解答 1

「トランプ大統領のツイート、フェイクの山」

　米国のトランプ大統領のツイートが頻繁に誤りを含んでいて不正確であることは秘密ではありません。彼がツイッターに発信する内容は過去に多くの誤解を招き、議論を引き起こしてきました。つい最近、トランプ大統領がアメリカ-イラン関係について発したツイートも例にもれず、その正確性が疑われています。1 月 7 日にトランプ大統領は以下の内容をツイッターに配信しました。

【2030 年 1 月 X 日からイランに対する集団安全保障に基づく武力行使を行う。友好国の安倍首相は日本の自衛隊も中東に送ってくれるという。実際、シンゾーは 12 月にすでにそんな決定をしているらしい。素晴らしい。国連安保理では中露が拒否権行使をするはずだから安保理決議は得られることはないだろうが、関係ない。同盟国の協力があればいいのだ。】

【イランのアリー・ロウハニ大統領は我々の武力攻撃の恐ろしさをよく理解しているはずだ。1969 年のイラン革命以降、イランは間違った道を歩んできたが、今こそ大多数のスンニ派の穏健な一般市民は立ち上がり、強硬な政治指導者に No を突きつけ、革命を起こしたほうがいい。】

　これらのツイートに含まれる誤りと根拠のない主張を明らかにするため、NHK でファクトチェックを行いました：

ツイート 1

　トランプ大統領はイランに対する武力行使を集団安全保障の一環として位置付けています。集団安全保障とは国際組織によって平和と安全を守ることであり、現在の国際連合がそれに当たります。国際連合では原則として加盟国の武力行使を禁止しており（国連憲章 2 条）、国際秩序に反する違法行為を行う国に対してのみ、牽制のために経済と武力の二段階の制裁が行われます（42 条）。しかし、トランプ大統領は「安保理決議を得られることはないだろうが、関係ない。同盟国の協力があればいいのだ」と断言しています。このように同盟国との個別的な軍事協力により国際秩序を保つことは集団的自衛であり、集団安全保障ではありません。なお、国際連合は国連憲章の 51 条で各国の集団的自衛権を認めておりますが、その行使の条件を国際連合加盟国への武力攻撃が発生した場合に限定しています。しかし、アメリカ合衆国がイランに武力攻撃を受けたか、イランからの被攻撃国にアメリカが援助を要請されたと示す証拠は現在のところありません。そのため、アメリカがイランに行う武力行使は集団的自衛としても認められるか疑わしいものであり、いくら同盟国の協力があろうと国際連合という集団安全保障体制の下で正当化されるものとは考え難いのが実情です。

　また、トランプ大統領がツイートで言及する「同盟国の協力」を実際にアメリカが十分に得られているとは言えません。トランプ大統領は日本の自衛隊の中東派遣がアメリカへの協力であると示唆していますが、日本政府の公式な立場では、中東自衛隊派遣の目的は日本船舶の護衛であり、アメリカの海上保安イニシアチブに協力するものではない「独自の取り組み」（菅氏）であります。

ツイート 2

　こちらのツイートの内容では細かな誤りが目立ちます。まず、イランの現役大統領は 2013 年に当選したハサン・ロウハニであり、名前はアリーではありません。また、イラン革命の年号は 1979 年で、同年に世界経済に大きな打撃を与えた第二次石油危機を引き起こす要因となりま

した。この時政権奪取に立ち上がったのは国民の大多数を占めるシーア派の勢力であり、現在でもイランは人口のほとんどがスンニ派ではなくシーア派イスラム教徒となっています。

　イラン革命の勃発までアメリカ資本はイランの石油の実権を握り、アメリカの支援を受けてきた協力的な政権の下で大きな利益をあげていました。このような対米追従を非難してイラン独自の政治を求めたのが民衆によるイラン革命でありました。それが結果的にアメリカに都合が悪かったために「間違った道」と決めつけるのは適切ではありません。

　トランプ大統領はツイートの終わりにイラン国民は革命を起こしたほうがいいと断言しています。けれども、民主政治を保障するような制度が定着する前に広範な民衆の政治参加をもたらす革命はそれまでの支配階級、特権層との権力争いを引き起こします。この時、支配階級、特権層はその地位を守るために国民の支持を集めやすい民族主義的主張を唱え、対外的に敵対心を煽ると予想されます。その結果、戦争や国際危機のリスクも高まると考えられます。以上のことから、革命を起こしたほうがいいと言うのは妥当ではありません。

解答２：

In praxis, informational asymmetry exists between two or more bargaining parties, meaning these parties withhold private information concerning their military power or true willingness to fight from each other. This generates a rational incentive in each party to misrepresent their private information in order to gain an advantage in discussions, thereby facilitating a resolution of issues favorable to them. This misrepresentation of information, particularly in the form of exaggerating one's military power or willingness to go to war in order to draw out concessions from the opposing side, is called bluffing and can cause rational leaders to opt for war over a peaceful resolution. Suppose that nations A and B's values for war (which is to say expected benefits of war) are $p-c_A$, $p+c_B$ respectively (p being the probability that A will prevail at war, and c_A, c_B being the costs of war for each nation) as shown in figure I. If nations A and B each represent their information accurately and have a shared opinion on the value of p, they will be able to find a peaceful resolution within the bargaining range that each would prefer to the costly option of war. Now suppose that A, uncertain of B's true value for war and underestimating B's willingness to go to war, estimates B's value for war as being at b' in figure II. In order to secure a better deal, A sends a signal that says their value for war is a', as shown in figure II, and that they will accept no proposal for a peaceful resolution that will leave them with anything of a lower value than a'. Furthermore, since both sides have an incentive to bluff, in order to render the signal effective A must convince B of their exaggerated resolution to fight war by actually taking costly actions in the direction of war (e.g., producing weapons, deploying troops, etc.). B, convinced of A's professed value for war, can no longer accept any peaceful proposition by A because any proposition by A would exceed B's value for war $p+c_B$ and therefore would be less favorable to B than war. Thus, the bargaining range disappears as a result of A's bluff and leaves both nations with no other option but to go to war. The same can be said of when nation B makes a bluff and when both A and B make bluffs to each other; in either case the bargaining range between the two nations disappears and a peaceful resolution cannot be reached, leaving both with no choice but to go to war.

Figure I

Figure II

設問 3：

       Iraq is currently on the brink of civil war. The recent military coup and civilian uprising in Baghdad, which took place as an aftermath of the turmoil surrounding the current political situation in Iran, has made the prospect of civil war in Iraq in the immediate future highly likely. This report offers a prognosis of the course that such a war would take if it were to occur based on data analysis on civil war duration provided by James Fearon (2004).

       First, the immediate outcome of the military coup and civilian uprising in Baghdad would be what Fearon classifies as a coup-related civil war or popular revolution. A coup-related civil war is a civil war between parties aiming to seize control of government who were formerly a part of the central authority, including the military; a popular revolution is a civil war instigated by large scale civilian protests in the capital city. A civil war initiated as an immediate result of the recent events in Iraq would fall under one or both of these cases. Based on Fearon's analysis (2004), this war is expected to be brief, around 3 years long. Since rebels tend to be much weaker than central authority, coups and revolutions rely on instigating a "tipping process" of the political establishment which causes a string of mass defections from and counteractions against the government. As a result, either the rebel forces replace the government, or the movement is suppressed and defectors stymied. Indeed, there is no middle ground for rebel forces cannot accept any peaceful settlement proposed by the central authority. This is due to the fear that the authority will renege on its promise once an agreement is reached and the ensuing period of peace allows the government to recover from the temporary "shock" sustained by the coup/revolution and regain stability and power.

       Either way the coup-related civil war/popular revolution plays out, the insurgence would deliver a "shock" to the government that would considerably weaken central authority. What can be expected then is that other rebel forces within Iraq, specifically the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), will use this opportunity to initiate a civil war as is indicated in the Secessionist War game model devised by Fearon (2004). The former case would be classified as a 'Sons of the Soil' war, where a peripheral ethnic minority fights a government comprised of the ethnic majority over control of land. The mean number of years for this type of war is 30 years. Here, the objective of the ethnic minority would be to prevail in war or to reach a secession or regional autonomy agreement favorable to the ethnic minority with the central government. Generally, the better regional forces are doing in the war, the more they expect from a deal with the government; but the more the government gives away to the regional forces, the stronger the temptation will be to go back on their word once the temporary "shock" crippling the central government is over, especially if the government has an enduring political or economic interest in expanding into the minority region. Thus forms a stalemate that protracts the duration of the civil war, again due to the rebel forces' distrust in the government's commitment to the terms of any possible settlements. If the Kurdish forces in Iraq regain control of Kirkuk, an area rich with petroleum, when the government is in its weakened state, the expected duration of the civil war would increase significantly. Additional oil revenue may also improve the Kurdish forces' bargaining power and contribute to an increase in the duration of the war (the mechanism being the same as the one outlined above: the increase in bargaining power of the regional forces influences settlement offers to be more favorable to the rebels, thereby increasing the government's incentive to betray once temporary instability is overcome and feeding into the commitment problem), although this is dependent on how well the regional forces can market their oil since petroleum is not a readily available source of finance (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

       Similarly, it can be predicted that ISIL will take advantage of the shake-up in government to regain influence in northern Iraq. A war between ISIL and the central government would not take on the traits of a 'Sons of the Soil' war, as would the Kurdish insurgence. In addition, Iraq is not known to possess the typical resources that prolong warfare in a contraband-financed civil war, such as cocaine, opium and diamonds. However, the known revenue sources for ISIL (e.g. taxation, extortion, illicit trade of petroleum and aid from foreign donors), though limited in scope, may be enough for the ISIL to carry out war against a weakened central government and empower its bargaining position, thus paving the way for a stalemate.

       In conclusion, a civil war in Iraq can be predicted to be carried out on two levels. First, a brief military coup/revolution would shake up the government and result in a regime change or a suppression of rebel forces, typically lasting around 3 years. Second, the 'shock' administered to the central authority

from the short-term coup would invite rebellion from the Kurds and possibly ISIL, resulting in a long-term 'Sons of the Soil' war lasting around 30 years and a financed civil war that will likely lead to a stalemate.

Resources:

Fearon, J. (2004). Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? *Journal of Peace Research, 41* (3), 275-301.

Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review, 97* (1), 75-90.