

Do Diversionary Incentives Affect Korea-Japan Historical Disputes?*

Wonjae Hwang**
Misa Nishikawa***

Do diversionary incentives affect Korea-Japan historical disputes? We argue that Japanese political leaders use diversionary foreign policy, when public approval ratings are low and the government at the legislative level is weak. However, when the government is strong, approval ratings do not necessarily drive such diversionary behavior. We support our claims by testing the hypothesis using the data on Korea-Japan historical disputes and hostile actions between 1998

* This work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies (KSPS) Grant funded by the Korean Government (MEST) (AKS-2012-AAZ-2101). The authors would like to thank T.Y. Wang, Ko Maeda, the KOREA OBSERVER editorial team, and anonymous reviewers for their invaluable contribution to the research.

** Wonjae Hwang is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, U.S.A. He has a book publication ("South Korea's Changing Foreign Policy") at Lexington Books (2017). His publications also appear in *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *International Interactions*, *Asian Survey*, and *Asian Perspective* among others.

*** Misa Nishikawa is Associate Professor of Political Science at Ball State University, Muncie, IN, U.S.A. She has published a book, entitled *Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences* (Palgrave Macmillan 2005). She has also published numerous papers in this area, which have appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Electoral Studies*, *Party Politics*, *Women and Politics*, *International Political Science Review*, and the *Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies*.

and 2016. The findings improve our understanding of the diversionary use of foreign policy in general and the effects of Japanese domestic politics on the historical disputes, specifically.

Key Words: Korea, Japan, Historical Disputes, diversionary use of force, government strength

I. Introduction

It is well known that there exists a high level of mutual animosity and emotional confrontation between South Korea (Republic of Korea, hereafter Korea) and Japan originating from historical disputes and their colonized-colonizer relations in the early twentieth century. Such disputes include mutual territorial claims over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands (hereafter Dokdo) and Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war criminals, including 14 Class-A war criminals, are memorialized. According to surveys conducted in 2014 (Kang, 2015),¹ 79 percent of Korean respondents express their negative views on Japan,² while only 15 percent of them express positive views on Japan. Similarly, 59.7 percent of Japanese respondents are negative about Korea, while only 14.3 percent are positive about Korea. Japanese negative views on Korea worsened in particular after Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited Dokdo in August 2012.

With such high levels of emotional confrontation and sensitivity to historical disputes, it would not be unreasonable to expect that Korea-Japan historical disputes affect domestic politics on both sides. According to the literature on the diversionary use of foreign policy, domestic along with international environments drive political leaders to divert public and elite attention from internal problems towards

1. The survey on Koreans was conducted for the BBC World Service in 2014. The survey on Japanese was conducted by Samjong KPMG and commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea in October/November, 2014.
2. The global average is 29 percent for the negative and 48 percent for positive views.

external crises by engaging in international conflict (e.g., Brulé and Hwang, 2010; Fordham, 1998; Morgan and Bickers, 1992). Since external crises, especially territorial disputes over lands, waters, and islands, can easily stimulate nationalist sentiments among citizens and/or promote internal solidarity around political leadership among the public and elites, political leaders have incentives to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior especially when domestic political situations are deteriorating for the leadership. Yet, few empirical studies have examined whether and under what conditions diversionary incentives influence Japan's foreign policies toward Korea, which is the issue we address in this paper.³ By exploring government strength at the legislative level as an important factor that promotes diversionary incentives, this study contributes to the literature on diversionary foreign policy in general and understanding of the effects of Japanese domestic politics on foreign policy, specifically.⁴

3. Exceptions are found in the work done by Cheung (2010), Kwon (2016), and Nicholis and his colleagues (Nicholis, Huth, and Appel, 2010). Kwon (2016) argues that Japanese conservative politicians tend to use the Takeshima issue as a way of appealing to nationalist sentiments in the hope of boosting cabinet popularity ratings and diverting public attention from domestic difficulties. Similarly, Nicholis et al. (2010) claim that when a Japanese incumbent leader is threatened with the loss of political support within the winning coalition, the leader tends to use diversionary foreign policies. Although the argument and findings are strongly associated with this paper, the latter work is limited in that it covers a period before 1942 only. This study focuses on Korea as a target of Japan's diversionary foreign policy. This is because of their colonizer-colonized state experience, neighboring relations with high economic and military importance, and various ongoing historical issues. Future work will benefit by exploring Japan's diversionary foreign policy toward other countries such as China.
4. Of course, it is also necessary to examine Korean political leaders' incentives to engage in historical disputes with Japan. In fact, previous work reports that diversionary incentives or expectation of rally effects are important factors in explaining Korea's engagement in historical disputes with Japan (Hwang, Cho, and Wiegand, 2017; Ye and Park, 2006). Nevertheless, few studies examine whether and under what conditions diversionary incentives drive Japan's foreign policies in particular toward Korea. In this regard, this work contributes to the literature by highlighting the existence of diversionary incentives of Japan in historical disputes with Korea.

We claim that Japanese political leaders are likely to engage in events of historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea as Japanese cabinet approval ratings decline. However, this tendency is seen only when government strength in the legislature is relatively weak. In comparison to strong governments, weak governments, such as a coalition government with multiple political parties and factions, invite more agents and veto players and, thus, are under high pressure to meet diverse policy demand from groups of the winning coalition, especially in a parliamentary system like the National Diet in Japan (De Hann, Sturm, and Beekhuis, 1999; Tsebelis, 1995).

In particular, weak governments become more vulnerable and sensitive to demands, criticism, and challenges from different parties and factions within governmental parties as the job performance ratings by the public deteriorate. In this case, political leaders in the government, such as Japanese prime ministers, have difficulty in maintaining their power bases in the government and effectively pursuing their key policies. Political leaders in weak governments, as a result, have strong incentives to utilize diversionary foreign policy to seek intra- and extra-party support for their leadership and, hence, solidify their power bases against factions and groups within the government (Nicholis et al., 2010).⁵

When the Japanese government maintains relatively high levels of power, in contrast, public approval ratings are not likely to affect diversionary behavior. Relatively strong governments are less vulnerable to public approval ratings, demands, and criticism from members of the government than weaker governments. Political leaders do not have strong incentives to utilize external crises as a way of strengthening their power bases in domestic politics. To empirically test these claims, we examine Japan's initiation of historical dispute or hostile actions against Korea between 1998 and 2016. The empirical findings support our claims.

5. Specifically, intra-party support for the leadership is about generating support across different factions within a political party. Extra-party support is about eliciting support from non-party members of the political leader's party who are mostly conservative and nationalistic.

In the following sections, we first examine historical disputes in Korea-Japan relations. Next, we outline the diversionary theory and explore how Japanese domestic political conditions can promote the initiation of historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea. We then discuss our research design, data, and variables used in this paper. Finally, we present the empirical results and conclude with a summary of the findings and their implications.

II. Korea-Japan Historical Disputes

Historical disputes between Korea and Japan are disputes related to the debate of whether Japan has rectified historical wrongs and provided sufficient and correct acknowledgements and apologies for atrocities and past suffering experienced by the Koreans during the Japanese colonial occupation from 1910 to 1945. Specific issues disputed include the ownership of the Dokdo Islands and disagreements on Japanese textbooks that describe Japanese imperialism and its treatment of Koreans during the colonial period. Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine⁶ especially since 1990s have been interpreted by Koreans as Japan's effort to promote historical revisionism or glorify Japan's imperialist past (Cheng, 2010). For Japanese, in particular Japanese conservatives, the Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of the modern Japanese history and their tradition and identity (Shibuichi, 2005), and Korea's negative reactions to Japanese politicians visiting the shrine are considered as an interference of domestic affairs. For many Japanese, prime ministers' visits to the shrine are not considered as hostile actions against Korea and are only weakly related to historical issues with neighboring states. Nevertheless, since the visits provoke angry reactions and severe criticism from Korea and other neighboring states, the 'perceived' hostile actions may require Japanese leaders to pay high international political costs.

In particular, Korea-Japan historical disputes have been centered

6. About 2.5 million Japanese war dead including 14 top war criminals during the Second World War are honored in the shrine.

on the ownership of the Dokdo Islands. Since Japan's claim of the islands ignites "deeply ingrained collective memory of past injustice" among Koreans (Khalil, 2012: 337) and is also associated with the debate on the legality of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910, the territorial issue is considered as related to historical disputes.

Each side has maintained a very firm position on the territorial issue, continuously claiming its sovereignty over the islands. Since 1952, Korea has maintained effective control of the islands by declaring 'the Peace Line', which claimed Korean sovereignty over much of the East Sea including the islands, and building a coast guard station there. Korea claims that its ownership of the islands is evident based on numerous historical documents dating back to 512 AD and contends that "Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, 2012, n.p.)

On the other hand, Japan claims that Dokdo was *Terra Nullis* until 1905, when the Japanese government incorporated them into Shimane Prefecture (Van Dyke, 2007). Japan also argues that Korea's claim over the islands proves to be invalid in the diplomatic documents disclosed by the U.S., when the U.S. rejected Korea's request to add Dokdo to the territories to be renounced by Japan in the process of drafting the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952.

There were several notable incidents associated with the Japanese claim over the islands. Shimane prefecture of Japan announced a "Takeshima Day" in 2005, which unilaterally declares and celebrates the belonging of Dokdo under the jurisdiction of the Shimane prefecture in 1905. In April 2006, the Japanese Coast Guard announced plans to dispatch maritime survey ships to the waters around Dokdo. In response to Japan's actions, Korea deployed surveillance planes and 20 naval and coast guard vessels into the disputed area. In 2008, the Japanese government ordered textbook publishers to assert Japanese ownership of the islands (Koo, 2010). As a protest against this action, Korea withdrew its ambassador to Japan. In 2012, when Lee Myung-bak visited Dokdo, the first time a Korean president ever visited the disputed islands, it prompted strong protests from Japan.

Since disputes over territory are likely to be connected to military confrontations and thus patriotic sentiments, the islands have gained significant nationalist and symbolic value among many Japanese people as well as Koreans.

Ironically, however, despite historical disputes and occasional deadlocks in bilateral relations, Japan and Korea have overall maintained a very close cooperative relationship at the national level. For example, as joint efforts to respond to North Korea's nuclear weapon and missile programs, Korea and Japan signed the trilateral information-sharing agreement with the U.S. in December 2014. Both governments compromised and signed a joint fisheries agreement that established a joint-use fishing zone around Dokdo in 1998. Economically, the two neighboring states have been important trade and investment partners with each other for a long time. For example, between 1993 and 2013, Japan was the second largest trade partner for Korea.

In terms of foreign policy preferences, Japan and Korea are quite similar. Between 1991 and 2012, the average Korea-Japan vote congruence rate in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was 48.5 percent (joint voting of yes or no) or 76.8 percent (joint voting of yes, no, or abstention), which was higher than rates with any other neighboring states.⁷ Similarly, according to ideal points estimated by Bailey and his colleagues based on UNGA voting results between 1991 and 2014 (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017), Japan and Korea reveal almost identical foreign policy preferences.⁸ Simply put, due to economic and security related national concerns, Korea and Japan have a strong interest in maintaining positive relations with each other and,

7. For example, according to the authors' calculation, Korea-U.S. vote congruence rate was 24.3 percent (yes or no votes only) or 29.6 percent (yes, no, or abstention) during the same period. Japan-U.S. vote congruence rate was 31.2 percent (yes or no votes only) or 35.5 percent (yes, no, or abstention).

8. The difference in Korea-Japan ideal points was only about 0.22, while Korea-U.S., Korea-China, and Korea-North Korea ideal point differences were 2.15, 2.27, and 1.42 respectively. The differences in Japan-U.S., Japan-North Korea, and Japan-China relations were 1.96, 2.46, and 1.61 respectively. Almost identical foreign policy preferences between Korea and Japan imply that they are very likely to cooperate with each other over diverse foreign policy issues.

hence, have an incentive to avoid conflict resulting from historical disputes that may deteriorate their relations. Therefore, it is hard to explain why historical disputes and hostile actions between Korea and Japan frequently occur in particular since 1990s.

In this regard, this study explores how domestic political environments in Japan affect its initiation of historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea. Since high levels of emotional tension arising from external historical disputes can easily penetrate into the minds and hearts of the citizens,⁹ in particular ideologically nationalistic conservatives, it is reasonable to suspect that rational politicians develop diversionary incentives to influence partisan and legislative politics.¹⁰

9. However, when it comes to the issue of comfort women during the Second World War, Japanese leaders do not enjoy much public support. For example, when Toru Hashimoto, the co-leader of Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Restoration Party), who was also the mayor of the city of Osaka, stated that "comfort women were necessary" in a press conference on May 13, 2013, he faced serious criticism both internally and externally partly because of his ignorance of the crime and partly because of his support of prostitution in general. Hakubun Shimomura, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, criticized Hashimoto saying that this type of statement should not be coming from the leader of a political party. Tomomi Inada, Minister of State for Regulatory Reform, also criticized that his statement weakens women's human rights. His party's popularity declined from 2.4 percent in May to 1.5 percent in June 2013 (NHK Monthly public opinion poll). In the 2013 Upper House election, held in July, only four candidates out of 44 won seats, although the party members expected to win 10 seats. The party members criticized the leadership for their loss (The Japan Times, July 22, 2013). Although Hashimoto was once a very popular politician, his statement took the momentum away from establishing a party at the national level. Likewise, the comfort women issue cannot be used effectively as a diversionary tool in Japan. In addition, since this paper analyzes Japan's initiation of historical disputes toward Korea, the comfort women issue is mostly dropped in the data of analysis.

10. Historical disputes can also be explained in part by Japan's historical revisionism. In particular, it can be argued that prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and revisionist narrative in Japanese history textbooks are influenced by Japan's historical revisionism to some extent. Nevertheless, assessing the link is beyond the scope of this paper. The purpose of this study is to explore how domestic political environments in Japan affect its initiation of historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea.

III. Government Strength and Diversionary Incentives of Initiating Disputes

The literature on diversionary foreign policy focuses on the questions of whether domestic problems or political unrest incentivize leaders to engage in international conflict for a diversionary purpose and what conditions encourage leaders to act on these incentives.

With respect to political leaders' diversionary incentives, there are mainly two possible explanations. First, since external threats or crises stimulate national pride and increase internal solidarity around political leadership, leaders can divert public attention from domestic issues and reduce public criticism of their political leadership (Brulé and Hwang, 2010; Fordham, 1998). When political leaders are vulnerable to criticism due to domestic troubles, they can take advantage of nationalistic sentiment by prioritizing the defense of disputed territory or promising to fix historical injustice with the hope that further disapproval is avoided (Downs and Saunders, 1996; Wiegand, 2011). A leader's concern that he or she will be punished by political opposition groups, the public (Fearon, 1994; Gelpi and Grieco, 2001), or members of their key constituencies (Morgan and Bickers, 1992) will generally influence foreign policy decision making and create an incentive to utilize external crises to weaken domestic discontent.¹¹ During the period of election, leaders can also attempt to boost their popularity among independent or undecided voters (Foster and Palmer, 2006), or the mass public in general (Fordham, 1998) to win

11. However, as they are unable to predict the effects of controversial foreign policies on the populace, leaders become cautious about their policy decisions, particularly when they wish to keep themselves and their parties in power (Huth and Allee, 2002). This being the case, leaders should be cautious in pursuing policies that oppose nationalist rhetoric, since this could damage their credibility, harm their reputation, or give rise to the possibility of domestic punishment of the leadership (Wiegand, 2011). However, since many Japanese are sensitive to Korea-Japan historical disputes, political leaders are not likely to worry about such potential backlash. Moreover, since the Liberal Democratic Party has controlled the governments most of the time, it makes logical sense that Japanese political leaders can effectively appeal to their key constituents who are mainly conservative and nationalistic.

an election (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

Second, external crises and boosted popularity can create an opportunity for leaders to strengthen their political bases in the government. When the government is relatively weak, losing support of their own party members and/or the coalition party members, political leaders such as the prime minister in Japan face diverse internal demands, challenges, and criticism within the winning coalition, and have difficulty in exercising firm leadership. This vulnerability within the coalition makes leaders ineffective in pursuing policy goals. In particular, when the level of public dissatisfaction with the government job performance is high, political leaders become vulnerable to such internal criticism within the winning coalition or even among their key constituencies. In this situation, Japanese leaders may use external crises or historical disputes with neighboring states in order to demonstrate their competency in foreign policies, highlight their ideological clarity, and thus, enhance evaluations of their leadership among key partisan supporters (Morgan and Bickers, 1992), including both conservatives and moderates in a coalition government or groups/factions within the winning coalition (Nicholis et al., 2010). Therefore, political leaders who receive boosted popularity within the winning coalition as a consequence of historical disputes can take advantage of it to solidify his/her political bases in the government or advance their key policies effectively such as accelerating military buildup or the Peace Constitution revision plans (Yokota, 2012).

The actions taken by Junichiro Koizumi in the 2001 presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) appear to follow the diversionary incentives. Koizumi, then Japanese prime minister, belonged to the Mori faction that had less than 60 members, while Ryutaro Hashimoto, the major political opponent in the election, led the largest faction within the LDP (about 100 members). Facing a tough battle in the election due to “weak support in terms of factional power within the LDP, Koizumi decided to seek extra-party support against Hashimoto’s intra-party support by making an advantage out of the Yasukuni issue” (Cheung, 2010: 534). By announcing his intention to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, Koizumi strongly appealed to the

Japan Association of Bereaved Families, which held a pivotal position in the election and continuously called for a prime ministerial visit of the Yasukuni Shrine. After winning the election, Koizumi in fact implemented the promise.

The latter explanation implies that declining public approval ratings do not always motivate leaders to rely on diversionary actions. In fact, political leaders do not need to assure strong support from the public all the time for their political survival. Although a high level of public disapproval can cause damage to political leadership, the level of vulnerability to domestic criticism and opposition varies across different political institutions.

In this study, we argue that the latter provides a better explanation for diversionary incentives in the context of Japanese domestic politics in recent decades. The so-called 'the 1955 System', in which the LDP was the dominant political party, lasted between 1955 and 1993. However, frequent political scandals, delayed reform programs, and factional politics within the party had led to the collapse of the 1955 System and the downfall of the LDP in 1993. Since then, the government has been led by a coalition of parties with and without the LDP. The fact that political leadership in the government can be altered by a different party other than the LDP or a coalition of parties enhances political leaders' incentives to utilize diversionary foreign policies to strengthen their power bases in the government.

In this regard, we focus on governments' strength at the legislative level as a key variable that promotes diversionary incentives. We conceptualize government strength as the support that governments have in the legislature, as Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) consider the support in the legislature as a key component of the government strength. Unlike in governments with strong domestic political support at the legislative level, weak governments invite multiple political agents such as coalition partners and factions within a party who may work as veto players in the decision-making process. In comparison to strong governments, weak governments are more likely to be under high pressure to meet diverse economic interests from various interest groups of the winning coalition especially in a parlia-

mentary system (De Hann, Sturm, and Beekhuis, 1999; Tsebelis, 1995).

Also, diverse interests are likely to engage weak governments in the 'war of attrition,' making it difficult to produce consistent domestic or foreign policies (Spolaore, 1993). In weak governments, there exists a high level of struggle among members of the government. More political agents or members attempt to shift the costs of government policies to other parties or agents, while minimizing their own costs. The weaker the government, the more the government is likely to face a serious internal power struggle.

Since diverse political agents and veto players attempt to take advantages of low approval ratings of the cabinet to attack the leadership and promote their interests, weak governments become vulnerable and sensitive to both public and elite criticism and complaints on the government's job performance. For example, Nicholis and his colleagues report that when a Japanese incumbent leader "fails to accept demands from selective groups within its winning coalition, the incumbent is threatened with the loss of political support" and in this situation we expect to observe the use of diversionary foreign policies (Nicholis, Huth, and Appel, 2010: 920). When a prime minister and her/his cabinet maintain relatively strong political power, on the other hand, they can retain power in office relatively easily, pursue key policies effectively, and thus, are less likely to worry about a decline in public popularity. For example, when the Abe government held relatively strong power in both lower and upper houses in 2016, Abe appointed his faction members to important positions in the cabinet despite criticism and complaints from other faction groups within the LDP such as the one led by Shigeru Ishiba, who was narrowly defeated by Abe in the 2012 LDP presidential election. In particular, the appointment of Toshihiro Nikai as secretary-general is believed as an effort to extend Abe's term as party president and hence effectively achieve his "goal of changing the postwar pacifist Constitution" (The Japan Times, August 14, 2016).

The above discussion suggests that it is important to consider both the strength of government and public support for the leadership, when we evaluate political incentives of diversionary behavior.

We argue that the impact of Japanese public approval ratings in the political leadership on diversionary foreign policy behavior is conditioned on government strength. Based on our claims, we present our hypothesis as follows.

Hypothesis: When a government is weak, low levels of approval ratings in Japanese political leadership significantly promote the probability of initiating historical disputes/hostile actions against Korea.

This hypothesis is designed to test our key argument on the relationship between public support and diversionary behavior conditioned on the strength of government.

IV. Research Design

As a way of evaluating diversionary incentives in Korea-Japan historical disputes, this paper examines Japan's initiation of Korea-Japan historical disputes between 1998 and 2016. The time period of analysis is chosen because the influence of government strength and approval ratings on the diversionary use of foreign policy is likely to be highly visible in the post-1955 system in Japan.¹²

Historical Dispute Initiation is coded one for any crises initiated by Japan against Korea concerning historical issues such as Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001 and zero for no crisis. This variable is coded one for the month a crisis occurs and zero otherwise. The events of historical disputes are listed in Table 1A in the appendix. As an alternative measure of diversionary foreign policy behavior toward Korea, we also use the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT), which is the most comprehensive event data (GDELT, 2017). Using broad international and regional news sources collected and coded through machine-based programs, the data collects directed dyadic interactions of conflict and coopera-

12. Another technical reason is the data availability of cabinet job approval ratings from the source of Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK).

tion. This data is useful in measuring low-intensity conflict behavior such as Japan's criticism on Dokdo, the history textbook issue, and prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. We use the GDELT data to measure Japanese verbal and material hostile actions by the government against Korea. *Verbal hostile actions* are coded when only verbal statements are issued against Korea, while *Material hostile actions* are coded when physical or materialized actions are carried out. The verbal or material hostile action variables are coded one for the month a hostile action occurs and zero otherwise.¹³

Since the occurrence of a historical dispute or hostile action is likely to be influenced by previous events, we utilize Cox proportional hazards model to account for the duration between events and test whether the peace duration between such events (in other words, the probability of observing Japan's initiation of historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea) is likely to be influenced by changes in domestic political environments. The use of event history models are more appropriate than regular regression models, since they are expected to bias the results without accounting for time dependence and left or right censored cases. Cox proportional hazards model is preferred to other estimation techniques, such as Weibull, since it does not specify the baseline hazard function.

The two key explanatory variables are government strength at the legislative level and public approval ratings of political leadership. To measure government strength, we use the Banzhaf index of voting power of coalition parties in the government (Huber, Kocher, and Sutter, 2003). This index measures each party's voting power in the parliament in terms of power to make a winning coalition or break up an existing one. By summing the Banzhaf indices of all parties in the government in the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives, we can effectively evaluate power relations among parties in the government and, hence, the strength of government.¹⁴ The mean

13. In the data of our analysis, there are 23 Korea-Japan historical disputes, 25 material hostile actions, and 82 verbal hostile actions of months.

14. Equal weight is given to electoral results in both upper and lower houses. Since elections in both houses are not held simultaneously, and also due to changes

value of the index is 80.14 and its minimum and maximum values are 62.38 (last two months in the first term of the Abe government and the Fukuda and Aso governments) and 92.74 (Abe government after June 2016) respectively.


To measure public approval ratings of political leadership in Japan, we use the cabinet approval ratings surveyed monthly by the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), which is Japan's only national public broadcaster. The mean value of the ratings is about 45, and its minimum and maximum values are 7 (at the end of the Mori administration) and 85 (at the beginning of the Koizumi administration in 2001) respectively. It is reasonable to suspect that there might be a potential endogenous relationship between approval ratings and other control variables such as economic indicators and time in office variables. To control for this issue, we utilize the residual term of approval ratings obtained in a regression on other relevant variables. Since the residual term of the approval rating variable includes only the remained variation in the variable unaccounted by other control variables, we can minimize the concern about a potential endogeneity between approval ratings and other control variables (Gartzke, 2000).¹⁵

To effectively describe our data, we show the changes of Japanese cabinet job approval ratings over time under different prime ministers, and the initiation of Korea-Japan historical disputes (circle symbols) in Figures 1a and 1b.

in the composition of a coalition government, the value of government strength changes frequently about every 1.2 years. For the information of government strength and historical disputes, refer to Table 3A.


15. Simply put, the correlation between approval rating variable and other control variables is zero. Another potential endogenous relationship may exist between approval ratings and historical disputes. In other words, the initiation of historical disputes may boost the Japanese cabinet approval ratings. Although theoretically possible, such positive reverse relationship is not observed in our data. When we regressed the historical disputes variable on the approval ratings variable, the result was not statistically significant and the sign of the coefficient was negative. This test result is consistent with findings in previous work (Kobayashi and Katagiri, 2014), which fails to find a positive impact of territorial crises on support for the Japanese prime minister.

Figure 1a. Cabinet Approval Ratings in Japan (1998~2016)
and Korea-Japan Historical Disputes*



* Circles indicate the occurrence of Korea-Japan historical disputes. Source: the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK)

Figure 1b. Cabinet Approval Ratings in Japan (1986-2006)
and Korea Japan Historical Disputes*



* Circles indicate the occurrence of Korea-Japan historical disputes. Source: the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK)

There are a few clear patterns found in the figures. In general, the cabinet approval ratings tend to decline over time, and historical disputes appear to occur when approval ratings are relatively low or in a descending trend. The occurrences of disputes are relatively few at the beginning of the government tenures when they enjoy high approval ratings. Some disputes are seen within the first five months of the Kan's and Koizumi's governments, but these approval ratings are in declining trends. Although an approval rating improves after the dispute in some cases, overall, it seems that an initiation of a historical dispute does not improve the approval rating. These results imply that the incentive of initiating historical disputes is not directly associated with low public support.

There are several control variables in our models. First, to control for economic conditions that may promote diversionary incentives (Chappell and Keech, 1978; Lewis-Beck, 2006), we use unemployment, inflation, and GDP growth rate variables. *Unemployment* and *Inflation* are expected to have a positive relationship with historical disputes, while *Growth* is negatively associated with the occurrence of historical disputes. Monthly observations of unemployment come from the World Bank. Quarterly observations of GDP growth rate and inflation in terms of GDP deflator come from OECD and the World Bank respectively.

Political scandals can affect public support for the cabinet and thus diversionary decisions (Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Smyth and Taylor, 2003). When a prime minister or his cabinet member's scandals are detected and prosecuted, the incentive to use foreign policies for a diversionary purpose is likely to increase. The dummy variable of *Political Scandal* is coded one for the occurrence of a scandal in a month and zero otherwise. When an election comes near, political leaders' incentive to utilize external crises to boost their chances to win the election may increase. The variable, *Upcoming Election*, is coded one for the two months prior to an election or the election month and zero otherwise.

According to the liberal peace thesis, strong economic ties may dissuade partners from engaging in conflict against each other. To

control for this effect, *Bilateral Trade* and *Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)* variables are included in the models. The logarithm forms of total bilateral trade and FDI volumes (millions of current us dollars) are used.

It is well known that leadership popularity tends to decline over time (Eisenstein and Witting, 2000; Stimson, 1976). Since the general trend of decaying popularity might be associated with dispute initiation, we control for the effects by employing the variable, *Time in Office*, which captures gradual erosion in cabinet approval. It is coded one for the first year, two for the second year, and so on. The baseline probability of having external crises may differ across different political leadership in Japan. To control for each government's unique characteristics, we also include a series of dummy variables for prime ministers, *Abe* (the second term), *Noda*, *Kan*, *Hatoyama*, *Aso*, *Fukuda*, *Koizumi*, and *Obuchi*, leaving *Abe* (the first term) and *Mori* as the reference category in the models. Descriptive statistics of data are available in Table 2A in the appendix.

V. Results

Table 1 reports the estimates using Korea-Japan Historical Disputes. Model 1 examines whether or not the approval ratings alone affect Japan's initiation of historical disputes against Korea. The main finding in this model is that there is a statistically significant and negative effect of the cabinet approval ratings on Korea-Japan historical disputes. In other words, holding other variables constant, a decrease in the cabinet approval rating is likely to decrease the duration of peace before another historical dispute against Korea occurs. Substantively, on average, the coefficient indicates that one point decrease in the approval rating increases the hazard of having the dispute by about 14.7 percent.

Table 1. Approval Ratings, Government Strength, and Korea-Japan Historical Disputes†


Dep. Var.: Historical Dispute Initiation	Model 1 Estimates (S.E.)	Model 2 Estimates (S.E.)
Approval Ratings	-0.159*** (0.059)	-0.667** (0.281)
Government Strength		-0.024 (0.084)
Approval* Government Strength		0.0066* (0.0035)
Bilateral Trade	6.850 (6.045)	7.989 (7.312)
Bilateral FDI	-4.980*** (1.139)	-5.090*** (1.306)
Upcoming Election	1.343 (0.946)	1.023 (0.987)
Unemployment	-3.391** (1.357)	-3.353*** (1.187)
Inflation	-1.202* (0.627)	-1.213** (0.577)
Growth (GDP)	0.187 (0.642)	0.682 (0.641)
Political Scandal	-16.281*** (1.845)	-14.877*** (1.291)
Time in office	-2.994*** (0.791)	-3.164*** (0.987)
Abe	-7.486* (4.221)	-7.929* (4.714)
Noda	-2.722 (3.588)	-2.876 (3.098)
Kan	-11.189* (5.881)	-13.385*** (4.295)
Hatoyama	-6.960 (4.364)	-8.571** (3.864)
Aso	-23.682*** (3.342)	-23.369*** (2.683)
Fukuda	0.577 (1.437)	-0.079 (1.100)
Koizumi	18.189*** (3.967)	19.343*** (4.875)
Obuchi	-7.656** (3.415)	-6.664** (3.356)
N	220	220
χ^2 -statistic	3661.08***	2278.14***

† Cox proportional hazards model; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses;

*** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$

In Model 2, which tests the conditional impact of government strength on the relationship between the approval rating and Korea-Japan historical disputes, the approval rating has a negative impact on the dispute initiation when government strength is relatively low. However, this negative effect disappears and loses statistical significance when government strength is relatively strong. In order to show this conditional effect more clearly, we create a figure of marginal effects in Figure 2. The figure shows a positive slope, reflecting the positive coefficient of the interaction term in Model 2, suggesting that the impact of the approval ratings is stronger when the government is weaker. For example, it shows that, holding all other covariates constant, one point decrease in the approval rating increases the hazard of having a Korea-Japan historical dispute by 18.1 percent when the value of government strength is about 72 in the index, which is lower than the mean value of 80. In contrast, when the value of government strength is about 84 in the index, one point drop in the approval rating increases the hazard by only about 10 percent. More

*Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Approval Rating conditioned on Government Strength**



* Estimated based on Model 2.

importantly, the figure shows that the effects become insignificant when the values of the power index are high. Its confidence interval includes the value zero on the y-axis, when the values are above 85, indicating the loss of significance.¹⁶ Overall, the results in these two models provide empirical support for our hypothesis.

As an alternative measure of diversionary foreign policy behavior, we use material and verbal hostile actions initiated by Japan against Korea in the GDELT data and report the estimates in Table 2. Unlike the results in Table 1, the approval rating variable by itself is not statistically significant in Models 3 and 5. This implies that low approval ratings do not necessarily generate independent effects on Japan's hostile actions against Korea.

Table 2. Approval Ratings, Government Strength, and Japan's Hostile Actions against Korea†

Dep. Var.: Hostile Action Initiation	Model 3 (Material) Estimates (S.E.)	Model 4 (Material) Estimates (S.E.)	Model 5 (Verbal) Estimates (S.E.)	Model 6 (Verbal) Estimates (S.E.)
Approval Ratings	0.005 (0.025)	-0.460** (0.225)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.202* (0.110)
Government Strength		0.063 (0.065)		-0.056** (0.022)
Approval* Gov. Strength		0.006** (0.003)		0.0024 (0.0015)
Bilateral Trade	-21.126 (21.561)	-20.571*** (6.985)	-2.239 (1.824)	-1.967 (1.840)
Bilateral FDI	-0.066 (2.156)	-0.325 (2.486)	-0.247 (0.422)	-0.296 (0.436)
Upcoming Election	-0.800 (0.731)	-0.764 (0.635)	-1.532*** (0.397)	-1.708*** (0.392)
Unemployment	-4.992 (3.719)	-5.220* (2.712)	-1.299** (0.629)	-1.596** (0.721)
Inflation	-1.193 (1.668)	-1.133* (0.625)	-0.399** (0.155)	-0.314* (0.174)
Growth (GDP)	-0.311 (0.435)	-0.031 (0.369)	0.102 (0.136)	0.161 (0.140)
Political Scandal	-27.388*** (1.059)	-26.591*** (1.014)	1.231*** (0.348)	0.986** (0.416)

16. By taking an exponential form of a marginal effect, we can obtain its hazard ratio.


Time in office	-1.276 (0.815)	-1.403* (0.735)	-0.189 (0.211)	-0.192 (0.217)
Abe	-2.067 (8.321)	-2.238 (3.688)	2.720* (1.423)	4.125** (1.868)
Noda	3.983* (4.046)	4.643* (2.517)	2.121 (1.410)	3.033* (1.759)
Kan	5.980 (3.859)	6.708* (3.975)	1.495 (1.684)	2.361 (1.985)
Aso	-31.219*** (5.074)	-28.346*** (2.286)	2.519* (1.378)	2.392 (1.508)
Fukuda	-30.469*** (2.735)	-27.851*** (1.367)	1.074 (1.056)	0.802 (1.147)
Koizumi	3.596* (2.172)	3.661 (2.374)	4.646*** (1.598)	5.593*** (2.118)
Obuchi	-29.680*** (3.921)	-29.074*** (2.620)	2.185 (1.846)	1.803 (2.083)
N	220	220	220	220
-2lnL	153.18	147.95	648.61	644.20
χ^2 -statistic	7600.68	6127.52***	143.63***	142.20***

† Cox proportional hazard model; two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses;

*** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$


However, as the results in Models 4 and 6 show, approval ratings have a significant negative impact on the initiation of material or verbal hostile actions against Korea and this impact is conditioned on the government strength. Although the interaction term by itself in Model 6 is not statistically significant, approval ratings and its interaction term with government strength are jointly significant, according to Figures 3 and 4, which show the marginal effects of approval ratings on the initiation of material or verbal hostile actions based on Models 4 and 6. When government strength is lower than 70 in Model 4 or 75 in Model 6, the approval rating variable generates significant negative effects on the hazard of initiating a hostile action, although the approval rating variable does not show significance when the government is relatively strong. Specifically, the upper limit of the confidence interval includes the value of zero on the y-axis, when the values of the power index are 70 and above for material actions (Model 4) and 75 and above for verbal actions (Model 6).

Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Approval Rating conditioned on Government Strength*



* Estimated based on Model 4

Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Approval Rating conditioned on Government Strength*



* Estimated based on Model 6

These figures show that, holding all other covariates constant, one point decrease in the approval rating increases the hazard of initiating a material (verbal) hostile action by 10 (5.3) percent when government strength is about 63 in the power index. However, when the value of government strength is about 70 in Model 4 (75 in Model 6), one point drop in the approval rating increases the hazard of material (verbal) action by about 5.8 (2.5) percent.

Overall, the results demonstrate that it is not only the degree of public support for the leadership that drives Japanese political leaders to engage in historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea for a diversionary purpose. It is also the weakness of government strength that makes political leaders take declining public support seriously and hence utilize diversionary foreign policy behavior. In this regard, our argument and findings significantly contribute to the literature on the diversionary use of force by highlighting specific political conditions under which domestic political problems or unrest lead to international conflict. Our findings also improve our understanding of occurrences of Korea-Japan historical disputes and their domestic political background.

With respect to control variables, the results in Tables 1 and 2 are mixed in general. Although bilateral FDI tends to reduce the initiation of historical disputes (Models 1 and 2), such significant effects are not found in the models of material (Models 3 and 4) and verbal (Models 5 and 6). Similarly, although bilateral trade decreases Japan's initiation of material hostile actions against Korea (Model 4), no such significant effects are found in other models. Upcoming election variable does not have any impact on initiation of historical disputes (Models 1 and 2) or material hostile actions (Models 3 and 4), but it appears to have a negative impact on initiation of verbal hostile action (Models 5 and 6). Interestingly, while political scandal promotes aggressive verbal actions against Korea, such negative personal events for political leaders appear to tie their hands and thus reduce their chances to initiate historical disputes (Models 1 and 2) or material hostile actions (Models 3 and 4).

Similarly, while economic growth is not associated with external

crises with Korea, inflation and unemployment tend to reduce the probability of initiation of historical disputes, material and verbal hostile actions. The slope coefficients are negative and significant for all models except for Model 3. These results imply that unlike in other democracies, in Japan, poor economic conditions do not promote diversionary decisions of foreign policies.

In comparison to other political leaders, Junichiro Koizumi is very likely to engage in such disputes and hostile actions. The slope coefficients are positive in all models and significant in five out of six models. In contrast, Aso and Obuchi administrations are less likely to engage in historical disputes (Models 1 and 2) or material hostile actions (Models 3 and 4) against Korea.

VI. Conclusions

This paper started with theoretically intriguing research questions: do diversionary incentives affect Korea-Japan historical disputes, and if so, then under what conditions? The empirical results of the models of Japan's initiation of historical disputes or hostile actions against Korea show that the cabinet approval ratings matter in explaining diversionary foreign policy decisions. However, this observation is more meaningful when the strength of government is relatively weak. When government at the legislative level is strong, Japanese leaders are not likely to engage in such disputes or hostile actions against Korea.

Weak governments that invite multiple political agents and factions are vulnerable to internal criticism, demands, and political opposition. Accordingly, it is hard for political leaders to effectively pursue their key public policies. When the cabinet approval ratings decline, it opens a window through which members of the winning coalition and diverse political agents in the weak government attack the government leadership. In this situation, political leaders are likely to rely on aggressive foreign policies to strengthen their power bases in the government. In this regard, our claims and findings con-

tribute to the literature on diversionary foreign policy by examining government strength as a specific domestic political condition of diversionary behavior. Further studies will benefit from exploring how different domestic political environments such as political party systems and the strength of government in terms of coalition, divided, or minority government affect diversionary foreign policy behavior.

The findings of this paper also suggest that the occurrence of historical disputes can be analyzed from the view of domestic politics. Domestic political environments in Japan as well as in Korea (Hwang et al., 2017; Ye and Park, 2006) significantly affect the onset of bilateral historical disputes. Unless major strides are made in resolving the disputes over ownership of the Dokdo Islands and other historical issues between Korea and Japan, emotional animosity and physical confrontations are likely to continue in the relationship between these two important states in the region.

References

- Bailey, Michael, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from UN Voting Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 430-456. (2017).
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, *The Logic of Political Survival*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
- Brulé, David, and Wonjae Hwang, "Diverting the Legislature: Executive-Legislative Relations, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 361-379. (2010).
- Chappell, Henry, and William Keech, "A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79, No. 1, 10-27. (1985).
- Cheung, Mong, "Political survival and the Yasukuni controversy in Sino-Japanese Relations," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 527-548. (2010).

- Cruz Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Carlos Scartascini, "Database of Political Institutions\Codebook, 2015 Update(DPI2015)," (2016); Updated version of Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, "New tools in comparative political economy: the Database of Political Institutions," *World Bank Economic Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 165-176. (2001).
- De Hann, Jakob, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and Geert Beekhuis, "The weak government thesis: Some new evidence," *Public Choice*, Vol. 101, 163-76. (1999).
- Downs, Erica Strecker, and Phillip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu islands," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 114-46. (1996).
- Eisenstein, Maurice, and Marie Witting, "Time and the Life Cycle of Presidential Approval: A Research Note," *Social Science Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 27-42. (2000).
- Fearon, James D., "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, 577-92. (1994).
- Fordham, Benjamin, "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 4, 418-439. (1998).
- Foster, Dennis, and Glenn Palmer, "Presidents, Public Opinion, and Diversionary Behavior: The Role of Partisan Support Reconsidered," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 269-288. (2006).
- Gartzke, Erik, "Preferences and the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 191-210. (2000).
- GDELT Project, Global data on events, location, and tone (2017). <http://www.gdeltproject.org/about.html>
- Gelpi, Christopher, and Joseph Grieco, "Democracy, leadership tenure, and the targeting of militarized challenges," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 6, 794-817. (2001).
- Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, "Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries," *Economic Policy*, Vol. 13, 341-92. (1991).
- Huber, Gerald, Martin Kocher, and Matthias Sutter, "Government

- strength, power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in OECD-countries. A voting power approach," *Public Choice*, Vol. 116, 333-350. (2003).
- Huth, Paul K., and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- Hwang, Wonjae, Wonbin Cho, and Krista Wiegand, "Do Korean-Japanese Historical Disputes Generate Rally Effects in Korea?" Presented at a conference. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, April 3-5, 2017.
- Kang, Seung-Woo, "Animosity against Korea runs high among Japanese," *The Korean Times*, November 8, 2015. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/11/116_190472.html.
- Khalil, Elias L., "The temper tantrum of nations: why would weak nations challenge hegemonic nations?," *International Negotiation*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 321-46. (2012).
- Kimura, Masato, and David Welch, "Specifying 'Interests': Japan's Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 213-44. (1998).
- Kobayashi, Tetsuro, and Azusa Katagiri, "Territorial Issues and Support for the Prime Minister: Experimental Evidences on Rally-'Round-the-Flag' Effect in Japan," Presented at International Conference on e-Democracy and Open Government Asia, 2014.
- Kobayashi, Yoshiaki, and Hiroki Tsukiyama, "LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM," in Nathan F. Batto, Chi Huang, Alexander C. Tan, and Gary W. Cox (eds.), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2016).
- Koo, Min Gyo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*. (New York, U.S.A.: Springer, 2010).
- Kwon, Edward, "Japan's Territorial Claim to Korea's Dokdo: The Voice of the National Diet." *Korea Observer*, Vol. 47, No. 2, 227-

26. (2016).
- Lewis-Beck, Michael, "Does Economics Still Matter? Econometrics and the Vote," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 68, No. 1, 208-12. (2006).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Dokdo: Korea's Beautiful Island* (Seoul, 2012).
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, 25-52. (1992).
- Nicholis, Natsuko, Paul Huth, and Benjamin Appel, "When Is Domestic Political Unrest Related to International Conflict? Diversionary Theory and Japanese Foreign Policy, 1890-1941," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, 915-937. (2010).
- Ostrom, Charles, and Dennis Simon, "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79, No. 2, 334-58. (1985).
- Shibuichi, Daiki, "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 197-215. (2005).
- Smyth, David, and Susan Taylor, "Presidential Popularity: What Matters Most, Macroeconomics or Scandals?" *Applied Economics Letters*, Vol. 10, No. 9, 585-8. (2003).
- Spolaore, Enrico, Policy Making Systems and Economic Efficiency: Coalition Governments versus Majority Governments (unpublished; Brussels' ECARE, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1993)
- Stimson, James, "Public Support for American Presidents," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1-21. (1970).
- The Japan Times, "Ishiba's Cabinet exit may challenge Abe." August 14, 2016.
- Tsebelis, George, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 289-325. (1995).
- Van Dyke, Jon. M., "Legal issues related to sovereignty over Dokdo and its maritime Boundary," *Ocean Development & International-*

al Law 38 (1/2): 157-224. (2007).

Wiegand, Krista E., *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2011).

Ye, Young-joon, and Park Seung-hee, "Japan's foreign ministry: "President Roh will not abandon hard-line policy against Japan in bid to avoid becoming lame duck," *Chungang Ilbo*, April 6, 2006.

Yokota, Takashi, "Why Japan and South Korea are feuding over a cluster of rocks," *Newsweek*, September 3, 2012.

▪ Received: July 11th 2017

▪ Accepted: October 10th 2017

Appendix

Table 1A. Japan-Korea Historical Disputes, 1994-2016

Crises	Crises	Date
Dokdo/ Takeshima crises between South Korea and Japan	Japanese patrol boat sailed around Dokdo Island	Feb. 1994 & 1996
	Japan declared 200 nm EEZ including Dokdo	June 1996
	Japanese prefecture of Shimane declared "Takeshima Day"	March 2005
	As a response to "Takeshima Day", Korean provincial assembly of Gyeongsangbuk-do declared "Dokdo Month"; Japan claimed Dokdo in its defense white paper	June, July 2005
	The Japanese Coast Guard announced plans to dispatch maritime survey ships to the waters around Dokdo; In response, Korea dispatched 20 gunboats and a research and a escort ship to the Dokdo area	April, July 2006
	Japan publishes a textbook that claims its power over Dokdo; The Japanese Ministry of Education announced a new supplementary education guideline on social studies textbooks that claim sovereignty on Dokdo	February, July 2008
	Three Japanese congressmen came to Korea to visit Dokdo	August 2011
	Japan made a proposal to take the case to ICJ, which was rejected by Korea eventually.	August 2012
Other Japan- Korea Historical Disputes	Japanese PM's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine	July 1996
	Japan's unilateral abolishment of the Korean-Japanese Fisheries Agreement	January 1998
	Japanese History Textbook issue	April, May 2001
	Japanese PM's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine	August 2001-2006
	Taro Aso, the minister of internal affairs and communications claimed that the change of Korean names to Japanese names during Japanese colonial rule was what Koreans wanted	May 2003
	Japanese congressmen's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine; History Textbook issue	April 2005
	Japanese PM's denial of enforcement of comfort women	March 2007
	Dispute over the invasion of a Korean fishing boat into Japanese EEZ	May 2008
	A Japanese minister stated that Japan's invasion and colonization of Korea was historically inevitable	March 2010
	Japanese PM's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine	December 2013

Table 2A. Descriptive Statistics (1998~2016)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Historical Disputes	220	0.105	0.307	0	1
Material Hostile Actions	220	0.114	0.318	0	1
Verbal Hostile Actions	220	0.368	0.483	0	1
Approval Rating	220	44.85	14.73	7	85
Government Strength	220	80.14	9.58	62.38	92.74
Inflation	220	1.060	0.053	0.987	1.171
Unemployment	220	4.405	0.651	2.958	5.519
Growth rate (GDP)	220	0.232	1.028	-4.8	2.3
Political Scandal	220	0.041	0.199	0	1
Ln(Bilateral Trade, \$ millions)	220	11.143	0.319	10.278	11.590
Ln(Bilateral FDI, \$ millions)	220	7.580	0.511	6.277	8.555
Time in Office	220	2.859	1.606	1	5
Election	220	0.164	0.371	0	1
Obuchi	220	0.091	0.288	0	1
Koizumi	220	0.295	0.457	0	1
Fukuda	220	0.050	0.218	0	1
Aso	220	0.055	0.228	0	1
Hatoyama	220	0.041	0.199	0	1
Kan	220	0.064	0.245	0	1
Noda	220	0.073	0.260	0	1
Abe (December. 2012~)	220	0.218	0.414	0	1