Who Gets the Job: A Model of Delegated Recruitment with Multidimensional Applicants

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Abstract

In this paper, I construct a theoretical model of delegated recruitment. In the model, applicants are multidimensional, differing in both expected ability and what I term "hiring risk." When the space of contracts is limited to the bonus contract commonly observed in the recruitment industry, the pool of applicants exhibits lower hiring risk then the first-best benchmark, even when recruiters are risk neutral. This implies recruiters pass-over high risk high reward applicants in favor of low risk, low-reward applicants. In a parametric implementation of the model, search efficiency and search intensity increase as the negative correlation between expected ability and hiring risk increases. Although the model is applied to recruiters, it extends well to any situations where search is delegated, the searched item has two dimensions, and there is an initial trial period.

1 Introduction

How people are allocated across firms is a central economic question, key to understanding how individuals escape poverty and governments reduce unemployment. It is also related to a question which captures the attention of every person who needs a paycheck: *how do employers decide who gets the job?* I suggest a novel perspective on this question by taking a step back. Employers only partially decide who gets the job. They delegate the first stage of the process to recruiters and other intermediaries, who build a pool of applicants from which the firm chooses. In this paper, I build a theoretical framework for delegated recruitment and show the typical recruiter contract has profound consequences for the types of applicants which are hired.

My approach is motivated by two primary observations. First, prior to hire, a recruiter or a firm forms beliefs over how well a prospective employee will perform once hired. These beliefs are based, initially, on a paper application, a LinkedIn profile or a resume. In an abstract sense, each possible item on a resume is a noisy signal of ability, and different items vary in their noisiness and in the way they cause a recruiter to update. Thus the whole resume is a package of signals, and variation in what each person has on their resume results in a distribution of possible posterior beliefs. To make this tractable, I assume beliefs can be characterized by a best estimate of the person's ability and an assessment of the uncertainty surrounding this estimate. To put it another way, the belief can be thought of as a forecast and a standard error of the forecast.

To illustrate this framework, consider two applicants applying for a data science position. Applicant A is traditional: they went to a four year college, got a degree in statistics, and interned at a large corporation. Applicant B is nontraditional: they only have a high school degree and are self-taught, but they won a Kaggle competition. Kaggle competitions often feature thousands of competitors, and winning requires a blend of ingenuity and luck. A recruiter might believe Applicant B has a higher expected ability. However, winning a Kaggle competition is a noisy signal, and applicant B is self-taught, so it is hard to say with certainty how B will do in a structured work environment. In comparison, A has a traditional background, and the recruiter has placed this type of candidate before. Thus the uncertainty surrounding A's forecast is lower.

Now for the second observation. There is a common form of recruiter-firm contracts. I interviewed three recruiters, and all reported the typical structure of recruiter pay is a fixed percentage of salary conditional on the employee being hired. They also stated that most recruiters offer some sort of guarantee: if the employee leaves for any reason prior to some agreed upon number of days, the recruiter will either refund the fee or place a new candidate for free. Among the three I interview, two specifically mentioned the period was 90 days. This is consistent with an informal survey conducted by Top Echelon, which found 96% of recruiters offered a guarantee, 86% had a guarantee period between 30 and 90 days. Additionally, 61% provided a replacement but not money back if the candidate failed to stay, while 26% offered a partial or full refund.

In the contracting literature, this payment scheme is called a bonus contract. The recruiters I interviewed also revealed typically commission rates are between 20 and 30 percent, meaning each placement represents a large fraction of a recruiter's total annual income. Since the bonus contract seems to be the norm, the question we ask is whether this contract induces misalignment between the types of applicants (in terms of expected ability and uncertainty) selected by the recruiter and the applicants the firm would ideally like to select.

Returning to Applicants A and B, one can imagine situations where a firm would be willing to take a risk on B. But because the recruiter is the one building the applicant pool, and the contract warps incentives, B may never make it to a hiring manager's desk. This is the sort of situation we are interested in understanding. Clearly, the answer has implications for inequality and accessibility. High quality signals of ability are expensive and limited - the cost of data science boot camps and ivy league school tuition are evidence.

In this paper, I build out a theoretical model of delegated sequential search, where the firm is restricted to bonus contracts. The model exhibits traditional moral hazard in that the firm cannot observe the search effort of the recruiter. It also exhibits moral hazard over the selection regions. The firm cannot observe what types of applicants the recruiter passes over for the job. Because search is over multidimensional objects, it is possible that two very different acceptance regions can require the same level of search effort, meaning the first form of moral hazard does not nest the second.

The model delivers two main theoretical predictions. First, if the firm is required to use only bonus contracts, the recruiter will over-select on applicant uncertainty compared to the first-best benchmark. In a sense, the recruiter will behave in a risk averse fashion and expend too much search effort finding applicants which are safe-bets. Second, efficiency, search intensity, and the size of bonus payments hinge critically on the correlation between applicant expected ability and hiring risk (uncertainty). Higher levels of correlation between the two induces agreement between the recruiter and the firm over which applicants are acceptable.

The implications of these results for human capital formation, income mobility, and inequality are large. To the extent precise signals of ability are costly, the findings in this paper suggest current contracts may be causing recruiters to distribute opportunity unevenly, by being unwilling to take risks on less traditional applicants. Jobs form the main method through which individuals escape poverty and form human capital, so the human costs of this uneven opportunity can add up quickly.

The results are consistent with the empirical observation that recruiters and hiring managers prefer longer resumes, as noted in Blackburn-Brockman and Belanger 2001. They also have interesting implications for proposals like "ban the box" or anonymous resume laws, as these programs generally increase uncertainty in the applicant pool. The model also provides a pathway for why informal references are so valuable: they greatly increase the precision of information presented on a resume, thus reducing the downside risk of a potential applicant.

Although I build the delegated search model with recruiters in mind, the results and the modeling environment can easily be applied to other contexts. For example, real estate agents search for houses for their clients. A real estate agent probably considers both the expected value of a house to a specific client as well as the noisiness of the value, due to different amenities. Once the house is sold, there is usually an escrow period, during which the buyer may call off the sale. Managers of a venture capital firm search for startup companies on behalf of their investors. Some of these firms focus on taking a startup public, which involves preparing for and having an initial public offering. In both of these examples, search is delegated, the object of interest has several dimensions, and there is a waiting period before the searcher gets the payout.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I review other work and explain how this research fits within the broader literature. In the model section I explain the primitives of the model and define the restricted class of contracts. In the analysis section I provide some general results without restricting the distributions of expected ability, and then provide comparative statics assuming an explicit distribution. I conclude with a discussion of the policy implications and possible extensions.

2 Literature

Although our model is driven primarily by observations in the recruiting industry, it draws deeply from two strands of the literature. The first strand is rather recent and niche, and I term it the "delegated search" literature. Ulbricht 2016 derives results for the form of optimal contracts under both moral hazard and adverse selection. The strongest result, and incidentally one very relevant for this paper, is that the sequential search problem is such that, even with risk aversion, the first-best outcome can be achieved with moral hazard. This is in stark contract to the typical moral hazard problem, where effort in undersupplied. Ulbricht further proves that it is only under joint moral hazard and adverse selection where the first-best fails to be achieved. Our model features moral hazard, in the sense that the firm cannot observe the number of search or the features of the passed over applicants. It also features the delegation of a sequential search problem. However, I differ in that I restrain the contract shape to be of a bonus form, and I allow for two dimensions of ex-ante heterogeneity. Incidentally, Ulbricht mentions recruiting agencies as a main application of this theoretical results. Other related work in this literature includes Lewis 2012, which investigates delegated search in a dynamic environment and Foucart 2020, which introduces a market for search intermediaries.

The second strand is the more general delegated choice literature. Papers in this literature are characterized by models where an agent is hired to select among a set of options, and the principle has to decide how much discretion to allow. These models are generally not dealing with sequential search, but they work with the idea of permission sets, which inspired our definition of acceptance regions. Armstrong and Vickers 2010 is motivated by a regulator approving mergers, and it considers optimal permission sets that maximize welfare. One of their extensions involves a situation where the agent may invest effort to discover additional options. This extension is quite similar in spirit to our model, except the contract restrictions I impose are not nested within their utility distributions. The last closely related paper in this strand is Frankel 2014, which is aptly titled "Aligned Delegation." In Frankel's model, there is uncertainty over the preferences of the agent, and the agent has private information relevant to the decision. Frankel's idea of alignment motivates much of the intuition in our paper.

In addition to the two theoretical strands, our model is motivated by the large literature on labor search and matching models. Early search and matching models incorporated homogeneous workers, but eventually models transitioned to include ex-ante heterogeneity along one dimension. Two papers which represent this stage of the literature well are Shimer and Smith 2000 and Postel–Vinay and Robin 2002. They interpret this ex-ante heterogeneity as "productivity" and "professional ability." More recently, the literature has expanded to consider models with multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. One such example is found in Lindenlaub 2017, where workers differ in both manual and cognitive skills. The idea that people who apply to jobs differ in multiple dimensions is a main idea of this paper, and it was in no small part inspired by the search and matching literature. Although our model does not claim to be general equilibrium, I believe it contributes to the search and matching literature by considering more closely the role of delegation in the matching process. A potential extension of our work, which I discuss in the conclusion, is the incorporation of a representative recruiter in a general equilibrium model of job search and matching.

Finally, our theoretical work is connected to a set of empirical papers on labor market intermediation. Although our work is not empirical, it provides a new economic force that may be driving observed changes in economic outcomes. Two papers are especially close to our work. The first is Barrios, Giuliano, and Leone 2020, which examines the impact of a labor market intermediary, the Accounting Rookie Bootcamp, on the labor market outcomes of PhD accountants. They find the intermediary decreased the returns from program rank and adviser network, which they interpret as signs that the ARC program caused employers to substitute away from more "blunt" signals of ability. Interestingly, the program seems to have led to worse results for non-English speakers. In the context of our model, the invention of ARC represents a reduction in the spread of ability uncertainty.

The second is Hoffman, Kahn, and Li 2018. The authors analyze the way hiring managers used job test information in making hiring decisions. After showing the job tests contain useful information about future performance (implying they should optimally be used), it is shown some managers choose to hire against the advice of the test. Hoffman and coauthors interpret this to mean hiring managers do not have superior private information, but are likely driven by biases or mistakes. The model I build in this paper supports the first channel: when intermediaries are delegated the task of hiring or recruitment, the contracting tools available can severely misalign the profit motive of the firm with the incentives of the manager.

3 Model

Players and Actions: There is a single risk neutral firm which desires to fill a single job opening. To fill the opening, it can hire a recruiter to search. The recruiter is risk neutral and operates a sequential search technology for applicants. The game is static.

Applicants and Information: Applicants are fully described by a single attribute, a, which can be interpreted as output produced net of some fixed market wage.[1] a is realized at the end of the game, and the firm exogenously fires the worker if $a < 0$. a is not observed by either the firm or the recruiter prior to hire. Instead, when the recruiter samples an applicant, it views a resume of the applicant, with two characteristics: (μ, σ) which are distributed in the population with joint distribution $G(\mu, \sigma)$. Conditional on observing these two characteristics, the distribution of a for that applicant is $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$.[2] The firm never observes μ, σ, even if the applicant is hired.

Search Technology: The recruiter can take i.i.d. draws of applicants at unit cost c. There is no limit to the number of searches. After drawing an applicant, the recruiter views their attributes (μ, σ) and then may either suggest the applicant for hire or continue search. I assume there is no recall (this is without loss). Search takes place in a single period, so there is no discounting. The search process is fully private, so the firm does not observe any of the draws of the recruiter or the number of searches.

Payoffs and Contracts: The firm is restricted to contracts of the form: $\alpha + \beta \mathbb{I}\{a > 0\}$. That is, a bonus contract where α is the base fee and β is paid if the employee remains. The firm receives the realized net output a less the payments to the recruiter. The firm receives 0 if an applicant is not hired. The recruiter receives $\alpha + \beta \mathbb{I}\{a > 0\}$ less the search costs. If the recruiter does not search, the recruiter receives no bonus but keeps the upfront payment α. I restrict attention to cases where recruitment is profitable in the first-best. That is, $E[a] = E[\mu] \geq c$.

Timing:

- First the firm commits to a contract consisting of (α, β).
- Then the recruiter accepts or rejects the contract. If she rejects, she receives her outside option 0.
- If she accepts, the recruiter sequentially searches for an applicant by taking i.i.d. draws from G.
- The recruiter suggests one applicant to the firm, and the firm hires the applicant.
- Finally, a realizes, the firm receives a, and if $a \leq 0$ the applicant is fired. The contract realizes.

3.1 Comments

The contract form is restricted in the above specific way because this is the contract observed in the recruiting industry. In general, one could consider a more general game where the firing threshold is also endogenous,

[1] Another interpretation is that a is ability relative to some break-even type of worker, where break-even is a worker who produces exactly the market wage.

[2] Another interpretation: the recruiter receives one of many possible noisy signals of ability. Depending on which type of signal they receive, the prior is updated. More noisy signals result in higher variance posteriors.

and part of the strategy of the firm. However, this complicates the model and adds little insight: if the firm realizes a prior to the full realization of the contract, the firm will fire the employee if a less the recruiting fees is not greater than 0.

It is worth understanding a, what I term ability. a is best thought of as the benefit of hiring an employee less the market wage during an *initial employment period.* In my model, a is part of the firm's profit regardless of whether the employee remains. This can be interpreted in the following way. During the initial period, the firm has to bare the cost (or benefit) beyond the market wage, which is exactly a. Once the period ends, if the employee is a net loss during the first period ($a < 0$) the firm either terminates or the employee leaves because the wage the firm offers is less than some outside option. If $a > 0$, the firm keeps the employee, and the wage is adjusted based on the publicly realized information so that wage and ability are equal. In either case, the additional profit is 0.

The assumption of risk neutrality of the recruiter is subject to debate, but it is more realistic when the recruiter is actually a recruitment agency. The assumption of a 0 outside option for the recruiter is equivalent to assuming a perfectly competitive market of recruiters. This appears to be reasonable in non-niche white collar sectors, given the rise of sites like LinkedIn and Indeed. The model abstracts away from wage setting, by embedding wages in a and assuming applicants are not players, and accept any job offer they receive. Although wage bargaining is an interesting phenomenon, it is not the focus of this model.

The two applicant dimensions, μ and σ, can be thought of as quantifying the point estimate of applicant ability and the uncertainty surrounding the estimate. As an example, consider again Applicants A and B from the introduction. Recall Applicant A is traditional, while Applicant B is nontraditional and won a competition. It is possible a recruiter sees these two as having the same expected performance, but the second might be perceived as a greater risk. In this sense, σ represents how much information is present in a resume/application. If I assume that recruiter beliefs match reality, then characteristics that drive up μ can be viewed as true productivity boosters, while things that drive down σ can be thought of as signaling boosters. Many things, like university education, likely do both: they raise μ and reduce σ.

The main economic force I wish to capture with this model is the misalignment of the firm and the recruiter's selection strategy along these two dimensions. Misalignment is driven entirely by the restrictions on the contract form. Notice that if the firm could choose any contract, it could achieve the first-best outcome by simply "selling the firm:" charge the recruiter an upfront fee and then pay the recruiter exactly a. Clearly this will cause perfect alignment between the selection regions: both the firm and the recruiter only care about μ, and the reservation μ will be characterized by the same maximization problem after some substitutions.

4 Non-Parametric Analysis

In this section, I analyze the first-best benchmark and the actual equilibrium without imposing additional assumptions on G. Our main object of interest is the acceptance region:

Definition 1 *(Acceptance Region) An acceptance region, denoted* $\mathcal{D}_\rangle$ *is the set of* (μ, σ) *pairs in the support which entity* i *would select if they operated the search technology.*

This object describes the search strategy of a player, and is similar in spirit to the reservation wage or reservation utility in a uni-dimensional search model. I will also be interested in the following summary statistic.

Definition 2 *(Average Hire Risk) Denote the average hire risk of selection region* i *as* r_i*. Define it as:*

$$r_i := E[\sigma|(\mu, \sigma) \in \mathcal{D}_i]$$

Average hire risk quantifies the level of applicant pool risk chosen by entity i. If $r_i > r_j$ entity i selected applicants with on average higher uncertainty (σ). A main question of this paper is the relationship between recruiter average hire risk and the first-best average hire risk.

4.1 First-Best

For the first-best benchmark, I consider the case when the firm can operate the search technology directly.[3] The firm is risk neutral, so it seeks to maximize expected profit. After searching an applicant, expected a is: $E[a|\mu, \sigma] = \mu$. As a result, the firm cares only about μ and the problem reduces to one-dimensional search.

Lemma 1 *In the first-best benchmark, where the firm operates the search technology directly, the acceptance region is given by:*

$$\mathcal{D}_F = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu \geq \mu^*\}$$

where μ^* *solves:*

$$c = \int_{\mu \geq \mu^*} (1 - F(\mu)) d\mu$$

The proof is provided in the Appendix. This lemma formalizes the idea that the firm does not care about the uncertainty (σ) dimension of an applicant. It is not worried about the downside risk of an employee because this downside risk is perfectly matched with the option value of picking a "diamond in the rough."

[3] Equivalently, when there is no contract restriction.

4.2 Firm-Optimal Contract

I consider the firm-proposing optimal contract, where the firm must delegate search to the recruiter. Since the firm cannot observe search, I require that the acceptance region satisfies an incentive compatibility constraint. Expected utility of the recruiter given a pair of (μ, σ) is:

$$U(\mu, \sigma) = \beta E[\mathbb{I}\{a > 0\} + \alpha = \beta\Phi\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma}\right) + \alpha$$

As a result, the recruiter cares only about maximizing the ratio μ/σ. Comparing this to the first-best, the firm's indifference curves are horizontal lines while the recruiter's curves are sloped lines emanating from the origin. Higher indifference curves have steeper slopes. When μ is positive, the recruiter prefers lower applicant uncertainty. When μ is negative, she prefers higher σ. Intuitively, the recruiter gains or loses nothing from applicant upside or downside, and wants to pick someone with the highest probability of being acceptable $a > 0$ to the firm. This is shown graphically in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Indifference Curves

From examining the shape of these indifference curves we can see the shape of the acceptance regions. If μ has strictly positive support, the recruiter's acceptance region will be a triangle, the area above one of the upward sloping blue lines. The firm's acceptance region will be a rectangle. Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.



Figure 2: Recruiter vs. Firm Acceptance Regions Over Applicant Types

The green region represents applicants which both the firm (in the first-best benchmark) and the recruiter hire. The red region represents applicants which the firm optimally wants to hire, but that are not selected by the recruiter. The blue region represents applicants which the firm would prefer not to hire, but the recruiter selects them. The firm uses β to choose the slope of the diagonal line, trading-off the two regions. We name these regions using the following formal definitions.

Definition 3 *The agreement region is the set of applicants with* $\mu, \sigma \in \mathcal{D}_R \cap \mathcal{D}_F$.

Definition 4 *The excluded efficient region is the set of applicants with* $\mu, \sigma \in \mathcal{D}_F - \mathcal{D}_R$.

Definition 5 *The included inefficient region is the set of applicants with* $\mu, \sigma \in \mathcal{D}_R - \mathcal{D}_F$.

Remark 4.1 *When the support of expected ability is positive, we can see from the graph that the recruiter is over-selecting "safe-bets." These low* μ*, low* σ *applicants are represented by the blue region. We call them "included inefficient" because they are selected but the firm would prefer they were excluded. The recruiter is also under-selecting "high-potential risks." These high* μ*, high* σ *applicants are represented by the red region. We call them "excluded efficient" because the firm would prefer they were included but they are excluded.*

Lemma 2 *Given* β*, define* $M(u)$ *as the CDF of* $u = \beta\Phi\left(\frac{\mu}{\sigma}\right)$*. In any incentive compatible contract, the recruiter's acceptance region is given by:*

$$\mathcal{D}_R = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu/\sigma \geq \Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{u^*}{\beta}\right)\}$$

where u^* *solves:*

$$c = \int_{u \geq u^*} (1 - M(u))du$$

Lemma 2 can be proved in the same way as Lemma 1, with the small additional step of defining the random variable u, which is the expected utility from an applicant given the contract after the initial fee, α, is sunk. Now I consider the full contracting problem of the firm. The firm maximizes:

$$\max_{\alpha,\beta} E[a - \beta \mathbb{I}\{a > 0\} | (\mu, \sigma) \in D_R] - \alpha$$

s.t.

$$\alpha + V(\mathcal{D}_R) \geq 0 \tag{IR}$$

$$c = \int_{u \geq u^*} (1 - M(u))du \tag{IC}$$

$$\mathcal{D}_R = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu/\sigma \geq \Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{u^*}{\beta}\right)\} \tag{REGION}$$

where V is the maximized value from optimal sequential search. The above problem can be simplified and reformulated.

Proposition 1 *Define* $x := \Phi^{-1}(u^*/\beta)$*. The firm-optimal contract can be solved by first solving the unconstrained maximization problem:*

$$\max_x E[a | \mu/\sigma \geq x] - \frac{c}{Pr(\mu/\sigma \geq x)}$$

and then obtaining β, u^* *from:*

$$c = \int_{u \geq u^*} (1 - M(u))du$$

and α *from:*

$$\alpha = -u^*$$

Proposition 1 proves that the problem can be solved by unconstrained, single variable maximization. The objective also makes clear that the firm is maximizing surplus within the constraints imposed by the contract form. The first term in the objective is the value of the employee to the firm, and the second term is the expected search cost to find an acceptable employee. Before imposing distributional assumptions, I present several results that hold for broad conditions on the joint distribution G. Throughout the rest of the paper, I denote G_x as the marginal distribution for variable x. The first result formalizes the idea that even if the two characteristics are independently distributed across the population, the form of the contract still induces the recruiter to under-select risky applicants relative to the first-best benchmark.

Proposition 2 *If μ and σ are independent, $\sigma|\sigma \in \mathcal{D}_F$ first-order stochastically dominates $\sigma|\sigma \in \mathcal{D}_R$.*

Proof. I start with the independent case. $Pr(\sigma \leq y|\sigma \in D_F) = G_\sigma(y)$ by independence. Then:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\sigma \leq y|\sigma \in \mathcal{D}_R) &= \int Pr(\sigma \leq y|\sigma \leq x\mu^*)dG_\mu(\mu) \\ &= \int \mathbb{I}\{x^*\mu \leq y\} + \mathbb{I}\{x^*\mu \geq y\}G_\sigma(y)dG_\mu(\mu) \\ &= G_\mu(y/x^*) + (1 - G_\mu(y/x^*))G_\sigma(y) \end{aligned}$$

This final term shows that the CDF conditional on the recruiter's acceptance region is a weighted average of 1 and $G_\sigma(y)$ which is always weakly greater than $G_\sigma(y)$. This is equivalent to first-order stochastic dominance of $\sigma|\sigma \in D_R$ by $\sigma||\sigma \in D_F$.■

This proposition demonstrates that when there is no connection (dependence) between the two applicant attributes, the contract form induces the recruiter to select less risky (lower σ) applicants. Part of the reason for this is that even if μ, σ are independent, $\sigma, \mu/\sigma$ will often be negatively correlated. To see this, consider the following *example*, which shows that independent attributes can still induce negative affiliation.

Example: $\mu \sim U[0,1], \sigma \sim exp(\lambda)$ where the two variables are independent. Then the joint pdf of $v := \mu/\sigma, \sigma$ is given by $f(v,\sigma) = \mathbb{I}\{v\sigma \leq 1\}\lambda exp(-\lambda\sigma)\sigma$. Two random variables are negatively affiliated if and only if their joint pdf is log submodular. Taking logs of the pdf gives: $log(f(v,\sigma)) = log(\mathbb{I}\{v\sigma \leq 1\}) - \lambda\sigma + log(\sigma)$. This function is clearly submodular: if the indicator is 0 for at least one of two pairs of values, it will also be 0 for the pairwise minimum. This is an example where independent μ, σ still results in negative affiliation, a much stronger condition than negative correlation.

Another interesting case is when there is some form of positive dependence between μ, σ. As the example hints at, it is not enough that μ, σ exhibit positive dependence: it must be that this positive dependence is "strong enough" where $\sigma, \mu/\sigma$ exhibit positive dependence. That is, the positive dependence must, in a sense, dominate the negative dependence between $\sigma, 1/\sigma$. This motivates the next proposition.

Proposition 3 *Suppose μ, σ are positively affiliated and $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ are negatively affiliated. Then the recruiter acceptance region is the full support of μ, σ. Also, the firm's acceptance region first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of precision within the recruiter's acceptance region.* [4]

[4]Note that it is necessary for μ, σ to not be negatively affiliated for the condition to hold.

Proof. If $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ are negatively affiliated this implies $E[\mu|\mu/\sigma \geq x]$ is decreasing in x. This implies the entire objective in Lemma 3 is decreasing in x. Thus optimal x will be set to $infmin\{\mu/\sigma|G(\mu,\sigma) > 0\}$. When the support of μ include 0, $x = 0$. Thus $\mathcal{D}_R$ includes the entire support of (μ, σ). To establish that the distribution of σ in the recruiter's acceptance region is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution in the firm's acceptance region, first note that $\sigma|\sigma \in \mathcal{D}_R$ is equivalent to the unconditional distribution of σ. Next, note that $\sigma|\mu \geq \mu^*$ first-order stochastically dominates the unconditional distribution because μ, σ are positively affiliated.■

Propositions 1 and 2 show two conditions under which the recruiter selects less risky applicants. However, both conditions are rather unnatural. It is unlikely that μ, σ are independent or positively correlated: in general, applicants which appear to be more skilled also present more information or accomplishments in their resumes. Thus in the real world, μ, σ are likely to be negatively associated: more able candidates will tend to have lower uncertainty. Put simply, negative correlation captures the idea that most signals which boost expected ability also reduce uncertainty.

Remark 4.2 *When the two attributes are* ***negatively affiliated****,* $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ *are* ***positively affiliated****. This implies the objective in Lemma 3 has the potential to be increasing over an initial range, leading to a more interesting problem with an interior solution. However, this also implies that both* $\sigma|\sigma \in \mathcal{D}_F$ *and* $\sigma|\sigma \in \mathcal{D}_R$ *will generally first order stochastically dominate the unconditional distribution of* σ*. Whether one dominates the other is unclear, as it will depend on* x^* *that solves the problem in Propositions 1 and* μ^* *which solves the first-best problem in Lemma 1.*

What these propositions and the remark should make clear is that the relationship between $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ greatly impacts the acceptance regions. This idea is why the next section specifies the joint distribution of $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ rather than μ, σ.

5 Parametric Analysis

In order to compare the first and second-best regions, and perform comparative statics, I impose a parametric assumption. For this problem, it is much simpler to specify a joint distribution for $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ rather than μ, σ directly. This avoids needing to apply transformation formulas when deriving results, and it highlights that it is the relationship between $\mu, \mu/\sigma$ that is most important. To simplify exposition, I call μ/σ *standardized ability* and denote it $\tilde{\mu}$. I then assume throughout that the below assumption holds.

Assumption 1 *(DIST) The joint cumulative distribution function of* $(\mu, \tilde{\mu})$ *is given by:*

$$H_{\mu,\tilde{\mu}}(\mu,\tilde{\mu}) = (1 - e^{-\lambda_1 \mu})(1 - e^{-\lambda_2 \tilde{\mu}})[1 + \rho e^{-\lambda_1 \mu - \lambda_2 \tilde{\mu}}]$$

The distribution in Assumption 1 is often referred to as a bivariate Gumbel-exponential distribution. It was first introduced in Gumbel 1960. For my purposes it has several desirable properties. First, it has positive support. Second, positive ρ induces a positive correlation between $\mu, \mu/\sigma$, negative ρ allows for negative correlation and $\rho = 0$ implies independence. Third, the marginal distributions of $(\mu, \mu/\sigma)$ are $exponential(\lambda_1), exponential(\lambda_2)$ respectively. Thus, changing λ_1, λ_2 allows us to easily introduce first-order stochastic shifts in the distributions. Different λ_1 values can be used to represent different industries or companies with different distributions of talent. Lower λ_1 implies a higher expected ability from a randomly drawn applicant. Different λ_2 values can represent situations with different types of applicant uncertainty. Lower λ_2 implies a higher expected standardized applicant ability. Holding the distribution of ability constant, this captures less aggregate applicant uncertainty.

Assumption 1 yields closed-form solutions to both the first-best and equilibrium problems. These are presented in the following proposition and theorem.

Proposition 4 *Under Assumption 1, the first-best acceptance region is given by:*

$$\mathcal{D}_F = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu \geq \mu^*\}$$

where has the closed-form solution:

$$\mu^* := -\frac{log(c\lambda_1)}{\lambda_1}$$

Proof. From Lemma 1, we know the general form of the acceptance region, what remains is to find μ^*. Next, note that under Assumption 1, the marginal distribution of μ is exponential, so the equation characterizing μ^* from Lemma 1 can be re-written as:

$$c = \int_{\mu^*}^{\infty} e^{-\lambda_1 \mu} d\mu = \frac{e^{-\lambda_1 \mu^*}}{\lambda_1}$$

Re-arrangement yields:

$$\mu^* = -\frac{log(c\lambda_1)}{\lambda_1}$$

which is the result. Note that the first-best solution does not depend on ρ.■

The Proposition shows that the size of the acceptance region, first-best profit, and first-best search intensity depend only on search cost (c) and the mean of applicant expected ability. When search costs are higher, the acceptance region increases in probability, indicating search intensity falls. When average expected ability increases the acceptance region rises in probability, even as μ^* rises. In this sense, improvement in applicant quality outpaces the rising standard for hire. I now turn to the equilibrium solution.

Theorem 1 *Under Assumption 1, the firm's problem has a unique solution with the following characteristics.*

1. ***Acceptance Region:***

$$\mathcal{D}_R = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu/\sigma \geq x^*\}$$

2. ***Fixed Payment*** α***:***

$$\alpha = -c \left\{ \frac{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1 - \Phi(x^* + \lambda_2)]}{\Phi(x^*)} \right\}^{-1}$$

3. ***Bonus Payment*** β***:***

$$\beta = c \left\{ e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1 - \Phi(x^* + \lambda_2)] \right\}^{-1}$$

where

$$x^* := \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2\lambda_2} log\left(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right) \ \ if \ \frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c} > 1 \\ 0 \ \ else \end{cases}$$

The Theorem can be proved by using Proposition 1 applied to Assumption 1. The full proof is provided in the Appendix because the steps are mainly algebraic with little economic insight. Recall that x^* is the slope of the lowest indifference curve within the recruiter's acceptance region. As ρ rises, x^* clearly rises, meaning the slope is increasing-expected utility from search after α is sunk is increasing. These closed-form solutions allow for several interesting comparative statics. Before proceeding, I introduce a useful measure of agency loss.

Definition 6 *Agency loss is defined as the difference between firm profit in the first-best benchmark and firm profit in equilibrium.*

Notice that because profit is equal to social surplus, this is simply the difference in social surplus under the two environments. First, I consider how agency loss due to delegation changes with ρ, the correlation between $\mu, \mu/\sigma$.

Theorem 2 *Under Assumption 1, agency loss declines with* ρ*. Additionally, incentives become stronger, in the sense that:*

1. *The equilibrium expected number of searches increases.*

2. *Equilibrium bonus payment β increases.*

Proof. Recall that agency loss is profit in the first-best less profit in equilibrium. ρ does not appear in first-best profit (because ρ impacts the joint distribution but not the marginal distributions), so it is only necessary to understand how equilibrium profit changes with ρ. Equilibrium profit is:

$$\Pi^*(\rho, x^*) = E[\mu|\tilde{\mu} \geq x^*] - \frac{c}{Pr(\tilde{\mu} \geq x^*)}$$

Under Assumption 1, the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix derives the conditional density and conditional expectation. Thus profit can be written explicitly as:

$$\Pi^*(\rho, x^*) = \lambda_1^{-1}(1 + \rho/2 - \rho/2e^{-\lambda_2 x^*}) - ce^{\lambda_2 x^*}$$

Using the Envelope Theorem, we have that:

$$\frac{d\Pi(x^*, \rho)}{d\rho} = \frac{1}{2}(1 - e^{-\lambda_2 x^*}) \geq 0$$

thus equilibrium profit is increasing in ρ implying agency loss is decreasing in ρ. Next recall that the expected number of searches is just $1/Pr(\tilde{\mu} \geq x^*)$. This can be expressed as $\left(\frac{2\lambda_1 c}{\rho\lambda_2}\right)^{-1/2}$ which is clearly increasing in ρ. Finally, from Theorem 1 β is increasing in ρ if x^* is increasing in ρ, which can be seen from inspection. ■

Because the firm extracts all surplus, Theorem 2 has a further implication: search becomes more efficient as ρ increases. Thus the model predicts delegated recruitment is more attractive in occupations where the candidates with the highest expected ability also tend to have the lowest uncertainty. This appears quite realistic: for entry-level positions there tends to be more equality in the level of uncertainty across candidates. Put another way, uncertainty is more independent of expected ability. However, for higher-level positions, better applicants tend to be more "tried and true"; that is uncertainty tends to fall more with expected ability. In this situation the model predicts firms will opt to delegate to recruiters more frequently for higher-level positions.

With this explicit solution we can understand how the sizes of the regions depicted in Figure 2 change with ρ.

Theorem 3 *Under Assumption 1, when ρ increases:*

1. *The **Recruiter Acceptance Region** decreases in probability.*

2. *The* ***Agreement Region*** *increases in probability.*

3. *The* ***Included Inefficient Region*** *decreases in probability.*

4. *The* ***Excluded Efficient Region*** *decreases in probability.*

The proof is provided in the Appendix. When ρ is negative, the conditions for Proposition 2 are met, and the solution is to set x^* to 0, which makes the acceptance region the entire support of (μ, σ). Once ρ is positive, ρ rising results in better alignment between the firm and recruiter, corresponding to an increase in the agreement region. The acceptance region shrinks in probability (the recruiter becomes more selective), which means that the inflow of excluded efficient applicant types is dominated by the outflow of included inefficient types. Efficiency improvements come more from not hiring the wrong people rather than from hiring more of the right people. If we interpret ρ as measuring industry correlation between $\mu, \tilde{\mu}$, the model predicts industries with higher correlation will have more selective recruiters. They will also favor applicants with

6 Discussion

All the analysis in this paper highlights one key insight: the common bonus contract causes recruiters to focus more on finding applicants with low hiring risk rather than applicants with high expected ability, despite the fact that the firm wants the recruiter to focus solely on expected ability. This misaligned search strategy results in distorted applicant pools. Economy-wide, this means that some applicants are receiving less opportunity than is socially optimal.

7 Conclusion

In the course of this paper, I outline a new theoretical framework of delegated recruitment. Importantly, I explore the misalignment that occurs as a result of multidimensional job applicants and a constrained contract space. I characterize the problem in the general case, and provide some results without specifying a distribution. I then impose parametric assumptions in order to compute comparative statics. Under the parametric assumptions, I show how bonus payments respond to changes in search cost, correlation, and applicant characteristic distributions. I also highlight that it is the correlation between expected ability and expected ability divided by uncertainty which controls much of the dynamics. Specifically, when there is a high level of negative correlation between ability and uncertainty, this induces positive correlation between expected ability and expected ability divided by uncertainty. This generates agreement over which types of job applicants are acceptable, which in turn raises search intensity and efficiency.

The subject of intermediaries in the labor market has received little attention in both the theoretical and applied literature, and this paper is an attempt to build a cogent theory that captures the trade-offs of delegation in this environment. Moving up the job ladder is a process that frequently operates through recruiters, and it is key to improving socioeconomic outcomes. As a result, better understanding the incentives current contracts create for recruiters is more than just an academic exercise. This paper makes clear that job training programs must focus on more than just providing skills. They must be designed to minimize the hiring risk surrounding perspective job seekers, otherwise intermediary effects may undercut effectiveness.

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8 Appendix

8.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Denote V as the value function of the firm. The dynamic programming problem of the firm is given by:

$$V = -c + \int \max\{\mu, V\} dF(\mu)$$

Re-arranged, this yields:

$$0 = -c + \int \max\{\mu - V, 0\} dF(\mu)$$

So the optimal strategy is a reservation rule characterized by μ^*. Plugging in $V = \mu^*$:

$$c = \int \max\{\mu - \mu^*, 0\} dF(\mu) \leftrightarrow c = \int_{\mu > \mu^*} \mu - \mu^* dF(\mu)$$

Integration by parts and assuming a bounded μ support gives:

$$c = -[(1 - F(\mu))(\mu - \mu^*)]_{\mu^*}^{\bar{\mu}} + \int_{\mu^*}^{\bar{\mu}} (1 - F(\mu)) d\mu$$

Since the first term is 0, this simplifies to:

$$c = \int_{\mu^*}^{\bar{\mu}} (1 - F(\mu)) d\mu$$

8.2 Proof of Lemma 3

I begin with the maximization problem:

$$\max_{\alpha, \beta} E[a - \beta \mathbb{I}\{a > 0\} | (\mu, \sigma) \in D_R] - \alpha$$

s.t.

$$\alpha + u^* \geq 0 \tag{IR}$$

$$c = \int_{u \geq u^*} (1 - M(u))du \tag{IC}$$

$$\mathcal{D}_R = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu/\sigma \geq \Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{u^*}{\beta}\right)\} \tag{REGION}$$

First prove the IR constraint must bind. Suppose it does not. Then the firm could lower α by ϵ and increase maximized profit without violating any other constraints. This contradicts optimality. Thus IR binds at the optimum. Next note that the value function V evaluated at the optimal acceptance region $\mathcal{D}_R$ is equal to expected value of the contract bonus over the acceptance region less the expected number of searches. That is:

$$V(\mathcal{D}_R) = E[\beta \mathbb{I}\{a > 0\} | (\mu, \sigma) \in D_R] - \frac{c}{Pr((\mu, \sigma) \in D_R)}$$

Substitute this into IR. Re-arrange IR and solve for α. Substituting the result into the objective obtains:

$$\max_{\alpha, \beta} E[a | (\mu, \sigma) \in D_R] - \frac{c}{Pr((\mu, \sigma)}$$

which is the desired form of the objective. Using Lemma 2, the modified problem becomes:

$$\max_{\beta, u^*} E[a | \mu/\sigma \geq \Phi^{-1}(u^*/\beta)] - \frac{c}{Pr(\mu/\sigma \geq \Phi^{-1}(u^*/\beta))}$$

$$c = \int_{u \geq u^*} (1 - M(u))du \tag{IC}$$

$$\mathcal{D}_R = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu/\sigma \geq \Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{u^*}{\beta}\right)\} \tag{REGION}$$

This makes apparent that the objective is no longer constrained by the constraints (since we have an extra degree of freedom), and in fact only depends on $x := \Phi^{-1}(u^*/\beta)$. Thus we can maximize the objective without constraints to derive x, then use the definition of x and the IC constraint to derive β, u^*. Finally, α can be retrieved from the binding IR constraint. Thus the problem reduce in the way stated in the Lemma.■

8.3 Proof of Theorem 1

Given two variables X, Y distributed according to the distribution given in Assumption 1, we can derive the PDF:

$$h(x,y) = \lambda_1\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_1 x - \lambda_2 y}[1 + \rho(2e^{-\lambda_1 x} - 1)(2e^{-\lambda_2 y} - 1)]$$

And then the conditional density:

$$h(x|y) = \lambda_1 e^{-\lambda_1 x}[1 + \rho(2e^{-\lambda_1 x} - 1)(2e^{-\lambda_2 y} - 1)]$$

$$h(x|y) = \lambda_1 e^{-\lambda_1 x} + \lambda_1\rho(2e^{-2\lambda_1 x} - e^{-\lambda_1 x})(2e^{-\lambda_2 y} - 1)]$$

$$h(x|y) = \lambda_1 \left(e^{-\lambda_1 x}(1 + \rho - 2\rho e^{-\lambda_2 y}) - 2\rho e^{-2\lambda_1 x}(1 - 2e^{-\lambda_2 y}) \right)$$

Then integrate this density to get the conditional expectation:

$$E[X|Y] = \lambda_1^{-1}(1 + \rho/2 - \rho e^{-\lambda_2 y})$$

To derive the conditional expectation that is relevant to the objective, apply Law of Iterated Expectations to $E[X|Y]$:

$$E[X|Y > y] = E[E[X|Y]|Y > y] = e^{\lambda_2 y}\int_0^\infty (\lambda_1^{-1}(1 + \rho/2 - \rho e^{-\lambda_2 y})\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 y} dy = \lambda_1^{-1}\left(1 + \rho/2 - \rho/2e^{-\lambda_2 y}\right)$$

Also note that Y has a marginal exponential distribution, thus:

$$Pr(Y > y) = e^{-\lambda_2 y}$$

Applying these results to $(\mu, \mu/\sigma)$ we have that:

$$Pr(\mu/\sigma > x) = e^{-\lambda_2 x}$$

$$E[\mu|\mu/\sigma > x] = \lambda_1^{-1}\left(1 + \rho/2 - \rho/2e^{-\lambda_2 x}\right)$$

From Lemma 3, the problem is characterized in terms of a single choice variable, x. We can now make the problem explicit:

$$\max_x \lambda_1^{-1}\left(1 + \rho/2 - \rho/2e^{-\lambda_2 x}\right) - ce^{\lambda_2 x}$$

The first derivative is:

$$\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1}e^{-\lambda_2 x} - ce^{\lambda_2 x}$$

For $\rho\lambda_2/(2\lambda_1) < 1$ the derivative is negative for all positive x, meaning that the objective is strictly decreasing, and thus the solution is to set $x^* = 0$. Otherwise the function is positive then negative, implying the objective has a global maximum. Taking the derivative again yields:

$$-\frac{\rho\lambda_2^2}{2\lambda_1}e^{-\lambda_2 x} - ce^{\lambda_2 x}$$

For $\rho \geq 0$, this is negative, and the function is concave, thus we can use the first-order condition to derive x^* when $\rho > 0$:

$$x^*(\rho, c, \lambda_1, \lambda_2) = \frac{1}{2\lambda_2}log\left(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right)$$

To derive the other choice variables from x^*, we must first find u^*, reservation utility from search. This can be had from the following two questions:

$$c = \int_{x^*}^{\infty}(\beta\Phi(y) - u^*)\lambda_2 exp(-\lambda_2 y)dy \tag{1}$$

$$\beta\Phi(x^*) = u^* \tag{2}$$

Solving for β from 2 and substituting this into 1, we perform the following manipulatyions:

$$\begin{aligned}
c &= \int_{x^*}^{\infty}(u^*\frac{\Phi(y)}{\Phi(x^*)} - u^*)\lambda_2 exp(-\lambda_2 y)dy \\
&= -u^* e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + \frac{u^*}{\Phi(x^*)}\int_{x^*}^{\infty}\Phi(y)\lambda_2 exp(-\lambda_2 y)dy \\
&= -u^* e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + \frac{u^*}{\Phi(x^*)}\left\{(-\Phi(y)e^{-\lambda_2 y}|_{x^*}^{\infty} + \int_{x^*}^{\infty}\phi(y)e^{-\lambda_2 y}dy\right\} \\
&= -u^* e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + \frac{u^*}{\Phi(x^*)}\left\{\Phi(x^*)e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + \int_{x^*}^{\infty}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{-y^2/2-\lambda_2 y}dy\right\} \\
&= -u^* e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + \frac{u^*}{\Phi(x^*)}\left\{\Phi(x^*)e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + e^{\lambda_2^2/2}\int_{x^*}^{\infty}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}e^{-(y+\lambda_2)^2/2}dy\right\} \\
&= -u^* e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + \frac{u^*}{\Phi(x^*)}\left\{\Phi(x^*)e^{-\lambda_2 x^*} + e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1 - \Phi(x^* + \lambda_2)]\right\}
\end{aligned}$$

$$u^* = c\left\{\frac{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1 - \Phi(x^* + \lambda_2)]}{\Phi(x^*)}\right\}^{-1}$$

The binding IR constraint implies $\alpha = -u^*$ (by the argument presented in the proof of Lemma 3). Thus:

$$\alpha = -c\left\{\frac{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2)]}{\Phi(x^*)}\right\}^{-1}$$

Finally, using equation 2:

$$\beta = c\left\{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2)]\right\}^{-1}$$

8.4 Proof of Corollary 4.2

The results simply require differentiating the expressions in Theorem 1:

$$\frac{\partial\beta}{\partial x^*} = \frac{c}{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}}\frac{\phi(x^*+\lambda_2}{(1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2))^2}$$

$$\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial\rho} = \frac{1}{2\lambda_2\rho}$$

$$\frac{\partial\beta}{\partial\rho} = \frac{\partial\beta}{\partial x^*}\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial\rho} = \frac{ce^{\lambda_2^2/2}}{(1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2))^2}\phi(x^*+\lambda_2)\frac{1}{2\lambda_2\rho}$$

This is clearly positive.

$$\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial c} = \frac{-1}{2\lambda_2 c}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{d\beta(x^*,c)}{dc} &= \frac{\partial\beta(x^*,c)}{\partial c} + \frac{\partial\beta}{\partial x^*}\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial c} \\
&= \{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2)]\}^{-1} - \frac{c}{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}}\frac{\phi(x^*+\lambda_2)}{(1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2))^2}\frac{1}{2\lambda_2 c} \\
&= \{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}[1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2)]\}^{-1}\left(1-\frac{\phi(x^*+\lambda_2)}{2\lambda_2(1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2))}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

The outer term is positive, so this derivative's sign matches the sign of the term in the large parentheses. This inner term is a function of the normal hazard ratio, which is in turn a function of x^*. x^* is decreasing in c, and the normal hazard ratio is an increasing function over positive numbers. As a result, the whole inner term will become positive for high enough c.

$$\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial\lambda_1} = -\frac{1}{2\lambda_2\lambda_1}$$

$$\frac{\partial\beta}{\partial\lambda_1} = \frac{\partial\beta}{\partial x^*}\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial\lambda_1} = -\frac{1}{2\lambda_2\lambda_1}\frac{c}{e^{\lambda_2^2/2}}\frac{\phi(x^*+\lambda_2)}{(1-\Phi(x^*+\lambda_2))^2}$$

This is always negative. ■

8.5 Proof of Theorem 2

Denote $\mu = u, \mu/\sigma = v$. Then:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E[\frac{u}{v}|v \geq x] &= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_x^\infty \frac{1}{v} \int_0^\infty uh(u|v)duh_v(v)dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_x^\infty \frac{1}{v} \int_0^\infty u\lambda_1 e^{-\lambda u}(1+\rho-2\rho e^{-\lambda_2 v}) - v2\lambda_1 e^{-2\lambda_1 u}\rho(1-2e^{-\lambda_2 v})du\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v}dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_x^\infty \frac{1}{v}\left(\frac{1+\rho-2\rho e^{-\lambda_2 v}}{\lambda_1} - \frac{\rho(1-2e^{-\lambda_2 y})}{2\lambda_1}\right)\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v}dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_x^\infty \frac{2+\rho}{2\lambda_1}\frac{1}{v}\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v} - \frac{\rho}{2\lambda_1}\frac{1}{v}2\lambda_2 e^{-2\lambda_2 v}dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x}\left(\frac{(2+\rho)\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1}\int_x^\infty \frac{1}{v}\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v}dv - \frac{\rho\lambda_2}{\lambda_1}\int_x^\infty \frac{1}{v}2\lambda_2 e^{-2\lambda_2 v}dv\right) \qquad \text{(E1)}
\end{aligned}
$$

for $x > 0$ this becomes:

$$
e^{\lambda_2 x}\left(\frac{(2+\lambda_1)\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1}\{-Ei(-\lambda_2 x)\} - \frac{\rho\lambda_2}{\lambda_1}\{-Ei(-2\lambda_2 x)\}\right)
$$

Now we can use this result to understand the average hire risk. First note that:

$$
r_R = E[\frac{u}{v}|v \geq x^*]
$$

$$
r_F = E[\frac{u}{v}] = E[\frac{u}{v}|v \geq 0]
$$

By Theorem 1, we have that $x^* > 0$ whenever $\rho > 0$. When $x = x^* > 0$, expression E1 is finite by known properties of the exponential integral/incomplete Gamma function. Thus r_R is finite and given by E1. This proves the first part of the theorem.

For the second result, note that when $\rho \leq 0$ $x^* = 0$ by Theorem 1, and then the expression in E1 does not converge and tends to infinity. This proves the second part of the result.

For the third part, we compute the below expectation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E[\frac{u}{v}|u \geq x] &= e^{-\lambda_1 x} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{1}{v} \int_x^{\infty} u h(u|v) du h_v(v) dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{1}{v} \int_x^{\infty} u\lambda_1 e^{-\lambda u}(1+\rho-2\rho e^{-\lambda_2 v}) - v2\lambda_1 e^{-2\lambda_1 u}\rho(1-2e^{-\lambda_2 v}) du \lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v} dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{1}{v}\left(\frac{1+\rho-2\rho e^{-\lambda_2 v}}{\lambda_1}(\lambda_1 x+1)e^{-\lambda_1 x} - \frac{\rho(1-2e^{-\lambda_2 v})}{2\lambda_1}(2\lambda_1 x+1)e^{-\lambda_1 x}\right)\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v} dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x} \int_x^{\infty} \frac{(2\lambda_1 x+2+\rho)}{2\lambda_1}\frac{1}{v}\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v} - (3\lambda_1 x+2)\frac{\rho}{2\lambda_1}\frac{1}{v}2\lambda_2 e^{-2\lambda_2 v} dv \\
&= e^{\lambda_2 x}\left(\frac{(2\lambda_1 x+2+\rho)\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1}\int_x^{\infty}\frac{1}{v}\lambda_2 e^{-\lambda_2 v} dv - (3\lambda_1 x+2)\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{\lambda_1}\int_x^{\infty}\frac{1}{v}2\lambda_2 e^{-2\lambda_2 v} dv\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

which again tends to positive infinity when $x = 0$. This proves the final part: for all ρ, r_F is positive infinity. ■

8.6 Proof

Notice that the intersection of the acceptance regions is given by:

$$\mathcal{D}_R \cap \mathcal{D}_F = \{\mu, \sigma | \mu \geq \mu^* \& \mu/\sigma \geq x^*\}$$

The probability of the intersection can be re-written as:

$$Pr(\mu \geq \mu^* \& \mu/\sigma \geq x^*) = 1 - \{Pr(\mu \leq \mu^*) + Pr(\mu/\sigma \leq x^*) - Pr(\mu \leq \mu^* \& \mu/\sigma \leq x^*)\}$$

Note that the second and third terms are the unconditional CDFs, both of which do not change with ρ. The fourth term is exactly the CDF. As a result, it is sufficient to show $H(\mu^*, x^*)$ increases in ρ to show the probability of the intersection increases in ρ.

Evaluating:

$$H(\mu^*, x^*) = (1 - e^{-\lambda_1 \mu^*})(1 - e^{-1/2 log(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c})}(1 + \rho e^{-\lambda_1 \mu^*} e^{-1/2 log(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c})})$$

which simplifies to:

$$H(\mu^*, x^*) = (1 - e^{-\lambda_1 \mu^*})\left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right)^{-1/2}\right)\left[1 + \rho^{1/2} e^{-\lambda_1 \mu^*}\left(\frac{\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right)^{-1/2}\right]$$

This function is clearly increasing in ρ, since μ^* does not contain ρ. As a result, the probability of intersection (a measure of alignment) increases with ρ. Finally, we can compute the measure of applicant types which are in the first-best acceptance region but not the recruiter's. That is:

$$Pr(\mu \geq \mu^* \& \mu/\sigma \leq x^*) = Pr(\mu/\sigma \leq x^*) - H(\mu^*, x^*)$$

The second probability we simplified above. The first probability is just the unconditional CDF.

$$H_{\mu/\sigma}(x^*) = 1 - \left(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right)^{-1/2}$$

Using this the original probability becomes:

$$Pr(\mu \geq \mu^* \& \mu/\sigma \leq x^*) = \left(1 - \left(\frac{\rho\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right)^{-1/2}\right)\left\{1 - (1 - e^{-\lambda_1\mu^*})\left[1 + \rho^{1/2} e^{-\lambda_1\mu^*}\left(\frac{\lambda_2}{2\lambda_1 c}\right)^{-1/2}\right]\right\}$$

The measure of applicants which are not in the first-best but are in the recruiter's region are given by:

$$Pr(\mu \leq \mu^* \& \mu/\sigma \geq x^*) = Pr(\mu \leq \mu^*) - H(\mu^*, x^*)$$

The first term does not change with ρ, and we showed earlier the second-term (the CDF evaluated at x^*, μ^*) rises in ρ, so the entire expression falls in ρ.