

# Lecture 10: Multitasking

Compensation in Organizations

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## Examples of Gaming

Paper	Setting	Gaming Described	$\Delta$ Worker+Firm Surplus?
Roy (1952)	US steelworkers	deliberate slacking	ambiguous
Oyer (1998)	US manufacturing	higher end of year sales	price decreases (weak -)
Larkin (2014)	software salespeople	higher last day sales	price decreases (weak -)
Courty and Marschke (2004)	federal bureaucrats	graduation date of trained workers	earnings reductions (-)
Alexander (2020)	doctors in New Jersey	sorting patients	ambiguous

Discussion: Dinerstein and Opper (2025) (Still working  
paper)

## Gaming vs. Multitasking

- ▶ I view gaming as manipulating the rules, typically via timing, to improve payouts.
  - ▶ Example: Closing a deal early to increase commission.
  - ▶ Example: Grading more leniently on a standardized test that is used for benchmarking.
  - ▶ Example: Working very hard for the first 4 hours of a shift and relaxing for the remaining 4.
- ▶ Multitasking involves choosing how much effort to spend on different tasks.
  - ▶ Example: Seeing more patients for less time vs. fewer patients for more time.
  - ▶ Example: Teaching more tested material at the expense of untested material.
  - ▶ Example: Producing more oil now rather than shutting down for maintenance.
- ▶ There are many situations that are both gaming and multitasking.
  - ▶ Example: Spending time opening fake bank accounts opposed to real accounts at Wells Fargo.

## Examples of Multitasking

Paper	Setting	Performance Pay Change	Multitasking Impact?
Dumont et. al. (2008)	doctors in Quebec	less	↑ teaching and time per service, ↓ volume
Tayan (Pop. Press 2019)	Wells Fargo bankers	more?	↑ fake accounts
Alexander (2020)	doctors in New Jersey	more	no impact
Gong et. al (2021)	doctors in China	more	↑ intensity, ↓ inpatient stays
Dinerstein and Opper (2023)	teachers in NYC	more	↑ tests scores, ↓ grades & attendance

# Dumont et. al. (2008)

**Table 6**

Impact of mixed compensation on practice variables, pediatrics and general surgery

PEDIATRICS (Control group: pediatricians paid only under the FFS scheme after reform)										
	Fixed effects OLS				Pooled Tobit					
	Volume / year	Income / year	Hours / week	Clinical hours/ week			Non-Clinical hours/ week			Research hours/ week
Treatment effect	-12.99***	15.83***	-1.87*	-2.88**	0.34	-3.46*	3.92***	3.27*	0.48	-9.56**
St. Error	3.72	6.62	1.12	1.14	1.33	1.83	1.40	1.85	1.19	4.03
Effect of the reform	-12.99***	15.83***	-1.87*	-2.88**	0.49	-2.92**	1.56*	0.48	0.61	-2.01*
St. Error	3.72	6.62	1.12	1.14	1.20	1.48	0.80	0.68	0.56	1.06
% effect of the reform	-12.81	8.69	-3.75	-6.55	2.20	-15.88	27.89	25.14	13.88	-38.20
Log likelihood	-	-	-	-	-3 423	-3 757	-2 678	-2 078	-1 653	-1 147
Hausman test <sup>a</sup>	53.86	37.68	41.10	44.97	-	-	-	-	-	-
Test of parallel trend <sup>b</sup>	0.92	0.48	0.28	1.22	2.27	7.60	9.03	2.55	7.99	9.05
GENERAL SURGERY (Control group: general surgeons paid only under the FFS scheme after reform)										
Treatment effect	-15.32***	18.37***	-2.70	-1.83	0.04	-4.68**	0.62	0.27	0.53	-1.36
St. Error	3.81	4.28	2.48	2.37	2.54	2.00	1.27	1.64	1.04	1.59
Effect of the reform	-15.32***	18.38***	-2.70	-1.83	0.06	-1.02	0.07	-0.83	0.38	-1.07
St. Error	3.81	4.38	2.48	2.37	2.52	0.83	0.95	0.75	0.66	0.77
% effect of the reform	-10.72	8.14	-4.81	-3.77	0.14	-31.47	0.81	-23.05	8.37	-21.53
Log likelihood	-	-	-	-	-4 509	-3 014	-3 093	-2 459	-1 916	-1 235
Hausman test <sup>a</sup>	39.41	8.07	169.10	26.50	-	-	-	-	-	-
Test of parallel trend <sup>b</sup>	1.46	0.98	1.13	0.71	4.81	0.96	1.19	2.08	2.49	2.08

Significance levels: \*10%; \*\*5%; \*\*\*1%.

# Discussion: Tayan (2019)

(Note: popular press article not peer reviewed research)

## The One Task Assumption

- ▶ So far we have assumed that there is a single, productive task.
- ▶ This captures many jobs and environments well.
- ▶ The trade-off is between exerting effort and not exerting effort.
- ▶ But some jobs have more than one type of productive effort.
  - ▶ Question: Can you give examples?
- ▶ Some jobs have destructive tasks!
  - ▶ Question: Can you give examples?

## The Multitasking Model: Dropping Uncertainty

- ▶ We want to capture a new force (multiple tasks)
- ▶ To keep things simple, we drop noise/luck/uncertainty ( $\epsilon$ )
- ▶ We no longer need to think about certainty equivalents, variances, etc.
- ▶ We also will assume an outside option of 0 for the worker.

## The Multitasking Model: Adding Multiple Tasks

- ▶ The worker will have two tasks, numbered 1 and 2.
- ▶ The cost of exerting effort  $e_1$  at task 1 and  $e_2$  will be  $c(e_1, e_2)$
- ▶ We will assume this function is increasing in each argument, but not much else.
- ▶ Output is given by  $y = ae_1 + be_2$ , where  $a, b$  can be positive or negative.
- ▶ We can only pay based on some measurement of effort:  $m(e_1, e_2)$

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Crowding Out

Teaching to the Test?

## Model

- ▶ Output is  $y = ae_1 + be_2, a > 0, b > 0$

- ▶ Cost of effort is:

$$c(e_1, e_2) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } e_1 + e_2 \leq 2\bar{e} \\ (e_1 + e_2 - 2\bar{e})^2/2 & \text{if } e_1 + e_2 \geq 2\bar{e} \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Only task 1 effort is measured:  $m = e_1$
- ▶ Only what is measured is rewarded:  $w(m) = \alpha + \beta m = \alpha + \beta e_1$
- ▶ Assume that without incentives (if  $\beta = 0$ ) the worker supplies all “free effort” (total effort up to  $2\bar{e}$ ) and splits total effort evenly across the two tasks:

$$e_1 = e_2 = \bar{e}$$

## First-Best Solution

See the board!

## Equilibrium Solution (What Actually Happens)

See the board!

# Equilibrium Solution (What Actually Happens)

## Theorem 1

*The firm uses high-powered incentives ( $\beta^* = a$ ) and the worker focuses entirely on task 1 ( $e_1^* = a + 2\bar{e}$ ,  $e_2^* = 0$ ) if:*

$$a \geq 2\bar{e} \frac{b - a}{a}$$

*Otherwise the firm uses a flat salary ( $\beta^* = 0$ ) and total effort is low and evenly split ( $e_1^* = e_2^* = \bar{e}$ )*

## Deepwater Horizon

- ▶ Cost reductions were rewarded ( $e_1$ ).
- ▶ But improving “safety” or “latent risk” was not.
- ▶ Part of this is not nefarious: cost reductions are easy to measure.
- ▶ Avoided disasters are impossible to measure!
- ▶ In some instances incentives are worse than no incentives!

## Counterterrorism at the FBI

- ▶ The FBI was created to fight traditional crime, like murders.
- ▶ Traditional crime is easy to measure:
  - ▶ How many suspects did you bring in?
  - ▶ How much evidence did you collect?
  - ▶ Was there a conviction?

## Counterterrorism at the FBI

- ▶ During the 1990s, the FBI tried to also handle domestic terrorism.
- ▶ But how do you measure this?
- ▶ Terrorism is rare.
- ▶ Successful counterterrorism prevents things from happening.

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Recall: Dinerstein and Opper (2025) (Still working paper)

Discussion: Lavy (2009)