



Ministry  
of Defence

## Joint Doctrine Publication 02

# UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience





# Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience – key points

## Military aid to the civil authorities (MACA)

Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to Defence ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event.

### Charging principles

- **Full:** pre-planned operations.
- **Marginal:** dynamic situations such as the response to flooding.
- **Zero:** where life is at risk, or the provision of liaison and/or a military assessment team.

Full cost should be assumed to be the default setting, although precise arrangements may be arranged on a case-by-case basis between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the requesting agency.

### Liaison

The MOD maintains a standing resilience liaison officer network comprising:  
4 Royal Naval regional liaison officers,  
18 joint regional liaison officers (all British Army) and 9 Royal Air Force regional liaison officers. If their personal details are unknown to the civil authorities then assistance may be sought in the first instance by e-mailing:  
[SJCUK-HQ-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk](mailto:SJCUK-HQ-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk)

## MACA principles

MACA may be provided where:

- there is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;
- other options, including mutual aid, commercial alternatives and the voluntary sector have been discounted;
- the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
- the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.

### Authorisation

The default setting is that a Defence minister must authorise all requests for Defence assistance. Exceptions to this policy includes ‘immediate assistance’ (life at risk, a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property). In this instance, local military commanders can authorise deployments and requests relating to Defence estate. Depending upon whether the civil authorities’ intended use is considered contentious or not, the request will be authorised either by a senior military officer locally or by a senior military officer in the MOD.



# Joint Doctrine Publication 02

# UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience

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Director Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

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# Foreword

Defence has a key role supporting lead government departments, devolved administrations and civil authorities as they prepare, respond and recover from disruptive challenges and major national events. This publication incorporates the latest UK government policy on military aid to the civil authorities. The pandemic event of 2020 and 2021, the increasing prevalence of climate change-driven events, and the attack in Salisbury in 2018 highlight the breadth, scale and complexity of the challenges that the UK faces.

This publication provides guidance and practical understanding to both a military and civilian audience on how Defence can support the civil authorities to deal with events such as natural hazards, major incidents or malicious attacks in the UK and the Crown Dependencies. Accordingly, I commend this publication to the widest audience.

A handwritten signature in dark green ink, appearing to read "Tim Fraser".

Admiral Sir Tim Fraser KCB ADC  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff



# Preface

## Purpose

1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02, *UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience*, 4th Edition describes how Defence contributes to the nation's resilience. JDP 02 recognises that resilience is only achieved through a fused, interagency approach to civil contingency.

## Context

2. The fourth edition of JDP 02 incorporates thinking from *Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* published in 2021, reflects upon revised cross-government and devolved resilience policy, and it notes the lessons learned in the years 2016 through to 2021. This publication:

- complements *Defence in a competitive age*, the Defence Command Paper 2021; and
- notes the Cabinet Office's updated assessment of the key risks that the UK faces as set out in the National Risk Register of December 2020.

## Scope

3. JDP 02 explains the ways and means through which military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) is delivered in the UK and the Crown Dependencies. MACA contributes towards a resilient homeland, capable of enduring disruptive events of natural origin as well those caused by human actions, including inadvertent, deliberate and occasionally malign activities. Resilience is foundational to ensuring the UK's security and way of life. Effective resilience underlines to potential adversaries that the benefits of malign activity will be largely denied, though of course not every eventuality can be deterred, and it thereby contributes to the UK's deterrence. JDP 02 makes an important contribution to the protect function of the Integrated Operating Framework explained in JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*. JDP 02 only covers MACA;

purely military activities that contribute to defence of the homeland, such as the protection of national airspace, sit outside the scope of this publication.

4. The term MACA applies to operations undertaken on behalf of other government departments within the UK, its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, and the Crown Dependencies. Operations undertaken by Defence within the Overseas Territories are outside the scope of MACA.

5. In producing this JDP, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre undertook a wide consultation. This included the Cabinet Office and across wider Defence, including: the MOD; the Headquarters Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom); the three single-Service Commands (Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force); Headquarters Defence Infrastructure Organisation; and the regional resilience liaison officers of all three Services.

## Audience

6. JDP 02 informs a broad civil and military readership. It provides guidance to those in Defence responsible for the planning, force generation, and command and control of Defence assets tasked to provide support to the civil authorities. The JDP also provides other government departments, devolved administrations, local authorities, partners and agencies with a broad understanding of the Defence contribution to resilience as part of a multi-agency approach to support the civil authorities.

## Structure

7. This JDP comprises four chapters. An outline of their contents is described below.

- a. **Chapter 1 – Context** explains civil contingency in the UK and the part that Defence plays. Factors that influence civil contingency are highlighted, before describing the risk management process that underpins the UK approach to civil contingency.
- b. **Chapter 2 – Policy: ends** outlines the MOD’s policy for providing support to the civil authorities. It considers the legal basis for MACA and the charging policy applied to other government departments and civil authorities making a MACA request.

- c. **Chapter 3 – Process: ways** details the end-to-end process for the employment, command and control, and recovery of Defence capability assigned to provide support to the civil authorities. It outlines Defence's resilience roles, the military aid request mechanism and planning considerations.
- d. **Chapter 4 – Delivery: means** considers Defence capability that may be tasked in support of MACA operations. It outlines how Defence conducts resilience education and trains alongside civil partners to prepare for potential civil contingency tasks.

## Linkages

8. JDP 02 is linked to several policy documents, including:

- *Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 2021* (referred to as the *Integrated Review* throughout);
- *Defence in a competitive age, 2021* (referred to as the *Defence Command Paper* throughout);
- *Responding to Emergencies: the UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations*, updated April 2013;
- *Cabinet Office Emergency Preparedness*, March 2012;
- *Cabinet Office Emergency Response and Recovery*, April 2010;
- *Preparing Scotland*, March 2016;
- *Cabinet Office Lexicon of Civil Protection*, February 2013;
- *The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework*, revised 2021;
- *HM Treasury, Managing Public Money*, revised May 2021; and
- *Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today*.

It is also linked to statute (both primary and secondary) and powers recognised by the common law, namely the:

- Civil Contingencies Act 2004;
- Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005;
- Emergency Powers Act 1964; and
- Royal Prerogative.

9. JDP 02 is linked to several doctrine publications. It sits below JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* and it sits alongside other thematic doctrine publications, namely:

- JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*;
- JDP 04, *Understanding and Decision-making*;
- JDP 05, *Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution*; and
- *Joint Doctrine: the interoperability framework*.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Joint Doctrine: the interoperability framework*, Edition 2, July 2016.

# Contents

Foreword . . . . .	iii
Preface . . . . .	v
Chapter 1 – Context . . . . .	1
Chapter 2 – Policy: ends. . . . .	33
Chapter 3 – Process: ways . . . . .	57
Chapter 4 – Delivery: means. . . . .	99
Lexicon . . . . .	131



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# Chapter 1

Chapter 1 explains civil contingency in the UK and the part that Defence plays. Factors that influence civil contingency are highlighted, before describing the risk management process that underpins the UK's approach to civil contingency.

Section 1 – Civil contingency . . . . .	3
Section 2 – The UK operating environment . . . . .	17
Section 3 – Risks . . . . .	19
Annex 1A – Devolved administrations . . . . .	21
Annex 1B – Lead government departments and agencies across the devolved administrations . . . . .	26
Annex 1C – Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles . . . . .	28

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Our first goal is to **build** our national **resilience**, so that we are able to **reduce** the **impact** of acute shocks and longer-term challenges on **lives** and **livelihoods** in the UK. National resilience is the product of **multiple factors**, including effective and trusted **governance**, government **capabilities**, social **cohesion**, and individual and business **resilience**.

”

Prime Minister's vision for the UK in 2030,  
*Integrated Review*, 2021

## Chapter 1

# Context

## Section 1 – Civil contingency

For the purposes of this publication the following definitions apply.



1

**military aid to the civil authorities**

Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority.

Note: These operations are subject to Defence Ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event, except in immediate risk of life situations.

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1, *UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm*

**resilience**

Ability of the community, services, areas or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.

Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1

1.1. In the UK the civil authorities take the lead in planning for, responding to and recovering from disruptive challenges and similar events. In this process the UK government exercises a broad coordinating authority, with devolved administrations responsible for conducting specific duties within their geographic boundaries. If civil authorities require assistance in this response, then military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) allows them to draw upon niche capabilities, general support and specific expertise held within Defence.

1.2. MACA may be appropriate when civil capabilities and capacities are overwhelmed by an incident, or when preparing for, and supporting, major national events. MACA occurs frequently across the UK; examples of significant events include the following.

- Providing widespread and general support during flooding events.

- Providing security for large-scale, pre-planned events of international and national significance, such as the London Olympic Games in 2012 and the G7 Summit in Carbis Bay, Cornwall in 2021.
- Support to the civil authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic, including establishing local testing centres, planning support to national, devolved and local government, and constructing the emergency Nightingale hospitals.
- Support in response to events not necessarily defined as a risk in the National Risk Register,<sup>1</sup> such as providing liaison, planning and logistic expertise to the civil authorities in the run-up to, and following, the UK's exit from the European Union in 2020.

1.3. MACA applies to operations conducted within the UK, its territorial waters and/or the exclusive economic zone, and the Crown Dependencies. Other government departments, Crown Dependencies and/or civil authorities may request MACA. Assistance is authorised in accordance with this publication and the powers to deploy Service personnel derive from the Royal Prerogative, the Emergency Powers Act 1964 or emergency regulations made under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA 04) depending on the nature and location of the task required. Operations to support Overseas Territories are not classified as MACA and are not covered by this publication.

1.4. Routinely, MACA requests will require ministerial authorisation, but in the event of a significant incident where there is an urgent requirement to save lives, alleviate distress and/or protect significant property, a local commander is empowered to lawfully conduct civilian tasks to address the situation without prior recourse either to ministerial authority or their own chain of command.<sup>2</sup> As soon as practicably possible, the chain of command should be informed of the decision and response. For the most significant and wide-ranging disruptive challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, military joint commanders may be given delegated authority to undertake specific tasks to support the local resilience forums (LRFs) and devolved equivalents.<sup>3</sup> Staff should not assume devolved administrations/partners across government have the same approach to delegation of authority and may require more time to consult their chain of command.

.....  
1 The National Risk Register is explained further at paragraphs 1.5 and 1.19–1.20.

2 In accordance with the 17 January 1983 Standing Defence Council Order.

3 In Scotland, the roles of LRFs are undertaken by regional resilience partnerships (RRPs) and local resilience partnerships (LRPs). The equivalents in Northern Ireland are the emergency preparedness groups (EPGs).



Our Armed Forces assisted the civil authorities for the London Olympic Games

## Strategic background

1.5. The UK faces an increasing number of disruptive challenges. The 2020 *National Risk Register* describes 38 risks, which are grouped into six broad areas:

- environmental hazards;
- human and animal health;
- major accidents;
- societal risks;
- malicious attacks; and
- risks occurring overseas.

Lead government departments (LGDs) are responsible for managing risks assigned to their respective portfolios and for conducting the associated contingency planning and preparation. Some of these risks may be a consequence of malign actors operating below the threshold of war or, indeed, the threshold of attribution. Events within any one of these categories have the potential to overwhelm civil authorities and may result in a request for Defence support. Defence is not immune to these risks as many have the potential to disrupt Defence outputs. Consequently, this support may be provided whilst Defence is itself under stress.

1.6. Providing resilience within the UK is enshrined in the *Integrated Review*.<sup>4</sup> A resilient homeland is crucial to strengthening security at home and overseas; a UK that can withstand and recover quickly from disruption deters our adversaries by changing the risk to reward calculation.

1.7. The CCA 04 provides the framework for civil protection.<sup>5</sup> It describes how organisations, particularly sub-departmental agencies and local responders, prepare for and respond to disruptive challenges. The Act comprises two parts.

a. **Part 1: Local arrangements for civil protection.** Part 1 establishes a clear set of responsibilities and roles for practitioners involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing different responsibilities on each.

- o Category 1 responders are organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies, for example, emergency services, local authorities and certain specified National Health Service (NHS) bodies.
- o Category 2 responders comprise cooperating bodies that are less likely to be intimately involved in planning work, but who would be involved in responding to incidents that affect their specific sector, for example, the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies, and other elements of the NHS.<sup>6</sup>

b. **Part 2: Emergency powers.** Part 2 of the Act enables temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious emergencies where existing legislation may inhibit the most

.....  
4 Two of the four pillars of the Strategic Framework within this review directly apply resilience operations: strengthening security and defence at home and overseas; and building the UK's national resilience.

5 The CCA 04 received Royal Assent on 18 November 2004, repealing the Civil Defence Act 1948 and the Civil Defence Act (Northern Ireland) 1950. The Act imposes duties on specified bodies with the aim of delivering a single framework for civil protection in the UK capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st Century. Since its inception, additional legislation has been enacted specific to the devolved administrations and this is referred to under 'linkages' in the preface.

6 Defence is neither a Category 1 nor Category 2 responder but should be fully involved with cooperating in emergency preparedness work in a supporting role. *Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme*, March 2012, Chapter 2.

effective response. To date, it has not been necessary to use these powers. In response to large-scale events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, when the government has the time and space to do so, it can enact scenario-specific legislation rather than enact Part 2 of the CCA 04.

1.8. The strategic objectives that underpin the UK government's response to a disruptive challenge are to:<sup>7</sup>

- protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment, and alleviate suffering;
- support the continuity of everyday activity and restore disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
- uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

Whilst set at the strategic level, these objectives underpin the response at all levels.

1



The CCA 04 defines an emergency as: 'an event or situation that threatens or causes serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security in the UK'. The definition covers a range of scenarios including adverse weather, severe flooding, animal and human-borne diseases, terrorist incidents and the impact of a disruption on essential services and infrastructure. Additionally, Cabinet Office guidance explains that to constitute an emergency, an incident or situation must also pose a considerable test for an organisation's ability to perform its functions. The common themes of emergencies are: the scale of the impact of the event or situation; the demands it is likely to make on local responders; and the exceptional deployment of resources. To constitute an emergency, this event or situation must require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responders.<sup>8</sup>

7 Cabinet Office, *Responding to Emergencies: the UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations*, updated April 2013.

8 Cabinet Office, *Guidance: Emergency preparedness*, 2012.



Our Armed Forces can assist in emergencies across all UK nations

## Devolved administrations

1.9. The devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have different settlements. These settlements are complex but broadly these administrations have the following areas devolved:

- policing;<sup>9</sup>
- health and social care;
- education and training;
- local government and housing;
- agriculture, forestry and fisheries;
- the environment and planning;
- tourism, sport and heritage; and
- economic development and internal transport.

Annexes 1A and 1B contains further details on the devolved administrations.

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<sup>9</sup> Non-counterterrorist policing is devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Policing in Wales is not devolved.

## Emergency management framework

1.10. The UK government employs a fused, interagency approach to ensure its response to a disruptive challenge is integrated across government.<sup>10</sup> This approach coheres state apparatus from central government, the devolved administrations, partners (for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency), LRFs and equivalents and, where necessary, the commercial, civil and voluntary sectors. The Cabinet Office applies a set of planning principles entitled Integrated Emergency Management, which is subdivided into six activity areas:

- anticipation (horizon scanning);
- assessment (of the risks);
- prevention (pre-event actions);
- preparation (development of contingency plans);
- response (to an event to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality); and
- recovery (longer-term activity of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community).

1

Comprehensive details for all six areas are contained in *Emergency Preparedness*.<sup>11</sup> However, the most relevant to Defence are expanded upon below.

1.11. **Preparation.** The Home Secretary has overall responsibility for the safety and security of the UK population.<sup>12</sup> In parallel, ministers from LGDs are responsible for contingency planning and response within their own specific areas. The Cabinet Office assumes overall responsibility for cross-government resilience preparedness and response capability.

- a. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) provides the coordinating function for contingency and resilience planning. It is responsible for

<sup>10</sup> See JDP 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*.

<sup>11</sup> For more information see Cabinet Office, *Guidance: Emergency preparedness*, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> Specific responsibilities for safety and security are devolved to LGDs.

ensuring a resilient and secure UK by improving the nation's ability to absorb, respond to, and recover from potentially disruptive challenges. Underpinning preparations, the CCS employs the Integrated Emergency Management approach. Devolved administrations are responsible for coordinating many aspects of resilience within their respective jurisdictions. To ensure a coherent approach they work closely both with the Cabinet Office and through their respective departments of state.<sup>13</sup> The UK government retains responsibility for coordinating the response to events where powers have been reserved, whilst devolved administrations will assume the lead in responding to events within their areas of jurisdiction that have been devolved.<sup>14</sup> Within England, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) has responsibility for community resilience. Community resilience describes the use of local resources and knowledge to assist the civil authorities in the event of a regional or local-level disruptive challenge.

- b. At the local level, resilience planning and preparation is coordinated on a multi-agency basis by the LRF. These comprise Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Other agencies, including Defence and the voluntary sector, are invited to attend where appropriate.
- c. The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK and are not subject to, or bound by, CCA 04.<sup>15</sup> In the event that Defence assets are requested by a Crown Dependency, this will be coordinated through the Ministry of Justice acting as the LGD.

**1.12. Response.** In response to a significant disruptive challenge within the UK, a range of different organisations and partners have a role to play in coordinating the response. This inter-agency approach is coordinated using the following mechanisms.

.....  
13 The Scotland Office, the Wales Office and the Northern Ireland Office.

14 An example of where powers are reserved to Westminster is during the response to a terrorist incident.

15 Managing an emergency in, or affecting, the Crown Dependencies of the Channel Islands and Isle of Man is a matter for their governments, with assistance being requested in the first instance through the agreements and arrangements already in place.

a. **Central response framework.** When faced with such a situation a central government response mechanism is initiated.<sup>16</sup> At the heart of this response is the activation of the UK's ad hoc emergency sub-Cabinet Committee: the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (Ministerial) (COBR (M)).<sup>17</sup> The Prime Minister, Home Secretary or nominated senior minister will chair key COBR (M) meetings involving ministers and officials from relevant departments. This provides:

- o a senior decision-making body within government to oversee the response;
- o a forum able to draw upon specialist advice from sub-groups and/or subject matter experts as necessary;<sup>18</sup> and
- o rapid coordination of the central government response supported by effective decision-making.

COBR (M) is subordinated by COBR (Officials).

b. **Lead government department.** Within central government, when responding to a disruptive challenge or when preparing for a major national event, a LGD<sup>19</sup> is formally appointed if the lead department is not clear. The LGD has responsibility for:

- o assessing the situation;

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<sup>16</sup> The UK government categorises three levels of emergency of national significance. These are, in descending order of magnitude, catastrophic emergency (Level 3); serious emergency (Level 2); and significant emergency (Level 1). Below the national level there is a further category, local emergency, which is defined as: emergency with local impact, the response to which is conducted by local responders, where necessary in conjunction with local government. Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013. In the case of a catastrophic or serious emergency, central government will provide direction, whilst in a significant emergency, central government provides support and will nominate or confirm the LGD.

<sup>17</sup> Within the devolved administrations, devolved responsibilities are coordinated through different mechanisms: in Northern Ireland it is the Crisis Management Group (Northern Ireland); in Scotland it is the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR); and in Wales it is through the Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales).

<sup>18</sup> This might include the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).

<sup>19</sup> In Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013, a lead government department is defined as a: department of the United Kingdom government or devolved administration designated as responsible for overall management of the government response to an emergency or disaster. There are LGDs identified for both the response and recovery phases of emergencies.

- o ministerial briefings;
  - o strategic communications, media and parliamentary interest; and
  - o providing coherent policy and other support to local responders.<sup>20</sup>
- c. **Local response.** Local responders, including agencies of national and devolved governments (for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and National Highways), play a pivotal role in shaping a UK response. However, local responses may vary from what is laid down below. Planners should expect variations and occasional duplication between local, regional, devolved and national coordination chains. The local-level response is based upon the standing LRFs. However, in response to a disruptive challenge a strategic coordinating group (SCG) may be stood up to coordinate multi-agency activities.
- (1) LRFs are permanent multi-agency partnerships comprising representatives from local public services, including the emergency services, local authorities, the NHS, the Environment Agency (EA) and others. These agencies are known as Category 1 responders, as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act; as required, Category 2 responders are invited to join.
- (2) SCGs are established on a temporary basis to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of an incident and establish a strategic framework within which local levels of command, control and coordination will be exercised. Its guiding objectives are to: protect and preserve life; contain the incident, mitigate and minimise its impacts, maintain critical infrastructure and essential services; create conditions for recovery; and promote restoration and improvement activity in the aftermath of an incident to return to the new normality. It will normally be the role of the police to coordinate activity with other organisations and chair the SCG. However, once an operation moves from response to the recovery phase it would be usual for the chair to pass to the local authority. The SCG does not have the collective authority to issue executive orders to individual responder agencies. Each agency retains its own command authority and defined responsibilities,

.....  
20 The only time the Ministry of Defence (MOD) would act as the LGD in a civil context would be for the response to a Defence nuclear accident or emergency.

and exercises command of its own operations. In other types of emergency, for example, certain health or maritime scenarios, an agency other than the police may initiate and lead the group.

Emergency services (comprising police, fire and rescue, and ambulance service) are usually the first responders to arrive at the scene of an incident.<sup>21</sup> They provide operational, tactical and strategic levels of command, control and coordination. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) provides coherent doctrine for the three emergency services and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to enable effective joint working and shared situational awareness. An explanation of JESIP is in Annex 1C.

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d. **Levels of command.** The emergency services order the levels of command, control and coordination in a multi-agency response from operational, tactical through to strategic in ascending order (this is different than Defence who refer to tactical, operational and then strategic). When working as single agencies, the civil authorities also refer to these as bronze, silver and gold commands.

e. **Coordination structures.** Upon the rapid onset of a disruptive challenge in a specific/limited geographic area, the emergency management framework is usually constructed from the bottom upwards. Subsequent escalation of the event, either in severity or geographical extent, or as situational awareness improves, may require operational-, tactical- and/or strategic-level coordination to be implemented. Certain situations may dictate that all three levels run in parallel, while other situations, such as wide area/slow onset disruptive challenges (for example, a pandemic) may see a response initiated by central government or by the sub-national or devolved administration. Cross-government procedures for responding to such events are articulated in the Cabinet Office's *Responding to Emergencies: the UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations*.<sup>22</sup> These procedures vary between agencies, so a multi-agency response to a disruptive challenge will require the integration of separate command structures, and crisis management arrangements, often with differing characteristics and cultures.

.....  
21 This is situation-dependent and may include organisations such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency where appropriate.

22 Cabinet Office, *Responding to Emergencies: the UK Central Government Response Concept of Operations*, updated April 2013, Sections 4–5.



Our Armed Forces helped with the recovery phase following the Salisbury nerve agent attack

1.13. **Recovery.** The recovery phase is defined as: the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.<sup>23</sup> The following should be noted about this phase.

- a. Preparations for the recovery phase form an integral part of emergency management. Arrangements for the recovery phase will be considered in the early stages of a response.
- b. Recovery will likely comprise a multi-level approach. Depending upon the scale of the disruptive challenge, activities may run concurrently at local, sub-national/devolved and/or national levels, and may involve central government, devolved administrations, partners, agencies and LRFs and equivalents.
- c. In contrast with the response phase, the recovery phase is often protracted and may take many months or even years to support affected communities through reconstructing infrastructure and

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23 Cabinet Office, UK Civil Protection Lexicon, Version 2.1.1, February 2013.

restoring emotional, social, economic and physical well-being.<sup>24</sup> During events that cover a wide area, it is not uncommon for the recovery phase to have started in one area, while an adjacent area remains in the response phase.

## Defence involvement

1.14. **Direction.** The *Integrated Review* reflects the UK government's intent to establish a 'whole-of-society' approach to resilience. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) will contribute to this through the provision of MACA and strengthening security at home (including the Crown Dependencies).

1.15. **Associated military operations.** Defence activities occurring in the UK that support strategic and overseas tasks may fall under UK operations.<sup>25</sup> While these operations may not support the civil authorities directly, they do require close civil-military liaison and cooperation. Accordingly, such activities use many of the mechanisms and procedures associated with MACA, but they may not be classified as MACA and are covered in Chapter 3.

1.16. **Responsibility.** Across Defence, responsibility for resilience is provided at different military levels. The three levels are strategic, operational and tactical.

a. **Strategic.** The MOD's Security Policy and Operations (SPO) Directorate, through the UK operations team, has strategic responsibility for any Defence contribution to prepare for and respond to civil emergencies.<sup>26</sup>

b. **Operational.** The Headquarters of the Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) (HQ SJC(UK)) is the coordinating headquarters for all MACA at the operational level. It is assigned an area of responsibility for resilience operations in support of the civil authorities in the UK in a separate directive from the Chief of the Defence Staff. The HQ SJC(UK) area of responsibility includes the land mass of the UK and Crown

<sup>24</sup> Planners should consider a variety of human security factors when planning MACA support because disruptive events may affect particular communities, demographics and genders differently. Defence uses the term 'human security' to describe an audience-centric approach to planning that takes account of the human environment and the security of individuals and communities.

<sup>25</sup> Examples include military support to the mounting of operations, host-nation support to foreign forces based in, or transiting through, the UK, and the nuclear emergency organisation.

<sup>26</sup> The SPO Directorate works closely with the CCS and, when COBR is activated, will likely represent the MOD at that forum in its response to disruptive challenges in the UK.

Dependencies and most internal waters.<sup>27</sup> HQ SJC(UK) will be notified of all MACA requests irrespective of whether in the maritime, land or air domains, but will pass those outside of its area of responsibility to the respective single-Service headquarters. Maritime operations in the UK marine area will be under the operational command of Commander Operations (COMOPS) in the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC). Responsibility for the area between the high and low water mark, and in estuaries, is deliberately undefined; tasks will be allocated to either HQ SJC(UK) or the MOC depending on the capability required. Air operations in UK airspace will generally be conducted under the operational command of the Air Defence Commander – Air Officer Commanding 11 Group (AOC 11 Gp). In certain circumstances, limited niche capabilities, such as finite medical resources or particular security-related tasks, may be retained within a separate command.

c. **Tactical.** A network of regional points of command (RPoCs), based on British Army brigade and regional headquarters, and regional liaison officers from all three Services, often with deputies,<sup>28</sup> exercise tactical responsibility and provide the primary link between Defence and civil authorities at devolved administrations, sub-national and local levels. When operating in this capacity, British Army brigade and regional commanders are referred to as the joint military commander (JMC). However, there may be circumstances where another commander other than the RPoC commander may exercise the JMC role. Specialist commands may be employed outside the RPoC framework if there is a requirement for a specific capability, for example, a Royal Air Force (RAF) JMC may be appointed where specific air expertise is required, or an engineer brigade for a role involving construction or demolition. Consideration should be given to protecting these specialist commands from generalist tasks if it is likely that their niche capabilities will be required in the near future.<sup>29</sup>

.....  
27 Certain internal waters, such as the Minches, remain the responsibility of the Fleet Commander.

28 The network of regional liaison officers comprises: joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs) (also representing the British Army); Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs); and Royal Air Force regional liaison officers (RAFRLOs).

29 Commander 8 Engineer Brigade was appointed as the JMC in 2020 for community testing in Liverpool during the COVID-19 response. The station commander RAF Honington was appointed JMC in 2016 in support of a Suffolk Constabulary operation in response to a missing airman from that station.

# Section 2 – The UK operating environment

## Situation

1.17. Defence will support LGDs and civil authorities in accordance with the MACA principles. However, other factors may serve to compound the resilience challenges facing the UK government.

- a. The UK population is forecast to grow to 70 million by 2027 and its average age is increasing. This will see increased demand on national infrastructure (housing, transport and utilities) and public services (health, education and social services). As a result, excess capacity may be reduced or lost altogether for national infrastructure and public services to be able to respond to, or provide support during, a disruptive challenge.
- b. The UK government and the commercial sector are jointly responsible for delivering the UK's critical national infrastructure.<sup>30</sup> Notwithstanding the contractual obligation to ensure business continuity, the UK government is the ultimate guarantor in the event of any failure of critical national infrastructure.
- c. Since 2015, the Defence estate has been further rationalised, with more units in larger, but fewer, UK bases. This has resulted in a reduced military footprint across the UK. Consequently, some units may need to travel further to reach any emergency. Once deployed, units may have less estate and infrastructure nearby on which to rely for support. Likewise, it has reduced options for Defence estate to be used by civil authorities for other purposes, such as for establishing rest centres or for the storage or forward-basing of stores.
- d. Frequent severe weather events are likely to continue to impact the UK. These have the potential to cause widespread local and even regional disruption, damage and injury that will test local responders' capacity and capability.

1

<sup>30</sup> The [Centre for Protection of Critical Infrastructure](#) details 13 critical sectors: civil nuclear; communications; defence; energy; emergency services; finance; food; government; hazardous chemicals; health; space; transport; and water and sewage.

- e. Terrorist attacks in the UK, including on shipping and critical national infrastructure in the exclusive economic zone, are assessed as highly likely, whether executed by foreign or UK-based extremists. Government departments play a key role in deterring future terrorist threats and, in the event of an attack, the Home Office has the lead to respond to any attacks. Recovery and rebuilding public confidence would be a cross-government effort.
- f. The increasingly interdependent nature of technology and infrastructure creates the potential for complex scenarios that are likely to challenge the capabilities of conventional emergency responders. The rapid onset of events may compromise the delivery of essential services. As a result, Defence should be prepared to respond to a range of circumstances, including attacks on critical national infrastructure and against its own digital capabilities.
- g. The media and influencers on social media can rapidly shape public opinion. In the face of crises, the UK government will quickly come under pressure from these to act. The pervasive nature of the media raises expectations and increases scrutiny. Defence may come under pressure to provide a contribution and, following any deployment, military personnel will be highly visible.
- h. The rules-based international order is increasingly challenged by states and non-state actors who seek to destabilise and delegitimise it for their own interests. This activity, aimed at undermining the UK's national security, can manifest in many ways. Events such as the Russian use of a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury in 2018 is an example of this.

## Boundaries

1.18. Operations conducted outside the exclusive economic zone of the UK or Crown Dependencies is not classed as MACA. The UK maritime area is determined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This system divides the sea into a series of zones, as shown in Figure 1.1. The UK's authority, both in terms of law and capacity, diminishes in each zone as distance from the land increases.




Figure 1.1 – Maritime zones

## Section 3 – Risks

1.19. Not all disruptive challenges are foreseeable. However, for those that are, the UK government's aim is to identify and mitigate the risk as far in advance as possible. To assist this the government produces a biennial National Security Risk Assessment. This is a classified assessment of the potential risks facing the UK over a five-year period. An unclassified version of the National Security Risk Assessment, known as the National Risk Register, is produced for public release.<sup>31</sup>

1.20. The National Risk Register considers the likelihood of a risk, assessing the consequence and likelihood to determine the impact, should the risk materialise. The resultant outcome produces a risk and a subsequent risk assessment allowing individual risks to be categorised and prioritised.<sup>32</sup> This enables appropriate action to be taken and/or the allocation of resources to eliminate, reduce or mitigate the effects of a risk, or reduce the probability of a risk materialising. Continuous horizon scanning allows risk to be reviewed and, if significant change is identified, revised.

<sup>31</sup> HM Government, *National Risk Register*, 2020 Edition.

<sup>32</sup> Risk is defined as: measure of the significance of a potential emergency in terms of its assessed likelihood and impact. Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013.

## Key points

- The UK government has developed, and significantly improved, the nation's civil response capability following a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st Century.
- Defence plays a supporting role by providing specialist capabilities and more generalist personnel support when: the civil authorities' capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident; directed to do so; or preparing for major national events.
- Other government departments or civil authorities can request Defence assistance through the MACA process.
- The CCA 04 provides the framework for civil protection.
- The UK government employs an integrated approach to a crisis or emergency response.
- The Cabinet Office assumes overall responsibility for cross-government resilience preparedness and response capability.
- During an emergency, or when preparing for a major national event, a single LGD is usually appointed.
- Defence is no longer viewed as the 'last resort' option; rather, it is increasingly seen as supporting the LGD and providing support where it is appropriate for it to do so.
- The National Risk Register considers the likelihood of a risk occurring, assessing this against a number of consequences to determine the impact should it materialise.

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## Annex 1A

# Devolved administrations

1A.1. The following annex details the key areas of devolved responsibility, the legislative underpinning and the regional variances in organisation. The annex is not exhaustive and planners should establish an early dialogue with regional subject matter experts. The UK government is responsible for the core legislation concerning resilience: the CCA 04. All the devolved administrations have been delegated elements of this legislation to deliver.

1A

## Scotland

1A.2. **General.** In Scotland, the Scottish Government and the First Minister deliver the executive function as the LGD for Scottish responsibilities devolved to Scotland. When delivering MACA in support of a devolved function, approval must be sought through an appropriately senior civil servant in the Scottish Government; generally this is the chief executive officer of a Scottish government agency and could range from Director Local Government (which includes Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, Police Scotland and the Scottish Ambulance Service), Director General NHS Scotland, Chief Executive Officer Scottish Environment Protection Agency or the Chief Medical Officer.

1A.3. **Legislation.** Part 1 of CCA 04 is delegated to the Scottish Government to deliver, with the First Minister having executive powers to enforce preparedness requirements in devolved areas. The Scottish Government and the First Minister oversee the response phase for those areas of responsibility devolved to the Scottish Government. This response is conducted alongside other government departments covering non-devolved areas.

1A.4. **Devolved areas of responsibility.** The Scotland Act 1998 provided the transfer of certain functional areas from the UK government to the Scottish Government. Therefore, Scottish Government ministers now exercise most executive and subordinate legislative powers in relation to local government, and this includes in the preparedness and response to civil contingency events.

1A.5. **Process.** For ‘bottom up’ requests, the civil authority requiring support should initially staff requests through their own agency and local resilience

## 1A

partnership (LRP) to ascertain the availability of mutual aid, and then through the SCG, if activated, to identify whether mutual aid, third sector or commercial resources are available (or combination of such avenues). When processing the MACA request, the relevant department in the Scottish Government should work with a Defence regional liaison officers (RLOs) to develop the MACA request, which would then be channelled through the Scotland Office in London for endorsement. In common with other devolved administrations, the Scottish Government cannot request MACA support directly from the MOD. They must approach the relevant UK territorial department to submit on their behalf. The LGD principle remains, and the MOD will expect to receive MACA requests from the Scotland Office rather than directly from the Scottish Government.

**1A.6. Request format.** Requests must be in written form and authorised by a senior representative of the requesting civil authority. The request format must contain the name of the requesting organisation, which organisation will be accepting financial liability, and as much detail as possible on the nature of the desired effect. RLOs and the government liaison officer should be consulted when compiling the request. In parallel, the MACA request is staffed by HQ SJC(UK) in accordance with the standing MACA process. Exceptions exist depending on the delegated authority related to MACA, such as those involving the use of Defence estate and/or for specific UK operations. In addition, whilst there is no formal devolved MACA funding agreement in Scotland between the Scottish Government and devolved agencies, the model used is similar to that used in England where the Scottish Government meets costs as required, and then claims back funds from the civil authority as appropriate.

## Wales

**1A.7. General.** In Wales, the Welsh Government and the First Minister deliver the executive function as the LGD for Wales for responsibilities devolved to Wales. When delivering MACA in support of a devolved function, approval must be sought through an appropriately senior civil servant in the Welsh Government; generally this is the chief executive officer of a Welsh government agency and could range from Director Local Government (which includes fire and rescue services), Director General NHS Wales, Chief Executive Officer Natural Resources Wales or the Chief Veterinary Office for Wales.

1A.8. **Legislation.** Part 1 of CCA 04 is delegated to the Welsh Government, with the First Minister for Wales having executive powers to enforce preparedness requirements in devolved areas. The Welsh Government and the First Minister oversee the response phase for those areas of responsibility devolved to the Welsh Government. This response is conducted alongside other government departments covering non-devolved areas.

1A.9. **Devolved areas of responsibility.** The Government of Wales Act 1998 provided the transfer of certain functional areas from the UK government to the Welsh Government. Therefore, Welsh Government ministers now exercise most executive and subordinate legislative powers in relation to local government; this includes in the preparedness and response to civil contingency events.

1A

1A.10. **Process.** For ‘bottom up’ requests, the civil authority requiring support should staff requests through their own agency to ascertain the availability of mutual aid, and then through the SCG, if activated, to identify whether mutual aid or commercial resources are available. The MACA request, if still required, should then be staffed through the civil authority ‘chain of command’ and, if the responsibility is devolved, this will be through the Civil Service lead up through to First Minister and then on to the Wales Office and potentially into the Cabinet Office for approval at UK ministerial level. In parallel with this, the MACA request is staffed by HQ SJC(UK), or for maritime operations COMOPS, in accordance with the standing MACA process. Exceptions exist depending on any Defence-delegated authority related to MACA, such as those involving the use of Defence estate and/or for specific UK operations. In addition, whilst there is no formal devolved MACA funding agreement in Wales between the Welsh Government and devolved agencies, the model used is similar to that used in England where the Welsh Government meets costs as required, and then claims back funds from the civil authority as appropriate.

## Northern Ireland

1A.11. **General.** Operational delivery of CCA 04 is undertaken at the regional Northern Ireland level by the eight autonomous devolved departments. These departments are centrally cohered by the Northern Ireland Executive Office in the Northern Ireland Hub.

## Operating framework

1A.12. **Civil Contingencies Group.** The Civil Contingencies Group (Northern Ireland) (CCG (NI)) is a strategic leaders' forum, focused on developing policy and legislation. The group is made up of eight departmental permanent secretaries and senior officials from the Executive Office, Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Depending on the timeline for implementation, CCG (NI) will either be at official or ministerial level, and it can plug directly into the COBR if appropriate.

1A.13. **Northern Ireland Hub.** The Northern Ireland Hub, within the Northern Ireland Executive Office's Civil Contingencies Division (CCD), seeks to identify emerging crises at range, affording the eight autonomous devolved departments time and space to collaborate and provide collegiate solutions. The central message of the Northern Ireland Hub is one of crisis avoidance, rather than emergency response. Through sustained contact with various civil contingency-focused issues, the Hub will understand departments' areas of risk and points of friction, allowing CCD to oversee and coordinate comprehensive exercising and training schedules, assuring core resilience and preparedness.

1A.14. **Strategic coordinating group.** The SCG remains a core feature of regional response to disruptive challenges as it is across the UK, responding to immediate, unforeseen events or superseding the Northern Ireland Hub as a regional crisis escalates across two or more departmental boundaries. Note that there is currently no Northern Ireland legislation that can compel a department, or its key staff, to chair an SCG.

1A.15. **Emergency preparedness groups.** Northern Ireland is split into three civil contingency-focused areas, based on three policing regions: north, south and Belfast. Each has a local government-led emergency preparedness group (EPG), within which all partner emergency responders and devolved department operational staff are part. The EPG is the constant, operationally engaged body that feeds direct to the Northern Ireland Hub, allowing the Hub to accurately horizon scan and build a credible picture of risk and resilience across the three EPGs.

1A.16. **Northern Ireland Emergency Preparedness Group.** The Northern Ireland Emergency Preparedness Group is the central, connected and strategically significant forum that is the connective tissue between the Northern Ireland Executive Office (Northern Ireland Hub) and the local level

EPGs. Co-chaired by a PSNI assistant chief constable and a rotating (annually) council chief executive, it delivers cohered, relevant and politically perceptive information packages to the Northern Ireland Hub to expedite and inform strategic decision-making. This forum can operate at the level of an SCG if a lead government department cannot chair the SCG or generate sufficient resource for one.

1A.17. **Departmental operations cell.** The departmental operations cell (DOC) is the reactive, operational arm of a devolved department. The DOC is designed to communicate directly with the Northern Ireland Hub, or if activated, the SCG.

## Military aid to the civil authorities

1A

1A.18. **Process.** Devolved departments are entitled to engage with 38 (Irish) Brigade directly to shape a MACA request but they will usually inform the Office of the First and Deputy First Ministers before making a formal submission, in order that cross-party assent might be gained. The NIO in London acts as the final signatory to ensure that appropriate political and security provisions have been made and mitigations put in place where appropriate, and that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is primed to comment on any perceived or potential negative messaging about regional military activity.

1A.19. **Delivery.** Whilst complexity remains, Defence remains a trusted partner within the Northern Ireland civil contingencies framework. Commander 38 (Irish) Brigade's contribution is engrained permanently within the Northern Ireland Hub structure, routinely engaging in exercising and training to prepare and instil core resilience. Within the 2021 *Building Resilience Together: Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework*, JMC Northern Ireland (JMC NI) continues to major on the 'prepare' element, through subtle and focused engagement at the strategic-operational level. Sustained JMC NI input to this regional framework has helped to place Defence resources in a more appropriate, apolitical space, within reach of all communities, for universal benefit.

## Annex 1B

# Lead government departments and agencies across the devolved administrations

## 1B

1B.1. The following table shows which departments and agencies are responsible for different policy areas.

Policy area	Department or organisation responsible and regional variation			
	England	Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland
Culture and sport	Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)	Welsh Government	Cabinet Secretary Health and Sport	Department for Communities
Border control	Home Office (Border Force)			
Cyber defence	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)			
Defence	Ministry of Defence (MOD)			
Digital	DCMS			
Economic development	Her Majesty's (HM) Treasury	Welsh Government (where delegated)	Cabinet Secretary Economy Fair Work and Culture	Department for the Economy
Education	Department for Education (DfE)	Welsh Government	Cabinet Secretary Education	DfE
Electromagnetic spectrum	DCMS and the Office of Communications (Ofcom)			
Energy (including nuclear safety)	Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)			
Environment (flooding, agriculture, fisheries, animal welfare)	Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)	Welsh Government and Natural Resources Wales	Scottish Environmental Protection Agency	Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs

Policy area	Department or organisation responsible and regional variation			
	England	Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland
Finance and taxation	HM Treasury	HM Treasury (unless delegated)	Cabinet Secretary Finance	Department of Finance
Food standards	Food Standards Agency	Food Standards Agency	Food Standards Scotland	Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs
Foreign policy	FCDO			
Fire and rescue services	Home Office	Welsh Government	Scottish Fire and Rescue Service	Department of Health
Health and social care	Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC)	Welsh Government	Cabinet Secretary Health and Social Care	Department of Health
Health and safety	Health and Safety Executive (HSE)			
Housing and local government	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC)	Welsh Government	Cabinet Secretary Communities and Local Government	Department for Communities
Policing	Home Office	Home Office	Police Scotland	Department of Justice
Prisons and probation services	Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	MoJ	Scottish Prison Service	Department of Justice
Public health	Public Health England	Welsh Government and Public Health Wales	Public Health Scotland	Department of Health
Transport: general	Department for Transport	Welsh Government (where delegated)	Transport Scotland	Department for Infrastructure
Transport: road	Department for Transport	Welsh Government (where delegated)	Transport Scotland	Department for Infrastructure
Transport: rail	Department for Transport			
Transport: air	Department for Transport (Civil Aviation Authority)			

## Annex 1C

# Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles

1C.1. The JESIP was a two-year programme that reviewed the response to major national disruptive challenges and disasters.<sup>33</sup> JESIP has produced joint doctrine that provides a common way for emergency services to work together.<sup>34</sup> Its purpose is to provide emergency service commanders with a framework to help them to respond together more effectively. JESIP is nationally recognised with support from emergency service chief officers and the Home Office, Cabinet Office and the Department of Health and Social Care.

1C.2. JESIP doctrine focuses on the interoperability of the three emergency services, whilst also acknowledging that response to a disruptive challenge is a multi-agency activity and the resolution of an emergency will usually involve collaboration with other Category 1 and Category 2 responders and partner organisations. JESIP doctrine is not a prescriptive set of rules, rather it aims to guide, explain and inform. Specifically, it provides guidance:

- on how responders should train and operate, by applying common terminology, principles and ways of working for passing information between services;
- on responders' actions in a multi-agency working environment to achieve the interoperability necessary for a successful joint response; and
- for commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, on the actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents.

.....  
33 Joint in the context of JESIP refers to national emergency responders. Distinct from the military definition which refers to activities where elements of at least two (military) Services participate.

34 *Joint Doctrine: the interoperability framework*, Edition 2, July 2016.

## The principles for joint working

1C.3. The need for interoperability between emergency services extends to other agencies that may be expected to operate with them, including the UK Armed Forces. Any contribution by Defence responders should be seen in a supporting role to the civil responders, who will have primacy throughout. Defence responders must be aware of the JESIP and will be expected to adhere to the procedures wherever possible. JESIP comprises five principles.

- a. **Collocation.** Collocation of commanders is essential and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face-to-face, at a single and easily identifiable location, known as the forward command post. Defence personnel operating with civil authorities at all levels must be aware of both the use of the joint decision model and the civil authorities' approach to operational record keeping and decision logging.<sup>35</sup>
- b. **Communication.** During incidents with a multi-agency response, civil commanders will use emergency services' interoperability talk-groups, especially when collocation proves challenging. To enable shared understanding, Defence responders need to be incorporated into the network. The mnemonic METHANE will be used over communications networks; responders will be expected to use this format as required when dealing with the civil authorities. METHANE is:
  - o **M**ajor incident declared;
  - o **E**xact location;
  - o **T**ype of incident;
  - o **H**azards present or suspected;
  - o **A**ccess – routes that are safe to use;
  - o **N**umber of casualties; and
  - o **E**mergency services present and those required.

.....  
35 The Joint Decision Model log template is available at the [JESIP website](#).

- c. **Coordination.** One of the emergency services will generally take the lead role at an incident to ensure an effective response. Any Defence contribution will likely be in a supporting role. It is the duty of the commander of the military unit or Defence asset to identify themselves at the forward command post and establish effective coordination with the lead civil responder to ensure tasking is appropriate.
- d. **Joint understanding of risk.** Commanders of civil emergency services will ensure the safety of responders by conducting a joint assessment of risk. This will include any Defence assets that are under the control of the civilian agencies. However, this does not absolve military commanders from their own assessment of the risks and, where necessary, military commanders must decide for themselves if the risks their personnel are exposed to are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable. In the event of disagreement between the responsible military commander and the civilian commander on a risk-related matter, the military commander must inform the military chain of command at the first opportunity.
- e. **Shared situational awareness.** Critical to success is a common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of a disruptive challenge, together with an appreciation of available resources and capabilities of all response agencies. To achieve this the emergency services employ the IIMARCH briefing format, which stands for:<sup>36</sup>
- o **I**nformation;
  - o **I**ntent;
  - o **M**ethod;
  - o **A**dministration;
  - o **R**isk assessment;
  - o **C**ommunications; and
  - o **H**umanitarian issues.

.....  
36 The IIMARCH briefing template is available on the [JESIP website](#) under 'templates'.

1C.4. **Joint decision model.** The joint decision model is designed to bring together all available information and reconcile potentially differing priorities to make effective decisions together. The joint decision model is illustrated in Figure 1C.1.



Figure 1C.1 – The joint decision model

1C.5. **Joint organisational learning.** Joint organisational learning provides emergency services and other responder agencies with a consistent and accountable mechanism to ensure lessons identified are acted upon and that they become lessons learned. Military units/personnel with an assigned MACA responsibility should participate in joint learning opportunities to enhance their awareness of the JESIP. Local emergency services liaison groups across the UK provide the ideal forum to exchange ideas and develop mutual understanding before they are likely to meet one another in a disruptive challenge situation. Regional resilience liaison officers from all three Services act as the interface with the civil authorities within boundaries to ensure that this occurs.



# Chapter 2

Chapter 2 outlines the Ministry of Defence's policy for providing military aid to the civil authorities (MACA). It considers the legal basis for employing Defence resources on MACA tasks, and the charging policy applied to other government departments and civil authorities making a MACA request.

Section 1 – Direction . . . . .	35
Section 2 – Military aid to the civil authorities policy . .	36
Section 3 – Legal . . . . .	39
Section 4 – Charging policy . . . . .	46
Annex 2A – Charging for military aid to the civil authorities activity . . . . .	51

“

Bolstering **UK resilience** is a key priority for the Prime Minister and this Government, to **protect** the **people** of the UK and our **democracy**. Resilience, at all levels of society, is **more important** than ever.

”

Paymaster General Speech on National Resilience Strategy, delivered on 13 July 2021

## Chapter 2

# Policy: ends

## Section 1 – Direction

2.1. The UK government's policy for using Defence to support activities in the UK is derived from the *Integrated Review* and the *Defence Command Paper*. The *Integrated Review* describes a strategic framework that include four elements:

- sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology;
- shaping the open international order of the future;
- strengthening security and defence at home and overseas; and
- building resilience at home and overseas.

2.2. Defence supports the civil authorities in ensuring resilience in the UK through either augmentation and/or providing specific capabilities. Enduring contributions are generally limited to only those where:

- it is unreasonable or unrealistic to expect the civil authorities to develop their own capabilities; or
- delivering the capability offers significant and demonstrable benefit for Defence.

The above points are not applicable to military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) tasks relating to industrial action or the undertaking of activity in support of service level agreements. Defence activities are anchored in a 'whole-of-government' or fused approach in support of wider national objectives.

2.3. There is a distinction between defending the UK from external military threats and responding to the internal and domestic risks identified in the National Risk Register. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) will act as lead government department (LGD) for defending the UK from any external military threat, with other government departments acting in a supporting role. Conversely, Defence will routinely act in a supporting role to other departments in responding to internal and domestic resilience and security challenges.

## Section 2 – Military aid to the civil authorities policy

2.4. **Policy.** MACA policy supports the government's intent to provide an effective response to all types of emergencies and major crises at national, devolved, sub-national and local levels. This means having a pre-planned, integrated and coordinated response from the emergency services, civil authorities and, where appropriate, the MOD. If there is a disruptive challenge or similar crisis in the UK, local emergency services provide the first response; should circumstances necessitate it, government departments or civil authorities may then seek to request military assistance as part of their coordinated multi-agency response to augment local responders. The contribution of Defence reinforces national resilience by providing Defence capacity, capability and resources to assist in the planning, response and recovery of a wide range of disruptive events.

2.5. **Policy criteria.** The provision of Defence assistance is governed by four principles. MACA may be authorised when:

- there is a definite need to act and the tasks our Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;
- other options, including mutual aid, commercial alternatives and the voluntary sector,<sup>37</sup> have been discounted;<sup>38</sup> and either
- the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
- the civil authority has all or some capability or capacity, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.

In exceptional circumstances Defence ministers can choose to temporarily waive these criteria. This may happen when there are major events of national and international importance, or an event that is catastrophic, or potentially so, in nature. Equally, in some cases intervention may be required earlier than the

.....  
37 The degree to which the voluntary sector can assist, and that this help can be guaranteed will be considered by Defence within the MACA request.


38 Usually verified by the joint or single-Service regional liaison officer for requests received from the civil authorities at the sub-national level, usually in consultation with the government liaison officer and strategic coordinating group chair.

criteria indicate to reduce the risk of events deteriorating and/or to reduce the scale of any subsequent Defence support.

**2.6. Ministerial authorisation.** Ministerial authority must be sought for any request for Defence resources under MACA.<sup>39</sup> Departments should note the following.

- a. Departments requesting Defence assistance will require their own minister's endorsement. In addition, the requesting department or devolved government must accept the financial costs as calculated by MOD and, if required, indemnify the MOD.
- b. If a request for Defence assistance is made through a Cabinet Office Briefing Room (Ministerial) (COBR (M)) meeting in response to a disruptive challenge, there is no requirement for a separate ministerial request by the government department needing Defence support, providing a Defence minister is present to accept the request. Where necessary, agreement from the LGD to meet costs and indemnify MOD is still required. Moreover, a written request will still be required from the LGD so that all parties are clear on the nature of the assistance effect that has been requested.

2



There must be a definite need and clear tasks for our Armed Forces to perform

<sup>39</sup> Except for circumstances of an urgent nature where there is an imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property, and requests to use Defence estate that are not contentious, or under other circumstances where authority has been delegated.



### Operation Shaku: the Defence contribution to flood relief efforts across the north of England following Storms Desmond and Eva, December 2015 to January 2016

Following the widespread disruption and damage caused by Storms Desmond and Eva, Defence was asked to assist with recovery efforts to survey and clear roads in Cumbria. Whilst there were commercial options available to Cumbria County Council for this type of activity, the number of roads that needed assessment, and in some cases the remote nature of the area, was beyond the capacity and capability of the commercial sector in the region at that time. Under pressure to return the area affected to normal business as quickly as possible, Cumbria Strategic Coordinating Group requested Defence assistance to support the recovery effort once the initial storm had eased. Under MACA, military engineers were deployed to survey routes, assess the level of damage to the road network and in some areas to clear debris and reopen key routes through Cumbria.

2

2.7. **Central government intent.** Defence can expect to become involved in both planning and preparation at a preparatory stage, and in recovery phase tasks, in addition to responding to disruptive challenges when they occur. This level of engagement between Defence and the civil authorities reflects central government's intent to use the full range of tools at its disposal to deal with crises and return to 'business as usual' as quickly as possible. Under this wider range of tasks, the MOD may be called upon to assist civil authorities with:

- planning – collaborative planning using military campaign tools to build capability and capacity;
- training – awareness of the MACA process, contingency planning and crisis management; and
- enhancement – broadening the contribution of Defence in contingency planning for low-to-medium likelihood/high impact events.

2.8. **Defence position on providing military aid to the civil authorities.** The Defence contribution to resilience is normally provided by the UK Armed Forces through spare capacity, so it is subject to the availability of resources. However, increasingly the provision of MACA activity comes at the expense of

a Defence output. Where a request for Defence support is likely to conflict with the Department's ability to deliver its core outputs, advice on prioritisation will be given to ministers by Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) in consultation with Director General Security Policy. The MOD does not usually generate forces or hold equipment specifically for resilience tasks.<sup>40</sup> This is because:

- the requirement is unpredictable in scale, duration and capability;
- Defence is often able to meet requirements from spare capacity; and
- it would involve using Defence's budget to pay for other government departments' responsibilities.

2

## Section 3 – Legal

### Principles

2.9. It is a principle of the UK's democratic system of government that the UK Armed Forces remain under the control of central government and that Defence ministers are accountable publicly for the actions of our Armed Forces.

2.10. The command structure of the UK Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the Defence Council (chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence) exercising the Royal Prerogative to the individual units and Service personnel. Routinely, all Defence operations, including those conducted in the UK, require authorisation by Defence ministers through the Defence Council.

2.11. All MACA operations must be conducted within the law. Service personnel are subject to Service discipline (the Armed Forces Act 2006) and military command at all times. Failure to comply with the law may result in criminal charges against an individual and/or civil proceedings being brought against the MOD. Unlike the police, Service personnel only have the same powers of arrest as ordinary citizens; this may limit the breadth of their utility when supporting the police.

.....  
40 Exceptions might include providing air defence assets to counter a terrorist air threat and explosive ordnance disposal.

## Legal basis for military aid to the civil authorities deployments

2.12. There are three possible legal bases for a MACA deployment. These are:

- the Royal Prerogative for military tasks, where support is provided to complement civil authorities' capabilities;
- a Defence Council Order under the Emergency Powers Act 1964 for tasks that are undertaken ordinarily by the civil authorities but where support has been requested for civilian tasks to replace capabilities provided by the civil authorities;<sup>41</sup> or
- emergency regulations made under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

2.13. Service personnel can deploy under the Royal Prerogative for 'military' work. There is no legal definition or test for 'military' work, it is an assessment based on knowledge, experience and precedent. Indicators can include: where Service personnel have been trained for a specific role by the military; where Service personnel undertake that work as their 'day job'; and/or work which has been seen traditionally as military activity. This type of work is requested usually, but not exclusively, by law enforcement agencies, most commonly the police, the Border Force and Her Majesty's (HM) Revenue and Customs.

2.14. For non-military tasks, the mechanism of a Defence Council Order is used to authorise the deployment of Defence resources. A Defence Council Order is made using powers in Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964. The MOD's Security Policy and Operations (SPO) Directorate is responsible for producing and issuing the Defence Council Order. Key points for the Defence Council Order include:

- it requires ministerial authorisation and should be signed by two members of the Defence Council on the same day;
- the work must be judged to be both urgent and of national importance; and
- the Defence Council provides governance and determines whether the task is of an urgent and nationally important nature.

.....  
41 Standing Defence Council Order, dated 17 January 1983, reflected in *The Queen's Regulations for the Army*, J11.001-010, provides for a response to an immediate emergency where civil authority capability is not yet available.

2.15. There is one standing Defence Council Order, dated 17 January 1983, which supports activity in response to a disaster when there is an imminent<sup>42</sup> threat to life, a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property. In these circumstances, local commanders<sup>43</sup> may provide immediate assistance without recourse to higher authority. Commanders must note that activity undertaken under this Defence Council Order is restricted to responding to the disaster. The 1983 Defence Council Order approves the employment of military personnel on tasks:

‘as being urgent work of national importance, such work as is considered by the local commander, at the time when the work needs to be performed, to be urgently necessary for the purposes of the alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in time of disaster and do hereby authorise the temporary employment in such work of officers and men of Her Majesty’s Naval, Military or Air Forces, and specific tasks to be performed by officers and men of these forces assigned to that employment being such as may be specified by or under orders of the officers commanding the forces.’



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However, as soon as is practicable after initiating a response, the local commander must inform the chain of command, with the chain of command ensuring that the Headquarters Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) (HQ SJC(UK)) and the SPO Directorate is informed.

2.16. Devolved administrations must not request MACA directly from the MOD. Instead, requests must be channelled through the relevant UK territorial department (Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales Offices) to submit on their behalf. MACA requests from the Crown Dependencies must be submitted by them to the Ministry of Justice in the first instance.

2.17. Routine liaison between Defence and the civil authorities at all levels, or providing military advice, does not require ministerial authority.<sup>44</sup> Approval is provided on a standing basis by the MOD’s Head Operations (Military or Policy)

.....  
42 In this context, ‘imminent’ means that there is no time either to consult the chain of command or conduct detailed operational planning.

43 The term ‘local commander’ is not defined in terms of rank. If the most senior person ‘on the ground’ is a private soldier (or equivalent) then they are the local commander.

44 Usually advice will be provided by a military assessment team, the generation of which would be approved by the SPO Directorate.

or at the sub-national level by the British Army's regional point of command (RPoC) commanders and single-Service equivalents.<sup>45</sup>

2.18. Using military personnel armed with weapons for MACA operations will always be an exception. The Chief of the Defence Staff's (CDS's) Directive, or the SPO Directorate's activation order, will state explicitly whether the use of personal weapons or specialist equipment is authorised and, if so, whether guidance cards and specific rules of engagement are to be applied.

## Indemnity and insurance requirement

2.19. The SPO Directorate will prepare ministerial submissions for all MACA requests. This will include any requirement for legal indemnity,<sup>46</sup> insurance and the position regarding providing military resources against commercial alternatives and the implications of state aid. The MOD may wish to be indemnified against potential claims arising from the assistance requested; in this case, MOD legal advisers will provide advice. Joint military commanders (JMCs) are to use RPoC or headquarter civil secretariats to manage charging and provide advice on relevant policy awareness.

## Health, safety and environmental protection

2.20. The MOD is required to comply with the Secretary of State for Defence's Health, Safety and Environmental Protection policy. When Crown exemptions apply, the MOD is under remit to produce internal policy guidance that, so far as is reasonably practicable, produces outcomes that correspond as closely as possible to legislative obligations.<sup>47</sup> The Defence Safety Authority is responsible for regulating Defence health, safety and environmental protection.<sup>48</sup> Commanders should seek advice through the relevant Defence Safety Authority branch where there are concerns regarding health, safety or environmental protection issues. The Defence Safety Authority also provides advice on duty holder responsibilities, risk assessment and risk management.

.....  
45 Sub-national liaison, undertaken primarily by regional liaison officers, does not require authorisation.

46 For 'notice' operations the MOD's SPO Directorate will agree indemnity principles with the requesting government department. Usually such principles will be set out in any memorandum of understanding between the MOD and the requesting department.

47 MOD, *Health, Safety and Environmental Protection in Defence: Policy Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence*, 2 April 2020.

48 Defence Safety Authority, *DSA01.1, Defence Policy for Health, Safety and Environmental Protection*, August 2016.



The Defence Safety Authority also provides advice on duty holder responsibilities, risk assessment and risk management

## Personnel

2.21. The employment of minors (under the age of 18) and cadets on MACA tasks is strictly governed. The following guidance applies.

- a. **Regular and Reserve Forces.** Regulars and Reservists who have not completed Phase 1 military training are not to deploy on MACA operations.
- b. **Ministry of Defence-sponsored cadet forces.** The MOD's Chief of Defence People has issued a separate but complementary directive regarding the employment of cadet force adult volunteers and cadets, and the use of cadet facilities, on MACA operations.<sup>49</sup> This direction is summarised below.
  - (1) Cadet force adult volunteers may volunteer their services if correctly trained and equipped for the task. In such an instance authority for any activity must be given by the appropriate Delivery Duty Holder before the activity takes place.

<sup>49</sup> Joint Service Publication (JSP) 814, *Policy and Regulations for MOD Sponsored Cadet Forces*, May 2019.

- (2) Infrastructure owned by the MOD can be provided as MACA. Bids for this infrastructure must be coordinated through the joint regional liaison officer and direct approaches to the site owner by the emergency service or local authority should be avoided. For non-MOD sites, it is for the owner of the site to grant permission.
- c. **University cadets.** University cadets<sup>50</sup> may only be employed on MACA tasks where there is an imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property if they are on duty at the time of the request.
- d. **Exchange personnel.** Where personnel from other nations serve in units assigned to operations in the UK, guidance should be sought from the MOD's SPO Directorate, through the chain of command, before such individuals are committed to operations.
- e. **National Health Service first responder co-responders.** Some National Health Service (NHS) ambulance services use personnel from Defence and other emergency services as co-responders to provide first response to medical emergencies in the local community. A small number of Service personnel volunteer as co-responders, with appropriate chain of command permission, to undertake the role during their off-duty time. These personnel could be the subject of a MACA request from NHS/ambulance trusts to enable them to be used on a full-time basis. A command and control element will be required to manage all such co-responder requests.

2.22. The Reserve Forces Act 1996 enables Reservists to support the Regular Forces on MACA tasks. Reservists are not used as part of the initial front line deployment during standing counterterrorist operations in support of the police, although they may be used in a follow-on capacity. However, such policy limitations do not apply to unit Full Time Reserve Service, and non-regular permanent staff personnel. In most instances, guidance should be sought from the UK operations team within the SPO Directorate whenever there is an intention to employ Reservists on MACA tasks.

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50 University cadets refers to fully trained members of University Royal Navy Units, Officer Training Corps and University Air Squadrons.

2.23. Reservists attending for duty, including weekend training, can lawfully be diverted to provide support to emerging or ongoing MACA operations. The supporting period must not extend beyond their expected training/duty period unless the individual consents and this will require authorisation in line with broader MACA policy. An example of such support is a head of establishment authorising the employment of Reservists who volunteer (not a formal callout) for MACA tasks in circumstances such as responding to an adverse weather event. During the force generation of Reserve Forces several factors should be considered.

- a. The generation of formed units of Reserves is much slower and more challenging than mobilising individual augmentees.
- b. Before the cost of a Reserve capability can be passed on to the requesting department, certain force generation criteria have to be met; principally Defence must demonstrate that the use of Reserves will protect key elements of the Regular Force committed to non-discretionary departmental activity. It may also be that Defence has exhausted a Regular capability, and that Reserves offer the only viable way to fulfil this MACA demand.
- c. Most Reserves Forces cannot be held at readiness for UK operations.
- d. Reserve Forces may contain experience, skills and local knowledge that are not present in the Regular Forces.

2.24. **Deploying Ministry of Defence civilians.** The MOD may seek to deploy MOD civilians in response to a MACA request. The scope of this deployment can vary, from virtual support to another government department through to physical collocation with another department, agency or within the commercial sector. MOD civilians deployed in this manner will be exclusively volunteers and are unlikely to be held at a formal graduated readiness. MOD civilians provide several capabilities that may be required by civil authorities, including: financial, commercial and policy knowledge; scientific knowledge in defence-related fields, such as counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and CBRN and explosives (CBRNe); technological solutions to emerging threats; communications; and space and cyber.

## Section 4 – Charging policy

2.25. **Context.** HM Treasury rules direct that government departments must charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks and that departments must not profit from activity carried out on behalf of another department.<sup>51</sup> With a few exceptions, MACA activity is not funded within the MOD budget and is conducted on a repayment basis.

2.26. **Financial principles.** Four financial principles govern Defence assistance. These are:

- Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes;
- Defence assistance should, where necessary, be safeguarded against risks through appropriate indemnity, financial and insurance arrangements;
- Defence personnel must not be used as a cheaper alternative to, or in competition with, commercial firms; and
- the basis of any financial charge may vary according to the urgency and/or nature of the assistance to which it relates.

2.27. **Charging levels and mechanisms.** There are three charging levels. These are:

- full costs;
- marginal costs; and
- zero costs.<sup>52</sup>

Guidance on the MOD's charging principles are shown in Table 2.1. Additional operational-specific guidance will be given by Defence Resources.

.....  
51 Detail contained in '[Managing Public Money](#)' updated May 2021.

52 More details can be found in Annex 2A.

Description	Activity/detail	Cost recovery principle
Military liaison officer/military liaison team assessment	Advice from the military liaison officer/military liaison team to civil authorities on the military capabilities and resources available to support an emergency response.	Zero cost
Military assessment team <sup>53</sup>	Advice from a small military assessment team to civil authorities on the military capabilities and resources available that might complement a civil authority's response to a disruptive challenge	Zero cost
Imminent threat to life, where there is a need to alleviate distress or a need to protect significant property	Immediate military intervention to prevent the loss of life and/or alleviate distress or a need to protect significant property.	Zero cost
Military planner support	Distinct from the provision of liaison, Defence may provide, on request, planners to assist civil authorities at all levels with the formulation, execution and testing of their plans.	Marginal cost
Defence response	<p>The deployed Defence resource, carrying out agreed activities at the request of the civilian authorities in response to an emerging or ongoing disruptive challenge.</p> <p>Marginal cost is predicated on the request for support being made by a strategic coordinating group (or equivalent) in response to a disruptive challenge. At the point at which civil authorities transition from 'response' to 'recovery' the charging mechanism will revert usually to full cost recovery.</p>	<p>Marginal cost</p> <p>Full cost</p>

53 Military assessment teams usually have no standard structure or are not held at readiness. The sole exception to this is the Infrastructure Response Force held at readiness by 170 Engineer Group in Chilwell.

Description	Activity/detail	Cost recovery principle
Planned support	Events not linked to a disruptive challenge, or where Defence is requested to support longer-term activities, will attract full cost recovery. Non-emergency, planned routine support will continue to be charged in full, unless MOD judges that there is a Defence benefit which offsets the cost.	Full cost
Training and exercising	Participation in relevant training or exercising at local resilience forum level, or above, may be provided at up-to marginal cost, proportionate to the activities/resources used. This is often at zero cost (military liaison officer participation, for example) but deployed troops on a field exercise may bring marginal cost.	Zero – marginal cost
Exceptional circumstances	The UK government meets the full cost of a response in exceptional circumstances; this is at ministerial direction.	Discretionary

**Table 2.1 – Military aid to the civil authorities charging mechanism**

2.28. **Financial responsibility.** Personnel dealing with requests for Defence assistance should be aware of:

- the financial principles likely to be applied;
- where applicable, the requirement in principle for indemnity and insurance cover; and
- the financial implications of conducting the activity.

Civil secretariats should be used to provide authoritative costings. Estimated costs should be provided to the requesting department at the first practical opportunity.

2.29. **Charging policy changes.** The charging policy may change during a MACA operation. Marginal costs are likely to be applied in the early, dynamic stages of a response to a disruptive challenge, increasing to full costs levied during the recovery phase due to protracted Defence involvement and the

resulting impact on MOD primary output. When it is in the national interest, Defence ministers may agree to reduce or waive costs.<sup>54</sup>

### Operation Prismed: October 2014 to January 2015



In late 2014, several trade unions with extensive representation in the health service secured a mandate for industrial action. To maintain normal services, health authorities across England put in place plans to mitigate the impact of the industrial action, including a request for Defence assistance.

Different circumstances across the country meant that the scale and type of support required of Defence varied between trusts with, at one extreme, a large requirement from the London Ambulance Service and, at the other, some ambulance trusts requiring no support at all. A consolidated request for Defence assistance was submitted by the Department of Health, and subsequently authorised by the MOD. HQ SJC(UK) developed a nationwide plan, which saw Defence successfully conduct Operation Prismed between October 2014 and January 2015, when the industrial action was cancelled. As this was a planned operation, the Defence contribution was charged at full cost.

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<sup>54</sup> Such a deviation from extant policy occurred in 2020–21 during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic when Defence ministers directed that marginal cost recovery would apply to all areas of the response, with the exception of those that ordinarily would be delivered at zero cost or where commercial alternatives were available.

## Key points

- Defence provides support to the civil authorities for resilience in the UK.
- With a few exceptions, Defence ministerial authority must be sought for any request for Defence resources under MACA.
- Under the UK government's Integrated Emergency Management principles, the UK Armed Forces can expect to be involved across the full range of planning, preparation, and response to disruptive challenges, as well as further recovery tasks.
- The Defence contribution to resilience is usually provided by Defence through spare capacity.
- There are three possible legal bases for a MACA deployment: the Royal Prerogative; a Defence Council Order under the Emergency Powers Act 1964; or emergency regulations made under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.
- During an incident where there is imminent threat to life, a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property, local military commanders are authorised to provide immediate assistance without recourse to higher authority.
- Providing Defence assistance is governed by four principles, authorised when:
  - there is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;
  - other options, including mutual aid, commercial alternatives, or the voluntary sector have been discounted; and either
  - the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
  - the civil authority has all or some of the capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.
- With a few exceptions, MACA activity is not funded from the MOD budget and is therefore conducted on a repayment basis.

## Annex 2A

# Charging for military aid to the civil authorities activity

2A

2A.1. The MOD's charging mechanisms are described in more detail in this annex. They are shown in descending order of scale, but application is in accordance with Table 2.1. For further detail see Joint Service Publication (JSP) 462, *Financial Management and Charging Policy*, Part 1 and Part 2.

2A.2. **Full costs.** Full costs cover both direct and indirect expenditure incurred in providing the assistance, including basic pay, allowances of the personnel involved and marginal costs expenditure (see below). Under HM Treasury rules it is normal for government departments to recover full costs as default. Full costs are likely to be recovered in the following circumstances.

- When there are extended or repeated calls for the same MOD support; regular use of the same MOD resources is likely to attract full costs, even if they are being used by different civil authorities.
- Where the civil authorities can make alternative arrangements (for example, mutual aid) but have not done so.
- Where the civil authority charges for the service they are providing (through Defence) or have an additional budget allocation for the overall task.
- Where support is non-emergency, planned or routine support, unless it is judged there is a Defence benefit to Defence which offsets the cost.

2A.3. **Marginal costs.** Marginal costs are costs for military activity that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. This includes: travel; subsistence; fuel; the cancellation of contracts as a result of Defence conducting MACA tasks; mobilisation bounty for Reserve Forces; and any similar expenditure. In addition, there may be an 'opportunity cost', which is the cost of a resource in terms of its alternative use. For example, the costs of deferring/cancelling planned Defence activity or recalling personnel from leave or stand down to hold them at increased readiness. Defence Resources may

recommend applying a flat rate to cover such costs. Marginal costs may be applied when:

- a task is undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities and has a direct benefit to the MOD;
- a task can be combined with an action that the MOD would undertake on its own behalf (for example, when a MACA task provides Defence-related training for our Armed Forces); and
- responding to an emergency, the strategic coordinating group has been established.<sup>55</sup>

2A.4. **Recovery at zero marginal cost.** Costs may be waived when:

- there is an imminent threat to life;
- there is a need to alleviate distress;
- there is a need to protect significant property;
- Defence deploys a military liaison capability and/or a military assessment team; or
- there are other exceptional circumstances.

In all other circumstances, the decision to waive costs is taken by ministers.

## Defence Infrastructure Organisation charging

2A.5. The indicative cost for using land/buildings is determined by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation or the commercial contractor managing the estate. The MOD has no authority to abate charges on behalf of commercial partners, for example, Landmarc, who manage the Defence Training Estate; however, commercial partners may be willing to do so.

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.....  
55 Or local resilience partnership in Scotland or emergency preparedness group in Northern Ireland.

## Reserve Forces and Cadets Association

2A.6. As a general principle, where goods or services are provided by the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association to an outside body, the full cost of its provision must be charged. The rules for abating charges are covered in detail in JSP 368, including guidance on charges as they should be applied to other government departments. Chief executives are given some discretion in abating charges on receipt of a business case.

### Guidance

2A.7. **Contingency.** During the planning phase, and dependent on the likely MACA task, Defence Resources will recommend charging a contingency amount to cover unforeseen costs. This provides the requesting authority with a realistic figure to help with planning and evaluating value for money.

2A.8. **Recovery.** The Director General Finance is responsible for coordinating the recovery of costs when multiple MOD top level budgets (TLBs) are involved in MACA activity. Command/Civil Service secretaries will be issued with a financial instruction detailing the procedures to be followed. In all other cases, individual TLBs are responsible for ensuring processes are in place to recover costs. In all cases, TLB finance staff are to be consulted.

2A.9. **Records.** All expenditure/receipts (estimated or otherwise) should be reported by single-Service Command/TLB finance staff, through the budgetary chain of command to a civil secretary/budget manager. Units must keep detailed expenditure records with invoices for audit purposes.

2A.10. **Cost estimate.** It is often difficult to accurately predict the cost of Defence support. A civil authority that bases its request for MACA on the assumption that Defence support is cheaper than commercial sources could be mistaken. As a rule the MOD does not guarantee to provide a cost estimate (as opposed to guidance on the charging regime) when it considers providing the support.

2A.11. **Value added tax.** In most circumstances, the MOD will not charge value added tax (VAT) to other government departments. However, if there is a commercial alternative to MOD services/goods, then VAT must be charged so that the UK government is not undercutting the commercial market. Each scenario is reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

2A

2A.12. **State aid.** State aid is described as any advantage granted by public authorities through the application of state resources on a selective basis to any organisation that could potentially distort competition and trade. The description of state aid is very broad because ‘an advantage’ can take many forms: it is anything that an undertaking (an organisation engaged in economic activity) could not get on the open market. Using taxpayer-funded resources to help one or more organisations in a way that gives an advantage over others may be considered as state aid. State aid rules can (among other things) apply to the use or sale of a state asset for free or at less than market price. The rules can apply to funding given to charities, public authorities and other non-profit making bodies where they are involved in commercial activities.

2A

## Notes

2A



# Chapter 3

Chapter 3 details the end-to-end process for the employment, command and control, and recovery of Defence capabilities assigned to providing support to the civil authorities. It outlines the resilience roles, the military aid request mechanism, and planning considerations.

Section 1 – Roles . . . . .	59
Section 2 – Tasks . . . . .	64
Section 3 – Requesting Defence support . . . . .	65
Section 4 – Planning considerations . . . . .	70
Section 5 – Integrity of UK waters and airspace . . . . .	79
Section 6 – Military operations in support of strategic and overseas tasks . . . . .	81
Section 7 – Related activity . . . . .	82
Annex 3A – Liaison . . . . .	84
Annex 3B – Military aid to the civil authorities request form guidance . . . . .	89
Annex 3C – Military aid to the civil authorities request process . . . . .	93
Annex 3D – Military support to the mounting of operations . . . . .	94

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What the **military** do so well  
is **planning** for huge surges,  
because that's in the **nature** of their  
**challenges.**

”

Richard Jones, Consultant Cardiologist,  
Queen Alexandra Hospital Portsmouth,  
*British Medical Journal*

## Chapter 3

# Process: ways

## Section 1 – Roles

3.1. In response to requests for assistance, Defence may contribute in six main roles, or functions. These are:

- command and control;
- liaison;
- planning;
- specialist advice and capability;
- general and non-specialist support; and
- education and training.

### Role 1: Command and control

3

3.2. **Strategic.** The Ministry of Defence (MOD) acts as both a military strategic headquarters and a Department of State. Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations) and the Director General Security Policy provide strategic guidance to ministers and other government departments through the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). Security Policy and Operations (SPO) Directorate will take the lead for all UK operations activity.

3.3. **Full command.** Full command will usually be retained and exercised by the single-Service chiefs. A description of normal military operational and tactical levels of command is below.

- a. **Operational command.** At the military operational level, the British Army's Commander Home Command is appointed as the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)). The SJC(UK) coordinates all military aid to the civil authorities (MACA) activity and is responsible for operations on the UK land mass.<sup>56</sup> When undertaking a MACA operation, the SJC(UK) is known usually as the 'joint commander'

<sup>56</sup> Commander Operations, within the Maritime Operations Centre, retains command for operations in UK territorial waters. Air Officer Commanding 11 Group, in their capacity as UK air defence commander, is generally responsible for air operations within UK airspace.

and is responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) for planning, executing and conducting Defence's contribution to resilience operations and other nominated operations, in their respective area, during peacetime. To initiate this, the CDS will issue a formal directive to the SJC(UK), which specifies tasks and an area of operations. All MACA requests are coordinated by the Headquarters Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) (HQ SJC(UK)) so that one operational headquarters retains oversight of the overall situation. It is likely that operations in the maritime or air domains will be passed to respective single-Service headquarters to be executed. HQ SJC(UK) can conduct joint actions and maintains close links with the three single-Service commands, Strategic Command and the Defence agencies for force generation.

b. **Tactical command on land.** At the military tactical level, command and control of Defence forces on the land will usually be delivered through the British Army's regional point of command (RPoC) structure. The RPoCs comprise the Headquarters of London District, a 2\* headquarters in the capital, together with nine further British Army brigades and headquarters<sup>57</sup> across the remainder of the UK. RPoC headquarters maintain strong links with the civil authorities within boundaries to understand the likely disruptive challenges that may occur. When tasked by the SJC(UK), their commanders step up to assume the role of joint military commanders (JMCs) who will exercise command over Defence assets within boundaries.

c. **Tactical command at sea.** Tactical command and control of maritime assets dealing with incursions and movement in home waters is coordinated through the Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre (JMOCC), within the National Maritime Information Centre. This is a comprehensive multi-agency maritime response centre coordinating the activities of Border Force maritime command, Royal Navy offshore patrol vessels, Marine Management Organisation, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and the police on a national basis.

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<sup>57</sup> London District is commanded by a major general, referred to as a 2\*. The further nine RPoCs comprise seven brigade headquarters, each commanded by a brigadier, and two regional headquarters in England, each commanded by a colonel.

3.4. **Coordinating authority.** The HQ SJC(UK) will execute the role of coordinating authority over the activities of Defence agencies.<sup>58</sup> Specifically, it oversees the deployment, management and recovery of any assets generated from Defence agencies. Figure 3.1 shows the command and control model.




Figure 3.1 – Generic command and control model for resilience/security operations

<sup>58</sup> These comprise: Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), Defence Nuclear Organisation, Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) and Defence Training Estate.

## Role 2 – Liaison

3.5. Defence support to the civil authorities is dependent upon timely and effective liaison with other government departments, civil authorities and, occasionally, commercial concerns. Defence's resilience capability is built around a network of full-time liaison officers which comprise:

- a network of strategic liaison officers embedded with other government departments;<sup>59</sup>
- joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs);
- Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs);
- Royal Air Force regional liaison officers (RAFRLOs); and
- military liaison officers (MLO) and teams.<sup>60</sup>

## Role 3 – Planning

3.6. In response to specific events, if requested to do so under MACA arrangements, Defence may deploy specialist planners into government at all levels. Such an undertaking is not designed to take over all planning responsibilities from the civil authority – civil primacy remains – rather, it would be to provide complementary and specialist planning support for a specific set of circumstances and, usually, for a time-bound period.<sup>61</sup>

## Role 4 – Specialist advice and capability

3.7. Defence can deploy specialist capabilities and provide advice to support the civil authorities. Defence specialist support is focused on eight areas:

- explosive ordnance disposal;
- specialist scientific support, primarily from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl);

.....  
59 During the COVID-19 response liaison officers were embedded with, amongst others, the Cabinet Office, the Department for Health and Social Care, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, the Welsh and Scottish governments and the Northern Ireland Executive. These ensured situational awareness and enabled Defence's support to partners across government.

60 Details of these are in Annex 3A.

61 Operation Rescript, Defence support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020-21, saw the deployment of a large number of planning staff into other government departments, devolved administrations and local government across the UK.

- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
- communications;
- cyber and electromagnetic activities;<sup>62</sup>
- logistic;
- engineering; and
- medical capabilities.

## Role 5 – General and non-specialist support

3.8. Defence may deploy general support to the civil authorities. Consulting with Strategic Command and the single-Services, the SPO Directorate is likely to use the most appropriate and available Regular unit or Service personnel. While personnel may not need specific pre-deployment training, all personnel required to support a Defence operation in the UK will undergo a period of reception, staging, onward movement and integration to include task-oriented training or familiarisation, which may be designed and delivered by the civil authorities as required.

- a. **Counterterrorism operations.** Although counterterrorism operations are police-led, there may be circumstances where Defence assets are required to deploy in support of them.
- b. **UK standby battalions.** The British Army fields three UK standby battalions (UKSBs); they provide the British Army's generalist force of choice for operations in support of civil authorities. These are described further in Chapter 4.

## Role 6 – Education and training

3.9. The MOD directs and delivers a wide range of resilience collective and individual training for both Defence and non-Defence audiences. This is described in more detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>62</sup> The functional owner for cyber defence is the MOD Chief Information Office.



The military can work with other organisations to assist with emergency responses

## Section 2 – Tasks

3.10. Defence support to the civil authorities falls into four broad categories:

- fixed tasks;
- enduring tasks;
- response phase tasks; and
- recovery phase tasks.

3.11. **Fixed tasks.** Fixed tasks are the irreducible minimum tasks that Defence is liable to deliver on a continual basis irrespective of other demands, including in the event of warfighting at scale. Fixed tasks are non-discretionary and delivered by assigned forces.

3.12. **Enduring tasks.** Enduring tasks comprise a wide range of tasks, usually undertaken on an open-ended basis, and may be underpinned by written agreements with requesting government departments. Examples include the Royal Navy's contribution to fishery protection and the tri-Service support to explosive ordnance disposal.

3.13. **Response phase tasks.** One of the UK government's standing strategic priorities during a disruptive challenge is to 'protect life and, as far as possible, property, and alleviate suffering'. Defence support during the response phase of a civil-led operation contributes to delivering this desired outcome. The process to be followed for delivering Defence support will depend upon the specific circumstances at the time.

- a. **Immediate assistance.** In response to an incident, where the need for assistance is urgent and where time does not allow for approval from higher authority, a local commander may assist without consulting the chain of command.
- b. **Routine response.** In all other circumstances, where there is time to consult the chain of command, Defence assistance will be sought using the request process and documentation described in Section 3. Requests from the local level will usually, although not exclusively, be made by the chair of a strategic coordinating group (SCG) or equivalent and submitted in writing to the relevant lead government department (LGD) for further consideration.

3.14. **Recovery phase tasks.** Recovery phase tasks, by definition, will seldom be urgent in nature. Requests for assistance must be submitted in writing by the civil authority. Central government may, however, choose to commit Defence to recovery phase tasks on a 'top down' basis rather than in response to a 'bottom up' request.

## Section 3 – Requesting Defence support

3.15. Requests for support from Defence will follow two broad channels: 'top down', where the request will be driven from central government or 'bottom up', where the request will be made by civil authorities at the sub-national, devolved or local level. Support may be requested during the preparatory, response and/or recovery phases. Requests will always be required in writing and will need authorisation through a process that is described below and illustrated in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2 – Military aid to the civil authorities process

## Principles

3.16. **Top down requests.** Top down requests are generated above the local level by the LGD or by the COBR. Before proceeding with the request, MOD staff will confirm the details of which department will fund the cost of Defence support and where any liability might lie. SPO Directorate staff will determine the capability required and balance this against current Defence priorities and operations in submissions to ministers.

3.17. **Bottom up requests.** Requests for support are submitted in writing by the civil authority, usually signed off by a police officer of at least chief superintendent rank, the chair of a SCG,<sup>63</sup> or an individual of equivalent status from an organisation categorised as a responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. On those rare occasions that a commercial concern requires Defence assistance, the request must be channelled through the appropriate LGD.

3.18. **Devolved administrations.** The LGD principle applies and Defence will expect requests relating to support in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to be channelled via the Northern Ireland Office, the Scotland Office or the Wales Office as appropriate, and not direct from the devolved government. Further detail on the process as it applies in the devolved administrations is contained in Annex 1A.

3.19. **Overseas Territories.** MACA does not apply to British Overseas Territories. Notwithstanding this, a mechanism for Defence to support these areas exists. As required, the respective governor, embassy or high commission of these Overseas Territories can submit an overseas assistance request for Defence assistance. These requests are then endorsed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) before being submitted to the MOD.

3.20. **Request format.** Requests must be submitted in writing using a standard template providing as much information as is available at the time (explained further in Annex 3B). The key information required includes:

- the desired effect;
- time expected on task;
- acceptance of financial responsibility; and
- acceptance of liability.

HQ SJC(UK) should be provided with a copy of the request to be submitted to the LGD by the regional liaison officer as soon as possible. Requesters are encouraged to submit requests early, and in draft, to allow HQ SJC(UK) to conduct early staffing and use the opportunity, if required, to refine the details of the prospective task.

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63 Or either the regional or local resilience partnership in Scotland, or the emergency preparedness group in Northern Ireland.

3.21. **Consideration by the lead government department.** LGDs will consider whether to support the request. Factors that will influence their decision include:

- financial constraints;
- availability of mutual aid;
- availability of commercial and other sources of support; and
- reputation.

A request for Defence assistance must be approved at ministerial level within the requesting government department. Once the request is approved, it should be sent to the CDS's duty officer within the MOD.<sup>64</sup>

3.22. **Considerations by the Ministry of Defence.** The SPO Directorate will consider the request against the four MACA criteria and the legal tests detailed in Chapter 2. SPO will provide policy-based military advice to ministers to help them decide. Their decision will address:

- policy – whether the request is compliant with Defence policy;
- political picture – if there is a political imperative or direction to undertake a task;
- precedent – if Defence has previously undertaken a similar task then that may increase the likelihood of further requests being approved;
- legal – that the legal powers exist for the Service personnel to deploy on the task, and that undertaking the requested activity would comply with the law; and
- capacity/capability – whether Defence can conduct the task.

3.23. **Activation.** The MOD will follow the process detailed in Annex 3C. A hierarchy of documentation related to the operation may include the following.

- a. **Defence Council Order.** If the task is for non-Defence activity authorised under the Emergency Powers Act 1964 (Section 2), a Defence Council Order is required to order Service personnel to deploy. It will authorise Defence to undertake defined tasks within a specified time frame.

.....  
64 Copied to the MOD UK Operations Team.

- b. **Memorandum of understanding/service level agreement.** For planned support, a memorandum of understanding or service level agreement will be agreed between the requesting civil authority and Defence setting out the principles of the support provided and the respective roles and responsibilities.
- c. **Activation order.** An activation order is a formal, military document authorising the force generation of assets, from all three Services if required, to undertake specified tasks and, usually, placing them under the operational command of SJC(UK).
- d. **Operational staff work.** The joint commander, single-Service commanders and RPoC commanders/JMCs will issue a range of operational staff work as appropriate to the operation.

## Miscellaneous

3.24. **Reserve Forces and Cadets Association estate.** Where the civil authorities request to use estate owned or managed by the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association (RFCA), the relevant regional liaison officer is to ensure that the local RFCA headquarters is made aware of the request.<sup>65</sup> Authorisation for its use will be in accordance with the flowchart in Annex 3C. Advice can be sought from the MOD's Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets. It should be noted that RFCAs operate a scheme called Alternative Venues, under which their estate can be used by public or private bodies, or private individuals for a range of events including conferences, meetings and social events on a repayment basis. Care should be taken to ensure that tasks that are clearly related to civil authority training and preparation for, or response to, disruptive challenges are staffed as MACA requests rather than under the Alternative Venues scheme, as the latter process does not allow for proper ministerial scrutiny of the requested support. If in doubt, RFCAs should consult their local regional liaison officer for further advice.

3.25. **Non-core estate.** Several ranges and other elements of Defence estate within the UK are owned by the MOD but managed by AWE, Dstl or QinetiQ under a long-term partnering agreement. Should such estate be required, then the relevant British Army RPoC brigade/headquarters commander is to be informed. In addition, the request is to be submitted by the relevant regional liaison officer to the Training, Evaluation, Services and Targets team within

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<sup>65</sup> Joint Service Publication (JSP) 814, *Policy and Regulations for MOD Sponsored Cadet Forces*, Version 2, May 2019.

Headquarters Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), who will advise on the appropriateness of the request for its use. Formal authorisation for its use will be given by DE&S, in consultation with the relevant agency.

3.26. **Defence Infrastructure Organisation.** Arrangements for using Defence estate managed by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation are covered in Chapter 4.

## Section 4 – Planning considerations

3.27. **Planning assistance.** Defence staff training places great emphasis on the ability to conduct planning in support of military operations. Such skills are readily transferable in terms of planning for, and responding to, disruptive challenges in the UK, with those who have undertaken command and staff training at the Defence Academy being in demand. There are many examples of Defence support in this area, and whilst Defence planning support to the 2012 London Olympic Games contributed to the success of that event, the contribution of military planners during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–21 proved pivotal. Defence planners were deployed into a wide range of bodies, including Whitehall-based departments, devolved governments, local resilience forums (and equivalent), public health agencies and local authorities. Civil authorities should be encouraged to seek early assistance from our Armed Forces. Requesting authorities should provide accurate job specifications so that the correctly qualified and experienced individuals can be selected. Moreover, working effectively with the civil authorities requires personal skills over and above those deployed usually within military environments; thus, military planners must be selected and trained.<sup>66</sup>

3.28. **Planning doctrine.** Planning guidance within Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations* (with UK national elements) will allow military planners to assist civil authorities in preparing for, managing the response to, and recovery from an emergency.

3.29. **Military assessment team.** Following a formal request, a military assessment team may be deployed alongside or to complement an existing MLO to provide specific or specialist military advice to civil authorities in preparation for, or in response to, a disruptive challenge. The deployment of a military assessment team does not constitute the deployment of a

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66 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine* provides further guidance on working with partners across government.

formal reconnaissance party, and there will be times where, having studied the situation, a team leader determines that there is no task for Defence to perform. For this reason, no charge will be made to the requesting civil authority. Except for the Royal Engineer Infrastructure Response Teams held at readiness by 170 Engineer Group, military assessment teams have no standard size, shape or readiness. They will be generated based upon the nature of the emerging situation and will receive an operational orientation briefing prior to deployment. Deployment of a military assessment team will be authorised by Head Operations (Military) within the SPO Directorate.

**3.30. Communication and information.** A MACA operation may involve several different agencies. Communication interoperability and a finite amount of emergency service communication equipment mean that communication information systems must be considered early in the MACA process. The early development of an information exchange requirement, built in conjunction with the other partners in the operation, will assist in developing an agreed communications approach and will negate the risk of ‘unofficial systems’ being employed.

**3.31. Readiness.** When directed, Defence will provide capability at readiness to support the civil authorities. Readiness is defined as: **the period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when the headquarters or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed) or ready for deployment.**<sup>67</sup> Readiness may be described in two ways.

- a. **Notice to move.** This is the time allowed, expressed usually in days or hours, for units to be able to move from their base location following an order from higher authority to do so.
- b. **Notice to effect.** This is the time allowed, expressed usually in days or hours, for units to be at a location of employment, generating a prearranged effect, with an agreed capability.

**3.32. Best effort.** Best effort is described as the rapid generation and deployment of personnel or capability, not nominated or pre-warned, for an operation, at best speed. Generating the force quickly may require risk to be taken against personnel, training and equipment, and may have an impact on other operations and activities. Under certain circumstances, such as security or counterterrorism operations, the need for rapid support from Defence might be of critical importance to the UK.

.....  
67 JDP 0-01.1, *UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm*.



Military aid to the civil authorities can involve assets and personnel from across the three Services, including Regulars and Reserves

3.33. **Whole force.** Where appropriate, the whole force approach will be applied, with Regulars, Reservists, civil servants and contractors being considered for use on operations in the UK. Defence personnel come with a broad mixture of skills, qualifications and experience, and may have local knowledge and contacts that will significantly enhance the effectiveness of the overall response. In response to a disruptive challenge, and following a formal request for support, Defence will select the most appropriate capability, at the appropriate readiness to create the required effect. Geography and the urgency of the situation will both have a bearing on force generation.

3.34. **Using Reservists.** In response to a no- or short-notice event, it is more likely that Defence will deploy Regular Forces in response to a formal request for support from the civil authorities. However, Reservists from all three Services may have niche skills and qualifications more appropriate to an event and may have local knowledge and understanding far deeper than Regular Forces who may be deployed from further afield. For these reasons, whilst it is more likely that Reservists will be used in a follow-on capacity rather than as part of a short-notice response, wider factors may mean that their early use should not be discounted. Defence can generate Reserve Forces at differing speeds depending upon their terms and conditions of service. With the exception of certain roles and capabilities, most Reservists are not held at readiness for operations in the UK.<sup>68</sup> However, for UK resilience operations,

.....  
68 Some Reservists in 1 and 11 Signal Brigades are held on high readiness terms and conditions of service.

Reservists may volunteer, with the support of their employer, to serve for an initial period of up to 14 days on Reserve Service Days (RSDs) without being mobilised. Where the requirement for Reservists is likely to endure beyond this 14-day limit, discussion will be necessary to decide whether enough volunteers exist for personnel to be rotated; alternatively, mobilisation may become the preferred option.<sup>69</sup> The following principles and conditions should be used to decide whether to employ Reservists on UK resilience operations.

- a. The Reserves will be considered for deployment on all UK resilience operations where the training requirements are achievable. All Reservists being deployed on UK resilience operations which require force protection measures, such as counterterrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN), must be mobilised from day one of being on task.
- b. Reservists will normally be considered for deployment in their local area, defined as one hour's travel from their home station. This principle seeks to ensure that increased use of Reserves on UK resilience operations does not undermine employer relationships.
- c. Reservists will be considered for deployment when there is enough time for their generation. The time required will depend on the training standard for deployment on the operation. Where generation is very simple and volunteers are readily available, Reservists could be employed in the initial response phase. More commonly, it is expected that Regulars will provide the initial response but will then be relieved-in-place by the Reserve.
- d. The single Services will cover the initial cost of deployments under voluntary training and other duties from their budget for RSDs. All three Services will meet the cost of mobilisation of the Reserves as they arise.
- e. Where Reservists are employed in similar or equivalent roles on the same task or operation, they should, where possible, serve on the same conditions of service, either RSDs or mobilised. Single Services will be required to seek a waiver from the SPO Directorate/Reserve Forces and Cadets Directorate should they wish to deploy Reservists on different conditions of service.

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69 In extremis, where a callout order is not in effect, Reservists may be used on RSDs for a period that does not exceed 14 days without recourse to mobilisation.

- f. The SJC(UK) holds delegated authority to mobilise Reservists employed on high readiness Reserve from 1 and 11 Signal Brigades without further reference to the MOD.
- g. In many instances, Reserve Forces personnel may be contributing toward the resolution of a crisis as part of their civilian employment; this opportunity cost must be factored into the mobilisation decision.
- h. With regards to cost recovery, the principles that apply to the use of Regular Forces will also apply to Reservists. However, any additional costs, such as mobilisation bounties or Reservist awards, will be absorbed by the relevant top level budget, unless the deployed Reservists are providing a niche capability.
- i. RSDs are voluntary; there is no compulsion for the Reservist to report for duty. RSDs do not provide the Reservist or employer with the compensation packages received when mobilised. Therefore, unit leadership and employer engagement are critical to the provision of personnel on RSDs.

**3.35. Apportionment.** Where specialist capabilities are requested to support the civil authorities, the SPO Directorate will assign these from the single-Service command best placed to meet the task. For larger, more generic operations, the SPO Directorate may apply the 1:3:1 principle; against this ratio, personnel will be provided from the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) respectively.<sup>70</sup> Often this principle is combined with a geographic-based approach to force generation (for example, the Royal Marines are more likely to be used in South West England).

**3.36. Cooperation and integration.** The SPO Directorate will provide direction on any emerging requirement for military planners/specialists to augment other government departments, or work in conjunction with foreign governments during an emergency or event. Similarly, military planners/specialists should be prepared to establish quick, durable links with the equivalent civil authority planners.

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<sup>70</sup> The 1:3:1 principle means that, for every five personnel generated, one will be from the Royal Navy, three from the British Army and one from the RAF. It is usually applied based on ‘colour of cloth’; whereby RAF personnel serving with the Joint Helicopter Command are viewed as RAF, not British Army (in whose chain of command the Joint Helicopter Command resides).

3.37. **Skills and capability.** When considering Defence support, military planners and regional liaison officers must steer civil authorities towards asking for an effect.<sup>71</sup> The use of effects-based terminology allows the SPO Directorate to develop the optimal military solution. This may include:

- specialist capability (for example, divers or boat units to assist with understand, clear and support);
- specialist personnel (for example, imagery analysts or Specialist Teams Royal Engineers to assist with understand); and
- units (for example, a UKSB to assist with tasks such as support, clear, protect and reassure).

### Operation Pitchpole – aerial imagery during Thames Valley flooding



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In 2013–14, severe winter weather brought significant localised flooding to many parts of the UK. The effect of successive storms required local, sub-national and national coordinated responses. Defence initially responded to routine requests for assistance, but once the scale of the situation had been recognised, Defence put in place a flood relief operation (Operation Pitchpole) led by the SJC(UK). The continuous rainfall led to widespread ground saturation, with the River Thames recording the highest flow rates on record.

There were a great number of MACA requests both for personnel and niche capabilities. While the National Police Air Service helicopters were able to provide low-level imagery, three of the SCGs responding to the flooding and the Environment Agency approached RAFFRLO London and South East on 12 February 2014 to request more strategic imagery. The RAFFRLO worked with the SCGs to identify areas of interest for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance air platforms to overfly. Both Sentinel and Tornado GR4, fitted with RAPTOR pods, aircraft were used. Following analysis by RAF image analysts, the imagery product greatly assisted strategic planning and decision-making. This helped reduce both risk to life and damage to properties and infrastructure.

<sup>71</sup> Resilience effects include: understand; clear; protect; reassure; warn; inform; evacuate; and support.



Lessons are likely to be identified during training exercises and in operations undertaken

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3.38. **Support.** Whilst preparing for, and during, disruptive challenges and similar events, civil authorities may seek to use Defence estate. This may include providing Defence estate, facilities and/or equipment to support:

- the mounting of a civil authority's operation; or
- training and exercising activities undertaken, or led by, such authorities.

In both cases a formal written request is required, even when there may be a mutual benefit to Defence from supporting such activity. When staffing such requests the key consideration is whether the nature of the activity is deemed contentious or not.<sup>72</sup> Authority to approve activity that is deemed non-contentious may be delegated to a Defence regional-level commander, whilst those considered contentious will require authorisation from the MOD Head of Operations (Military).<sup>73</sup> Exceptionally, they may require ministerial authorisation. Unless directed otherwise, then the pre-planned activities will be charged at full cost. With regards to costs associated with the use of Defence estate, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation provides guidance and precise details on costs to be charged.<sup>74</sup>

.....  
72 There is no prescriptive definition of the word 'contentious', but it will include the effect on Defence's reputation of supporting the activity, and the response of the media and/or wider general public.

73 Royal Navy: naval base commanders; and naval regional commanders. British Army: RPoC commanders. RAF: station commanders.

74 Defence Infrastructure Organisation Standing Operating Instruction, *Policy for Daily Rates of Charging for Facilities on the Defence Training Estate*, 11 April 2019.

3.39. **Lessons capture.** Lessons are likely to be identified during all three phases of an operation: preparation, response and recovery. Adhering to Defence policy, the lessons process comprises the following.<sup>75</sup>

- a. **Collect.** Observations are the foundations of the lessons process. HQ SJC(UK) collects observations from all relevant Defence organisations using a master lessons tracker and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-endorsed format of observation, discussion, conclusion, recommendation (ODCR). Other media such as first impressions reports, post-operational reports, Microsoft Teams chat rooms, and TED-style talks are used also.
- b. **Analyse.** Not all observations will be taken forward as an endorsed lesson. Thus, HQ SJC(UK) will analyse and filter all observations for duplication, relevance and seek further clarification if required. In accordance with standing practice, a quarterly military judgement panel will also be held as part of this process.
- c. **Action.** The observation becomes subsequently a lesson identified, which is then required to be allocated to an appropriate organisation or body that has the authority, and the means, to resolve the highlighted problem or develop the proposed best practice.
- d. **Implement.** During this phase the allocated organisation and supporting stakeholders will conduct the necessary work to resolve the lesson identified. The leadership of the involved organisations and the associated lessons teams will monitor and track progress to ensure that the lesson identified is fully addressed in a timely fashion.
- e. **Validate.** Either judged case by case or at a quarterly operational lessons board, validation of a lesson identified is when the analysis and implementation phases are complete. The lesson identified then becomes a lesson learned.

3.40. **Lessons capture.** HQ SJC(UK) is responsible for coordinating the capture of Defence lessons on the land, through in-mission and post-event reporting, and the appropriate follow-up action. Defence may be invited to contribute to the civil authorities' lessons capture process. Whilst not obliged to support such events, where appropriate and when invited, Defence should endeavour to attend. At sea the Maritime Accident Investigation Branch will conduct a similar function.

<sup>75</sup> 2016DIN03-020, *Defence Lessons Policy*.



## Operation Rescript – mass COVID-19 testing in 2020

On Friday 30 October 2020, the MOD was directed by the Prime Minister to assist with a mass testing team within the National Health Service (NHS) England test and trace programme by undertaking a whole town testing pilot in the City of Liverpool. This asymptomatic testing pilot had two purposes: first, to reduce the presence of COVID-19 in the city by trial; and second, to provide practical experience of whole town testing to guide national testing policy that might be applied elsewhere in the country. By the following Monday, 8 Engineer Brigade had created a plan alongside the Department of Health and Social Care and had deployed its headquarters to Liverpool. It was given command of five UK Resilience Units (1st Battalion Irish Guards, King's Royal Hussars, 1st Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment, 19 Regiment Royal Artillery and 39 Engineer Regiment) and a support squadron. The tempo of the deployment required the force to be adaptive and learn ‘in-flight’ not only to optimise its testing processes, but also capture lessons that might be used to inform the development of the wider mass testing national programme. The effective use of key liaison officers at civil authority strategic, tactical and operational levels was essential to share lessons and observations from the sites in Liverpool rapidly, and to shape the national testing policy. The lessons process was given emphasis and it was command-led, with Commander 8 Engineer Brigade employing a dedicated staff officer to collect, process and share lessons daily across the force, as well as with local authorities and the NHS.

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**3.41. Military aid to the civil authorities versus civil engagement.** Care must be taken to ensure that tasks which are clearly MACA-focused are not undertaken under the principles of civil engagement. The three uniformed Services each have slightly differing definitions of civil engagement but broadly include objectives such as enhancing Defence’s reputation, influence and standing.<sup>76</sup> Civil engagement tasks occur in low-risk situations and are not in response to a specific and/or dynamic event. They may be authorised at unit level but are not routinely scrutinised by higher command prior to activity occurring. Any activity that requires Defence personnel to create effect in response to a disruptive challenge or similar circumstances must be planned and authorised as MACA.

.....  
 76 The British Army’s definition of civil engagement is: the Army gains understanding, legitimacy and access through attraction activities, primarily engagement and outreach, but supported by communications. Engagement can be conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level in order to develop mutual relationships, connect the Army with society, break down barriers, dispel myths, as well as identify opportunities for outreach and even recruiting activity.

# Section 5 – Integrity of UK waters and airspace

## Direction

3.42. The UK is dependent on air lines of communication and shipping routes. The *Defence Command Paper* directs that Defence will provide high readiness air and maritime assets to deter and respond to threats to the UK.

## UK waters

3.43. The United Nation's International Maritime Organization is the international body responsible for measures to improve maritime safety and security worldwide. Responsibility for safety and security in UK waters, including the exclusive economic zone, lies with the UK. As one part of this, the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency are responsible for implementing the International Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port Facility Security Code within UK waters and port facilities.<sup>77</sup> The code contains detailed security-related requirements for national governments, port authorities and shipping companies.<sup>78</sup>

3.44. The *UK National Strategy for Maritime Security* details the UK's approach to maritime security.<sup>79</sup> This contains five maritime security objectives, the third and fourth of which have particular relevance to resilience and security within UK waters.<sup>80</sup> The strategy requires a number of partners from other government departments and agencies to work together to deliver maritime security, which includes the MOD.<sup>81</sup> The Royal Navy plays its part by its maritime security work. Six of the eight NATO maritime security activities contribute to UK resilience: maritime situational awareness; maritime security enforcement; fighting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (for example, a nuclear device in a

.....  
77 This is a mandatory requirement for all countries party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974; the UK is a signatory.

78 International Maritime Organization, *Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code*, 2012.

79 Her Majesty's (HM) Government, *The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security*, 2014.

80 Ibid., page 9. Third objective: 'protecting the UK, our citizens and our economy by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign group-flagged passenger and cargo ships'. Fourth objective: 'assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK Marine Area'.

81 For example, the National Maritime Information Centre embodies the strategy's core principles of integration and collaboration, by acting as the national fusion focal point for intelligence/information sharing. Whilst practically, delivering maritime security requires collaboration between the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Border Force, HM Revenue and Customs, the National Crime Agency, the police and the Armed Forces.

ship heading up the Thames estuary); protecting critical infrastructure; maritime counterterrorism; and maritime trade operations.

3.45. The MOD supports other government departments and agencies with responsibility for aspects of UK maritime security. These are shown in Table 3.1.

<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Government department/agency</b>
Maritime environmental protection	Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency
<b>Salvage</b>	<b>Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency</b>
Investigations of maritime accidents	Department for Transport/Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)
<b>Investigations of air accidents</b>	<b>Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch</b>
Safety at sea	Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Civil search and rescue	Department for Transport/Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Port and shipping security	Department for Transport – transport security <sup>82</sup> and MOD <sup>83</sup>
<b>Law enforcement</b>	<b>Police</b>
Immigration control	Home Office/Border Force
<b>Enforcement of UK customs and fiscal enforcement</b>	<b>Her Majesty's (HM) Revenue and Customs<sup>84</sup></b>
Serious and organised crime including counter narcotic interdiction	National Crime Agency
<b>Marine enforcement</b>	<b>Marine Management Organisation on behalf of the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency and, in Northern Ireland, the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs.</b>
Disaster relief and humanitarian aid	Home Office/devolved administrations/local authorities/police

**Table 3.1 – UK government department responsibilities for maritime security**

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82 The Department for Transport is responsible for the security of all major means of transport. Transport Security is the department's coordination arrangements for responding to serious disruption.

83 MOD: Naval Base Commander for naval dockyards.

84 HM Revenue and Customs has departmental responsibility to the Chief Secretary of the Treasury; this arrangement reflects HM Revenue and Customs primary responsibility, which is to collect revenue on goods brought into the UK.

## UK airspace

3.46. The UK is responsible under International Civil Aviation Organisation and NATO obligations for the safety and security of aircraft flying through UK airspace. The Department for Transport, the MOD and the Civil Aviation Authority are responsible for the integrity of UK airspace. This is achieved by establishing situational awareness<sup>85</sup> to detect and analyse potential airborne threats,<sup>86</sup> with contingency plans for the interception, escort and potential neutralisation of established airborne threats.<sup>87</sup> Detailed contingency plans for ensuring the integrity of UK airspace against airborne threats exist. However, these are beyond the classification of this publication.

## Section 6 – Military operations in support of strategic and overseas tasks

3.47. **Direction.** The *Defence Command Paper* requires the UK Armed Forces, and wider Defence, to support several strategic and overseas tasks that are described below. These require Defence to work closely with civil authorities and adopt the same command and control protocols as those employed for UK security and resilience. These tasks, although categorised as UK operations, are not considered to be MACA even though they may include Defence support to some form of resilience or security operation or activity.

3.48. **Military support to the mounting of operations.** The planning, deployment, support and recovery of overseas operations are known as military support to the mounting of operations (MSMO). MSMO cover:

- UK lines of communication;
- the security of Defence critical assets;
- Defence nuclear emergency; and

3

<sup>85</sup> Situational awareness is achieved by fusing civil air traffic control pictures with corresponding military data and resources to form the recognised air picture.

<sup>86</sup> Potential airborne threats comprise: aircraft losing communications; renegade aircraft (a stolen or hijacked aircraft by terrorists to perpetrate a terrorist act); and asymmetric capabilities (including light aircraft, unmanned air vehicles and slow-moving airborne platforms).

<sup>87</sup> Further details on defence counter-air operations are in Air Publication (AP) 3002, *Air and Space Warfare*, 4th Edition, October 2020.

- return of UK Armed Forces and their dependants.<sup>88</sup>

Planning for MSMO requires extensive liaison between Defence staffs and civil authorities, especially the police and local authorities. Direction on MSMO will be issued under separate arrangements by the SPO Directorate (see Annex 3D for further information).

## Section 7 – Related activity

3.49. **Aircraft post-crash management.** Aircraft post-crash management (APCM) is not MACA activity; however, occasionally civil authorities mistakenly view APCM as MACA. This is due to the similarities that exist between MACA activity and an APCM response, both of which require Defence and civil authorities to work together. APCM policy is set by the Military Aviation Authority, which is part of the Defence Safety Authority; this sits outside the scope of this publication.<sup>89</sup>

3.50. **Media.** In response to a disruptive challenge within the UK, the government will appoint a LGD to oversee the coordination of communications and messaging. Routinely, the lead will not sit with the MOD and, thus, Defence will seek to align its media coverage with this wider government messaging to support the operation. Ensuring that Defence's actions are consistent with the overall strategic narrative, and are communicated coherently with the public, cross-department and internally amongst Defence, is the responsibility of the Directorate of Defence Communications. Operations in support of the civil authorities offer an opportunity for Defence to showcase its capabilities and worth to the nation, but equally must be sensitively handled, with consideration always given to the supporting role of Defence and the primacy of other departments of state.<sup>90</sup>

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88 Details of these operations are in Annex 3D.

89 *The Military Aviation Authority's Manual of Post-Crash Management*, April 2015, is the definitive policy for APCM.

90 Further details on media can be found within 2020DIN03-005, *Contact with the Media and Communicating in Public*, January 2020.

## Key points

- At the military operational level, the British Army's Commander Home Command is appointed as the SJC(UK) for operations on UK land mass. Commander Operations, within the Maritime Operations Centre, retains command for operations in most UK territorial waters.
- Defence's capability for resilience operations is built around full-time liaison officers provided by the single Services. These include JRLOs, RNRLOs and RAFRLOs. They are complemented by a network of deputies and other MLOs as the task or situation dictates.
- When requested, and when in accordance with the MACA principles, Defence can deploy planners to complement the disruptive challenge-focused planning capabilities of government at all levels.
- Defence can provide both advice and specialist capabilities and general support to the civil authorities.
- Defence support to the civil authorities falls into four categories:
  - enduring tasks;
  - fixed tasks;
  - response phase tasks; and
  - recovery phase tasks.
- Requests for Defence support may arise from: 'top down', where the request originates from central government, or 'bottom up', where the request will be made by civil authorities at the regional or local level or by devolved governments or Crown Dependencies.
- When considering Defence support, planners and regional liaison officers should steer civil authorities towards asking for an effect.
- As specified in the *Defence Command Paper*, the MOD supports other government departments and agencies with responsibility for aspects of UK maritime security.
- Detailed contingency plans for ensuring the integrity of UK airspace against airborne threats exist.

3

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Annex 3A


# Liaison

3A.1. Defence deploys a network of full-time, Reservist and specially generated liaison officers at the national, devolved, sub-national and local levels. The nature and scale of this network will be driven by the civil authorities' requirement for contingency planning, or as a response to a specific disruptive challenge. These points of contact fulfil several functions: providing situational awareness; maintaining robust communication channels; and facilitating understanding. At the national level this liaison function may be achieved through a mixture of embedded personnel, assigned permanently to other government departments or their agencies, complemented by the deployment of further time-bound staff to deal with specific situations. Liaison officers are used in a variety of circumstances, including: with partners across government (these can include other departments of state, non-ministerial departments); civil authorities; and, for specific operations, the commercial sector. Ultimately, wherever the commander requires greater understanding, enhanced clarity or expertise they may choose to deploy liaison officers.

3A.2. Whilst not part of the standing network of Defence resilience liaison officers, the MOD retains a specialist civil-military cooperation liaison capability within 6 (UK) Division, 77 Brigade. This finite capability has expertise in several areas, including all aspects of human security and other cross-cutting government departmental themes, security capacity building and stabilisation, and energy security. Much of this capability is Reservist and is held at various levels of readiness. Tasking for this capability occurs through the SPO Directorate. These liaison officers can operate in a reachback or deployed capacity, providing liaison capability with functional expertise to better facilitate mutual understanding and trust between assigned commanders and civil authorities, together with non-governmental organisations and agencies.

3A.3. Commanders must carefully consider how they wish to deploy liaison officers for maximum effect and should not underestimate the breadth of civil agencies with which they may be required to coordinate and cooperate. Building relationships, understanding and developing trust with civil authority colleagues can take time. An approach that is abrasive or overbearing can polarise and be counterproductive. Consequently, selecting the right staff with the correct experience and knowledge is crucial. Commanders should avoid the temptation to by default employ junior or inexperienced staff in this role; these individuals may struggle to express the commander's intent or describe the capabilities available or requested. An effective, trusted liaison officer can add considerable value.

**3A.4. Royal Navy regional liaison officers.** The Royal Navy maintains a regionally-based organisation of four naval regional commanders (NRCs) in the UK, all of whom have a broad range of single-Service responsibilities.<sup>91</sup> Their duties include providing specialist advice on Royal Navy and Royal Marines capabilities and this is delivered through four RNRLOs. The laydown of RNRLOs within the Royal Navy regional chain of command is shown at Figure 3A.1. Routinely, the RNRLOs report to their respective NRCs; however, for resilience operations they are subordinated under the Royal Navy's Commander Maritime Operations.



**Figure 3A.1 – Royal Navy regional commands within the UK**

<sup>91</sup> The Naval Regional Commanders are based in Rosyth, Liverpool, Bristol and London.

**3A.5. Joint regional liaison officers.** There are 18 full-time JRLOs and they all serve under the operational command of their respective RPoC commanders; however, they maintain direct liaison with HQ SJC(UK). JRLOs are the principal coordinators amongst the regional liaison officers due to the greater likelihood of British Army support to MACA activity. A map showing the British Army's RPoC structure, through which JRLOs are deployed, is at Figure 3A.2.




Figure 3A.2 – British Army regional points of command in the UK

**3A.6. Royal Air Force regional liaison officers.** The RAF maintains a network of nine RAFRLOs in the UK who are the RAF focal point for UK resilience operations and are the Defence lead for all air-related civil or military liaison. They have additional responsibilities that include regional APCM response at very high readiness; counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) advice; and Major Accident Control Regulations (MACR) coordination. They are under the operational command of Air Officer Commanding No. 11 Group at Headquarters Air Command. The RAFRLOs have seven part-time deputies to aid organisational resilience. A map showing the laydown of RAFRLOs is at Figure 3A.3.




Figure 3A.3 – Royal Air Force regional liaison officers in the UK

3A

3A.7. **Wider liaison.** A number of recent operations, most notably Defence support to the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–21 under Operation Rescript, have highlighted the need for Defence to be prepared to field a wider range of liaison officers and planners at all levels: central and devolved government, sub-national bodies and agencies, and local responders. A network of liaison officers is maintained, trained and held at readiness for commitments such as Operation Temperer;<sup>92</sup> however, in most circumstances such augmentation will be designed to suit the requirements of a specific operation.

3A

.....  
92 Operation Temperer is the UK government's plan to support the police following a major disruptive event.

## Annex 3B

# Military aid to the civil authorities request form guidance

3B.1. If MACA is required, then a request form must be completed. The request form is referred to colloquially as an 'Annex B' as it is Annex B to a standard operating procedure sponsored by HQ SJC(UK). A copy of the most up-to-date template can be obtained from HQ SJC(UK) and it is essential that the most current version of the document is used.<sup>93</sup> Guidance on completing the MACA request form, with example text highlighted in colour, follows, although civil authorities should be encouraged to use the skills of the network of regional liaison officers to ensure that forms are accurate, brief and unambiguous. The form represents a formal request from the civil authorities for Defence support and, therefore, must be signed off by them; however, should time allow then circulation of the draft to both HQ SJC(UK) and the British Army's RPoC will allow the requirement to be finessed.

3B

a. **Introductory section.** This must include details of the key personnel involved in the request together with the identification of the Department of State from which Defence will recover any costs incurred following the operation.

b. **Headline summary of the situation** – to be completed by the requesting agency. This includes:

- o an estimate of the severity of the event and the impact in terms of properties/people/installations affected;
- o any special considerations, such as vulnerable communities and future forecasts;
- o the implications of not achieving this request; and
- o an outline of next actions or events.

<sup>93</sup> HQ SJC(UK) can be contacted at: SJCUK-HQ-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk.

c. The requesting agency should indicate what effect the Defence support is seeking to create. An example of this text is below.

In view of the identified risks of widespread flooding in multiple locations throughout the county the request for Defence assistance is as follows.

### Preparation and prevention

Assist multi-agency responders to maximise the safety and security of communities by taking all reasonable steps to protect vulnerable premises and locations by:

- erecting temporary demountable flood defence barriers (where, how many, by when);
- constructing sandbag flood defences as required (where, how many, by when); and
- clearing debris that may lead to blockages of waterways (where, how many, by when).

3B

### Response

Assist multi-agency responders by:

- warning and informing the community of the flood risk (where, how many people, by when);
- being prepared to provide support to evacuate the community to designated rest centres (where, how many people and are any vulnerable communities involved, by when); and
- gaining access to communities cut-off by flood waters, ensuring that essential provisions are provided (where, how many people and are any vulnerable communities involved, by when).

d. This and subsequent sub-paragraphs all form part of the same part of question 4 on the Annex B. The requesting agency should indicate whether there is a requirement for armed assistance.

e. **What is the effect required?** The requesting agency should complete this and the following key words should be considered for use (this list is not exhaustive but these are terms recognised within Defence and may speed up the provision of capability): **clear, confirm, coordinate, deliver, deny, deploy, distribute, escort, establish, evacuate, extract, find, guard, inform, liaise, protect, relieve, reassure, replenish, search, support, transport, warn.**

f. The requesting agency should indicate what alternatives have been considered as explained in the example below.

Due to the size of preparation and prevention measures, and potential requirement for large-scale evacuation effort, the multi-agency response capabilities of responders has become stretched. Mutual aid for XXX County Council is in place along with a number of volunteer organisations.

3B

g. **What, when, where, how and for how long?** The MOD liaison officer is to complete this, and include:

- effect to be created;
- what (assets required);
- when (date-time-group of all taskings and duration); and
- where (location).

h. **An impact statement** – The MOD liaison officer to complete as far as is practicable. It should include:

- disruptions to Defence;
- a hazard summary;
- a threat assessment; and
- any presentational issues.

i. Lastly, the requesting civil authority must agree to accept:

- responsibility for the conduct of their own risk assessment;


3B

- own indemnity against loss, damage, injury or death while on MOD estate (if applicable);
  - it has been issued with an appropriate licence from the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (if applicable);
  - it is aware that costs will be recovered by the MOD; and
  - any request by the MOD for indemnification.
- j. As far as practicable estimated costs should be provided by the HQ SJC(UK) or by the appropriate command.
- k. Upon completion of the civil authority's part of the request form, a relevant local regional liaison officer will provide detail on the task (extracted from the effect requested by the civil authority), the suggested assets that should be generated, a description of key timings, and information on points of contact that will assist in the timely delivery of the effect. Thereafter the form will pass to HQ SJC(UK) for comment.

3B.2. The form represents a formal request for Defence support and, if originated at local level, must be sent to the relevant lead government department for scrutiny and approval and thence to the MOD. The process described above, including the role of HQ SJC(UK), is to ensure that ministers in both the requesting LGD and Defence have full sight of the facts before making their decisions.

# Military aid to the civil authorities request process

## Annex 3C



1. What constitutes 'normal military work' is a policy question, but in general terms would involve activity that involves some degree of training which Defence already possesses for military purposes.
2. What constitutes 'urgent work of national importance' is a policy question, but the implication is that this should be exceptional and rare.
3. Delegated from the Minister for the Armed Forces – novel or contentious requests should be referred for ministerial authorisation and considered for HM Treasury endorsement. In the absence of Head Operations Military, Assistant Head (Military) UK Operations is empowered to authorise.
4. Royal Navy – naval regional commander or naval base commander; Army – regional point of command commander; and Royal Air Force – RAF station commander. Referred for ministerial authorisation and considered for HM Treasury endorsement. In the absence of Head Operations Military, Assistant Head (Military) UK Operations is empowered to authorise.

## Annex 3D

# Military support to the mounting of operations

## Reception arrangements for military patients

3D.1. Military casualties sustained overseas requiring specialist treatment will be repatriated to the UK whenever possible. Potentially, within an overseas theatre, prisoners of war and local/other civilians will be treated the same. The NHS is responsible for the reception, triage and acute secondary care of military patients repatriated to the UK.

## UK lines of communication

3D.2. The UK's internal lines of communication (LOC) facilitate the deployment of our Armed Forces overseas, and during times of heightened threat are vulnerable to malign actors. Measures to protect them include movement control and the main road route system. When tasked by the MOD's SPO Directorate, HQ SJC(UK) is responsible for maintaining plans to support the protection of UK LOC.<sup>94</sup>

## United States/UK lines of communication

3D.3. Under the United States (US) Visiting Forces arrangement, the US military maintains bases in the UK. This arrangement allows for the provision of ad hoc assistance without recourse to politicians for the requisite authority. In addition, the UK government has a bilateral arrangement with their US counterparts known as the US/UK LOC. This arrangement, supported by other extant arrangements such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement (ACSA), covers the provision of host-nation support that extends beyond the scope of the US Visiting Force arrangement; this support may increase during times of heightened tension/crisis. The Logistics Implementation Policy Document (LIPD) provides policy, reference and planning guidance to US/UK LOC. It is jointly sponsored by the US European

.....  
94 Requests for details on movement control and main road route system measures should be directed to the HQ SJC(UK) duty officer.

Command's US Office of Defence Co-Operation in the US Embassy and Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Support Operations) within the MOD.<sup>95</sup>

## Defence critical infrastructure

3D.4. To be able to support wider UK security and resilience activity it is vital that Defence itself is resilient. The UK's critical national infrastructure (CNI) provides vital services the country needs to function and these encompass facilities, technology, information, processes and people. Defence considers its CNI to be those facilities, technology, information, processes and people deemed essential to the delivery of non-discretionary Defence tasks. Any requirement for security or resilience enhancements are to be staffed through the appropriate channels of the front line commands/top level budget/enabling organisation responsible for Defence CNI (DefCNI) assets. Defence policy on protective security and the identification, categorisation and management of DefCNI is set out in Joint Service Publication 440, *The Defence Manual of Security and Resilience*.

## Defence nuclear emergency

3D

3D.5. The Secretary of State for Defence has overall responsibility for nuclear safety in the MOD, including the effectiveness of the Department's nuclear emergency response arrangements. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces has ministerial responsibility for nuclear emergency response arrangements. The Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO) is responsible for sponsoring the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, managing the Defence Nuclear portfolio, advising on UK nuclear policy, and on international cooperation on nuclear matters. DNO is also engaged in Defence Nuclear Enterprise safety and security, including nuclear emergency response policy and the assurance of emergency response arrangements.

3D.6. The MOD is appointed as the LGD for emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets (other than an emergency arising as a result of a terrorist event where the Home Office is appointed as the LGD). The MOD's responsibility as LGD is for the response phase of the emergency. The Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is the LGD for the recovery phase (the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency) in England. The relevant devolved administration will be the LGD for the recovery phase outside of England.

<sup>95</sup> Further information on the US/UK LOC is available through the CDS's duty officer.

3D.7. On declaration of a Defence nuclear emergency the Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (DNEO) will be activated as part of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation. The Headquarters DNEO will:

- advise on MOD operational policy and provide military advice to the central government crisis management organisation;
- provide strategic guidance and direction for the military response and interpret policy decisions into clear unambiguous direction;
- advise Defence ministers and senior officials on the status of the emergency, including any mitigating actions; and
- represent the Department's LGD role within the central government response.

3D.8. For a Defence nuclear emergency, the MOD's senior representative coordinating the MOD operational response within the strategic coordination group is the MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA). The MCA is the primary focus for the direction and coordination of all MOD response activities in the incident area. In addition to the pre-planned military support required by the MCA to deal with their tasks, the civil authorities may also require additional military aid which would be requested under MACA arrangements.

### **Return of UK Armed Forces and their dependants**

3D.9. A large-scale evacuation of UK Armed Forces personnel and their dependants from a foreign-based UK garrison may require support from UK-based military units. Support may include assistance with:

- reception at the air or seaport of disembarkation;
- accommodation;
- feeding; and
- rehabilitation.

## Notes

3D



# Chapter 4

Chapter 4 considers key Defence capabilities that may be tasked to support military aid to the civil authorities operations. It outlines then how Defence conducts resilience and security education, training and exercises, to prepare for civil contingency tasks, alongside civil authorities, agencies and partners.

Section 1 – Capability . . . . .	101
Section 2 – Education and training . . . . .	121
Annex 4A – Categories of Defence training . . . . .	126

“

The Armed Forces are **good** at **mounting** big, **complex** logistical operations at **short notice**; they are **trained** to provide **transport** and **engineering** support, and their **medics** can operate with poor infrastructure and strained resources.

”

*Lifting our Sights Beyond 2030,  
Future Agenda*

## Chapter 4

# Delivery: means

## Section 1 – Capability

4.1. When requested, Defence can provide a range of niche capabilities along with non-specialist personnel to support the civil authorities. The Ministry of Defence's (MOD's) Security Policy and Operations (SPO) Directorate, in conjunction with single-Service commands and Strategic Command, will identify the best-placed and most appropriate military capability to support a request. In the first instance, as detailed in the previous section, civil authorities must consult with their joint or single-Service regional liaison officers when considering a request for Defence support.

### Explosive ordnance disposal and search

4.2. Defence maintains a joint, rapidly deployable explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)<sup>96</sup> and search<sup>97</sup> (EOD&S) capability that is organised and scaled to counter the threat posed by explosive ordnance hazards. The explosive ordnance threat exists on land and at sea. This threat includes conventional munitions, improvised explosive devices, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices.

4.3. The Royal Navy and British Army contribute to the joint EOD&S capability. Their specialist capability reflects the environments in which they operate.

- a. **Royal Navy.** The Royal Navy conducts maritime EOD (incorporating maritime improvised explosive device disposal) and underwater search in tidal waters and inland waterways, on the coastline below the high-water mark, in vessels at sea or in port, and on or in offshore installations.

<sup>96</sup> EOD is defined as: the detection, accessing, uncovering, identification, mitigation, rendering safe, recovery, exploitation and final disposal of explosive ordnance, regardless of condition. Note: Explosive ordnance disposal extends to explosive remnants of war and stockpile, or other explosive ordnance that has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. NATOTerm.

<sup>97</sup> Search is defined as: the capability to locate specific targets using intelligence assessments, systematic procedures and appropriate detection techniques. Pamphlet No. 11 Search Amendment 1, *Military Engineering*, Volume II Field Engineering, 2009.

b. **British Army.** The British Army acts as the command lead for EOD&S across Defence. Within the UK the British Army is responsible for: EOD command and control; the disposal of legacy wartime air-delivered munitions and service ammunition; CBRN devices; use of EOD electronic countermeasures; and providing advanced search, including hazardous environmental search, in the land environment.

4.4. Deployed Defence EOD&S assets operate in support of, and under the direction of, the civil police throughout the UK.<sup>98</sup> The senior police officer present at the scene will be the incident commander. Tactical command of EOD&S teams is delegated to the Joint EOD&S Operations Centre in Didcot. For major incidents, a joint police/military command and control structure will be established; specialist military EOD&S advisers may reinforce police command levels.

4.5. Requests for EOD&S assistance are made directly to the Joint EOD&S Operations Centre by the civil police or the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. The best placed, available joint or single-Service specialist team will be identified and then tasked.<sup>99</sup>



Our Armed Forces are responsible for disposing of legacy wartime munitions

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98 Defence assets are responsible for EOD&S, in support of the civil police throughout the UK, except for Greater London, where Metropolitan Police assets are responsible for EOD&S.

99 Further direction and guidance on joint EOD&S is in Joint Service Publication (JSP) 364, *Joint Service EOD Manual*, Part 1: Directive, August 2014.

## Salvage and maritime operations

4.6. Defence provides a specialist team for salvage and maritime operations (SALMO); the civilian team belongs to the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) agency. The SALMO capability is held at very high readiness to support the MOD and other government departments' marine salvage requirements. SALMO comprises a range of tasks/roles which can be used for military aid to the civil authorities (MACA), including:

- carrying out first aid repairs to damaged or submerged vessels;
- recovering ditched aircraft from the sea or inland waters;
- clearing ports, facilities and approaches;
- locating and recovering objects from the seabed, including deep water; and
- providing specialist advice on salvage operations.

4.7. The Defence SALMO capability largely relies on the commercial sector to provide specialist platforms and plans. An on-call commercial cell is available to support requests for SALMO capability. For example, under MACA arrangements the SALMO capability supported the Air Accident Investigation Branch following the crash of a Super Puma helicopter off the Shetland Islands in 2013.

4

## Aircraft recovery

4.8. The Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron (JARTS) provides Defence's aircraft recovery and transportation capability for helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft and uncrated aircraft components. JARTS is tasked via the Defence Accident Investigation Branch (Air). A memorandum of understanding between the MOD and Civil Aviation Authority allows JARTS to deploy to civil air crash events without the specific authority of MOD.

## Cyber and electromagnetic activities

4.9. National demands for support to cyber defence, such as Defence Digital Rapid Response Teams, will typically be processed through the National Cyber Security Centre to the MOD through an extant memorandum of understanding. The mobilisation of Cyber Reserves will be coordinated through the Defence Digital Operations Headquarters at MOD Corsham.

## Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

4.10. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) provides Defence with situational awareness, upon which timely and effective decisions and plans can be made. Defence ISR capability may be provided to support MACA operations. Defence ISR can assist with:

- support to police investigations, including locating missing persons;
- wide area reconnaissance;
- providing geospatial services and analysis, including providing a current operational picture;
- infrastructure damage analysis and assessment; and
- intelligence products to support our operations and other government departments' and civil authority decision-making.

4.11. Any request for ISR assistance must be driven by information requirements, rather than a specific collection platform. In a UK-led directed operation, following direction from the SPO Directorate, through Headquarters Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) (HQ SJC(UK)), the Joint Intelligence Operations Centre is responsible for allocating and prioritising the collection requirement. For operations in the maritime, the Maritime Operations Centre will do this in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Operations Centre.



The early generation of a well-resourced and strongly-connected Information Manoeuvre Group enabled us to make sense of the vast array of inputs from the neural network and wider COVID-19 information sources.

Lieutenant General Sir Tyrone Urch

## Intelligence support

4.12. An embedded J2 intelligence capability (known on Operation Rescript as the Information Manoeuvre Group (IMG)) provides a wide variety of intelligence and information-based subject matter expertise, much of which is held in the Reserve Force. HQ SJC(UK) has a broad range of embedded

intelligence disciplines including operational intelligence, geospatial intelligence, counter threat, information requirements management, and information activities and outreach.


4.13. Such a structure assists Defence and partners across government understand the problems better, provide insights into planning (including force protection) and, in certain circumstances, may enable Defence to predict a likely MACA requirement. This is achieved through the analysis of data and qualitative reporting and it has the ability to apply intelligence methodologies to resilience problems and draw information from across government.

### Information Manoeuvre Group – Operation Rescript 2020–21 predictive analysis



4

In mid to late 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, government departments were planning for winter 2020–21, a period expected to severely test the UK's resilience to concurrent crises. However, most departments were focused on a narrow set of issues, such as hospital capacity and testing, rather than the whole spectrum of issues including, for example, adverse weather. The IMG drew on the work of government departments to create a paper which presented the cumulative threat posed by possible resilience challenges. This provided Defence with a uniquely comprehensive insight into the threat posed by concurrent emergencies and the extent to which simultaneous support to partners across government may be required.



Source: IMG

Figure 4.1 – A graph from the IMG's January 2021 paper, detailing the reasonable worst-case scenario for hospital occupancy during winter 2020–21; understanding occupancy was vital as Service personnel were deployed to hospitals worst hit by the virus



## Information Manoeuvre Group – Operation Rescript 2020–21 predictive analysis (continued)

### Predict the military aid to civil authorities requirement

The data and reporting that the IMG had access to, and its relations with other government departments and local resilience forums (LRFs), enabled intelligence staff to provide indicators and warnings of several MACA requests before they were submitted. For example, in summer 2020 the UK government was focused on mitigating the impact of localised outbreaks to delay the second wave of the virus. IMG analysts identified localised outbreaks by comparing fluctuations in data. By analysing a range of metrics presented by the platform and fusing this with qualitative reporting at the local level, they were able to predict if outbreaks were likely to grow or whether they could be easily controlled. Working on this intelligence, HQ SJC(UK) supported local authorities by despatching testing teams to mitigate the outbreaks where required.

### Interactions with other government departments

4

HQ SJC(UK)'s understanding of the changing nature of the pandemic was strengthened by deploying intelligence staff to key roles across government, including the Cabinet Office and the Vaccine Task Force. Defence Intelligence staff supported the development of national policies, including the UK's COVID-19 alert level system. As well as supporting cross-government outputs, staff provided the HQ SJC(UK) with key vital insights into developments related to the virus and where Defence may have been required to support.

**4.14. National Maritime Information Centre.** The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), part of the Joint Maritime Security Centre, provides the UK with a comprehensive picture of potential threats to UK maritime security. The NMIC brings together information and intelligence provided by all government maritime stakeholders including the MOD, the Joint Forces Intelligence Group, UK Border Force, the National Crime Agency, Her Majesty's (HM) Revenue and Customs, the police, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Marine Management Organisation, Department for Transport and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The NMIC facilitates a cross-government approach to understanding the maritime picture to assist departments and agencies to counter the maritime threats that the UK faces.

## Mountain rescue

4.15. The Royal Air Force (RAF) Mountain Rescue Service (MRS) provides a ground-based, all-weather search and rescue organisation, maintained at high readiness. They operate in difficult terrain and poor weather conditions that inhibit helicopter operations. While the core role is aircraft post-crash management, they routinely support the emergency services under MACA arrangements and civilian mountain rescue teams to locate missing persons.

**RAF Mountain Rescue Service support the police in the search for a missing child**



In June 2016, Cheshire Constabulary requested the assistance of the RAF MRS in the search for a 14-year-old girl who had gone missing four days earlier. Twelve members of RAF MRS deployed from RAF Valley to the search area in Cheshire. On arrival, the team was briefed that the missing girl was diagnosed with depression and had not taken her medication. She had a history of running away and making shelters in the local woods; however, these areas had already been searched by friends and family members. The RAF MRS was tasked with searching high-probability wooded areas in the vicinity until light faded. The following morning the RAF team was tasked with further search areas in conjunction with search teams from North East Wales Search and Rescue (SAR), Cheshire Constabulary, Merseyside SAR, Cheshire SAR, National Police Air Service, Bolton SAR and Woodlands SAR. Shortly after the teams had deployed to their respective search areas the missing girl made herself known to a member of the public in an area five kilometres to the south east of the search area. She had been hiding in a hedge for five days and had become delirious due to dehydration and hunger. She was taken to hospital by ambulance and given the all clear soon afterward.

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## Planning specialists

4.16. Defence planning staff are well-versed, trained and practised in the principles of planning to meet specific strategic objectives. Moreover, Defence personnel assigned to support the civil authorities with planning will be conversant with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP),<sup>100</sup> as these underpin multi-agency emergency services planning. Planning capability is held at every level of military command.

100 Described in Chapter 1.

- a. **Strategic.** The MOD's SPO Directorate develops plans for Defence to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of disruptive challenges detailed in the National Security Risk Assessment. When required, and usually in response to a request from other government departments, the MOD will embed planning staff, permanently or temporarily, to help develop contingency plans.
- b. **Operational.** At the military operational level, HQ SJC(UK) will develop scenario-specific contingency/operation plans for providing Defence support to the civil authorities on UK land mass. Where required, such plans will be validated in conjunction with the civil authorities.
- c. **Tactical.** At the military tactical level, planning support can be delivered by:
  - o regional point of command (RPoC) headquarters and maritime battle staff;
  - o single-Service units across the UK;
  - o a UK standby battalion (UKSB); or
  - o specialist units providing niche capability (for example, air/aviation, communications and logistics).

4.17. Where planners are required, the requesting agency must provide details of the role/task for which the planners are necessary so that the SPO Directorate can assign personnel with the correct knowledge, skills and experience.

## Command and control

4.18. Each Service can provide a command and control capability to complement and support civil authorities responding to a major incident/emergency or when planning for a major national event. Each of the single Services offers differing styles of command and control capability.

- a. **Royal Navy.** Royal Navy vessels (frigates or larger), either at sea or alongside a port, can be used as an effective command and control facility for Category 1 responders during a major incident/emergency or when supporting a major national event. A Royal Navy vessel may provide a primary command and control node, as well as an alternative/back-up or a forward presence. Vessels are equipped with on-board facilities and communication and information systems (CIS) (including secret and above secret); this provides embarked

responders with limited accommodation, meeting/planning rooms and real life support.

- b. **British Army.** The British Army defaults primarily and routinely to the RPoC headquarters and occasionally to the UKSBs to provide a command and control capability in support of the civil authorities. Both these units can plug into civil authority command and control nodes quickly from operational (bronze) through to strategic (gold) level. This capability is routinely practised with civil authorities during multi-agency exercises.
- c. **Royal Air Force.** The RAF can use RAF Force Protection Wing headquarters and RAF Regiment squadrons to provide forward command and control in support of civil authorities. Equipped with organic communications and information systems, these deployable forces can plug-in to a civil authority's command and control nodes. Working to the lead RPoC headquarters or an RAF station when deployed, these self-contained RAF formations have a proven capability working at tactical coordinating group and bronze levels.

## Communications

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4.19. Joint Military Commander Communications Informations Systems (JMC CIS) is held at readiness to support UK operations and delivers information communication services for UK operations.<sup>101</sup> This strategic capability is delivered via a combination of parent unit-based systems and deployable CIS, operated by Regular and Reservist personnel.

4.20. JMC CIS assets assigned to UK operations are held at 48 hours' notice to effect, or less. Reservist readiness depends on a combination of high readiness Reserve, the Regular cadre and Reservist good will. Reservists provided CIS support during Operation Rescript in 2020–21.<sup>102</sup> The SPO Directorate tasks JMC CIS for UK operations. JMC CIS has access to the following capabilities.

- a. Fixed CIS which supports HQ SJC(UK) and the JMC CIS headquarters.

<sup>101</sup> Less special forces and some specific air operations.

<sup>102</sup> Operation Rescript was the Defence name for operations in support of civil authorities in the UK to assist with the COVID-19 response, including outbreak management, community testing and vaccination task forces.

- b. A command support team/immediate response team – which supports small deployed command and control nodes.<sup>103</sup>
  - c. Airwave, which is the Home Office-managed radio system used by emergency services and Defence personnel assigned to UK operations.<sup>104</sup>
  - d. BOWMAN, which supports fixed/deployed locations in the event of a catastrophic failure of the UK communications infrastructure.
  - e. TACIT, which supports the UK's counter-CBRN response.
- 4.21. In addition to JMC CIS, both the Royal Navy and RAF have organic communications capabilities. Royal Navy ships are equipped with CIS that can enhance and interoperate with civil authorities' systems. The RAF communications capability may be used to enable air operations in support of MACA.
- 4.22. When working with other government departments in a collegiate planning role, Defence personnel must consider the limitations of MOD computer systems. Interoperability may require the use of liaison officers to other departments or changes to ways of working.

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## Engineering

- 4.23. **British Army engineering.** British Army engineers offer a breadth of engineering capability that can be used in support of civil authority-led operations in the UK. Many of the skills and equipment in the civilian engineering industry are replicated by the Royal Engineers. These can be deployed into austere environments or situations where local authorities and other government departments lack the integral capability or time to set up contracts with industry. In addition, Commander 8 Engineer Brigade can provide specialist military engineering advice to a joint commander when required or, in certain circumstances, personally assume the role of joint military commander. The Royal Engineers can deliver a variety of reconnaissance activity, including the following.

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103 Command support teams and immediate response teams deliver identical capability. Immediate response teams are staffed by Regulars; whereas, command support teams are staffed by Reservists.

104 Airwave will be replaced in due course by the Emergency Services Network mobile communications programme.

- a. **Initial reconnaissance.** The rapid assessment of general civilian infrastructure and routes. This form of reconnaissance is sufficient to establish whether Defence capability can meet the task required and to determine the level of damage that has been sustained. Initial reconnaissance output is likely to include a site sketch and potential courses of action.
- b. **Detailed infrastructure reconnaissance.** The Royal Engineers have Chartered Engineers in all disciplines (civil, electrical and mechanical) that can conduct detailed technical reconnaissance on damaged and/or at-risk infrastructure. The output from such activity will routinely be a complete, detailed design report.
- c. **Dive reconnaissance.** The Royal Engineers diving capability can conduct underwater reconnaissance, construction and demolition tasks.

4.24. **Survey and mapping.** The Royal Engineers can survey and provide mapping of the UK land mass at short notice. This capability includes a comprehensive geospatial capability with associated production facilities that can deploy and operate in austere locations if required. The Royal Navy does the same in the maritime environment, where it is called a ‘rapid environmental assessment’.

4.25. **Planning and design.** All Royal Engineers units can assist joint regional liaison officers (JRLOs) with resilience planning advice to local authorities and other government departments. Deployment of Royal Engineers advisers to work alongside JRLOs during major incidents has proved highly advantageous. Mobile, detailed design capability can deploy forward to assist civilian authorities where required; this includes the initial reconnaissance skill sets and draughtsmen.

4.26. **Construction.** Royal Engineers capability may be used in rapid repair and access tasks where temporary military solutions can deliver critical access for emergency services and evacuation, or to conduct emergency infrastructure repair. Much of the military equipment, such as bridging assets, may not be suitable for general use by civilians during the recovery phase because they do not comply with local authority health and safety standards.

4.27. **Demolition.** The Royal Engineers possesses the ability to conduct explosive demolitions. Whilst unusual, this capability has been used in the past but can only be deployed where there is absolute necessity.

4.28. **Rapid runway clearance.** The RAF maintain a specialist team at high readiness to provide rapid runway clearance. Capabilities comprise specialist aircraft lifting and towing expertise, aircraft cutting skills and aircraft hazard management.

## UK standby battalions

4.29. The British Army maintains three UKSBs at extremely high readiness to support UK operations. Assigned geographic areas of responsibility, the UKSBs provide Defence with a generalist force of choice to support civil authorities in response to a disruptive challenge or similar event.<sup>105</sup> Since the UKSBs were established in 2011, UKSBs have completed diverse resilience roles, including industrial action mitigation, flood mitigation activities on a number of operations, and testing haulage drivers in the vicinity of the Channel ports during the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2020. In addition, the UKSBs are assigned to support the police with specific security operations in the UK.

4.30. Once activated and deployed, the UKSBs are held under the operational command of the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)). UKSBs have the following characteristics:

- they are agile and can plug into civil authority systems;
- they are adaptable and scalable force packages able to deploy large numbers of trained, disciplined, Defence personnel to a wide range of roles;<sup>106</sup>
- they have up-to-date situational awareness of the UK joint operations area; and
- they have self-contained logistics allowing them to sustain themselves for 48 hours anywhere in the UK.

4.31. On a routine basis UKSBs, in conjunction with the Environment Agency, undertake familiarisation in constructing Environment Agency-owned temporary flood barriers, which can be erected rapidly when required. When deployed operationally, Environment Agency staff will always be present on site, providing direction and oversight.

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105 Comprising: North (Northern England (approximately north of the Mersey to Humber estuaries), Scotland and Northern Ireland); and South 1 and South 2 (south of the Mersey to Humber estuary line). When circumstances require it, the UKSBs can operate outside their assigned areas of responsibility.

106 Ranging from an eight-person section to the entire UKSB of around 400 personnel.

## Fleet ready escort

4.32. The Royal Navy maintains a vessel in the UK marine area at 24 hours' notice to move. The crew are trained in a range of areas, including general MACA and counterterrorism.

## Sustainment

4.33. All three Services can sustain their forces to maintain the necessary level of operational activity for the required duration. This could include, but is not limited to, real life support, protective equipment, transport and medical support. Importantly, deployed personnel would not need to draw on local resources that may be required by the local authority or population, such as food or fuel. Real life support for UK operations comprises catering (including field catering) and accommodation facilities (field showers, deployed laundry facilities, and so on).

## Medical

4.34. Defence maintains a health and medical capability that in certain circumstances may be able to assist with MACA. All military personnel receive a level of basic first aid and combat casualty care training for the purpose of immediate life-saving response to injuries sustained on operations or exercise. This training is designed for military purposes and whilst providing skills for self and buddy care within military teams, it has limited utility in a civilian context.

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Defence can help medical services in times of crisis

4.35. The Defence Medical Services (DMS) maintains military health care services, such as primary health care and rehabilitation within the firm base and deployable medical capability for support to operations and overseas activity. Capabilities include force health protection, pre-hospital emergency care, deployed hospital care and medical evacuation. DMS personnel are employed across a range of health care professions, as well as trained non-vocational military medical technicians and assistants.



### Operation Rescript – medical support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic

During 2020–21, Defence was called upon in several guises to support the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Early in the pandemic Defence provided generalist support to plan and run mobile testing facilities across the UK. In doing so, Defence proved the concept of these mobile testing units, ensuring the system in place was viable before handing the routine running over to a contractor.

More specialist medical capability was provided to assist in the vaccination programme by establishing a vaccination quick reaction force. This vaccination force, staffed with Service personnel who were not committed to the National Health Service (NHS), helped administer an estimated 64,800 vaccines over four months in support of public health.

Other specialist assistance included providing combat medical technicians to the NHS across six integrated care systems in the south east. In this instance, trained medical staff were deployed to support wards, discharge units and emergency departments. They carried out critical care and interventions such as non-invasive ventilation.

These are only a few of the many examples of Defence assistance under Operation Rescript during this period, but they demonstrate some of the diverse tasks that Defence can take on.

4.36. Assistance to MACA may be where an aspect of the NHS<sup>107</sup> is in crisis and under pressure to meet demand, or where a situation would benefit from specific military medical expertise or equipment and contracted provision cannot be provided due to the urgency of the situation, in line with MACA

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107 Inclusive of devolved administrations' NHS organisations.

principles. Examples include providing military personnel to uplift NHS staff, establishing field medical treatment facilities, providing medical teams to operate in hazardous environments or advising on specialist areas such as mass casualty management, disease outbreaks, chemical, biological, radiological and explosive injuries, medical logistics and the provision of care in hostile and austere conditions.

4.37. Some medical capability is embedded within front line command units and are tasked for MACA within Defence operational priorities in the usual manner. However, many Regular and Reserve DMS personnel routinely work within the NHS. The deployment or mobilisation of these staff on a MACA task must be in liaison with the relevant NHS Trust, NHS of the devolved administration or Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) to reconcile the local impact to the NHS of losing (or relocating) that capability.

## Transport

4.38. Defence maintains an array of transport that is able to operate on water, land and in the air, to move both people and materiel to where they are needed. This capability has wide utility when supporting MACA, including the rapid movement of military forces and specialist equipment into an area and, in extremis, to help evacuate civilians away from a place of danger or threat. The SPO Directorate will approach the appropriate single-Service tasking authority to task transport in support of MACA. Each Service contributes to this capability.

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a. **Royal Navy.** The Royal Navy's transport includes ships, maritime helicopters (adapted to use over water), patrol boats and small boats (rigid inflatable boats) capable of operating in the open ocean and the littoral (including inland waterways). Within the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines provide landing craft and amphibious vehicles that can lift vehicles, personnel and equipment. The Royal Marines also have vehicles that can wade in deep water.

b. **British Army.** The British Army's transport includes bulk equipment and personnel lift vehicles, small boats and helicopters.

c. **Royal Air Force.** The RAF's transport includes bulk equipment and personnel lift vehicles, mechanical handling equipment and heavy equipment transporters for use on the land, and a range of aircraft, including helicopters which can rapidly move personnel and materiel around the UK.



## Delivering oxygen to hospitals during Operation Rescript, March to April 2020

In late March 2020, during the initial phases of Operation Rescript, a request was received from DHSC for the military to provide support to reinforce and guarantee the continuity of the supply of oxygen into NHS hospitals. At that time, demand for oxygen was rising not only due to increased use within established hospital facilities, but also to equip the emerging Nightingale facilities. DHSC's specific request was for support in the form of qualified tanker drivers to meet this additional demand and mitigate anticipated civilian and commercial sector staff shortages caused through illness and enforced self-isolation.

Working with the two largest suppliers of medical oxygen in the UK, Defence fuels experts from HQ SJC(UK) designed a training programme to rapidly re-role elements of the Operation Escalin (Defence's role in ensuring the UK's fuel distribution) cadre of trained fuel tanker drivers. Upon completing this mission-specific training, Defence personnel deployed to undertake 39 days of driving effort, supplying hospitals throughout England and Wales, whilst the headquarters continued to support an industry-led solution, matching suitably-qualified civilian drivers from allied industries (whose own work had been suspended due to the pandemic) with the requirement of this task. Costs for this support were recovered in line with the broader Operation Rescript approach.



## Defence estate

4.39. The MOD owns and operates a diverse estate totalling 452,000 hectares, making it one of the largest landowners in the UK.<sup>108</sup> Defence's estate comprises:

- training areas;
- firing ranges;
- transit camps;
- naval bases;
- army barracks;
- airfields;
- Service families' accommodation; and
- Defence facilities.

4.40. Top level budget (TLB) holders are responsible for their infrastructure and will need to be consulted before any Defence estate can be released for a MACA operation. The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) is responsible for providing advice and delivering services in support of Defence infrastructure. To assess the full impact of any operation on infrastructure, advice will have to be sought from both the TLB holder and DIO.

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4.41. During an emergency, or when planning for a major national event, early consideration should be given to the potential use of Defence's estate. This may include forward mounting assets (both Defence and civil authorities), temporary accommodation for personnel, catering services (both on and off site), and storage for equipment and materiel. Early engagement with the DIO military liaison officer, Reserve Forces and Cadets Association and respective TLB holders through the SPO Directorate will confirm that the required Defence estate, and the infrastructure present is available, properly authorised for use, fit for the intended purpose, and that the suggested activity can be supported through existing contracts with MOD industry partners.<sup>109</sup> While heads of establishment command individual sites, they are not considered infrastructure specialists. In all such instances, and prior to a plan being enacted, advice and guidance should be sought from the local DIO site representative.

<sup>108</sup> This equates to 1.8% of the total UK land mass.

<sup>109</sup> While general principles of cost recovery apply to resilience and security operations, MOD industry partners who supply services outside the scope of their contract will invariably seek to recover additional costs from civil authorities.

4.42. Rationalisation of Defence's estate will lead to a 30% reduction in built estate by 2040.<sup>110</sup> This may impact longer-term civil authority emergency/major incident contingency plans. On a case-by-case basis, where Defence estate is used to support longer-term contingency plans, a memorandum of understanding or memorandum of temporary occupation may be required. The SPO Directorate will lead on drawing up the memorandum of understanding, supported by MOD legal advisers, in conjunction with the relevant legal department of the civil authority. Together they will draft such memoranda to formalise arrangements (for example, clarify payment for services, terms of occupancy and financial/legal liabilities).



#### Operation Trelawny – Security operation in support of the G7 Summit in St Ives, June 2021

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The UK's presidency of the Group of Seven nations (G7) saw the body's annual summit take place in the Carbis Bay resort near St Ives in Cornwall. A significant enhancement was required to existing facilities at the resort and elsewhere to allow the G7 Summit to take place. As part of the wider police-led security plan, all vehicles entering the G7 venues required screening by police and security staff at a remote vehicle search site (RVSS) at Hayle Rugby Club. However, one week before the Summit took place it was discovered that the Hayle RVSS could not accommodate light and heavy goods vehicles (HGVs); this resulted in a serious but unexpected security issue.

Through the RAF Regional Liaison Officer (RAFRLO) for the south west, Defence was able to offer an alternate solution to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in the form of RAF Portreath, a military radar site near the venue. The site was surveyed by the FCDO's contractor, supported by Devon and Cornwall Police, seven days before the start of the G7 Summit, followed by a rapid build and test. The JRLO and RAFRLO were instrumental in progressing the use of the site under a DIO licence as the most expedient method of assuring access to the site as well as payment to the MOD. The RVSS was built midweek and became operational by the required deadline, allowing over 90 HGVs to be searched and sealed enabling them to safely enter the Summit venues and offload the equipment needed to support the international event.

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<sup>110</sup> Defence estate is divided between rural estate (training areas/firing ranges) and built estate (naval bases/airfields/barracks) on a ratio of 83% to 17% respectively.

## Counter-chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

4.43. In the event of an incident involving CBRN activity, Defence can bring together a counter-CBRN response from military and scientific agencies in consultation with the civil authorities. Details of this response are beyond the classification of this publication.

### Operation Morlop – Nerve agent attack in Salisbury



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On 4 March 2018, a former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, Yulia, were discovered unconscious in the centre of Salisbury having been poisoned by Novichok nerve agent. As the counterterrorism investigation progressed, it became clear that a trail of the deadly nerve agent had spread from the original point of poisoning at the Skripal's residence and subsequently across the city and beyond. Responding to a MACA request from the Counterterrorism Command for military support, 180 personnel deployed to initially help the investigation by preventing the spread of the agent and then, in support of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) as the lead government department, remediate any items including vehicles, buildings or areas that may have been contaminated. These specialists came from across Defence including: 20 (Defence CBRN) Wing, RAF Regiment; 29 Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Search Group; Falcon Squadron, Royal Tank Regiment; and from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl). On 30 June 2018, Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were found poisoned by the same nerve agent at a property in Amesbury, some seven miles away, generating a similar response from the military.

Operation Morlop supported the Home Office investigation and the Defra remediation – often simultaneously which required deconfliction of the competing demands from both government departments, removing 36 vehicles, cleaning 12 complex sites, taking 7,200 analytical samples and spending over 13,000 hours in CBRN personal protective equipment. Marginal costs were charged for support to the investigation whilst full costs were charged for the remediation work. The military element of the task was closed on 1 March 2019 after 356 days on task.



The Royal Navy maintains a fire and rescue capability for its own vessels

## Fire and rescue

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4.44. Defence Fire and Rescue (DFR) is Defence's professional fire and rescue capability, primarily in support of Defence airfields. DFR units are based throughout the UK, often in geographically remote locations.

4.45. Under MACA immediate assistance arrangements, DFR<sup>111</sup> assets can respond to life-threatening incidents when local authority fire and rescue services are unable to provide an effective and timely life-saving response.<sup>112</sup> Following normal MACA arrangements, DFR units may respond to support local authority fire and rescue services and national resilience assets, and/or be requested to attend major incidents or emergencies to provide specialist advice on using DFR capability. The DFR duty officer acts as the focal point for advice and requests for both assistance and attendance. Except for responding to natural disaster events where life is at risk, or there is a need to alleviate distress or to protect significant property, the deployment of DFR assets will remain subject to ministerial authorisation.

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111 DFR remain the service provider for the fire and rescue provision to Defence. The DFR service has a contract with Capita to meet part of this requirement. Irrespective of the capability used, all MACA requests must be made through Headquarters DFR.

112 Any support to the local authority fire and rescue services will depend on the capacity of the DFR unit to maintain its primary output in support of flying operations.

4.46. The Royal Navy maintains a maritime fire and rescue capability for its own vessels. In certain circumstances this capability may be used to assist in MACA.

## Non-specialist capability

4.47. When responding to major incidents and emergencies and planning for national events, Defence may need to consider deploying large numbers of non-specialist personnel to support the civil authorities across a wide area or multiple locations. This was the case during Operation Pitchpole in 2014 (Defence's support to flooding across much of southern England) and Operation Olympics in 2012. The Defence contribution may comprise personnel from formed units and non-formed units.

- a. **Formed units.** Formed units have the advantage of deploying with established command chains and potentially organic communications, logistics and mobility.
- b. **Non-formed units.** Non-formed unit personnel are classified in military terms as individual augmentees, who are drawn from across a single Service. They form together for the duration of the task, under a nominated command chain/structure and are reliant on external military formations for real life support, logistics and mobility. SPO Directorate staff work closely with the single-Service commands and Strategic Command during the force generation of non-specialist personnel to ensure they are not overmatched by the task.

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# Section 2 – Education and training

## Training governance

4.48. The SPO Directorate is the strategic lead for UK operations training and exercising within Defence. Direction and guidance are provided annually through the Training Management Group mechanism, with representation from across Defence.<sup>113</sup> The Training Management Group's remit is to coordinate all Defence resilience and UK operations training and exercising.

<sup>113</sup> Representatives from: the SPO Directorate; HQ SJC(UK); single-Service commands; and Defence agencies/organisations (for example, Dstl and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)).

4.49. Within Defence, HQ SJC(UK) provides the operational-level, land-based lead for resilience and UK operations education, training and exercising. The Royal Navy conducts its own resilience training and exercises. Direction is issued annually through the HQ SJC(UK) training and exercising directive. The HQ SJC(UK) fulfils the Joint Service Training Requirement Authority for all resilience individual education and training. Moreover, HQ SJC(UK) is responsible for programming and supervising resilience exercises across Defence.

4.50. At the Defence tactical level, the British Army's Headquarters Regional Command (HQ RC) serves as the single-Service Training Delivery Authority<sup>114</sup> for all resilience and UK operations activities.<sup>115</sup> HQ RC assists HQ SJC(UK) develop, programme and resource training, helped by the single-Service commands. The British Army's RPoCs provide the focal point for resilience training with civil authorities at the regional and local level.

## Working with other government departments

4.51. Defence is not listed as a categorised responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. However, although not a statutory requirement, Defence conducts resilience training with the civil authorities across a range of scenarios and in a number of formats that include:

- table top exercises;
- command post exercises;
- field training exercises; and
- study and briefing days.

4.52. Lead government departments are responsible for their internal resilience training and exercising, but cross-government resilience training and exercising is coordinated and supported by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. Within the SPO Directorate, the UK Operations Team provides the MOD's input to this. When invited and appropriate, the MOD will support all cross-government resilience exercises, from national to local level. At the

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114 JSP 822 also states that the Training Development Authority must be distinct from the Training Requirement Authority and is the organisation responsible for training delivery, but not always for the actual training itself.

115 Except for specialist activity such as EOD.

national level, this includes Tier 1 and Tier 2 exercises, while at the local level this will likely comprise RPoC headquarters or sub-units supporting local resilience forum exercises/training events.

### Multi-agency gold incident command course, Derby, June 2021



On an annual basis the MOD directs the HQ SJC(UK) in its capacity as Defence's Joint Training Requirements Authority for resilience training to design and deliver an extensive programme of individual resilience training. HQ SJC(UK) is further tasked to oversee the British Army's HQ RC's delivery of biennial resilience mission rehearsal exercises (MRXs), assuring the ability of the British Army's RPoC to plan and conduct resilience operations in support of the civil authorities. With regards to individual training, in addition to a programme of internally delivered training for Defence resilience practitioners, HQ SJC(UK) directs the attendance of MOD personnel on civil authority training courses, such as the College of Policing's multi-agency gold incident command (MAGIC) course, which is designed to prepare senior emergency services personnel for the challenges of command in response to disruptive challenges in the UK.



## Training categories

4.53. Defence resilience training comprises three categories:

- education;
- individual training; and
- collective training.

Annex 4A provides an outline of each training category.

4.54. The underlying cost recovery principle that will be applied is that Defence support to civil authority-led training events may be charged at marginal cost or waived altogether. HQ SJC(UK) issues direction when required; clarification/advice should be sought by the requesting civil authorities from the JRLO in the first instance.<sup>116</sup>

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116 Royal Navy regional liaison officers (RNRLOs) and RAFRLOs are equally able to provide direction and guidance.

## Key points

- SPO Directorate staff work closely with single-Service commands to identify the best-placed Defence capability to support a request.
- Defence maintains a joint, rapidly deployable EOD&S capability to counter threats from explosive ordnance hazards.
- Defence ISR capability provides situational awareness, upon which timely and effective decisions and plans can be made.
- Defence planning staffs are well-versed, trained and practised in the principles of planning to meet specific strategic objectives.
- Defence can provide a command and control capability to complement and support the civil authorities during an incident or when planning for a major national event.
- Military engineers offer a wide breadth of engineering capability that can be used on resilience operations in support of the civil authorities.
- The UKSBs are held at extremely high readiness and provide generalist support to UK operations.
- Early consideration should be given to the potential use of Defence estate in consultation with the DIO to support MACA.
- In the event of an incident involving CBRN activity, Defence can bring together a counter-CBRN response from military and scientific agencies in consultation with civil authorities.
- Defence conducts resilience training with the civil authorities on a range of scenarios.

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## Annex 4A

# Categories of Defence training

## Education

Title	Description	Sponsor/delivery
Cross-government briefing day	<p><b>Aim:</b> educate non-military government audiences on how and what Defence contributes to resilience in the UK.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> ministers, civil servants from lead government departments.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> briefing day/twice a year.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> MOD's SPO Directorate – UK Operations Team</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p>
Devolved government to local-level MACA briefing and awareness days	<p><b>Aim:</b> educate key non-Defence personnel in devolved administrations down to the local level on how and what Defence contributes to resilience in the UK, focused especially on their area of responsibility.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> ministers, civil servants from lead government departments.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> briefing day/four times a year.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK) supported by Defence regional liaison officers as required</p>
Defence contribution to resilience course – Level 3	<p><b>Aim:</b> educate a Defence audience on MACA in the UK responding to a disruptive challenge at the national, devolved administration and regional levels.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> middle/senior ranked Defence personnel, uniformed and non-uniformed, with a resilience role.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> two-day residential course/six times a year.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p>

Title	Description	Sponsor/delivery
Defence contribution to resilience course – Level 2	<p><b>Aim:</b> educate a Defence audience on MACA in the UK responding to a range of disruptive challenges but specific to a region.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> military personnel from the three Services with a resilience role.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> one-and-a-half-day course/at least annually.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> RPoC supported by RNRLOs and RAFLRs</p>

## Individual training

Title	Description	Sponsor/delivery
Counterterrorist training	<p><b>Aim:</b> prepare a Defence audience for specific counterterrorism operations.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> Defence personnel from the Royal Navy, British Army and RAF assigned to counterterrorism operations.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> rigorous training to ensure Defence personnel meet the exacting operational standards required by the UK government and police.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> MOD's SPO Directorate – UK Operations Team</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> units assigned to the specific counterterrorism operation</p>
Miscellaneous	<p>There remains a regular requirement to deliver focused, occasionally operation-specific, training and education to a wide range of Defence and non-Defence audiences. Objectives and content will be determined on a case-by-case basis.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p>
Royal Navy Unit Training	<p><b>Aim:</b> train and exercise Royal Navy units in disaster relief and MACA.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> Royal Navy units.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> training at Fleet Operational Sea Training/building on individual training.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> Navy Command</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> Fleet Operational Sea Training.</p>

4A

## Collective training – generic

Title	Description	Sponsor/delivery
Study days	<p><b>Aim:</b> educate/exercise operational-level and formation headquarters in their resilience role.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> military operational-level and formation headquarters staff.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> raise awareness through briefings/seminars of a scenario drawn from the National Security Risk Assessment. HQ SJC(UK)/RPoC will each conduct at least one study day per annum.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK)/RPoC</p>
Other events	<p><b>Aim:</b> raise awareness/educate Defence personnel on civil authority resilience capabilities and roles.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> Defence personnel, usually drawn from HQ SJC(UK), RPoC, regional liaison officers and UKSBs.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> support to/participate in civil authorities running field/live exercises.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK), RPoC and/or UKSB</p>
Resilience MRX	<p><b>Aim:</b> assess the ability of RPoC headquarters to plan and conduct operations in support of civil authorities in the UK.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> RPoC headquarters staffs – whole force approach (Regulars, Reservists, civil servants and contractors).</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> MRXs are planned, prepared and delivered by HQ RC staff and last usually for up to five days. MRXs are preceded by a defined programme of preparatory events and exercises, including planning conferences and a two-day long preparatory procedural exercise designed to practise RPoC staffs in planning and conduct of UK operations.<sup>117</sup></p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ RC</p>

<sup>117</sup> RPoC will run one unassured exercise in the years in which a formal resilience MRX is not conducted.

## Collective training – mission specific

Title	Description	Sponsor/delivery
Scenario specific training	<p><b>Aim:</b> analyse and refine a Defence response to a specific scenario/event.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> Defence personnel from RPoC, UKSB or a unit assigned a resilience role.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> multi-agency table top exercise/command post exercise/field training exercise based on a scenario likely drawn from the National Security Risk Assessment.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> MOD's SPO Directorate – UK Operations Team</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK)/RPoC</p>
Rehearsal of concept drills	<p><b>Aim:</b> rehearse impending security/resilience operation prior to deployment.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> key unit commanders and staff with responsibility for executing the plan. If able to, this should include multi-agency representation.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> end-to-end review and confirmation of the prepared plan; ideally this should have multi-agency participation to aid understanding.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> HQ SJC(UK)/unit assigned to the contingency operation (for example, UKSB)</p>
All ranks briefings	<p><b>Aim:</b> inform/update a Defence audience assigned to a contingency operation in support of the civil authorities.</p> <p><b>Audience:</b> Defence personnel assigned to a specific contingency operation in support of the civil authorities.</p> <p><b>Activity:</b> either immediately prior to deployment, or by standard arrangement a structured brief explaining the situation, MACA policy, role and likely tasks.</p>	<p><b>Sponsor:</b> HQ SJC(UK)</p> <p><b>Delivery:</b> unit assigned to the contingency operation (for example, UKSB)</p>

4A

## Notes

4A

# Lexicon

## Section 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Arrangement
AJP	Allied joint publication
AOC 11 Gp	Air Officer Commanding 11 Group
AP	Air Publication
APCM	aircraft post-crash management
AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment
BEIS	Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CBRNe	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives
CCA 04	Civil Contingencies Act 2004
CCD	Civil Contingencies Division
CCG (NI)	Civil Contingencies Group (Northern Ireland)
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CIS	communication and information systems
CNI	critical national infrastructure
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
COBR (M)	Cabinet Office Briefing Room (Ministerial)
COMOPS	Commander Operations
C-UAS	counter-unmanned aircraft system
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DCMS	Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
DE&S	Defence Equipment and Support
DefCNI	Defence critical national infrastructure
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DfE	Department for Education
DFR	Defence Fire and Rescue
DHSC	Department for Health and Social Care
DIO	Defence Infrastructure Organisation
DLUHC	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
DMS	Defence Medical Services

DNEO	Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation
DNO	Defence Nuclear Organisation
DOC	departmental operations cell
Dstl	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
EA	Environment Agency
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EOD&S	explosive ordnance disposal and search
EPG	emergency preparedness group
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
G7	Group of Seven
HGV	heavy goods vehicle
HM	Her Majesty's
HQ RC	Headquarters Regional Command
HQ SJC(UK)	Headquarters Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom)
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
IMG	Information Manoeuvre Group
ISR	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JARTS	Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron
JDP	joint doctrine publication
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles
JMC CIS	Joint Military Commander Communications Informations Systems
JMC	joint military commander
JMC NI	Joint Military Commander Northern Ireland
JMOCC	Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre
JRLO	joint regional liaison officer
JSP	joint Service publication
LGD	lead government department
LIPD	Logistics Implementation Policy Document
LOC	lines of communication
LRF	local resilience forum
LRP	local resilience partnership
MACA	military aid to the civil authorities

MACR	Major Accident Control Regulations
MAGIC	multi-agency gold incident command
MAIB	Marine Accident Investigation Branch
MCA	MOD Coordinating Authority
MLO	military liaison officer
MOC	Maritime Operations Centre
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MRS	[RAF] Mountain Rescue Service
MRX	mission rehearsal exercise
MSMO	military support to the mounting of operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHS	National Health Service
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
NMIC	National Maritime Information Centre
NRC	naval regional commander
ODCR	observation, discussion, conclusion, recommendation
Ofcom	Office of Communications
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAFRLO	Royal Air Force regional liaison officer
RFCA	Reserve Forces and Cadets Association
RLO	regional liaison officer
RNRLO	Royal Navy regional liaison officer
RPoC	regional point of command
RRP	regional resilience partnership
RSD	Reserve Service Days
RVSS	remote vehicle search site
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SALMO	specialist team for salvage and maritime operations
SAR	search and rescue
SCG	strategic coordinating group
SGoRR	Scottish Government Resilience Room
SJC(UK)	Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom)
SPO	Security Policy and Operations

TLB	top level budget
UK	United Kingdom
UKSB	UK standby battalion
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	United States
VAT	value added tax

## Section 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into two parts. First, we list terms and their descriptions that are used as reference for this publication only. Second, we list endorsed terms and their definitions which may be helpful to the reader.

### Definitions used for reference in this publication only

#### **emergency (or disruptive challenge)**

An emergency (or disruptive challenge) as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is a situation or series of events that threatens or causes serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security in the United Kingdom. (*Cabinet Office, UK Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency*, 2010)

#### **hazard**

Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e. non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or to economic, social and political structures.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

#### **indemnity**

Security against or exemption from legal responsibility for one's actions. (*Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, 12th Edition, 2011)

#### **lead government department**

Department of the UK government or devolved administration designated as responsible for overall management of the government response to an emergency or disaster. There are lead government departments identified for both the response and recovery phases of emergencies.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

#### **liability**

A thing for which someone is liable, especially a financial obligation. (*Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, 12th Edition, 2011)

#### **major incident**

Event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services major incident plans.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

### **recovery**

The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

### **resilience**

Ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

### **response**

Decisions and actions taken in accordance with the strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by the emergency responders. At a high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of an emergency and create the condition for a return to normality.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

### **risk**

Measure of the significance of a potential emergency in terms of its assessed likelihood and impact.

(Cabinet Office, *UK Civil Protection Lexicon*, Version 2.1.1, February 2013)

The [\*UK Civil Protection Lexicon\*](#) can be accessed via the Gov.uk website.

## **Endorsed definitions**

### **military aid to the civil authorities**

Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority.

Note: These operations are subject to Defence Ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event, except in immediate risk of life situations.

(JDP 0-01.1, *UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm*)

### **notice to move**

A warning order that specifies the time given to a unit or headquarters to be ready to deploy.

Note: This order normally precedes an order to move and may increase or decrease the time to prepare. (NATOTerm)

**readiness**

The period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when the headquarters or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward) deployed or ready for deployment.

(JDP 0-01.1, *UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm*)

**security**

The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism and damage, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. (*NATOTerm*)

Note: whilst this NATO definition of security is wide ranging, this JDP explains Defence activities in support of the civil authorities in the UK responding to disruptive challenges identified by the Cabinet Office.



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