http://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S13048966.html

（コラムニストの眼）格差固定化の企て　高学歴層が築く、見えない壁　デイビッド・ブルックス

過去一世代の間に、大卒以上の学歴を持つ層は、驚くほどうまく、その恵まれた地位を我が子に引き継いできた。さらに、その他の階層の子どもが自分たちの仲間入りをする機会を狭めることにも、恐ろしいほどたけてきている。

彼らがいかに巧みに第一のタスク――我が子の後押し――をこなしているかは明白だ。重要なのは、子にひたすら尽くす「ペディアクラシー」だ。この数十年間、米国の上位中間層は、出来のいい子どもを育てることを人生の中心に置いてきた。

上位中間層の母親には様々な手段も育児休暇もあるから、高卒の母親よりも母乳育児をする割合がずっと高く、その期間もはるかに長い。

上位中間層の親は、それより下の所得階層の親に比べて、２倍から３倍の時間を就学前の子どもと過ごすことができる。１９９６年以来、裕福な層の教育費は３００％近く増加したが、その他の層ではほぼ横ばいだ。

中間層の暮らしが厳しくなるにつれ、上位中間層の親は我が子が決して階層を滑り落ちないよう、ますます必死になっている。もちろん、自分の子孫に尽くすことは何も悪くない。

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倫理的に問題となるのは、第二のタスク――違う階層の子どもを同じ機会から排除すること――だ。米ブルッキングス研究所のリチャード・リーブスは、近著で、高学歴層が社会制度を操作する構造的な方法について詳述している。

その最たるものが地域ごとの住宅の建築規制だ。高学歴層は、ポートランドやニューヨーク、サンフランシスコといった地域に住む傾向にある。これらの地域では、良い学校や良い就職機会のある場所から、貧しくて教育レベルの低い人々を遠ざけるような住宅や建築の規制が敷かれている。

これらの規制は、米国全体の経済成長に破壊的な影響を及ぼしている。ある経済学者たちが行った研究によれば、米国の上位２２０の都市圏における住宅建築規制は、１９６４年から２００９年にかけて、米国の経済成長の総計を５０％以上押し下げている。さらに、格差拡大の深刻な要因にもなっている。ジョナサン・ロスウェルの分析では、最も規制の強い都市が最も規制の弱い都市と同等になれば、地域間の格差は半分になるという。

リーブスが指摘する二つ目の構造的障壁は、大学入試だ。高学歴の親は、優秀な教師がいる地域に住む。さらに、親類縁者が卒業生であれば優遇される制度や、学びのある旅を多く経験して育ったことが評価される入学基準、就職につながる無給のインターンシップといった恩恵を子に与えることができる。

だから、米国の競争率の高い上位２００の大学に通う学生の７０％が所得分布の上位２５％の出身でも、不思議はない。米国のエリート大学群は、その入学基準を掲げて特権の巨大な山々の頂きに座り、奨学金制度でその他の人々にはちっぽけなはしごを用意して良心を満足させている

のだ。

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リーブスの本に感銘を受けた私だが、著者と何度か話すうち、彼が強調する構造的障壁よりも、その下の８割との間を隔てるインフォーマルな社会的障壁の方がより重要だと考えるようになった。

先日、私は高卒の女友達と昼食に行った。無神経なことに、そこはグルメなサンドイッチ店だった。「パドリーノ」や「ポモドーロ」といったサンドイッチの名前、ソップレッサータ、カポコッロ、ストリアータ・バゲットといった食材の名前を前にして、彼女の表情がすぐさま凍りつくのを目撃した。他の店に移ろうかと尋ねると、彼女は不安げにうなずき、私たちはメキシコ料理店で食事をした。

米国上位中間層のさまざまな機会に恵まれた文化は今、その階層でたまたま育っていなければ判読できないような文化的記号で彩られている。それらは、人が誰しも持つ、屈辱や排斥への恐れに訴えかける。「お前はここで歓迎されていないぞ」というのが主たるメッセージだ。

エリザベス・カリッドハルケットは、徹底した分析による著書で、高学歴層は消費や富の誇示によって障壁を築いているのではないと主張する。むしろ、希少な情報を持つ者しかアクセスできない慣習を確立させることによるのだという。

機会に恵まれた地域で居心地よく暮らすには、正しいバレエ・エクササイズをし、正しいだっこひもを使い、ポッドキャスト、屋台、お茶、ワイン、ピラティスにいたるまで、正しい好みを持つ必要がある。当然、（現代作家）デイビッド・フォスター・ウォレスや、子育て、ジェンダーなどについても、正しい態度が求められる。

高学歴層がはりめぐらす複雑な網は、自分たちを残してその他の人々をゆすり落とす揺りかごのようだ。（高級食品スーパー）ホールフーズ・マーケットであなたと共に心地よく買い物をする客の８０％が大卒である理由は、値段ではなく、文化的規範のせいなのだ。

社会的地位に関するルールには、結束を促す機能がある。高学歴の人々を引き寄せ、相互の絆を強め、その他の人々を遮る。高学歴層が築いてきた流動性に対する障壁は、目に見えないだけに一層強力になっている。それ以外の人には、その障壁が何かを言い当てることも、理解することもできない。ただそこに壁があることだけは分かっているのだ。

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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/opinion/how-we-are-ruining-america.html

How We Are Ruining America

David Brooks JULY 11, 2017

Over the past generation, members of the college-educated class have become amazingly good at making sure their children retain their privileged status. They have also become devastatingly good at making sure the children of other classes have limited chances to join their ranks.

How they've managed to do the first task — giving their own children a leg up — is pretty obvious. It's the pediacracy, stupid. Over the past few decades, upper-middle-class Americans have embraced behavior codes that put cultivating successful children at the center of life. As soon as they get money, they turn it into investments in their kids.

Upper-middle-class moms have the means and the maternity leaves to breast-feed their babies at much higher rates than high school-educated moms, and for much longer periods.

Upper-middle-class parents have the means to spend two to three times more time with their preschool children than less affluent parents. Since 1996, education expenditures among the affluent have increased by almost 300 percent, while education spending among every other group is basically flat.

As life has gotten worse for the rest in the middle class, upper-middle-class parents have become fanatical about making sure their children never sink back to those levels, and of course there's nothing wrong in devoting yourself to your own progeny.

It's when we turn to the next task — excluding other people's children from the same opportunities — that things become morally dicey. Richard Reeves of the Brookings Institution recently published a book called "Dream Hoarders" detailing some of the structural ways the well educated rig the system.

The most important is residential zoning restrictions. Well-educated people tend to live in places like Portland, New York and San Francisco that have

housing and construction rules that keep the poor and less educated away from places with good schools and good job opportunities.

These rules have a devastating effect on economic growth nationwide. Research by economists Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti suggests that zoning restrictions in the nation's 220 top metro areas lowered aggregate U.S. growth by more than 50 percent from 1964 to 2009. The restrictions also have a crucial role in widening inequality. An analysis by Jonathan Rothwell finds that if the most restrictive cities became like the least restrictive, the inequality between different neighborhoods would be cut in half.

Reeves's second structural barrier is the college admissions game. Educated parents live in neighborhoods with the best teachers, they top off their local public school budgets and they benefit from legacy admissions rules, from admissions criteria that reward kids who grow up with lots of enriching travel and from unpaid internships that lead to jobs.

It's no wonder that 70 percent of the students in the nation's 200 most competitive schools come from the top quarter of the income distribution. With their admissions criteria, America's elite colleges sit atop gigantic mountains of privilege, and then with their scholarship policies they salve their consciences by offering teeny step ladders for everybody else.

I was braced by Reeves's book, but after speaking with him a few times about it, I've come to think the structural barriers he emphasizes are less important than the informal social barriers that segregate the lower 80 percent.

Recently I took a friend with only a high school degree to lunch. Insensitively, I led her into a gourmet sandwich shop. Suddenly I saw her face freeze up as she was confronted with sandwiches named "Padrino" and "Pomodoro" and ingredients like soppressata, capicollo and a striata baguette. I quickly asked her if she wanted to go somewhere else and she anxiously nodded yes and we ate Mexican.

American upper-middle-class culture (where the opportunities are) is now laced with cultural signifiers that are completely illegible unless you happen to have grown up in this class. They play on the normal human fear

of humiliation and exclusion. Their chief message is, “You are not welcome here.”

In her thorough book “The Sum of Small Things,” Elizabeth Currid-Halkett argues that the educated class establishes class barriers not through material consumption and wealth display but by establishing practices that can be accessed only by those who possess rarefied information.

To feel at home in opportunity-rich areas, you’ve got to understand the right barre techniques, sport the right baby carrier, have the right podcast, food truck, tea, wine and Pilates tastes, not to mention possess the right attitudes about David Foster Wallace, child-rearing, gender norms and intersectionality.

The educated class has built an ever more intricate net to cradle us in and ease everyone else out. It’s not really the prices that ensure 80 percent of your co-shoppers at Whole Foods are, comfortingly, also college grads; it’s the cultural codes.

Status rules are partly about collusion, about attracting educated people to your circle, tightening the bonds between you and erecting shields against everybody else. We in the educated class have created barriers to mobility that are more devastating for being invisible. The rest of America can’t name them, can’t understand them. They just know they’re there.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/inequality-pierre-bourdieu.html

Getting Radical About Inequality

David Brooks **JULY 18, 2017**

I’m not in the habit of recommending left-wing French intellectuals, but I’m beginning to think that Pierre Bourdieu is helpful reading in the age of Trump. He was born in 1930, the son of a small-town postal worker. By the time he died in 2002, he had become perhaps the world’s most influential sociologist within the academy, and largely unknown outside of it.

His great subject was the struggle for power in society, especially cultural and social power. We all possess, he argued, certain forms of social capital. A person might have academic capital (the right degrees from the right schools), linguistic capital (a facility with words), cultural capital (knowledge of cuisine or music or some such) or symbolic capital (awards or markers of prestige). These are all forms of wealth you bring to the social marketplace.

In addition, and more important, we all possess and live within what Bourdieu called a habitus. A habitus is a body of conscious and tacit knowledge of how to travel through the world, which gives rise to mannerisms, tastes, opinions and conversational style. A habitus is an intuitive feel for the social game. It's the sort of thing you get inculcated with unconsciously, by growing up in a certain sort of family or by sharing a sensibility with a certain group of friends.

For example, in his surveys of French taste, Bourdieu found that manual laborers liked Strauss's "The Blue Danube" but didn't like Bach's "The Well-Tempered Clavier." People who lived in academic communities, on the other hand, liked the latter but not the former.

Your habitus is what enables you to decode cultural artifacts, to feel comfortable in one setting but maybe not in another. Taste overlaps with social position; taste classifies the classifier.

Every day, Bourdieu argued, we take our stores of social capital and our habitus and we compete in the symbolic marketplace. We vie as individuals and as members of our class for prestige, distinction and, above all, the power of consecration — the power to define for society what is right, what is "natural," what is "best."

The symbolic marketplace is like the commercial marketplace; it's a billion small bids for distinction, prestige, attention and superiority.

Every minute or hour, in ways we're not even conscious of, we as individuals and members of our class are competing for dominance and respect. We seek to topple those who have higher standing than we have and we seek to wall off those who are down below. Or, we seek to take one form of capital, say linguistic ability, and convert it into another kind of capital, a good job.

Most groups conceal their naked power grabs under a veil of intellectual or aesthetic purity. Bourdieu used the phrase "symbolic violence" to suggest how

vicious this competition can get, and he didn't even live long enough to get a load of Twitter and other social media.

Different groups and individuals use different social strategies, depending on their position in the field.

People at the top, he observed, tend to adopt a reserved and understated personal style that shows they are far above the "assertive, attention-seeking strategies which expose the pretensions of the young pretenders." People at the bottom of any field, on the other hand, don't have a lot of accomplishment to wave about, but they can use snark and sarcasm to demonstrate the superior sensibilities.

Sometimes, the loser wins: If you're setting up a fancy clothing or food shop you go down and adopt organic and peasant styles in order to establish the superior moral prestige that you can then use to make gobs of money.

Bourdieu helps you understand what Donald Trump is all about. Trump is not much of a policy maven, but he's a genius at the symbolic warfare Bourdieu described. He's a genius at upending the social rules and hierarchies that the establishment classes (of both right and left) have used to maintain dominance.

Bourdieu didn't argue that cultural inequality creates economic inequality, but that it widens and it legitimizes it.

That's true, but as the information economy has become more enveloping, cultural capital and economic capital have become ever more intertwined. Individuals and classes that are good at winning the cultural competitions Bourdieu described tend to dominate the places where economic opportunity is richest; they tend to harmonize with affluent networks and do well financially.

Moreover, Bourdieu reminds us that the drive to create inequality is an endemic social sin. Every hour most of us, unconsciously or not, try to win subtle status points, earn cultural affirmation, develop our tastes, promote our lifestyles and advance our class. All of those microbehaviors open up social distances, which then, by the by, open up geographic and economic gaps.

Bourdieu radicalizes, widens and deepens one's view of inequality. His work suggests that the responses to it are going to have to be more profound, both on a personal level — resisting the competitive, ego-driven aspects of social networking and display — and on a national one.