB in the 1998–2006 cycle, for which results are negative but not statistically significant.) Establishing a local branch office boosts parties' electoral performance in national level elections by between 2 and 6 percentage points, which is substantively large given parties' relatively low baseline vote shares.

As a robustness check, we conducted a placebo test for the results in the first two cycles. To do so we reestimated the DiD model, but used the *subsequent* period's treatment indicator. Establishing a local party branch *after* an election cannot logically have an effect on that election. However, the same municipal characteristics that might lead a party to open municipal offices prior to one election should also encourage that party to open branches prior to another election in the future. That is, municipalities in which a party establishes itself in one cycle are likely to be similar to those in which that party establishes itself in the next. Consequently, "opening a branch in the future" is a perfect placebo for estimating whether some omitted determinant of opening a branch in the present (rather than the observable fact of actually opening a branch) is driving parties' improved electoral performance. If the results reported in the preceding text are simply capturing the effect of unobserved municipal characteristics on party performance, rather than capturing the effects of organizational presence, the placebo should logically yield results similar to those of the actual treatment. The placebo does nothing to undermine our findings. As Table 4.2 reports, it never has a statistically significant effect, supporting our hypothesis that establishing an organizational presence has an independent causal impact on vote share.

4.4 PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

The fact that the three main parties benefit roughly equally, in terms of votes, from establishing local organizational presence reinforces the idea that electoral success can be achieved even without a clear ideological message. Parties have good reason to establish a local organizational presence: to nominate candidates and win votes. Two hypotheses remain to be explored: whether the PT's distinctive success in cultivating partisans, not just voters, can be linked to the party's local-level organizational expansion, and whether this effect appears only where civil society is relatively densely organized.

4.4.1 Data and Methods

As before, we rely on a comparison between municipalities in which parties established themselves relative to municipalities in which they did not. Although the hypothesized causal connection between local organization and cultivating party ID is straightforward, limited availability of appropriate data presents challenges to empirically testing the relationship. As noted previously, Datafolha has asked the same party ID question in surveys since 1989. However, only surveys fielded after March 2002 identify respondents' municipality. This means that we can explore only a single useful election cycle.[9]

A second challenge pertains to the hierarchical nature of the data. As in the previous section, we rely on a DiD design to determine whether changes in the level of party ID from the start to the end of the cycle in the treatment group (where a party established a local presence) differ significantly from changes in the level of party ID in the control group (where it did not). However, our analysis here differs from that in the previous section in that in this case, although the treatment is observed at the municipal level, outcomes are observed by aggregating individual-level survey responses.

Datafolha's national sample typically ranges between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents, who come from a couple hundred of Brazil's thousands of municipalities. This means there are insufficient individual observations in most municipalities to estimate party ID at the municipal level in any single survey. To circumvent this problem, we pooled individual responses from different surveys close to October 2004 to create observations for t_0, and then did the same from surveys close to October 2008 to create observations for t_1. As previously, we use only individuals in municipalities in which parties had no organizational presence at t_0, which left us with total sample sizes that range from just under 1,000 to 2,600 for each party (see Table 4.3). The quantity of interest is the share of respondents who identify with the party in "treated" and "untreated" municipalities, and in particular, how that proportion changes from t_0 to t_1.

We then estimated linear probability models for each party. In such models, coefficients can be interpreted directly as proportions (and differences in proportions) of voters in municipalities in each of the treatment conditions. This sort of model is appropriate even though our dependent

[9] As noted earlier, as of this writing we could not obtain more recent Datafolha survey microdata that would permit extension of this analysis for subsequent election cycles. Datafolha only makes its data public, depositing it with the Center for Public Opinion Research (CESOP) at the University of Campinas, with some delay.

variable at the individual level is dichotomous, because the two independent variables and their interaction define nonoverlapping and exhaustive subgroups in the data; i.e., the model is saturated (Angrist & Pischke 2009). We adjusted for the hierarchical structure of our data in two ways: first by including clustered standard errors by municipality, which accounts for the fact that individuals are not independent observations but live in particular municipalities; and then with a random-effects model, which allows treatment effects to vary across municipalities. As a robustness check, we estimated a third model that includes a number of individual level control variables. In this last case, we estimated a logit regression with random effects instead of a linear probability model, because the model is no longer saturated once control variables are included, rendering linear probability models inappropriate.

4.4.2 Results

As before, Table 4.3 reports treatment effects and the baseline levels of party ID only for the three main parties. For the two linear probability models, we report the the intercept and the coefficient on the interaction term, which can be directly interpreted as the baseline proportion and treatment effect, respectively. In the logit model, we report the predicted baseline probability and marginal effects of the treatment for an average individual in an average municipality.

Estimates across different specifications yield similar effects for each party. However, the contrast across parties is stark: For the PT, the three models suggest that establishing local presence leads to a substantial increase in party identification: increases of close to 60% relative to the baseline levels in the sample, with p-values within the 0.10 level for models without controls and less than 0.05 once individual level controls are included. In contrast, for the PMDB and the PSDB the effects are essentially zero.

In sum, although opening a party branch at the local level increases electoral performance for all of Brazil's main parties, only the PT was able to translate this activity into stronger affective partisan attachments. What's different about the PT is not that it organizes locally, but that it uses its local-level organizational presence differently.

4.5 THE CIVIL SOCIETY CONNECTION

Let us now turn to our third and final hypothesis. Here, we modify the model in the previous section by including an interaction term between

TABLE 4.3. *Effect of Establishing Local Presence between 2004 and 2008 on Identification with PT, PMDB, and PSDB*

	PT			PMDB			PSDB		
	OLS Clustered SE	**Linear Rand. Effects**	**Logit Rand. Effects**	**OLS Clustered SE**	**Linear Rand. Effects**	**Logit Rand. Effects**	**OLS Clustered SE**	**Linear Rand. Effects**	**Logit Rand. Effects**
Baseline	0.240	0.224	0.158	0.070	0.070	0.007	0.011	0.011	0.007
	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Effect estimate	0.129	0.148	0.113	0.047	0.028	−0.000	−0.006	−0.004	−0.000
	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.008)
	0.076	*0.059*	*0.035*	*0.193*	*0.464*	*0.176*	*0.629*	*0.768*	*0.939*
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Individuals	920	920	894	1861	1861	2387	2475	2475	2387
Municipalities	43	43	43	69	69	118	118	118	118

The sample size varies across parties because they are based on the number of municipalities in which each party was not yet present in 2004. The sample size varies across specifications within parties because of missing observations on the individual-level control variables (sex, income, age). For the linear regressions, the reported effects correspond directly to the regression coefficients. For the logit regression, effects were computed through parametric bootstrapping (see appendix for details). Standard errors are shown in parentheses and *p*-values in italics.

the treatment indicator and the number of NGOs per thousand residents, our measure of municipal-level civil society density. This allows us to determine whether the effect of establishing local presence varies with the preexisting density of civil society.

Figure 4.2 presents the results graphically,[10] showing that the effects of establishing local presence on party ID do vary with civil society density – but only for the PT, which sees significant increases in party ID when it establishes branches in cities where organized civil society density is above the median. Where civil society is less dense, the PT is unable to cultivate affective partisan attachments. (Recall that the PT does gain votes where it establishes a local branch, so its investment in such cities is hardly wasteful.) For the PMDB and PSDB there is no increase in identification at any level of civil society density.

To recapitulate, party organization affects electoral performance, and does so similarly for all the main parties. Party organization is also linked to an expansion of party ID, but only for the PT. And even for the PT, this effect is limited to places where civil society is already fairly dense. The way the PT used its partisan infrastructure to connect to organized civil society is what differentiated it from other parties in terms fostering party ID. This organizational connection is a necessary element for understanding the rise of petismo. However, petismo's decline suggests that organizational expansion is not sufficient to maintain partisanship, especially once the party is in government. Let us now turn to the PT's recent loss of partisan support.

4.6 THE DECLINE OF PETISMO AFTER 2013

The PT's strategy of cultivating partisanship from the top down at the grassroots paid dividends up through 2013. Yet, that year two crises shook Brazilian politics to its core: the massive *petrolão* or *Lava Jato* scandal and a deep recession. With the PT holding the reins of power, it took the blame for both – and as Figure 2.1 indicates, the level of petismo in the electorate subsequently plunged.

Such a rapid drop in partisanship is unusual in comparative perspective, and may foretell the PT's collapse, as happened to Italy's Christian Democrats and Venezuela's *Acción Democrática*, for example (e.g., Lupu

[10] Because the DiD model already included an interaction between the time and treatment dummies, the interaction with civil society density implies a three-way interaction term and its partial two-way interactions. See online supplemental information referenced in the preface for complete set of estimates.



(a) PT (b) PMDB (c) PSDB

FIGURE 4.2. Effects of establishing local presence on identification, by levels of civil society density.
Estimates were obtained from a DiD logit with random effects by municipality and the addition of (log of) civil society density in a three way interaction with treatment and time, and all lower dimension interaction terms. Effects were computed by parametric bootstrapping (for details, see the appendix).

2016). However, in both of those cases the entire party system collapsed, not just one party. Despite the Brazilian system's high fragmentation and the problems the PT and other parties still confront, as of this writing (February 2018) nothing indicates such wholesale change is in the offing, even as evidence implicates politicians from most established parties in illegal campaign finance activity.

Still, how can we explain this rapid decline of petismo, given the "Michigan school" notion that party ID, once acquired, is fairly sticky? Our answer to this question is necessarily provisional. We cannot even indirectly test any hypotheses because, as noted, we lack pre- and post-decline survey microdata that would permit comparisons of partisans' demographics before and after 2013. We also did not field a panel in 2010 that continued in 2014 that we could again field in the future. Follow-up research on this topic may unearth patterns that we do not anticipate here.

Despite these limits to analysis, we offer an explanation for petismo's decline that is rooted in our theoretical expectations about the nature of partisanship. As suggested earlier, explaining the decline of petismo requires reconciling the Michigan and Rochester schools. The Michigan school remains the dominant approach to understanding party ID (e.g., Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002). It holds that partisanship is a form of social identity, a prepolitical "unmoved mover" (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 128) that shapes political attitudes and acts as a perceptual filter. This explains motivated reasoning, as in Chapter 3: partisans have powerful psychological incentives to interpret information in a way that supports their identity's moral worth. Partisans want their party to look good because they want to feel good about themselves – even if this sort of information processing tends to distort the facts and leads to cognitive dissonance (e.g., Evans & Andersen 2006; Gerber & Huber 2010).

If the Michigan school were correct, individuals' partisan preferences would entirely shape their perceptions of the economy (for example), and not vice versa (Evans & Pickup 2010). In addition, controlling for measurement error, if partisanship were truly an unmoved mover then we would not see short-term fluctuations in levels of partisanship. However, aggregate levels of party ID typically do move systematically in response to events such as recessions and wars (e.g., MacKuen, Erikson, & Stimson 1989, 2002). This suggests that even in the short term, some individuals are turning their partisan attachments "on" or "off" depending on events, or even changing partisan affiliations.

How can we explain these fluctuations? The Rochester school (Fiorina 1977, 1981) offers an answer to this question. For Fiorina, partisanship is

not an unmoved mover. It is instead a "running tally," in which partisans continually update evaluations of their party in light of new information. This implies that in response to certain events, partisans take off the rose-colored glasses that cast their party in a positive light. Fiorina's argument also reverses the causal arrow of the Michigan school, implying that partisanship is caused by perceptions of party performance, not *a cause of* perceptions of party performance (e.g., Converse & Markus 1979; Achen 1992; Tilley & Hobolt 2011).

Even Michigan school advocates concede that partisan change – up to and including large-scale "realignments" – can occur during deep political crises or periods of dramatic social change (Miller & Shanks 1996, pp. 184–185). Yet this approach borders on the tautological, for it suggests that the dividing line between "normal" and "extraordinary" periods can be known only after the fact, if we observe substantial partisan change. Discovering the factors that promote or permit partisanship change is crucial, because the causal arrow between partisanship and events may run one way during periods of stability but run the other way during a crisis (Evans & Pickup 2010, p. 1248).

Another way to reconcile the Michigan and Rochester schools is by recognizing that partisanship may be relatively more "movable" for certain people than others. Partisans – like electorates – are a heterogeneous group. Some are hard core: they close ranks in the face of criticism, ignore negative information about their party no matter how bad it gets, and remain partisans through thick and thin. Others have relatively weaker partisan attachments to begin with. Those with weaker or more ambivalent partisan attitudes to begin with might be more receptive to negative information about their party, and thus more likely to deny an affinity for that party when the negative overwhelms the positive.

Evidence supports Fiorina's intuition that short-term factors such as major scandals or the fumbling of an economic crisis have scant effect on hard-core partisans but sometimes undermine the partisan attachments of more ambivalent partisans (Lavine et al. 2013, p. 184).[11] Persistently negative information can even reshape identity itself, as some partisans will reevaluate the fit between their partisan attachments and their beliefs and political preferences (Lavine et al. 2013, p. 189).

As suggested, petistas who came to the PT after 2002 may have been relatively weaker partisans. That is, the partisan attitudes of these "new

[11] See also Clarke and McCutcheon (2009) and Neundorf, Stegmueller, and Scotto (2011).

recruits" may have been qualitatively different from those of old-timers. After 2002, the PT had to cast off the role it had played for more than twenty years as an opposition party and take on an entirely new character, that of a government party. Although it continued its organizational expansion throughout that decade and continued to recruit among civil society, after 2002 the party's success at attracting petistas came to depend more on the success of its government programs and policies than on the cultivation of ties with organized civil society.

Nevertheless, even in the face of a profound crisis, we still expect partisan attitudes of petistas to be bounded. That is, it is important to note that the decline of petismo is not a partisan realignment. Realignments differ from dealignments, and in this case the distinction lies with the fact that even if petistas did "leave" the PT they clearly did not join other parties. No other party benefited from petismo's decline. Instead, the decline of petismo recalls the concept of bounded partisanship. As noted in Chapter 2, within the bounds of "picking a side by not picking a side," partisanship is actually rather flexible. Even under normal conditions some partisans oscillate between identifying with their party and declaring themselves to be nonpartisans – yet few actually switch parties. It should therefore be no surprise that during a crisis, a larger proportion of partisans may claim to be abandoning their party. Over time, these defectors may even come back into the party's fold.[12]

In sum, for many partisans the Michigan model holds: partisanship is a stable form of social identity that resists external political pressure. For others, Fiorina's model holds: partisanship is subject to change, particularly in crises. The question is, which partisans are likely to have weaker attachments? Research expects weaker partisan attitudes among (1) younger voters (Niemi & Jennings 1991); (2) those who experienced little early-life familial partisan socialization (Zuckerman et al. 2007); (3) individuals for whom other social identities such as race or religion do not reinforce party ID (Montgomery, Smith, & Tucker 2015); and (4) individuals who came to identify with the party only after it acquired political power. In what follows we explore these hypotheses as best we can, given limitations on data availability.

[12] As Green et al. (2002, p. 2) note, "Recessions, wars, and dramatic swings in parties' political fortunes tend to leave a shallow imprint on adults' partisan affiliations." Changes in the nature of mass partisanship do occur, but usually only over the long term through partisan "realignments" that gradually transform the social composition of a party's base rather than indicate mere short-term displeasure with the party's performance.



FIGURE 4.3. Petismo by age group (1989–2014).
The figures report the share of petistas among survey respondents, by two age brackets. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

4.6.1 Did the Young Defect?

As noted, unfortunately data to test these hypotheses directly are simply unavailable. We can, however, explore available data to draw reasonable inferences about the first hypothesis, which relates age to the decline of petismo. Figure 4.3 explores the incidence of petismo among young (sixteen to twenty-four years old) Brazilians compared against all other age groups. It reveals that for most of the party's history, the PT had relatively greater success recruiting partisans among younger Brazilians. This is unsurprising. Around the world, youth tend to be attracted to opposition movements and parties. However, the figure also shows that the gap between age groups began to narrow after Lula won the election in 2002, and flipped around 2010. The ratio of the share of petistas in the youngest bracket compared to that in the older bracket evolved from about 5/3 in the early 1990s to about 0.9/1 in 2014.

Despite this finding, the most obvious trend in the figure is that the share of petistas in the youngest and oldest groups covaries tightly. Up through 2013, petismo tended to grow among *all* age groups (with a dip following the *mensalão* scandal). This suggests that the gap did not narrow because recruitment among youth faltered, but because the party began to attract older Brazilians. And after 2013, petismo also plummeted among all age groups. The fact that the two "age" lines cross around 2010 is of secondary importance relative to this more important finding. Age does not appear to be the most important factor driving the recent dramatic decline in petismo.[13]

Unfortunately we cannot test the second hypothesis, regarding family socialization. Even without data, we can, however, discard the third hypothesis, which considers potential connections between cross-cutting social cleavages and petismo. As Figure 2.5 confirms, there was no change in the likelihood that petistas self-declare as white between 2010 and 2014, meaning that a shift in the PT's racial base cannot explain petismo's decline.

4.6.2 From Opposition to Government

This leaves the last hypothesis. A shift in a party's representational linkages as it moves from opposition to government is normal, and happens in any country. Lula's and Dilma's governments sought to maintain the party's ties to civil society (Amaral 2011), but this relationship changed after 2002 (Hochstetler 2008; Ribeiro 2009; Hunter 2010; Samuels 2013). The party came to depend on the state rather than on grassroots support for sustenance, and the party's image became inextricably linked to its performance in office. In our view, the key to understanding why petismo declined has to do with who became petistas after Lula became president, and how and why they were recruited.

Despite the dip in petismo following the *mensalão*, the fact remains that the PT successfully recruited many new partisans in the decade after 2003. The number of petistas rose even as the party had to engage in a massive transfer of qualified personnel from the party ranks into the government after Lula's initial victory.[14] Winning the presidency meant

[13] When survey microdata become available, this hypothesis merits another look.

[14] Interview with Luiz Dulci, PT co-founder and Secretary-General of the Presidency under Lula, São Paulo, March 20, 2013.

prioritizing government work over the party's institutional development. As one PT leader noted, "Even in a medium-sized city, if we elect two members of the city council, all of a sudden they have more resources at their disposal than the entire regional party branch does. And when you win the mayor's office, there's just no time to worry about the party or its program at all."[15]

How can we explain the paradox of the party continuing to recruit petistas even as the demands placed on the party to run the government shortchanged its outreach efforts? The reason the PT continued to attract petistas even as it hollowed out its organizational outreach is because its move from opposition to government changed the nature of petismo. After 2002 petismo symbolized support for an "insider" mode of politics rather than an oppositional "outsider" approach. As the PT's own leaders recognized, this challenged the party's outreach efforts because it shifted the party's appeal away from its traditional base among politically engaged Brazilians and toward those who were less likely to be engaged – people who became aware of the PT only after Lula had won the presidency.[16]

For such Brazilians, petismo was far less about an affective attachment to what the PT claimed to stand for as an opposition party and more about whether one approved of what the party accomplished in office. The PT's outreach after 2003 did seek to capitalize on its successes, emphasizing the connection between the party's proposals, the government's policies, and substantial improvements in people's lives.[17] Even though the PT did continue to have success where civil society remained strong, for members of Brazil's rising middle classes, the party's accomplishments in office likely weighed more heavily than any ideological affinity they might have felt for the PT based on their engagement in civil society. Moreover, even though in 2014 petistas were still more likely to be activists than nonpartisans (see Figures 2.11 and 2.13), the PT's own leaders believed that performance in office mattered most of all. As one party official put it, members of the rising middle class "are less likely to be union members, members of progressive churches, or in organized urban social movements." Instead, they moved up the socioeconomic

[15] Interview with Joaquim Soriano, former PT Secretary-General, March 19, 2013, São Paulo.

[16] Interview with Renato Simões, PT Secretary of Popular Movements, São Paulo, March 18, 2013.

[17] Interview with Joaquim Soriano, former PT Secretary-General, March 19, 2013, São Paulo.

ladder "with no tradition of organized intermediation between their interests and the government – nothing that provided them with any sort of political awareness."[18] In frustration, PT leaders saw potential petistas credit Lula personally rather than the PT for changing their lives.[19]

The problem was not that the PT's connections to civil society in rising middle-class communities were relatively weaker – it was that existing civil-society groups in those communities differed in a key way from the PT's historical base. Citing groups in lower- and lower-middle class communities such as mothers' groups (*associações de mães*), samba or rap music clubs, or local sports leagues, PT co-founder Luiz Dulci stated that, "Our vocabulary is designed to attend to 'claim-making' groups" (*grupos reivindicatórios*), but organizations in lower-middle-class communities do not necessarily fit this type. Moreover, he stated that the PT not only lacked a tradition of dialogue with such groups; it was also culturally unprepared to establish one. "We have not yet figured out how to reach these kinds of groups – not physically, but rhetorically and symbolically," he said. PT leaders attempted to dialog with these segments of society, "not just by giving them things, but by asking them what they want, and by visibly including them" by "inviting community leaders to participate in local or national councils, in the Ministry of Culture or Sports for example." Government policies facilitated such dialog by "revealing the State as capable of addressing their concerns, and then providing an opening for the party to claim credit."[20] Although the party had success recruiting partisans up through 2013 where civil society was stronger, its outreach efforts after 2002 proved insufficient, because despite its rise, petismo's eventual decline suggests that partisan attachments may have been shallower among the party's newer supporters.

We suggest that the qualitative change in the nature of petismo after 2002 may have made a rapid decline in partisanship more likely in a crisis. Although we cannot directly test most of its empirical implications, our argument is that the move from opposition to government not only shifted the extent to which the party engaged in partisan recruitment but also changed who the party sought to recruit and why its targets might have

[18] Interview with Renato Simões, PT Secretary of Popular Mobilization, São Paulo, March 18, 2013.

[19] Interview with Edinho Silva, PT President of the São Paulo State Legislative Assembly, São Paulo March 15, 2013.

[20] Dulci interview.

found the party appealing. Although petismo increased after 2002, newer petistas may have been weaker partisans than those who became petistas earlier. However, this heterogeneity in the nature of petismo over time should not lead to the party's disappearance, as the different forms of petismo can coexist. A return to being the largest opposition party might even prompt more solid "party building," along the lines of what the party did in the 1980s and 1990s.

4.6.3 Discussion and Conclusion

The PT created a self-image as a party of activist citizens – Brazilians who want to engage in politics to help change society. Since its early years the party sought to engage such citizens, by cultivating connections to organized civil society. The increase in petismo in the 1990s and 2000s is a byproduct of these efforts.

Although many scholars have highlighted the autonomy of politics in the process of cleavage formation, such research has focused on elites' national rhetorical, electoral, and policymaking efforts. Here we suggest that party leaders have another tool in their kit to help instantiate their brand at the mass level: opening local party offices and engaging organized civil society. By developing local organization, parties reach out and personally engage individuals and groups in political experiences that directly "forge collective memories and identities" (Torcal & Mainwaring 2003, p. 84).

Our analysis reveals that neither dense civil society not party strategy alone is sufficient to generate mass partisanship. The two factors interact. Petismo was crafted from the top down, but party strategy bears fruit only when civil society – the bottom-up element – is already dense. Importantly, the PT pursued this strategy both when it was in opposition *and* when it controlled the government, suggesting that creation and dissemination of a brand name are not tools exclusive to small, resource-poor opposition parties – they can be part of a political strategy for consolidating power over the long term.

Local party organization is a missing link between top-down "supply side" and bottom-up "demand side" arguments about the origins of party systems. As such, the evidence that such a tactic works in practice carries broad comparative implications – both for understanding party-system development in historical perspective and for understanding contemporary party-system evolution. Our findings suggest that parties can supply

their product – their brand name – and reap profit in votes and partisan support if they reach out not merely to a set of individuals, but also to individuals who are already enmeshed in activist social networks.

In European democracies, parties on both the left and the right sought to connect not just to like-minded individuals, but also to individuals who were already enmeshed in mobilized social networks. Likewise, the decision of the PT's rivals *not* to pursue a similar strategy echoes the choices other parties have made, in different countries and in different historical eras.

Given the dual crises that hit in 2013, a decline in petismo would be unsurprising. The question is whether petistas who set their partisan identity aside have done so only temporarily, or permanently. If petismo's decline reflects bounded partisanship, then many petistas might eventually return to the fold. After all, petismo experienced a similar decline around 2005, in the aftermath of the *mensalão* scandal, but it rebounded and surpassed its previous level fairly quickly. Economic conditions clearly differentiate 2013 from 2005, suggesting that the state of the economy rather than corruption might be driving petismo's slump, particularly among newer petistas. The *mensalão* damaged the PT's reputation, but many PT supporters were willing to forgive and forget. Only time will tell whether the PT will again weather the storm.

4.A APPENDIX: MEASURING CIVIL SOCIETY DENSITY

In Figure 4.2, we report how the impact of parties' organization presence on partisanship varies across levels of civil society density. These estimates are based on regressions similar to those reported in Table 4.3, but that include an interaction of the "treatment" (i.e., party presence at the local level) with the preexisting level of civil society density in each municipality.

Our indicator of civil society density was defined as the log number of relevant civil society entities per capita in each municipality. We computed this indicator from a census of nonprofits carried out by the Brazilian Geographic and Statistical Institute (IBGE). IBGE's original categorization of nonprofits includes fourteen different legal categories. Several categories clearly do not fit into the concept of civil society that we want to capture. The IBGE also provides a more limited definition of NGOs called *Fundações e Associações Sem Fins de Lucro* (FASFIL) which correspond to nonprofits that meet five criteria that are accepted internationally as the

TABLE 4.4. *Distribution of Nonprofit Organizations by Type (2006)*

	No. of Org.	No. of Mun.	FASFIL	Our Definition
Notary Public (Cartónio)	8,798	3,617	No	No
Social Organization (OS)	4,144	1,508	Yes	Yes
Public Interest Social Organization (OSCIP)	1,557	599	Yes	Yes
Other Foundations maintained with Private Funds	7,466	1,810	Yes	Yes
Autonomous Social Service Provider	2,432	605	No	Yes
Condominiums Owner Associations (Condomínio)	140,167	1,135	No	No
Implementing Agency (Progr. Dinheiro Direto na Escola)	9,301	1,496	No	Yes
Extra-Judicial Conciliation Commission	14	14	No	Yes
Mediation/Negotiation Agency	123	85	No	Yes
Political Party	6,341	2,778	No	Yes
Union	20,222	4,290	No	Yes
Domestic Office of Foreign Foundation/Association	90	58	Yes	Yes
Foreign Foundation/Association	43	28	No	Yes
Other Associative Groups	414,187	5,546	Yes	Yes

definition of nonprofit entities.[21] In Table 4.4 we present the list of categories, their prevalence, and whether they were included in the definition we ultimately used. Our definition was somewhere in between the two IBGE definitions, simply excluding *condomínios*, and *cartórios* from the population of NGOs.

[21] The five criteria are that organization be (1) entirely private; (2) not primarily for profit, and any profit generated is reinvested entirely; (3) legally incorporated; (4) self-administered; and (5) voluntary. For more information, see IBGE – Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2004).

5

Partisanship, Antipartisanship, and Voting Behavior

About half of Brazilians are or have been either partisans or antipartisans. To what extent have these positive and negative partisan attitudes shaped voting behavior?

Every four years, on the same day in October, Brazilians cast ballots for president, senator, governor, federal deputy (members of the lower chamber of the national legislature), and state deputy (members of state legislatures). Scholars have already revealed a great deal about the factors that shape results of these elections. In presidential elections the incumbent government's provision of redistributive benefits seems to matter a great deal (Zucco 2013). In down-ticket elections candidates depend on their local name recognition, which is a function of their ability to "bring home the bacon" through pork-barrel politics, and on their own wealth and/or their personal connections to deep-pocketed sources of campaign finance, because candidates for all offices except president cannot rely on their party for funding (Ames 1995; Samuels 2002).

We also know that contextual factors matter. For example, aggregate economic performance is strongly related to outcomes in presidential elections. A strong economy boosted the PSDB's Fernando Henrique Cardoso to office in 1994 and helped Lula's reelection effort in 2006, while a weak economy undermined the PSDB candidate in 2002 (Mendes & Venturi 1995; Carreirão 1999, 2007). Campello and Zucco (2016) have even shown that Brazilian presidents' popularity responds to international economic conditions, which they certainly cannot influence.

None of the foregoing factors are directly related to voters' perceptions of candidates' *parties*. To what extent does positive and/or negative partisanship also shape voters' decisions, encouraging them to cast ballots



FIGURE 5.1. Government evaluations given party identification.
The figure shows the predicted probabilities of rating the government as good or very good given self-identification with the president's party, with the main opposition party, or with some other or no party. Data are from the Datafolha surveys listed in Appendix 2.A that included a government evaluation question. Probabilities were estimated by a logit regression of positive government evaluation on party ID, income, age, sex, and type of municipality. Predicted probabilities were obtained by holding other variables at their modal category. We coded the presidents' party as being the PRN for 1990 and 1991 and the PMDB for 1992 and 1993, even though Itamar Franco formally joined the PMDB only after leaving office. The PT was considered the main opposition party prior to 2003, and the PSDB afterwards. The 95% confidence intervals are shown.

for candidates only of "their" party – or to avoid casting ballots for the "other" party, across all levels of elections?

Consider Figure 5.1, which explores evaluation of government performance since 1989. In line with the notion that contextual factors matter, the data suggest most broadly that the state of the economy shapes presidential popularity. For example, President Cardoso's (1995–2002) approval went up as Brazil's economy stabilized early in his first term, but then plummeted as Brazil entered a recession circa 1998. The data also show declines in presidential evaluation as the economy entered a recession in 2014 under President Dilma, and during the crisis that led to the impeachment of President Collor in 1992.

However, the data also reveal that economic performance is not the only factor that shapes presidential evaluation: partisanship also plays a powerful role. Since 1989, evaluation of presidential performance has been substantially higher among those who identify with the president's

party, and substantially lower among those who identify with the main opposition party. Nonpartisans and those who identify with other parties fall roughly in between government and opposition partisans.

For example, PSDB supporters ("government" partisans between 1995 and 2002) viewed President Cardoso more positively than other Brazilians, especially petistas ("opposition" partisans during that period). Likewise, President Lula's approval rating went up across the board at the start of his first term in 2003, but then declined among PSDB identifiers ("opposition" partisans during his two terms) during the *mensalão* scandal of 2005–06. However, as motivated reasoning would predict, the *mensalão* scandal did not damage petistas' ("government" partisans between 2003 and 2014) view of Lula. In fact, their evaluation of his government improved! Likewise, as the economic crisis deepened at the end of President Dilma's first term, the evaluations of nonpartisans and partisans of the opposition party declined markedly, while petistas continued to regard her performance positively.

The differences between petistas and tucanos under all presidents are substantial and suggest that partisanship is a lens through which many Brazilian voters perceive politics, just as the conventional definition of partisanship suggests it should. In the rest of this chapter, we back this claim up through systematic examination of survey data on vote intention and recall.

Relatively little research has explored the impact of positive partisanship in Brazilian elections, and scholars have almost completely ignored negative partisanship. An important effort, Ames, Baker, and Renno (2009) suggested that most Brazilian voters are ticket-splitters: they evaluate presidential candidates separately from the way they choose congressional candidates or candidates for other offices. However, while they present aggregate national-level totals of straight and split ticket voting for one election (2002), they use a different source of data to explore individual-level voting behavior – a survey of voters in two medium-sized Brazilian cites. Here we offer the first analysis of the impact of partisanship on voting behavior across all levels of elections (except municipal) using individual-level data from national-sample voter surveys from the 2002, 2006, and 2014 Brazilian National Election Studies (BNES) and the 2010 and 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Studies (BEPS), as described in Appendix 2.A.[1] We explore the impact of partisanship on vote choice across all five offices contested in those years.

[1] For 2014, results for state deputy are from the BNES, while all other results come from the BEPS. This is because the BEPS did not include a vote recall question for State Deputy.

We first explain why exploring the impact of positive and negative partisanship is substantively important for the study of voting behavior in Brazil, and then put our key hypotheses to the test: that positive and negative partisanship shape vote choice for a large plurality of Brazilian voters and bring a substantial degree of coherence to the party system in the electorate. Not surprisingly, given what we've shown thus far, we find that partisanship weighs the heaviest for petistas, and then for tucanos. Negative partisanship – antipetismo – also powerfully shapes vote choice, particularly in majoritarian elections (president, governor, and senator). In contrast, PMDB partisanship has little to no effect on vote choice for those who identify with that party.

5.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTISANSHIP FOR VOTING BEHAVIOR

Previous chapters demonstrated several ways that partisanship shapes voter attitudes, but we have yet to put the concept to its most important test. When push comes to shove, positive and negative partisanship really matter for the study of politics to the extent that they shape vote choice. If millions of people proclaim affinity for a party but cast votes for a different one, their statements of allegiance are symbolic at best, and meaningless at worst.

If partisanship really does matter, we should be able to show that identification for or against a party shapes the probability of voting for or against that party's candidates, up and down the ticket. And to the extent that partisanship does shape election results, it also shapes the relationship between voters and elected officials. In democracies, individual politicians do not make policy – parties do. Parties are necessarily collective agents of representation and accountability. Partisanship thus helps voters prospectively make sense of the policy options available, and simplifies the task of retrospectively judging responsibility for government performance. An "inchoate" party system (Mainwaring 1999) is one in which differences between parties do not matter for these goals – to politicians *or* to voters.

Partisanship also serves as a link between presidents and their parties in the legislature. When the electoral fates of presidential and congressional candidates are tied together through shared partisanship, "separation of purpose" – the inherent tension between presidents and their parties in separation-of-powers systems – is reduced (Samuels & Shugart 2010). And when such connections are weak, the opposite holds: presidents are more likely to be free agents, unaccountable to their party, its

organization, or its ostensible principles, and legislators are more likely to feel relatively disconnected from their party's president and his or her goals.

The degree to which partisanship connects presidents and assemblies is critical for understanding governance because Brazilian presidents' relative success is determined both by the level and consistency of support they receive from their own party as well as by their need to construct a multiparty coalition (Abranches 1988; Amorim Neto 2006). Where partisanship is weak, the president's party will be weak, and the connection between the president and his or her party will be weak. This may make it harder for the president to build and maintain a governing coalition.

We are not suggesting that Brazilian partisans will always cast a pure straight-ticket vote, from president down to state legislator, and then for their party's candidates for mayor and city councilor during off-year municipal elections. In fact, given the diversity of electoral coalitions that form around the country, most voters cannot cast a straight ticket vote even if they wanted to, as most parties do not field candidates in all races. Nevertheless, to the extent that partisanship matters in voters' minds, it may filter up through the political system, influencing the ebb and flow of governance. It is therefore critical to know how much partisanship matters for voters' decisions in the ballot booth.

5.2 PARTISANSHIP, TURNOUT, AND VOTE RECALL

The first question we explore is whether partisanship matters for the most basic voting decision of them all: whether to show up at the polls or not. Does having a party ID make Brazilians more likely to turn out to vote? In Brazil voting is technically mandatory for all literate citizens between eighteen and seventy years old.[2] However, some voters do not show up. Others show up but then cast a "blank" ballot and vote for nobody, or they "nullify" their ballot, a choice akin to voting for Mickey Mouse. Many voters show up, cast a vote for president and perhaps governor, and then leave the remaining options blank, which counts as having voted. In 2016, Brazil had about 143 million eligible voters. About 115 million showed up to the polls (80.4%), but only about 104 million cast a valid ballot in the presidential race (72.7% of eligible voters). The other 11 million either voted blank (4.4 million) or null (6.7 million). Meanwhile, only about 97 million voters cast a valid ballot for federal deputy (67.8%

[2] It is optional for 16–17 year olds, those older than 70, and those who cannot read.

of eligible voters) – meaning that about 10 million blank and 7.4 million null ballots were cast in the legislative election.[3]

The surveys we explore in this chapter first ask respondents whether they voted, in the sense of having gone to the polls or not. They then ask respondents who they voted for or whether they cast a blank or null ballot, for each of the five offices contested. Voters can also say that they do not remember who they voted for, or choose to not respond.

Are partisans more likely to turn out to vote? If so, partisanship could serve as a valuable resource for parties to nudge supporters to the polls, where in theory they would cast ballots for their candidates. By encouraging supporters to turn out, partisanship could begin to make a difference in terms of winning and losing, particularly given Brazil's close and extremely competitive legislative elections, where in some cases just a few dozen votes can make or break a candidacy.

Analysis of turnout in Brazil is somewhat problematic. Because voting is mandatory for most adults, the baseline rate of turnout should be relatively high to begin with. This raises the bar for observing any effect of partisanship on additional turnout. We also have to deal with considerable noise in our survey results, due to measurement error. Surveys typically tend to overestimate turnout owing to social desirability bias. This is borne out in the surveys we explore: actual turnout in the four elections we analyze ranged between 80% and 83%, while turnout as measured by our surveys was typically closer to 90%.

These two issues give some insight into the relatively weak results in Figure 5.2. Turnout seems only slightly higher among positive partisans than nonpartisans, and the difference is not always statistically significant. Antipartisans, it seems, do not behave differently from nonpartisans.

With the difficulties of measuring turnout in mind, we explore a related concept, vote recall. As noted earlier, conditional on having shown up at the polls, voters are asked to cast ballots for five races. When asked by survey interviewers some respondents remember all five of their votes, while others remember none. We hypothesize that partisans will be more likely to recall the names of their candidates, across levels of elections.

In the surveys we explore, respondents were presented with all candidates' names for presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial races – yet even so, as revealed in the text that follows, some did not recall their choices.

[3] Information obtained from the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* website, www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/estatisticas-candidaturas-2014/estatisticas-eleitorais-2014-resultados, March 1 2017.



FIGURE 5.2. Turnout by type of voter.
The figures report the share of members of each group that report casting a vote. Reported turnout is higher than actual turnout in all elections. See Appendix 2.A for data sources and coding details.

Vote recall is much worse in federal and state deputy races. In these elections, voters choose from dozens or even – in some states – hundreds of candidates. Given this, for federal and state deputy the survey interviewers could not present respondents with candidates' names. Instead, they asked respondents to recall their candidate's names on their own. We double-checked whether responses corresponded to a real candidate's name in the official sources. The fact that we know what state survey respondents live in helped us narrow down the possibilities and allowed us to increase the valid response rate over the original survey data files.

To assess the relationship between partisanship and vote recall, we use the same sorts of linear probability models and presentational approach as we did in Chapter 3. This means that the outcome variable is always dichotomous (recall or not, for each office), and that we report shares (and difference in shares) across several types of voters: petistas, tucanos, partisans of other parties, and antipartisans.[4]

Figure 5.3 shows how recall varies across types of voters. For president, recall is close to universal for all types of voters – the baseline level for nonpartisans is 94%. Recall is also quite high in gubernatorial races, as it is in three of four years for senatorial elections. Meanwhile, recall of candidate names in state and federal legislative races is generally much lower, around 50% on average. In any case, the figure also reveals that with few exceptions, across all years and all offices, partisans of all parties are more likely to recall their vote than nonpartisans.

The observed differences may not appear very large in some cases, but remember that for president, governor, and senator, the baseline is very

[4] Here, nonvoters are excluded. The denominator includes those who voted for a party or candidate, those who cast a blank or null ballot, as well as those who don't remember who they voted for but said that they did vote.



(a) 2002



(b) 2006



(c) 2010



(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.3. Vote recall by type of voter.
The figures report the share of members of each group recall their choices for each vote cast. Respondents who declared casting an invalid ballot (null or blank) were also coded as not recalling. Voters who did not turn out were excluded from the analysis. The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010, and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014, for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.

high, meaning it is difficult for partisanship to make an additional difference. For example, vote recall in gubernatorial elections averages about 84% – but for petistas, the average is 6.7 points higher. For PSDB partisans the effect is even stronger – 10%. In the senatorial races, average recall for nonpartisans is 70.8%, but for petistas it is 8.2 points and for tucanos 11.6 points higher. Even in state and federal deputy cases, partisanship makes a substantial difference for vote recall. In federal deputy elections, the average recall rate for nonpartisans is only 37%, but petistas are 9.4 points more likely, and tucanos a full 21 points more likely, on average, across the four elections. In contrast, we see no consistent effect for antipartisans. They are slightly less likely to recall their candidates than nonpartisans in the first three elections, but in 2014 they shifted to being slightly more likely.

5.3 PARTISANSHIP AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Positive partisanship makes Brazilians slightly more likely to turn out to vote, and more likely to remember who they voted for. The next question to explore is, conditional on showing up to the polls, how much difference does partisanship – positive and/or negative – influence who voters choose? We suggest that regardless of "objective" conditions such as the state of the economy, positive partisans should be more likely to vote for their party's candidates than for another party's candidates, and negative partisans less likely to vote for their disliked party than other voters. If partisan attitudes do not matter then people who declare themselves partisans or antipartisans of this or that party should not differ in terms of voting patterns from those who express no partisan attitudes. We explore voting for president first, and then down-ticket offices.

5.3.1 Partisanship and Presidential Voting

We explore the impact of partisanship on presidential voting with two sources of data. The first includes the last Datafolha voter intention survey taken before the first round of every election. Because most of these surveys do not contain antipartisanship questions, at this point we can explore the effects of positive partisanship only.

The left panel in Figure 5.4 confirms that in the first round of every presidential election, petistas have been very faithful to their party's candidates. In every election except 1989 the probability that a petista would vote for his or her party's candidate hovers around 90%, the same as the



(a) Vote for PT Candidates (b) Vote for PSDB Candidates

FIGURE 5.4. Probability of voting for PT and PSDB candidates given party ID. The figures show the predicted probabilities of voting for the party that one identifies with in presidential elections, using a series of Datafolha surveys. Probabilities were estimated using multinomial logit regressions of voting intention on party ID, income, age, sex, and type of municipality. The dependent variable was a three-category variable for choice in the first round of each presidential election [PT candidate, PSDB candidate, other candidates]. Party ID was coded as [PT, PSDB, PMDB, other, no party]. Predicted probabilities were computed by setting other variables to their modal category. The 95% confidence intervals are shown.

proportion of Democrats (89%) and Republicans (90%) in the 2016 US presidential election who voted for their party's candidate (New York Times 2017), in what was widely regarded as a highly polarized electoral environment (Abramowitz & Webster 2016). The same figure reveals that nonpartisans (which here includes antipartisans) were much less likely to vote for the PT's presidential candidates – but PSDB identifiers were even less likely than nonpartisans to vote PT, in every year except 1989.[5]

When we consider the right-hand panel of Figure 5.4, results echo our earlier findings that PSDB partisanship is nearly as coherent as petismo. The PSDB formed only in 1988, so the weak result for the PSDB in 1989 is understandable. Yet starting with the subsequent election in 1994, the probability that a PSDB partisan would vote for the PSDB candidate jumps. The probability doesn't quite reach what we see for petistas voting for PT presidential candidates, but nonetheless it is clear that PSDB partisans are much more likely to vote for the PSDB candidate than

[5] If we could separate out antipetistas from nonpartisans in these data, it is likely that the "antipetista" line would resemble the PSDB's, while the "No ID" line would show higher percentages of voting for Lula.

nonpartisans. Meanwhile, self-identified petistas see the PSDB as an outgroup and almost never vote for PSDB presidential candidates.

Figure 5.4 does not report results for partisans of other parties. In some years, other parties have run presidential candidates. However, these parties typically have very few partisans, too few to be useful in survey analysis. The only exception is the PMDB, which ran its own candidate in 1989 and 1994. In results not shown, we can confirm that PMDB partisanship is much weaker than petismo or PSDB partisanship. For example, in 1989 and 1994 only 13.7% and 21.1% of PMDB partisans stated that they planned to vote for their party's candidates (Ulysses Guimarães and Orestes Quércia, respectively), an extremely low rate compared to partisans of either the PT or the PSDB.

Partisanship powerfully shapes vote choice in Brazilian presidential elections for the two parties that have alternated power since 1994. Let us now bring antipetistas into the picture. This requires using a different set of surveys, ones that include an antipartisanship question. Table 5.1 presents probabilities of voting for the PT or PSDB presidential candidate in every election since 1989, using the surveys described in Appendix 2.B. In addition to including totals for antipetistas and PMDB partisans, this table also permits comparisons against Figure 5.4, as it also includes presidential vote intention for nonpartisans and partisans of the PT and PSDB. However, because none of these surveys was taken near election day (some assessed vote intention months or even a year, as in 1997, before each presidential election), we expect somewhat weaker results than what we saw in Figure 5.4.

Consider first the results for the PT and PSDB, to compare with Figure 5.4. The results again show that petistas are extremely likely to vote for the PT candidate – the probabilities are somewhat lower compared to Figure 5.4, but still quite high – and extremely unlikely to vote for the PSDB candidate (the highest proportion is 10.6% in 1997, at the peak of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's popularity).

The results for tucanos also echo what we saw in Figure 5.4: most PSDB partisans intend to vote for PSDB candidates, at rates somewhat below what we saw for petistas voting for PT candidates. PSDB partisans are also usually more likely to say that they would vote for the *PT's* candidate than petistas are likely to support the PSDB candidate (every year except 1989 and 1997), supporting the notion from Chapter 2 that PSDB partisanship is less tightly "bounded" than petismo.

Results also again indicate that PMDB partisanship is much weaker, as it has no consistent effect on vote choice. In 1989, only 17.7% of PMDB

TABLE 5.1. *Vote Intention For PT and PSDB Candidates By Type of Respondent (1989–2014)*

	1989		1994		1997		2002		2006		2010		2014	
	PT	**PSDB**	**PT**	**PSDB**	**PT**	**PSDB**	**PT**	**PSDB**	**PT**	**PSDB**	**PT**	**PSDB**	**PT**	**PSDB**
PT	47.5	5.7	72.8	3.0	66.6	10.6	85.8	3.1	82.9	4.0	76.3	5.8	79.5	4.2
PSDB	4.7	50.0	20.8	37.5	3.1	74.8	20.4	53.8	11.7	53.4	10.3	70.3	5.2	71.8
PMDB	3.2	4.3	22.2	11.5	13.7	37.8	36.5	39.1	24.4	21.1	37.5	41.3	24.7	46.1
Antipartisan	0.0	15.4	3.2	15.8	2.2	53.6	15.1	43.8	4.4	42.4	14.9	48.5	18.2	40.1
Nonpartisan	3.5	3.6	17.8	8.2	15.5	34.2	52.4	17.3	36.4	16.2	43.1	25.8	42.2	29.1

The columns in each each refer to the candidates of the PT and the PSDB. The rows refer to the type of respondent, according to her party identification. See Appendix 2.B for details of the surveys used.

identifiers stated they would vote for their party's presidential candidate, Ulysses Guimarães.[6] Unfortunately, in 1994, the survey did not include the name of the PMDB's presidential candidate, so we cannot provide a result for PMDBistas for that year.

In 1998 the PMDB sat out the presidential race – it ran no candidate and joined no coalition – and in the absence of a clear indication from PMDB leadership, PMDB partisans voted for the PSDB over the PT by about a 3–1 margin. Yet in 2002, even though the PMDB joined a PSDB-led coalition, its supporters split nearly evenly between the PT and PSDB. In 2006 the PMDB formally sat out the election, but informally switched sides and supported the PT. Even so, its partisans again split between the PT and PSDB candidates. In 2010, the PMDB formally joined the PT ticket and one of its leaders – federal deputy Michel Temer – even ran as Dilma's vice-presidential running mate. Yet despite this ostentatious support for the PT, PMDB partisans again split their votes between the PT and PSDB candidates. Four years later Temer ran again on the PT–PMDB ticket, but that year PMDB partisans went for the PSDB's candidate by a nearly 2–1 margin. The inconsistent behavior of PMDB identifiers and the party's zig-zag alliance behavior speak volumes about its chameleon-like ability to adapt to evolving circumstances – but also suggest that its "brand name" in Brazilian politics is nearly meaningless.

Positive partisanship clearly matters in presidential elections – for the PT and the PSDB, but not the PMDB. Let us now turn to antipetistas. The first thing to note is that antipetistas are extremely unlikely to vote for the PT's candidate – the highest proportion is 18.2% in 2014, but in four of seven elections the probability is less than 5%. Note as well that antipetistas' vote intentions for president do not mimic tucanos'. That is, although antipetistas are always more likely to vote for PSDB than PT presidential candidates, antipetismo is not simply a disguised or "shy" form of PSDB partisanship.

Results from two different sets of national surveys confirm that both positive and negative partisanship powerfully shape vote intentions in Brazilian presidential elections. For partisans of the PT and PSDB, party ID is nearly determinative. That is, if we know someone is a partisan for one of these two parties, we can predict his or her presidential vote with near certainty. For these Brazilians, contextual factors matter little, if at all. As for antipetistas, we may not know who they will vote *for*, but

[6] That year, most PMDB partisans said that they would vote for PRN candidate Fernando Collor.

we do know who they will *not* vote for – the PT. Negative partisans are not simply "free agents" like nonpartisans – antipartisanship dramatically reduces their plausible vote choices.

5.3.2 Down-Ticket Voting

If we want to predict how a Brazilian will vote in the presidential race, all we have to do is ask which party he or she likes or dislikes. Once we know the answer to that question, what more can we learn about the voter's choices in other races?

Assessing the impact of partisanship on down-ticket voting in Brazil presents several challenges. For one, few surveys have asked about vote intention or recall in down-ticket races. In addition, as noted earlier, although vote recall is high in the presidential race, far fewer voters can recall their votes for federal and state deputy.

More importantly perhaps, Brazil's fragmented party system and wide use of electoral coalitions at all levels of elections makes the meaning of a "partisan" vote unclear. The problem starts with the fact that parties do not always field candidates for every position, either at the national or state levels. For example, as noted, most parties do not run presidential candidates, instead joining coalitions with parties that do. In 2014, twenty-one parties ran candidates for federal deputy but formally endorsed another party's presidential candidate instead of running their own. This meant that only 40% of all votes for federal deputy went to candidates from parties that also fielded a presidential candidate.

Parties also often choose not to field candidates in down-ticket races because of the complex nature of the electoral coalition-building process. The presidential race is not the only factor parties take into account when forming electoral coalitions, as state-level considerations also often weigh heavily (Abrucio 1998; Samuels 2003). And except in 2002 and 2006, parties have been free to enter into *different* coalitions at the state and national levels. That is, party A could join with party B in the presidential race, but then it could (for example) ally with party C in the race for governor, senator, and federal and state deputy, opposing an alliance in that state that included party B and party D. On top of this, coalitions in down-ticket offices can differ both within and across states.[7] This means that

[7] For example, if parties A, B, and C join in a gubernatorial coalition in a state, they have the following options for composition of lists for federal and state deputy elections: A, B, C, AB, BC, AC, and ABC. The coalitions can differ for the federal and state deputy

parties that support a single presidential candidate may (and frequently do) oppose each other in some state races.[8]

The reason the coalition logic plays out this way at the state level is because parties engage in log-rolling based on available resources and whether they have competitive candidates, in an effort to maximize chances of victory. For example, in a particular state party A may agree to support party B's candidate in, say, the senatorial race if party B agrees to support party A's candidate for governor. Sometimes national party organizations intervene in state-level negotiations, but the national logic does not always dominate.

Negotiations about presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial races have repercussions for the composition of candidate lists for federal and state deputy elections. Recall that Brazil uses a version of open-list proportional representation in legislative elections. Voters cast a vote for a candidate or party in a state-wide at-large election. Seats are awarded proportionally to lists (whether the list contains candidates from one or several parties) based on the sum of candidate and party votes that each list obtains. Once it is known how many seats each list has won, seats are awarded within each list in descending order to the candidates with the most personal votes, regardless of party affiliation. (This means that votes for candidates from party A may end up helping elect candidates from party B, or vice versa.)

Typically (but not always), once parties agree to join forces in the gubernatorial and/or senatorial races, their candidates run on a joint list in both legislative elections. The fact that lists for legislative elections consist of candidates from many parties complicates voters' task – but not simply because the list has many names on it (each single-party list can nominate 1.5 times as many candidates as there are seats up for election, which ranges between eight and seventy; coalitions can nominate up to twice as many candidates as there are seats). One would think that with so many slots to fill, voters might have several potential candidates from their own party to choose from. However, this is not always the case, because Brazil's electoral system imposes a tradeoff on both

elections – for example, AB for federal and AC for state deputy. The electoral rule states only that a party cannot join a coalition with another party that is running a candidate for governor.

[8] In 2002 Brazil's Supreme Court ruled that parties could not form "conflicting" coalitions at state and national levels. In March 2006 Congress passed Constitutional Amendment No. 52, which overturned this ruling. However, the new rule took effect only after the 2006 elections.

candidates and parties. Parties must run competitive candidates, but the open list means candidates on a list compete for votes against each other *and* against candidates on other lists. This means that competitive candidates fear not being competitive "enough" relative to other candidates on their own list. They prefer being on a list where they are likely to receive many votes, but other candidates receive far fewer. In such situations they are likely to win a seat if their list wins a seat.

The more competitive candidates there are on a list, the more that any individual candidate fears intraparty competition. Brazilian politicians frequently switch parties precisely to minimize both intraparty and potential intralist competition (Desposato 2006), and parties' negotiations about electoral coalitions are colored by legislative candidates' desire to avoid competing for votes against not just copartisans but against other parties' candidates on their joint list. Within each state, candidates often have informal bailiwicks in certain municipalities. Candidates always seek to avoid being part of a joint list that has multiple candidates with geographically overlapping bailiwicks. Sometimes candidates will switch parties or not even run, if they fear that their effort and expense might be wasted.

The point of all this detail is to emphasize the point that the meaning of a "partisan" vote in Brazil is often unclear. Given the fact that parties do not always nominate a candidate for all offices, partisans might *want* to cast a vote for a candidate from their party for one of the offices on the ballot, but may not have the option to do so. In fact, the coalition-building process sometimes even generates incentives for party leaders to encourage their supporters to vote for candidates from *other* parties.

In presidential elections this is not a significant problem for our analysis, given that the vast majority of partisans are either petistas or tucanos and that the PT and PSDB have always run presidential candidates. However, the problem gains relevance in down-ticket offices, where even the PT and PSDB, just like other parties, do not always run candidates in every state. Even in legislative elections, the composition of a joint list may leave voters with no candidate from their party that they feel "represents" them, whether geographically or thematically.

The complex politics of stitching together electoral coalitions at both the national and state levels means we have good reason to expect the level of "pure" partisan ("straight ticket") voting to decline in down-ticket races. However, it also means that we have good reason to expect that the politics of electoral coalition building generates incentives for "coalitional partisan voting" – that partisans will be relatively more likely to

vote for candidates from their own party *or* coalition than to vote for candidates not from their coalition.

Exploring coalitional partisan voting also makes sense given our goal of understanding the connection between elections and governance in Brazil. All Brazilian presidents elected since 1989 have built multiparty coalitions to govern, and electoral coalitions in the presidential race have typically become governing coalitions after the election has been decided. Citizens could promote smooth executive–legislative relations by casting all of their votes within their coalition, or, they could promote divided government by casting a vote for coalition A for president and a vote for coalition B for federal deputy, for example. Given this, using official sources, we identified not only the party of each candidate that respondents voted for,[9] but also the other parties in that party's coalition.[10]

To begin our analysis, Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 present evidence of the extent of pure partisan voting for PT, PSDB, and PMDB candidates for governor, senator, and federal and state deputy. Figure 5.5 explores the probability that PT, PSDB, and PMDB partisans, antipetistas, and nonpartisans (the dotted line) cast votes for candidates from the PT, while the other two figures explore voting for PSDB and then PMDB candidates. As earlier, we use linear probability models. The outcome variable always measures the probability that a respondent in that category voted for a candidate from that party. To reiterate, the denominator in the analysis that follows is everyone who says that they turned out to vote and cast a vote for a candidate, party or a blank or null ballot. It includes those who say they voted but who do not remember for whom they voted.

Let's begin with Figure 5.5. Recall the earlier results for the presidential race, in which petistas voted for PT candidates about 80–90% of the time. Here, we see that the likelihood that petistas vote for PT candidates in down-ticket races is lower and weakens further as we move down the ticket. However, petismo always matters – the differences are always statistically significant and substantively quite large. Petistas are always far more likely than members of other groups to vote for PT candidates.

Taking a closer look, we see that in gubernatorial elections, the average probability across the four elections that a nonpartisan votes for the PT candidate is 18.5%. In contrast, the average probability that a petista

[9] If a respondent mistakenly provided a state deputy candidate name as the response for the federal deputy question, we coded this as a valid response to the federal deputy question, and vice versa.

[10] Since a respondent's party is necessarily always part of his or her party's coalition, coalitional voting will always be at least as frequent as pure partisan voting.



(a) 2002

(b) 2006

(c) 2010

(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.5. Voting for PT party candidates.
The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010, and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014, for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.



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

(b) 2006



(c) 2010



(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.6. Voting for PSDB party candidates.
The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010, and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014, for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.



(a) 2002

(b) 2006

(c) 2010

(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.7. Voting for PMDB party candidates.
The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010, and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014 for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.

votes for the PT candidate is 46.2%, an increase of almost 28 points. Although this might not seem like a very high level, recall that in many states the PT does not even run a candidate and we are simply pooling all respondents for each year, meaning many petistas do not even have the option to vote for a PT candidate. Meanwhile, in federal deputy elections the average probability across all four elections that a nonpartisan votes for a PT candidate is 9.1%, while the average probability that a petista does so is 20%. Even in state deputy elections, petismo matters significantly, increasing the likelihood of voting for the PT by an average of 13.7 points. Again, while these proportions may seem low, remember that only about half of respondents even remember their choice in federal or state deputy elections. Even given this, the effect of partisanship more than doubles the probability a petista voted for a PT candidate, relative to a nonpartisan.

As for other forms of partisanship, their effect on voting for PT candidates matters relatively more in gubernatorial and senatorial elections. For example, Figure 5.5 reveals that in five of eight of those races, PSDB partisans are less likely than nonpartisans to vote for PT candidates. The same is true of antipetistas in seven of eight cases. Even PMDB identifiers are statistically less likely than nonpartisans to vote for PT candidates in majoritarian elections, in six of eight cases. In contrast, in legislative elections antipetismo and partisanship for the PMDB and PSDB do not consistently drive support away from PT candidates – in only two of eight cases the coefficient is both lower and statistically distinct from nonpartisans.

Petismo is a powerful form of in-group identity. Brazilians who identify with the PT are far more likely to vote for PT candidates, up and down the ticket, than are other Brazilians. The PT also serves as an out-group: its candidates repel PMDB and PSDB partisans to some extent, as well as antipetistas in presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial races. However, the effect of the PT as an out-group appears to decline in legislative elections, at least when we consider "pure" partisan voting for the PT.

Let us now turn to Figure 5.6 and explore the impact of partisanship on voting for PSDB candidates. Like petismo, PSDB partisanship has both in- and out-group effects. In terms of positive partisanship, while the effect of PSDB partisanship is powerful in presidential elections, in gubernatorial races we see strong effects in 2002 and 2006, a tiny effect in 2010, and no effect in 2014. In senate races, the effects are statistically significant in three of four elections, but the magnitude is smaller on average than for the PT. In the legislative races, the effects of PSDB partisanship are clear in

seven of eight cases, and the effects are similar to what we saw for the PT: in federal deputy races PSDB partisans vote for PSDB candidates 23.3% of the time, an increase of 9.6 points over nonpartisans (the increase for the PT was 10.9 points), while in state deputy elections PSDB partisanship increased the probability of a vote for a PSDB candidate by 13.6 points (the increase for the PT was 13.7 points).

When we turn to the impact of other forms of partisanship on the probability of voting for a PSDB candidate, we see some consistency, but only for petistas, the main out-group for the PSDB. Petistas are less likely to vote for PSDB candidates in seven of eight gubernatorial/senatorial cases, while in the legislative elections petistas also veer away from PSDB candidates in four of eight cases, although the effects are small. Meanwhile, PMDB partisans are all over the map, sometimes more and sometimes less likely to vote for PSDB candidates. Finally, again showing that their attitudes are distinct from tucanos, antipetistas exhibit no clear preference for PSDB candidates.

We see even less of an effect of positive or negative partisan attitudes when we turn to Figure 5.7, which explores the impact of partisanship on voting for PMDB candidates. The first thing to note is that with the exception of 2014, the effects of PMDB partisanship on voting for PMDB candidates in gubernatorial and senatorial elections are less consistent (five of eight cases) and much smaller what we saw earlier, for the PT and PSDB. In legislative elections, the effect of PMDB party ID is also less consistent than for either PT or PSDB partisans.

The impact of out-group effects is similarly inconsistent. In gubernatorial and senatorial elections, petistas are less likely than nonpartisans to vote PMDB in four of eight cases, but the effects are small – and in one case, petistas are *more* likely than nonpartisans to vote PMDB. In legislative elections we get a similar result: in four of eight cases petistas are less likely to vote for a PMDB candidate than nonpartisans, but the effects are again quite small.

For PSDB partisans, the effects are even weaker: in only two of eight gubernatorial/senatorial cases do we see an out-group effect, and that effect appears in only one of eight of the legislative elections. We also see no clear effect when we consider antipetistas: sometimes they are more likely and sometimes less likely to vote for a PMDB candidate. Overall, the results here fit with the general description of partisan effects we have discussed: strongest for the PT, somewhat weaker for the PSDB, and weakest for the PMDB.

Now let us turn to Figures 5.8–5.10, which explore the expanded dependent variable – "coalition" voting patterns. Here, as expected, we



(a) 2002



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

(c) 2010



(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.8. Voting for PT coalition candidates.
The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010 and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014 for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.

obtain even stronger and more consistent results. In Figure 5.8 we see that in every year for every office, petistas are much more likely than members of every other group to vote for candidates from coalitions that include the PT.

For their part antipetistas are significantly less likely than nonpartisans to vote for candidates in PT-led coalitions in six of eight gubernatorial and senatorial races, often by a significant margin, but the effect is less clear (only two of eight cases) in legislative elections. Meanwhile, PSDB partisans are significantly less likely than nonpartisans to support candidates in PT coalitions in five of eight cases for gubernatorial and senatorial elections, and three of eight legislative elections. We see a similar result for PMDB partisans, who are less likely that nonpartisans to vote for a PT-supported coalition candidate in five of gubernatorial or senatorial elections, but only in one of the legislative elections. Antipetistas also shy away from PT-coalition candidates in six of eight gubernatorial and senatorial races, but only two of the legislative races.

In contrast to the results for the PT, the results in Figure 5.9 suggest that PSDB partisanship has a weaker ability to keep voters' choices within the party's coalition. While Figure 5.8 shows that petismo has a consistent effect on coalition voting, Figure 5.9 reveals an inconsistent pattern. In 2002, PSDB partisanship has a positive effect across all levels of elections. We see the same effect in three of four races in 2010, but only in the gubernatorial and senatorial races in 2006 and only in the federal and state deputy elections in 2014. Unsurprisingly, however, in almost every race petistas are the least likely group to vote for candidates the coalition that includes the PSDB.

Finally, to confirm the strength of PT and PSDB partisanship relative to PMDB partisanship, consider the results in Figure 5.10, which explores the impact of PMDB party ID on voting for candidates in the PMDB's coalition. Recall that the PMDB has not run a presidential candidate since 1994, but that in many years it has formed part of either the PT or the PSDB's presidential coalition. it has also formed electoral coalitions with both parties in different states over the years.

This willingness to partner with parties across the political spectrum means the notion of "out-group" is ill-defined for PMDBistas. And this fact helps explain what we saw in Table 5.1, that PMDB partisanship had an inconsistent effect on coalition voting in presidential races. In 2014, PMDB partisanship even had a negative effect, as PMDB partisans went for the "other" coalition's candidate by a 2–1 margin. This finding is echoed here for down-ticket offices. Sometimes PMDB partisanship has



(a) 2002

(b) 2006

(c) 2010

(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.9. Voting for PSDB coalition candidates.
The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010, and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014 for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.



(a) 2002

(b) 2006

(c) 2010

(d) 2014

FIGURE 5.10. Voting for PMDB coalition candidates.
The data used in each year are from a single survey (ESEB 2002, ESEB 2006, BEPS 2010, and BEPS 2014) with the exception of 2014, for which State Legislator figures are from ESEB. See Appendix 2.A for descriptions of data sources and coding details.

a positive and statistically significant effect, but sometimes it has a null effect, as in every race in 2006. (There's even one case in which it has a negative effect, in state deputy races in 2010).

A strong partisan should cast a vote for his or her party's candidates in down-ticket races. Yet Brazil's extremely complex party system and electoral rules complicates the voters' task. In gubernatorial and senatorial elections, parties that many voters prefer often simply do not field candidates. In the federal and state deputy elections, very rarely does a party field zero candidates, but voters may find no candidate from their region or who represents their interests on their party's list – or even on their coalition's list.

In any case, if partisanship were meaningless then it would not have any effect on what voters actually do, and partisans' voting behavior would not differ from nonpartisans'. Exploration of several national surveys confirms that positive and negative partisanship powerfully impact vote choice in Brazil. Once we know whether a Brazilian identifies with or dislikes a particularly political party, we gain a great deal of information about their likely voting behavior, up and down the ticket. Regardless of context, petistas and tucanos are more likely to vote for their party's candidates, or for candidates from their party's coalition. This effect is strongest for the PT and somewhat weaker for the PSDB. For the PMDB, partisanship has the weakest and least consistent effects. As for antipetistas, their aversion for the PT also provides considerable information about likely behavior, at least in majoritarian races, because they are always less likely to vote for PT candidates or candidates from the PT coalition in those races.

5.4 CONCLUSION

Previous chapters explored the extent and consistency of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil, and the impact of such attitudes on voters' political attitudes. This chapter fills in the picture of the impact of partisanship on Brazilian politics, exploring the impact of partisan attitudes on voting behavior.

For many Brazilian voters, factors such as economic conditions, incumbent government policy, or candidates' personal attributes matter a great deal. However, such contextual factors matter mainly for nonpartisans. As Chapter 3 revealed, Brazilian partisans filter positive information about their party in, and negative information out. Partisanship serves as a perceptual screen through which voters understand the political world. As

one might expect, this filtering process also shapes vote choice, favoring candidates from the in-group and discriminating against candidates from the out-group. For PT and PSDB partisans, economic context matters not at all for presidential elections, and factors such as pork-barreling and candidate name recognition matter far less in down-ticket races than for nonpartisans.

Positive and negative partisanship have the strongest effects for petistas, who are both far more likely to vote for their party's or coalition's candidates up and down the ticket, and far *less* likely to vote for the PSDB's candidates. PSDB partisanship also has a relatively strong impact on vote choice, both positively and negatively, even though far fewer Brazilians identify with the party than with the PT. This suggests that cultivating a party brand could have helped the PSDB consolidate an even broader base of popular support. However, the party never invested in recruiting and retaining partisans. Instead, its candidates have had to win votes on other bases – primarily on their prior experience in office and personal reputation. Meanwhile, the PMDB has squandered what may have been at one point in time a valuable resource, its party label. PMDB partisanship is about as widespread in the Brazilian electorate as is PSDB partisanship, but it is at best a very weak form of social identity. Finally, for antipetistas, context and candidate attributes also matter very little, at least in majoritarian elections. Antipetistas' choices are dramatically constrained simply by whether a PT or PT-supported candidate is on the ballot.

The findings in this chapter confirm one of our book's key points, that Brazil's party system in the electorate has – for much of the postmilitary regime period – been far more coherent than many have believed. For nonpartisans, candidates' party affiliations do not matter much, if at all. Yet since redemocratization about half of Brazilian voters have expressed an affinity for or against one of the country's many political parties. For these voters, partisanship constitutes an important form of social identity. As a form of membership in a particular political community, partisanship has generated strong incentives to support "their party's" candidates and to oppose candidates from parties considered to be rivals.

It's true that most Brazilians split their tickets (Ames et al. 2009). Even partisans frequently split their tickets. They do so unavoidably, because many parties do not run candidates for every office, starting with the presidency. Yet even given all the informational and institutional hurdles placed in its way, partisanship still shapes vote choice. In fact, both

positive and negative partisan attitudes matter. Positive partisanship powerfully increases the probability a voter will choose a candidate from his or her party. Negative partisanship can also shape voting behavior – even if we don't know who an antipartisan is voting for, their antipathy for a particular party may greatly reduce their choice set.

6

Partisanship and Antipartisanship in Comparative Perspective

Since the publication of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), political scientists have regarded positive partisanship as critically important – almost a "master variable" for explaining political participation, vote choice, candidate evaluation, and attitudes toward public policies. By contrast, relatively little research on negative partisanship exists. Does negative partisanship have the same effects in other countries as it does in Brazil?

This chapter demonstrates that our claim about the importance of negative partisanship can be generalized. Individuals can have either positive or negative partisan attitudes – or both – in any country around the world, and such attitudes play an important role in vote choice. Scholars of parties and voting behavior who ignore the independent role that negative partisanship can play are missing a potentially large part of the story about individual motivation to vote or otherwise participate in politics.

Most research on negative partisanship has been conducted in a single country (e.g., Maggiotto & Piereson 1977; Caruana, McGregor, & Stephenson 2015; McGregor, Caruana, & Stephenson 2015) or in countries with single-member districts (Medeiros & Noël 2013). (Exceptions include Rose & Mishler [1998] and Vlachová [2001]). Our exploration of Brazil suggests that antipartisanship can matter even in multiparty, proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. Mayer (2017) is the only large cross-national study that we know of. She used surveys from the third module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to explore negative partisanship in seventeen European PR systems.

Our approach here is similar to Mayer's, but differs in three ways. First, we incorporate a geographically broader sample, analyzing countries from Latin America, Asia, and North America as well as Europe.

Second, we explore negative partisanship at two distinct points in time – about twenty years apart, using CSES surveys from the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s. And third, our conceptualization of negative partisanship departs from Mayer's. Whereas she examined the concurrent effects of positive and negative partisanship on individual voting behavior, allowing individuals to posses both positive and negative partisan attachments, in keeping with earlier chapters in this book we explore whether negative partisanship alone can predict the behavior of individuals who lack a positive partisan attachment.

Our approach generalizes what we have said about Brazil: negative partisanship has had and continues to have a consistently important impact across a range of countries – from middle-income to very wealthy, and from long-established democracies to relative newcomers to competitive elections. It also suggests that negative partisanship may remain crucial to explaining voter behavior even as the fortunes of traditional center-left and center-right parties decline in many countries. In short, as in Brazil, it is important to focus on positive *and* negative partisanship even as party systems "melt down," to flip the notion from Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that European party systems had "frozen" soon after the advent of universal suffrage. Even if positive attachments dissipate, negative attitudes may remain strong.

In what follows we first describe the data and define key terms. We then provide basic descriptive information about the levels of positive and negative partisanship in the countries in our sample. Subsequently we turn to the sources of negative partisan attitudes, exploring the sociodemographic correlates of negative partisanship and then the relationship between political activism and negative partisanship. As in Brazil, the findings in this section are somewhat ambiguous, and suggest a need for additional comparative research. However, findings in the next section are unambiguous, in terms of the ways that negative partisanship impacts turnout and vote choice. Our results confirm that although the level of negative partisanship does vary cross-nationally, its effects can be felt in a wide variety of socioeconomic and political contexts.

6.1 THE DATA

To explore negative partisanship cross-nationally, we use surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).[1] To demonstrate

[1] See www.cses.org.

that negative partisanship is not simply a phenomenon that has emerged as a result of recent polarization (for example), we sought to maximize the timespan covered by the data. We therefore selected countries that were surveyed in the earliest (between 1996 and 2001) and most recent (between 2011 and 2016) CSES modules. This gave us nineteen countries – sixteen that were present in CSES modules 1 and 4 and three that were included in modules 2 (between 2001 and 2006) and 4: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, USA. This sample gives us decent variation on global region, per capita GDP, and age of democracy.[2]

6.1.1 Operationalization of Positive and Negative Partisanship

The structure of the CSES partisanship question has changed over time, making it difficult to operationalize the concepts of positive and negative partisanship consistently across survey modules. To overcome this challenge, in all surveys we considered as positive partisans those who reported feeling "close to" some party and who were subsequently able to name a particular party.[3]

Operationalizing negative partisanship poses an even greater challenge, because the CSES surveys we explored did not ask respondents whether they would *not* vote for a particular party.[4] Given this, we built our negative partisanship indicator from feeling thermometers. All CSES waves presented feeling thermometers, which range from 0 (least positive) to 10 (most positive) for different parties in each country. The number of thermometers presented varied from two to six, and the criteria for whether the survey included a particular party was not always obvious. In order to standardize comparisons across countries and over time, respondents were classified as negative partisans if they gave a zero on the feeling thermometer to any party that met the following two criteria[5]: (1) it was one of the three largest parties in terms of number of positive partisans,

[2] There are actually twenty-three countries that fit this description, but we dropped Thailand and Slovenia owing to extremely low levels of partisanship (less than 15%, overall), as well as Poland and Bulgaria because one or more of the main parties were not included in the question used to create our antipartisanship measure (see below). Whenever available, we employed sample and population weights in the analysis.

[3] CSES Module 1 surveys further pestered voters who answered "no" to the first question by asking them whether they felt closer to any party relative to others.

[4] The only CSES wave that included the behavioral antipartisanship question was wave 3, which Mayer explored.

[5] We adopted this conservative definition to compensate for the absence of a "would not vote for" behavioral question. Mayer, in contrast, defined antipartisans as those who gave

as long as the party had at least 5% of the total and (2) it was one of the three largest parties in terms of lower chamber vote share.[6] Adopting these criteria has the added benefit of streamlining what becomes (as will be seen in the text that follows) a rather complicated analysis.

In most country/wave observations, this approach produced a set of three parties. However, only two parties met the criteria in both years for the USA, and four parties in module 1 for Canada and for module 4 for Switzerland, France, and Iceland. In any case, to be consistent with our use of the concept earlier in this book, we considered "pure" negative partisans to be respondents who expressed no positive partisan attachment but who did express a negative attitude toward a particular party. Unless otherwise noted, when we use the terms negative partisan or antipartisan in this chapter we are always referring to this group of "pure" antipartisans.

In the analysis that follows each respondent is considered either a nonpartisan, positive partisan, or negative partisan. In some instances, when we refer to a specific political party, we disaggregate partisans and antipartisans into those who support or oppose that reference party and those who support or oppose other parties.

6.2 BASIC DESCRIPTIVES

The first question we want to explore is whether the rates of negative partisanship are similar to what we've seen in Brazil. The first columns of Table 6.1 report overall partisanship figures in the early (module 1 or 2) and late (module 4) survey for each country. Contradicting reports of the decline of partisanship worldwide, we find that the aggregate levels of positive partisanship in our sample declined only slightly between early and late observations – 46.2% to 45.2%.[7] Partisanship actually *increased* in ten of nineteen countries, and some large declines (such as those in Israel, Brazil, and the Czech Republic) were offset by equally large increases in Korea, Taiwan, and Germany.[8]

a rating between 0 and 4 on the thermometer scale *and* who declared that they would "never" vote for that party in the behavioral question.

[6] The CSES itself coded parties in order of their respective sizes in the lower chamber (or equivalent) election, so we used the CSES coding for this criterion.

[7] Mayer (2017, p. 4) reports that 46% of respondents expressed a positive partisan attachment in CSES module 3.

[8] The data do show an increase in the fragmentation of partisanship in thirteen of the nineteen countries in the sample. On average, partisans were split into 3.3 effective parties in the early surveys and 3.6 in the late observations. This observation is compatible with the weakening of traditional parties and the emergence of niche parties, though we do

TABLE 6.1. *Partisanship and Antipartisanship*

	Partisanship			Antipartisanship		
	Module 1/2	Module 4	Change	Module 1/2	Module 4	Change
Australia	83.5	85.2	1.7	2.4	4.0	1.6
Brazil	45.2	21.1	−24.0	15.7	23.9	8.3
Canada	50.1	44.0	−6.1	16.1	12.4	−3.8
Czech Republic	44.5	29.4	−15.1	28.8	21.7	−7.1
France	48.1	59.0	10.8	32.3	20.1	−12.1
Germany	33.9	46.0	12.1	14.2	11.6	−2.7
Iceland	47.9	43.2	−4.7	7.8	12.3	4.4
Ireland	27.6	20.6	−7.0	6.7	18.2	11.5
Israel	61.5	37.0	−24.5	17.3	18.3	1.0
Japan	37.5	40.2	2.7	4.3	9.3	5.0
Mexico	44.0	44.9	0.9	20.7	9.6	−11.1
New Zealand	55.6	57.0	1.4	7.1	7.3	0.2
Norway	52.3	47.7	−4.7	9.4	7.2	−2.2
Portugal	46.7	36.8	−9.9	8.0	18.7	10.7
Republic of Korea	23.2	44.9	21.7	9.6	6.4	−3.2
Sweden	51.8	51.1	−0.7	8.4	19.9	11.5
Switzerland	35.7	39.1	3.4	12.8	7.9	−4.9
Taiwan	32.6	54.0	21.5	8.1	5.2	−3.0
USA	56.9	58.4	1.4	1.6	4.4	2.8
AVERAGE	46.2	45.2	−1.0	12.2	12.5	0.3

The last columns of Table 6.1 report the shares of negative partisans in the early and late survey in each country. On average, the share of negative partisans increased slightly from module 1 or 2 to module 4, from 12.2% to 12.5%. Ten of the nineteen countries in the sample saw an increase in negative partisanship. Although Brazil has the most antipartisans at 24%, it is by no means an outlier. In Portugal, Israel, Ireland, France, and Sweden, more than 18% of voters are negative partisans.

At this point we consider it important to note that most antipartisans are not "systemic" antipartisans, i.e., voters who reject any and all parties. Antisystem attitudes that reject all parties (see Poguntke & Scarrow 1996) have imprecise implications for the study of electoral behavior compared to antipartisanship focused on one party. The latter is likely to predict voting and other forms of political behavior. Consider Table 6.2. The first

not examine this issue directly. We computed the fractionalization index considering only positive partisans. For Germany, we treated the CSU and the CDU as the same party. In all other countries we accepted CSES's coding of parties.

TABLE 6.2. *Opposition to a Single Party*

	As % of Antipartisans		As % of Population	
	Module 1 or 2	**Module 4**	**Module 1/2**	**Module 4**
Australia	56.1	69.9	1.3	2.8
Brazil	60.9	40.5	9.6	9.7
Canada	67.7	73.0	10.9	9.0
Czech Republic	88.4	65.8	25.4	14.3
France	86.0	65.2	27.7	13.1
Germany	50.6	82.2	7.2	9.5
Iceland	78.1	57.4	6.1	7.0
Ireland	75.9	83.7	5.1	15.2
Israel	59.8	63.2	10.4	11.6
Japan	73.7	73.3	3.2	6.8
Mexico	60.0	42.6	12.4	4.1
New Zealand	89.5	85.8	6.4	6.3
Norway	92.2	91.9	8.7	6.6
Portugal	51.0	63.5	4.1	11.9
Republic of Korea	68.6	78.1	6.5	5.0
Sweden	86.2	97.6	7.3	19.5
Switzerland	81.6	90.9	10.4	7.2
Taiwan	73.3	72.2	6.0	3.7
USA	87.7	90.5	1.4	4.0
AVERAGE	73.0	73.0	9.0	8.8

two columns show that on average 73% of antipartisans dislike just one party, and that this number is constant over the fifteen to twenty years between the two CSES survey modules.

To illustrate the relative size of the antipartisan contingent, the last two columns in the table also report the share of "single party antipartisans" relative to the country's overall population. On average about 9% of a country's entire population opposes a single party. Note that this number is larger than the levels of positive partisanship for most parties in any country in our sample.

In one respect, Brazil is somewhat atypical: despite our focus on the PT and even though the vast majority of Brazilian antipartisans are antipetistas, relatively *fewer* of Brazil's antipartisans are "single party antipartisans" than in other countries, at least in the CSES surveys. Nonetheless, the fact that there are so many antipartisans in Brazil means that the absolute share of the population that opposes a single party is almost 10%. The number we report here is slightly lower than the figures we worked with in earlier chapters, but we attribute the difference to the way the

concept is measured in the CSES survey (via thermometer scores) versus in earlier chapters (via more focused questions).

Scholars of voting behavior have long overlooked the relatively large number of antipartisans around the world. In many countries, a significant proportion of voters have strong *negative* attitudes toward a party (or parties), but no positive attachment to any party. To the extent that there are large numbers of negative partisans, and to the extent that their attitudes about parties, candidates and politics differs from both nonpartisans and positive partisans, comparative scholars have omitted a great deal of potentially important and useful information by lumping negative partisans and nonpartisans together.

Earlier in this book we showed that antipartisans in Brazil are not only sociologically different from nonpartisans but that they also behave quite differently. To what extent can we say the same about negative partisans in other countries? The evidence just presented suggests that on average, about one-third of the voters usually considered "nonpartisans" actually do hold powerful partisan attitudes – just of the negative kind. To what extent do these negative partisans differ from nonpartisans? Let us first turn to the question of potential sociodemographic differences.

6.3 SOCIODEMOGRAPHICS OF ANTIPARTISANSHIP

In this section, we examine the correlates of antipartisanship in the nineteen countries in our sample. To do so we explore results of multinomial logit regressions in which the dependent variable is a categorical indicator that can take the following values: nonpartisan, partisan, or antipartisan. The regression includes country fixed effects and examines the extent to which the probability of falling into one of those categories varies with socioeconomic factors: age, gender, income, education, and being from a union household or not.[9] We estimate, therefore, the following model:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\text{Age}_i + \beta_{2j}\text{Sex}_i + \beta_{3j}\text{Income}_i + \beta_{4j}\text{Schooling}_i + \beta_{5j}\text{Union}_i + \nu_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where i indexes individuals and j indexes the categories of the outcome variable and ν indicate country fixed effects. As such, Y_i is a vector of $J - 1$ dummies indicating which category individual i belongs to. The

[9] Age is a continuous variable. Both income and education were recoded from a quasi-continuous to a three-level ordinal variable. Gender was equal to 1 if the individual was a male, and union household took the value of 1 if anybody in the respondent's household belonged to a union.



FIGURE 6.1. Changes in the probability of partisanship, antipartisanship, and nonpartisanship.
The figure shows changes in the probability of an individual being a partisan, antipartisan, or nonpartisan, for all respondents in all countries in both waves, for given changes in each independent variable. The degree of change in each variable is described in the text.

multinomial model estimates one coefficient for each category, except for the excluded baseline category (which in this case corresponds to nonpartisans).

Multinomial logit results are better presented as predicted probabilities. Figure 6.1 reports first differences for each variable. As is clear, the

first three variables have very little effect in terms of predicting antipartisanship across these nineteen countries. Changing gender from female to male increases the probability of positive partisanship by about 0.03 and decreases the probability of nonpartisanship by slightly less than that, but it does not produce statistically significant effects on negative partisanship. Likewise, moving from thirty years of age to fifty, which is slightly more than one standard deviation change in age, increases the probability of partisanship by just over 0.06 and decreases the probability of nonpartisanship by 0.06, but produces no statistically significant change in the probability of antipartisanship. A similar pattern holds for union membership: relative to a respondent from a nonunion household, a respondent from a union household has a 0.03 greater probability of being a partisan and a 0.03 lower probability of being a nonpartisan, but essentially the same probability of being an antipartisan.

In contrast, income and education are both statistically significantly associated with all three types of voters. Moving from the lowest to the highest income category increases the probability of partisanship by 0.04 and decreases the probability of nonpartisanship by 0.03 and antipartisanship by 0.01 – a small but significant effect. The effect of education, however, works in the opposite direction for antipartisanship: moving from less than secondary education to postsecondary education *increases* the probability of partisanship by over 0.05 and antipartisanship by 0.13, but decreases the probability of nonpartisanship by 0.07.

At a minimum, the results confirm that in cross-national perspective partisans and antipartisans do differ from nonpartisans in small but sometimes significant ways. Not surprisingly, given extant research, in general terms nonpartisans are more likely to be found among women, younger people, nonunion households, and among those with lower income and education. Antipartisans are "in between" nonpartisans and positive partisans on all of these variables, as their prevalence hardly varies with age, gender, and union membership. Antipartisanship does vary with income and education, but in opposite directions. Since these two variables tend to covary positively in the population, this result merits further research.

To illustrate the central ambiguity of our findings about antipartisans, consider that a sixteen-year-old woman with low income and a low education level has a 0.21 probability of being a partisan and a whopping .68 probability of being a nonpartisan. Meanwhile, a sixty-year-old man with high income and postsecondary education has a probability of .49 of being a partisan, and of .42 of being a nonpartisan. Yet in both cases, the probability of being an antipartisan is about 0.1.

An inability to classify antipartisans along demographic and socioeconomic lines is consistent across countries. We examined this issue on a country-by-country basis, and found no clear pattern in what makes a typical antipartisan. In contrast to the answer to the question of "what makes a partisan?" where sociological and demographic factors typically weigh heavily, the answer to this question for antipartisanship may depend on idiosyncratic factors specific to each country's party system. This makes sense given what we know from the Brazilian case, that antipartisanship is a reactive set of attitudes that depends on the prior emergence of a particular "out-group," whereas positive partisanship typically requires cultivation of a sociological connection to an "in-group."

6.4 POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND ANTIPARTISANSHIP

Before examining the effects of antipartisanship, we explore one more potential correlate of partisanship, antipartisanship, and nonpartisanship: political activism. In Brazil, we argued that the data were compatible with a story in which partisanship is driven by partisan recruitment. Antipartisans, by contrast, are less likely to be hooked into activist networks and hence less likely to be contacted and recruited by a party. This at least partly explains why most antipartisans never develop a positive partisan attachment.

If the Brazilian experience is generalizable, then we should find that political activism is associated with partisanship, but not with antipartisanship. Preliminary evidence of this correlation emerged in the previous analysis, given the association between union membership and partisanship. In this section, we examine in more detail whether political activism is more common among partisans than nonpartisans and antipartisans.

To examine this question we constructed, as in Chapter 2 (see, for instance, Figure 2.11), an index of activism. This combines participation in unions, professional organizations, business associations, and farmers' associations. Obviously this is a limited notion of "activism," but it is all we had to work with. Moreover, the question about union membership is not asked in all countries, and even where it is asked there is substantial missingness, and missing values can mean different things.[10]

In addition, the activism items (other than union membership) were only asked in wave 4 of the CSES, and even then, only for nine of our

[10] In some countries, union membership was asked only for a subset of the sample. In all countries, the levels of missingness on this variable are much higher than for other sociodemographics. For this reason, we did not include individual union membership in the analysis in the previous section, as it modified the sample size considerably.

TABLE 6.3. *Partisanship, Antipartisanship, and Political Activism*

	Union (1)	Business (2)	Farmer (3)	Profess. (4)	Activism Index (5)	(6)
Intercept (Nonpartisans)	0.195	0.037	0.042	0.085	0.254	0.133
(SE)	0.058	0.010	0.014	0.031	0.005	0.008
p-value	0.001	<0.001	0.003	0.006	<0.001	<0.001
Partisans	0.018	0.010	0.009	0.015	0.066	0.035
(SE)	0.006	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.008	0.007
p-value	0.005	0.004	0.016	0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Antipartisans	−0.001	0.004	0.002	<0.001	−0.048	−0.004
(SE)	0.009	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.011	0.010
p-value	0.928	0.371	0.740	0.940	<0.001	0.688
Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
N	15,793	15,166	15,204	15,299	15,793	15,793
Countries	9	9	9	9	9	9

The table reports estimates of a linear probability models. In all cases, the dependent variable is a dummy for participation in specific organization or in any organization in the case of the activism index (models 5 and 6). The intercept can be interpreted as the share of nonpartisans who are active, while coefficients on Partisans and Antipartisans are the difference relative to the baseline.

nineteen countries. In what follows, we restrict our analysis to these countries.[11]

Table 6.3 reports estimates from simple linear probability models for all countries. The independent variables are always dummies for one of the types of organizations or for the aggregate index. In the case of the aggregate index, as the overall level of participation is relatively low, we define as "politically active" anyone who participates in at least one organization.

In all cases, the binary indicator is regressed on a categorical dependent variable that takes on the values of nonpartisan (baseline), partisan, or antipartisan. We present results for participation in specific organizations (models 1–4) including country random effects, and for the aggregate index (models 5 and 6) we present a pooled specification and with country random effects.

Overall, whereas about one quarter of nonpartisans have some type of political engagement, the figure is closer to one third for partisans. Given this, it is not surprising that for each type of activism (models 1–4),

[11] The countries for which data are available are Brazil, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan.



FIGURE 6.2. Partisanship, antipartisanship, and political activism.
The figure shows the share of each type of voter who is active in at least one type of organization discussed in the text, by country.

partisans always show greater engagement (a positive and significant coefficient) than both antipartisans and nonpartisans. The differences are not particularly large for participation in any type of organization, but considering the restricted definition of activism, which generates baseline levels of participation that are rather low, the increase in participation is far from negligible. In contrast, as expected antipartisans are indistinguishable from nonpartisans on all four variables.

Even with the limited definition of activism, once we aggregate all forms of participation (models 5 and 6) the difference between partisans and nonpartisans grows more striking, and the results also suggest that antipartisans actually may be *less* active than nonpartisans (as in model 5, with fixed effects).

Figure 6.2 disaggregates the results for the nine countries for which we have data. In six of the nine countries, partisans have a higher

degree of participation than antipartisans. In Brazil this pattern is most pronounced; we speculate that this is because petismo dominates among partisans, and petistas tend to be activists.

In short, echoing our results for Brazil, we find no cross-national tendencies in terms of political engagement that might differentiate antipartisans from nonpartisans. As expected, only positive partisans are more politically engaged than average.

6.5 DOES ANTIPARTISANSHIP MATTER?

Although we have not found large, general sociological differences among partisans, nonpartisans, and antipartisans in cross-national survey data, we have shown that antipartisans – defined as those who dislike a party without positively identifying with any other – comprise a substantial share of the population in many countries. We now examine whether these voters behave in distinctive ways. What is the impact of negative partisanship on voting behavior? We focus first on turnout and then on vote choice.

6.5.1 Turnout

As in our analysis of Brazil, we strongly expect partisans to show up to vote more often than nonpartisans. Antipartisans should fall somewhere in the middle – more likely to turn out than nonpartisans, but perhaps not as likely as partisans.

To assess these hypotheses, we examine the complete sample of voters in nineteen countries in both CSES waves. Our dependent variable is a binary indicator for having cast a ballot.[12] Our independent variable of interest is the type of the respondent, which is essentially the same as the outcome variable we used in Section 6.3: nonpartisans (the baseline), partisans, or antipartisans.

We estimate three different specifications of linear probability models: a simple pooled model, one with country random effects (i.e., random intercepts), and one with country random effects with individual level control variables (gender, age, income, and education). We also estimate this last specification separately in the early and later survey

[12] Wave 4 of the CSES used separate questions to assess presidential election turnout and legislative election turnout. We used presidential elections for the countries for which it was available (Brazil, France, USA, and Taiwan), and legislative turnout for all others.

TABLE 6.4. *Partisanship, Antipartisanship, and Turnout*

	Both Periods			By Wave	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept (Nonpartisans)	0.792	0.794	0.745	0.749	0.644
(SE)	0.002	0.016	0.016	0.021	0.019
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Partisans	0.139	0.126	0.116	0.113	0.115
(SE)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Antipartisans	0.030	0.031	0.026	0.027	0.026
(SE)	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.007
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Random Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	67,705	67,705	54,495	28,685	25,810
Countries	19	19	19	19	19

The table reports estimates of a linear probability models. In all cases the dependent variable is a dummy for turnout. The intercept can be interpreted as turnout among nonpartisans, whereas coefficients on Partisans and Antipartisans represent the difference in turnout relative to the baseline.

waves. The simplicity of linear probability models is attractive here, as the intercept can be interpreted directly as turnout among nonpartisans and the coefficients in each category as the differences in turnout for each category, relative to the baseline. The results are presented in Table 6.4.

Results are extremely stable across all specifications, which is unsurprising given the large sample and given that our variables of interest are defined at the level of the individual. Turnout among partisans is 11.6 points higher than for nonpartisans in our preferred specification (model 3), which includes random effects with individual-level control variables. This difference is all but identical in the early and late waves of surveys. Turnout among antipartisans, in contrast, is 2.7 percentage points higher than for nonpartisans. Although the difference is smaller than what we see for partisans, the result is clearly distinguishable from zero, even if we run the estimations separately for each CSES wave.

If we examine these results by country, we find that antipartisans are more likely than nonpartisans to vote in six countries, and less likely in only one country (Australia). In the other thirteen countries, the differences are not statistically significant. The relatively small effects is unsurprising given that the turnout among nonpartisans is already very high in

several countries. Cross-sectionally, there is a strong negative association between turnout of nonpartisans and the added turnout by antipartisans ($r = -0.66$, p-value $= 0.02$), which suggests that part of the cross-sectional variation is simply a ceiling effect generated by high levels of baseline turnout. Put more simply, antipartisans do tend to turn out more often than nonpartisans except where turnout is already very high among nonpartisans.

6.5.2 Voting Behavior

Finally, let us turn to voting behavior. To simplify the presentation, we concentrate on different groups' likelihood of voting for the party with the largest share of antipartisans in each country. This approach follows from our definition of antipartisanship, is compatible and comparable with what we did in previous chapters, and is relevant to real-world politics considering that antipartisanship is in most countries (as in Brazil) concentrated on just one party.

More specifically, the reference party is the party with the largest number of antipartisans among respondents with no positive partisan attachment. (In almost all cases this is also the party with the largest number of antipartisans in the country even if we include positive partisans' negative attitudes.) Table 6.5 reports the reference party for each country, for each wave of the CSES. In some countries, we see the same party in both waves. In most cases, however, the reference party differs across waves. This is because in some countries the incumbent party had changed, and in others the party system had simply evolved. In some cases negative partisan attitudes shifted between mainstream parties (as in Ireland), or between different fringe parties (as in Germany).

Our outcome variable is voting for the reference party in the most salient election for which we have data. For most countries this is the legislative (parliamentary) election, but for countries with separation of powers systems it is the presidential election. Some additional details are in order.

The CSES surveys contain separate variables for presidential vote choice (if applicable) and vote choice for the party of either the list or individual candidate in the most recent legislative election. Countries with mixed electoral systems have two vote-response variables, one for the party-list level and another for the individual candidate level. We used the party-list responses where possible, and used the party of the individual candidate only when the list choice variable was absent.

TABLE 6.5. *Antiparties by Country*

Country	Early	Late
Australia	National Party	Australian Greens
Brazil	Workers' Party	Workers' Party
Canada	Reform Party	Conservative Party
Czech Republic	Communist Party	Communist Party
France	National Front	National Front
Germany	Alliance 90/Greens	Left Party (Die Linke)
Iceland	Independence Party	Independence Party
Ireland	Fine Gael	Fianna Fail
Israel	Shas	National Liberal Party (Likud)
Japan	New Frontier Party	Japanese Communist Party
Mexico	PRI	PRI
New Zealand	National Party	National Party
Norway	Progress Party	Progress Party
Portugal	Popular Party	Left Bloc
Rep. of Korea	United Liberal Democrats	New Frontier Party
Sweden	Left Party	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	Swiss People's Party
Taiwan	Chinese New Party	People First Party
USA	Republican Party	Republican Party

For most countries with separation of powers systems – Brazil, France, Taiwan, and the USA – we used the vote choice in presidential elections. Israel had a direct executive election prior to the early CSES module, but it shifted back to pure parliamentarism before the latter wave. Given the timing of the two CSES modules we use responses from these different elections in Israel. In Mexico, we could not use the presidential election in the second wave because the 2012 survey did not register partisanship correctly (vote choice is missing for more than 99% of respondents). We therefore used the 2015 survey instead, which contained only legislative voting preferences. For symmetry, we used the 1997 legislative-only survey for the early wave for Mexico.

In keeping with the approach from earlier chapters, our analysis regresses the outcome binary variable on a set of categorial independent variables that describe the different types of voters. Given that our dependent variable is probability of voting for a specific party, we use a more disaggregated typology of voters here relative to what we did in the previous section on turnout. Here, the variable "type" can take the following values: nonpartisan, partisan of the reference party, partisan of another party, antipartisan of the reference party, and antipartisan of another party.

TABLE 6.6. *Partisanship, Antipartisanship, and Vote Choice*

	Both Periods			By Wave	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept (Nonpartisans)	0.251	0.233	0.233	0.208	0.237
(SE)	0.002	0.017	0.018	0.019	0.022
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Partisans	0.629	0.607	0.607	0.593	0.624
(SE)	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.008
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Antipartisans	−0.204	−0.208	−0.202	−0.185	−0.214
(SE)	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.009
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Other Partisans	−0.211	−0.182	−0.178	−0.162	−0.191
(SE)	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.005
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Other Antipartisans	0.118	0.118	0.120	0.091	0.168
(SE)	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.011	0.013
p-value	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Random Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	53,823	53,823	44,338	23,362	20,976
Countries	19	19	19	19	19

The table reports estimates of a linear probability models. In all cases, the dependent variable is a binary indicator for casting a ballot for the reference party. The reference party is defined in Table 6.5. The intercept can be interpreted as vote for the reference party among nonpartisans, whereas coefficients on other variables represent the difference in vote for the reference party relative to the baseline for that group.

Table 6.6 reports results from the same specifications of models we presented earlier for turnout, but for vote choice and with the expanded classification of voter types. As before, the intercept can be interpreted directly as vote choice among nonpartisans (the reference category), and the coefficients in each of the other categories are the differences in voting for the reference party relative to the baseline.

Results are extremely consistent: partisans of the reference party vote for that party at much higher rates – about 60 points higher – than nonpartisans. In contrast, people with negative attitudes toward the reference party almost never vote for it (the coefficients on antipartisans for voting for the reference party are almost identical to the intercept, but in the opposite direction). In fact, pure antipartisans are about as (un)likely to

vote for the reference party as are partisans of *other* parties. Lastly, voters with negative attitudes toward a different party tend to vote for the reference party relatively more often than nonpartisans, but much less frequently than partisans of the reference party.

Strikingly this pattern holds in almost every country in our sample. For simplicity we present the results by country graphically, in Figure 6.3. In all countries, partisans of the reference party vote for their party at much higher rates than nonpartisans, and with the sole exception of Germany, where the behavior of antipartisans is indistinguishable from that of nonpartisans, in all countries antipartisans of the reference party almost never vote for that party. These results echo what we found in earlier chapters for Brazil, using different data sources. Antipartisan attitudes clearly weigh heavily when considering vote choice, and clearly distinguish antipartisans from nonpartisans.

6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter complements our detailed analysis of Brazil by offering a comparative perspective on the concept of antipartisanship. Antipartisans appear to exist everywhere, in greater or lesser numbers. On average, antipartisans add up to about a third of those who scholars typically classify as "nonpartisans." Their presence is fairly constant over time, meaning that antipartisanship is not a function of particular events.

Our findings in some ways are merely suggestive. As in Brazil, cross-nationally antipartisans do not have a distinct demographic makeup. As we acknowledged in terms of our exploration of voting behavior in Brazil, additional research is required to understand why some voters develop only antipartisan attitudes while others become positive partisans, and others disdain all attachments to political parties, whether positive or negative.

In any case, ignoring antipartisans' attitudes and behavior could mean a significant loss of information for understanding voting behavior and policy attitudes. Our findings do confirm what we found for Brazil in terms of antipartisans' voting behavior. In particular, pure antipartisans exhibit markedly different voting behavior from nonpartisans.

At a minimum, the results in this chapter suggest that scholars should take antipartisanship far more seriously than they have. Additional research is necessary. In particular, our results suggest that there may be distinct "varieties" of antipartisanship in different contexts. In some



FIGURE 6.3. Partisanship, antipartisanship, and vote choice by country.
The figures show the share of each type of voter that declared having cast a ballot for the reference party. The reference party is defined in Table 6.5.

countries (Brazil or Mexico, for example), antipartisanship is relatively widespread and focuses on one major party over a fairly long period of time. Elsewhere (e.g., France or Switzerland) antipartisanship consists of antipathy for relatively small and/or ideologically extreme parties, while in other cases (New Zealand or Ireland, perhaps) antipartisanship may simply be a function of which party is the incumbent. The comparative dynamics of antipartisanship are beyond the scope of this chapter, but offer grounds for a great deal of future research.

7

Conclusion: Parties, Voters, and Brazilian Democracy

Conventional scholarly wisdom has long assumed that mass partisanship is weak and immaterial in Brazil – that voters' stated affinities or antipathies for this or that party have little effect on their political attitudes and behavior, particularly when compared against the weight of candidates' personal qualities and performance in office, whether in terms of managing the economy or providing constituent service. This view is incorrect. Despite Brazil's confusing party system and candidate-centric electoral rules, both positive and negative partisanship have mattered a great deal, for a substantial proportion of Brazilian voters.

Most research in political science has focused on positive partisanship, but Social Identity Theory (SIT) teaches us that out-group antipathy may actually drive attitudes and behavior more than any in-group affinity. SIT also suggests that positive and negative partisan attitudes do not necessarily mirror each other. These two notions pushed us to focus on both sides of the partisanship coin, in an effort to better understand Brazil's party system in the electorate.

Chapter 2 showed that observers have underestimated the extent of partisanship in Brazil's electorate. For about half of Brazil's voters – the nonpartisans – the conventional wisdom *is* true: partisanship plays no role in determining political attitudes or voting behavior. Yet this means that the other half have held either positive and/or negative partisan attitudes, or both. Chapter 2 also showed that since the 1980s, most partisan attitudes in Brazil have revolved around the PT, whether for or against, and demonstrated that the divide between petistas and antipetistas cannot be boiled down to sociological or demographic factors or to differences of opinion on important policies.

Instead, the divide is a product of distinct normative views about how politics should work – particularly, about the value and purpose of democracy. Petistas have supported democracy because they want to use it to bring about social and economic change; antipetistas are less committed to democracy to begin with, and tend to fear change.

Chapter 3 turned to the relative strength of positive and negative partisan attitudes in Brazil. It showed that positive partisanship is as tightly "bounded" as it is elsewhere, particularly for the PT, and revealed that both positive and negative partisans engage in motivated reasoning. Positive partisans willingly ignore facts that cast their party in a negative light, while negative partisans interpret the facts so that the disliked party appears politically or morally suspect. Finally, the chapter showed that the policy views of petistas and antipetistas – but not other Brazilians – are easily manipulated by the mere presence of the PT and PSDB labels attached to different policy positions. As in other countries, psychological pressure for conformity among positive and negative partisans powerfully shapes their political attitudes.

How did such partisan attitudes emerge? The rise of petismo and antipetismo are both puzzling. The difficulty in explaining petismo is that unlike the emergence partisanship in other countries, we must explain how it emerged where no party ID had existed before – a case of partisan alignment rather than realignment. Chapter 4 explained how the PT deliberately structured its party organization to combat the personalistic and antipartisan incentives of Brazil's electoral system, engaging activists in civil society to cultivate mass partisan attachments. It is worth noting that despite the regularity of competition between the PT and PSDB in presidential elections, the party system in the electorate did not follow this pattern. The PT cultivated a large share of partisans, but no other party did, because no other party chose the branding strategy that the PT did.

Our explanation for the rise of antipetismo is that it is an ironic unintended consequence of the PT's own efforts to cultivate petismo. Perhaps obviously, antipetismo cannot exist without petismo. The PT's investment in cultivating its brand name paid off handsomely in terms of both partisan sentiment and votes, but in Brazil's sea of meaningless partisan acronyms, it also made the PT stand out among voters repelled by its efforts. The rise of antipetismo is a case of the PT being a victim of its own success.

Chapter 4 also offered an explanation for why petismo went into decline around 2014. As per the Michigan school, partisanship may be a deeply held and largely unchanging form of social identity. Yet Fiorina's

notion of partisanship as a running tally implies that even strong partisans sometimes reevaluate their party in light of new information. The latter approach helps understand what happened following Dilma's poor performance in office. Our argument and findings suggest that her mismanagement of the economy was relatively more important than the PT's involvement with corruption in explaining the decline of petismo.

The notion of bounded partisanship also implies that the recent decline of the PT may not spell the party's complete demise. Although partisans sometimes shift between partisanship and independence, they rarely switch allegiance to another party. This suggests that many ostensible nonpartisans today may be latent petistas, turned off by the wave of antiparty sentiment that has swept the country.

Of course, no one can predict what the future will bring, and if the PT does disappear then the question is whether our argument can provide some insight. Lupu (2016) emphasized that in combination with poor performance in office, partisan "brand dilution" is the key factor heralding party collapse. Our exploration of the rise and decline of petismo suggests two things. First, contra Lupu's argument, brand dilution can *increase* party strength. After all, political moderation can attract partisans repelled by radicalism, and there are more voters in the political center than there are on the fringe. Second, brand dilution combined with *good* performance in office can *improve* a party's fortunes. In the 2000s, the PT abandoned many of its programmatic commitments and entered into strange bedfellows coalitions. What's more, many of its leaders became enmeshed in a huge corruption scandal during Lula's first term that appeared to make a mockery of the so-called *modo petista de governar*. Yet as Figure 2.1 revealed, none of this had any effect on the number of petistas. In fact, the PT continued to gain adherents throughout that decade. The implication is straightforward: without the deep recession during Dilma's second term, petismo might not have declined much at all.

The point is, brand dilution cannot be *directly* responsible for the PT's decline. However, we are not willing to completely dismiss the importance of brand dilution for the PT's decline. Brand dilution may generate a medium-term payoff in terms of cultivating partisans. However, after the brand has been watered down, newer partisans may be attracted to the party for different reasons than older partisans. When a party moderates, the new partisans it attracts may be less invested in the party's programmatic commitments and more responsive to the party's performance in office. The implication is that partisanship may come to rest on different, shakier ground, and be more susceptible to rapid declines.

Partisanship based on performance may be more open to the sort of updating that Fiorina's "running tally" theory suggests. This implies that brand dilution may be *indirectly* responsible for the PT's decline.

Having explained the origins, meaning, and ebb and flow of partisanship in Brazil, Chapter 5 returned to the question of the impact of positive and negative partisanship on voter behavior. The conventional wisdom suggests that "pork, pageantry and performance" (Ames 2008) are the key factors shaping vote choice for most offices in Brazil, and that given this, most voters split their tickets (Ames, Baker, & Renno 2009). Chapter 5 showed that this interpretation is insufficient. For about half (sometimes more, sometimes less) of Brazilian voters, both positive and negative partisan attitudes shape voting behavior, up and down the ticket. Despite the party system's complexity and the electoral system's disincentives to cultivate a party vote (Samuels 1999), positive partisanship dramatically increases the likelihood a voter will choose a candidate from his or her party, while negative partisanship works powerfully in the opposite direction.

Finally, in Chapter 6 we showed that the notion of negative partisanship can travel across political contexts. Although Brazil appears to have a relatively high number of antipartisans, the share of pure negative partisans in different countries – individuals who have no positive partisan attachment but who strongly dislike a particular party – averages about 10%. Moreover, despite considerable change in the structure of party systems around the world and in the purported decline in the intensity of partisan sentiment in recent decades, the number of negative partisans and the impact of antipartisan sentiment appears to be fairly constant. Negative partisanship in a wide sample of countries has a strong impact on voting behavior. The findings here – admittedly preliminary – at a minimum suggest a need for additional research on the nature and impact of negative partisan attitudes.

7.1 IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

7.1.1 Partisanship Matters

Our key point can be succinctly summarized: partisanship can matter, even in a country where few expect it to. Since redemocratization, at times more than half of Brazilian voters have held positive and/or negative partisan attitudes, and these sentiments are not epiphenomenal – they shape evaluation of presidential performance, of public policies, and

of candidates for office. However, it also remains true that for about half of Brazilian voters, partisanship does not matter, and has never mattered. In addition, at the time of this writing, Brazil's party system is in worse shape than normal. The PT is in decline but other parties are hardly faring any better, with the *Lava Jato* scandal persistently revealing new and more perverse ways that corruption fueled the entire political system. By 2017, as noted in Chapter 1, Brazilian voters' opinions of their political parties had hit rock bottom, the lowest in the region.

The ebb and flow of mass partisanship in Brazil since the 1980s reveals a paradox. The country *can* have strong(er) parties in the electorate, but the default appears to be relative weakness. There is nothing natural about a strong party system in the electorate – in any country, but particularly in Brazil. Strong mass partisanship requires deliberate and sustained investment by party elites, but Brazil's electoral and governing institutions nudge parties toward a less programmatic and more personalistic approach to cultivating linkages with voters, which (as the corruption scandals reveal) attenuates electoral accountability. After all, "policy" does not seem to matter relative to "pork and pageantry" for most candidates – except for those from the PT and the PSDB, for whom "partisanship" also matters, a great deal.

We began this book by noting a core belief of political science: democracy is unthinkable without political parties. More than that – most scholars assume that a coherent party system in the electorate is normatively a good thing, from voters' perspective. Political parties play a key role in fostering congruence between citizens' views and government policies (Huber & Powell 1994; Powell 2009; Dalton, Farrell, & McAllister 2011) – and a system with little congruence warps the concept of representation and cannot be considered a high-quality democracy (Luna & Zechmeister 2005). This is the root of the normative critique of clientelistic parties – their success is based on the distribution of contingently targeted private benefits – a diminished notion of the concept of *res publica* – rather than universalistic public goods (Stokes 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). To the extent that parties take clear policy positions, voters can make better-informed choices about public affairs, and they can hold elected officials' feet to the fire when their performance falls short. A strong party system in the electorate makes possible the defining qualities of democracy: representation and accountability.

Since transitioning back to democracy in the 1980s, Brazil has been held up as a poster child for the malaise of weak parties in the electorate. The evidence in this book suggests that Brazilian politicians can create strong parties, but that few have much of an interest in doing so.

Thus while our results do suggest that PSDB partisanship is almost as strong as petismo for its own partisans, it remains a fact that PSDB leaders did not invest a great deal in fostering widespread attachment to their party. Only the PT heavily promoted its party brand, and at its high point petismo shaped the attitudes and voting behavior of millions of Brazilians. Petismo clarified policy and voting options for many Brazilian voters – both for and against – and the competition between the PT and PSDB for the presidency between 1994 and 2014 gave the party system a veneer of coherence.

7.1.2 *Negative* Partisanship Matters

The rise of petismo was accompanied by the emergence of a massive number of antipetistas in the electorate. Whether one is working in the Michigan school of partisanship as the "unmoved mover" or the Rochester school in which partisanship is a "running tally," nearly all scholars have assumed that when we say "partisanship," we mean positive partisanship. Yet, as we have made clear, negative partisan attitudes can matter a great deal too. They can emerge independently of a positive partisan attachment, as most antipetistas have no positive feelings for any political party. And as examples from around the world reveal, the impact of negative partisanship is hardly unique to Brazil. We believe that future research on new democracies in Latin America and beyond will reveal far more coherence to political attitudes and voting behavior than many have observed, once we include both positive as well as negative partisanship.

7.1.3 Partisanship Shapes Evaluations

Our book has another, perhaps even more important implication for understanding the past and potential future of Brazilian politics. Most observers accept that candidate qualities and performance in office weigh heavily for most Brazilians' voting decisions. Ames (2008) add that "issue voting" matters to some extent. Our findings suggest that for a large swath of the electorate, partisanship itself can shape voters' evaluations of candidate qualities, of politicians' performance in office, and of public policies. For Brazilians with positive and/or negative partisan attitudes, there are no "objective facts" about party or candidate performance, or about the economy or other hot-button issues. Everything is filtered through the lens of partisanship. The endogeneity of attitudes and perceptions to partisanship is one of the most powerful findings of recent research (e.g., Green,

Palmquist, & Schickler 2002; Evans & Andersen 2006; Goren, Federico, & Kittilson 2009), and the evidence we presented suggest that this is also how things work for many Brazilian voters.

Brazilian partisans and nonpartisans differ in a crucial way: the former wear goggles that filter information so that their party always comes out looking good. For negative partisans, the process works in reverse: the goggles always cast the disliked party in a negative light. Goggles are a metaphor for the way that partisanship changes individual psychology. Maintaining a social identity is important for one's sense of self-worth. As such, partisans have psychological incentives to support their group and reject adverse information. Partisans tend to follow the information shortcut of adopting their party's position as their own, rather than engaging in the cognitively more costly task of critical reasoning.

This insight from Social Identity Theory has powerful implications for understanding Brazilian politics. Most importantly, it suggests that partisans' attitudes and political behavior cannot be inferred directly from "objective" empirical indicators of the economy, how much pork their community received, or of candidates' personal qualities or performance in office. For a large plurality of Brazilian voters, partisanship powerfully molds perceptions of pork, pageantry, performance – and policy. In effect, partisanship changes individuals' policy attitudes and perceptions of incumbent performance, in addition to making their attitudes more univalent and less malleable (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen 2013). This is a darker side of partisanship for democracy, as it implies that positive partisans are willing to ignore "reality" – something that does not bode well for democratic accountability, for example.

7.1.4 Partisanship > Personalism

Our book's findings also inform the question of how to interpret Lula's two election victories. This is not merely a matter of historical importance, as Lula continues to play a key role in Brazilian politics and given the open question about the PT's future. We are less interested in why Lula won more votes than his adversaries than in the fact that in both 2002 and 2006, Lula won far more votes than his *party* did in the concurrent legislative election. The reason is obvious – many nonpetistas voted for Lula, but then voted for candidates from other parties in the legislative elections. The reason they split their tickets is also simple: partisanship is not the same – both conceptually and in terms of real-world importance – as personalism. "Lulismo" has been a powerful force in Brazilian politics,

but the relative numbers of lulistas and petistas suggest that the factors associated with the former are distinct from those associated with the latter. Most importantly, contra Singer (2009), lulismo is not and never was a form of social identity, while petismo was and for many still is.

Moreover, there is no evidence that the rise of lulismo embodies a lasting transformation of voters' preferences or a realignment of the party system (see Samuels & Zucco 2014*a*). Nearly all petistas have a high opinion of Lula, but relatively few of all those who like Lula have a particularly strong attachment to the PT. The difference between lulismo and petismo represents a serious problem for the PT, as it remains an open question whether the party can survive without Lula. Argentina has "Peronism without Perón" but Peronism was and is something more than personalistic affinity for Perón himself – it signals attachment to a partisan idea (no matter how little of that idea remains today) and engagement with a partisan organizational structure (Ostiguy 1997; McGuire 1999). Lulismo is neither of those things – but petismo is. If the PT manages to survive and thrive in the future it will not be because of Lula; it will be because of the grunt work that party activists do to engage Brazilians at the grassroots level and show them that electing party members to office can effectively change their lives for the better.

7.1.5 Partisanship Complicates Governance

Partisanship has mattered in several important ways in Brazil – but as implied earlier, its consequences may not be as uniformly positive as democratic theory assumes. For one, the rise of the PT was associated with an unforeseen consequence: an increase in political polarization among politically engaged and informed Brazilians, between petistas and antipetistas. This echoes what has happened in recent decades in the United States, where more and more voters feel strongly attached to "their" party and feel a strong dislike for the "other" party (Levendusky 2009; Abramowitz & Webster 2016). There is no necessary causal connection between strong parties in the electorate and political polarization, but historical cases from 1930s Germany to 1960s Chile and beyond suggest at least a strong correlation. Most contemporary scholarship ignores this darker side of strong partisanship, perhaps because of the dominance of the "partisan decline" narrative in comparative politics research (e.g., Dalton et al. 2002).

The PT's experience also suggests that under presidentialism, programmatic parties with widespread partisan support may confront a difficult

challenge. Despite the benefits that cultivating mass partisanship brought the PT, the party ended up abusing the faith its supporters had placed in it. Quite obviously, the growth of partisanship for the PT was insufficient to tie the party to its programmatic principles. Indeed, the growth of petismo may have placed the PT in a difficult situation precisely at moment when Lula needed flexibility to form a governing coalition. That is, as Samuels and Shugart (2010) explained, presidentialism creates "separation of purpose" between the executive and legislative "branches" of a political party. Presidentialism increases the vote-seeking incentives in the "executive" branch of any party that nominates a credible candidate for president, and simultaneously undermines the policy-seeking incentives of the "legislative" branch of that same party, compared to a similar party in a parliamentary system (Strom 1990).

The reason is not because a presidential candidate from a policy-seeking party is unlikely to have broad enough appeal to make it to the second round of a majoritarian presidential election (although the pressure to moderate is real and incentives of this nature clearly did nudge the PT toward the political center [Samuels 2004; Hunter 2010]). It is because in a multiparty situation, the greater the difference between a president's vote total and his or her party's vote total in legislative elections, the lower the congruence in the electoral support bases between the two party "branches." The president may feel he or she represents a wide constituency, while the party's legislators may feel stronger incentives to remain true to the party's programmatic base. This is the root of "separation of purpose" – different branches of a single party may have different political goals.

Although observers have long highlighted the plebiscitarian nature of the executive branch under the separation of powers (Shugart & Carey 1992; Linz & Valenzuela 1994) all Brazilian presidents know that they cannot govern alone (Abranches 1988) – although some have discovered that fact the hard way. Serious presidential candidates in Brazil construct broad multiparty coalitions – not just to win the election, but because once the election is over, they will need those parties to govern. The smaller the president's party, the larger the governing coalition must be. Presidents from ideologically moderate or catch-all parties such as the PSDB have found the process of coalition-building relatively easier than presidents from programmatic parties like the PT, who find that their own party resists ceding cabinet portfolios to coalition partners. As per the concept of separation of purpose, coalition governance often puts presidents and their own parties at odds – with the party as the inevitable loser, since

it cannot credibly go into opposition. Presidents may have to steamroll their own parties, forcing them to give up a piece of the pie they coveted. If they do not, as Lula and Dilma both discovered, governance suffers (Amorim Neto 2002).

In short, programmatic parties like the PT are caught between a rock and a hard place under multiparty presidentialism, as they face countervailing incentives. To expand the party's base they are pushed to cultivate partisanship, given a relative lack of funds and a comparative advantage in terms being able to rely on motivated and engaged activists. Yet to the extent that this strategy bears fruit, the same party faces incentives to compromise in the electoral and governing arenas – and such pressures may paradoxically undermine the programmatic nature of partisanship.

The PT continued to attract partisans during Lula's presidency, but when government performance declined, support evaporated. Petistas whose partisanship was "activated" after 2002 may be what are known in American sports parlance as fair-weather fans. Their partisanship may be bounded, as discussed in Chapter 2, but it may depend relatively more heavily on their perception of their party's performance in office than on its ostensible programmatic principles. "Hard-core" partisans' perception of their party's performance in office may be relatively immune to the facts, but "fair-weather" partisans may be more willing to remove their goggles and see the world as it really is. Parties like the PT can cultivate mass partisanship under inauspicious conditions, but their success brings about new challenges.

7.1.6 The Limits of Partisanship in Brazil

Although partisanship can and has mattered a great deal in Brazilian politics, it is also important to highlight the limits of our argument. After the PT's decline, Brazil's party system in the electorate may have lost a good deal of whatever coherence it once had. Even during its heyday, Brazil's party system in the electorate never extended much beyond the PT/PSDB axis, plus antipetistas. Partisanship for the PMDB has mattered less and less since the 1980s, and few other parties ever registered large numbers of partisans. In the end, for most voters, voting behavior has never been partisan. Instead, nonpartisan factors – the "pork, pageantry and performance" of the conventional wisdom – were and remain decisive.

Brazil's voters can hardly be blamed for their low opinion of Brazil's parties and their reluctance to feel any sort of connection to any party. Brazil's party system remains extremely fragmented and characterized

by considerable discontinuity, as many parties have disappeared, merged with others, and/or changed their names. Politicians' apparent lack of interest in differentiating their parties from others means that the list of parties that currently hold seats in the Chamber of Deputies befuddles even experts, who are unable to say with certainty what most of them stand for, if anything.

High fragmentation and programmatic opacity make it difficult for most voters to conceive of parties as distinct entities, distinguish their policy proposals, and decide which they like and which they dislike. Most voters cannot even identify which parties are in government and opposition. Voters do know who to blame when there is a recession or a huge scandal, at least in presidential elections. But the president is only one piece on Brazil's complex political system, and the hurdles are higher for voters to hold other officials to accounts. For most voters, personalities, not parties, continue to dominate.

Partisanship is to be a two-edged sword for democracy. Without a strong party system in the electorate, representation and accountability suffer. Yet strong partisanship may also bring about increased polarization. In any case, presidentialism may undermine programmatic partisan attitudes. A "Goldilocks point" might be ideal, where there is some coherence to the party system in the electorate, but where voters also express a good bit of partisan ambivalence (Lavine et al. 2013) – that is, they are *critically* loyal to their party. They do not wear partisan blinders or goggles, but are free to update their evaluations and engage in the reasoning essential to a democratic electorate.

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Samuels' and Zucco's meticulously researched book is a major contribution to the evolving concept of negative partisanship and a marvelous dissection of the recent travails of Brazil's Workers' Party. Few works on Brazilian politics have been so theoretically and comparatively informed, or have rivalled the rigorous methodological standards of this study.
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By differentiating negative partisanship from nonpartisanship, Samuels and Zucco advance our understanding of mass political behavior in Brazil. At this time of marked political turmoil, their analysis sheds light on the possible contours and patterns likely to emerge.
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Samuels and Zucco make a forceful case that partisanship matters, even in the unlikeliest of contexts. They have written not only the book on partisanship in Brazil, but also a must-read for anyone interested in public opinion, voting, or political parties more generally.
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This is an excellent contribution by two major scholars. Samuels and Zucco offer a major and innovative theoretical contribution in rethinking how partisanship and anti-partisanship shape party politics in and beyond Brazil.
Scott Mainwaring, *Harvard University*

A major contribution to our understanding of anti-partisanship and a valuable corrective to much of the received wisdom that dominated our understanding of Brazilian politics in the 1990s and 2000s.
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